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BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

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00108713

ARMY (INDIA).

RETURN to so much of an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 26 May 1846;—*as calls for*,

ABSTRACT RETURNS "of the Strength of the European and Native Corps of the Regular INDIAN ARMIES, on the 1st day of May 1837 and on the 1st day of May 1845, at each of the Three Presidencies, *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*."

A "RETURN of the Number of European Officers of the INDIAN ARMIES, Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers, at each of the Three Presidencies, absent from Regimental Duty, on 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st day of May 1845."

"ABSTRACT RETURNS of the Augmentations of Corps, and the Number of Officers and Men added to the several Branches of the INDIAN ARMIES, Regular and Irregular, at each of the Three Presidencies."

"ABSTRACT RETURN of the Total Strength of HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS, Cavalry and Infantry, in each of the Three Presidencies of *India*, on the 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st day of May 1845."

[*N.B.—The present Return completes the Series of Papers called for by the above-mentioned Order of the Honourable House.*]

East India House,
21 Jun. 1847.

JAMES C. MELVILL.

(*Mr. Hume.*)

*Ordered*, by The House of Commons, to be *Printed*,
17 *February* 1847.

Parliamentary Papers

Under 2 oz

RETURN of the Strength of the European and Native Corps of the Regular Indian Armies, on the 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st May 1845 at each of the Three Presidencies, *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*; stating the Number of separate Corps of Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers; the Number of European Officers of each Rank, and the Total Number of all Ranks borne on the Muster Rolls of each Corps on those Two Days; also of the several Irregular Corps of Cavalry and Infantry at each of the Three Presidencies on the 1st May 1837 and the 1st May 1845, stating the Strength of Officers and Privates, and distinguishing the number of European Officers and their Rank serving with each such Corps; stating also whether the Corps were employed in permanent or temporary Service, and the Date of their being first Enrolled.

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1837.

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BENGAL:** | | | | | | | | |
| Regular Cavalry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | — | — | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 494 |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 5 | 4 | 2 | 497 |
| 3d — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 487 |
| 4th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 496 |
| 5th — | — | — | — | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 496 |
| 6th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 495 |
| 7th — | — | — | — | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 496 |
| 8th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 493 |
| 9th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 496 |
| 10th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 496 |
| | — | 5 | 3 | 27 | 48 | 33 | 20 | 4,948 |
| City Guard: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | 118 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | — | 2 | 3 | 13 | 24 | 18 | 26 | 1,990 |
| Artillery | — | 9 | 8 | 49 | 70 | 32 | 3,338 | 4,339 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | — | 1 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 778 | — |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | 1 | — | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 753 |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 749 |
| 3d — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 739 |
| 4th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 752 |
| 5th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 752 |
| 6th — | — | — | — | 4 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 699 |
| 7th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 744 |
| 8th — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 9th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 740 |
| 10th — | — | — | — | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 724 |
| 11th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 750 |
| 12th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 13th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 748 |
| 14th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 15th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 16th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 728 |
| 17th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 750 |
| 18th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 752 |
| 19th — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 742 |
| 20th — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 748 |
| 21st — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 749 |
| 22d — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 23d — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 750 |
| 24th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 718 |
| 25th — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 714 |
| 26th — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 750 |
| 27th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 752 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1837—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 28th Regiment | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 749 |
| 29th — | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 30th — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 749 |
| 31st — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 750 |
| 32d — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 744 |
| 33d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 749 |
| 34th — | – | – | – | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 742 |
| 35th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 751 |
| 36th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 37th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 743 |
| 38th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 750 |
| 39th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 750 |
| 40th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 751 |
| 41st — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 42d — | – | – | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 736 |
| 43d — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 739 |
| 44th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 742 |
| 45th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 745 |
| 46th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 748 |
| 47th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 750 |
| 48th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 49th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 750 |
| 50th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 751 |
| 51st — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 6 | [illegible] | 2 | 736 |
| 52d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 719 |
| 53d — | – | – | – | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 75[illegible] |
| 54th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 71[illegible] |
| 55th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 7[illegible] |
| 56th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 75[illegible] |
| 57th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 749 |
| 58th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 752 |
| 59th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 60th — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 743 |
| 61st — | – | – | – | 5 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 62d — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 751 |
| 63d — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 750 |
| 64th — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 751 |
| 65th — | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 749 |
| 66th — | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 746 |
| 67th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 745 |
| 68th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 745 |
| 69th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 748 |
| 70th — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 748 |
| 71st — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 72d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 752 |
| 73d — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 751 |
| 74th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 749 |
| | – | 46 | 41 | 195 | 388 | 233 | 147 | 54,988 |
| Irregular Cavalry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 303 |
| 2d — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 643 |
| 3d — | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | – | 952 |
| 4th — | – | – | 1 | – | 2 | – | – | 644 |
| 5th — | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | 825 |
| | – | – | 3 | 2 | 8 | 1 | – | 3,447 |
| Local Corps (Infantry): | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Calcutta Native Militia | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | 1 | [illegible] |
| 2d. Ramgurh Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1,174 |
| 3d. Hill Rangers | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | – | 2 | [illegible] |
| 4th. Nusserec Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | [illegible] |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1837 —*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Local Corps (Infantry)—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 6th, Sirmoor Battalion | – | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 734 |
| 7th, Kemaoon Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 747 |
| 8th, Assam Light Infantry | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | – | 2 | 954 |
| 9th, Mairwarrah Local Battalion | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | 762 |
| 11th, Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | – | 2 | 959 |
| Arracan Local Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 465 |
| Hurrianah Light Infantry | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 698 |
| Assam Sebundy Corps | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | 746 |
| Bheel Corps | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | 412 |
| Nerbudda Sebundy Corps | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | 1,756 |
| Resident's Escort (Cummandoo) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 96 |
| | – | 1 | 2 | 14 | 26 | 3 | 19 | 11,730 |
| MADRAS: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 472 |
| 2d — | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 473 |
| 3d — | – | – | – | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 474 |
| 4th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 477 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 471 |
| 6th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 474 |
| 7th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 472 |
| 8th — | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 473 |
| | – | 2 | 4 | 21 | 43 | 29 | 24 | 3,786 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 1 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 26 | 26 | 956 |
| Artillery | – | 5 | 5 | 27 | 39 | 31 | 1,878 | 1,656 |
| 1st European Regiment | – | 2 | – | 8 | 10 | 6 | 753 | — |
| Carnatic European Veteran Battalion | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | – | 261 | — |
| | – | 3 | 1 | 11 | 12 | 6 | 1,014 | — |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | 1 | – | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 732 |
| 2d — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 714 |
| 3d — | – | – | 1 | – | 5 | 4 | 2 | 672 |
| 4th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 725 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 738 |
| 6th — | – | – | – | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 664 |
| 7th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 736 |
| 8th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 694 |
| 9th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 734 |
| 10th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 714 |
| 11th — | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 737 |
| 12th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 737 |
| 13th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 720 |
| 14th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 731 |
| 15th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 754 |
| 16th — | – | – | 1 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 709 |
| 17th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 686 |
| 18th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 726 |
| 19th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 727 |
| 20th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 726 |
| 21st — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 721 |
| 22d — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 733 |
| 23d — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 732 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1837—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MADRAS—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 24th Regiment | – | – | 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 734 |
| 25th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 704 |
| 26th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 747 |
| 27th — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 704 |
| 28th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 730 |
| 29th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 700 |
| 30th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 737 |
| 31st — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 749 |
| 32d — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 700 |
| 33d — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 747 |
| 34th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 732 |
| 35th — | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 725 |
| 36th — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 716 |
| 37th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 731 |
| 38th — | – | 1 | – | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 749 |
| 39th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 710 |
| 40th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 735 |
| 41st — | – | – | 1 | – | 5 | 2 | 2 | 752 |
| 42d — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 735 |
| 43d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 725 |
| 44th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 695 |
| 45th — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 690 |
| 46th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 756 |
| 47th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 696 |
| 48th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 747 |
| 49th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 685 |
| 50th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 698 |
| 51st — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 708 |
| 52d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 730 |
| Native Veteran Battalions: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st — | – | – | 1 | 9 | 4 | – | 2 | 1,043 |
| 2d — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | – | 2 | 743 |
| | – | 25 | 37 | 149 | 299 | 137 | 108 | 30,918 |
| BOMBAY. | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry (Light): | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | 3 | 5 | – | – | 495 |
| 2d — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | – | 479 |
| 3d — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 6 | 1 | – | 489 |
| | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 19 | 3 | – | 1,463 |
| Artillery | – | 2 | 4 | 18 | 29 | 15 | 1,268 | 691 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 15 | 14 | 29 | 471 |
| European Regiment | – | – | 2 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 692 | — |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 728 |
| 2d — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | – | – | 687 |
| 3d — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | – | – | 700 |
| 4th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 744 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 749 |
| 6th — | – | – | 1 | – | 6 | 1 | – | 739 |
| 7th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 737 |
| 8th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 705 |
| 9th — | – | – | – | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 772 |
| 10th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 728 |
| 11th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 699 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1837—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOMBAY—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 12th Regiment | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | – | 741 |
| 13th — | – | – | – | 3 | 6 | – | 2 | 747 |
| 14th — | – | – | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 | – | 753 |
| 15th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | – | 727 |
| 16th — | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 1 | – | 701 |
| 17th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | – | 739 |
| 18th — | – | 1 | – | – | 5 | 2 | 1 | 713 |
| 19th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 686 |
| 20th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | – | 746 |
| 21st — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 740 |
| 22d — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 4 | 1 | – | 728 |
| 23d — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 703 |
| 24th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | – | 753 |
| 25th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | – | 754 |
| 26th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | – | 753 |
| | – | 5 | 18 | 59 | 121 | 46 | 20 | 18,889 |
| Poona Irregular Horse | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 843 |
| Guzerat Provincial Battaliog | – | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | – | 524 |
| Candeish Bheel Corps | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 1,093 |
| Marine Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 712 |
| Native Veteran Battalion | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 1,019 |
| | – | – | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | – | 3,341 |

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL. | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry (Regular): | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 495 |
| 3d — | – | – | – | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 470 |
| 4th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 499 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | – | 4 | 3 | 3 | 499 |
| 6th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 500 |
| 7th — | – | – | – | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 381 |
| 8th — | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 500 |
| 9th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 463 |
| 10th — | – | 1 | – | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 486 |
| 11th — | – | 1 | 1 | – | 4 | 4 | 3 | 489 |
| | – | 6 | 6 | 20 | 44 | 30 | 30 | 4,782 |
| Governor-General's Body Guard | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | – | 2 | 433 |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,159 |
| 2d — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1,167 |
| 3d — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,172 |
| 4th — | – | – | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 757 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1,166 |
| 6th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,151 |
| 7th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,138 |
| 8th — | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1,155 |
| 9th — | – | – | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1,052 |
| 10th — | – | 1 | – | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,168 |
| 11th — | – | – | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,166 |
| 12th — | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1,164 |
| 13th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,142 |
| 14th — | – | 1 | – | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1,166 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 15th Regiment | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1,079 |
| 16th — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,142 |
| 17th — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1,143 |
| 18th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1,069 |
| 19th — | — | — | — | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1,159 |
| 20th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,156 |
| 21st — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,015 |
| 22d — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 1,176 |
| 23d — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,161 |
| 24th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,160 |
| 25th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1,181 |
| 26th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1,144 |
| 27th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1,172 |
| 28th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,151 |
| 29th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,132 |
| 30th — | — | 1 | — | 5 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 1,166 |
| 31st — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,084 |
| 32d — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,147 |
| 33d — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,108 |
| 34th — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 35th — | — | 1 | — | — | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,139 |
| 36th — | — | — | — | 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,134 |
| 37th — | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,205 |
| 38th — | — | — | — | 1 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,193 |
| 39th — | — | — | — | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,155 |
| 40th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,177 |
| 41st — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,130 |
| 42d — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1,108 |
| 43d — | — | — | — | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1,140 |
| 44th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1,136 |
| 45th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,134 |
| 46th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1,115 |
| 47th — | — | — | — | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,100 |
| 48th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1,102 |
| 49th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,118 |
| 50th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,182 |
| 51st — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,129 |
| 52d — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,110 |
| 53d — | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1,157 |
| 54th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,186 |
| 55th — | — | — | — | 3 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 1,113 |
| 56th — | — | — | — | 5 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,157 |
| 57th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1,161 |
| 58th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 1,169 |
| 59th — | — | 1 | — | 5 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,149 |
| 60th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,137 |
| 61st — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,148 |
| 62d — | — | 1 | — | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1,133 |
| 63d — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,161 |
| 64th — | — | 1 | — | 5 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 774 |
| 65th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1,150 |
| 66th — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,130 |
| 67th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,178 |
| 68th — | — | — | — | 5 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,144 |
| 69th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 823 |
| 70th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,154 |
| 71st — | — | — | — | 1 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,111 |
| 72d — | — | — | — | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,134 |
| 73d — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 1,148 |
| 74th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 1,167 |
| | — | 38 | 36 | 180 | 470 | 198 | 140 | 82,411 |
| Regiment Khelat-i-Ghilzie | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 790 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845 —*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry (Irregular): | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 1,004 |
| 2d — | – | – | – | 2 | 3 | – | – | 805 |
| 3d — | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | – | 804 |
| 4th — | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 805 |
| 5th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 805 |
| 6th — | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | – | 329 |
| 7th — | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | – | 755 |
| 8th — | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 755 |
| 9th — | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | 382 |
| | – | – | 3 | 14 | 11 | – | – | 6,944 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 4 | 5 | 18 | 39 | 10 | 35 | 1,368 |
| Artillery | – | 8 | 9 | 39 | 82 | 46 | 3,179 | 4,833 |
| European Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 849 | — |
| 2d — | – | 1 | – | 7 | 13 | 9 | 908 | — |
| | – | 2 | 1 | 11 | 29 | 17 | 1,757 | — |
| Irregular Corps: | | | | | | | | |
| Local Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st. Calcutta Native Militia | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | 1,127 |
| 2d. Ramgurgh Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1,359 |
| 3d. Hill Rangers | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | 2 | 464 |
| 4th. Nusseeree Battalion | – | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 1,113 |
| 6th. Sirmoor Battalion | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | 1,043 |
| 7th. Kemaon Battalion | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | 1,103 |
| 8th. 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | 2 | 1,130 |
| 2d Ditto - ditto | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | – | 2 | 1,149 |
| 9th. Mhairwarrah Battalion | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 760 |
| 11th. Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | 3 | 939 |
| Arracan Battalion | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | – | 2 | 926 |
| Hurreanah Light Infantry Battalion | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 2 | 1,015 |
| 1st Regiment Oude Local Infantry | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | 942 |
| 2d Ditto - - ditto | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | 942 |
| Sebundy Sappers and Miners | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | 907 |
| Malwah Bheel Corps | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | 641 |
| Meywar - ditto | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | 2 | 1,026 |
| Resident's Escort (Katmandhoo) | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | 96 |
| | – | 1 | 5 | 26 | 23 | 1 | 33 | 15,081 |
| Bundlecund Legion: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 640 |
| 1st Battalion Light Infantry | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 2 | 1,087 |
| Artillery Company attached | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | 80 |
| 2d Battalion Light Infantry | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 2 | 1,132 |
| | – | – | – | 7 | 3 | – | 5 | 2,939 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Military Police Battalions: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Battalion Saugor and Nerbudda Military Police | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 2 | 1,493 |
| 2d - - ditto - - ditto | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1,560 |
| 1st Battalion Bundlecund Military Police<br>2d - - ditto - - ditto | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 8 | 3,240 |
| Umballa Military Police Battalion | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | 2 | 1,144 |
| Bareilly | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | 2 | 1,121 |
| Meerut | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 2 | 1,121 |
| Delhi | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | 2 | 1,118 |
| Nimar Police Corps | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 347 |
| | — | — | 2 | 5 | 2 | — | 19 | 11,144 |
| MADRAS: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 486 |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 494 |
| 3d — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 488 |
| 4th — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 486 |
| 5th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 497 |
| 6th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 498 |
| 7th — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 469 |
| 8th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 471 |
| | — | 5 | 6 | 17 | 41 | 26 | 24 | 3,889 |
| Artillery | — | 4 | 5 | 27 | 48 | 20 | 1,727 | 1,818 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | — | 2 | 2 | 8 | 20 | 15 | 40 | 703 |
| European Regiments: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st | — | — | 2 | 3 | 15 | 9 | 872 | — |
| 2d | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 7 | 914 | |
| | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 16 | 1,786 | — |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | 1 | — | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,015 |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 838 |
| 3d — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 1,008 |
| 4th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 980 |
| 5th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 970 |
| 6th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 984 |
| 7th — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 1,0[illegible]3 |
| 8th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,021 |
| 9th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 982 |
| 10th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 1,042 |
| 11th — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,041 |
| 12th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1,005 |
| 13th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 1,0[illegible]3 |
| 14th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,013 |
| 15th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1044 |
| 16th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 1,021 |
| 17th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,016 |
| 18th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1041 |
| 19th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1,044 |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Nat Commiss Non Commiss and Rank an |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MADRAS—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| 20th Regiment | — | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 21st — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 22d — | — | — | — | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 23d — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 24th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
| 25th — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| 26th — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 27th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 28th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 29th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 30th — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 31st — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
| 32d — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 33d — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 34th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 35th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 36th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 97 |
| 37th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
| 38th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
| 39th — | — | 1 | — | — | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 40th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 41st — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 9 |
| 42d — | — | 1 | — | 4 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 43d — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
| 44th — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 45th — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 46th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 47th — | — | 1 | — | 5 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 99 |
| 48th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 49th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 50th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| 51st — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| 52d — | — | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1,0 |
| Native Veterans: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Battalion | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 10 | — | 2 | 1,54 |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 4 | 11 | 7 | — | 2 | 1,32 |
| | — | 29 | 38 | 163 | 418 | 177 | 108 | 55,37 |
| BOMBAY: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | 1 | — | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 48 |
| 2d — | — | — | 1 | — | 6 | 4 | 2 | 49 |
| 3d — | — | — | — | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 44 |
| | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 12 | 6 | 1,43 |
| Artillery | — | 4 | 3 | 12 | 33 | 21 | 660 | 88 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | — | 1 | 1 | — | 11 | 9 | 25 | 37 |
| European Regiments: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | — | 1 | — | 7 | 10 | 760 | — |
| 2d — | — | 1 | 1 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 739 | — |
| | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 18 | 20 | 1,499 | — |

BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY, 1845—*continued.*

| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOMBAY—*continued.* | | | | | | | | |
| Native Infantry: | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Regiment | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,051 |
| 2d — | — | — | 1 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 1,075 |
| 3d — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1,125 |
| 4th — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1,122 |
| 5th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1,147 |
| 6th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1,049 |
| 7th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1,139 |
| 8th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 1,147 |
| 9th — | — | — | — | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,153 |
| 10th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 1,135 |
| 11th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1,130 |
| 12th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 5 | 4 | — | 99[illegible] |
| 13th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 1,152 |
| 14th — | — | 1 | — | — | 9 | 5 | 1 | 1,154 |
| 15th — | — | — | — | 1 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1,087 |
| 16th — | — | — | — | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1,021 |
| 17th — | — | — | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5 | | 1,1[illegible]3 |
| 18th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | — | 1,161 |
| 19th — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1,13[illegible] |
| 20th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1,0[illegible]0 |
| 21st — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1,120 |
| 22d — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | — | 1,146 |
| 23d — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1,139 |
| 24th — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1,114 |
| 25th — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | — | 1,07[illegible] |
| 26th — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 7 | 5 | — | 1,13[illegible] |
| | — | 8 | 15 | 47 | 157 | 120 | 26 | 28,991 |
| Marine Battalion | — | — | — | 1 | 3 | — | — | 1,146 |
| Candeish Bheel Corps | — | — | — | 2 | 1 | — | — | 1,093 |
| Sawunt Warree Local Corps | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | 534 |
| Native Veteran Battalion | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | 1,147 |
| Guzerat Provincial Battalion | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | 1,038 |
| | — | — | 2 | 5 | 6 | — | — | 4,958 |
| Poona Auxiliary Horse | — | — | — | 2 | — | — | — | 942 |
| Guzerat Irregular Horse | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | | 752 |
| Scinde Irregular Horse | — | — | — | 1 | 2 | — | — | 779 |
| | — | — | — | 4 | 3 | — | — | 2,473 |
| Scinde Camel Corps | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 6 | 1,9[illegible] |

## RECAPITULATION.

| | 1837. | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
| BENGAL: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry | – | 5 | 3 | 27 | 48 | 33 | 20 | 4,948 |
| Body Guard | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 118 |
| European Infantry | – | 1 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 773 | – |
| Artillery | – | 9 | 8 | 49 | 70 | 32 | 3,338 | 4,339 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 2 | 3 | 13 | 24 | 18 | 26 | 1,090 |
| Native Infantry | – | 46 | 41 | 195 | 388 | 233 | 147 | 54,988 |
| Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Irregular Cavalry | – | – | 3 | 2 | 8 | 1 | – | 3,647 |
| Local Infantry | – | 1 | 2 | 14 | 26 | 3 | 19 | 11,730 |
| Bundlecund Legion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Military Police Battalion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| MADRAS: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry | – | 2 | 4 | 21 | 43 | 29 | 24 | 3,786 |
| European Infantry | – | 3 | 1 | 11 | 12 | 6 | 1,014 | – |
| Artillery | – | 5 | 5 | 27 | 39 | 31 | 1,878 | 1,656 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 1 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 26 | 26 | 956 |
| Native Infantry | – | 25 | 37 | 149 | 299 | 137 | 108 | 39,015 |
| BOMBAY: | | | | | | | | |
| Cavalry | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 19 | 3 | – | 1,463 |
| European Infantry | – | – | 2 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 692 | – |
| Artillery | – | 2 | 4 | 18 | 29 | 15 | 1,268 | 691 |
| Engineers and Sappers and Miners | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 15 | 14 | 29 | 471 |
| Native Infantry | – | 5 | 18 | 59 | 121 | 46 | 21 | 18,889 |
| Irregular Horse | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 843 |
| Irregular Infantry | – | – | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | – | 3,341 |
| Scinde Camel Corps | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | – | 109 | 138 | 625 | 1,181 | 637 | 9,384 | 151,971 |

## RECAPITULATION.

| 1845. | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colonels. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | |
| | | | | | | | | BENGAL: |
| – | 6 | 6 | 20 | 44 | 30 | 30 | 4,782 | Cavalry. |
| – | – | – | 1 | 4 | – | 2 | 433 | Body Guard. |
| – | 2 | 1 | 11 | 29 | 17 | 1,757 | – | European Infantry. |
| – | 8 | 9 | 39 | 82 | 46 | 3,179 | 4,833 | Artillery. |
| – | 4 | 5 | 18 | 39 | 12 | 35 | 1,368 | Engineers and Sappers and Miners. |
| – | 38 | 36 | 180 | 470 | 308 | 146 | 83,411 | Native Infantry. |
| – | – | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 999 | Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment. |
| – | – | 3 | 14 | 11 | – | – | 6,944 | Irregular Cavalry. |
| – | 1 | 5 | 26 | 23 | 1 | 33 | 15,981 | Local Infantry. |
| – | – | – | 7 | 3 | – | 5 | 2,939 | Bundlecund Legion. |
| – | – | 2 | 5 | 2 | – | 19 | 11,144 | Military Police Battalion. |
| | | | | | | | | MADRAS: |
| – | 5 | 6 | 17 | 41 | 26 | 24 | 3,889 | Cavalry. |
| – | 1 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 16 | 1,786 | – | European Infantry. |
| – | 4 | 5 | 27 | 48 | 20 | 1,727 | 1,818 | Artillery. |
| – | 2 | 2 | 8 | 20 | 16 | 40 | 703 | Engineers and Sappers and Miners. |
| – | 29 | 38 | 163 | 418 | 75 | 108 | 55,378 | Native Infantry. |
| | | | | | | | | BOMBAY: |
| – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 12 | 6 | 1,430 | Cavalry. |
| – | 1 | 2 | 5 | 18 | 20 | 1,499 | – | European Infantry. |
| – | 4 | 3 | 12 | 33 | 21 | 660 | 899 | Artillery. |
| – | 1 | 1 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 25 | 376 | Engineers and Sappers and Miners. |
| – | 8 | 15 | 48 | 157 | 120 | 26 | 28,991 | Native Infantry. |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 3 | – | 2,473 | Irregular Horse. |
| – | – | 2 | 5 | 6 | – | – | 4,958 | Irregular Infantry. |
| – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 6 | 1,935 | Scinde Camel Corps. |
| – | 115 | 146 | 624 | 1,512 | 754 | 11,115 | 235,684 | |

RETURN of the Number of EUROPEAN OFFICERS of the INDIAN ARMIES, Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers, at each of the Three Presidencies, absent from Regimental Duty on 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845, stating the Number and Rank of such Officers, and whether absent on Furlough, on Sick Certificate, or on Staff Employ.

| | 1837. | | | 1845. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | FURLOUGH. | | | FURLOUGH. | | |
| | P. A. | S. C. | Staff. | P. A. | S. C. | Staff. |
| BENGAL: | | | | | | |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 8 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 11 | 22 |
| Majors | 9 | 8 | 20 | 4 | 7 | 26 |
| Captains | 40 | 33 | 130 | 26 | 45 | 206 |
| Lieutenants | 58 | 84 | 117 | 31 | 90 | 283 |
| Cornets, 2d Lieutenants and Ensigns | 6 | 24 | 20 | 6 | 24 | 20 |
| MADRAS: | | | | | | |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 3 | 18 | 17 | 4 | 9 | 13 |
| Majors | 8 | 4 | 14 | 8 | 2 | 8 |
| Captains | 27 | 38 | 81 | 25 | 33 | 126 |
| Lieutenants | 21 | 93 | 52 | 18 | 78 | 57 |
| Cornets, 2d Lieutenants and Ensigns | — | 17 | — | 1 | 12 | 5 |
| BOMBAY: | | | | | | |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 8 | 6 | 12 | 3 | 8 | 16 |
| Majors | — | 5 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 8 |
| Captains | 9 | 31 | 49 | 3 | 33 | 94 |
| Lieutenants | 9 | 39 | 55 | 6 | 66 | 73 |
| Cornets, 2d Lieutenants and Ensigns | — | 17 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 2 |
| TOTAL | 206 | 429 | 592 | 144 | 434 | 959 |

Officers absent on leave in India, or at the Cape and elsewhere to the eastward of the Cape, are not included in this Return.

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NATIVE CORPS where the Number of EUROPEAN OFFICERS present on 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845 did not amount to One-half the established Number.

| 1837: | 1845: |
|---|---|
| Bengal:—One Regiment of Cavalry. | Bengal:—One Regiment of Cavalry. |
| Madras:—Two Regiments of Native Infantry. | Bombay:—Two Regiments of Native Infantry. |
| Bombay:—Five Regiments of Native Infantry. | |

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Highest and Lowest Number of EUROPEAN OFFICERS present with any one NATIVE CORPS on 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845; and the Average Number with each Corps at each of the Presidencies.

| | 1837. | | | 1845. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Highest Number. | Lowest Number. | Average. | Highest Number. | Lowest Number. | Average. |
| Bengal | 18 | 8 | 12 ½ | 22 | 9 | 14 |
| Madras | 17 | 8 | 12 | 22 | 11 | 14 |
| Bombay | 15 | 8 | 10 | 18 | 11 | 13 |

RETURNS of AUGMENTATIONS of CORPS, and the Number of Officers and Men added to the several Branches of the INDIAN ARMIES, Regular and Irregular, at each of the Three Presidencies, stating the Dates and Extent of such Augmentations, made between 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845; and also any Reductions in the same Period.

| | European Commissioned Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Natives. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **BENGAL.** | | | |
| Regular Corps: | | | |
| 29 June 1838.—Increase of 10 Men per Company to Native Infantry Regiments | - | - | 5,920 |
| 16 Aug. 1838.—Increase of 10 Men - ditto - ditto | - | - | 5,920 |
| 20 May 1839.—Addition to Engineer Establishment | 27 | — | — |
| 31 July 1839.—Addition of a Ninth Company to each Regiment of Native Infantry | - | - | 7,400 |
| 8 Oct. 1839.—2d European Regiment | 45 | 920 | — |
| 7 Sept. 1840.—One Lieutenant and one Ensign added to each Regiment of Infantry | 156 | — | — |
| 17 Aug. 1841.—Increase to the Artillery | 30 | — | — |
| 5 Feb. 1842.—A Tenth Company added to each Regiment of Native Infantry | - | - | 7,400 |
| 16 July 1842.—Addition of one Lieutenant to each Regiment of Infantry | 78 | — | — |
| 24 Jan. 1845.—One Captain added to each Regiment of Native Infantry | 74 | — | — |
| | 410 | 920 | 26,640 |
| Irregular Corps: | | | |
| 28 Aug. 1837.—Arracan Local Battalion, addition of four Companies to | - | - | 460 |
| 2 July 1838.—Sebundy Corps of Sappers and Miners | - | - | 206 |
| 12 July 1839.—2d Assam Sebundy Corps | - | - | 690 |
| 24 Feb. 1840.—Malwah Bheel Corps | - | - | 448 |
| 15 July 1840.—Meywar Bheel Corps | - | - | 1,145 |
| 23 Dec. 1840.—6th Regiment Irregular Cavalry | - | - | 760 |
| 28 April 1841.—7th - ditto - ditto | - | - | 760 |
| 31 Jan. 1842.—8th - ditto - ditto | - | - | 760 |
| 4 Oct. 1842.—Regiment of Khelat-i-Ghilzie | - | - | 816 |
| 29 Dec. 1842.—Increase to Governor-General's Body Guard | - | - | 218 |
| 18 Feb. 1843.—*One Battalion Saugor and Nerbudda Military Police | - | - | 1,344 |
| — *Two - ditto - ditto | - | - | 1,344 |
| 11 Mar. 1843.—One Battalion Bundlecund Military Police | - | - | 1,344 |
| — Two - ditto - ditto | - | - | 1,344 |
| 15 Jan. 1844.—The Service Battalion | - | - | 900 |
| 3 Feb. 1844.—9th Irregular Cavalry | - | - | 760 |
| Mar. 1844.—Two Rissalahs of Cavalry added to Governor-General's Body Guard | - | - | 204 |
| 18 April 1844.—Umballa Military Police | - | - | 1,120 |
| — Rohilcund - ditto | - | - | 1,120 |
| — Meerut - - ditto | - | - | 1,120 |
| — Delhi - - - ditto | - | - | 1,120 |
| 12 July 1844.—Agra Reformed Police Battalion | - | - | 1,120 |
| 18 Mar. 1844.—The Bundlecund Legion permanently attached to Bengal Army. | | | |
| | — | — | 19,103 |

* To do duties of Nerbudda Sebundy Corps.

*(continued)*

| | European Commissioned Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Natives. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **MADRAS.** | | | |
| Regular Corps: | | | |
| 29 June 1838.—Increase of 10 Men per Company to Native Infantry Regiments - - - - - | - - | - - | 4,160 |
| 16 Aug. 1838.—Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - - | - - | 4,160 |
| 31 July 1839.—Addition of a Ninth Company to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - | - - | - - | 5,200 |
| 8 Oct. 1839.—2d European Regiment - - - - | 45 | 920 | — |
| 7 Sept. 1840.—One Lieutenant and one Ensign added to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - | 112 | — | — |
| 17 Aug. 1841.—Increase to the Artillery - - - - | 12 | — | — |
| 5 Feb. 1842.—A Tenth Company added to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - - - | - - | - - | 5,200 |
| 16 July 1842.—Addition of one Lieutenant to each Regiment of Infantry - - - - - - - | 56 | — | — |
| 24 Jan. 1845.—One Captain added to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - - - - | 52 | — | — |
| | 277 | 920 | 18,720 |
| Deduct, | | | |
| 13 Jan. 1843.—The Establishment of a Regiment of Native Infantry, reduced to the extent of 10 Men per Company - - - - - - | - - | - - | 5,200 |
| | 277 | 920 | 13,520 |
| **BOMBAY.** | | | |
| Regular Corps: | | | |
| 29 June 1838.—Increase of 10 Men per Company to Native Infantry Regiments - - - - - | - - | - - | 2,080 |
| 16 Aug. 1838.—Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - - | - - | - - | 2,080 |
| 31 July 1839.—Addition of a Ninth Company to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - | - - | - - | 2,600 |
| 8 Oct. 1839.—2d European Regiment - - - - - | 45 | 920 | — |
| 7 Sept. 1840.—One Lieutenant and one Ensign added to each Regiment of Infantry - - - | 60 | — | — |
| 17 Aug. 1841.—Addition to the Artillery - - - - | 12 | — | — |
| 5 Feb. 1842.—A Tenth Company added to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - - - | - - | - - | 2,600 |
| 16 July 1842.—One Lieutenant added to each Regiment of Infantry - - - - - - - | 30 | — | — |
| 24 Jan. 1845.—One Captain added to each Regiment of Native Infantry - - - - - - | 26 | — | — |
| | 173 | 920 | 9,360 |
| Irregular Corps: | | | |
| 24 May 1839.—Guzerat Irregular Horse - - - - | - - | - - | 766 |
| 8 Aug. 1839.—Scinde - - ditto - - - - - | - - | - - | 490 |
| — Sawunt Warree Local Corps - - - | - - | - - | 830 |
| 25 April 1845.—Scinde Camel Corps - - - - | - - | - - | 1,935 |
| | — | — | 4,021 |

RETURN of the Total Strength of HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS, Cavalry and Infantry, in each of the Three Presidencies of *India*, on 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845, stating the Number of Officers and Privates borne on the Muster Rolls at these Dates.

| | 1837. | | 1845. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | European Officers. | Rank and File. | European Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. |
| BENGAL: | | | | |
| Cavalry - - - - - - - | 44 | 1,205 | 70 | 1,959 |
| Infantry - - - - - - - | 251 | 6,370 | 367 | 11,117 |
| MADRAS: | | | | |
| Cavalry - - - - - - - | 32 | 648 | 34 | 721 |
| Infantry - - - - - - - | 275 | 5,931 | 264 | 7,313 |
| BOMBAY: | | | | |
| Cavalry - - - - - - - | 29 | 639 | 32 | 694 |
| Infantry - - - - - - - | 140 | 2,891 | 196 | 5,345 |
| | 771 | 17,684 | 963 | 27,149 |

East India House,
28 August 1846.

*Philip Melvill,*
Sec. Mil. Dep[t].

# ARMY (INDIA).

ABSTRACT RETURNS relative to the Strength of the European and Native Corps of the Regular INDIAN ARMIES, 1 May 1837 and 1 May 1845, at the Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*.

*(Mr. Hume.)*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
17 *February* 1847.



*Under* 3 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (MILITARY EXPENDITURE).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 22 March 1871;—*for*,

"STATEMENTS in Detail of the EFFECTIVE and NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES entered in the HOME ACCOUNTS for the Two following Years, viz.:—

| | TOTAL of Effective Services. | TOTAL of Non-Effective Services. |
|---|---|---|
| | £. | £. |
| 1866–67 - - - - - - - - | 1,780,531 | 1,048,845 |
| 1867–68 - - - - - - - - | 1,611,638 | 1,136,128 |

"And, of the Amounts chargeable to the Governments of *India*, of *Madras*, and of *Bombay* for EUROPEAN MILITARY STORES in each of the last Four Years, ending 1869-70."

India Office,
30 March 1871.

W. G. GOODLIFFE,
Accountant General.

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STATEMENT in Detail of the EFFECTIVE and NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES entered in the HOME ACCOUNTS of the Government of *India* for the Two following Years, viz., 1866-67 and 1867-68.

## 1866-67.

(For 11 Months only, the Financial Year having been altered at this date and made to end with 31st March instead of 30th April.)

| EFFECTIVE CHARGES. | £. | £. |
|---|---|---|
| The Imperial Government for Troops serving in India: | | |
| Capitation Rate, at 10 *l.* a man, on 60,000 men - - - - | 600,000 | |
| On account of clothing supplied to depôts in this country of regiments serving in India for 1862-63, 1864-65, and 1865-66 - - - | 75,000 | |
| | | 675,000 |
| Furlough Allowances: | | |
| Pay of Military Officers on Furlough; | | |
| Bengal - - - - - - - - - - | 99,682 | |
| Madras - - - - - - - - - - | 64,436 | |
| Bombay - - - - - - - - - - | 54,558 | |
| | | 218,676 |
| Passage of Officers and Troops: | | |
| Outwards - - - - - - - - - - - | 123,926 | |
| Homewards - - - - - - - - - - - | 148,975 | |
| | | 272,901 |
| On Account of Contracts for Construction and Equipment of Indian Troop Transports: | | |
| Further Instalments on account of construction of ships - - - | 565,930 | |
| Incidental expenses, salaries and travelling expenses of officers superintending ditto - - - - - - - - - - | 2,962 | |
| Hospital bedding for the five vessels - - - - - - | 735 | |
| | | 569,627 |
| Carried forward - - - £. | | 1,736,204 |

1866–67—Effective Charges—*continued.*

| | £. | £. |
|---|---|---|
| Brought forward | | 1,736,204 |
| **India Overland Troop Transport Service:** | | |
| Salaries, allowances, and travelling expenses of officers | 468 | |
| Bedding, furniture, and fittings for the ships | 2,615 | |
| Bills drawn for supplies on account of the service by Captain Willoughby, R.N., principal transport officer in Egypt | 802 | |
| | | 3,885 |
| **Purchase of Horses:** | | |
| Cost of 20 mares and 17 horses | 6,070 | |
| Charges connected with above purchase, and freight to Calcutta | 1,407 | |
| | | 7,477 |
| **Cost of Education of Officers and Cadets at Chatham and Sandhurst:** | | |
| Contribution due to the Imperial Government for the expenses connected with the education of Artillery and Engineer officers for the year 1866–67 | 6,612 | |
| Ditto - ditto - cadets at the Royal Military College for the same period | 2,607 | |
| | | 9,219 |
| **Cost of Education and Pay of Assistant Surgeons at Netley, and their Allowances and Passage to India on Appointment:** | | |
| Pay to the Imperial Government for cost of education at Netley | 2,728 | |
| Pay, &c. of assistant surgeons whilst at Netley and on passage to India | 2,358 | |
| Passage of ditto to India | 4,805 | |
| | | 9,891 |
| **Purchase by Bombay Government of Two Vessels of the Anglo-Chinese Squadron and Stores:** | | |
| Purchase of the two vessels "Quangtung" and "Thule" (£. 14,500) | | |
| Deduct repairs and dockyard charges (£. 6,376) | 8,124 | |
| Value of Stores taken over | 3,758 | |
| | | 11,882 |
| **Miscellaneous:** | | |
| Removal, warehousing, unpacking, sorting, and other charges on account of 1,100 cases containing 22,000 stand of arms received from Madras for sale | 1,185 | |
| Freight of army clothing received from India, &c. | 322 | |
| Stores taken from Shanghai to Bombay by the G Battery, 14th Brigade, Royal Artillery, in April 1865 | 241 | |
| Stores returned into the Grand Arsenal, Bombay, ex H. M. S. "Penguin" | 195 | |
| | | 1,943 |
| TOTAL Effective Charges, 1866-67 | £. | *1,780,501 |

* Not 1,780,531*l.* as stated in Resolution.

## NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **The Imperial Government on account of Retired Pay, &c. of Troops serving or having served in India (Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27):** | | |
| Capitation rate, at 3 *l.* 10 *s.* a man on 60,000 men | | 210,000 |
| **Retired Pay, including Colonels' Allowances:** | | |
| Bengal | 328,193 | |
| Madras | 273,728 | |
| Bombay | 145,340 | |
| | | 747,261 |
| Lord Clive's Fund Pensions | | 91,584 |
| TOTAL Non-Effective Charges, 1866-67 | £. | 1,048,845 |

1867-68.

| Effective Charges. | £. | £. |
|---|---|---|
| **The Imperial Government for Troops serving in India:** | | |
| Capitation rate, at 10 *l.* a man on 63,000 men | 630,000 | |
| Balance up to date standing to the credit of the War Office in the statement of outstanding claims between the Imperial Government and the India Office | 100,000 | |
| Expenses incurred by the War Department for the supply of non-commissioned engineer officers and sappers during 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866 | 8,620 | |
| | | 738,620 |
| **Furlough Allowances:** | | |
| Pay of military officers on furlough: | | |
| Bengal | 103,919 | |
| Madras | 76,281 | |
| Bombay | 57,740 | |
| | | 237,940 |
| **Passage of Officers and Troops:** | | |
| Outwards | 35,477 | |
| Homewards | 123,571 | |
| | | 159,048 |
| **On Account of Contracts for Construction and Equipment of Indian Troop Transports:** | | |
| Further instalments on account of construction of Ships | 240,145 | |
| Incidental expenses, salaries, and travelling expenses of officers superintending, &c. | 6,599 | |
| Hospital bedding | 642 | |
| Bedding for the troops | 23,916 | |
| Pay of officers and men | 901 | |
| | | 272,203 |
| **India Overland Troop Transport Service:** | | |
| Salaries, allowances, and travelling expenses of officers, stationery, expenses of office in Egypt, &c. | 1,931 | |
| Table linen | 2,483 | |
| Bedding | 999 | |
| China and glass | 1,668 | |
| Lamps | 1,125 | |
| Furniture and hardware | 14,746 | |
| Plated articles and cutlery | 5,831 | |
| Ice, ale, water, &c. supplied, and freight of provisions | 575 | |
| Hay's anti-fouling composition, varnish, &c. | 1,475 | |
| Freight of moorings to Alexandria | 358 | |
| Coals | 32,049 | |
| Bills for supplies drawn by paymasters of transport | 35,211 | |
| Ditto - - ditto - - transport officer in Egypt | 11,182 | |
| Specie and freight charges thereon, for supplies transmitted to ditto | 35,102 | |
| | | 144,735 |
| **Purchase of Horses:** | | |
| Cost of 19 stallions | 4,180 | |
| Charges connected with above purchase, and freight to Calcutta | 901 | |
| | | 5,081 |
| **Cost of Education of Officers and Cadets at Chatham and Sandhurst:** | | |
| Contribution due to the Imperial Government for the expenses connected with the education of artillery and engineer officers for the year 1867-68 | 6,612 | |
| Ditto - - ditto - - cadets at the Royal Military College, for the same period | 3,072 | |
| | | 9,684 |
| **Cost of Education and Pay of Assistant Surgeons at Netley and their Allowances and Passage to India on Appointment:** | | |
| Paid to the Imperial Government for cost of education at Netley | 6,011 | |
| Pay, &c. of assistant surgeons whilst at Netley, and on passage to India | 1,495 | |
| Passage of ditto to India | 2,292 | |
| | | 9,798 |
| Carried forward £. | | 1,577,109 |

1867-68.—Effective Charges—*continued.*

| | £. | £. |
|---|---|---|
| Brought forward - - - | - - | 1,577,109 |
| Royal Victoria Hospital at Suez, construction: | | |
| Preparation of plans and drawings, and expenses connected with title-deed of land - - - - - - - - - - - | 259 | |
| Instalments on account of contract for erection of hospital - - - | 28,582 | |
| Part payment of purchase of a condensing apparatus - - - | 569 | |
| | | 29,410 |
| Miscellaneous: | | |
| Price of commission paid to Captain Scott Jervis, late Aide-de-Camp to General Sir William Mansfield - - - - - - - - | 1,800 | |
| Clothing taken from China to India by G Battery, 14th Brigade, Royal Artillery, in April 1865 - - - - - - - - - | 623 | |
| Clothing, accoutrements, &c. taken from the Cape of Good Hope to India in November 1865 by 96th Regiment - - - - - - | 1,936 | |
| Removal and other charges on account of 5,000 stand of arms received from India for sale - - - - - - - - - - | 177 | |
| Freight and other charges on clothing and stores received from India for sale, &c. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | 583 | |
| | | 5,119 |
| TOTAL Effective Charges, 1867–68 - - - £. | | 1,611,638 |

NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The Imperial Government, on account of Retired Pay, &c. of Troops serving or having served in India (Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27): | | |
| Capitation rate, at 3 *l.* 10 *s.* a man on 63,000 men - - - - - | - - | 220,500 |
| Retired Pay, including Colonels' Allowances: | | |
| Bengal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | 330,555 | |
| Madras - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | 276,154 | |
| Bombay - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | 144,097 | |
| | | 750,806 |
| Lord Clive's Fund Pensions - - - - - - - | - - | 141,743 |
| Lord Clive's Fund, Payments to Representatives of Lord Clive: | | |
| Amount payable in the year 1867 to the Earl of Powis and the Baroness Windsor (11,539 *l.* 10 *s.* each) under order of the Master of the Rolls, for compromise of the suit "Sir John Benn Walsh, Bart., *v.* the Secretary of State for India in Council" - - - | - - | 23,079 |
| TOTAL Non-Effective Charges, 1867–68 - - - £. | | 1,136,128 |

AMOUNTS chargeable to the Governments of *India*, of *Madras*, and of *Bombay*, for EUROPEAN MILITARY STORES in each of the last Four Years ending 1869-70.

| | INDIA. | | MADRAS. | | BOMBAY. | | TOTAL. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Stores. | Freight. | Stores. | Freight. | Stores. | Freight. | Stores. | Freight. |
| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
| 1 May 1866 to 31 March 1867 * - | 314,760 17 – | 4,135 17 6 | 122,472 7 3 | 1,287 19 3 | 111,054 2 3 | 2,351 3 2 | 548,287 6 6 | 7,774 19 11 |
| 1 April 1867 to 31 March 1868 - | 452,344 4 1 | 5,851 7 8 | 152,327 14 8 | 2,077 3 5 | 129,269 12 11 | 10,193 1 – | 733,941 11 8 | 18,121 12 1 |
| 1 April 1868 to 31 March 1869 - | 452,659 13 10 | 8,745 11 11 | 211,059 17 10 | 3,347 17 3 | 185,734 12 4 | 11,073 10 7 | 849,454 4 – | 23,166 19 9 |
| 1 April 1869 to 31 March 1870 - | 492,101 12 – | 10,175 11 9 | 179,766 10 6 | 4,706 10 7 | 183,841 15 3 | 7,899 4 1 | 855,709 17 9 | 22,781 6 5 |
| £. | 1,711,866 6 11 | 28,908 8 10 | 665,626 10 3 | 11,419 10 6 | 609,900 2 9 | 31,516 18 10 | 2,987,392 19 11 | 71,844 18 2 |
| | £. 1,740,774 15 9 | | £. 677,046 – 9 | | £. 641,417 1 7 | | £. 3,059,237 18 1 | |

* For 11 months only; the Financial Year having been altered at this date and made to end with 31st March instead of 30th April.

# STATEMENTS in Detail of the EFFECTIVE and NON-EFFECTIVE CHARGES entered in the HOME ACCOUNTS for the Years 1866-67 and 1867-68; and, of the Amounts chargeable to the Governments of *India*, of *Madras*, and of *Bombay* for EUROPEAN MILITARY STORES in each of the last Four Years, ending 1869-70.

(*Mr. Eastwick.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
3 *April* 1871.

# EAST INDIA (LOCAL ARMIES).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons; dated 1 March 1861;—*for*,

"COPY of the REPORT of the COMMITTEE appointed last Year to consider the Details for carrying out the AMALGAMATION of the LOCAL INDIAN and LINE ARMIES."

India Office, 2 March 1861.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Secretary for Military Correspondence.

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COPY of the REPORT of the COMMITTEE appointed last year to consider the Details for carrying out the AMALGAMATION of the LOCAL INDIAN and LINE ARMIES.

My Lord and Gentlemen, India Office, 30 July 1860.

I HAVE the honour to request you to form yourselves into a Committee, for the purpose of preparing suggestions as to the various detailed measures which it may be advisable to take for effecting the amalgamation of the European forces of the Indian army with the general army of the Crown.

2. In making your suggestions, I have to request you to bear in mind that the existing privileges of the officers and soldiers of the Indian army, as assured to them under the clauses of the 21st and 22d Victoria, c. 106, must be scrupulously respected.

3. It is desirable that in the proposals of your Committee due regard should be paid to economy.

4. I enclose a Memorandum of several of the points which appear to me to demand your attention. Other matters may occur to your Committee in the course of its proceedings, as necessary to be taken into consideration; and I shall feel obliged by your reporting on these just as fully as on the points named in the Memorandum.

5. Any information that may be required by your Committee from the offices of the Secretaries of State for War or India, or from the Horse Guards, will be readily afforded to you.

6. In conclusion, I desire to remark that I shall be glad to be favoured with your report at as early a date as may be consistent with a full consideration of the important subjects before you.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Charles Wood.*

Lieutenant General the Lord Hotham, M. P.
Lieutenant General Sir Charles Yorke, G. C. B.
Major General Clarke.
Brigadier General Russell, C. B.
Colonel Sir Peter Melvill, K. C. B.
Lieutenant Colonel Wetherall, C. B., and
Lieutenant Colonel Norman, C. B.

MEMORANDUM.

I.—The effect of amalgamation upon the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the Local India army, and the measures desirable to be adopted with respect to them.

II.—The formation of staff corps for India, to which officers of the Line and Local armies will be eligible. All officers on the permanent staff in India to be taken* from this corps, as well as those for native irregular regiments.

It may be desirable to consider the best steps to make these regiments available for general service as soon as possible, with due regard to the privileges both of the officers and of the men who have enlisted for Indian service.

The following points appear here to demand attention :—

1. The conditions under which transfers to the staff corps shall take place.

2. The mode of promotion in the staff corps.

3. The power of exchange from the corps.

4. The manner in which officers might, under special circumstances, be removed from the corps.

5. Position, pay, &c. of officers of the staff corps in the several grades, including furlough regulations and pay, when temporarily unemployed.

6. System of retirement.

7. Position of officers after attaining the rank of colonel.

III.—Conditions under which officers of the Local Army may have the option of volunteering into the Line.

IV.—Conditions under which exchanges may take place between officers of the Line and those of the present Local regiments.

V.—Mode of regulating the promotion of officers of the Local army who do not join the staff corps or volunteer for the Line.

VI.—What additional inducements to retirement it may be advisable to hold out at the present time to the officers of the Indian Army.

VII.—What amount of promotion should be given to them in consequence of these retirements.

VIII.—Whether the number of colonel's allowances may not be prospectively reduced, and how.

IX.—What regulations will be necessary for the Artillery of the three Presidencies.

X.—Ditto for the Engineers.

XI.—Ditto for the Medical Service.

XII.—Whether any regulations are required as to the Military or Orphan funds, and Medical retiring funds.

XIII.—Whether it would be desirable to transfer any part of the military business now transacted at the India Office to the Horse Guards.

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* The word "ultimately" should have been inserted here, which would have prevented a mistake into which the Committee has fallen in page 4.

Sir, Cannon-row, 7 August 1860.

I DO myself the honour to transmit a Memorandum of certain recommendations, which the Committee, nominated by you to report on the details necessary for the amalgamation of the line and Indian armies, desire to offer for your early consideration in anticipation of the detailed report which will be hereafter forwarded.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hotham.*

The Right Honourable
Sir Charles Wood, Bart., M.P., G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

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MEMORANDUM.

As the consideration of the many questions involved in the amalgamation of the line and Indian armies may occupy some time, the Committee think it right to offer suggestions at once relative to three points, upon which action seems desirable in the event of the bill now before Parliament becoming law.

1. With respect to the enlistment and re-engagement of soldiers for corps of the Indian army,—

The Committee recommend that measures should be taken, as soon as the bill passes, for the alteration of the terms of attestation; and that men should enlist or re-enlist for these regiments on precisely the same terms as for corps of the line.

The Committee understand that recruiting for the Indian army is temporarily suspended in England, but presume that men, whose period of service has expired, are frequently re-engaging in India.

It therefore seems to the Committee very desirable that instructions as to the form of re-engagement should be sent to India as soon as practicable.

In re-engaging, the Committee think it most necessary that the men should feel that their previous engagements with the State, as respects pension, are not in the slightest degree to be violated.

2. Relative to the reduction of European regiments in Bengal,—

The Committee are informed that two of the corps of Bengal Cavalry, and three of the Bengal Infantry regiments, are to be reduced.

They would recommend that orders should be sent to the Government of India to carry out the measure as soon as practicable, for they deem it very inexpedient that regiments should hear that they are to be reduced, and yet remain embodied for a considerable subsequent period.

The Committee understand that the absorption of these regiments into the corps to be retained is a matter of no difficulty, as the latter, even after the absorption, will be within their proper complement of men; and they further understand that there will be few, if any, supernumerary non-commissioned officers, as the non-commissioned grades were ordered only to be kept complete in proportion to the number of rank and file remaining after the discharge, at their own request last year, of a large number of men of all ranks.

3. Military and orphan funds and medical retiring funds,—

As the gradual extinction of the military and orphan funds, and perhaps of the medical retiring funds, appears a necessary consequence of the amalgamation of the armies, the Committee would suggest that no officers appointed after the passing of the Act should be called on, or permitted to subscribe to these funds, as those who once subscribe may consider themselves to have a claim on the fund for life.

(signed) *Hotham.*

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To the Right Honourable Sir *Charles Wood*, Bart., G.C.B., M.P., Secretary of State for India.

We have carefully considered the several questions, which you have submitted to us; and we now beg leave to lay before you our opinion thereon.

1. The effect of amalgamation upon the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the local Indian army, and the measures desirable to be adopted with respect to them.

1. We are of opinion that the contemplated amalgamation will not produce any sensible effect upon the officers or the men of the local Indian army, so long as they continue to serve in India.

But the existing engagement of both officers and men of the Indian army is for service in India; the engagement of the officers is indefinite as to time; and that of the men is limited to 12 years in the artillery and cavalry, and to 10 years in the infantry.

Therefore, to make an Indian regiment available for general service, it will be necessary immediately to alter the terms on which the men are enlisted and re-enlisted; and to allow a period of 12 years, in the case of the artillery or cavalry, and of 10 years, in that of the infantry, to elapse; after which every man in the ranks will be under an engagement for general or universal service; and then the regiment, as respects the men, will be as available for removal to a colonial or home station, as any other of the British corps.

But as respects the officers, it is not possible to prescribe the period at which they can become removable with their men from India, unless with their own consent.

In the course of time, it is probable that, by exchanges and transfers, the conditions now subsisting may be changed; but we cannot at present devise any measures by which the process can be accelerated.

We have already, in our letter of the 7th August, recommended that the terms of enlistment and of re-enlistment should be altered without delay. We consider that in future these terms should be exactly assimilated to those established in all the other British regiments, and that the same forms of attestation should be invariably used. We are aware that it has been said that every enlisted man has a right to re-enlist (if he have not forfeited the right by his own misconduct), under precisely the same terms and conditions as those of his original engagement. We believe this claim to be quite untenable, and we regard it as of no moment; for should it ever be put forward the men who considered themselves bound to local service only, could, without difficulty, be transferred as volunteers to other regiments, when their own was ordered for removal from India.

2. The formation of a staff corps for India, to which officers of the line and local armies will be eligible. All officers on the permanent staff in India to be taken from this corps, as well as those for native irregular regiments.

2. We have carefully considered the proposed formation of a staff corps for India, to which officers of the line and local armies may be alike eligible; and we subjoin the rules, which we deem most proper for the constitution of such a corps upon an efficient footing.

The designation "staff corps," may, perhaps, be less appropriate than that of "staff list," because, in a military sense, the term "corps" implies internal organisation; whereas the contemplated body will be ever fluctuating in number; the different ranks, or grades, will bear no fixed proportion or relation to each other; and promotion will be regulated without reference to seniority either in the army or the corps.

NOTE by Sir *C. Wood*.

It was not intended that all local officers now holding permanent staff appointments should join the staff corps. They, or regimental officers, *may* do so, if they like it and think it advisable; but all local officers now holding permanent staff appointments are to be permitted to retain them—if the Indian Government wish to retain their services—on their present footing.

We understand it to be intended to form the staff corps, in the first instance, by the transfer, to a separate list, of all officers employed in India, permanently, in situations or on duties detached from their regiments, with the exception only of the purely military staff. All officers so transferred must consent to retain, and to continue henceforth to hold, their appointments on the condition of resigning their regimental position, accepting, in lieu, the advantages offered by the staff.

It is not improbable that, in some instances, the offer of transfer may be declined, and officers now serving on the staff may prefer to return to their regiments and take the chances of regimental rise; and the services of such officers may be at the moment very valuable to the civil administration, or at least it may not be practicable readily to

to relieve them, and to supply their places. We think that in such a case, the Governments in India should have power to make exceptions, whenever it may appear that, by a rigid adherence to the rules laid down, the public interests would be injured, and to retain such staff officers until such time as the Government con conveniently dispense with their services on the staff.

In future, however, the condition of staff or detached employment should be imperative. The field of selection for the staff may be thereby narrowed to a certain extent; but we hold it to be essential to the efficient working of the system, that no exception beyond that specified in the rules, viz., the purely military staff, as named in the margin, should be permitted.

Adjutant general's department; quartermaster general's department; brigade majors; personal staff.

The term "permanent" applied to staff duties may require some explanation. We conclude it to mean situations or employments of a permanent nature, distinct from such as are merely accidental or contingent or terminable within a limited period.

There are certain regulations in India which confine the tenure of staff offices to particular ranks. A paymastership, for instance, may be held by a regimental captain, but, when the holder becomes a major, he must vacate the office, and return to his regiment. Such limitation is inconsistent with the proposed constitution of a staff corps, and must be materially modified if not altogether abrogated.

Promotion in the staff corps is to be governed by length of service only. Officers of the corps will be eligible to receive special brevet rank in the army. We conceive, however, that officers so circumstanced must hold a commission for their substantive rank in lieu of their former regimental commission, and that claims to retirement on full pay will be regulated by this substantive rank, and not by any brevet rank which may have been obtained in the army.

With respect to the future promotion of those officers of the existing local army who may be transferred to the staff corps on its first formation, we observe that a great number of the officers at the head of each rank of the local army are at present on the staff. Many, we have no doubt, are holding appointments and performing duties of so important a nature, that it would be very inconvenient for the Government to dispense with their services immediately. To obviate, therefore, the probability of such officers supposing they may be injured by the transfer to the staff corps, and, therefore hesitating to consent to it, we think that the advantages of regimental rise which they at present possess should be secured to them, that is to say, that their names should be retained, as if they were seconded, on the rolls of their regiments; and when their turn arrives by regimental rise, they should receive the step, if they have not previously gained it by length of service. This process will, it is true, cause the promotion of two men on one vacancy; but one of the two promotions will be without any additional charge, and it will not occasion any disturbance in the regular advance of other officers. It will, therefore, be of no moment to any but the individual concerned.

As regards the pay of the staff corps, it belongs, we consider, to the Indian Government to fix the proper scale of remuneration for the duties to be performed; but we conceive it would not be right to continue to officers, removed from the strength of regiments, the payment of any emoluments under the head of regimental pay. The same furlough and retiring regulations as are in force for the Indian army generally will always be applicable equally to the staff corps, but provision must be made for such officers as may be deprived of their appointments or employment, otherwise than by their own conduct or choice. Such officers, whilst out of employment, should receive the garrison pay and allowances of their rank, and it must be the care of the Government to re-employ them, whenever the opportunity for so doing may occur.

We presume that the staff corps, when constituted, will be subject, entirely and solely, to the Indian Government, and that the list for each presidency will be distinct, and subject to the Government of that Presidency, no further interchange of appointments between the officers of different Presidencies being permitted than exists at present under the general control of the Supreme Government.

In matters of discipline and conduct, all officers bearing Her Majesty's commission must, of course, be governed by the articles of war in use for the imperial forces.

The following are the rules which we would propose for the formation of a staff corps, or list, for India :—

A staff corps to be formed for service in India, to consist of an unlimited number of officers of all ranks.

All officers of the local armies and of the line, now holding permanent staff or detached appointments, excepting such as are purely military, but including service with irregulars, to have the option, subject to the approval of the Indian Governments, of being transferred to the staff corps or returning to regimental duty.

Hereafter any officer under the rank of field officer (or above that rank, if he have previously served on the staff) will be eligible for transfer to the staff corps on appointment to the staff by the Indian Governments, provided he has served three years with a regiment, and two of the three in India, and has passed the prescribed examinations.

Officers will not be finally removed from their regiments and transferred to the staff corps until after a period of probation, and they become permanently appointed to the staff.

Promotion in the staff corps to be governed by length of service, and to be irrespective of departmental position.

Officers transferred to the staff corps to go in with the rank they hold in their regiments, and to obtain promotion according to the following scale :—

After 12 years' service, of which four must have been in the staff corps, to become captains.

After 20 years' service, of which six in the staff corps, to become majors.

After 26 years' service, of which eight in the staff corps, to become lieutenant-colonels.

Five years' service in the staff corps as lieutenant-colonel to bring the brevet rank of colonel ; after which succession to the rank of major-general would take place according to seniority in the army of India.

Officers of the staff corps are to be eligible for brevet rank, in common with the rest of the army.

The army rank alone of the officers of the staff corps to tell for military command ; but officers holding civil staff appointments to be disqualified, as at present, for such command.

Officers on the rolls of regiments to be eligible for military staff appointments ; that is, the appointment of a regimental officer to a purely military staff situation is not to necessitate his transfer to the staff list, but an officer so employed may, by his own choice and with the concurrence of the Government, be so transferred, retaining his appointment.

The whole of the officers of irregular native corps to be on the staff list.

Eligibility of exchange between regiments and the staff corps to be recognised, but subject entirely to the approval and sanction of the Indian Governments. In such cases, the officer transferred to a regiment will go in as junior of his rank at the time of exchange.

The power of removal from the staff corps is in the Government. Officers so removed are liable to be placed on half-pay, or they may be returned to regiments ; and officers going to the staff corps would understand that in the latter case they must go back to a corps as junior of their grade.

Officers of the staff corps coming from the line to be eligible for transfer to the half-pay list, and to have the option of retiring on the scale of pension laid down in the existing Regulations of the Indian army for length of service, provided they have served at least 10 years in the Indian staff corps.

A certain number of the senior colonels of the staff corps to have an allowance assigned to them equivalent to that of the regimental colonels.

No officer to be permanently appointed to any situation on the staff (save the purely military appointments), or to a civil or detached appointment of any description), without being transferred to the staff list, and struck off the strength of his regiment.

All officers on the staff list to receive pay according to the appointment they hold, and no other allowance to be received by them but such as may be assigned to the senior colonels, and except in payment of necessary and authorised office expenses.

Officers of the staff corps temporarily unemployed will receive the garrison pay and allowances, according to the Indian scale, of their substantive rank.

3. With regard to the condition under which officers of the local army may have the option of volunteering into the line, we would observe, that the opportunities for the transfer of an officer in this manner will be very rare, as in most cases it would interfere with the promotion of the senior officer of the next rank in the regiment of the line in which the vacancy might occur. But an officer of the local army so transferred, on any special opportunity offering, should carry with him and retain all the advantages from the Indian funds to which he has contributed so long as he may continue a member of those funds. His service in the Indian army should be allowed to count, and he would stand exactly in the same position, as respects claim to half-pay and full-pay retirement, as any other officer of the same rank and the same length of service in the line; but he will of course retain no claim to the benefit of the retirements allowed under the regulations of the Indian army for length of service, nor would his widow and children be entitled to the pensions granted by Her Majesty to the families of deceased officers under the War Office regulations, as they would be provided for from the Indian funds, to which he has been a contributor. He should be considered equally eligible to sell his commission, after the usual period of service, as an officer of the line who had not purchased his commission.

3. Conditions under which officers of the local army may have the option of volunteering into the line.

4. As respects the conditions under which exchanges may take place between officers of the line and those of the present local regiments, we think it desirable that the removal of officers, either by transfer or exchange, from one service to the other, should be restricted to those under the substantive rank of major. In the case of exchanges, parity of age, at least within seven years, should be required: and brevet majors or brevet lieutenant-colonels should only be allowed to exchange with officers having the same brevet rank.

4. Conditions under which exchanges may take place between officers of the line and those of the present local regiments.

Any officer who may be transferred or may exchange from one service to the other must enter his new regiment as the junior of his rank, whatever may be the date of his commission.

Every application for an exchange or transfer must be accompanied by a certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment as to the perfect eligibility, in all respects, of the applicant, and that his desire to exchange has not been induced by any regimental proceeding of any kind, or by any cause affecting his honour and character.

The officer of the Indian army having exchanged into the line would be exactly in the same position, in all respects, as is recommended in the case of an officer transferred to that branch of the service.

The officer of the line having exchanged into the local army would count his former service in the line, and be allowed the benefit of the Indian retirements after the same period of service as other officers of the local army, provided he shall have served 10 years in India; but he would have no claim to the retirements allowed to officers of the line. His widow and children would, however, be entitled to the pensions granted to the families of deceased officers under the War Office Regulations.

We think it right here to submit for consideration whether, as officers who may hereafter be appointed to regiments of the Indian army will not be allowed to contribute to the Indian funds, and their widows and children will, in consequence, derive no provision therefrom, they should not be entitled to the same advantages as are granted to the families of all officers of the line under the War Office Regulations.

5. We do not understand in what manner any change can be introduced into the existing system of promotion in the local army of India without an infringement upon the guarantee contained in the 56th and 58th clauses of the "Government of India" Act of 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106).

5. Mode of regulating the promotion of officers of the local army who do not join the staff corps or volunteer for the line.

Every officer of the Indian army (excepting only the ensigns appointed during the last year) is on the rolls of a regiment; and whether the regiment be standing complete and perfect in all parts, as in the armies of Madras and Bombay, or consist of nothing more than a "cadre" of officers without men, as is the case to a large extent in the army of Bengal, still the right of all the officers to the "like advantages, as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they

had continued in the service of the Company," has been deliberately and comprehensively guaranteed, and cannot now be denied.

We consider that under this pledge the promotion of the officers of the three armies, after the staff corps has been formed, must of necessity be allowed to proceed exactly on the same principles as before; nor can the volunteering of individuals here and there into the line cause any difference. The "cadres" must be preserved throughout the entire army, and promotion must go forward regularly and in the established order. We conclude that new appointments will be made only at the bottom of the list, and under different conditions. The local system, therefore, will be gradually approaching towards its ultimate extinction. The process will be slow, but, though very possibly means may hereafter be found of hastening it, we can at the present moment only suggest that it be left to itself, and to work itself out in the course of time.

The formation of the staff corps will of course occasion a great number of vacancies in every regiment, and it may be a question whether these should be wholly or only partially filled up in the ordinary course of promotion.

We consider that it is necessary for the efficiency of the service to keep the regimental establishments complete. It should be observed, however, that of the captains, two in each native infantry regiment, and four in each European, have been allowed specially for staff and detached service; and, when the non-regimental duties are otherwise provided for, a reduction of the established number of captains to five in the native, and to one for each troop or company in the European regiments, may very properly be effected.

In filling up the vacancies occasioned by the drafting off to the staff list, regard must be paid to the inequality of promotion in the several regiments that must arise if arrangements be not made to meet and correct it. Probably the Indian Government will be able to effect such arrangements without much difficulty, by applying the principles which have been laid down and are well understood in raising new regiments, and generally in all army augmentations.

6. What additional inducements to retirement it may be advisable to hold out at the present time to the officers of the Indian army.

6. Taking it for granted that inducements would only be held out to the old officers of the Indian army to leave the service, three modes of inducing them to do so of their own accord appear to offer; but all of them, if made use of to any extent (and it appears useless in a large army to make any effort in this direction, unless to induce the retirement of a considerable number), involve a large outlay.

They are,—

1st. The formation of a senior list, to which a certain number of the old officers now in receipt of colonel's allowances might be removed without prejudice to their incomes.

2d. The offer of an increased rate of pension (say 150 *l.* or 200 *l.* per annum extra) to a certain number of officers of upwards of 32 years' service in India.

3d. The payment of a bonus down to officers of 32 years' service and upwards, who would at once retire on their pensions.

The first plan would be apparently costly. For instance, if 60 officers in all three Presidencies were removed to the senior list without prejudice to their present incomes, the outlay would be something like 66,000 *l.* a year, provided all who were promoted in their stead received colonel's allowances; but promotion would be given in this manner to all grades of the army, and the charge would be a rapidly decreasing one, as it might be arranged that the officers transferred to the senior list should be of the age of 70 and upwards.

The second plan might induce a certain number of officers to retire who saw no early prospect of obtaining the higher income consequent on becoming recipients of the colonel's allowance; and if the advantage was limited to those of 32 years' service and upwards, no very young men could take advantage of the offer.

The third plan would probably have much the same effect as the second. Most men, perhaps, would prefer a sum of money down; but to induce any to go, less than 2,500 *l.* or 3,000 *l.* would, it is apprehended, be of no effect.

There are many regimental captains of more than 32 years' service who have hardly any prospect of living to retire on colonel's allowances, and some of these would

would probably avail themselves of an offer of this kind; also, probably some majors, and perhaps a few lieutenant colonels. But those lieutenant colonels who have any prospect of obtaining their regimental full colonelcies within the next few years would certainly hesitate to sacrifice that prospect for 200 *l.* a year in addition to their pension, or even for a bonus of 2,500 *l.* or 3,000 *l.*

We are aware that a grant of some period of service to count for pension has been spoken of as a mode of inducing retirement, but we do not think this would practically answer. We believe it is not thought desirable to induce men to leave the service who have a fair amount of work still left in them; and it is only men of an age, at which probably they are still efficient, who would receive any benefit from a plan of this kind, inasmuch as, speaking generally, every officer in the Indian army, of 50 years of age and upwards, is either entitled or very near to being entitled to the highest pension given by regulation—that of a colonel.

We are not aware to what extent the Government would be prepared to expend money in inducing retirements at this time. If the senior list was adopted, less than 60 retirements in the whole Indian army would hardly be of use; and if the second or third proposal was adopted, nearly double that number would be requisite to produce any real effect on the army.

We are not prepared to say that such an outlay is actually necessary; and unless the Government are disposed to go this length, we think it would be better not to hold out any special inducements to retire.

7. What amount of promotion should be given to them in consequence of these retirements.

7. If the present organisation is maintained, we feel some difficulty in suggesting that promotions shall not be made in room of every one of these retirements.

For instance, the Artillery and Engineers certainly will require as many field officers as at present; and if one or more of their field officers retired in consequence of the advantage offered to them, we conceive it would be absolutely requisite to promote in room of those retiring.

And so with any corps that is maintained.

But even in the Bengal native infantry regiments that have mutinied, or in the Madras and Bombay armies, should any regiments of those Presidencies be reduced, there is a great difficulty and some hardship in not giving promotions in full in room of those who retire. The whole of the field officers of the cavalry and infantry of each Presidency, whether belonging to European or native regiments, are in one line for promotion, and any stoppage of promotion in these grades affects every regiment of the branch in which the stoppage takes place in that Presidency.

We will suppose that 20 lieutenant colonels of the Bengal Infantry accepted an offer of increased pension and retired, and that Government decided, as they, by an outlay of money, had procured these extraordinary retirements, and the greater number of the Bengal regiments were only "cadres" of officers, that they would only fill up half the vacancies thus caused, and leave the Commander in Chief to arrange that field officers should be removed to other corps for duty, if it so happened that an existing regiment had a vacancy, while a non-existing regiment had a field officer available for duty.

So far, the actual requirements of the service would be met; but the whole of the Bengal Infantry would have lost 10 of the 80 lieutenant colonelcies they had hitherto possessed, and promotion to that grade would become so much the slower than at present, and this disadvantage would fall just as much on the European and existing native regiments as on the officers of those corps that have disappeared.

Again, if a major retired and his place was not filled up, his regiment would have lost his step, for every major has a position in the line which ensures his promotion to lieutenant colonel in a certain period (about five to seven years from the time he becomes a major); and on his becoming a lieutenant colonel, the senior captain of his regiment becomes a major, and the whole corps obtain a step. They would lose this, and, being without a major at all, we do not understand how it could well be arranged that they should ever again have a promotion to the rank of major, or again share in the advantage of line promotion.

These arguments apply to Madras and Bombay in common with Bengal, with the additional reason, that, in these two Presidencies, at present, all the

regiments are in existence, and are maintained on the same footing as previously.

We think it altogether a matter of doubtful expediency to check promotion, already slow, in the Indian armies, and are inclined to think that if a reduction of the number of officers is absolutely needed, the reduction should commence from the bottom, by appointments being stopped.

We understand that, even in Bengal, there are not sufficient officers for the requirements of the public service, and that almost the only officers without any real employment are some of the old lieutenant colonels of mutinied regiments. If these latter leave the service, or if any field officers leave the service, and their places are not filled up in full, there will be the same number of captains and old subalterns as at present, but with diminished hopes of promotion, consequent upon the reduction in the establishment of field officers.

We do not think this can be expedient; and, as stated in our reply to Question 6, we are not prepared to say that there would be any great advantage in inducing any extraordinary retirements at present.

**8. Whether the number of colonel's allowances may not be prospectively reduced, and how.**

8. In the Indian army there is a colonel to every regular regiment of cavalry or infantry, European or native, and to every battalion of Artillery or Engineers; and all regimental colonels receive the allowance which, under the designation of "colonel's allowance," has been fixed as an equitable commutation for the share of the profits of the clothing offreckoning fund, which have always been allowed to be their common and peculiar perquisite.

It will be perceived that in the Indian army the number of "colonel's allowances" is precisely equal to the number of regiments or battalions, and, in proportion to the strength of the army, measured by the number of its regular regiments. We are of opinion that this principle cannot properly be departed from, either immediately or prospectively. If in the process of passing from a war to a peace establishment, any regiments are reduced absolutely, and the strength of the army reduced to a corresponding extent, then the number of colonels must necessarily be reduced also, and the number of allowances at the same time. But if the measure in operation be not the reduction of the strength of the army, but simply the conversion of regular into irregular regiments, for the purpose of effecting a new organisation, while the number of men maintained is the same, or nearly the same as before, we are of opinion that under such circumstances it would be scarcely fair to diminish the number of "colonel's allowances."

We do not think it necessary to enter into the question how far the expectations of officers to succeed in due course to the "colonel's allowances" may be regarded as included among the rights and advantages secured to them by the Parliamentary guarantee. But, as a matter merely of policy or expediency, we would observe that the regimental colonelcy, with its corresponding allowance, is the prize to which the officers of the local army have been accustomed from their first entrance into the service to look forward, as the termination of their active career. And it is almost needless to add that any measure which retards the flow of promotion, and postpones the prospect of succession to the highest paid rank of the service, must inflict a very heavy disappointment, and carry with it the sense of serious injury, if not of positive wrong, in the minds of all the officers of the Indian army.

**9. What regulations will be necessary for the artillery of the three Presidencies.**

9. We recommend that the whole of the artillery of the three Presidencies should form, henceforth, a part of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, without prejudice in any way to the present system of rise of any of the officers; and we submit the following plan, which we conceive will, in the most effectual way, and without injuring any one, tend to bring about an entire amalgamation of the Royal with the Indian Artillery.

The artillery of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay should be added as additional brigades to the Royal Regiment of Artillery in proportion to their present establishment. Thus, the Bengal Horse Artillery might be formed into the 2nd and 3rd horse brigades of the Royal Regiment; the 1st and 2nd battalions of Bengal Artillery into the 16th brigade of Royal Artillery (two battalions of Indian artillery consisting of exactly the same number of companies or batteries as a brigade of Royal Artillery); and so on throughout.

It is not possible for us accurately to lay down the number of brigades that would thus be added to the Royal Artillery; but, taking the present number of captains in the

the Indian Artillery as the basis of calculation, 18 brigades of horse and foot artillery would be added. As there are not so many companies, however, on the establishment of the Indian Artillery as there are captains, it would probably not be deemed necessary to form them into more than 14 or 15 brigades; but the establishment of officers of each brigade should be on the same scale as in the Royal Artillery; and thus, though the number of officers might in fact be reduced, there would be no stoppage of promotion, but rather the reverse.

We propose that four lists of officers should be maintained for promotion, those of the present Royal, and three Indian regiments.

In these corps each officer now serving would rise precisely as at present, and those in the Indian Artillery would continue to serve in their own Presidencies, unless they desire to be employed elsewhere.

All future appointments of young officers to supply vacancies in any of the four regiments to be made to the Royal Artillery; but they would, of course, be liable to serve everywhere, and to be posted to the brigades formed out of the Indian regiments.

These officers at first would rise only by the vacancies in the Royal Artillery; but after the last subaltern in any of the Indian regiments had become a second captain, the next vacancy in the grade of second captain in that corps would cause the promotion of the senior subaltern in the Royal Regiment, and one captain would be added to the establishment of that regiment.

In like manner, when the youngest officer who entered the Indian Artillery, has become a lieutenant colonel in his regiment, the next vacancy in that grade in that regiment would promote a captain of the Royal Artillery to be lieutenant colonel in the Royal Artillery.

Thus there would be a full complement of officers of every grade at all times kept up; the promotion of every officer now in the artillery would remain altogether unimpeded and uninjured, while the process of amalgamation would be steadily progressing.

Exchanges between the regiments on the part of the present officers seem unnecessary under such a system as that here proposed; for if an officer now in the Indian Artillery desired to serve out of India, and it was thought proper so to employ him, there would be no practical difficulty in appointing him to a brigade elsewhere than in India, without affecting in any degree his standing or the standing of any one else for promotion.

The claims of the Indian officers not to have their brigades or batteries commanded by officers now in the Royal Regiment, until actual vacancies are occurring in the lists of the field officers and captains, now in the Indian Artillery, should be duly granted.

Though the proportion of officers of the different grades should be made the same in the Indian as in the Royal Artillery, it appears that this cannot be carried out conveniently as regards "general officers."

The Royal Artillery have a fixed establishment of generals, lieutenant generals, and major generals, to which they rise quite irrespective of the promotions and vacancies of the line generals.

The Indian Artillery have no generals regimentally. The highest regimental rank is that of colonel, and the succession to the ranks of major general, lieutenant general, and general, is on one list for every colonel of the whole Indian army. To make a fixed establishment of generals for the Indian Artillery would greatly upset the system of promotion that has hitherto prevailed, and would undoubtedly cause much supercession of the other branches in the grades where hitherto it was impossible for them to be superseded, save in such a case as that of Sir Archdale Wilson, who was made a major-general for distinguished service.

As long, therefore, as a separate establishment of generals is maintained for officers now in the Indian army, it seems requisite that the promotion to general officer of those now in the Indian Artillery should go on as at present.

Hereafter, when the Indian Artillery officers are absorbed, or nearly so, or if the general officers of the Royal and Indian armies are placed on one list, a fresh arrangement must be made for the general officers of the Artillery.

In other respects, doubtless, it is expected by the Indian Artillery officers that they should have the same proportions of the different grades as in the Royal Artillery. This seems desirable, though it is not absolutely necessary to carrying out amalgamation in the manner here proposed. But it would be inconvenient

venient to have one portion of the same regiment rising by a different scale of promotion from the other, and we therefore recommend assimilation.

As previously stated, we are not able to fix what should be the number of brigades into which the Indian Artillery may be formed; but, supposing the Bengal Artillery, which consists of an establishment of 12 brigades and battalions, is formed into seven brigades, the relative establishment would be as follows :—

| *Present Indian Establishment.* | *Royal Scale for seven Brigades.* |
|---|---|
| 12 colonels. | 7 colonels commandant. |
| 24 lieutenant colonels. | 14 colonels. |
| 72 captains. | 28 lieutenant colonels. |
| 72 second captains. | 56 captains. |
| 168 lieutenants. | 63 second captains (seven for adjutants). |
| | 168 lieutenants. |
| 348 | 336 |

But as, under the system of a staff corps, few officers would be absent, the total number of officers available for regimental duty would be probably quite as many as at present.

We find that 57 batteries of horse, field, and garrison artillery have been recommended in a despatch from Lord Canning for Bengal; seven brigades would amount to 56 batteries.

We have no information as to the artillery considered requisite for Madras and Bombay, but it seems desirable that the establishment of the corps should be arranged so that the change should not check promotion. The present establishment of the artillery of these two Presidencies combined is exactly equal to that of Bengal, in the proportion of four brigades for Madras, and three for Bombay.

One disadvantage would accrue to the Indian Artillery (and it is believed only one) from the assimilation of establishments; that is, that there would be prospectively fewer colonels with "colonel's allowances;" in fact, if the establishment of seven brigades was adopted for Bengal, there would be five officers now receiving "colonel's allowances" in excess of the number of brigades.

To declare that the five juniors were in receipt of these allowances as supernumeraries, would be a great blow to the lieutenant colonels now looking forward to receiving them as the reward of more than 40 years' Indian service; and, knowing the desire that exists to deal liberally in the amalgamation, we strongly recommend that they may be retained until the Indian officers are all absorbed, up to the rank of regimental colonel, when the increase of colonels commandant to the Royal Artillery might commence on the Royal Artillery scale.

If these allowances are continued, all that need be declared is, that the colonels commandant of brigades should receive "colonel's allowances," and such number of the senior regimental colonels (not colonels commandant) as will make up the number equal to the colonels now receiving "colonel's allowances," so that in Bengal, if seven brigades were constituted, the seven colonels commandant and five senior colonels would receive "colonel's allowances."

If any reduction in the number of these allowances is made, we strongly urge that the reduction should be very gradual, so as not to put a great check upon the rise of old officers to the greatest prize of the Indian service.

The effect of the alteration of establishment of course depends on the number of brigades into which the regiments of Indian Artillery are formed.

Say the Bengal Artillery are formed into seven brigades, the nine senior lieutenant colonels will become regimental colonels, which will complete the 21 colonels to equal the Royal scale; and the seven seniors may be called colonels commandant at once, the next five receiving, as above suggested, the "colonel's allowance," (which they now receive), but called colonels as at present.

To complete the 28 lieutenant colonels, 13 first captains will require to be promoted to lieutenant colonel. There would be then three supernumerary first captains.

There

There would be also nine supernumerary second captains.

There would thus seem to be some slight stoppage of promotion for the second captains and subalterns; but in reality this would not be so, if a staff corps is established. There are not many artillery officers on staff employ; but still sufficient would probably at once go to the staff corps to cause the absorption of the 12 supernumerary captains and second captains; and every officer in the Artillery, by the alteration of the establishment, would actually be nearer his lieutenant colonelcy than at present.

Considering the liberal scale of field officers, and that extra second captains are provided to meet the demand for officers as adjutants of brigades, it seems that the appointments of assistant adjutant general of Artillery in Bengal and Madras, and of brigade major of Artillery in Bombay, should not involve transfer to the staff corps; but we are of opinion that officers in the Ordnance Commissariat Department should be seconded, as Royal Artillery officers are when holding similar appointments.

It seems unnecessary to go into the details of the effects of the alteration of establishment in the Madras and Bombay Artillery. Although those corps are smaller, their present proportion of officers of the different grades is exactly the same as in the Bengal Artillery, and would naturally be raised or decreased in the same proportion.

All recruits, hereafter, would enlist for the Royal Artillery; and as young officers also join the Royal Artillery, the training of every artillery officer and soldier would be hereafter uniform.

It probably would be found advantageous to attach officers of the Indian Artillery to some extent, and on their own application to the depôt brigade at Woolwich; and they would be available in common with Royal Artillery officers for the duty of taking the artillery drafts to India.

In 12 years the whole of the men of the Indian brigades would be available for general service; but in reality, if needed, any particular troop or company could at any time hereafter, at very short notice, be brought away, by the transfer to other troops or companies in India of men who wished to remain, their places being taken by recruits hereafter enlisted, and old soldiers willing to serve out of India.

The appointments of brigadiers commandant of the Indian Artillery have hitherto been invariably filled by officers of those regiments, all of whom have looked on these situations as belonging to their corps; but we feel that it will be hereafter impossible to confine the command altogether to these officers, as the senior qualified officer in each Presidency may at times be one who now belongs to the Royal Artillery, and his claim to the command cannot be ignored.

10. What regulations will be necessary for the corps of engineers.

10. The corps of Engineers of the three Indian Presidencies are on the same footing of organisation, as respects superior officers, as the Indian Artillery.

The Bengal Engineers consist of five battalions of officers, and the Madras and Bombay Engineers of three battalions each. Each battalion consists of a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, six captains, six second captains, and 12 lieutenants, making a total of 297 engineer officers.

A very few of these officers are attached to the corps of Sappers and Miners of the three Presidencies; a few hold some of the miscellaneous appointments that are scattered throughout India, but the great bulk are employed in the Department of Public Works. In time of war they are recalled from civil duties to take their part in military operations as commanding and field engineers.

We consider it very desirable that the amalgamation should be applied equally to all branches; and we think that the principle on which we have proposed to unite the Indian Artillery with the Royal will be found to be equally applicable to the Indian and Royal Engineers.

But a difficulty has been presented in the way of an amalgamation which, so far as we understand it, may be thus described;—That in the Royal Engineers employment on works is considered the corps duty (so to speak) of an officer; that it is in a great degree military employment, and that military rank is fully observed amongst the various officers employed. Further, that money responsibility,

sibility, and the keeping of the heavy accounts connected with works, do not devolve upon the officer of Royal Engineers.

In the Indian Engineers, on the other hand, the officer employed on the public works is considered in a purely civil department, and quite detached from his corps (although nearly all the effective officers of the engineers are engaged in it), in a situation where military rank is ignored, and where the money responsibility and labour of accounts are vast and overwhelming.

We have had the advantage of personal communication with Colonel Harness on the one side and Colonel Baker on the other, and of perusing the correspondence which passed in India on the subject of the employment of officers of the Royal Engineers on public works in 1859. But it appears to us that the difficulty has been much overrated, and that it ought not to be allowed to bar the very desirable measure of amalgamating the corps as a military body, and giving to the Royal Engineer officers the advantage of service in India. There is a great want, too, of engineer agency in India, and if the Royal Engineer officers are not to be employed there, officers must be supplied to the Indian service from some other source.

It is very possible that the Indian system of public works may admit of profitable revision, and that the two systems of England and India may be blended into one. We can only suggest this for the consideration of the Indian authorities, while, at the same time, we express our conviction that, even without such revision, there is no insuperable obstacle to the employment of the officers of the Royal Engineers in India upon all duties now taken by those of the Indian corps.

It does not appear necessary to repeat the details of the scheme of amalgamation which we have suggested for the Artillery, further than to remark that it would be desirable to remodel the Engineers into the same proportions of each grade of officers as the Artillery and Royal Engineers, maintaining four separate lists for promotion of those now in the four corps, and for all vacancies appointing young officers at the bottom of the present list of Royal Engineers.

Officers now in the Indian Engineers might be made use of anywhere with their own consent; and besides the stream of young Royal Engineer officers who would take service in India, as elsewhere, possibly older officers of Royal Engineers might at times desire Indian employment; to comply with which would doubtless be expedient, provided they were wanted in India, and not needed for Royal Engineer duties elsewhere.

Some allusion seems necessary to the corps of Indian Sappers and Miners.

Each Presidency has a corps of native Sappers and Miners, to which are attached a proportion of European non-commissioned officers. These corps have usually an engineer officer in command, and one as adjutant, and ordinarily a few of the younger engineer officers attached to them. When more officers are wanted, they are given by the infantry; but infantry officers appear to be more attached at the present day to the Madras corps than to the Sappers and Miners of Bengal and Bombay.

In considering the question of amalgamation, it is perhaps unnecessary for us to allude to this system of officering the corps of Sappers and Miners. Whatever may be the apparent disadvantages, the three corps seem to have been always efficient and forward in service; but some change appears requisite, consequent on amalgamation, in the mode of supplying the European non-commissioned officers to these corps. Hitherto intelligent recruits have been selected in England for the Indian Sappers and Miners, trained at Chatham, and then sent to India to the head quarters of one of the three corps. They at once became non-commissioned officers, and were doubtless very useful, more especially on field service, where, with the smallest party of Sappers, the superintendence of an intelligent and daring European is so essential.

It appears necessary to keep up an establishment of European non-commissioned officers for these corps; and it seems to us that in future it would be a vast improvement to allow annually a certain number of men of the Royal Engineers of approved character to volunteer for the non-commissioned grades of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Sappers and Miners. The drain need only be small, and men would be obtained who had served and learned discipline in the ranks of a company, instead of, as at present, mere recruits, who become non-commissioned

non-commissioned officers in a most important corps, peculiarly subject to being broken up into detachments, who have not had sufficient means of acquiring perfect habits of discipline.

It might be made a condition to such men of the Royal Engineers as volunteered for the Indian Sappers and Miners, that, in the event of their being reduced to the ranks for misconduct, they would be liable to be sent to any regiment of the line, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

The men at present with these corps would, of course, continue as heretofore, re-enlisting or taking their discharge at the conclusion of their present engagements, just the same as the other branches of the service.

11. The Indian Medical Service consists of an establishment of about 860 commissioned officers, divided into the three establishments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, the promotion having hitherto been by seniority, and quite separate in each Presidency. **11. What regulations will be necessary for the medical service**

This body furnishes the officers for the medical staff of the Indian army, for the medical care of all the regiments (European and native) of that army, for all the civil medical duties and miscellaneous medical appointments throughout India. Assistant surgeons are also often attached temporarily to troops of the line, when the medical officers of the line are not in sufficient numbers for the work; and the superintending medical officers of the Indian army have various duties in connexion with the Queen's troops, such as the regulation of the issue of medicines and hospital stores from the depôts to regiments, and the distribution of the subordinate medical establishments, who are attached, according to the requirements of the service, to line or Indian regiments.

There are also a few situations held by medical men in all the Presidencies, the duties of which are not medical, but for which certain medical officers have evinced a peculiar fitness.

The Indian navy is supplied with surgeons from the Bombay medical establishment.

In fact, if we except the medical officers of the Queen's line army, and a few (so called) uncovenanted medical officers, all the medical duties of India are performed by this body of 860 gentlemen, aided by a subordinate staff of apothecaries, hospital stewards, native doctors, &c.

All these gentlemen are military officers, and hold commissions; even when employed in civil, medical, or in purely civil situations, as is occasionally the case, they retain their commissions, and are liable to, and as a general rule look forward to return to military employment.

Save in special and exceptional cases, all assistant surgeons perform duty with troops (sometimes for several years) before being nominated to a civil medical situation; and as a general rule, promotion to the rank of surgeon involves forfeiture of the civil situation and return to a regiment, there being comparatively few civil charges that can be held by full surgeons.

The system, we are informed, has worked well; and it seems desirable to leave it untouched, as far as may be consistent with an amalgamation of the two services.

We have had the advantage of hearing the opinion of a very intelligent and experienced Indian medical officer, and we find he deprecates in strong terms the retention of a separate local medical service after amalgamation. He conceives, and it appears to us with great reason, that such a service would sink into an inferior service, and would be entered only by inferior men, confined, as they would eventually be, to the medical charge of native troops and to civil medical duties.

This gentleman states that even in civil situations the medical officers attach the highest value to their possession of military commissions and military rank, and prize highly the privilege of returning to military employment, and the possibility of earning military honours.

He considers that the usefulness of civil surgeons, particularly at large and important stations, would become much lessened, were they, under any new prospective arrangement, not to be known as military medical officers. Further, that it is a great advantage to a young medical man to have been attached for a time to a regiment, before being thrown on his own independent resources.

We cannot but feel the justice of these arguments; and make the following

suggestions in view to securing in future a supply of medical officers for duty in India on a system as nearly approaching the present one as possible, without foregoing the advantages of amalgamating the separate services into one great military medical establishment of Her Majesty.

The three medical services of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay can remain as at present, continuing to rise to the rank of surgeon by seniority, as guaranteed by Act of Parliament, until the last assistant surgeon now in the Indian armies is absorbed.

These officers would be available for all the duties, military and civil, which they now perform.

After the lapse of some years, should it be determined to bring away from India any of the European troops now of the Indian army, and the medical officers attached to them be unwilling to leave India, it would be necessary to remove them to other corps or situations in India, and to appoint, in their room, either medical officers of the Royal army, or others of the old Indian service, who were willing to quit India.

Indeed we can see no objection to officers of the Indian medical service being employed anywhere, even at present, if they are willing, and it is thought expedient to do so; but of course they would have to submit to the rules, as to pay, and any other regulations that might be in force at the station to which they proceeded.

If employed out of India, their position on the list for promotion need not be affected, neither need their claim on the funds of their Presidency be invalidated, provided they kept up their subscriptions.

So far for the present service.

To provide for the future, we recommend that for each vacancy in any of the three Indian lists, an appointment be made of an assistant surgeon on the staff in Her Majesty's army; and that he, or some other assistant surgeon of the Royal army, should be sent to India.

Upon his arrival at any of the Presidencies, he might go through a short course of practice at the Presidency general hospital, and then be attached to an European corps for duty, very much as is now the practice with the assistant surgeons of the Indian army.

As vacancies occurred in native corps or miscellaneous medical appointments for which there were no officers of the present Indian medical establishment available, assistant surgeons of Royal regiments, or staff assistant surgeons doing duty with regiments, would be selected, the patronage of the various appointments remaining as at present.

The medical education of the officer having been already tested in England, the only additional qualification required for Indian practice would be a knowledge of the diseases of the country, and a colloquial acquaintance with the language. The former would have been acquired at the general hospital, and while with a regiment, his stay with which, prior to any independent appointment, should not be less than a year; and the latter qualification would be tested, as at present, by examination.

Should an assistant surgeon of a line regiment obtain a situation of this kind, his place with his regiment could be supplied by a staff assistant surgeon.

On this plan, the full number of medical officers needed, could be maintained in India, and there would be a field for selection for civil medical charges and for native regiments.

These situations would be in the light of staff appointments, and the officers holding them should be eligible to return to corps of the line; but while in civil employment, or with native troops, they should be completely under the control of the superior local authorities.

It would be some time before any of the assistant surgeons hereafter entering could expect to become surgeons, but perhaps their promotion might be arranged for much on the plan proposed for the artillery.

This would be, that when all the present assistant surgeons of any of the three Presidencies had become surgeons, every vacancy in the latter grade might promote an assistant surgeon of the Royal army.

There are matters of detail connected with this proposal that would probably have to be arranged after communication with the Director General of the Army Medical Department at home, and the principal Inspectors General of Hospitals in

in India; but we anticipate no real difficulty in carrying into effect a scheme of the kind.

But one medical staff would hereafter be needed for the duties of India, and we should hope that such an arrangement may be made with respect to these appointments as will be consistent with the efficiency of the service, and a due consideration for the interests of the medical officers of the two armies.

We think it right to observe that the rate of promotion to the rank of surgeon in the Indian medical establishment has been very slow, varying from 18 years in Madras to somewhat under 14 in Bengal, and the whole of this service (save any period of leave) is foreign service. In the Royal Army, on the other hand, the promotion has of late been very rapid, and we should be very glad if, upon the amalgamation taking place, some impetus could be given to promotion in the Indian medical establishments, so as to bring them upon something like an equality with the members of the Royal Medical Service.

The pensions of the members of the present Indian medical establishments would of course be given at the guaranteed rates, and future first appointments would come under the ordinary rules of Her Majesty's army.

No remarks or suggestions seem necessary with respect to the subordinate medical establishments of India. The appointments to them are made in India, and are mainly filled by East Indians and natives; it is a purely local service, and appears to require no alteration in its constitution consequent upon amalgamation.

In conclusion, we would recommend, in order to make the amalgamation as complete as possible, that all the medical officers now of the Indian army should be formally considered to belong to one, the Royal Medical Service, though they must continue, as secured by Act of Parliament, to rise by seniority to the rank of surgeon, serving ordinarily in their present Presidencies, and not liable to serve out of India, save at their own desire.

12. It appears to us that it will not be possible, with an amalgamated army, to maintain any of these funds on their present footing.

12. Whether any regulations are required as to the military or orphan funds and medical retiring funds.

They were formed solely for an Indian service, and we believe the best course will be for the Government at once to take them over, with all their assets and liabilities.

We have already recommended, in the memorandum attached to our letter of the 7th instant, that officers hereafter appointed should not be required or permitted to subscribe to these funds. As a matter of course, all existing interests in these funds must be scrupulously regarded, and we propose that subscriptions should go on as hitherto, the Government receiving all money paid on this account.

Present subscribers to the Military and Orphan Funds have the right to subscribe in higher grades upon promotion, or in Bengal, upon completing certain specified periods of service. Unmarried subscribers have also the right, on marriage, of subscribing as married men.

These rights form part of the privileges of the subscribers, and will doubtless be continued.

In fact, all subscribers to any of these three funds, and all annuitants thereon, should feel that, as far as they and their families are concerned, they are in exactly the same position after the funds have been taken over by Government as they were before that measure took place.

We have already suggested that all officers hereafter appointed to the army should be under the same regulations regarding pensions to widows and orphans as those which are now in force for the line army.

It may be asked why it is necessary to discontinue the Military, and Orphan, and Medical Retiring Funds.

The answer would be this, that hereafter all appointments of military and medical officers will be, as we presume, to the general army of the Crown, and that it will be therefore impossible to maintain funds which have heretofore belonged to one particular Presidency of India, and the subscribers to which have been officers of that Presidency alone, who, subject to a certain amount of control on the part of the Government, managed their fund on their own views, and on somewhat different systems in each Presidency.

With one army of officers liable to serve everywhere, the maintenance of such funds would be impossible.

We have already recommended that an officer exchanging into a regiment out of India may be allowed, if he pleases, to continue his subscriptions to these funds, and maintain his interest in them. The responsibility of paying his subscriptions regularly will rest with himself.

Should this be thought undesirable, although we can see no practical objection to it, and it be decided that officers now in the Indian army entering the line must leave the funds, it would appear just that they should receive back all the payments they have made, or be entitled to some other equitable compensation, and besides, that their widows and children should become eligible to the pension regulations in force in the line army.

In concluding this branch of our Report, we desire to remark, that if the medical department is maintained as a local service, which we, however, deprecate, it will not be absolutely necessary to wind up the Medical Retiring Funds.

**13. Whether it would be desirable to transfer any part of the military business now transacted at the India Office to the Horse Guards.**

13. With respect to the transfer of any part of the military business now transacted at the India Office to the Horse Guards, we are of opinion that the same returns should be transmitted from all European corps to the Horse Guards as are required from regiments of the line; and that the proceedings of all general courts-martial on European officers and soldiers, including those in the staff corps, should be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General in England, as is now done in the case of regiments of the line.

We have now given our opinion on the several points which have been specially referred to us; but there are some other subjects to which, before concluding our report, we desire to allude.

We have endeavoured to frame a plan by which we conceive the contemplated amalgamation of the line and local armies may be effected in the artillery and the engineers; but we feel that our report would be incomplete if we did not advert to the other branches of the service, and point out the manner in which the same principle may be applied to the cavalry and the infantry, and the amalgamation thus extended to the whole army.

We have already treated of the men of the European cavalry and infantry, as part of the local European troops; but the European officers of the native cavalry and infantry are also to be included, we presume, in the amalgamation, although the men of their corps must continue purely local.

The cavalry and the infantry in the Indian army are in distinct lines, as distinct from each other and from all others as the artillery or engineers. But as respects the officers of each, there is no division between those of the European and those of the native corps. The ensign of infantry, on first arrival in India, is posted to an European or native regiment indiscriminately, according to the vacancy that there happens to be at the moment. Where posted he usually remains till he rises to the rank of major. Then the field officers are placed in one list for promotion; the major of an European regiment, when he becomes a lieutenant colonel, may be, and very frequently is, immediately moved to command a native regiment; and any available lieutenant colonel on the list is transferred to an European regiment as readily as to a native, whether his former service has been with natives or with Europeans.

Precisely the same system is followed in the cavalry; but it must be observed that, until very recently, there was no European cavalry in the local army of India. Within the last two years five regiments have been raised in Bengal, which are now to be reduced to three; but the officers are still in the "cadres" of their original branch, the native cavalry; and so, we believe, it is intended that they should remain.

To prepare the European part of the native army for amalgamation with the line, it would be very convenient, were it practicable, to separate the field officers of the European force from those of the native regiments, and it is essentially necessary that the European officers of the native army should be recognised as a body belonging to the Royal army, although serving with corps necessarily local.

It would then be easy to arrange that, with the existing officers, promotion should go on, as it does at present, and continue to proceed according to the Indian rule and practice. All first appointments would be made at the bottom of the list, and under new conditions; and the gradual progress towards the extinction

extinction of the old system and the substitution of the new would be exactly the same as in the artillery corps, which we have already described in full.

If the army be remodelled on the principle and in the manner we propose, there will be six distinct lists of officers of the existing local army for the Bengal Presidency, and five for each of those of Madras and Bombay; viz., artillery; cavalry, European (in Bengal only); engineers; cavalry, native; infantry, European; and infantry, native. The officers of every branch will rise separately, and new appointments will be made at the bottom of each branch, under conditions peculiar to each, as may be hereafter determined.

If the staff corps, formed as has been proposed, be added, it will be a seventh list, but the officers composing it will be drawn from all the others, as well as from the line.

We have not hitherto adverted to the subject of the depôts for the European regiments of cavalry and infantry, but we consider it most essential that depôts for each of these branches of the service should be formed and stationed at home, as is the case with regiments of the line.

We consider it necessary to draw especial attention to the position of the colonels of the two armies about to be amalgamated, with reference to their promotion to the rank of major general.

We have observed that there are still 38 of the colonels of the army of the line, who were promoted in the general brevet of 20 June 1854, who still remain in that rank, while all those of the Indian army, who were promoted at the same time, are now major generals, and also 18 of the number promoted in the subsequent brevet of 28th November 1854.

On a reference to the list of colonels of the two armies, it appears that there are 202 of the army of the line, who were included in the brevets of 20th June and 28th November 1854, who still remain in that rank, while there are only 105 of the Indian army included in those brevets, who are not major-generals.

The fixed establishment of general officers for the cavalry, guards and line, is,—

| | |
|---|---|
| 50 | Generals. |
| 80 | Lieutenant Generals. |
| 130 | Major Generals. |
| 260 | |

and that for the Indian army is,—

| | |
|---|---|
| 25 | Generals. |
| 50 | Lieutenant Generals. |
| 145 | Major Generals. |
| 220 | |

The number of colonels in the line army is at present 345. Of these, however, many will probably not be found entitled to be placed on the fixed establishment of general officers.

The number of those in the Indian army in the three Presidencies is 221, who will all be entitled to be placed on the establishment on their promotion.

It would, therefore, seem that the establishment of general officers for the line army does not secure to the superior officers of that army an equal degree of promotion with those of the Indian army, and that if no arrangement be made that will in some degree equalise the promotions to the rank of major general, on the amalgamation of the armies the colonels of the line will suffer a very extensive supercession by those of the Indian army, a contingency which it is very desirable to guard against, particularly as we apprehend that in future the commands and employments on the staff in Europe will be open to the general officers who have belonged to the Indian as well as to those of the line army.

As the general officers and colonels in each of the services rise according to seniority, the obvious mode to accomplish this object would be to place the general officers and colonels of the cavalry, guards, and line, and those of the three Presidencies of the Indian army on one list, according to the dates

of their commissions; and, on the occasion of a vacancy among the general officers, the senior of each rank on the list should be promoted.

With reference, also, to the promotions by brevet in succession to the general officers, the lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains of the two services, and of the Royal Marines, should, in like manner, be placed on one list according to their ranks, and the senior of each rank who may be eligible for promotion under the existing regulations should, on such an occasion, be promoted.

But there is a financial difficulty in such an arrangement, the general officers of the Indian army receiving no additional pay on their promotion to that rank, while the colonels in the cavalry, guards, and line, and regimental field officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, are allowed, on their promotion to the fixed establishment of general officers, the unattached pay of 1 *l.* 5 *s.* a day.

If, therefore, a colonel of the latter service were promoted in succession to a general officer of the Indian army, he would be in excess of the establishment, and would not, under the existing regulations, be entitled to the unattached pay of his rank.

It appears to us, however, to be so necessary to secure the advantage of equal promotion to the superior officers of the two armies, on the amalgamation taking place, that we would hope that some arrangement may be made that would effect this object; and we therefore recommend the subject for special consideration.

It is to be observed, that there is a fixed establishment for the general officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers distinct from that of the cavalry, guards, and line, and it may, therefore, be advisable that the same system should be adopted with the Artillery and Engineers of the Indian army.

The number of general officers for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers is fixed at—

| *For the Artillery.* | *For the Engineers.* |
|---|---|
| 6 Generals. | 3 Generals. |
| 10 Lieutenant Generals. | 5 Lieutenant Generals. |
| 16 Major Generals. | 8 Major Generals. |
| 32 | 16 |

And where a general officer of either corps is to be succeeded, the senior general officer of the next rank and the senior colonel are promoted; but the remaining successions by brevet to the lieutenant colonelcy and majority are filled by the senior major and captain of the army, the Ordnance Corps, or Royal Marines, to whichever branch of the service they may belong.

Should this system be adopted for the promotion of the Artillery and Engineers of the Indian army, the general officers and colonels of those branches of the service should be placed on the same lists respectively as the general officers and colonels of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers; and it is submitted whether an addition may not be made to the fixed establishment of general officers for those services, instead of deducting from the present establishment for the Indian army a number proportionate to the officers who would thus be removed from the general list.

We would, however, recommend that the colonelcies of the regiments of the Line and of the battalions of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers should continue, as at present, to be allotted to the general officers who have belonged to those services; and that the general officers of the Indian army should retain, exclusively, all their present advantages.

We append to our Report some remarks by Colonel Sir P. Melvill Melvill, upon the proposed staff corps, and an alternative proposition, which we recommend for consideration, should the staff corps not be found to be practicable in the manner intended.

(signed) *Hotham*, Lieut. General.
*C. Yorke*, Lieut. General.
*A. Clarke*, Major General.
*D. Russell*, Brig. General.
*P. M. Melvill*, Colonel.
*E. R. Wetherall*, Colonel.
*H. W. Norman*, Lieut. Colonel.

Cannon Row, 30 August 1860.

REMARKS upon the proposed Staff Corps, and an alternative Proposition for Consideration, should the Formation of such a Staff Corps be found to be impracticable.

THE formation of a Staff Corps for India is a measure which has often been proposed and discussed, but which has always hitherto been rejected, chiefly on account of the expense involved.

The existing system of supplying officers for the Staff from the rolls of regiments, is no doubt open to the very serious objection that the efficiency of regiments is thereby endangered, and the frequent conflict of interest in the same officer, between the Commander in Chief who requires him for regimental duty, and the Government, which desires to use him for the civil service of the administration, is embarrassing, and may even at times be injurious to the service.

On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the expectation of Staff employment incites the young officers of the army to exertion; and the experience gained upon the staff, when grafted on a good stock of early professional training, tends to enlarge the views and extend the knowledge of the older officers, and to fit them for the higher commands, better, probably, in most instances, than the uniform round of regimental routine.

It is not, therefore, clear that the total separation of the staff from the regimental system will be attended with all the advantage that might at first sight be supposed; and, in a financial point of view, it is certain that a staff corps must bring with it a very considerable increase of expense to the state. At present the duties of the staff are performed by the regimental officers; and if to the regimental establishment a staff corps be superadded, of course there must be an additional charge for every additional officer brought on to the establishment.

It may be said, indeed, that the expense thus incurred may be met by a reduction of the establishment; but as it is not supposed that there can be any diminution in the number of officers employed upon the staff, such reduction must fall entirely upon the regiments; and if the places of those who are drafted off to the staff corps be not filled up, how can such a corps be understood to correct the evil caused by the withdrawal of so many officers for staff duties? Indeed, the evil would thus be aggravated, because the absent staff officers, under the existing system, are available for recall to regimental duty when urgently required, or when the regiment takes the field, whereas if they are severed altogether from their regiments, there will be no such resource whence to supply regimental deficiencies when occasions of emergency arise.

It is true that a middle course may be taken; the staff may remain undiminished in numbers, and regimental establishments may be partially reduced; but still there must be an increase of expense to the extent of the difference between the regimental establishment of officers as it stands now, and as it will stand after the staff corps has been added.

The proposed staff corps must necessarily be unlimited in number; and not only unlimited, but ever varying, for the requirements of the administration, for civil as well as military and detached duties of every kind, are not, and never can be at all times the same. Officers are perpetually taking long leave to Europe, and returning at distant intervals; new appointments are created and old appointments are abolished or placed in abeyance, with a frequency that precludes any fixity of numbers in such a staff corps; and provision must be made, by means of an unattached list or in some other manner, for officers thrown out of their employment on the staff, and for whom there is no regimental place to which they can be returned.

Besides, this staff corps must be an incongruous mass, made up of departments in which officers have a departmental rise peculiar to themselves, and for which special qualifications are demanded, and of an infinite variety of disconnected appointments of a political, military, police, and fiscal character, ramified to an indefinite extent. It will be as impracticable to classify as to fix the numbers of the officers of the staff corps. No officer can be assumed to be qualified for every department or appointment included in the list of the staff corps, nor can any system of examination be laid down which shall ensure that an officer appointed to one place on the staff will be found qualified for removal

to another. It follows that the Government, in making their appointments, cannot be restricted to selection from the names already on the staff list; that list, therefore, will have a constant tendency to enlargement, and the surplus will be carried to an unattached or unemployed list, with its consequent burden of useless charge.

As an alternative for the proposed staff corps, which may equally or in a greater degree promote the amalgamation of the line and local armies, and produce less disturbance in the existing local system, I beg to suggest the following plan, not as one that is free from grave objections, but as one that is open to less serious and less numerous objections than the other:—

1st. That three unattached lists be constituted, one for each Presidency, to consist, in the first instance, of all the European officers now on the regimental rolls of the native army.

2d. That from these lists the Government of India select the officers required for staff and detached appointments and employment of every kind; and that the Commander in Chief be authorised to post all officers not taken out for detached employment to native regiments, regular and irregular, according to his discretion.

3d. That officers so posted shall rank with each other according to the dates of their substantive commissions (not brevet), and be freely transferable from one regiment to another, at the pleasure of the Commander in Chief.

4th. That promotion eventually be by seniority in the gradation list, but for the next 10 years (or any other period that may be fixed) that all officers now on the regimental roll of the local army be allowed to rise in their regiments, and in the line of field officers, according to the existing system of promotion in the Indian army.

5th. That officers on the unattached lists be held to be eligible for all commands when duly qualified.

The most obvious objection to be urged against this plan is, that officers who are liable to be so moved about must necessarily lose all interest in any particular regiment, and have no opportunity of becoming intimately known to their men, or of obtaining a correct knowledge of them. There is force, no doubt, in this objection, but in practice I think it may be much weakened, if not quite taken off. It must be remembered that lieutenant colonels are already moveable, and majors become so when promoted to the higher rank. The officers at present attached to any regiment would remain with it, the transfer of their names to an unattached list causing no actual change in their position; and it may fairly be expected that the Adjutant General would exercise care to prevent any other removals than such as were absolutely necessary to equalise the efficiency of regiments.

The amalgamation of the unattached lists with the line would, as in the case of the European corps, be effected gradually from the bottom. Ensigns would be appointed, who would rise as the existing local officers passed away, and exchanges between the line and the lists would be arranged with less difficulty than with a staff corps, because in the one case an officer would come in as the expectant only of a staff appointment, whereas in the others he could not enter until he had received an appointment.

It should be clearly understood that it is not intended to confine the selection of officers for staff appointments to the unattached lists; the Government would always have full power to take, for any duty they required, any officer, line or local, whom they wished, provided only he were duly qualified for such appointment according to established rules; and officers of the unattached lists would be available for appointment to the staff only in the same degree as officers serving with European corps, and on precisely the same conditions.

(signed) *P. M. Melvill,* Colonel,
Bombay Army.

# EAST INDIA (LOCAL ARMIES).

COPY of the REPORT of the COMMITTEE appointed in 1860 to consider the Details for carrying out the AMALGAMATION of the LOCAL INDIAN and LINE ARMIES.

(*Sir Minto Farquhar.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
5 *March* 1861.



*Under* 4 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (NATIVE TROOPS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 1 April 1867;—*for*,

"COPY of MINUTES by the Most Noble the Marquis of *Tweeddale*, K.T., Governor and Commander in Chief of *Madras*, of the 6th day of March 1845, and of the 28th day of March 1845, upon the System under which NATIVE TROOPS of that Presidency are employed on FOREIGN SERVICE."

Military Department, India Office, April 1867.

T. T. PEARS, Major General, Military Secretary.

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MINUTE by the Most Noble the Marquis of *Tweeddale*, dated 6 March 1845.

IT appears to me that the most satisfactory course which I can take in offering my opinions upon the several points required to be noticed in the letter from the Government of India, will be, in the first place, to submit a brief account of the various occasions on which the Madras sepoys have been employed on foreign service, from which I shall be enabled, I think, to show that I advance nothing but upon the ground of actual facts, and the continued experience of a long course of years.

2. The earliest instance of the employment of the sepoys of this Presidency on foreign service appears to be that of the expedition to Bengal, under Clive. There are, however, no records forthcoming from which any information can be obtained as to the terms upon which the sepoys were engaged to proceed, nor were the sepoys at that time serving under any regular system of organization. 1756.

3. In 1762 there appears an order* intimating that the Government of Madras had stipulated to furnish the Crown with 2,000 men for the expedition to Manilla, under Colonel Draper. Troops of all arms, sepoys included, are noticed in various orders as forming part of this number, but no particulars are given as to the terms, further than that the whole, both officers and men, European and Native, appear to have been called for as volunteers.

4. In 1779 the Government announce that sepoys are required for the service at Bencoolen, and a bounty of 40 rupees is offered to each man willing to serve there for the term of three years. G. O. G. 5 October 1779.

5. The first distinct mention of the subject, however, occurs in 1794, when sepoys G. O. G. 29 April 1794.

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* G. O., 20th July 1762.

EXTRACT from General Orders, dated 20th July 1762.

"The Major of Brigade to bring a return to the Adjutant General of the number of sepoys already entered for the expedition, specifying likewise the number of disciplined or new sepoys. The quantity which the Company has stipulated to furnish His Majesty, which is to consist of 2,000; the return of the pioneers and two foreign companies of Meyer and Faizaw's to be also produced. A return of West Irregulars to be made as soon as possible."

sepoys were required for the expedition to Amboyna. On that occasion the Government called for their services in the following terms:—

Fort St. George, 29 April 1794.—General Order by Government.

A detachment, equal to two complete companies in the several ranks, to be formed forthwith from each of the following corps, to move from the different stations as shall hereafter be directed:—

SOUTHERN DIVISION.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Native battalion, two companies, or non-commissioned rank and file | - | 156 |
| 2nd - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 5th - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 9th - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 13th - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 21st - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 24th - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| 31st - ditto - - ditto - - ditto - - | - | 156 |
| TOTAL Native Non-commissioned Rank and File - - | | 1,248 |

CENTRE DIVISION.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3rd Native battalion - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| 6th - ditto - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| 10th - ditto - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| 16th - ditto - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| 19th - ditto - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| 20th - ditto - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| TOTAL Native Non-commissioned Rank and File - - | | 936 |

NORTHERN DIVISION.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 11th Native battalion - - - - - - - - - | - | 156 |
| GRAND TOTAL Native Non-commissioned Rank and File - | | 2,340 |

These details, when assembled, to be formed into three temporary battalion of ten companies each, and be brigaded.

G. O. C. C. 30 April 1794.

6. These instructions from the Government were promulgated to the army by the Commander in Chief in the following order:—

"General Order by Colonel *Brathwaite*.

Head Quarters, Choultey Plain, 30 April 1794.

"THE particular mode of forming the Native detachments, required by the orders of Government of the 29th instant, is left to the heads of corps.

"The Commander of the Army is confident that no consideration will be allowed to operate in hindrance of that selection of men which the present occasion requires, and is so consistent with the credit of corps. He takes it for granted that a preference will be given to volunteers, and desire that it may be explained to the several detachments that they are to have the honour of being employed on foreign service. He recommends that the minutest attention be given to provide for the subsistence and comfort of the families left with each corps during the absence of the troops."

G. O. C. C. 16 September 1794.

7. More men than were required immediately volunteered, and the Commander in Chief, with the view, as it is stated, "to reward, so far as present circumstances will permit, the merit of those Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers who so gallantly offered themselves as volunteers for foreign service," ordered them to be removed, with one step of rank each, into certain new corps which were then being raised.

8. The battalions thus formed were afterwards reinforced by a draft from the 11th

11th battalion, which was called for in the following letter from the Adjutant General:— Colonel Barry Close.

EXTRACT from a Letter from the Adjutant General of the Army to Major *MacNeile*, dated 21 June 1796. 21 June 1796.

"GOVERNMENT having come to the resolution of reinforcing the troops now serving to the eastward at Amboyna and Banda, under the General Orders of Admiral Rainier and the immediate command of Major Vigon, and also to place you in the command of such reinforcement, which must sail from the coast in seven or eight days, and is to consist of at least a subaltern's party of artillery, two companies of European infantry, and about four of Native infantry. I have the honour to signify the Commander in Chief's desire that you will accordingly hold yourself in readiness to proceed on such service, as soon as you receive orders for the purpose from Government. The party of Native infantry for detachment is to consist of four companies, each complete to the fixed establishment of 68 privates, &c., and two European subalterns. This detail, it is the wish of the Government, should be furnished from the 11th battalion, and as the whole corps is not called, for, that the party for detachment should be composed of volunteers."

9. This call was instantly responded to, many more than the required number immediately coming forward for the service. From the wording of the Adjutant General's letter it may be inferred that the whole battalion would have been called upon had not a detachment only been sufficient.

10. Nothing is stated in the correspondence of the terms of service.

11. In a letter from the Adjutant General, the conduct of the troops thus employed is subsequently noticed in the following favourable terms:—

"The General has desired me to signify the satisfaction he has experienced in perusing the desirable accounts you have given of the corps under your command since its departure from the coast, and the cheerfulness with which the men have proceeded on every service that has occurred for them in the distant quarter in which they are employed." 19 July 1796. Colonel Barry Close, A. G.

12. Subsequently to the capture of the Dutch Settlements, the troops continued in garrison at Malacca, Amboyna, and Banda, with only partial relief until 1801, when a volunteer corps was formed from six different battalions, which were permitted to volunteer for the Madras Volunteer Battalion.

13. On this last occasion the tour of service was specified to be for three years, and promotion to all grades held out a sure inducement.

14. Not long after the formation of the expedition to Amboyna, several entire battalions proceeded on foreign service to Ceylon, where they subsequently continued in the performance of garrison duty at Colombo, Jaffuspatam, and Trincomallee; the 1st and 9th until the middle of 1797, and the 7th until May 1802. 1794-95.
Among those present:
1st Regiment, Native Infantry.
7th - ditto - - - ditto.
9th - ditto - - - ditto.

15. In 1795 the Native troops on foreign service were authorised to grant family certificates for such portion of their pay as they might think proper, which the Government promised should be paid at whatever stations the families might find most convenient. G. O. G. 7 July 1795.

16. Shortly after an order was issued promising rations while on board ship of rice, dhall, ghee, curry stuff, salt fish, betel, and tobacco, and to be continued on shore as long as the nature of the service might require. G. O. C. C. 15 July 1795.

17. The expedition to the Moluccas and Ceylon were followed in 1797 by the embarkation of a portion of the 3rd and 5th Native Infantry, together with the 33rd and 34th Battalions of Native Infantry, and a detachment of volunteers from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Native Cavalry, upon an intended expedition to Manilla. These proceeded as far as Penang, whence they returned, the expedition having been abandoned. Honorary badges were afterwards granted to all the Native ranks. 1797. Now the 23rd L. I. 24th Native Infantry.

18. Additional advantages are noticed as having been attached to foreign service during this year. 1797.

The Governor in Council, after noticing "the unexampled alacrity and spirit with which the Coast Native troops have embarked for foreign service, during G. O. G. 19 March 1797.

the war," states that he is "naturally led to consider every means of preserving that spirit, and of rewarding that zeal," and he announces "a donation of three months' family money to the heirs of all sepoys who may be killed or die on service to the eastward."

A donation of two months' family allowance to heirs of all sepoys who may be killed or die on Ceylon.

"Ten supernumerary boys to be allowed to each battalion, to be chosen exclusively from the near relatives of those who may have died on the service."

G. O. G. 12 August 1797. 19. By further orders subsequently issued, each sepoy was to have a cumly and one month's advance of pay.

G. O. G. 15 August 1797. Families were to be allowed, whenever they might desire it, rice, equal to the amount of their family certificates.

Each battalion was allowed to take with it 50 boys.

The Government promised that the troops should be brought back to the coast as soon after the war as circumstances might permit.

1800. 20. In 1800 a small detail, consisting of 25 of all ranks of the Body Guard, with 40 or 50 Bombay Infantry, proceeded to Persia as an escort to the British Envoy. They are stated by Subadar Major Sher Alibeg, my Native aide-de-camp, who was one of the party, to have been allowed double pay.

1808. 21. In 1808 a detachment of Cavalry, Artillery, Horse Artillery, and Pioneers, composed of volunteers from different regiments, embarked for service in Persia. On this occasion the 2nd Battalion 15th Regiment Native Infantry, 2nd Battalion 18th Regiment, and 2nd Battalion 25th Regiment, then stationed together at Wallajahbad, all volunteered to a man of their own accord, under the impression that infantry also would be sent.

22. This detachment, as originally formed, consisted of about 1,000 of all ranks. It embarked at Mangalore, and disembarked at Bombay, where it remained encamped for five months, when the troops were ordered back, and only a small detail actually proceeded to Persia.

A donation of a month's batta was granted to the men on their return, and honorary badges, "as a mark of distinction, and as a proof of the sense entertained by Government of their attachment to the service, and of their meritorious conduct while absent from their own establishment."

23. Those employed on this occasion in Persia appear to have received additional pay, termed "Persian Allowance," at the rate of eight reals for a sepoy, equivalent to about seven rupees.

1810. 24. In 1810, it being in contemplation to employ a portion of the Native troops of this army in Java, volunteers were called for, under orders from the Governor General, from seven different battalions to form a volunteer corps, "to be employed upon an expedition to the eastward."

25. On this occasion distinct inducements were held out to all ranks.

Subadars were to be advanced one class.
Jemadars to be promoted to subadars.
Havildars to jemadars.
Naigues to havildars.
A proportion of sepoys to naigues.

The corps not to be kept on the service longer than three years, when it was to be either relieved or recalled.

On their return to be allowed to join any corps they liked.

To be allowed full batta and rations.

To receive bounty clothing, viz.:—

1 Great coat.
1 Trowsers.
2 Flannel banyans.
2 Flannel long drawers.
2 Socks.

Advance of two months' pay in addition to pay of current month.

Family certificates to be issued, with promise of regular payment between 1st and 6th of every month.

Full

Full amount of family certificates to be continued to heirs of all casualties until return of corps.

Families of all men dying or killed to be pensioned on half-pay.

No fewer than 7,000 men immediately volunteered.

26. The troops were not, however, required; but the battalion of volunteers, which continued embodied, and eventually became the Madras Rifle Corps, subsequently formed a part of the expedition to the French Islands.

27. Shortly afterwards occurred the expedition to the French Islands, on which were employed details of 1810.

3rd and 6th Cavalry.
6th Battation Native Infantry.
2nd Battalion 12th Native Infantry.
Volunteer Corps (as above).
2nd Battalion Pioneers.
Detail 1st Battalion Pioneers.

28. In warning these corps for the service, the Adjutant General* directed it to be intimated that it was "the intention of Government to employ the battalion on an expedition." Commanding officers were directed to "adopt immediate measures to ascertain if all were disposed to accept the preference which the Commander in Chief had given them of being employed on foreign service," and the men were "in the first place to be informed that, in the event of any individuals being indisposed towards the *nature* of the service, they would be drafted into other corps, and that no disapprobation would attach to them for such choice, but that their places would be supplied by volunteers from other corps." * Colonel Conway.

The same indulgences were promised as before offered to the volunteers, excepting that the bounty clothing was limited to one great coat and one pair of trowsers.

29. In 1818 the 1st Battalion 15th and 2nd Battalion 18th Regiments were ordered to Ceylon. No mention was made in the Adjutant General's letter of volunteering. It was merely intimated to the corps that they were "to be employed on field service in Ceylon;" that they were to receive bounty clothing, and issue family certificates; and that "all the liberal consideration that had ever been shown to the Native troops, when similarly employed, would be extended to them and their families." 1818-19. Now the 29th Regiment. 36th Regiment.

These corps remained in Ceylon in garrison, in different stations, during 1818 and part of 1819.

30. In 1824, five battalions were simultaneously warned for the expedition to Ava. Commanding officers were directed to hold their battalions in readiness to embark at the shortest notice for foreign service, intimating to the Native commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, rank and file, that any individuals unwilling, from prejudices of caste, family connections, or other good cause, to follow their colours, would be drafted into other corps, and that their places would be supplied by volunteers. They were promised that "every attention should be paid to their comfort," and that "all the liberal considerations which had been usually shown to the Native troops, when employed on foreign service, should be extended to them and their families."

1824:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Battalion. | 3rd | Native Infantry. |
| 2nd - ditto - | 8th | - ditto. |
| 1st - ditto - | 9th | - ditto. |
| 2nd - ditto - | 10th | - ditto. |
| 2nd - ditto - | 17th | - ditto. |

31. These "liberal considerations," as specified in other orders, were the same as those allowed to the troops on the expedition to the French Islands; and Sir Thomas Munro shortly afterwards† considered it necessary to extend the grant of pension to heirs to cases of death after return to India from wounds, or disease contracted on foreign service. † 1825.

32. Twelve more battalions successively followed on the same service, and all on the same terms.

In May 1824, the 7th and 43rd.
In June 1824, the 10th and 16th.
In August 1824, the 28th.
In September 1824, the 26th and 30th.
In February 1825, the 22nd.

In April 1825, the 38th.
In October 1825, the 1st and 32nd.
In January 1826, Head Quarters, and two squadrons of the 1st Light Cavalry, and 36th Native Infantry.

33. The 7th Regiment, after having been employed at the reduction of Martaban, and other places on the Tenasserim coast, was thrown into garrison at Mergui and Tavoy, where it remained from October 1824 to May 1826.

* 1st Regiment.
32nd - ditto.
36th - ditto.

34. Hostilities having terminated, three regiments* were left to garrison the ceded territory, upon which duty they were retained until the completion of the usual three years' tour. These corps had all originally embarked for *active service* like the rest, and had served some time in Ava before the termination of the war. They were left behind in garrison as being the corps last arrived from India.

The 1st Regiment embarked for Ava in October 1825, and after having been employed against the enemy in Pegu, was ordered to garrison Mergui, where it remained from May 1826 to August 1827.

The 1st Regiment suffered severely from sickness in the early part of its service in Ava, having lost 41 men by death, and sent back 205 to the coast sick, between October 1825 and April 1826.

The 32nd Regiment embarked in October 1825, and proceeded as far as Prome, whence it was sent back to garrison Tavoy, where it remained from May 1826 till May 1829.

The 36th Native Infantry embarked in January 1826, and was sent, after the peace, to garrison Amherst, where it remained from May 1826 till July 1829.

35. The head quarters and one wing of the 35th embarked for Ava, also for active service; but intelligence arriving of the peace, disembarked again, and the regiment was sent the following year to Penang.

36. The 24th and 31st Native Infantry were also named for the same service, and were on the point of embarkation when the war terminated.

37. The 10th and 16th Regiments were originally intended to be employed at Rangoon; but their destination was subsequently altered to Arracan, and they proceeded to Chittagong, where they remained for some time in the performance of ordinary duty, in conjunction with Bengal troops. On their debarkation at Chittagong, their rations were discontinued on the ground that the Madras rules respecting rations to troops on foreign service were not at all applicable to their case, for that as they were serving in the Company's territories they were not on foreign service, and that rations were not issued to the Bengal troops under similar circumstances.

This decision was, however, earnestly opposed by Sir Thomas Munro, who strongly deprecated any alteration of the rules under which the Native troops of this Presidency had always been employed on foreign service.

After showing that the issue of rations on shore was no novel indulgence, but, on the contrary, only in accordance with established usage, Sir Thomas observes: "Looking at the present merely as a question of good faith, the Governor in Council conceives that, as far as the issue of rations is concerned, service at Chittagong to Madras sepoys is foreign service. The sepoys serving there were warned for service at Rangoon, and their destination was unexpectedly changed after they had received two months' advance of pay and their family certificates had been issued. This change has operated in no way to their benefit, and would involve them or their families in the greatest distress if it deprive them of the rations they would otherwise have received." "The term 'foreign service' is applied to all service preceded by a sea voyage, to which the natives of India feel so strong a repugnance. It is not applied to service in a foreign state to which the sepoys march by land. On the other hand, it has been applied without question to service in Ceylon, though not a foreign state. The origin of the indulgence to sepoys of this establishment proceeding on foreign service is probably to be traced to their repugnance to embark on board ship, certainly not to any reluctance on their part to serve in a foreign country. In the opinion of the Governor in Council, the object in view is chiefly gained at that expense. Whatever be the origin of these indulgences, it would be impossible to satisfy the minds of sepoys who have embarked for one strange land, that they were not as well entitled to them as their

their companions embarking at the same time for another, and there does not appear to the Governor in Council to be any just ground for the distinction."

The Government of India on this representation revoked its first decision, and in the following terms distinctly established the one essential characteristic of all foreign service:

"His Lordship in Council fully concurs with the Honourable the Governor in Council in the argument in favour of considering as foreign service all expeditions involving a voyage by sea. The facts adverted to in your Despatch distinctly prove that the claim to rations is not new and unprecedented, but, on the contrary, consistent with established usage; and his Lordship in Council regrets that, from imperfect information on that point, the orders to the Commissary General of the 29th July last refusing the sanction of the Supreme Government to the claim in question should have been issued."

38. These two regiments landed at Chittagong in July 1824, and returned to Madras in January 1826, having lost by sickness, while on service, 292 of the Native ranks.

39. The regiments in Ava suffered also considerably; during nearly the whole of the first year's service, the sepoys were exposed to the most severe privations of every description. They received only the ordinary sea rations of salt fish, &c., no fresh meat being procurable; and the sickness and mortality from this cause, and from climate and exposure, were very serious, the returns showing the number of deaths in 1824 and 1825 to have been 1,184 out of a force of about 15,000, exclusive of upwards of 800 sent back to the coast sick.

40. In the latter part of 1824 a recruiting depôt for the regiments on service was formed at Wallajahbad, and a hospital for their sick and wounded was established at the same station.

The first reinforcement to the corps in Ava was supplied partly by recruits, but chiefly by volunteers from different regiments, to the number of 600.

These men all knew that they were wanted to fill up the places of the sick and dead, and they were for some time at Wallajahbad, preparatory to their embarkation, yet all went forward cheerfully.

The average number of sick and wounded at Wallajahbad during the same year was 470, reaching at one time to 817, of whom 105 died in hospital.

The recruits had thus constantly before their eyes numbers of wretched sufferers from sickness and wounds, and had full opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the nature of the service on which they were to be employed, and of the privations to which they were likely to be exposed, yet, without any bad effect, no feeling of dissatisfaction was engendered, nor did foreign service become in consequence unpopular. The recruits were still found perfectly willing to embark.

Upwards of 2,000 embarked in successive detachments.

41. It may be observed, that there were also at the depôt employed in the instruction of the recruits, non-commissioned officers from most of the regiments remaining in garrison, whose accounts of what they saw there of the foreign service; details of course reached their friends in their own corps, and yet some of these corps also subsequently proceeded without hesitation on the same service.

The option given in 1824 to individuals of not accompanying their corps on foreign service was continued to all regiments subsequently required to embark until 1840, when it was omitted as being no longer necessary.

*Note.*—Since the war in Ava, the Madras Infantry have continued to be employed on foreign service in the Tenasserim Provinces, the Straits of Malacca, China, and Aden; the corps ordered abroad comprising two at Moulmein, one in the Straits, two in China, and one at Aden.

In accordance with the recent instructions of the Government of India, however, the practice has been again reverted to, and the option was accordingly given to the 42nd Regiment as formerly.

42. This brief review of the various occasions on which the Madras sepoys have been employed on foreign service appears to me distinctly to establish the following facts:

1st. That the employment of our sepoys on foreign service has been invariably recognised as being on their parts altogether voluntary.

2nd. That while admitting this principle, it has been the constant object of our whole system, by attaching *peculiar advantages* to such service, to render our sepoys willing cheerfully to proceed upon it whenever required.

3rd. That originally the sepoys were obtained for foreign service *individually*, as volunteers, but that as the subject became familiar to them, and as the particular advantages attached to it became more generally known, the practice of calling for volunteers was gradually altered into what has now been the established system of the Madras army for the last 30 years, of at once naming a regiment for the duty, so as that to proceed on foreign service should come to be looked upon by the men as the rule, and that unwillingness so to serve should be deemed the exception.

43. How entirely this system has proved effectual is at once shown by the fact that, not to include battalions of volunteers and some thousands of recruits, no fewer than 45 of our regular corps have already taken their tour of foreign service ; that of these 45, two have actually served three times, and nine of them twice, and that *all*, without a single exception, have proceeded on such service with their own cheerful acquiescence, and without any extra or additional inducements being held out in any case.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9th | Native | Infantry | - Amboyna, 1795; Ceylon, 1797; Ava, 1824. |
| 24th | „ | „ | - Amboyna, 1795; Isle of France, 1810; Penang. |
| 1st | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1795; Ava, 1825. |
| 6th | „ | „ | - Isle of France, 1810; China, 1842. |
| 7th | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1795; Ava, 1824. |
| 12th | „ | „ | - Ava, 1824; Penang, 1836. |
| 14th | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1798; China, 1842. |
| 19th | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1818; Moulmein, 1838. |
| 23rd | „ | „ | - Amboyna, 1795; Malacca, 1832. |
| 29th | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1818; Malacca, 1831. |
| 36th | „ | „ | - Ceylon, 1818; Ava, 1826. |

44. Further, I consider it to be also distinctly proved that it has at all times been usual for the Madras sepoys to be retained on foreign service for the full period of a three years' tour, in the performance of garrison duty, after hostilities have ceased, whether the stations have been permanently added to the Company's territories, or whether they have been occupied only for a time.

That the sepoys have been found at all times perfectly willing to embark, notwithstanding that they have been fully aware of the extent of actual sickness and mortality, and of the privations they would have to encounter, as well in regard to provisions as from the nature of the service generally.

That foreign service has invariably been understood by them to mean employment beyond sea, out of their own presidency, or, in other words, out of their own country, where their families could not follow or be with them; no distinction having ever been known to them, or having ever been attempted by the Government, between active service or garrison duty, or between the Company's territories and the territories of any other Power, whether British or foreign.

*Note.*—Thus, for example:—The 16th Regiment, as already noticed, was considered as on foreign service while in garrison at Chittagong, and the same regiment having been ordered in 1844 to proceed by sea from Belgaum to Surat, the men immediately claimed the usual foreign service allowances.

I wrote to a friend at Bombay on hearing of this, stating that had the regiment been ordered to proceed *by land*, I believed the men would have marched without saying a word; and four days after the despatch of my letter, my adjutant general received a communication from the officer commanding the regiment, making precisely the same statement and nearly in the same words.

45. It remains for me to offer my opinion upon the following points:—

1st. That garrison duty in China has been the cause of serious discontent amongst our Native troops.

2nd. That a marked distinction ought to be made between garrison service within the Company's territories, which the State has a right to expect, and service in distant colonies or countries, which ought to be voluntary.

3rd. That the avowed insecurity of our present system ought at the earliest period to be rectified.

46. Upon the first point I have already shown that such service has not been unusual ; and I would now observe that the feeling of unwillingness evinced by the 2nd and 41st Regiments to remain in China has had no connection whatever

ever with the mere circumstance of their being employed on garrison duty, but that it has been occasioned solely by their having originally embarked under what they certainly appear to have understood as a distinct promise that they were to return to India on the termination of the war.

47. The troops in China have never been exposed to any privations at all equal to those endured by the corps employed in Ava, nor have they suffered to any greater extent from sickness.

The 2nd Regiment has lost, during nearly three years' service, 1321 by death, and has sent back to India sick 69. In other respects the corps has been remarkably healthy, comfortably quartered, and plentifully supplied with good provisions.

*Note.*—The 1st Regiment lost, between October and May 1824-25, forty-one men by death, and sent back to India sick, 205.

The 41st Regiment, exposed to the unwholesome climate of Hong Kong, badly quartered, and badly fed, lost 181, and sent back 61.

*Note.*—The 10th and 16th Regiments lost by death, between July 1824 and January 1825, 292 men, and sent back to India sick, 272.

The 4th Regiment has indeed suffered severely, having already lost in China by death 186, and sent back to India sick, 277; but this corps embarked for Hong Kong in a very sickly state, 40 men having died at Singapore, and 243 having been sent back sick to Madras, while the surgeon of the regiment had reported that many, though doing their duty, were unequal to a march of a few miles; and yet, in the midst of all this sickness and mortality, this good old regiment has never uttered one word of complaint, nor ever asked to be relieved.

EXTRACT from Letter from Major General D'Aguilar, dated 23rd September 1844.

"No care or consideration shall be wanting towards the sepoys who, amidst sickness as sudden in its later effects as unparalleled, have evinced throughout the most exemplary patience and good conduct."

48. With the full knowledge of all that has been suffered by their fellow-soldiers, and after having witnessed the successive debarkations of the numerous invalids of the 4th Regiment in particular, with whom they have been in constant and immediate communication when on duty at the Presidency Hospital, the 42nd Regiment has embarked without a moment's hesitation on the same duty; and not only without a single man asking for his removal or discharge, of which all had the free option, but with the addition of a number of recruits* enlisted after the order had been issued, and of several† men from other corps, who exchanged into the regiment for the purpose of joining relations, including four from the 6th Regiment, Native Infantry, who had already been in China.

* 25.
† 34.

49. Stronger proofs could not be adduced, I think, to show that the sepoys have not objected to remain in China, and do not now object to proceed there, merely on account of the particular nature of the service.

50. Upon the second point, I have shown that no such distinction has ever been known; and I would now state the grounds upon which I consider that no such distinction ought ever to be attempted.

51. The one essential characteristic of all foreign service, in the estimation of our native troops, lies in the single circumstance of its permanently separating them from their families by sea. This is the one great distinction with them, between foreign service and service of whatever description elsewhere. When once this absolute separation from their families takes place, it makes not the slightest difference to the sepoys for what particular purpose it is to be endured. Whether for active service, or for garrison duty; whether in Ava or at Singapore; whether at Aden or Hong Kong, the case to them is precisely the same. They are separated by the sea from their families and homes, and they endure all the discomfort of this separation, which to men accustomed, as our sepoys are, always to have their families around them, who prepare their meals, and who provide for all their other personal wants, is undoubtedly very great. They are stationed in what to them is a perfectly foreign country, among a people differing from them in language, in religion, and in customs; and whether it happens to be the territory of the Company or of the Crown, or whether it is held only for a time from any other power, all these things remain precisely the same. Thus the 7th Regiment, after the conquest of Martaban, and other places in the Tenasserim Provinces, remained in garrison at Tavoy and Merqui. By the subsequent

treaty of peace those places were ceded to the East India Company, but the mere accident of a treaty could obviously make no difference to the sepoys. To them the places remained exactly the same, the service there involving just the same separation from their families, and just the same discomfort; and accordingly the troops at those stations have continued to serve there on precisely the same conditions to this day. And so with Aden, and Hong Kong, and Chusan. It matters nothing to the sepoy that one treaty has made Aden a Company's possession, or that another has made Hong Kong a possession of the Crown, while Chusan is eventually to revert to the government of China. It would not make the slightest difference to him were the cases reversed, or were all to belong to the Company, or all to the Crown, or to anybody else. His position at each would remain exactly the same. By no mere distinction of name could he be enabled to imagine a difference, really not existing, in his own personal condition.

52. I have no hesitation, therefore, in expressing my conviction that the distinction cannot be made, and I must add that, in my opinion, in justice to the sepoy, it ought not. We have, I consider, no right to expect that our sepoys shall proceed on such service, otherwise than with their own free will. We have no right to require them to quit their own country and to be separated from their families and all domestic ties, and to endure the privation of service beyond sea among a foreign people, and to expose themselves to the sickness which usually attends it, excepting as we are able to make it their own voluntary act, by granting them additional allowances for such service, sufficient to compensate them for the hardships it involves.

53. This has been our fundamental principle throughout, a principle dictated alike by justice and by policy; and thus the constant aim of our whole system hitherto has been to assure ourselves of the cheerful acquiescence of the men.

54. It has been inferred, as following from this, that our system rests upon an insecure footing; and it is considered, which is the remaining point upon which I have to remark, that this ought, at the earliest period, to be rectified.

55. I am quite willing to admit that this insecurity exists; but I believe that practically its existence depends upon ourselves, and that instead of arising out of our own proper system, it has been occasioned solely by interference with it and departure from it.

56. It is quite true, as I consider, that if a regiment should be found unwilling to embark, the men could not and ought not to be compelled. I must explain, however, that practically this supposition includes two very different cases, which would require to be very differently dealt with. If the refusal proceeded simply from dislike to the nature of the service, there being no other ground for such dislike but the mere feeling of the men, though I should still not consider it either politic or just to use compulsion, I should certainly feel myself quite at
c liberty to deal with the regiment as deserving to be held up to the rest of the army as having disgraced itself by shrinking from a duty which all before had cheerfully fulfilled. But if the refusal proceeded from dissatisfaction, occasioned by reduction of the allowances before attached to the service, and forming practically, as understood by the men, the established conditions of foreign service, the case would be altogether different. It would be not of the slightest avail then to punish the particular regiment, for all other corps being alike interested, and all sharing in the same feeling, that so long as the Government fulfilled its engagements and granted the usual conditions of foreign service, they were in duty and in honour bound to go; but that if the Government refused these allowances, they were under no such obligation. Such of the regiments as had already served on the old allowances would consider the refusal nothing more than right, and those still remaining to take their tour would undoubtedly follow the example.

57. This is no theory, but simply a deduction from actual facts. The first of the above cases I do not anticipate, at least during the 80 years of which we have had experience it has never yet occurred. Nearly the whole of the Madras Infantry have actually been found willing to embark, and not only is there not a single instance on record of their having evinced the slightest backwardness in regard to the particular nature of the service, but men have actually been known

to

to hurry down from a distance by forced marches, lest they should not be in time for embarkation. Of the second case, however, there have been examples, as in the instances of the 2nd and 41st, and 47th Regiments, when upon the one sole ground of reduction of allowances, the men displayed unwillingness to proceed on foreign service, but the moment the men's minds were satisfied on that one point of objection, all unwillingness instantaneously ceased to exist.

58. Since the war in Ava, in addition to the reduction in the rate of batta, which of course affects the great body of the sepoys personally, reductions have been made in the amount of pensions to heirs, and the indulgence of pensions to heirs of men dying after their return to the coast, established by Sir Thomas Munro in 1825, has been withdrawn.* These latter reductions have directly affected all ranks in the one particular on which they are the most sensitive, and they feel that foreign service has been curtailed in the most important of all its advantages. I am borne out by all experience in affirming that had no such reductions been made, no manifestation of unwillingness to embark on foreign service would ever have been known. The insecurity therefore which may now exist must be attributed not to our system, but to the acts of the Government itself, in making alterations in it, and it follows that if no such alterations are made no such insecurity, as established by long experience, is practically to be apprehended.

*Note.*—My remarks here refer only to the allowances specially affecting foreign service.

Among the changes which have been made in the allowances, &c., of the army generally, there are some which, singly considered, are no doubt to the sepoys' advantages, but taken in the aggregate I believe they are not so, and are certainly not at all popular with the sepoys themselves.

59. Although making conditions for general service with recruits, previous to enlistment, might give the appearance of justice to any punishment awarded for an infraction of them, nevertheless a knowledge of their ignorance, when they first enter the army, induces me now to believe it would not prove of the slightest avail. Our young recruits have little thought beyond the moment, and they might easily be got to engage to serve in any part of the world; but this would not hinder them for an instant from refusing to embark, should they afterwards be required to go on board ship, on what they would then, for the first time, come practically to understand were not the same allowances as had been enjoyed by others before them. It is when the sepoys come to make out their family certificates, and when their wives and mothers also come to understand distinctly, as a matter of their own personal concern, what provision will be made for them should they lose their husbands or their sons; it is then that the subject comes first to be really considered, and that the feelings of the men are first excited.

It might in such case be lawful to use compulsion; but I cannot think that such a course would be either wise or useful in the native army. It must prove injurious to the credit of the Government, if the wives and families of the sepoys are left in discontent and distress in India, whilst their husbands or sons are serving under compulsion abroad; and until the whole social system of the population of this Presidency be altered, the sepoy cannot carry his wife or family with him on foreign service, even if it were practicable or desirable, which it is not, that a passage should be provided for them at the public expense; neither can he leave them without support, so that it is in fact absolutely necessary for the sepoy on such occasions to have the means of providing for the maintenance of those dependent on him.

60. But besides that the introduction of any special stipulation to serve within particular limits would not be effectual, I consider that it would be, in effect, injurious.

Any alteration of this nature must at once attract attention, and must unavoidably tend to suggest to all already enlisted without such stipulation, that they are not under any similar obligation.

Nor do I see how it could be established with fairness to the men themselves.

It will be obvious that our young recruits can understand nothing whatever of what is meant by the "Company's territories," and therefore that they can know nothing of the extent of the obligation they incur; moreover, those territories themselves are continually changing; and thus, if construed to mean the

* Since restored by order of the Court of Directors, G. O. C., 24th January 1845.

the territories as existing at the time of each man's enlistment, which in fairness it ought to be, the men of the same corps in a very few years' time would come to be placed on different limitations of service.

61. The Madras sepoy makes a declaration to serve the Government with truth and loyalty; faithfully to obey the orders of all officers set over him, and never to abandon his colours, but to defend them with his life.

This, supported by the various advantages which the Government have most wisely and justly granted, has hitherto been found amply sufficient to ensure the needy and willing service of our sepoys whenever and wherever required; and it certainly appears to me, that in a question of so great importance, the difference of so many years should at least render us slow to make change.

62. I know of but one effectual remedy for the existing insecurity, and which would apply as much to the European as to the native soldier. It is, that the full advantages formerly attached to foreign service should be restored, and that they should be scrupulously maintained inviolate.

63. I think it right in conclusion, to express my opinion that upon this, as upon all questions in any manner affecting our native troops, it is of the utmost importance for us to bear in mind as a great, and I believe, an unalterable principle, that the native army of this Presidency possesses a character peculiar to itself, to which I shall now advert; and that it should consequently be left as much as possible under its own peculiar system; since measures which may be most appropriate for other armies, may often be ill-adapted, or even quite unadapted to this.

64. The native army of this Presidency, it should always be remembered, though essentially mercenary, possessing nothing of a national character, and not under the influence of any national feeling of loyalty properly called, is yet at the same time not purely mercenary, for what, as in the British army is the result of national feeling, has been produced in this, to a considerable extent, by the continued operation of various causes arising out of our particular system.

65. The Madras sepoys usually enter the service when very young; sometimes as offering them the best, or perhaps the only means of subsistence, and sometimes, as in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery generally, from hereditary preference to the army as their proper family calling.

Their regiment thenceforward becomes their permanent home, for they have rarely any other tie, or any other view than that of passing the rest of their lives in the service, hoping to obtain promotion, and sure of succeeding, in course of time, to a sufficient pension.

Few, comparatively, ever think of quitting the ranks under any other circumstances; all, after a few years' service, marry; and their wives, mothers, sisters, and other relatives and dependents, mostly living with the corps, each regiment constitutes a sort of military colony*; distinct in many of its habits and feelings generally, and bound together, and to the service, by peculiar ties.

Amongst themselves is the common feeling of association as belonging to the same corps and to the same army; and the strong sense they have of the obligation by which they are bound in common with the natives of this country generally, to assist in the maintenance of their poor relations; added to which, there exists throughout the cavalry, and in all the old regiments of infantry, a feeling of family connection with our service; through several successive generations, from the first formation of our native army.

Intimately connected with these feelings, or rather forming the essential principle by which they have been induced, are the great advantages offered by our service, especially in the certainty of full and punctual payment, and in the permanent provision secured for themselves for life, and for their families, by our pension establishment; coupled with the unlimited confidence which, until recently, constant experience had brought the sepoys to entertain in the stability of our system, and the irrevocable character of all our engagements.

This, in fact, has been the foundation on which the peculiar character of our army

* Each regiment of native infantry may be estimated as comprising an average aggregate of from 3,500 to 4,000 souls.

army has been formed; and on this, and on the feeling which has arisen out of it, our officers have been able to establish, often to a remarkable extent, a spirit of attachment to the "Company's service," in preference to all others, and personally also to themselves.

Altogether their character is such as has, I believe, never belonged to any other body of mercenary troops.

It differs essentially from that of the German auxiliaries or free companies of former times in Europe, who, serving for pay, would never hesitate to take whichever side could give the highest terms. This, indeed, was a common practice with sepoys also, in the days of Lawrence and Clive; but it gradually ceased, and very noble proofs were afterwards given by our men of fidelity to their colours, in circumstances of extreme temptation, when, in the wars with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sooltan, constant attempts were made to induce them to take service against us.

They perhaps most resemble the Swiss corps, formerly in the French and other Continental services; faithful to their employers, not from any national feeling, but from having been for successive generations in their pay, and having thus become personally identified with them in all their military character.

And as we know was the proverb with the Swiss then, so with the sepoy now, "No pay, no soldier," while like the Swiss, if only the terms of his contract be faithfully fulfilled by his employers, the sepoy is found invariably true and faithful to the Government he serves.

The whole fabric rests on this one foundation—the certainty of personal advantage secured to them, as the general rule, for life: any alteration in the peculiar benefits which have been for years past attached to our service, and which have from long enjoyment become familiar to all as its sure *mamool*, its established *custom*, directly shakes the whole structure. Considering, therefore, the peculiar character and constitution of the army of this Presidency, I cannot but feel deep regret that so many changes should have been made without an opportunity being afforded to this Government to offer their opinions previous to those changes being adopted.

The men composing the Madras army are as perfectly distinct in their habits and feelings from the armies of the other Presidencies as are, for example, the Germans and French; they are, in fact, just as much *nationally* different; and far from having any sort of fellow-feeling, they look upon and speak of each other as belonging to distinct countries; so that even the men from Hindoostan, of whom a few hundreds are to be found in the ranks of the Madras army, invariably designate themselves as "foreigners."

Each army has now for many years gone forward successfully under its own system; and I certainly think that all our experience has very plainly shown it to be our wisest, as well as our safest course, to make as few changes as possible.

The advantages of a general assimilation in the Indian armies, recruited from a population extending over so many different countries, connected with one another by no one common tie, either national or military, I believe to be at best but very doubtful; of its positive evils we have had some lamentable proofs, and I can only hope that future times may not afford a repetition of them.

(signed) *Tweeddale.*

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MINUTE by the Most Noble the Marquis of *Tweeddale*, dated 28th March 1845.

I HAVE already placed on record a full statement of the grounds upon which I consider that employment on foreign service, of whatever description, must always be perfectly voluntary on the part of the native troops, and that the distinction between garrison service within the East India Company's territories as a duty "which the State has a right to expect," and for which the Hon. Mr. Chamier is of opinion "no option should be allowed," and service in distant countries which ought to be "voluntary," cannot and ought not to be made.

2. I have only therefore now further to observe, that in the instances of the 2nd, and 41st, and 47th Regiments, the Government have had, as it appears to me, sufficiently decided proof, that however deservedly high the reputation of the Madras sepoys for their soldierlike feeling, the distinction between active field service and garrison duty has not been, and never will be, found to have the effect of rendering them willing to embark on board ship, under any reduction of established allowances.

3. The 2nd and 41st Regiments were required for active field service in China; they were dissatisfied, because of the reduction in the rates of family pension, and had they not received what in their estimation was tantamount to a promise that the old rates should be allowed, I believe there is a good reason for considering that they would not have consented to embark.

4. The 47th Regiment was required for active field service in Scind. They were dissatisfied on account of the usual promise of rations having been withheld, when at the same time they were called on to prepare their family certificates previous to embarkation, and without the grant of rations the Government are aware that the regiment would certainly have refused to proceed.

5. I may add that, in my opinion, the danger of refusal is quite as great under any system of volunteering as under the present arrangement, and with this important difference, that after having once had recourse to a call for volunteers, and having met with a refusal, the Government would be absolutely helpless, there would remain no other measure to which they could have resort. The Government will remember that the men of the 47th Regiment were in vain called upon to volunteer as soldiers; their willingness to go on foreign service I never had the slightest reason to doubt, and the moment the usual rations were granted, and which enabled the sepoys to make out their family certificates, every man was found instantly willing to embark; equally vain would it then have been found to call for volunteers from any other corps had the rations still been withheld, as the same desire to provide for the wants of their families during their absence is equally felt by the whole native army.

6. As explained in my former Minute, foreign service is really voluntary; every man having his free option either to go or stay; but if with that option, any regiment should decline the duty, the Government may, I think, rest satisfied that it would be to no purpose whatever then to call for volunteers. The refusal would to a certainty rest upon the one sole ground of pay and allowances, and as certainly upon that same ground, the same refusal would unquestionably be pronounced by every other corps in the native army.

(signed) *Tweeddale.*

# EAST INDIA (NATIVE TROOPS).

COPY of MINUTES by the Most Noble the Marquis of *Tweeddale*, K.T., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of *Madras*, of 6th March 1845 and 28th March 1845, upon the System under which NATIVE TROOPS of that Presidency are Employed on FOREIGN SERVICE.

*(Sir James Fergusson.)*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
4 *April* 1867.

191. *Under 2 oz.*

# EAST INDIA (ARMY OFFICERS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 7 April 1870;—*for*,

"COPY of a LETTER from the Government of *India*, dated the 18th day of October 1869, No. 364, with its Enclosures, and of the REPLY of the Secretary of State for *India*, dated the 18th day of February 1870, No. 37, regarding the proposed Scheme for offering some inducement to FIELD OFFICERS of the INDIAN ARMY to RETIRE (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 140, of Session 1869)."

Military Department, India Office, 11 April 1870.

T. T. PEARS, Major General, Military Secretary.

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The Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State for India; dated Simla, 18th October 1869, No. 364. (Military.)

My Lord Duke,

YOUR Grace's Despatch, No. 73, of the 11th March last, on the subject of offering some inducement to Field Officers to retire, has been for some time under our consideration, and we now beg to enclose papers as per accompanying list, for the further consideration of your Grace.

2. We are of opinion that sufficient ground is shown in the memoranda and notes prepared by Major General Norman and Colonel Broome to justify our suggesting that your Grace should re-consider the terms of your Despatch, though we have no desire to press upon your Grace the adoption of any scheme of the kind under discussion, if your Grace on full review of all that is said, feels such a scheme to be inexpedient.

3. There are, however, certain instructions conveyed in the Despatch under acknowledgment to which we have given our attention, and on which certain orders have been issued by us, and on which we desire to offer observations.

4. Your Grace desires that all the young officers who have entered the service since 1858 under special conditions, and who have not yet qualified for staff employment by passing in the Native languages, shall be informed that in the event of their not so qualifying within a certain period, they will be removed from the service.

5. We have thought that to allow a period of 18 months for this purpose will be liberal and sufficient, and we have issued an order to this effect, which will be communicated by letter direct to every officer concerned.

6. With regard to the order of your Grace that officers borne on the Cadres of the late Indian army who have not passed in the languages, should be employed on the staff in such positions as they may be thought fitted for, we would strongly represent to your Grace that it is very inexpedient to carry out such a departure from rules which have existed since 1837, and have for many years past been rigorously enforced.

7. Such a measure will be viewed as a hardship by those officers who, carrying out the desire of Government, have qualified in the languages and thereby have become entitled, under the rules of the service, to expect that appointments and

promotions in departments, &c., were alone to be bestowed upon them, and upon others similarly qualified.

8. Such a rule would operate, as far as it *could* operate, with peculiar hardship at a time when considerable reductions are impending in the three Presidencies, by which many deserving officers will lose appointments, and whose interests demand our special care.

9. Moreover, it is to be remarked that as there is a superfluity of superior officers, there will usually be two or more candidates for every vacant appointment; and in such case the best officer should be selected, who will ordinarily be one who has taken the trouble to qualify in the languages.

10. The number of unpassed officers who entered prior to 1858 is now small, and on a full consideration we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that to give effect to the instructions on this point would only produce an extremely limited effect in reducing the number of unemployed officers, while the mere issue of an order to the effect contemplated would create an impression of hardship on the minds of the great body of officers who have complied with the regulations and qualified in the Native languages.

11. Paragraph 56 of your Grace's Despatch desires that a report be furnished in the case of each officer whom it may not be considered desirable to retain in active employment, by reason either of questionable conduct or intellectual incapacity, in view to his removal from the effective list.

12. We have already on more than one occasion since receipt of the Despatch, submitted to your Grace the cases of officers who seemed to come within its terms, and we shall continue this course whenever occasion arises; but we have a difficulty in carrying out these instructions in a general way, especially with unemployed officers, for it is only when an officer commits an act of grave misconduct, or signally fails in some way or other, that we can confidently submit the case as coming within the terms of your Grace's instructions.

13. We shall, however, ask the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to forward for our consideration the cases of any officer who they may deem to come under the terms of paragraph 56 of the Despatch.

14. As the Despatch itself has been long under consideration, and as we have thought it our duty to address your Grace on certain points referred to in it, and as it was long since published in the public papers, it has not seemed to us expedient now formally to republish the Despatch in the "Gazette of India."

We are &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
*W. R. Mansfield.*
*H. M. Durand.*
*J. Strachey.*

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

THE Secretary of State replies at length to the Despatch addressed to him by the Government of India, on the 7th November 1868, on the subject of the present condition and future prospects of the Staff Corps, and which made certain proposals in view to inducing some of the senior officers to retire.

The Duke of Argyll rejects the proposals; states that they would involve an absolute pecuniary loss to the State, instead of being economical as believed by the Government of India; argues that the apprehensions as to there being a vast number of officers hereafter on Colonels' allowances, is exaggerated; does not admit the existence of the administrative difficulties felt by the Government from there being an unduly large body of field officers; proposes certain measures other than those advocated by the Government of India for the reduction of the number of unemployed officers; and finally, expresses regret that the fact of a scheme for retirement having been submitted should have become public, and begs that in future in all possible cases, the views of Her Majesty's Government should be ascertained before a proposal of this nature is made the subject of general and departmental investigation.

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The Despatch is accompanied by a report on the financial bearings of the proposals prepared by Major General Hannyngton, well known as an actuary of ability.

Prior to the general submission of this Despatch for orders, the Controller General of Military Expenditure was requested to offer any observations on it that might occur to him; and his memorandum, which I have had printed, is put up with the papers.*

I also annex a memorandum by myself. I do not submit this as a matter of duty as Secretary to Government, but as due to myself individually; for the proposals of the Government of India so strongly objected to by the Secretary of State, were in a great measure founded on the views taken by Colonel Broome, and then, after full consideration of Colonel Broome's memorandum, by myself, and my views were expressed, not as Secretary to Government, but as then holding the position of temporary Member of Council. I therefore hope that my own separate memorandum may be forwarded to the Secretary of State, not in the expectation that the decision arrived at by Her Majesty's Government will now be altered, but as in some sort my own vindication for submitting proposals which have been so absolutely and entirely rejected.

As the decision is expressed in very positive terms, it is presumed that there is nothing to be done by the Government, save to give effect, as far as possible, to the instructions contained in the Despatch, and to reply to it.

I will, therefore, proceed to offer some remarks and suggestions as to the measures to be taken in consequence of this Despatch:—

1st. Should the Despatch be published to the Army, or its substance be briefly made known?

It appears to me that it should not be published in its entirety, notwithstanding that Mr. Grant Duff said in the House of Commons, in reply to a question that the Despatch if moved for by any one would be given as an unopposed return. But being *so* made public is one thing, and being published by the Government of India in the "Gazette" is another thing. The tone throughout is greatly that of censure on the Government for endeavouring to bring about a remedy for what was believed to be an evil, involving large and growing expense, and, as I believe, that the conclusions of the Despatch will be strenously disputed, it appears to me that all that should be announced is the resolution of Her Majesty's Government not to hold out any inducements to retire, with perhaps a very brief announcement that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, such inducements would be contrary to economy, and do not seem called for on other considerations, accompanied by a statement of such measures as have to be carried out in pursuance of the orders of Her Majesty's Government.

*Note.*—Since this part of my note was written, the whole correspondence has been published at Home, and is, of course, known to every one who takes an interest in it. The question still remains whether it should be published in its entirety in the "Gazette of India."

*H. W. N.*, 5-6-69.

The next point is to give effect to the orders with respect to unemployed officers in view to the reduction of this class.

In the first place, the Commander in Chief in India and the Governments of Madras and Bombay, may be asked at once to divide all those unemployed officers who may have been borne on the cadres of regiments of the old Indian Army into two classes as follows:

I. Those qualified in all respects for employment;

II. Those not qualified for employment.

In making this classification, the conditions of paragraphs 53 and 54 of the Despatch must be observed.

Those included under the first heading should be employed as early as may be practicable, and of each of those included under the second head, a special report should be made in accordance with paragraph 56 of the Despatch. In connection with this point, a General Order will have to be issued, allowing of the employment in staff situations for which they may be thought fit of unpassed officers who were borne on any regimental cadre prior to the re-organization of the Army.

Next, in accordance with paragraph 55, each of the officers who entered the service since 1858, will have to be addressed in a separate letter, and told that if he does not qualify in the languages, he will be removed from the service. It is left to this Government to fix this period, and as possibly some of these officers may not as yet have studied at all, and the higher standard examination is not easy, the limit of 18 months may not be considered too extended. By the last Army Lists, there were of this class of officers still unqualified in the languages—

| | |
|---|---|
| | 30 in Bengal. |
| | 28 in Madras. |
| | 7 in Bombay. |
| TOTAL - - - | 65 |

The

* As I have detailed its principal points in my own separate memorandum, it is perhaps unnecessary for me to allude to them here.

The fourth point is connected with paragraph 52 of the Secretary of State's Despatch, which says that until all qualified officers of the Indian Army are provided for, the admissions to the staff corps from the line should to some extent be restricted.

Officers are only admitted from the line at present to fill actual vacancies either at the bottom of departments (civil or military), or as subalterns in Native Regiments.

It does not seem that there are many surplus Indian officers for this kind of employment. Of course to such extent as officers may now become available under the paragraph removing the regulation restricting employment of unpassed officers, a proportionate decrease of admissions will take place, but this will not be of much magnitude.

In Madras and Bombay, the admissions are small, and probably will have to go on at least at the present rate. The number of probationers in these two Presidencies is 24 and 28 respectively, which represent the admissions of a longer period than one year.

In Bengal, the admissions are greater, the number of probationers on 1st April being 82; but then no one was admitted, save to an actual vacancy in a situation appropriate to a young officer.

However, of course it may be explained to the Commander in Chief, and to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, that in filling vacancies in departments or corps, available unemployed officers, who may be considered fit, are to be used in preference to bringing in probationers from the line.

The fifth point on which orders are necessary is the reply to be sent to the Secretary of State, the tenor of which of course will be decided by the Governor General in Council, on a perusal of all that is before Government; and with respect to this I do not desire to offer any opinion, but I think it well here to draw attention to the circumstance that the Despatch concludes by expressing the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that, in all possible cases, the views of Her Majesty's Government should be ascertained before a proposal of this nature is made the subject of general and departmental investigation. It does not appear how the Government *could*, in the present case, come to an opinion on a matter which was attracting attention and discussion as a serious evil without having it investigated in all its bearings. The proposals *followed* this investigation and report, rather than, as apparently implied in the Despatch, the proposal being made the subject of investigation.

I can certainly say for myself that it was only on a study of Colonel Broome's Report that I arrived at any decided idea of what was best to be done.

It appears to me to have been entirely in accordance with official practice that the Government, having a representation before it from the Commander in Chief showing the number of surplus officers of rank, and feeling that this was an evil which must result in increased and useless expenditure, should cause the matter to be investigated by its proper officer, which report would naturally include any suggestions which occurred to that officer as likely to meet the difficulty.

Out of these inquiries and suggestions arose the proposal. To address the Home Government on the subject of an alleged evil without having the circumstances and extent of that evil previously investigated is certainly contrary to practice, and seems opposed to the recognised mode of conducting public business.

Is any notice to be taken of this injunction and implied censure?

There is but one point remaining to be adverted to, viz., the fact stated by the Secretary of State, that the submission by this Government of a scheme for retirement became known here and in England before Her Majesty's Government were aware that such a scheme was in contemplation.

I doubt the fact of its being known for certain that such a scheme was in contemplation until, at all events, Her Majesty's Government had received it. For years past the matter has been agitated and discussed, individual officers have prepared schemes and sent or given them to various officials, including, I believe, the late Viceroy. It was therefore of course to a certain extent taken for granted that Government were considering the question thus brought before it, but I think until recently nothing more was known.

The Secretary of State says that Sir Stafford Northcote, in reply to a question put to him in the House of Commons on 3rd April 1868, said that no retiring scheme was contemplated, although, on 23rd May *following*, the Controller General of Military Expenditure sent in his memorandum on the subject. As this memorandum was not sent in at Simla till seven weeks after Sir Stafford Northcote made his reply in the House, and as it was not till some months after the receipt of the memorandum that the Government arrived at the conclusion that it would be well to induce retirements, it was not wonderful that Sir Stafford should have been ignorant of Government contemplating a scheme which, in truth, they did not contemplate till five or six months after the date of his reply in the House of Commons.

Prior to Government arriving at a decision, I do not believe any article or information in the papers was in the slightest degree authentic, though of course, as some of the documents before Government came from individual officers—Colonel Hervey, of the Thuggee Department, for instance—very likely those documents were furnished to the press by themselves or their friends. They, however, were simply schemes prepared by individuals, and, as far as I recollect, were never stated to be approved by Government.

Paragraph 59 of the Despatch states that, in the "Calcutta Review" of August 1868, a paper was published on the subject of a retiring scheme bearing the clearest marks of having

having been written by one who had access to at least a portion of the papers submitted subsequently to Her Majesty's Government. I never saw the article until my attention was directed to it by this very paragraph of the Despatch, but I have since ascertained who was the author. He has assured me that he saw no official papers of any kind, and in fact the article itself shows this.

Nor had he any idea as to the views of Government on the subject.

I was personally anxious that the scheme should not become public, but knowing how much such matters as this are talked of, often through inadvertence, was agreeably surprised to find that for several weeks after the Despatch had been sent off no word as to the fact transpired.

At last, about the middle of December, a short paragraph in the "Madras Athenæum" contained a very correct abstract of what had been recommended.

How it reached that paper I have not the slightest knowledge or suspicion.

From that period the newspapers wrote constantly on the subject, and it was discussed in military circles more or less incorrectly for several weeks, but nothing nearly as authentic as the statement in the "Athenæum" appeared, and some of the statements were exaggerated and mischievous. Where they came from I have no means of knowing. My own share in the matter is explained in a few words. About the middle of January, when very inaccurate reports on the subject were circulating, a gentleman connected with the press called on me and asked for information on the subject, and as the scheme had been dispatched more than two months previously, I did then give him confidentially more accurate information than was then in circulation, but not more accurate, though perhaps a little more detailed, than that given six weeks previously in the Madras paper. I also told him that I had reason, from private information, to believe the scheme would not be accepted. This gentleman, in whom I believe all departments have placed confidence, made a rather larger use of the information than I intended or expected; but he did not originate it, or, I think, in reality give the scheme a more authentic appearance than it previously had, but still he put it in such a shape that I was sorry for having made the communication.

This is all that ever went from me, or, I believe, from any one at all connected with this department, to the press directly or indirectly.

It remains now for orders to be passed on the several points adverted to in this note.

*H. W. N.*, 5-6-69.

*P.S.*—A further memorandum from Colonel Broome, received after the foregoing was written, is also put up. Also now a third memorandum, dated 3rd July 1869.

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MEMORANDUM by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, on the Despatch of the Secretary of State, No. 73, of 11th March 1869, replying to Despatch from the Government of India proposing a Scheme to induce Lieutenant Colonels to retire from the Indian Army.

I HAD prepared a memorandum on this Despatch when the publication, by authority, of the Secretary of State at Home of the whole correspondence connected with the proposed retiring scheme, led me to think it desirable to alter, and in fact to re-write the memorandum.

I have separately prepared the usual office note on the Despatch in my capacity of Secretary to Government; but as I was a temporary Member of Council, when the proposals of the Government of India were made, it seems to me fair that I should individually have the opportunity of vindicating myself for taking a prominent part in suggesting proposals which have been so absolutely rejected, on both financial and administrative grounds, by the Secretary of State.

The Controller General has furnished his memorandum on the Despatch, the first idea of which originated from his report of the 23rd May 1868 on the present state and future condition of the Staff Corps, and this will, I presume, form part of the enclosures to any Despatch sent by the Governor General in Council in reply to the Secretary of State.

I venture, respectfully, to submit my request that my memorandum may also be sent, for though I am exceedingly anxious to avoid any appearance of continuing to press a scheme objected to by Her Majesty's Government, or any modification of that scheme, it seems quite impossible for me not to endeavour to defend myself from the reflection thrown by the publication of the Duke of Argyll's Despatch on those who had a hand in a proposal condemned in such unqualified terms in that Despatch; and I have therefore thought it right to prepare this memorandum, and trust I shall not be thought guilty of any disrespect in so doing.

I would propose to deal with the subject in four parts,—first, to detail the circumstances which led to the proposals of the Government of India; secondly, to advert to the objections to those proposals on financial grounds, as set forth in the Despatch of the Secretary of State; thirdly, to reply to some of the objections raised in that Despatch on administrative grounds; and, fourthly, to briefly note the probable effect of the measures ordered by the Secretary of State to meet the evils complained of.

The mode of carrying out the orders of the Secretary of State has been entered into in my office note as Secretary, and need not here be alluded to.

First, then, as to the circumstances which led the Government of India to make a proposal in view to the inducement of a certain number of superior officers to retire.

For several years past the newspapers, both in India and in England, have teemed with articles and letters on the subject of the number of unemployed officers of rank in the Indian service, pointing out how the number was increasing, and how ruinous the system was in a financial point of view, while the unemployed officers themselves, though drawing good pay with next to nothing to do, were discontented, and many of them anxious to retire, and thus relieve the State of their presence, which was in some sort an inconvenience, and of the difference between their Indian pay and whatever might be given them in the shape of annuity or retiring pension.

There was a general sort of anticipation (not in the slightest degree fostered, as far as I know, by any in authority), that one result of the two popularly called "Grievance Commissions," which assembled in 1863 and 1865, would be the promulgation of some scheme for the clearance of superfluous officers. None of the measures resulting from the reports of these commissions, however, tended in this direction, while the boon of colonels' allowances to every lieutenant colonel of the staff corps of 12 years' service, and the simultaneous admissions of all Indian officers to the staff corps, who please to enter it, as conceded in 1866, and the increased impetus thereby given to the promotion of officers who remained "local," and their much earlier prospect of colonels' allowances brought retirements almost to a stand-still, and rendered any prospect of more than very rare and occasional retirements hopeless, while the promotions consequent on the measure added, as shown by my Minute of the 26th September last, 286 field officers at once to the Indian Army, with the certainty of a large and constant increase for many years to come.

Every officer in the Staff Corps or old Indian Army had now a certainty of his colonel's allowances (1,124 *l.* a-year) at an average age of 56 years; some of the local officers indeed at a much earlier age. It therefore was not to be expected that officers, save in rare cases of confirmed ill-health, or the possession of private means, would retire on the small pensions given at the earlier periods of service, and the evil of a large number of unemployed field officers for many years to come, and of an immense expenditure on colonels' allowances, in lieu of a smaller expenditure for ordinary pensions with a limited number of colonels' allowances, seemed imminent.

Various schemes for remedying this state of things were propounded in the newspapers and in conversation, nearly all containing some proposal for inducing retirements, but no one connected immediately with the Government, I believe, seriously considered these schemes until his Excellency the Commander in Chief officially brought to notice the unnecessary number of field officers, and the expense and inconvenience arising therefrom.

The matter then came officially under consideration; a scheme for retirement, having, at about the same time, been sent in by Colonel Hervey, of the Thuggee Department. Both documents, that of the Adjutant General, written by order of the Commander in Chief, and the scheme submitted by Colonel Hervey, were reported on by the Controller General of Military Expenditure, in accordance with regular official usage, and subsequently dealt with in the Military Department of the Government. Each Member of the Government in succession recorded his opinion on the report and proposals of the Controller General; mine, as temporary member in immediate charge of the Military Department, entering naturally very fully into the subject, and making proposals in modification of those of Colonel Broome.

In the main, it may be said that my proposals were adopted, and whether those proposals were deemed judicious or not by Her Majesty's Government, I submit that it was esssential thoroughly to go into the subject, and to address the Home Government upon it. It was quite impossible to ignore the general, nay universal, feeling in India that something was required to reduce the number of field officers; and even if the proposal was rejected (as it has been), it was considered that it would be advantageous to have a positive decision from the Secretary of State to that effect, and thus relieve the army from the uncertainty that was felt as to measures likely to be undertaken.

A proposal accordingly went Home, and for some time (as shown in my note as Secretary) was quite unknown, as far as I can ascertain, to the Press or Public.

That proposal was believed to be an advantageous one on both administrative and financial grounds, and it seemed clearly the duty of the Indian Government, believing it to be so, to make it.

This leads me to the second point, viz., the objections urged to the proposals of the Government of India on financial grounds by the Secretary of State.

It was believed by the Government of India that its proposals would tend to economy, but the Secretary of State, in the 31st paragraph of the despatch, says that the apprehensions of the Government of India as to the increasing cost of the Staff Corps for effectives and non-effectives, are "greatly exaggerated," and that the adoption of the proposals would "involve an absolute loss of 467,000 *l.*, including an immediate payment of 200,000 *l.*, assuming that none of the unemployed officers are absorbed." How does it happen that a scheme carefully prepared, greatly in the interest of economy, is thus unequivocally condemned as expensive, and involving a loss of nearly half a million sterling? At first sight it would seem to any one that Her Majesty's Government, fortified by the calculations of an able actuary, must be right, and the Government of India entirely wrong; but

I venture

I venture to submit that, on a closer examination, this will hardly appear to be the case. How then can there be such a discrepancy between the two?

First, I would recapitulate what Colonel Broome points out in his memorandum of the 29th April, viz.:—

I. That there is nearly as much difference between the usual standard tables of life as there is between the result of the calculations of Major General Hannyngton and himself;

II. That the main objection raised by Major General Hannyngton to his (Colonel Broome's) calculations, viz., that in them allowance is not made for casualties occurring during the twelve years from 1868 to 1880, is not valid, an annual reduction of five per cent. for casualties throughout that period having been made by Colonel Broome, a reduction which experience seems to show is sufficient (*see* paragraphs 14, 15, 16, and last part of 21 of Colonel Broome's memorandum);*

III. That, as I understand Colonel Broome's argument, the principle accepted and adopted in 1861 by Her Majesty's Government for inducing officers to retire was, save in matters of detail, the same as that now proposed, and is shown by General Hannyngton himself to have produced a total saving in the non-effective charges to a considerable extent;

IV. That Major General Hannyngton's tabular statements of retirements, based as they are on the experience arising from an entirely different state of affairs from those now prevailing, or likely to prevail, have little value when applied to calculations affecting the future;

V. That Major General Hannyngton has, in his calculations as to the number of colonels' allowances, made no reference to the proportion that will belong to the local army, which would, in his own method of calculation, bring up the maximum number of colonels' allowances to 888, of which 739 are of the Staff Corps. This, though less than Colonel Broome estimates it, is apprehended to be a sufficiently alarming prospect.

Having considered the foregoing points noted by Colonel Broome, it still seemed to me that one element was wanting in the calculations, that is, an element which has always appeared to me to be the most important one towards effecting a saving, viz., the pay saved by officers retiring, or the difference between pay and pension of such officers.

It is admitted by the Secretary of State that the estimated outlay consequent on the proposals would only amount to 467,000 *l.*, "if none of the unemployed officers are absorbed"; and Major General Hannyngton, in paragraph 15 of his report of 4th February, glances at the possibility of a saving in this direction; but in point of fact it is the saving in this direction that would, it is believed, meet more than the outlay, even admitting all the other calculations of Major General Hannyngton to be accurate.

It struck me that if 100 were really absorbed out of the 200 lieutenant colonels who retired (supposing the full number for whom inducements were proposed, took them), there would be a *saving*, instead of a loss, of 467,000 *l.*, while in each of the other 100, whose places required to be supplied at the bottom by subalterns, there would be some further, but smaller, saving. For instance, it appeared to me that as no colonel within three or four years of his colonel's allowance, that is, above 34 or 35 years' service, would retire on the not very large inducement offered, we might take the average service as lieutenant colonel, of those retiring, as five years. This would give them seven years in receipt of lieutenant colonels' pay prior to succession to colonels' allowances, or a *minimum* sum of 993 *l.* each per annum, or 6,851 *l.* each; so, if a hundred of the lieutenant colonels retiring were unemployed, or would have their places supplied in any way by unemployed officers of other grades, there would be a saving of 695,100 *l.* Allowing that 20 per cent. of these officers were on furlough on half pay, we must deduct 69,510 *l.* from the above, leaving a gain of 625,590 *l.* against the alleged loss of 467,000 *l.*

Of the other 100 some might be local officers, in whose room promotions would have to be made; but, as stated in my previous minute, and adverting to the extraordinary rate of promotion in the local service certain to continue, I would only give one step for two vacancies.

In this way there would be a further saving, especially as the pay of unemployed local officers is higher than that of Staff Corps officers; in each alternate case respectively of a local lieutenant colonel retiring, there would be either a total saving of a lieutenant colonel's pay, or the saving of the pay of a subaltern absorbed by promotion.

Where an employed Staff Corps officer has to be replaced by bringing in a subaltern (the only way he can be replaced, as far as the Staff Corps is concerned), there would still be a saving. Indeed the only class of officers on whom there would be no saving would

* *Note.*—I confess that on this point I incline to think that General Hannyngton is correct, but Colonel Broome is about to submit a further explanation of his calculations.

would be those who held appointments the pay of which is consolidated, as in civil employ, or at the head of departments, and whose retirement absorbed no unemployed officer; but in this class the retirements would necessarily be limited.

In fact, making every allowance for circumstances unfavourable to my calculations, I think at least a *saving* of 120,000 *l.* might be expected from the proposals, instead of a loss of 467,000 *l.*

The exact saving must of course depend on the number of unemployed officers retiring or absorbed, and I will discuss the probabilities in this direction presently; but I would now observe that, having asked Colonel Broome's opinion as to the view just taken, he has prepared a further memorandum, dated 10th June, which is submitted to Government, and to which I beg to draw attention, which, going into some detail, bears out fully my argument as to the saving instead of loss in the proposal.

In this second memorandum Colonel Broome further points out a feature in General Hannyngton's calculations, which would appear to make a difference in the result as assumed by him of 176,108 *l.* in favour of the scheme.

I think, therefore, assuming that 100 lieutenant colonels were absorbed out of 200 retiring, there would be a large gain; and that even if only 60 or 70 of this 200 were thus altogether absorbed, there would still be no loss. Of course if less than 200 retired, the proportionate loss and gain on either side would probably be proportionately altered both ways; and in any case I cannot conceive the likelihood of an actual loss.

Before concluding this branch of the subject, I will consider why it is assumed that a certain number of the lieutenant colonels retiring will be unemployed officers, or will cause others unemployed to be absorbed.

In the 25th paragraph of the despatch of the Secretary of State, the Government of India is told "that there are no grounds whatever for anticipating that the officers now unemployed would be more ready to accept the terms now offered than other and more efficient men."

I am compelled to believe quite the contrary.

In 1861, when the inducements to retire were greater than those now offered, and when there was no certainty of colonels' allowances at any fixed period, and when therefore even an employed officer had a strong temptation to take the additional annuity, which, in the case of a lieutenant colonel, the grade now referred to, varied from 200 *l.* to 550 *l.* per annum, the majority of those who retired in Bengal were *unemployed*, though the proportion of these to the employed was less than it is even now.

At present employed lieutenant colonels are all in good positions, with pay varying from a minimum of 1,300 *l.* to 3,000 *l.* or 4,000 *l.* a year, with liberal furlough rules that did not exist in 1861, so that they can visit England on private affairs as well as on medical certificate. As, besides this, they are certain of a permanent income in England of 1,124 *l.* per annum after a service of 12 years in the grade, I should imagine that few employed lieutenant colonels would retire.

Judging from the cases I know of personally, or have heard of, those anxious to retire, or who would retire on the comparatively small inducement proposed, are almost entirely unemployed officers, and my impression is that, while probably not perhaps more than 150 lieutenant colonels in all would have accepted the proposal in the three Presidencies, at least two-thirds of these would have been unemployed officers. It is true that the returns only show 95 lieutenant colonels as now unemployed altogether, and some of these, from the short period they will have to wait for colonels' allowances, are certain not to retire; but on the other hand there are 63 lieutenant colonels on furlough, who hold no appointment whatever in India, and who may, for all purposes, be considered as unemployed officers.

Believing, as I firmly do, that the majority of those who retired would be unemployed, while the retirement of others would absorb unemployed officers of their own or some other rank, and thus render admission or promotion unnecessary, and recollecting that there are even employed officers whose situations would not be filled up, I think there can be no doubt whatever that the loss assumed by General Hannyngton, if the proposal had been carried out, is quite fallacious, and that under the least favourable circumstances that could be expected in the matter of retirements, there would be a very large pecuniary gain on the whole scheme.

I do not think there is any more that I can say on this part of the subject, but I trust I have said enough to show that there was sufficient ground, when the proposal was made, to justify the Government of India in believing that a saving, and not a loss, would arise from it.

In treating now of the objections offered to the scheme of the Government of India on other than financial grounds, I trust I shall not be deemed to go beyond my province. It seems essentially necessary to put forward a reply, and to show that the Government of India was not altogether without reasons for the view it took, and that with some knowledge of the exact state of affairs at present in the Indian Army, it did not inconsiderately submit proposals which would be injurious to the public interests.

The Secretary of State considers that the apprehensions of the Government of India as to the embarrassment arising from a probable excessive number of field officers are exaggerated, and it is intimated that there is too great a tendency to judge of what is the proper proportion of field officers by the conventional standard of a British regiment.

Though there may be some differences between the estimates of Colonel Broome and

and Major General Hannyngton, I think, even if we assume the latter to be correct, the Government of India may not, without reason, think there is embarrassment in the prospect of having, in the year 1879, no less than 1,305 Lieutenant Colonels and Majors in a body of officers, numbering probably much less than 3,000, besides 205 officers on colonels' allowances, and that from 1869 to 1881, there would be over 1,100 Field Officers. This is independent of the Field Officers of the local Army, who will be probably at no distant date more numerous than the Captains, while local subalterns will very shortly disappear. Making every allowance for the difference of the duties required of Staff Corps Officers and Regimental Officers, this prospect seems to have justified serious consideration, and I am not aware that the Government, or any Member of it, ever thought it necessary that the proportion of the different ranks should be the same in the Staff Corps as in a British Regiment. In my Minute I especially guarded against any assumption of this kind, and more than once pointed out that there ought to be a very unusual proportion of superior officers in the Staff Corps; but I thought that 900 Lieutenant Colonels and Majors would be very ample even after all local Field Officers had disappeared.

It hardly appears, therefore, that the proposals originated from exaggerated misapprehensions, or from a false idea as to the proper constitution of the Staff Corps with respect to proportion of officers.

Next, the Secretary of State thinks that the proposal would not have the effect desired by the Government of India of reducing the number of unemployed officers, as they would be no more likely to retire than employed officers, while the retirement of the latter would inflict an injury on the State and embarrass the public service.

In a former part of this memorandum, I have given reasons for believing that the retirements would be mainly among unemployed officers. I can only repeat my conviction to this effect, and I cannot suppose that any embarrassment would arise from the retirement of employed officers to the utmost extent that is likely. In fact, various regiments have been commanded for almost unprecedented periods by the same officers, and, as a rule, there has been a stagnation for the last seven years in the upper ranks of corps and departments, so that I believe a great benefit would arise instead of an injury to the service by the retirement of a moderate number of employed Lieutenant Colonels, whose places would be filled by the advancement of junior officers of departments or corps, and here and there, perhaps, by the absorption of unemployed officers.

The Secretary of State reminds the Government of India that, even after the offer of inducements to retire, it would be in no better position than at present to enforce retirement. As respects actual power to remove officers to the retired list, this may be true, but there are considerations at present which, though not touched on in the Secretary of State's Despatch, cannot but now operate to prevent stringent measures towards removing officers from the service.

Many of the unemployed officers are of unexceptionable character as gentlemen. They became unemployed through the mutiny and disbandment of their corps; and, had not this misfortune happened to them, would probably have remained on, and if not considered good officers would still have, possibly, never been considered as inefficient. Under a new system, requiring vigour and judgment in senior officers, they are not thought fit for employment, and yet a Government like that of India would ever be loth to act with harshness to officers so circumstanced. If, however, these officers, having an increased pension and a bonus offered to them, coupled with a warning that henceforth officers who remained unemployed beyond a certain period would be placed on the pension list, persisted in remaining on without a hope of active employment, no one could feel much compunction at seeing them, after a further period of unemployment, placed on the retired list.

At all events, what would be deemed harsh conduct towards officers of this description now would be viewed in a different light if these officers declined to accept an offer of retirement now made to them.

The Secretary of State further refers to a misapprehension as to the object of pensions, and thinks there is a great objection to induce officers to retire too early. As the proposal of the Government of India only held out special inducements to officers of a minimum of 26 years' service for the temporary measure, while their average service would probably be over 30 years, and the permanent proposals only touched officers of 25 years' service and upwards, I cannot think that the Government would lose much by any retirements likely to take place under such schemes.

If an officer has not risen, or has not an immediate hope of rising, to a command or responsible position after 25 years' service, I imagine that the retirement of that officer will not be a very serious loss to the State, while the officer who is thoroughly useful, and who has attained to a comfortable position, or is likely to do so, will hardly retire on the very small income proposed, either as a temporary measure, or on the permanent scale of pensions.

Stress is laid by the Secretary of State on the liberality of the pensions now given, which are said to be more liberal than in any other military service in the world. If this is admitted, I would still remark, that in no army in the world that I know of are officers always on foreign service in a hot climate; that the rates have been the same for very very many years; that they are very small in proportion to the pay of those in active employment, which latter is certainly not excessive when compared with expenses; and that, looking to the general scale of incomes among the class who enter the Indian service as a livelihood, a pension of 191 *l.* 12 *s.* after 20 years' Indian service, or even of 456 *l.* 5 *s.*

after 32 years' Indian service, does not strike the mind as a very tempting prospect. The higher pensions of 600 *l.* and 750 *l.* a year are practically inoperative as respects the officers concerned, as these pensions are not attainable until close on the period at which Colonels' allowances are claimable.

Another objection raised is, that the adoption of any measures of the kind proposed would irritate the large body of officers transferred from the Indian to the British Army, who would not partake in the benefits. This may be an objection, but as respects those who are in Her Majesty's Cavalry and Infantry, the grant just announced of the privilege of the Indian Pension Rules, even if they exchange into purchase Regiments and serve henceforth out of India, will remove one great cause of discontent among a considerable body of officers, and I cannot think that this objection, as far as it may hold good with respect to artillery and engineer officers, is insurmountable, and should of itself alone override the propriety of adopting a scheme proposed on broad grounds by the Government of India.

The objection that a measure of the kind proposed would unsettle the minds of officers and lead them to expect further measures is, I think, answered by the fact that they have for the last seven years expected some measure, and I much fear will continue to expect some measure. Had the scheme proposed been adopted, I think it might have been announced in a way calculated entirely to set men's minds at rest as to the possibility of any future scheme being approved. Two special grounds might have been assigned for the measure as a final one at this time, *first*, to give unemployed officers of the old army, who now have little prospect of further usefulness, the opportunity of voluntary retirement; and, *secondly*, to reduce the number rising to colonels' allowances under the order of 1866. Since the retiring scheme of 1861 was carried out, the whole army has been reorganised, and officers who then felt uncertain as to their future prospects in the service, and may have remained on, hoping for employment, must by this time feel pretty certain as to their prospects in that direction.

I believe this scheme would have been accepted and looked on as final.

At present I see the press is far from accepting the present decision; indeed, a very influential paper says that, now that the proposal of the Government of India is rejected, "the way is cleared for a more liberal and comprehensive scheme."

I would here observe that an important proposal of the Government of India is not either approved or negatived by the Secretary of State. I allude to the restriction of admissions to the Staff Corps by a gradual reduction of the large number of officers in civil employ. As some misapprehension exists on this subject, it may be well to point out that, while the greatest benefit may arise from a liberal admission of military officers to those important branches of the civil or political service in which a career is open for all possessed of ability to rise to high posts, and in which officers may fairly expect to serve until retirement, there is a branch of civil employ in which the prizes are so few that after some years, officers become dissatisfied. I allude to the police, in which there are a large number of military officers, for whom, as they rise in rank and years, there are few suitable positions, while the subordinate officers might, save in peculiar situations, be non-military persons. The return to the military service of police officers threatens a serious inconvenience, and in Bombay already, that Government sends back to military duty or non-duty all police officers on their becoming lieutenant colonels.

I will now, as briefly as possible, refer to the measures decided by the Secretary of State, and their probable effect.

They are—

I. To divide the unemployed officers of the staff corps, or cadres of regiments, into two classes, viz., those qualified in all respects for employment, and those from various causes not qualified, and to remove from the service those not considered qualified according to the definition of the Secretary of State.

II. To employ, as if qualified, according to regulation, those officers whose names were borne on regimental cadres prior to the re-organisation of the army, who have not passed the prescribed examination in the native languages qualifying them for employment:

III. To require the young officers who were admitted to the Indian service under special conditions between 1858 and 1862, when all examinations to the Indian service ceased, to pass within a specified period, on pain of removal altogether from the army.

Now, the first measure will be found in practice, and if not carried into effect simultaneously with some retiring scheme, to be very difficult.

The Secretary of State appears to lay down that every officer should be employed, or should be removed from the service; but he considers that only those whose moral delinquency or mental incapacity would have caused their removal from the service under the system in force before the amalgamation, can now be compulsorily removed.

All I can say is, that I am quite certain not 10 per cent. of the unemployed officers can in any fairness be classed under such a category, and yet of the remaining 90 per cent. a majority, I might say a large majority, are not fitted for employment in any position of real trust or independent command.

Those who are young may improve, but field officers, the class we are really discussing

cussing, who for 10 or 12 years under successive commanders in chief have remained without any actual employment, can hardly be, for the most part, officers who a commander in chief would like to place in important positions.

Here and there, there are very capable officers who, from accident or from recent loss of appointment, are unemployed. Such are sure to be employed eventually, and his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India is known to have exerted himself greatly to employ unemployed officers; but however much his Excellency may be inclined to strain to the utmost a generous appreciation of the good qualifications an officer may possess, I should be very much surprised if he does not consider that there are many unemployed field officers who certainly would not have been removed from the service under the old system, and who would indeed under it have commanded regiments, or perhaps brigades, who are totally unfit to be entrusted with the commands or positions which would now-a-days fall to lieutenant-colonels in an army greatly composed of soldiers more difficult to manage than the soldiers of the old army, and under a system where great discretion and power is entrusted to senior officers. In saying this I allude especially to Bengal, but in a great degree the argument applies to Madras and Bombay. I also assume that the actual employment of officers must rest greatly with the Commander in Chief, for the civil departments, save in rare cases, will only consent to be recruited from among young officers, and in the army departments to bring in unemployed, and, as respects departmental duties, untrained officers over the heads of those who have long been in the department seems impossible. In fact, the theory of the Secretary of State in this Despatch hardly appears to recognise the paramount necessity, as respects the Indian Service, of looking to something higher in an officer than a mere escape from "moral delinquency or intellectual incapacity," and fails to accept the fact, so strongly forced upon attention out here, that there is hardly a situation in the Indian administration, and certainly not one that can be properly given to a field officer in the army, in which it is not better almost to pay any pension than to place an incompetent officer.

It appears too that some little consideration might fairly be extended to those officers who have done good service for many years past, and who might now be superseded in appointments they had not unnaturally looked for by the placing of unemployed officers over their heads, the latter in many cases being possibly without anything like equal merit or claims.

An acquaintance with the unemployed field officers in Bengal, and I imagine it must be much the same in Madras and Bombay, would, I believe, convince the Secretary of State that the scheme he proposes cannot, without danger to efficiency, and we cannot afford to run such risks, really tend to reduce the unemployed list in any very appreciable degree.

The second order is to employ unpassed officers just as if they were passed according to qualifications.

It will doubtless seem to some passed officers who have exerted themselves to qualify in the Native languages, that it will be rather hard to be deprived of a step they had expected in a regiment or department by the placing over their heads of an unemployed unpassed officer, who must necessarily have been without employment for several years at the very least.

But passing over this hardship, though I think it should be not altogether disregarded, is the officer who ever since he entered the service from 10 to 30 years ago, knew he could obtain no real advancement without passing, and who for 10 years has been denied all real duty or staff pay and yet never tried, or at all events managed to pass the examination, is such an officer, who must be idle or stupid, or certainly without zeal, or all three, is such an officer, likely to turn out a good incumbent of a situation involving energy and responsibility, as now do nearly all situations in the Indian Army, more especially those that could be held by senior officers of the grade it is most desirable to reduce?

In point of fact, the officers removed from the service under the Secretary of State's order as unqualified will, I venture to predict, be so few as to hardly affect the total of unemployed officers, while those not removed will, either for the most part remain unemployed, or will obtain situations where their presence will in many cases be a calamity.

The third measure is to remove the young officers of the general list, who will not pass in the languages within a certain period. This order only affects 86 officers in the three Presidencies, doubless most of whom will now pass within whatever period is fixed. The effect of this rule will be good, even though the threat of removal may seem harsh.

I have now gone through all that occurs to me in connection with the Despatch, and with all respect I would summarise the conclusions at which I cannot but arrive as follows:—

1st. That the proposals sent home by this Government would have tended to economy and efficiency.

2nd. That the orders issued in supersession of these proposals will be either operative to a very small extent, or detrimental to efficiency.

If, however, it is not deemed desirable to urge Her Majesty's Government to re-consider the proposals, or if, on re-consideration, they are still rejected, I would urge very strongly that the resolution arrived at be affirmed in the most positive manner, and that the

the officers of the army be given distinctly to understand that, under no circumstances whatever, will any scheme to induce retirement be entertained.

At all events I shall feel I have frankly and fully stated all that occurs to me on the subject, and that I do so as a matter of duty and with no personal object whatever.

26 June 1869. *H. W. Norman.*

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MEMORANDUM by the Comptroller General of Military Expenditure; Simla, 29 April, 1869. No. 25 U.

THE undersigned has the honour herewith to return the Military Despatch, No. 73, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, dated 11th March 1869, with its enclosures, received with Case 1 of Schedule No. 6,* which was forwarded for any observations or suggestions he may desire to offer.

* Dated 17th April 1869.

2. As regards the general question involved in this Despatch, after the very decided opinion expressed by His Grace the Duke of Argyll, the undersigned considers that it would be unbecoming on his part to offer any further arguments in support of the views expressed in his previous memorandum, No. 30 T. of 23rd May 1868; but he would, with all deference, beg leave to offer a few remarks in regard to the allegation of incorrectness in the calculations submitted with that memorandum, without entering into any controversy on the general question, as that may be considered definitively settled.

3. The Secretary of State referred the memorandum and the calculations contained in its appendix to Major General Hannyngton, an officer who possesses so high a reputation for ability in dealing with questions of this nature, that the undersigned feels considerable diffidence in expressing opinions contrary to his conclusions.

4. Major General Hannyngton has submitted a report on the calculations in the undersigned's memorandum, and also an elaborate formula for the construction of a new set of tables which are attached.

5. According to these latter, he reduces the maximum number of Colonels of the Staff Corps in the probable receipt of Colonel's allowance from 982, as estimated by the undersigned, to 749, and fixes the period of attaining that maximum as the year 1896.

6. The undersigned, in his report, purposely avoided the employment of, or reference to, algebraical formula, as practically these are understood by few, and even those who in earlier years may have studied the subject, if not in the habit of making such calculations, can scarcely appreciate the real value of these formula.

7. In dealing with probabilities, there must be a liability to error, and the ablest actuaries have employed various formula and deduced tables from them with very different results. For instance, taking the several standard tables of expectation of life for, say, an officer just attaining his company in the Staff Corps, which he would ordinarily do at 30 years of age, according to the following tables his expectation of life is—

| | |
|---|---|
| Chester Tables | 31·30 years. |
| Northampton Tables | 28·27 ,, |
| Carlisle Tables | 34·34 ,, |
| Government Tables | 33·17 ,, |

8. Thus, it will be seen that the difference between the Carlisle and Northampton tables in this respect is nearly as great as that between the result of the calculations submitted by the undersigned and those deduced by Major General Hannyngton.

9. The main objection raised by the latter officer to the calculations submitted by the undersigned is, that in Appendix J., annexed to Memorandum No. 30 T., allowance is not made for casualties occurring during the 12 years from 1868 to 1880.

10. A reference to the previous Appendix I., of which J. (up to 1880) is a summary as regards Colonels, will, it is believed, show that this objection is not valid.

11. It will be seen that an annual reduction of five per cent. has been allowed throughout for the casualties amongst the Colonels, as explained in paragraph 56 of the Memorandum.

12. The result is that, although 527 officers, according to their standing, on 1st January 1868, would, exclusive of casualties, be advanced to the Colonel's allowance in the 12 years, only 438 are represented as actually receiving it on 1st January 1880. Five per cent. in this case represents only the death casualties, no other being likely to occur in that grade. In the other grades in which the annual deduction is made in the same way, the per-centage of casualties includes both deaths and retirements.

13. Thus it is clear that the casualties are provided for in every grade for the first as well as the subsequent years of the series.

14. The

14. The actual results, as shown by the last (1st April) Army Lists as compared with the estimate of the undersigned for the beginning of 1869, do not warrant the belief that the provision for casualties was neglected or under-rated.

15. The figures severally are as follow :

| | Estimated. | Actual. |
|---|---|---|
| Colonels in receipt of Colonel's allowance - - | 10 | 10 |
| Lieutenant Colonels - - - - - - - | 490 | 515 |
| Majors - - - - - - - - - | 584 | 587 |

16. The few officers promoted in the beginning of this year very nearly representing the difference, and giving, as far as can be now ascertained, an actual surplus of five field officers on 1st January above the estimate of the undersigned.

17. Major General Hannyngton, in support of his own view, and in opposition to the general theory of increasing cost in the annual amount of Colonel's allowance, which the undersigned represented as the serious impending evil, points to the fact that the charges for pensions and colonel's allowance together have decreased since 1862–63 by an average of 13,103 *l.*, and of colonel's allowance alone of 10,712 *l.* per annum.

18. But under the peculiar circumstances of the period in question, the undersigned ventures to think that the natural deduction from these results would rather tell the other way.

19. Prior to the amalgamation, there were 176 colonels' allowances for the Native Army, Infantry, and Cavalry, viz.:

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal - - - - - - - | 74 | 10 | 84 |
| Madras - - - - - - - | 52 | 8 | 60 |
| Bombay - - - - - - | 29 | 3 | 32 |
| | 155 | 21 | 176 |

20. In December 1861, about 200 officers were induced to retire by the offer of extra pensions ranging from 550 *l.* to 150 *l.* additional, according to standing. Of the officers who accepted this scale, nearly half were lieutenant colonels, and as under this arrangement the Government had purchased their claims to the colonel's allowance, their names were kept in the Army List, but *in italics*, and as they were nominally promoted to colonels, the step was a lapse, and the colonel's allowance they would have received was a gain to Government.

21. This number has been reduced from 176 to 134, viz.:

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal - - - - - - - | 49 | 8 | 57 |
| Madras - - - - - - - | 46 | 4 | 50 |
| Bombay - - - - - - | 24 | 3 | 27 |
| | 119 | 15 | 134 |

The reduction in seven years being 42, or six per annum, less than the five per cent. allowed by the undersigned for the casualties in this grade.

22. Twelve officers have also been transferred from the Indian to the Imperial List, making a total reduction in the former of 54, equivalent to a present total decrease in cost of 60,741 *l.* 18 *s.* per annum. In like manner, every extra pension that lapses is a permanent gain to Government.

23. It may be here observed that the principle on which the extra pensions were granted in 1861, is precisely similar to that proposed by the undersigned in his memorandum, viz., that Government should buy up the claims of senior officers to the colonel's allowance by giving an equivalent to the value of that deferred annuity.

24. The undersigned is under the impression that Major General Hannyngton drew up the scale for such purchases; but the Secretary of State for India modified the scale by giving even sums in groups of 3, 5, 10, &c., according to standing, instead of the precise value of each individual's claim. In this case the whole value was given in additional pensions; the undersigned proposed to give it partly in additional pension and partly in a bonus as being more likely to prove acceptable.

25. Major General Hannyngton's tabular statement of retirements on pension for 20 years prior to the mutiny, annexed to his report, has little practical reference to the present date. Then the large majority of retirements was the result of regimental purchase, which is now at an end.

26. But admitting that Major General Hannyngton's estimate may be the more correct one, it is to be observed that he calculates on a maximum number of colonels with colonel's allowance in the staff corps at 749, instead of 982, according to the calculations of the undersigned. He makes no reference to the local colonels, of whom at the same period the undersigned calculated there would be 172. Reducing this latter number according to Major General Hannyngton's ratio would give 139, which with the 749 of the staff corps would represent a total of 888 recipients of the allowance, which will give an annual cost of 998,866 *l.* 16 *s.*, or close upon one million sterling, and this for a purely native army, not half the strength of that for which, prior to the mutiny, 176 colonels' allowances were deemed sufficient at an annual cost of 197,973 *l.* 12 *s.*

27. The undersigned most sincerely trusts that his estimate may ultimately prove to be an exaggerated one, as the results of the modified and reduced calculations, as shown above, are indicative of a very severe pressure on the finances of the Indian Empire.

28. As a question of military economy, the undersigned would venture to suggest that the decision of the Home Government should be communicated to the army officially, as there are undoubtedly some officers disposed to retire from the service, who delay so doing in the hope of some inducement to resignation being offered. If convinced that no such offer is likely to be made, they would probably retire at once. It is to be feared, however, that the number of those so inclined is not very large.

*Arthur Broome*, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

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MEMORANDUM by the Controller General of Military Expenditure; Simla, 10th June 1869, No. 92 U.

IN acknowledging Military Department Office Memorandum, No. 177 of yesterday's date, the undersigned has the honour to state that, undoubtedly, in estimating the probable loss or gain to the State by the adoption of the proposal of the Government of India to give additional pensions with a bonus to 200 Lieutenant colonels to induce their retirement, the calculation should, on the one hand, exhibit the present value of the probable amount these officers would receive if they remained in the service, and, on the other, the present value of their probable receipts if they retired on the terms proposed.

2. In the first case, this would represent their effective pay, Indian or furlough, during the period until, having completed 12 years' service as substantive Lieutenant colonel, they became entitled to the colonel's allowance, and from that date their colonel's pay with that allowance for the remainder of their lives.

3. In the latter case, the ordinary pension, with the addition of 150 *l.* per annum for life, and the proposed immediate bonus of 1,000 *l.*, must be taken into the calculation.

4. In Major General Hannyngton's estimate, he has taken the terms of the latter condition into full account; but, in the former case, he has only estimated for the present value of the deferred annuity of the colonel's allowance, entirely omitting the important item of the present value of the amount of effective pay to be drawn by the officers in the interim, prior to their attaining that allowance.

5. This omission very materially affects the results to the extent of nearly a million sterling; for, whilst General Hannyngton's statement exhibits a probable loss to Government of nearly half a million sterling, the gain, including this item, would, on the most moderate calculation, amount to above half a million.

6. This is capable of clear demonstration by the following figures.

7. It may be premised that the proposed grant was to 200 substantive lieutenant colonels,

colonels, and it may be inferred that these officers would necessarily be amongst the juniors of that grade.

8. No officer who, having served six years in the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel, and having only six more to serve to entitle him to his colonel's allowance, of which two at the least might be passed in Europe on furlough on medical certificate, would be likely, unless in very bad health, to give up the certainty of an annuity of 1,125 *l.* deferred only for six years, for so inadequate an equivalent as an additional pension of 150 *l.* and a bonus of 1,000 *l.*, more especially when the pay to be drawn in the interim would be so much more than the proposed pension. The only officers likely to accept the proposed terms would be found amongst those who had from 12 to 6 years to serve, and probably the average would be officers of 30 years' entire service, who had already served four years in the grade of lieutenant colonel, and still had eight years remaining to serve for the colonel's allowance, of which two could be passed on furlough.

9. This average may, for the purpose of estimate and comparison, be assumed as a fair and reasonable one.

10. Major General Hannyngton's calculation, as given in abstract in paragraph 12 of his Report of 4th February 1869, and in detail in Table VII., is as follows:—

| | £. | £. |
|---|---|---|
| Present value of 200 pensions of rank for life - - | = 813,995 | = 4,069 per officer. |
| Ditto - - 200 extra pensions of 150 *l.* for life | = 378,677 | = 1,894 „ |
| Bonus to 200 officers at 1,000 *l.* each - - - | = 200,000 | = 1,000 „ |
| Total Value - - - | £. 1,392,672 | = 6,963 each. |
| Present value of 200 deferred annuities of 1,124·871 *l.* - - - - - - - - | = 925,564 | = 4,628 |
| Difference being the estimated loss to Government - | £. 467,108 | = 2,335 each. |

11. It is difficult to estimate the present value of the 200 officers' pay until they attain their colonel's allowance, so as to correspond precisely with General Hannyngton's other calculations, as his tables do not give any estimated "expectation of life," or the present value of annuities for a limited period. A close approximation may however be obtained.

12. Neison's Tables of life, which he employs, show that if 4,766 were living at 48 years of age (the equivalent of 30 years' service) at 56 years of age, when the colonel's allowance would be attained, 3,609 would still remain alive; the decrement in eight years being 1,157, or less than a quarter of the original number. But this decrement is very evenly spread over the whole period, so that in the case of the casualties that might take place, the annuities would have to be paid for shorter or longer periods of from one to eight years, reducing the decrement, as regards such payments, to one-eighth of the original number.

13. Some of the officers retiring would be drawing consolidated allowances, but the majority would be in receipt of the pay of lieutenant colonel, either—

| | £. | *s.* | *d.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| In the Cavalry - - - - - - = | 1,388 | 8 | – |
| In the Infantry - - - - - - = | 1,238 | 14 | – |
| Or in the Staff Corps - - - - - = | 993 | 9 | – |

per annum, if in India, or half these amounts if on furlough under the new rules. The Staff Corps rate may, therefore, be assumed as the minimum average that would be drawn.

14. Adopting this rate, the result for the eight years prior to attaining the colonel's allowance would be—

| | £. | *s.* | *d.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two years' furlough on half pay - - - - | 993 | 9 | – |
| Six years' full pay in India - - - - - | 5,960 | 14 | – |
| TOTAL drawn in Eight years - - - | £. 6,954 | 3 | – |

giving an average of 869 *l.* per annum for the eight years in round numbers.

15. The present value of an annuity for eight years of 869 *l.* according to the Carlisle Tables, calculated at five per cent., would be $6{\cdot}463213 \times 869 = £.5{,}616{\cdot}5$; but deducting one

one-eighth this amount, or 702 *l.*, for probable casualities as noted above, the result would be £.4,914·5 per officer, or 982,900 *l.* for 200 officers:—

16. According to General Hannyngton's own figures, therefore, the calculation should stand as follows:—

| | £. |
|---|---|
| Present value of eight years' pay to 200 lieutenant colonels - | 982,900 |
| Ditto - ditto deferred value of colonel's allowance for 200 lieutenant colonels - - - - - - - - - | 925,564 |
| Total present value if the officers remain in the service - | 1,908,464 |
| Present value of increased life pension and bonus to 200 lieutenant colonels - - - - - - - - - | 1,392,672 |
| Difference being the real gain to Government of the officers retired £. | 515,792 |

17. Thus, instead of a loss of 467,108 *l.*, there would be a gain to Government of 515,792 *l.*, making a total difference of 982,900 *l.*

18. It might be urged that if 200 lieutenant colonels retired, their places must be filled by subalterns to be admitted to the staff corps in their room, whose pay should constitute a set-off against the saving thus exhibited. Were this argument valid, there would still be a considerable gain, as the Indian pay for 200 subalterns in eight years would only amount to 433,440 *l.* Practically, however, there would be no necessity for such replacement.

19. Of the 200 officers likely to retire, a considerable portion would doubtless be unemployed, for these would have the least inducement to remain in the service, whilst others would be holding civil appointments often unsuitable to their rank, and which it would be neither necessary nor desirable to fill up with military men. The military appointments and commands likely to be vacated by these retirements could be met from the surplus officers at present unemployed, of whom it may be safely inferred that a sufficient number would be found qualified.

20. At the beginning of this year there were 374 officers unemployed, of whom 95 were lieutenant colonels, 70 majors, 209 captains and subalterns. Thus, it is evident that 200 retirements amongst the lieutenant colonels would not render necessary any corresponding addition to the staff corps.

21. There is one other point in Major General Hannyngton's calculations which, as they have been adopted by the Right Honourable the Secretary of State, it may be desirable to bring to notice.

22. Instead of calculating the present value of the probable receipts in either case of 200 junior lieutenant colonels, Major General Hannyngton estimates the aggregate value of the claims of all the lieutenant colonels in the staff corps and of 226 senior majors, who, under the proposed scheme, would not have been allowed to claim the retiring pensions and bonus; and from the total amount thus deduced, he assumes the proportion for 200 officers, by which arrangement he brings into the calculation a number of officers, the value of whose claims to the immediate additional pensions would be comparatively large, whilst that of their prospect of the deferred colonel's allowance would be proportionately small, thereby materially affecting the result deduced.

23. This will be better understood by assuming that the average of the 200 retirements would be after 30 years' service as inferred above, when the present value of the increased pensions (£.365+150=£.515), and of the deferred annuity of the colonel's allowance (1,124 *l.* 17 *s.* 5 *d.*, or, in round numbers, 1,125 *l.*) would be according to General Hannyngton's own Tables:—

| | | £. |
|---|---|---|
| Present value 200 proposed pensions - - | 12·107 × 515 | =6,235 |
| Ditto - ditto - deferred annuities - - | 5·1385 × 1,125 | =5,780 |
| Difference - - | | £. 455 |

£.455 × 200=£.91,000+£.200,000=£.291,000, instead of £.467,108—the amount of loss estimated according to the general average adopted.

*Arthur Broome*, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

MEMORANDUM by the Controller General of Military Expenditure.

Simla, 3 July 1869.—127 U.

IN continuation of memorandum No. 25 U, dated 29th April last, from this branch, the undersigned would beg leave, with reference to paragraphs Nos. 9 to 13 of that memorandum, to offer the following remarks regarding the point therein noticed, with the view of obviating any possible misconception on the subject.

2. It is to be borne in mind that in the statements originally submitted with this Department memorandum No 30 T. of 23rd May 1869, the calculations were all of a simple arithmetical nature, a course which was purposely adopted in order to render them perfectly plain and comprehensible, and to afford greater facility for testing their correctness.

3. In estimating not only the number of survivors on a given date but for a series of years, as also the position of the officers according to their ages and grade for every year, ordinary figures do not afford the same facilities as algebraical formulæ, and, to attain the somewhat complicated result desired, a comparatively cumbrous and circuitous mode of calculation was rendered unavoidable.

4. The whole of the officers in the staff corps were taken into account; their date of entrance into the service being known their periods of promotion were easily ascertained, and an average of casualties in each grade, based on past experience of mortality, was adopted.

5. The progress of each annual batch was thus calculated year by year, the promotions and the casualties being shown, and the resulting total carried on to the next year.

6. Undoubtedly there is a defect in this arrangement, although, under the circumstances, an unavoidable and in the long run, not a very serious one, viz., that in bringing forward the annual batch for promotion, the only figure that could be employed is that of the present numbers eligible. This is the error alluded to by Major General Hannyngton, who observes that the number so brought forward should be reduced by the probable casualties during the period intervening between the present time and the date of promotion.

7. But the undersigned would observe that the casualties occurring or likely to occur during that period have already been provided for and are shown in the annual totals brought forward; and to allow for them again in each batch promoted would be to cause a double deduction.

8. The arrangement adopted leaves the grand total correct, but admits of error in allotting larger numbers to the higher grades. The evil being greatest in the earlier years of the series; but its tendency is to diminish rather than increase in accumulative ratio.

9. To prove the defect, Major General Hannyngton adopts a comparative process of calculation, and shows that according to a table of existing lives, the number of survivors at the commencement and end of a given series should be the proportion between the present number entitled to promotion and that likely to obtain it.

10. Carrying out this principle which, where the survivors at a given date only are required, is equitable and simple, and applying it to the existing officers, or rather to the number existing on 1st January 1868, for which date the original statements were framed, it will be seen by the annexed statement based on the table of lives employed by Major General Hannyngton, that of the 2,220 officers, who by their standing would be entitled, if they survive, to the colonel's allowance in 1896, the year which he assigns as the maximum, 882 would be in receipt of that allowance instead of 726, which is the figure he deduces. The maximum year would really be 1897, when his total is 749, and when, according to the process now adopted, based on the expectation of life, the figure above given would be proportionately increased.

11. This figure, it is to be remembered, is not confined to those who will at any time attain the colonels' allowance, but to those who will do so by, and retain it in, the year 1896.

12. Moreover, it is confined to the staff corps alone. But there are, or on 1st January 1868 were, 958 local officers of all ranks, of whom 141 were already in receipt of the colonel's allowance, leaving 817 to attain it.

13. Assuming the same proportions as for the staff corps, the result will be (2,401 : 817 :: 828 : 300) a further addition of 300 local officers, who will be drawing the colonel's allowance in 1896, irrespective of any possible survivors amongst those now in receipt of it, being a larger maximum of recipients and of ultimate expenditure than the undersigned had estimated.

14. As illustrating the remark contained in paragraph 7 of this office memorandum No. 25 U., regarding the varied results obtainable in uncertain calculations of this nature, according to the formulæ and tables employed, it may be observed that in calculating the surviving officers in 1896 in receipt of colonel's allowance, according to the Carlisle Tables, and for economy of time, taking the average age of each grade, which, in a corresponding

trial by Neison's Tables, gives a little smaller result than when each year is worked out separately, the total number of staff corps officers would be 1,291, as noted below :—

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4657 | 1841 | 391 | 154 | Present average age of | 46 | years. | |
| 5009 | 2525 | 645 | 325 | „ | „ | 41 | „ |
| 5474 | 3521 | 739 | 475 | „ | „ | 33 | „ |
| 5748 | 4000 | 485 | 337 | „ | „ | 28 | „ |
| Survivors entitled in 1896 to colonels' allowance | | | 1,291 | | | | |

15. Taking all the foregoing circumstances into consideration, and making the fullest allowance for the final consequences of the defect inherent in the mode of calculation unavoidably adopted in the original memorandum No. 30 T., from this branch, the undersigned considers that there is every reason to apprehend that the result, as regards the pecuniary interests of Government, were not exaggerated in that memorandum.

*Arthur Broome*, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

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STATEMENT showing the actual Number of Staff Corps Officers in the Service on 1st January 1868, with their probable Ages, supposing them to have joined the Army when 18 years old; also the probable Number that will not only survive to attain the rank of Colonel with Colonel's Allowance, but will remain alive in the year 1896; according to the Life Tables employed by Major General *Hannyngton*.

| AGE. | Number existing at each Age on 1st January 1868. | Probable Number that will Survive in 1896. | Years in which they will attain Colonel's Allowance. | AGE. | Number existing at each Age on 1st January 1868. | Probable Number that will Survive in 1896. | Years in which they will attain Colonel's Allowance. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 65 to 56 Average 59 | 37 | 3·0 | 1868 to 1874. | 40 | 116 | 46·1 | 1883 |
| | | | | 39 | 119 | 48·1 | 1884 |
| 55 | 3 | 0·4 | | 38 | 98 | 40·2 | 1885 |
| 54 | 2 | 0·3 | | 37 | 106 | 44·0 | 1886 |
| 53 | 5 | 1·0 | | 36 | 90 | 37·7 | 1887 |
| 52 | 6 | 1·3 | | 35 | 84 | 35·4 | 1888 |
| 51 | 12 | 2·8 | | 34 | 74 | 31·4 | 1889 |
| 50 | 18 | 4·6 | | 33 | 68 | 29·1 | 1890 |
| 49 | 17 | 4·6 | | 32 | 72 | 30·0 | 1891 |
| 48 | 27 | 7·9 | 1875 | 31 | 117 | 50·8 | 1892 |
| 47 | 34 | 10·6 | 1876 | 30 | 127 | 55·7 | 1893 |
| 46 | 58 | 19·0 | 1877 | 29 | 128 | 56·6 | 1894 |
| 45 | 91 | 31·2 | 1878 | 28 | 163 | 72·7 | 1895 |
| 44 | 81 | 29·0 | 1879 | 27 | 155 | 69·8 | 1896 |
| 43 | 136 | 50·1 | 1880 | | | | |
| 42 | 90 | 34·1 | 1881 | TOTAL | 2,220 | 881·9 or 882 | |
| 41 | 86 | 33·4 | 1882 | | | | |

NOTE by the Honourable Sir *H. M. Durand*,—Simla, 9th August 1869.

WHATEVER the views of the Members of Government may be on the somewhat conflicting calculations of Major General Hannyngton and Colonel Broome, as also those of Major General Norman, I suppose that there will be no difference of opinion as to compliance with the request of the latter officer. I propose, therefore, that the memorandum of Major General Norman, dated 26th June 1869, and the three memoranda by Colonel Broome, dated 29th April, 10th June, and 3rd July 1869, be transmitted to the Secretary of State.

2. The Despatch of the Government of India, dated the 7th November 1868, to which the Secretary of State's Despatch of the 11th March 1869 is a reply, was forwarded during my absence on leave from the Council. It is, therefore, for the first time that I have had the opportunity of reading the Despatch in question, with its appended Minutes by His Excellency

Excellency the Commander in Chief, Major General Norman, and Sir R. Temple. A careful perusal of these papers in connection with the Despatch from the Secretary of State and the memoranda of Major General Norman and Colonel Broome, written since its receipt, raise the following questions:—

1st. Can any satisfactory conclusion be formed on the conflict of actuary calculations?

2nd. If formed, do the conclusions warrant a reference to the Secretary of State before taking action on the orders communicated in the Despatch of the 11th March, in positive terms. In other words, are the conclusions strong enough to suspend acceptance of the instructions of the Secretary of State, and to ask for a reconsideration of the subject?

3. I must premise that I approach the subject with that kind of impartiality which arises from the following convictions, viz.:—

1st. That, regarded as a system of military organization, the Staff Corps, constituted as it was at first, and modified as it has since been, was a mistake and proves a failure;

2nd. That regarded as a system of ancillary civil organization and administration, it is full of anomalies, inelastic, and teeming with sources of embarrassment and difficulty;

3rd. That strive as we may to bolster up and improve the Staff Corps system thus constituted, it cannot last; and that consequently it is only a question of more or less time given to temporary shifts and expedients ere a thorough re-organization will be forced upon Government. That event may take place, either in prudence before, or else after a signal collapse under the strain of war, but it is to my mind absolutely inevitable. Shifts and expedients may delay, but they cannot dispense with the unavoidable and impending necessity for a radical reform;

4th. Neither in the Despatch of the Government of India, nor in the reply of the Secretary of State, is there any perception or acknowledgment of such an imperative necessity as one overhanging the State. On the contrary, both Despatches regard the existing Staff Corps of India system as suited to the requirements of the State, and between the two parties to the controversy, it is merely a question of the Staff Corps proving a greater or less financial burthen to the State in times to come.

4. This to my mind is a very limited and confined point of view, from which to face so large and important a question, and though I do not myself accept it as the right one, yet such being the conditions of the controversy on the face of these papers, the points for comparison and consideration are narrowed down to restricted and figured limits. Confining myself to these, therefore, without compromising myself thereby on the graver issues which facts will sooner or later force upon the attention of Government, I proceed to remark on the following points:—

5. First, the actuary calculations. As affecting the financial question largely, a prominent point for consideration is the difference noted by the Secretary of State in the 33rd paragraph, where it is pointed out that, according to General Hannyngton, instead of the number of officers of the several Staff Corps receiving the colonel's allowance being likely to amount in 1892 to 981, as estimated by Colonel Broome, they will not exceed 487 according to the Controller General's tables, or 629 according to tables more favourable to life. In the first case, there is a difference of 504, in the second of 352; in other words of 554,400 *l.* in the one, and of 387,200 *l.* in the other of charge over-estimated for 1892.

6. The discrepancy is remarkable; but I have no doubt that General Hannyngton is right, and has pointed out an error which vitiates Colonel Broome's calculation. The latter in paragraph 7 of his memorandum of 3rd July 1869 combats the objection advanced by General Hannyngton in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Report of the 4th February 1869, but in a way which does not weaken the force of the objection. For the promotions which fall due on the years from 1868 to 1880 are brought up and added to existing colonels without any deductions for casualties prior to the year they are added to the number of colonels. It is true that after they are thus added, a deduction of five per cent. is made on the aggregate thus formed for that year, but this cannot remedy the omission of the five per cent. due on casualty deductions for years previous to promotion. The mistake only becomes observable where, as in 1873, a batch of 71 are brought up; before that year the promotions due will be few, and the omission scarcely signifies. But the 71 are in 1873 added without any deduction for the annual casualties of the five previous years from 1868 to 1873; and though five per cent. is deducted from the aggregate thus formed for 1873, when passing on to 1874 the establishment for the 1st January, it is evident that the five per cent. deduction should have been applied year by year to the 71 from 1868 to 1872 inclusive; and that then instead of 71 being brought up, 16 less, that is 55 would have been added. The error is cumulative, but varying with the promotions that fall due to the living in the subsequent years, as their periods of service entitle them to promotion. Thus in 1868 there are only 15 men whose promotions fall due in 1874, and by the deduction of five per cent. for seven consecutive years, the number to be promoted would be under 15 in 1874; so on with

the remaining years. But according to Colonel Broome's method, the five per cent. only touches those brought up after they are added, not during the years between 1868 and the year of promotion; of course the error is aggravated in 1878, 1879, 1880, because the promotions due on commissions in 1868 increase, and the omitted deductions of five per cent. for 10, 11, and 12 years swell the miscalculation.

7. This is distinctly shown in another way in paragraph 10 of General Hannyngton's Report by the application of life tables, from which it is deduced that instead of 136 officers being brought up for promotion in 1880, the number should have been 77.

8. It is explained in another manner by a writer who signs himself "Boreas," whose communication was published in the Bombay "Times of India" of the 8th instant. As this writer's explanation is lucid, and his results correspond with those of General Hannyngton, I recommend a reference to the computation.

9. It will also be observed that an officer, Lieutenant Colonel R. Ranken, Madras Staff Corps, corrected in a memorandum, dated March 1868, his previous calculations of April 1867, and that his corrected computation, which allows five per cent. for annual casualties and retirements, approximates with remarkable closeness to both General Hannyngton's and "Boreas'" calculation of the number of colonels in 1855, which Lieutenant Colonel Ranken rates at about 400, "Boreas" at 402, and General Hannyngton 422 by one set of tables, 510 by another.

10. I have been desirous of testing my own conclusion by such independent computers not only on account of the intrinsic importance of this financial question, but also in justice to Colonel Broome, whose calculations as Controller General, I have found to be remarkably accurate, and therefore when an oversight, such as that pointed out by General Hannyngton, occurs, it is imperative to make sure that the criticism is accurate.

11. Granting that General Hannyngton's view may be assumed as correct on this most important particular, there is another in which he, I think, omits to credit to the proposals of Major General Norman and Colonel Broome what, under their supposition of the number of lieutenant colonels that might be induced to retire, and half of whom would be absorbed, forms a material consideration. I advert to the pay saved by officers retiring, or the difference between pay and pension of such officers.

12. General Hannyngton, in his 15th paragraph, alludes to the difference between Indian pay and the pension of rank as a set-off or a counterbalance to the loss shown in his 13th paragraph; but as in that computation the hypothesis is assumed of the retirement on bonus and pension of 200 officers, so inseparable an item as the difference between their Indian pay and pension ought certainly not to have been eliminated from the estimate of gain or loss to the State from the acceptance of the proposals. It seems to me to enter as an essential element, and that its omission, *pro tanto*, vitiates the result at which General Hannyngton arrives in paragraph 13, where he drops entirely this *per contra*. In fact having entered on one side of the account the present value of the pension of rank, it would only have been in accordance with the rules of book-keeping to have entered the present value of Indian pay on the other. The result arrived at would then have appeared more favourable to the proposals made by the Government of India, and the balance would have shown a gain rather than a loss on the hypothetical computation.

13. Whilst, however, I admit this objection to General Hannyngton's review of the proposals of the Government of India, I must avow my own doubt of the assumed constant in this calculation, viz., the retirement of 200 officers, as affording an approximation to the effect that might have resulted from the scheme of the Government of India.

14. It aimed at inducing unemployed field officers, both local and staff corps, and younger lieutenant colonels of the staff corps to retire on the terms offered. Except in a few cases, I doubt whether the advantages offered were adequate to attain anything approaching to such an exodus of officers. Quite independently of the consideration of the inexpediency of getting rid, or of trying to get rid, of young lieutenant colonels amongst the most useful class of officers, the terms offered as an allurement for resigning the prize of colonel's allowances were only likely to be entertained in instances where health had so completely broken down, as to render six or seven years' further residence in the country very dangerous, or where the accession of private means or opportunities of saving money by the long incumbency of well-paid appointments favoured early retirement and return to England.

15. Entertaining this opinion, and also feeling that it is never desirable that Government should come forward with a measure the success of which is so extremely problematical, I am disposed to regard the rejection of the proposals of the Government of India by the Secretary of State as supported by other considerations than those stated in the Despatch of the 11th March 1869, though I by no means underrate some of the arguments based on general principles enunciated by that Despatch in vindication of its decision. I think, therefore, that the Government of India would be hardly warranted in suspending acceptance of the instructions of the Secretary of State, unless it were prepared to submit proposals which did not conflict with the views and principles laid down by the Duke of Argyll for the guidance of the Government of India.

16. At

16. At the same time I confess that I cannot contemplate with indifference the enormous expenditure which an unmodified protracted existence of the staff corps will entail on the finances of India before it arrives at its normal condition. It is calculable, on General Hannyngton's computations, that the future expense for colonels' allowances alone will aggregate, before that normal stage is reached, about twenty million sterling. This is exclusive of the annual cost of the staff corps during the period from 1868 to 1905. Still, though quite alive to these weighty considerations, I can suggest no scale of pensions or bonus likely to induce officers to retire, except such as approaches nearer to the value of the annuity of colonels' allowances, and which would therefore prove of small financial benefit, if of any, which is doubtful, and would moreover not be final; for I fail to see any finality either in the proposals made by the Government of India, or by any more favourable scheme that might be suggested. The process, to be effective, would have to be periodically repeated; and the remedy, in the aggregate, would then probably result in anything but economy.

17. Even the elimination, if it could be effected by transfer to the list of the Civil Service of all officers who had been employed in the purely civil administration of the country for three or four years, would prove but a partial remedy, and not a few practical difficulties would have to be surmounted. Judging from what passed in the council of the Governor General in 1867, such a scheme would not be likely to meet with acceptance here, and its chance of approval by the Secretary of State in council would be still less. Any such a suggestion, therefore, would hardly be regarded as a satisfactory reason for suspending action on the positive orders of the Secretary of State.

18. After the publication in England of the Despatch of the Secretary of State, I question the expediency of not publishing it, *in extenso*, in the "Gazette of India." On the whole it would seem politic to print it in its entirety, and to issue a general order with a view to giving effect to its instructions.

19. In that general order the Commanders in Chief of the three Presidencies might be desired to report on the unemployed officers of the several armies with due regard to the 51st, 52nd, 53rd, and 54th paragraphs of the Secretary of State's Despatch.

20. The general order might state that, in accordance with paragraph 55, the officers who entered the service since 1858, had been individually addressed, and given a period of two years in which to pass the higher standard.

21. The general order might state that the Commanders in Chief of the Presidencies had been addressed on the subject of paragraph 52.

The instructions sent to them must necessarily admit the exercise of much discretion on this point, and will require care, otherwise a blow will be struck at the admission of probationers very detrimental to the supply of the lower grade of the staff corps.

22. With regard to the remarks by the Secretary of State in the 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th paragraphs, I think it would have been better, viewing the importance of the subject, if the late Governor General, instead of directing, as was done in his Minute of the 13th of August 1867, paragraph 2, the consideration of arrangements for applying a remedy to the state of things brought forward by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, had directed Colonel Broome, the Controller General of Military Expenditure to report on the question of the present and future expenditure of the staff corps and local services, and after being put in possession of the prospective condition of the staff corps and local services, had referred to the Secretary of State, in order to obtain the views of the Home Government as to the expediency of taking into consideration remedial measures. The Home Government having already stated that certain beneficial measures were final, there is much force in the remarks by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49 of his Despatch; and before formally entering into the question of remedial arrangements, necessarily subversive of the finality thus announced, I feel that it would have been considerate to consult Her Majesty's Government before committing the Government to a step which, in conception, involved an infraction of the finality orders. I contemplated this course at the conclusion of my Minute of the 8th August 1867, where the memorandum of the Commander in Chief was regarded as tentative only of the views of the Secretary of State on the general principles involved.

23. I have never read the article in the "Calcutta Review" to which the Secretary of State has alluded in the 59th paragraph. I cannot therefore pretend to offer any opinion on the point whether it derived its inspiration from official papers or sources. I cannot doubt for a moment, but what the Secretary's account of his own anxiety to avoid a premature publication of the scheme proposed by the Government of India is absolutely correct, and therefore without contesting the views expressed by the Secretary of State, I think the Governor General in Council may entirely exonerate Major General Norman from any implication in the censure conveyed by the Secretary of State on this head.

24. I have kept back the papers and the preceding paragraphs, because I was anxious to ascertain, with reference to my own doubt as explained in the 13th and following paragraphs, what the result of the offer made in 1861 of 300 retirements had been. This took time, but I think the delay was preferable to circulating my doubts without offering some reason for advancing it.

25. The inducements held out by the offer of 1861 were much stronger than the proposals under consideration. At that time staff corps officers had in prospect only one colonel's allowances for every 30 officers; the local officers could only attain colonel's allowance by casualties to a limited grade. Now, after 38 years' service, every officer has this coveted prize in prospect, the number being unlimited.

26. However, in 1861, notwithstanding the circumstances being so greatly in favour of the offer when compared with existing circumstances, it appears that only 205 of the 300 were taken. I think it clear from this fact that, situated as officers now are, both local and staff corps, that very strong inducements could alone operate, and those must be far stronger than either Colonel Broome's or Major General Norman's scales to hold out a reasonable hope of success.

27. Speaking of the error pointed out by Major General Hannyngton in Colonel Broome's calculations, I have used the word "oversight;" but though Colonel Broome, with whom I have discussed the point, concedes that it is a blot, he shows that so long as he employed, for the sake of lucidity, arithmetical instead of algebraical calculations, the adoption of the course which would have eliminated this error would have been very cumbrous; that it is a blot most felt in the earlier years of the series, and which gradually wears itself out, the final result, as shown in his last memorandum, being that the amount of colonel's allowance, when the maximum is reached, according to the life tables which Major General Hannyngton uses to prove Colonel Broome's error, as great or greater than he represented, and a most serious matter for consideration.

28. I certainly must grant that, whilst the weak point in his mode of calculation has been prominently brought forward, and made the most of, the other, and not less important points, which cannot be contravened, are not noticed. I am under the impression that the Government of India are under great obligation to Colonel Broome for having, in the discharge of his duty as Controller General of Military Expenditure, called our attention not alone to the financial results as regarding the number of officers who will ultimately obtain colonels' allowances, but also to the excessively serious evil of the annually increasing disproportion of the several grades, and the consequently inevitable increase in the proportion of highly-paid field officers. I think that practically, so far as the services of the State are concerned, this is a radical fault in the present staff corps system which Colonel Broome has brought out into strong light, and which I do not find Major General Hannyngton grapple with.

29. In a Minute on the reduction of army expenditure, I shall deal with this subject; but it is unnecessary here to enter upon it, the question here being what action to take on the Despatch of the Secretary of State of the 11th March 1869.

*H. M. D.*

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MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief.—12th October 1869.

WITH regard to the questions suggested in the Military Department, I would advise that at this late date, as compared with the receipt of the Secretary of State's Despatch of March 11th, it would be most inexpedient to publish that Despatch officially in this country, or to make any announcement regarding it in the General Orders of Government. The purport of it is already well known to the public. It is, I think, unnecessary to call upon the several Commanders in Chief to make a further classification of the unemployed officers.

The Government is actually in possession, at all events in this Presidency, of the personal opinion of the Commander in Chief with regard to every unemployed officer, that opinion having been carefully corrected by research in the offices of the Adjutant General and the Military Secretary.

These matters have but very recently again received the most exact revision on the part of the Adjutant General, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, the results of which must now be with the Military Department.

I myself went over every name, assisted by my principal staff officers and the records of the departments.

With regard to a principle on which refusals to entertain applications have been consistently made for a great many years by the several Governments, in order to insure efficiency among employed officers, I think it unfortunate that the Secretary of State should now prescribe a retrograde action with reference to unpassed officers who entered the army subsequently to 1837.

There is no excuse whatever for such unpassed officers.

The whole of their career has taken place on the distinct understanding that staff employ was out of the question unless they passed the language test.

It is only the stupid, the extremely idle, or the profligate, who have failed to pass it, with very rare exceptions.

All regimental appointments are now properly declared staff appointments, such appointments being held on the same terms as in what used to be called the irregular regiments, the nominees being selected for the appointments on having passed the language tests, and having otherwise shown themselves to be good officers.

I think it may be said, and perhaps not altogether without reason, that there will be something

something like a breach of faith under the existing circumstances of the army, were we to prefer officers who have not complied with the tests, according to which all the other officers hold appointments. The latter may fairly enough say that a very important condition of their career in this country would now be interfered with.

But I would venture to take another ground.

Considering the present organisation of these armies, the paucity of the number of effective officers, and the fact that the establishments are calculated on the admittedly thorough efficiency of the regimental officers, it does appear to me more to be regretted than I am able to express to impose on the cadre organised as above described, gentlemen who, reasoning *à priori*, must be declared to be incapable.

I have no objection to offer to the proposal to place additional pressure on the officers of the General List who have entered the service since 1858.

As suggested by the Military Department, this may be properly done in a separate letter to each officer concerned. The limit of 18 months is liberal; but in order to avoid the appearance of hardship, it may be accepted.

The reductions which have been proposed to the Secretary of State will of course swell for a time the unemployed lists in the three Presidencies. I think it may be well to advise the Adjutant General to be careful to apply the rule exactly with reference to admission of probationers for the staff corps in the case of actual vacancies only, and that qualified officers returned to the Commanders in Chief for employment, whether from reduced regiments or from the civil establishments, should be generally disposed of in real situations before new probationers can be admitted to the three staff corps from the line regiments.

The answer of the Commanders in Chief to aspirants for the staff corps would then be, that their names were noted, and would receive consideration, according to date of application, as vacancies might occur, a preference, however, being given to those who had passed the higher standard in Hindoostani, in other languages, and the special studies for the several departments.

I would here mention a strong opinion, that all experience shows that an indiscriminate application of the principle laid down in para. 12 of the Secretary of State's Despatch is in practice out of the question.

Even in the civil departments, it is found difficult to ignore altogether the facts and bearings of military rank.

It is owing to complications arising from such matters that the civil departments are prone to decline as much as possible the services of officers who have got beyond the subaltern rank. They like to take their men unfettered by any privilege of seniority or superior standing.

But in regiments it is, generally speaking, impossible to put out of sight the question of army seniority.

I can safely say that my greatest difficulty in managing the patronage and appointments of the army has lain in guarding the susceptibilities of officers in these respects, and in the careful watch which has been required for the purpose of remedying the effects of the previous appointment of young officers to positions which might enable them to command their seniors in regiments.

Wherever this has occurred, there has generally been discontent, and sometimes failure in discipline.

By the exertion of much care in the office of the Military Secretary, I have at length almost got over the inequalities alluded to without impairing regimental efficiency in any particular, and I believe this has been greatly appreciated in the army at large.

The result is that now, with few exceptions, promotion goes in the regiments without bringing in officers from the outside, a very important result to have achieved with regard to the changes in the army of the last eight years.

This must be interfered with for a time in disposing of the officers about to be reduced from active employment; but, with the exception of setting aside the idle and incompetent, the principle involved in the rule should be held by all prudent Governments and Commanders in Chief, to be the one for ordinary guidance, if we would have good-will, content, and therefore the best sort of discipline among the British officers who serve in the Native regiments of the armies of this country.

I abstain from entering into the controversy between Major General Hannyngton and Colonel Broome, regarding the results of present establishments, mortality amongst them, and so forth.

As before stated, I am averse to an increase of pensions in order to induce field officers to retire, while I should not have been sorry to have offered a small bonus, in order to make palatable the reform suggested by me in my Minute dated 10th October 1868, *vide* 2nd page.

I set out in the margin* the paragraph to which I allude.

It

* I think, therefore, that the sham of the "doing-duty" officers should be abolished, and that all officers not actually employed in permanent or officiating appointments should be declared to be *unemployed*, with the consequences similar to those affecting general officers, viz., that after three years of unemployment they might reside where they liked, whether in India or in England, on British pay of their rank until their services are called for, or until they declare finally to retire, provided that after five years of non-employment, retirement on pension of rank be rendered obligatory. As the pensions even now exceed the British pay of rank, it appears to me that in a manner perfectly equitable, we should thus avoid all the dangers depicted by Colonel Broome.

It appears, then, to me that the practical treatment of this part of the subject lies in a very small compass, if Her Majesty's Government be desirous of reducing the non-effective lists which threaten to overwhelm the finances of this country.

The question is simply this. Is it proper, wise and equitable to continue to give Indian full pay indefinitely to large numbers of officers of high rank, who are notoriously doing nothing, many of them being utterly unfit for employment, while some of the others would evade it in one way or other, were the offer of employment made to them.

For any army but that of India, this question would be summarily answered in the negative by Parliament, or whatever the ruling power might be.

I cannot conceal from myself that when questions regarding Indian officers come before Parliament, they are discussed from a point of view differing from that affecting home establishments, which are paid for and watched by the tax-paying community of Great Britain.

In all the discussions of late years in these matters, it has appeared to me that when treated of in England, the personal interests of British establishments in this country are alone thought of, the finances of India, or to speak more correctly, the people who are taxed to supply those finances, being forgotten.

It seems to me then that all schemes are futile, and any execution likely to be fruitless unless the Supreme authorities in the face of very considerable difficulties may be prepared to act towards the Indian establishments with reference to the unemployed, somewhat as the Secretary of State for War would be induced by Parliament to act towards those of Great Britain; if such a state of things were possible there, according to which a large number of field officers continues to draw the full pay of their rank while practically unattached and doing nothing.

The Government at home is, however, so committed by a long course of opinions and admissions fatal to economy in this matter, that I am aware there would be much difficulty in having recourse to an immediate measure based on the principle of common sense, economy, and justice to the tax-payers, to which I have adverted.

But there can be no objection as regards good faith or consistency, if the measure be declared to take effect from a future date, as already suggested by me, the interim of time being applied to the reduction of the list of the unattached field officers, in the manner suggested by the Secretary of State, and, as I would advise, by the offer of a small bonus to a given number of officers, this bonus *not being payable to any officer, who may be considered by Government to be worth retaining in the service.* I attach great importance to the distinction here drawn. In my humble opinion the precaution thus shown obviates the objection declared in the Despatch, *see* para. 40, viz., that a general measure might cause the Government to lose some of its military servants who are in the vigour of life, and eminent in their reputation.

Finally, I would recommend Government, both here and in England, to contemplate the future, and in so doing, gradually to introduce a system, according to which the services of officers who have risen in the British service may be secured for the salaries afforded in the several departments, their retiring allowances thus following the scales of British unattached pay, as we see in the case of officers filling high staff appointments which are approved by the Horse Guards. For the argument and details of this measure, I beg to refer to my Memorandum, dated 19th August 1869, which is attached as Appendix B. to my Minute on the reduction of military expenditure, dated 11th September 1869.

*W. R. Mansfield.*

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General Order by the Governor General of India in Council, in the Military Department.—(No. 1056, dated Simla, the 16th October 1869.)

In accordance with instructions from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, his Excellency the Governor General in Council is pleased to announce that all officers on the general lists of the Cavalry and Infantry of the three Presidencies, who do not qualify for staff employment by passing the higher standard examination in the Native languages before the 1st May 1871, will be removed from the service.

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Lieutenant Colonel *A. B. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, and to the Secretaries to Government, Military Department, Madras and Bombay.—(Nos. 370, 371, and 372, dated Simla, the 16th October 1869.)

I am directed to enclose a copy of a General Order, No. 1056 of this day's date, announcing that all officers on the general lists of the Cavalry and Infantry of the three Presidencies, who do not qualify for staff employment by passing the higher standard examination in the native languages before the 1st May 1871, will be removed from the service, and to request that, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, / the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, a copy of it may be sent direct to each officer concerned.

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Lieutenant Colonel *A. B. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, and to the Secretaries to Government, Military Department, Madras and Bombay.—(Nos. 373, 374, and 375, dated Simla, the 16th October 1869.)

I AM directed to annex an extract of a Despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, No. 73, dated 11th March 1869, and to request that, under the orders of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, reports on the cases of any officers, who may come strictly under this category, may be forwarded to the Government of India for consideration.

PARA. 15.—With regard to those officers whom it may be considered not desirable to continue in active employment, by reason either of questionable conduct or intellectual incapacity, you will cause a special report to be made in each case, with a view to their removal from the effective list, upon such conditions as their several cases may render just and expedient.

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The Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office, London, 10 February 1870.

My Lord, No. 37 (Military).

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Military Letter, No. 364, dated 18th October 1869, forwarding certain papers relative to the subject of your former Despatch, No. 443, of the 7th November 1868, and of my reply thereto of the 11th March last, No. 73.

2. The papers now submitted consist of a Minute by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, dated 12th October 1869; a Minute by Sir H. Durand, dated 9th August 1869; two Memoranda by Major General Norman, dated respectively the 3rd and 29th June last; three Memoranda by your Controller General of Military Expenditure, dated severally the 29th April, 10th June, and 3rd July 1869; and copy of a General Order, dated 15th October 1869, with correspondence connected therewith.

3. In forwarding these papers your Government observe that you are of opinion that sufficient ground is shown in the Memoranda and notes prepared by Major General Norman and Colonel Broome, to justify your suggesting that I should reconsider the terms of my Despatch, though you have no desire to press the adoption of any scheme of the kind under discussion, if, on full review of all that is said, I feel such a scheme to be inexpedient.

4. Although I am of opinion, as shown in my Despatch of the 11th March, that there are reasons of an administrative character against the scheme proposed in your letter of the 7th November 1868, which more than counterbalance any financial considerations involved in the matter, I have thought it right to clear up any doubts that might have arisen upon the latter point by referring these papers also to Major General Hannyngton; and I forward, for your Lordship's information, that gentleman's report.

5. I see in the papers now forwarded, no reason for doubting the propriety of the decision communicated to you in my former Despatch of the 11th March last; and as the discussion on the financial merits of the scheme would appear now to have exhausted the subject, your Lordship will, I doubt not, agree with me that it is not desirable to carry that discussion any further.

6. I learn from the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of your letter, and from the General Order which accompanies it, that, in furtherance of the proceedings suggested in the 55th paragraph of my Despatch, you have granted to the young officers on the general list until 1st May 1871, to qualify themselves for staff employment by passing the higher standard examination in the native languages. I approve of this proceeding, but would suggest that provision should be made by a further notification for the cases of officers absent in the meantime in Europe.

7. In the 6th and three following paragraphs of your letter, you give reasons for considering it inexpedient to carry out the instructions contained in the 54th paragraph of my Despatch, the terms of which were as follows:—" Among the latter

latter class" (that is, the officers who have not passed the language test), " it is generally understood that there are many officers otherwise well qualified for active employment, and who in many cases possess a colloquial knowledge of the language. Her Majesty's Government consider it advisable, under present circumstances, that all of this class of officers, whose names were borne on any regimental cadre prior to the re-organisation of the army, should be employed on the staff, whether passed or not, in such departments and positions as your Government may consider them individually best fitted for. Such a course of procedure will doubtless involve a departure from an established and very important rule, but can form no embarrassing precedent, inasmuch as all officers, before entering the Staff Corps hereafter, must qualify in the native language."

8. I understand that your objections to this measure are :—

1st. That it will be viewed as a hardship by those officers who, carrying out the desire of Government, have qualified in the languages, and thereby have become entitled, under the rules of the service, to expect that appointments and promotions in Departments, &c., were alone to be bestowed upon them, and upon others similarly qualified.

2nd. That as there is now a superfluity of superior officers, there will usually be two or more candidates for every vacant appointment, and in such case the best officer should be selected, who will ordinarily be one who has taken the trouble to qualify in the languages.

3rd. That the number of unpassed officers who entered the service prior to 1858 is now small.

9. With regard to the first objection, I have to observe that, while I cannot admit that any officer who has, in obedience to a reasonable order, and with a view to his own interests, qualified for employment by passing in the native languages, could with propriety complain of the exercise, on the part of the Government, of its undoubted right to waive the order in any case where the interests of the service rendered it desirable, the instructions communicated to your Lordship on this subject are not, I conceive, open to the objection made, inasmuch as they do not tend to place the unpassed officer on a footing of equality with those who have passed.

10. There can be no question that the latter would have, *cæteris paribus*, higher claims, and a far larger field of employment open to them. There are, however, positions in which a thorough knowledge of the native languages is not only not absolutely requisite, but in which other qualifications may be of far higher importance, and under the present exceptional circumstances, with a considerable number of unemployed officers still remaining, it appears to me unreasonable that their services should be lost to the State, and the officers themselves maintained in idleness, notwithstanding that suitable employment could be found for them, in compliance with a rule which at the time of their entering the service had not the effect of precluding them from regimental employment.

11. The above remarks apply also to your second objection ; and with regard to the third, it seems to me, that the smaller the number of the officers in question, the less will be the inconvenience of the nature anticipated by your Lordship in carrying out those instructions.

12. It must rest with the several Governments, however, to select such officers as they may, in the interests of the public service, think well fitted for the various appointments connected therewith.

13. I have only to repeat, and to request, that instructions accordingly may be communicated to the Government of Madras and Bombay, that under present circumstances the interests of Her Majesty's service seem to require that the fact of an officer who entered the service prior to 1858 not having passed in the native languages should not be considered an insuperable objection to his employment in situations for the duties of which he may possess, in other respects, special qualification, and for the discharge of which a high degree

degree of accomplishment in the languages of the country is obviously not necessary.

14. The fact that there are such appointments does not in the least degree lessen the importance of the existing general rule, which requires that all officers shall pass an examination in the native language before entering into the Indian service.

15. I have only further to remark, that the terms in which the unpassed officers are alluded to by both Sir W. Mansfield and Major General Norman, in their respective Minutes, have served to strengthen my conviction of the propriety of the course laid down in my Despatch of the 11th March, as to the proper mode of dealing with them.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Argyll.*

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(Enclosure.)

NOTES on the MEMORANDA of the Controller General, by Major General *J. Hannyngton.*

* No. 25 U., dated 29th April 1869.
„ 92 U., „ 10th June „
„ 127 U., „ 3rd July „

1. In offering some remarks on the Memoranda* of the Controller General, in reference to my report of the 4th February last, I shall endeavour to be brief, and to avoid minute criticism.

2. To facilitate reference, a few paragraphs are cited in the margin.

Memorandum 25 U.

9. The main objection raised by the latter officer to the calculations submitted by the undersigned is, that in Appendix J., annexed to Memorandum No. 30 T., allowance is not made for casualties occurring during the 12 years from 1868 to 1880.

10. A reference to the previous Appendix I., of which J. (up to 1880) is a summary, will, it is believed, show that this objection is not valid.

11. It will be seen that an annual rate of 5 per cent. has been allowed throughout for the casualties among the colonels, as explained in para. 56 of the memorandum.

12. The result is, that although 527 officers according to their standing on 1st January 1868, would, exclusive of casualties, be advanced to colonels' allowance in the 12 years, only 438 are represented as receiving it on 1st January 1880. Five per cent. in this case represents only the death casualties, no other being likely to occur in that grade.

3. The desired reference (para. 10) only serves to confirm the objection. In the Controller General's Appendix I., in the columns headed "Promotions in the Year," new groups of lives are continually brought up without subjection to a previous death rate. In para. 6 of Memorandum No. 127 U., this error is admitted, and excused as being "in the long run not a very serious one." It has been sufficiently described in paras. 10 to 12 of my former report.

4. On the illustration (para. 12) now offered by the Controller General, I have to observe that an annual death rate of 5 per cent. would, out of 527 lives, leave only 285 surviving the term of 12 years. In proof of this I submit the following equation, which may be verified by numerical computation from year to year,

$$527\ (1 - \cdot 05)^{12} = 285$$

which is the true result of the Controller General's hypothesis.

Similarly,

$$527\ (1 - \cdot 0153)^{12} = 438$$

which is the result now stated by the Controller General, and which corresponds with a death rate of 1·53 per cent. only, or little more than one and a-half, instead of 5 per cent. The magnitude of the error could not be more clearly shown than by this example.

26. But, admitting that Major General Hannyngton's estimate may be the more correct one, it is to be observed that he calculates on a maximum number of 749 instead of 982, according to the calculations of the undersigned. He makes no reference to the local colonels, of whom at the same period the undersigned calculated there would be 172.

5. There is a misapprehension here (para. 26). The calculations do not refer to the same period. The Controller General did not carry his estimate beyond the year 1891, for which year my estimate is 629.

6. The local colonels were not overlooked. Their number was estimated by proportion from the final entries in para. 69 of the Controller General's first memorandum, thus—

$$1154 : 982 :: 629 : 739$$

the result being stated as 740 in para. 33 of the Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 73, of the 11th March.

7. The Controller General's calculations respecting the local officers are not consistent. For example, in paras. 12 and 13, Memorandum 127 U., he concludes that, besides the survivors of the existing 141 local colonels, there will be "a further

"addition of 300 local officers who will be drawing the "colonel's allowance in 1896."

8. The discrepancy, as I suppose, arises from an oversight. The "General List" has apparently been added to that of the local officers. There were on the 1st January 1868 not more than 405 local officers under the rank of colonel, and of these, I compute that 128 will be drawing colonel's allowance in the year 1897. The calculation is entered below. The second column is very nearly the same as is given in the statement following the Memorandum No. 127 U.; the third is taken from Table III. of my former report; the fourth shows the number of local officers; and the fifth, which is derived by proportion from the three preceding columns, shows the expected number of survivors in 1897. The third column of the Controller General's Statement should agree with the third column of this table; it differs, I know not why.

| | Staff Corps. | | | Local Officers. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | 2. | 3. | | 4. | 5. |
| Age. | 1868. Living. | 1897. Surviving. | | 1868. Living. | 1897. Surviving. |
| Over 51 | 17 | 3·02 | | 24 | 4·26 |
| 51 | 12 | 1·74 | | 3 | 0·44 |
| 50 | 18 | 2·96 | | 7 | 1·15 |
| 49 | 16 | 2·94 | | 10 | 1·80 |
| 48 | 27 | 5·48 | | 16 | 3·25 |
| 47 | 34 | 7·55 | | 17 | 3·77 |
| 46 | 58 | 13·95 | 75·68 *See* para. 20, below. | 25 | 6·01 |
| 45 | 91 | 23·50 | | 27 | 6·97 |
| 44 | 81 | 22·26 | | 15 | 4·12 |
| 43 | 136 | 39·50 | | 21 | 6·10 |
| 42 | 90 | 27·44 | | 12 | 3·66 |
| 41 | 86 | 27·35 | | 9 | 2·86 |
| 40 | 116 | 38·31 | | 8 | 2·64 |
| 39 | 119 | 40·57 | | 4 | 1·36 |
| 38 | 98 | 34·34 | | 11 | 3·85 |
| 37 | 106 | 38·05 | | 10 | 3·59 |
| 36 | 90 | 32·97 | | 7 | 2·56 |
| 35 | 84 | 31·29 | | 7 | 2·61 |
| 34 | 74 | 27·96 | | 7 | 2·64 |
| 33 | 68 | 25·98 | | 10 | 3·82 |
| 32 | 72 | 27·76 | | 15 | 5·80 |
| 31 | 118 | 45·84 | | 18 | 6·99 |
| 30 | 126 | 49·40 | | 12 | 4·70 |
| 29 | 122 | 48·26 | | 21 | 6·60 |
| 28 | 170 | 67·88 | | 39 | 15·57 |
| 27 | 155 | 65·51 | | 50 | 21·13 |
| | | | | 405 | 128·25 |

9. This Memorandum, paragraphs 1 to 20, purposes to show that by the retirement of 200 lieutenant colonels there would accrue, in the following eight years, a saving, the present value of which is 515,792 *l.*

Memorandum No. 92 U., dated 10th June 1869.

10. The marginal table gives the values of a temporary annuity till the age of 56, and is deduced from column 6, Appendix VII., of my former Report.

| Age. | Annuity till 56. | Age. | Annuity till 56. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 44½ | 7·147 | 50½ | 4·220 |
| 45½ | 6·729 | 51½ | 3·586 |
| 46½ | 6·301 | 52½ | 2·900 |
| 47½ | 5·840 | 53½ | 2·153 |
| 48½ | 5·342 | 54½ | 1·341 |
| 49½ | 4·804 | 55½ | 0·460 |

11. The yearly pay of a Staff Corps lieutenant colonel is 993·45 *l.* It appears from the latest Army Lists that, out of 513 lieutenant colonels, 129, or about one-fourth, are on furlough. Supposing this proportion to be constant, it has the effect of reducing the gross charge for pay by one-eighth = 0·125. The number of lieutenant colonels in the Staff Corps who have consolidated salaries, and whose retirement would not reduce the military charge in India is, as well as I can make out, 83. Hence a further reduction of $\frac{83}{513}$ = 0·162 may

may be allowed. The sum of these reductions is 0·287, and it follows that—

$$993{\cdot}45 \times 0{\cdot}713 = £.\,708{\cdot}33$$

is the actual saving to result from the retirement of a Staff Corps lieutenant colonel.

12. Leaving out the lieutenant colonels who have only six years or less to serve, the valuation will be as follows:—

| Number. | Annuity. | Product. |
|---|---|---|
| 81 | 7·147 | 578·907 |
| 91 | 6·729 | 612·389 |
| 58 | 6·301 | 365·458 |
| 34 | 5·840 | 198·560 |
| 27 | 5·342 | 144·234 |
| 17 | 4·804 | 81·668 |
| 308 | | 1981·216 |

Proportion for 200=1286·504.

Hence,

$$1286{\cdot}5 \times 708{\cdot}33 = £.\,911{,}266.$$

How much of this is clear gain will presently appear.

13. The revision of my estimate proposed by the Controller General (paras. 22 and 23, Memorandum 92 U.), and the calculation offered in support of it, do not bear examination. If (according to para. 8 of the same memorandum) the senior lieutenant colonels be likely to refuse the inducements offered, it will apparently be difficult to find 200 lieutenant colonels whose "retirements would be after 30 years' service." And as to the 226 senior majors "who would not have been allowed to claim the retiring pensions and bonus," their being included did not materially affect the valuation. They were included because, during the period between the inception and completion of the measure proposed, they would necessarily come within its range.

14. In the expeditious process (paragraph 23, Memorandum 92 U.) used by the Controller General to show that my valuation was widely amiss, there is a source of error which escaped his notice. The supposition that 30 years' service may be taken as near enough for the purpose is incorrect. For not only are the present values of immediate pensions at the younger ages greater, but also the number of officers who may retire is greater than at 30 years' service. To put this point beyond further question, I take the following figures from Table VII. of my Report, confining the calculation within the limits now assigned by the Controller General:—

| Ages. | Number. | Column 9. | Column 11. | Column 12. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44 to 45 - | 172 | 668·6534 | 2,188·254 × 292 = | 638,970·168 |
| 46 to 49 - | 136 | 649·4431 | 1,671·127 × 365 = | 609,961·355 |
| Sums - | 308 | 1,318·0965 | 3,859·381 | 1,248,931·523 |
| Proportions for 200 Officers - - | | 855·907 | 2,506·091 | 810,994· |

15. Bringing this into an account, as in my former report,—

| | £. | | £. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 855·907 × 1,124·9 = | 962,875 | 2,506·09 × 150 = | 375,914 |
| Balance loss - | 424,033 | Bonus - - | 200,000 |
| | | Pension of rank | 810,994 |
| | £. 1,386,908 | | £. 1,386,908 |

It is here, I trust, made evident that the difference between this and the former estimate is not important.

16. I must now recur to the estimated saving, as exhibited in para. 12 above. The Controller General considers that admissions to the staff corps may be stopped for the next eight years, and consequently that the saving is absolute. But a reference to Major General Pears's Letter, No. 443, dated 7th November 1868, shows (para. 2) that this is not intended, and that one-half of the vacancies will be recruited.

17. The result is as follows,—

| | £. | | £. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discounted Indian pay of 200 lieutenant colonels - - - | 911,266 | Loss as above - - | 424,033 |
| | | Pay of 100 lieutenants for eight years - | 216,720 |
| | | Balance gain - - | 270,513 |
| £. | 911,266 | £. | 911,266 |

The apparent gain might be increased by discounting the pay of the young officers, but I have not thought this necessary, the new admissions being not limited by any strict conditions. There is a margin for more or less.

18. The possibility of such a saving as is here shown was admitted in the 15th paragraph of my report, but I did not then, nor do I now, conceive this to be the real matter at issue.

19. For, in examining the proposed measure, I was much more impressed by the expressions cited in the margin * than by any financial pressure caused by the present existence of unemployed officers. My attention was turned to the future. I saw, and I still see, that the scheme under consideration would not in any effectual degree lighten the coming burden.

20. Supposing the inference to be correct, that in the year 1897 there will be in the staff and local corps together 877 officers on colonel's allowance, let it be asked, what reduction in this future number would be caused by the present retirement of 200 lieutenant colonels? The answer, easily obtained from the bracketed figures in the table, para. 8 above, is, that there will be $\frac{75{\cdot}68 \times 200}{307} = 49$ survivors of the 200, and taking these from 877, there would still remain 828; whence it appears that the relief, as to ultimate charge, would be comparatively trifling.

21. A yearly payment of $877 \times 1{,}124{\cdot}9 = 986{,}512$ *l.* is doubtless very large. But this estimate of it arises from the extreme and untenable hypothesis that there will be no intermediate retirements on the ordinary pensions. So far is this from being in accordance with present experience, that, in the Gazette of 16th November 1869, no less than twelve retirements are notified.

22. Further, if such a state of things ever happen, the ordinary pension list will have merged into the charge for colonel's allowance. This has already been well pointed out by Colonel Norman, who says, "If the number anticipated by "Colonel Broome do survive and serve on to obtain colonel's "allowances, the costs for pensions of officers retiring on "ordinary pensions will have almost disappeared, and this, "though, of course, less than the charge for colonel's allow-"ances, would considerably reduce the cost of estimated "expenditure. It is also to be recollected that the old *Native* "Army had 176 colonel's allowances in addition to a heavy "pension list."

23. The conclusion expressed in the 19th paragraph of my former report remains undisturbed. So far as the future can be predicted, the proposed measure would not materially reduce the ultimate cost of the Staff Corps. It may also be justly inferred that any practical measure of this kind, single and sudden, would be likewise ineffectual.

24. As

* This increase to the number of colonel's allowance is the most serious point in the whole case.—Colonel Broome, 14.

The ultimate and almost appalling effect to our finances.—Sir W. Mansfield, 43.

I still believe that the financial effect of the present constitution of the Staff Corps must, in a few years, become formidable.

Its cost threatens to be overpowering.—Sir R. Temple, 49.

The results, as foreshadowed in Colonel Broome's report, promise to be serious.—Colonel Norman, 57.

*Note.*—The figures refer to the pages of the Parliamentary Paper, No. 140, 9th April 1869.

24. As to the possible saving at the present time, coupled with a large immediate outlay, it cannot be considered apart from administrative measures, concerning which my opinion is not desired.

25. In apology for the length of these remarks, I may be permitted to quote the words of the late Mr. Griffith Davies:—

"Even at the hazard of being thought prolix, I have purposely abstained from advancing anything without giving my reasons for so doing. I have long been taught that mere opinions will not settle the differences of contending parties, though I have seldom found that which convinces the judgment remaining inoperative."

*J. Hannyngton.*

London, 2 December 1869.

# EAST INDIA (ARMY OFFICERS).

COPY of a LETTER from the Government of *India*, dated 18 October 1869, No. 364, with its Enclosures, and of the REPLY of the Secretary of State for *India*, dated 18 February 1870, No. 37, regarding the proposed Scheme for offering some inducement to FIELD OFFICERS of the INDIAN ARMY to RETIRE (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 140, of Session 1869).

(*Sir Charles Wingfield.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
12 *April* 1870.

173. +

*Under* 4 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (BENGAL MILITARY FUND).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 6 May 1864;—*for*

"COPY of CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Honourable the Court of Directors, on the subject of a LETTER from the Directors of the BENGAL MILITARY FUND, No. 1023, of the 7th day of September 1855, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department."

India Office,
26 May 1864.

T. L. SECCOMBE,
Secretary, Financial Department.

(*Sir Fitz Roy Kelly.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
31 *May* 1864.

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No. 146.—Financial.

The Government of *India* to the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs, Fort William, 29 October 1855.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of your Honourable Court's Despatch, No. 75, dated the 15th August last, we have the honour to transmit, for the orders of your Honourable Court, copies of three further communications (noted as per margin), from the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund, submitting, in continuation of Mr. Neison's Report on the state of the Institution, a second Paper on the same subject, prepared subsequently by Major Hannyngton, of the 24th Regiment Native Infantry, and soliciting, as Major Hannyngton's calculations exhibit a very disastrous condition of affairs, that your Honourable Court will extend greater favouring to the Fund than those conceded in your Despatch, No. 32, dated the 18th April last.

Letter from the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund, No. 1023, dated the 7th ultimo, with enclosures.

Ditto, No. 1117, dated the 29th ultimo, with enclosure.

Ditto, No. 1191, dated the 15th instant, with enclosure.

2. We beg also to lay before your Honourable Court a copy of a Resolution which we have recorded on other points in connection with the above reference. Your Honourable Court will see that we have declined to comply with the prayer of the Directors, that the monies of the Fund entrusted to their management should be regarded for the future as a book-debt of the Government, and that they should be allowed, with a view to enable them to accumulate additional capital, to take advantage, in the meanwhile, of the present depressed state of the money market, to invest the cash balance of the Fund, now in the hands of the Sub-Treasurer, in Government four per cent. paper, in the name of any two Government officers, as trustees of the Fund, whom the Government might select for the office.

3. We are of opinion that the project of investing in four per cent. paper is totally inadmissible; and, as respects the book-debt plans, we beg to remark that our decision on the subject is in conformity with your Honourable Court's orders, as conveyed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your Despatch, No. 19 of 1854, dated the 30th May, directing that the capital of Service Funds should be invested in non-transferable Treasury Notes, bearing a fixed rate of four per cent. interest per annum.

We have, &c.
*J. Dorin.*
*J. Low.*
*J. P. Grant.*
*B. Peacock.*

Military Department.—No. 1023.

The Directors of the Bengal Military Fund to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of *India*.

Sir, Calcutta, 7 September 1855.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 584, of the 19th June 1855, enclosing the copy of a Despatch, No. 32, of the 18th April last, from the Honourable the Court of Directors to the Most Noble the Governor General in Council.

2. The Despatch of the Honourable Court complies partially with the solicitations made in our Secretary's letter, No. 1171, of the 30th September 1853; but the concessions granted fall so far short of the wants of the Fund and of what we conceived to be our just and reasonable claim, that we feel deep disappointment at the result of our appeal.

3. When we did ourselves the honour of addressing you in the letter above quoted, we laid before Government what had been then ascertained to be the amount of the Fund's debt, and we solicited the sanction of the Court of Directors to measures which we considered would be sufficient, in combination with the assistance sought from the State, to re-establish the solvency of the Fund.

4. These measures involved a heavy increase to the donations and subscriptions of the members, and the reduction of the pensions of all widows residing in Europe to the par of exchange allowed to the Fund by the Honourable Court. They were carried by the votes of a large majority of the subscribers, and were brought into operation on the 1st of July 1853. Their financial result has been most satisfactory, and has reduced the deficit of the Fund by 27 lakhs of rupees.

5. The inquiry which was then being made by Mr. Neison into the state of the institution has been brought to a close, and we regret to say that he has proved beyond a doubt that the debt that had accumulated on the 1st of January 1853 amounted to 47 lakhs of rupees. His report is dated the 13th November 1854, and was submitted for the information of Government with our Secretary's letter of the 25th January 1855.

6. We have now the honour to forward a Report, which has been drawn up at our request by Major Hannyngton, an honorary member of the direction, which exhibits a still more disastrous state of our affairs than is shown by Mr. Neison. His calculations are brought up to the 1st of July 1853, when the change above referred to was effected in the rates of contribution to the Fund. On that date the excess of liabilities over assets is estimated by him at the enormous sum of 60 lakhs of rupees.

7. The discrepancy shown in the results of these two valuations, which are nearly contemporaneous, and are made on the same lines and by the same tables, might lead to the supposition that either the one estimate or the other must be erroneous in some essential points; but the cause of the difference is, we think, satisfactorily accounted for by Major Hannyngton.

8. Mr. Neison's valuation is over-favourable, and that is the fault we had to find with that made by him in 1849, when he estimated our deficit at $10\frac{3}{4}$ lakhs of rupees.

9. The result of Major Hannyngton's valuation is in accordance with our own view of the state of the Fund, and confirms what the late Mr. Griffith Davies represented it to be in his Report of 1844, when he recommended "that the pensions of existing and future widows of the present Fund be immediately reduced to three-fourths of the amount then payable or held out to them." Any such measure has been postponed as long as possible, in deference to the wishes of subscribers, as well as in compassion to the widows, and we were unwilling to resort to it until all the other sources from which it was possible to re-establish the prosperity of the Fund had been exhausted.

10. The reforms which were introduced in July 1853 have reduced the debt of the Fund, according to Mr. Neison, to rupees 20,70,507-5; or, as shown by Major Hannyngton, to 31,98,981 rupees.

11. That

11. That much of this deficiency has arisen from peculations and losses by exchange, which might have been rectified in some measure by the Directors of the fund in 1826, we will not attempt to deny. It is, however, clearly established, in the reports of Mr. Neison and Major Hannyngton, that existing subscribers are now contributing at rates that are more than sufficient to provide the reduced Europe pensions which will be claimable hereafter, and that they will also cover future claims to personal benefit.

12. The remaining debt is, therefore, a debt of the past generation, and might with justice be recovered from existing widows, whose pensions, as Mr. Griffith Davies remarks, would thereby only be reduced "to what the contributions of their husbands provided for them, and what they therefore ought to have received in years past."

13. We cannot for a moment suppose that the Government would sanction so harsh a step as to make the widows liable for the entire debt of the Fund, or that the Army would support us were we to propose any such measure. We are perfectly aware of the very great distress that will arise from our reducing the pensions of existing widows, and we would rejoice if we could take as our guide the principle uniformly followed by Government in similar cases, of making all reductions of income prospective. We have, however, weighed all the various modes open for adoption by which to overcome the evils under which the Fund labours, and we have no hesitation in recommending for the approval and confirmation of Government the proposals given in the margin, which are about to be submitted to the Army.

1st. That personal benefits be withdrawn from subscribers whose emoluments at the time of proceeding on furlough, or within six months of that time, equal those of a regimental major; and that, in the case of married subscribers not included in this category, and who may otherwise be eligible to such benefits, one moiety of the present rate shall only be claimable.

2d. That unmarried subscribers who may draw personal benefits shall, on the occasion of their marrying, be required to refund a moiety of the same, to place them on a footing as respects such allowances with married members.

3d. That half passage-money only be allowed to future widows, unless a special subscription, at rates to be fixed, be paid for this item as a separate benefit, and that the rate of passage-money to existing annuitants eligible to claim that benefit be reduced one-half.

4th. That the existing scale of pension of all widows, whether residing in Europe or India, be reduced 10 per cent., pending a further appeal to the Honourable the Court of Directors on their behalf.

5th. That a third of their pensions be continued to widows on remarriage.

6th. That members be allowed to subscribe—a colonel after 27 years' service, lieutenant-colonel after 22 years, majors after 17 years, and captains after 10 years, instead of 32, 27, 22, and 12, as at present.

14. It will be observed that all these proposals tend to reduce expenditure. We might meet our difficulties by raising further our subscriptions and donations, but we are firmly convinced that the Army, as a body, cannot afford to pay higher rates; and we consider it doubtful if existing subscribers would be justified in taxing officers who must join the Fund hereafter, for debts over which they had no control, and in payment of which they are in no way interested. They will, as well as existing subscribers, be required to relinquish a portion of their claims to personal benefits, and to accept reduced pensions for their wives; but these are indirect taxes, which we trust will not be objected to.

15. The state of the Fund may be briefly represented as follows: On the 31st December 1854, there were 579 widows on its rolls, the present value of whose pensions is 81,24,095 rupees. The net capital on that date available to meet this liability was 43,21,900 rupees, which shows a deficit of 38,02,195 rupees. This is considerably above what Mr. Neison and Major Hannyngton have calculated to be the deficiency in our capital, as shown in paragraph 10: when their calculations were made, the number of widows was considerably below what it is now, whereas the net capital was nearly as great as it is at present. We have annexed to this letter a Statement (Appendix B.) showing the value of the pensions of existing widows at the close of the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, and the amount of net capital available to meet those pensions. From this it would appear that our existing liabilities are increasing rapidly, whereas our vested capital, which is our sole means of providing for this heavy responsibility, has increased but little during the period named. Our deficiency in 1852 was 31,89,017 rupees, and at the end of last year it had reached the sum of 38,02,195 rupees, as stated above. It hence appears that our debt is increasing at the average rate of three lakhs per annum, and, unless prompt measures be taken to meet this growing evil, the Fund will soon be reduced to a state of bankruptcy.

 16. Assuming

16. Assuming, what we firmly believe will be found hereafter to be correct, that the increased rates of contributions are fully adequate to meet all future calls on the Fund, we propose to provide by retrenchment a sum that will make up for the loss of interest we suffer yearly from the deficiency in our capital, and also enable us gradually to reduce our debt, so that it shall be liquidated within the lifetime of the last survivor of our existing widows.

It is estimated, as shown in the margin,* that the proposals referred to in paragraph 13, together with the additional aid that has been sanctioned by the Honourable the Court of Directors, will yield a sum of 2,01,000 rupees per annum. By reducing pensions we reduce our liabilities, both present and prospective: those of the Old Fund we have no power to reduce, but the reduction of the pensions of the New Fund widows by 10 per cent. will reduce our liability on their account from 77,74,715 rupees to 69,97,244 rupees, or in round numbers to 70 lakhs. The capital available to meet this liability, after providing for the pensions of the Old Fund widows, is 40 lakhs, which leaves a deficit of 30 lakhs, and this is the sum for which we have made provision.

17. Having now endeavoured to lay before Government a concise statement of what we consider to be the present state of the Bengal Military Fund, and of the measures we propose to save it from eventual bankruptcy, we should not be doing justice, either to ourselves or to those whose interests are entrusted to our care, if we allowed our representations to go before the Honourable the President in Council without a further appeal to the Honourable the Court of Directors for assistance.

18. The principle of granting pensions to the widows of officers has been long established. It is not only confirmed by custom, but it is authorised by regulation; and the pensions of widows are now looked upon as a portion of the guaranteed emoluments of the British officer. They cannot, it is true, be claimed as a right, but they are promised to all widows "not left in wealthy circumstances, as rewards for good and faithful services rendered by deceased officers" In the Royal Army, the amount given to each widow is fixed and definite; in the Bengal Army, the grants in aid of pension are indefinite, and their amount is uncertain. They are derived from three sources—viz., by a direct grant from Government of 24,000 rupees a-year, and by indirect grants in the shape of additional interest on all balances deposited in the Government Treasury, and by a higher rate of exchange than is generally procurable in the open market.

19. We by no means quarrel with these arrangements—they are liberal in the extreme; but we complain of the manner in which the Court's orders relating to them have been carried into effect, as regards the funds of the institution of which we are the guardians.

20. In their Military Letter to Bengal of the 30th August 1826, the Honourable the Court of Directors confirm the rates of pension and the regulations generally of the Bengal Military Fund. They engage to "make the desired advance to the Agent of the Fund in England on the same terms as are allowed to other Indian institutions, namely, 2 *s.* 4 *d.* per sicca rupee; and they also authorise the Bengal Government to allow eight per cent. interest on the *bonâ fide* balances of the Fund paid into the Treasury." In a subsequent letter, of the 4th July 1832, they inform the Trustees of the several Funds that they cannot engage to continue to

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* Estimated outturn of the additional grant by Government, and of the Directors' proposals about to be submitted to the army:—

| | Rs. |
|---|---|
| 1. Government additional grant, exchange | 21,000 |
| 2. Government additional grant by exemption from interest charge | 48,000 |
| 3. By withdrawal of personal benefit | 34,000 |
| 4. By withdrawal of a moiety of widows' passage-money | 8,000 |
| 5. By reductions of pensions | 90,000 |
| Rs. | 201,000 |

to an indefinite extent the assistance as above granted; but they agree to advance the sums required in England, making them repayable in India at 12 months' date, and "at 1 *s.* 11 *d.* per sicca rupee, that being fully as high as could be realised by a consignment of bullion." The difference between the new rate of exchange above named, 1 *s.* 11 *d.*, and 2 *s.* 4 *d.*, the old rate, they order to be given to the Fund, but desire that it may be credited "as a donation from the Company."

21. The first rule has not been carried out as regards the Bengal Military Fund since the year 1836, when the Company's rupee was introduced into India. The Bengal Funds from that period have been receiving but 2 *s.* 2¼ *d.* the Company's rupee, whereas the Funds of Madras and Bombay have received 2 *s.* 3 *d.* for the same rupees, which is the rate that ought to have been allowed to the Bengal Funds, that being the just equivalent of 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the sicca rupee, with reference to its relative value to the Surat rupee, in which all transactions with Government were formerly carried on. The amount of loss owing to this cause was shown in our letter, No. 1171, of the 30th September 1853. In their Despatch, now acknowledged, the Honourable Court decline to reopen this question. We beg humbly to observe that we did not offer any objection to the exchange paid in 1826, nor ask to reopen the question, but merely showed the indisputable fact that, on the alteration of the currency in 1836, our Fund was put to a heavy loss by an inadvertent departure from the rate of 1826, which rate we begged might be restored retrospectively, as it has now been prospectively since the 1st July 1853.

22. The second rule has not been fulfilled in spirit as regards this Fund, in consequence of the state of the institution. Its capital has never reached the amount it ought to have attained, on account of overpayments to its widows residing in Europe and defalcations from the roguery or incapacity of its officials. Its losses under this head commenced with its birth, and have now swollen to the grand dimensions set forth in Appendix A.

23. Thirdly, the terms on which the Home advances were ordered to be made in the letter of 1832 have never been fulfilled, interest at 5 per cent. having invariably been charged from the date of advance to the day of payment. That this was not intended is evident from the wording of the letter, and from the fact that 1 *s.* 11 *d.* the sicca rupee is the outturn of a bullion remittance on which interest at 5 per cent. for 12 months has been charged.

24. Appendix A has been drawn up with a view to show the amount that has been credited during the last five years in the books of the Fund as donation-exchange and donation-interest received from the Company. The first statement gives the amount credited on account of exchange, 1 *s.* 9 *d.* $\frac{9}{16}$ the Company's rupee being taken, as ordered by the Court, as the par rate of our transactions with the Government; it also shows the amount that would have been credited had 2 *s.* been established as the par of exchange. The second statement exhibits the gratuity received by the Fund as additional interest on its balances in the hands of the Sub-Treasurer during the past five years, and the sums that would have been received annually had the funds been solvent. The total grants received are equal to one-fourth of the pensions payable yearly to our widows, whereas the amount that would have been received if the fund were solvent is equivalent to one-half the amount paid yearly to our widows.

25. It is evident from this, that the Bengal Military Fund is not receiving from the Government what the Honourable the Court of Directors originally intended that it should receive, nor is the gratuity granted to it equal in proportion to the Court's grants to the other Indian institutions that are solvent.

26. We annex a statement of the pensions allowed to widows under Her Majesty's Warrant, to which we have above referred; and to it we have appended, by way of contrast, the proportion of the Government gratuity given to the Fund that falls to each widow's share, and the proportion that she would be entitled to if the orders of the Court were carried out in their original integrity.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the PENSIONS of WIDOWS of OFFICERS of HER MAJESTY'S ARMY, and of the GRANTS in aid of Pensions allowed by the Company.

| | Queen's Widows. | Company's Quarter-Pension, the Sum received. | Widows' Half-Pension, the Sum that ought to be received. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. |
| General Officers | 120 – – | 85 10 11¼ | 171 1 10½ |
| Colonels | 90 – – | 85 10 11½ | 171 1 10½ |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 80 – – | 68 8 – | 136 16 – |
| Majors | 70 – – | 51 6 6¾ | 102 13 – |
| Captains | 50 – – | 34 4 4½ | 68 8 9 |
| Lieutenants | 40 – – | 25 5 8¼ | 51 1 4½ |
| Ensigns | 36 – – | 20 6 3 | 40 12 6 |

27. In making this contrast, we are aware that the widows of Indian officers are entitled to pensions from Lord Clive's Fund, but we are not in a position to say what number of the existing widows of the Bengal Military Fund are in receipt of its benefits.

AMOUNT of PENSIONS payable to WIDOWS from LORD CLIVE'S FUND.

| | £. s. d. |
|---|---|
| General Officers | 114 1 3 |
| Colonels | 114 1 3 |
| Lieutenant-Colonels | 91 5 – |
| Majors | 68 8 9 |
| Captains | 45 12 6 |
| Lieutenants | 22 16 3 |
| Ensigns | 18 5 – |

As those only who are in indigent circumstances are admitted to this pension, it is presumed that but few of the widows of officer of the higher grades are drawing pensions from this source; and the pensions of the lower grades are so small that, combined with the gratuities these grades receive from the Company, they barely exceed the pensions of corresponding grades in the Royal Army.

28. In estimating the amount of the Court's gratuities, we have treated them as *bonâ fide* grants, and we have considered the whole amount as given to the widows; but it must not be forgotten that, with the exceptions of subaltern officers homeward-bound, the Fund provides the sick and wounded officer proceeding to England with passage-money home and out again, and contributes towards his maintenance and the payment of his doctor's bills when in England. It should also be remembered that the donation by exchange is the difference between two arbitrary rates fixed by the Court which have no existence in reality. An exchange of 1 *s.* 11 *d.* and 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the sicca rupee is equal to 1 *s.* 9½ *d.* and 2 *s.* 2¼ *d.* the Company's rupee; and, unless the Court's drawing rate on India is 1*s.* 9½*d.*, the full donation credited is never actually given. At present the Court's drawing rate on India is 2 *s.* 2*d.* the Company's rupee; the donation, therefore, received under this head is ¼ *d.* on the rupee, or 1 per cent. on the balance of the Home payments, which is equal to about 9,288 rupees per annum. The sum that will be credited in our accounts as a donation will be equivalent to 4¾ *d.* on each rupee, or to 17½ per cent. on the balance of the Home payments, viz., to 1,62,540 rupees per annum—this being the average amount of the exchange donation credits of the last five years.

29. In

29. In conclusion, we respectfully solicit a reconsideration of our case, and an entire revision of the rules under which the several gratuities given to the Fund are sanctioned. In lieu of the indirect aid now granted, we would solicit direct assistance in the manner sanctioned by Her Majesty's Regulations to the widows of the Bengal Army. We humbly solicit that the grants to the widows and to the invalids may be distinct and separate, and that all payments be continued to be made as at present from the India House, the money being refunded in India at 60 days' sight, and at the exchange at which the Court may be drawing on Bengal.

30. We would further solicit that we may be permitted to take advantage of the present depressed state of the money market, to invest our cash balance now in the hands of the Sub-Treasurer, in Government four per cent. paper, in the names of any two Government officers as Trustees of the Fund, whom Government may appoint—a measure which will at once increase our capital five lacs of rupees, and give us an addition to our income of 40,000 rupees per annum, without any material detriment to the State.

We have, &c.

*H. P. Burn,*
Lieutenant Colonel, President.

*K. Mackinnon,*
*F. D. Atkinson,*
Directors.

Major *Hannyngton* to the Secretary to the Bengal Military Fund.

Sir, Chota Nagpore, 9 May 1855.

HAVING some time ago expressed an opinion that the then existing rates of contribution paid by members of the Fund were insufficient, the Directors were pleased to request that I would compute a scale of rates, and they subsequently allowed me to prepare, at the charge of the Fund,* the extensive series of Tables necessary for the object in view. These I have now the honour to submit. They are constructed on the data used by Mr. Neison; but in form they differ materially from his, and from any that have been put forth for the same purpose.

2. It has usually been assumed that all members subscribe under Article 8 of the Fund rules, and consequently that age and rank have fixed relations. By this hypothesis, calculations are shortened, but the result may differ considerably from those deduced in stricter accordance with facts.

3. In the Tables of Messrs. Davies and Neison, the survivorship pension values are encumbered with the accidental amount of the pension which is not uniform, and thus at the lower ages the deferred increments are not readily separable from the pension of the present rank. But the amount of the pensions may at any time be changed, and the alterations be such as to render the Tables useless. I have therefore omitted the pension factors; and these Tables, being applicable to any conditions whatever, will not, I hope, be thought a superfluous addition to those already in our hands. The means of solving the contingent passage money of widows is now for the first time supplied.

4. The first question to be solved is, whether the rates of contribution originally imposed were sufficient. This has been affirmatively answered by Mr. Neison, but it will bear, and indeed requires, further examination.

5. Omitting

* The fund paid the salaries of two writers employed under Major Hannyngton, at 30 rupees per mensem, for 14 months, to relieve him of part of the manual labour involved in preparing the voluminous Tables appended to the Report.

5. Omitting the deferred increments, the summary at p. 52 of Mr. Neison's report (1849) may be put in the following form:—

| Age. | RANK. | Present Value of the Pensions, India. | Payable in Europe at 2 *s.* 6 *d.* per Sicca Rupee. | Contribution, India. | Loss or Gain, India. | Per Cent., Europe. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* |
| 25 | Lieutenant - - - | 1,552 | 1,697 | 1,229 | — 20·80 | — 27·58 |
| 30 | Captain - - - - | 2,255 | 2,466 | 2,046 | — 9·27 | — 17·03 |
| 40 | Major - - - - | 3,576 | 3,911 | 3,654 | + 2·18 | — 6·57 |
| 45 | Lieutenant Colonel - | 4,764 | 5,210 | 5,171 | + 6·44 | — 2·67 |
| 50 | Colonel - - - - | 5,852 | 6,433 | 7,570 | + 29·36 | + 17·68 |

6. This Table clearly indicates that, under the original rates, the contributions of subalterns and captains were insufficient, and that, when the loss in exchange caused by remitting the pensions at 2 *s.* 6 *d.* the sicca rupee is taken into account, the contributions of all grades below that of colonel were insufficient. But most of the colonels pay the reduced Europe rates. The gain from this class is only an appearance, the supposed case being more favourable than the average.

7. Still, retaining the original rates, a more extensive view of this important branch of the subject is easily obtained. The following Table (constructed by formula 14 of the Appendix) includes a variety of instances within probable limits, and it will be a sufficient guide to general conclusions:—

| RANK, and Amount of Actual Subscriptions. | Ages at Marriage. | WIVES: 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Subscription requisite for present Rank only: | | | | |
| | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* |
| Lieutenant - - - - *Rs.* 120 | 20 | 149 | | | | |
| | 25 | 164 | 171 | | | |
| | 30 | 172 | 180 | 184 | | |
| Captain - - - - *Rs.* 192 | 25 | 200 | 210 | | | |
| | 30 | 212 | 222 | 226 | | |
| | 35 | 216 | 231 | 236 | 235 | |
| | 40 | 228 | 237 | 246 | 244 | 233 |
| Major - - - - - *Rs.* 336 | 35 | 280 | 306 | 312 | 309 | |
| | 40 | 290 | 310 | 326 | 322 | 304 |
| | 45 | 313 | 331 | 338 | 344 | 324 |
| | 50 | 354 | 372 | 378 | 372 | 361 |
| Lieutenant Colonel - - *Rs.* 432 | 40 | 327 | 353 | 380 | 373 | 347 |
| | 45 | 352 | 392 | 389 | 402 | 373 |
| | 50 | 402 | 428 | 437 | 431 | 422 |
| | 55 | 527 | 539 | 571 | 565 | 535 |
| Colonel - - - - *Rs.* 600 | 45 | 299 | 335 | 352 | 377 | 337 |
| | 50 | 353 | 389 | 404 | 399 | 396 |
| | 55 | 493 | 538 | 556 | 552 | 518 |
| | 60 | 745 | 814 | 846 | 848 | 809 |

Here, as before, we see that the actual subscriptions of subalterns and captains are, in every instance, too low; those of majors are sufficient till above the age of 45; those of lieutenant colonels till 50, and those of colonels till 55. It follows that, by all marriages of subalterns and captains, and of field officers if contracted after the age just mentioned, the Fund has been suffering loss; and, on the whole, it may certainly be concluded that considerable injury has arisen from an original defect in the assigned rates of contribution.

8. The

8. The following Table is adapted to the new rates of marriage donation :—

| RANK, and Amount of Actual Subscriptions. | Age at Marriage. | WIVES: 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Subscriptions requisite for present Rank only : | | | | |
| | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* |
| Lieutenant - - - - 150 | 20 | 144 | 150 | | | |
| | 25 | 158 | 166 | | | |
| | 30 | 167 | 175 | 178 | | |
| Captain - - - - 240 | 25 | 189 | 198 | | | |
| | 30 | 200 | 210 | 214 | | |
| | 35 | 203 | 219 | 223 | 227 | |
| | 40 | 211 | 223 | 233 | 231 | 220 |
| Major - - - - 420 | 35 | 253 | 278 | 283 | 279 | |
| | 40 | 259 | 269 | 297 | 292 | 273 |
| | 45 | 279 | 297 | 310 | 314 | 293 |
| | 50 | 317 | 336 | 343 | 342 | 330 |
| Lieutenant Colonel - - 540 | 40 | 268 | 297 | 327 | 318 | 291 |
| | 45 | 290 | 332 | 330 | 347 | 316 |
| | 50 | 336 | 364 | 375 | 370 | 364 |
| | 55 | 454 | 488 | 502 | 497 | 468 |
| Colonel - - - - 750 | 45 | 186 | 225 | 245 | 277 | 235 |
| | 50 | 232 | 272 | 289 | 287 | 292 |
| | 55 | 361 | 409 | 230 | 429 | 397 |
| | 60 | 594 | 667 | 702 | 709 | 669 |

It thus appears that, with reference to present rank only, the increased contributions of subscribers are still rather too low ; from the higher grades the Fund will derive some profit ; but in all this it is to be observed that the passage money contingent on widowhood, and the personal benefits claimable by married members, are omitted.

9. The increments payable by officers who are already married, on passing to a new rank, must now be examined. For this purpose, using the new rates, and according to the principles explained in Article 18 of the Appendix, the following Table has been prepared :—

| Promoted, and the Actual Increment of Subscriptions. | Age at Promotion. | 20 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 55 | 60 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Requisite Increments of Subscription on Promotion: | | | | | | | | |
| | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* |
| Captain - - 90 | 25 | 10 | 11 | | | | | | | |
| | 30 | 13 | 15 | 15 | | | | | | |
| | 35 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 15 | | | | | |
| | 40 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 13 | | | | |
| Major - - 180 | 30 | 69 | 74 | 75 | | | | | | |
| | 35 | 74 | 78 | 79 | 78 | | | | | |
| | 40 | 79 | 83 | 84 | 82 | 75 | | | | |
| | 45 | 88 | 92 | 92 | 89 | 82 | 71 | | | |
| Lieutenant Colonel 120 | 35 | 59 | 63 | 64 | 62 | | | | | |
| | 40 | 64 | 68 | 69 | 66 | 59 | | | | |
| | 45 | 73 | 76 | 76 | 73 | 65 | 54 | | | |
| | 50 | 88 | 91 | 91 | 86 | 77 | 64 | 50 | | |
| Colonel - - 210 | 40 | 55 | 58 | 59 | 56 | 59 | | | | |
| | 45 | 63 | 66 | 66 | 63 | 55 | 43 | | | |
| | 50 | 78 | 81 | 80 | 75 | 66 | 53 | 38 | | |
| | 55 | 110 | 115 | 115 | 110 | 99 | 83 | 66 | 45 | |
| | 60 | 166 | 176 | 178 | 174 | 161 | 143 | 122 | 96 | 62 |

Hence it appears that the incremental rates of subscriptions are now more than adequate. It may here be necessary to explain that, although the increments of pension for the successive grades of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel be equal, the donations on promotion are unequal, and, consequently, the requisite increments of subscription differ.

 10. The

10. The application of the preceding Tables may be shown by an example:

A lieutenant, aged 25, marries a lady aged 20; besides the prescribed donation or fine, he should pay a subscription of 158 rupees yearly. He does pay 150 rupees, which is rather too small on promotion to successive rank at the ages of 30, 35, 40, 50. He should, besides the established fines, pay the successive increments of 15, 82, 65, 53 rupees, that is to say, the subscription should be 158, 173, 255, 320, 373, but they will be 150, 240, 420, 540, 750. Other cases will give similar results, and thus the general sufficiency of the new rates payable in India is demonstrated.

11. I will not here enter on an examination of the Europe rates. That they are insufficient I have little doubt; but by what Tables they should be measured is not yet, so far as I am aware, decided.

12. On the 30th June 1853, the condition of the Fund was as follows:—

| | | Liabilities. | | Assets. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | In Europe: | £. | | £. |
| 52 | Colonels | 51,288·77 | | 13,268·61 |
| 35 | Lieutenant Colonels | 20,071·63 | | 7,815·96 |
| 62 | Majors | 29,093·93 | | 12,251·87 |
| 61 | Captains | 16,398·82 | | 7,532·28 |
| 22 | Lieutenants | 4,327·12 | | 1,706·31 |
| 35 | Permanent Members | 22,408·23 | | 1,881·46 |
| 267 | | £. 143,588·50 | | 44,446·49 |
| | At 2 *s.* 2¼ *d.* | *Co.'s Rs.* 13,12,809·1 | | 4,06,368·0 |
| | In India; | *Co.'s Rs.* | | *Co.'s Rs.* |
| 71 | Colonels | 5,47,210·4 | | 3,55,612·4 |
| 137 | Lieutenant Colonels | 7,85,744·8 | | 7,38,914·0 |
| 197 | Majors | 9,07,773·3 | | 9,70,311·9 |
| 405 | Captains | 12,86,659·0 | | 13,55,665·3 |
| 366 | Lieutenants | 8,07,979·2 | | 8,28,457·6 |
| 23 | Ensigns | 40,645·7 | | 38,361·9 |
| | | *Co.'s Rs.* 43,78,009·7 | | 42,87,323·1 |
| | | | Extra Donations | 1,39,900·0 |
| 1,466 | Wives | 56,90,818·8 | | 48,33,591·1 |
| 514 | Widows (New Fund) | 71,69,284·1 | Capital | 42,16,177·0 |
| 34 | Ditto (Old Fund) | 3,66,692·2 | Other Assets, | 9,78,046·0 |
| | | | Total | 1,00,27,814·1 |
| | | | Deficiency | 31,98,981·0 |
| | | | *Co.'s Rs.* | 1,32,26,795·1 |

This valuation includes the recent alterations in the rates of contribution and the reduction of the rate of exchange allowed to widows of the new Fund in Europe. For each member whose age was known, a separate computation was made according to the actual circumstances of the case. In the absence of data, a few averages were taken; but, on the whole, the facts were more clearly followed than heretofore they have been.

13. The contribution of members permanently resident in Europe were taken at the Europe rate, and were valued by the Indian Tables; therefore, with reference to the remark in para. 11, they are open to further consideration.

14. It is also proper to mention that the residuary subscriptions of widowers have not been brought into account. They are, as it seems to me, a part of the unmarried contributions, and, so far as applicable to the payment of widows' pensions, they are included in the "Excess," from which they cannot be separated,

rated, and are, therefore, in effect, credited above among "Other Contingent Assets."

15. On comparing the foregoing results with Mr. Neison's valuation at page 40 of his Report, a final difference of 11,28,463·5 rupees will be perceived, this valuation being less favourable than his by that amount. The following analysis will show the particulars; the upper figures are Mr. Neison's :—

LIABILITIES.

| | *Co.'s Rs.* | *Co.'s Rs.* | *Co.'s Rs.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wives | 69,21,818·3<br>56,90,818·8 | 12,30,999·5 | |
| Widows | 75,09,672·7<br>75,35,976·3 | 26,306·6 | |
| | | | 12,04,695·9 |

ASSETS.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Married | 68,71,207·1<br>48,33,591·1 | 20,37,616·0 | |
| Unmarried Members, and other sources | 11,87,199·4<br>9,78,046·0 | 2,09,153·4 | |
| Capital on the respective dates | 43,02,567·0<br>42,16,177·0 | 86,390·0 | |
| | | | 23,33,159·4 |
| Difference of the Valuations | | *Co.'s Rs.* | 11,28,463·5 |

16. Such a disparity as this between two nearly contemporaneous estimates for the same lives, and by the same Tables, is very remarkable. One obvious cause is the application of Europe rates to the members in Europe, and others are the differences of contingent assets from unmarried contributions and of actual capital. Something may also be due to difference of method and of epoch; Mr. Neison having, in the latter case, anticipated the new rates, which only began a half-year after the date of his valuation. However, the full details of the present valuation are before the Directors, and are open to Mr. Neison's inspection or revision. I apprehend that it will be found in the main correct, and that our assets are short by about one-fourth of their proper amount.

17. The following losses have certainly been sustained by the Fund :—

| | | *Co.'s Rs.* |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Loss by allowing to Widows in Europe a fictitious exchange of 2 *s.* 6 *d.* the sicca rupee, the Fund receiving 2 *s.* 4 *d.* only | | 18,56,778·39 |
| 2. Loss by peculations, with interest, till close of 1853, as estimated by Mr. Neison | | 11,22,004·12 |
| 3. Loss by depreciation of exchangeable value of the Sonauth rupee by the introduction of the Company's rupee, since 1836 : | | |
| Widows | *Co.'s Rs.* 3,64,734·63 | |
| Miscellaneous payments | 11,983·82 | |
| | | 3,76,718·45 |
| TOTAL | *Co.'s Rs.* | 33,55,495·96 |

18. There appear to be two conditions under which an institution, such as the Military Fund, may exist. The first is, that of a mutual assurance society, having its assets and liabilities so balanced that a dissolution, without loss to any one interested, might at any time be effected. The second is, that the continuance of the society, by accession of members during indefinte time, being (as it is in our case) secured, the current income should equal the current outlay, but a dissolution without loss to some or all concerned be impracticable.

19. That the Military Fund is not in the first of these conditions, is manifest.

20. It has often been asserted, and by persons of great ability, that for our Fund the second condition only is requisite. Sounder views now prevail. It is generally perceived that existing members cannot justly impose a burden of debt on their successors. The end, though distant, must come, and provision should be made for it.

21. However, if the Fund were now in the second condition, it would be possible to bring it gradually into the first. A small yearly surplus accumulating at compound interest, would in time raise a sufficient capital. It is, therefore, desirable to ascertain whether the Fund be now in this condition.

22. A glance at the valuation, para. 12, and a comparison of the incumbent liabilities with the cash assets, will show that the bulk of the existing deficiency is a cash deficiency. We ought to have in the Government Treasury, say, 32 lacs more than we have there, and we ought to be realising the interest on it, say 256,000 rupees yearly. Now, it seems obvious that, if we had this additional income, though the capital be wanting, we should be in a state approaching to the second condition; but, failing this, we are not so favourably situated.

23. A similar result may be otherwise obtained. Our present income, exclusive of interest on capital, applicable to the payment of pensions, is 576,000 rupees, without apparent tendency to increase. The probable yearly payments to widows at quinquennial periods, are noted in the margin,* to indicate the rate of increase, and the limit to which it will finally reach. Taking the amounts year by year, an easy computation (Appendix III.) shows that, in about fourteen years from the present time, 1855, our capital will be exhausted, and we shall have nothing but the above-mentioned income of 576,000 rupees; and, if we take the average deficiency of income thenceforward at 8 lacs, we may find this sum, to be received after fourteen years, is at present worth $8 \times 34 = 272$ lacs; whence it appears that an increase now of this amount to our annual income, would enable us to proceed for an indefinite period without further damage. This and the conclusion in the preceding paragraph, seem to be each confirmatory of the other, and we desire here a most important caution as to the value of time on this matter. What s practicable now, becomes impracticable by delay.

* 

| Years. | Probable Amount of Pension. |
|---|---|
| | *Rs.* |
| 1855-56 | 9,11,808 |
| 1860-61 | 10,71,691 |
| 1865-66 | 11,89,914 |
| 1870-71 | 12,78,562 |
| 1875-76 | 13,41,882 |
| 1880-81 | 13,83,040 |
| 1885-86 | 14,05,202 |
| Limit | 14,46,862 |

| Estimate of Income: | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Married donations | 81,000 |
| Members' subscriptions | 417,000 |
| Unmarried surplus | 40,000 |
| Gain by reduction of exchange | 22,000 |
| Interest on current receipts | 15,000 |
| Total - *Co.'s Rs.* | 5,76,000 |

24. Our position is indeed remarkable. Recurring to the valuation, para. 12, and observing that our future subscriptions ought to belong to the past generation, we may readily perceive that, under existing conditions as to interest and exchange, we, the living members, are solvent.

| | |
|---|---|
| Our future liabilities are | 56,90,818 rupees. |
| Our future assets are | 58,11,637 rupees. |
| Excess | 120,819 rupees. |

It is therefore the incumbent liabilities that weigh us down.

25. The advantages conferred on the Fund by the Government, are such as no public assurance office can procure; and, in consideration of these advantages, subscription has been made compulsory. But, owing chiefly to a fatal oversight (para. 17) on the part of the early managers of the Fund, the benevolent intentions of the Government have been frustrated. For, if our subscriptions be further increased, or the pensions of our widows reduced, until the conditions necessary to stability be fulfilled, it will follow that the greater part of the present members, and all future members, will obtain little, if anything, more than might for the same payments be purchased in the public offices.

26. However, to prevent the rapid exhaustion of our funds, and as a temporary measure, I would earnestly recommend that the army at large raise immediately a contribution of $2\frac{1}{4}$ lacs yearly. Let it be understood that this is for the support of the widows already incumbent on the Fund, a charitable aid. The amount should, I think, be made up by a per-centage on pay and allowances,

ances, including therein all staff and civil salaries. In this way, two per cent. would be sufficient.

27. That the army would afford a long sustained effort of this kind may be doubted; consequently, the measure just proposed may fail to find acceptance. In such case we are still bound by honesty and necessity to act, and that with promptitude and decision. We must immediately reduce the pensions to all widows (those of the old Fund and the ensigns excepted) by 20 per cent. or one-fifth. The pensions would then be as in the following Table:

| | In India. | In Europe. | Lord Clive's Fund. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
| Colonel - - - - - | 2,238 10 5 | 260 6 5 | 144 1 3 | 364 7 8 |
| Lieutenant Colonel - - | 1,835 14 5 | 201 2 7 | 95 5 - | 292 7 7 |
| Major - - - - | 1,373 2 5 | 150 3 9 | 68 8 9 | 218 12 6 |
| Captain - - - - | 915 7 2 | 100 2 6 | 45 12 6 | 145 15 - |
| Lieutenant - - - | 683 7 2 | 74 15 - | 22 16 3 | 97 11 3 |

28. This reduction, in so far as it affects the widows now incumbent, is supposed to admit of no remedy; but, as to contingent pensions, any member who may desire to maintain the original rate, should be permitted to do so, on condition that he avail himself of the option within a limited period, say six months from the introduction of the new scale, or at any time on furnishing a health certificate. The contributions may be (with great facility) determined by the Tables for each particular case. The amount of the reduction is noted in the margin,* and an example or two will be instructive. Thus, to make up the difference, a major aged 40, and ten years older than his wife, should pay $\frac{343{\cdot}3 \times 2{\cdot}1}{12{\cdot}3 \times 12} = 4{\cdot}881$, say five rupees a month; and in like manner a colonel, aged 55, and fifteen years older than his wife, should pay $\frac{572{\cdot}2 \times 2{\cdot}5}{7{\cdot}13 \times 12} = 16{\cdot}719$, say seventeen rupees a month. By this arrangement, the severity of the measure would be considerably mitigated. I think that subscription in advanced ranks should also be more freely allowed than heretofore, the restrictions as to time served being relaxed, but a health certificate being in all cases required.

* Colonel - - - 572 - - 1·625
Lieut. Colonel - 457 - - 7·250
Major - - - - 343 - - 2·875
Captain - - - 228 - - 8·625
Lieutenant - - 170 - - 8·625

29. That the Government will, at this crisis of our affairs, be disposed to afford some aid, may be hoped; but official delay is, according to all past experience, inevitable, and therefore it is that I would urge the immediate adoption of the measures above suggested.

30. It will now be proper to inquire whether the Fund has, on the Government, any just claims arising out of the engagements voluntarily undertaken by the latter. These engagements were,—

To allow eight per cent. interest on the *bonâ fide* balances of the Fund paid into the Treasury.

To make advances in England at 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the sicca rupee, in respect of which it was afterwards resolved that the advances should be repayable in India at 12 months' date, and at 1 *s.* 11 *d.* per sicca rupee, that being full as high as could be realised by a consignment of bullion. The difference between 1 *s.* 11 *d.* and 2 *s.* 4 *d.* was directed to be credited as a donation from the Company.

31. Of these engagements the first has been fulfilled.

32. The exchange account is, owing to various causes, rather complicated, but a little attention will enable us to comprehend a subject in which there is no real difficulty.

33. In adjusting 12 months after date the advances made in Europe, the Treasury officers have always required the Fund to pay interest at 5 per cent. on the balance due. By what instructions the Treasury has been guided we are ignorant, and on the propriety of the change a decisive opinion can scarcely

be offered, for, after all restrictions, whatever the Fund receives over the market rate of exchange is a free gift. What was the original intention of the Court, though not expressly stated, may be inferred, and it will be safe to conclude that this charge of interest was intentional.

34. Such a charge may or may not be included in the rate of exchange; the following considerations will suggest a probability that, in the instance before us, the interest was included in the rate.

35. The avoirdupois ounce of 437½ grains of pure silver being worth five shillings or 60 pence, the sicca rupee of 176 grains pure is worth $\frac{176 \times 60}{437{\cdot}5} = 24{\cdot}137$ pence, the interest on which for 12 months at five per cent. is 1·207 pence; and, by deducting this interest, we have 22·93 pence per sicca rupee, a rate that exactly accorded with the tenor of the Court's despatch of the 4th July 1832, being fully as high as could, under these conditions, be realised by a consignment of bullion. A seemingly strong argument might hence be drawn in proof that the further charge of interest by the Treasury officers was double, and erroneous; but the question may now be left to the judgment of the Honourable Court.

36. Some derangement of the course of exchange prejudicial to the Fund was caused by the introduction of the Company's rupee at par with the Sonat rupee, the former being only $\frac{145}{148}$ of the latter.

37. The pay of the troops in Bengal was fixed in Sonat rupees, and, by order of the Governor General in Council, dated 29 December 1815, it was directed that the exchange should be effected in cases of remittances to or from the Upper Provinces, at the valuation of 95·11 sicca rupees per 100 Lucknow or Sonat rupees; hence the rate of exchange, clear of fractions, is 111 sicca for 116 Sonats; and hence also it follows that, when the sicca rupee produced in exchange with London 2 *s.* 4 *d.*, the Sonat rupee produced 2 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{23}{29}$. But the Company's rupee, being only $\frac{15}{16}$ of the sicca rupee, has, by some oversight of the Treasury, or perhaps of the Fund officers, been passed in exchange with London for its actual value, producing, when the sicca rupee is 2 *s.* 4 *d.*, only 2 *s.* 2¼ *d.*, whereby, since 1836, the Fund has lost $\frac{63}{116}$ of a penny in each rupee, or 2·07 per cent. on the sums paid into the Treasury.

38. It therefore, on the whole, appears that the engagement to give the Fund 2 *s.* 4 *d.* per sicca rupee has not been strictly kept, but that the departure from it has been most probably unintentional; and, if this conclusion be true, an equitable revision of the existing arrangement is desirable.

39. For the heavy loss noticed in item 1, para. 17, the Government is not responsible; but that our loss has greatly lessened the amount of interest heretofore paid by the Government, as compared with what under other circumstances would have been paid, is manifest. The Fund's loss consists of two parts—capital expended 9,87,041 rupees, and interest thereon 13,46,780 rupees, of which interest Government has in a manner saved three-eighths or 5,05,043 rupees; and, as the total sums of 23,33,821 rupees would have been invested in Government notes, the Government is in like manner now saving annually three per cent. interest thereon, or 70,015 rupees.

40. The amount of aid now granted by the Government to the Fund is exhibited in Appendix IV. It is about 2½ lacs of rupees a year, not apparently a large sum, but the extent to which the resources of the State may with propriety be applied to such institutions as the Military Fund is not here to be discussed. The actual amount must necessarily be noticed in any complete inquiry respecting the present condition and prospects of the Fund.

41. The following is a brief summary of the conclusion above set forth:—

I. As to the state of the Fund.

1. That, as compared with the pensions held out to widows, the new rates of contribution by married members are sufficient.

2. That, owing chiefly to the rate of exchange allowed to widows having been higher than the Fund received or could afford to give, our assets are now short by at least thirty lacs of rupees.

3. That, as to living members, the contributions and claims are fairly balanced, and consequently that the deficiency is referable to the liabilities left by deceased members.

II. As

II. As to remedial measures.

1. That a yearly contribution of $2\frac{3}{4}$ lacs of rupees, begun immediately, and continued for an indefinite period, would maintain the practical solvency of the Fund.

2. That, failing such contribution, the pensions of widows, present and future, should immediately be reduced 20 per cent.

3. That a revision of the accounts with Government in respect of interest on advances in Europe, and the rate of exchange allowed for the Company's rupee, is very desirable, it being doubtful whether in these particulars the original benevolent intentions of the Government have been fulfilled.

42. Of remedies we have to choose between increase of contributions and reductions of benefits; either of these will be felt as an evil, but the former affects in the lesser degree the greater number, the latter in greater degree the fewer and more helpless; therefore, the former is the more worthy of adoption, and if adopted, it is at least probable that the Government would grant some further assistance, so that the Fund might in a few years be extricated from its difficulties.

43. Some minor points are noticed in the Appendix; they are not unimportant, but it is unnecessary to introduce them here.

44. That the result of this investigation has not been more satisfactory may be lamented; but in this case to look boldly at the truth is especially needful. In my own mind I am assured that the state of the Fund is not more prosperous than it thus appears to be, for that Mr. Neison's Table XI. assigns the utmost vitality is, I think, indisputable, and by it we have measured our risks without leaving a margin for possibly adverse deviations, a course that no office would venture to pursue, though for us, perhaps, not unsafe.

45. I cannot conclude this Report without mention of the effective manner in which you have prepared and supplied the information that from time to time I have called for, and I would add the expression of my thanks for the assistance that on all occasions you have readily given.

I have, &c.

*J. C. Hannyngton,*
Major, 24th N. I.

## Appendix I.

### For Males.

1. There being three rates of mortality applicable to the Military Fund, let them be indicated by the following symbols:—

| Person. | Age. | Number living at that Age. | Table. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Officer - - - | $x$ | $lx$ | Neison, xi. Ref., 1849. |
| Wife - - - | $y$ | $ly$ | Davies, ii. „ 1844. |
| Widow - - - | $w$ | $lw$ | Neison, xv. „ 1849. |

2. Hence—

$lx - lx$ xi $= dx$ — the number of officers now aged $x$, who die in the next year.

$ly + ly$ xi $= ly + \frac{1}{21}$, the number of wives now aged $y$, who live till the middle of next year.

3. The present value of a unit of money to be received $x$ years hence, money bearing compound interest at the rate of $v$ per cent. is $\frac{1}{cvxrjx} > vx$, and if the payment be deferred for another half-year, the expression becomes $\frac{1}{(1 + r) x (1x \frac{r}{7})} v^u + \frac{1}{2}$.

The rate of interest obtained by the Military Fund is eight per cent.

4. From the foregoing elements the following combination are derived.

$lx^x = Dx.$

Sum of $Dx$ from $Dxa$ to the end of the Table $= Nx.$

$\frac{Nx}{Dx} = dx$, the present value of an annuity on the life of an officer aged $x$.

5. If the annuity be payable in equal portions monthly, half a year's purchase may be added. This condition may be usefully symbolized thus:—

$$\frac{Nx + \frac{1}{2} Dx}{D\,x.} = \frac{1}{2} + dx.$$

6. Annuities on the lines indicated by $x$ and $W$ may be obtained in a similar manner.

7. $$dx\, v^x + 1 = Cx.$$

Sum of $Cx$ to the end of the Table $= Mx =$

$\frac{Mx}{Dx} = Ax$ the present value of an assurance on the life of an officer aged $x$.

8. If the assurance be payable at the instant of death, $vx + \frac{1}{2}$ should be put for $vx + 1$. The assurance on a single life is not among the benefits granted by the Military Fund; but these formulæ are inserted as introductory to the survivorship assurances ($x$ against $y$), which are applicable to the valuation of passage money.

9. $$lx\, v^x\, ly = Dx\, ly - Dxy.$$

Sum of $Dxy$ from $D\,(xy)\,ro$, to end of the Table $= \frac{N}{xy}$.

$\frac{Nxy}{Dxy} = dxy$ the present value of an annuity to continue during the joint existence of the persons aged $x$ and $y$; that is, to cease on the extinction of either.

10. $$dx\, v^{x+1}\, vy + \tfrac{1}{2} = Cx\, ly + \tfrac{1}{2} = C\tfrac{1}{xy}\, 1.$$

Sum of $C\frac{1}{xy}$ to the end of the Table $= M\frac{1}{xy}$.

$\frac{1}{Mxy} = A\frac{1}{xy}$ the present value of an assurance, payable at the end of the year, in which $x$ may die, provided that $y$ have survived $x$. This is a survivorship assurance, commonly called an assurance on $x$ against $y$. If payable at the instant of death, $v^x\, \frac{1}{2}$ must be paid for $v^x + 1$.

11. $$dx\, v^x + \tfrac{1}{2}\, ly + \tfrac{1}{2}\, dW + \tfrac{1}{2} = D\tfrac{2}{xy}.$$

*Note.*—This is an anomalous expression, but the $W$ derived from it is intelligible, and has all the properties of that symbol.

Sum of $D\frac{2}{xy}$ from $D\frac{2}{xy}$ to the end of the Table $= N\frac{2}{xy}$.

$\frac{N\frac{2}{xy}}{Dxy} = d\frac{2}{xy}$ the present value of a contingent pension, payable during the widowhood of a wife, aged $y$, whose husband's age is $x$.

As the expression $(x + 1)\,(y + 1)$, denoting that both lives are advanced one year, frequently occurs, it has been contracted into $(xy + 1.)$

12. The present value of a contingent pension of $M$ rupees, to commence with and to continue during widowhood is $Ma\,\frac{2}{xy}$, and the present value of a subscription of $S$ rupees, payable during marriage, is $Sa\,xy$.

13. Equating these values, we obtain $Ma\,\frac{2}{xy} = Sa\,xy$ and $S = Ma\,\frac{2}{\frac{xy}{axy}}$.

14. If a donation or fine $f$ be immediately paid, the requisite yearly subscription will be reduced, and will become $S = Ma\,\frac{2}{\frac{xy}{axy}}\,S$.

15. The present value of a deferred pension of $(MM)$ rupees, to be received in event of an officer dying after that he and his wife have survived of $n$ years is $(Mm)\,\frac{N\frac{2}{xy} + n}{Dxy}$.

16. The present value of a deferred subscription of $(SS)$ rupees, to commence after that an officer and his wife have survived the term of $n$ years, and to continue during the remaining term of their joint existence, is $(SS)\,N\frac{xy + xm}{Dxy}$

17. The present value of a deferred donation or fine of $f$ rupees, payable in event of an officer and his wife surviving the term of $n$ years, is $f\,\frac{Dxy\,(1+n)}{Dxy.}$

18. Equating

18. Equating 15 and 16, we have $(SS) = (MM) \frac{N \frac{2}{xy} + n}{N\,(xy) + n}$, and if the deferred fine be considered $(SS) = (MM) \frac{N \frac{2}{xy} 1 + m - f\,Dxy + m}{N\,(xy) + n}$.

19. The present value of $p$ rupees to be paid at the end of the year in which an officer, now married, may die, leaving a widow, is $p\,A\,\frac{1}{xy}$.

20. The present value of a widow's pension of $M$ rupees, yearly, is $M^a\,m$, and, if the value be taken for the middle of the year of age, it is $M\,\frac{dw + dw + 1}{2}$: the annuity being corrected for half-yearly or quarterly payments as may be requisite.

21. Should there be occasion to inquire what amount of pension may be granted for a given subscription, we have from 13, $M = \frac{sa\,xy}{a\,\frac{2}{xy}}$ and if the donation be included

$$M = \frac{sa\,xy\,sf}{a\,\frac{2}{xy}}.$$

22. The subscription being fixed, it appears from the last article that the requisite donation or fine for disparity of age in any given case, is $f = M^a\,\frac{2}{xy}\,S\,a\,x\,y$.

## Appendix II.

### Construction and Application of the Tables.

1. To construct the logarithm of $Dx$:—

| Age. | $x$ | Log. $vx$. | + | Log. $vx$ | = | Log. $Dx$. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 9 | 04,13,927 | 6 | 65,76,245 | 5 | 69,90,172 |
| 99 | 0 | 00,00,000 | 6 | 69,10,482 | 6 | 69,10,482 |
| 98 | 0 | 60,20,600 | 6 | 72,44,720 | 7 | 32,65,320 |
| 97 | 1 | 14,61,280 | 6 | 75,78,957 | 7 | 90,40,237 |
| 96 | 1 | 54,40,680 | 6 | 79,13,195 | 8 | 33,53,875 |

2. Given logarithm $Dx$, to construct logarithm $Dx\,y$ when $xy = 8$.

| Age. | $x$ | Log. $Dx$. | + | Log. $Cx$. | = | Log. $Dxy$. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 5 | 69,90,172 | 1 | 14,61,280 | 6 | 84,51,452 |
| 99 | 6 | 69,10,482 | 1 | 27,87,536 | 7 | 96,98,018 |
| 98 | 7 | 32,65,320 | 1 | 41,49,733 | 8 | 74,15,053 |
| 97 | 7 | 90,40,237 | 1 | 54,40,680 | 9 | 44,80,917 |
| 96 | 8 | 33,53,875 | 1 | 66,27,578 | 9 | 99,81,453 |

3. Given the logarithm of $Dxy$, to construct $1\frac{1}{u}$ logarithm of $Nxy$ and $Dxy$, such to five places.

For this purpose we shall employ a Table of addition logarithms, and shall, after the first step, omit the indices.

| $x$ | | | Log. $dxy$ | $dxy$. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 99 | $N$ | 6,84,515 | 8,87,535 | 0,075 |
| | | 7,96,980 | | |
| | | 0,03,140 | | |
| | | 2 | | |
| 98 | $N$ | 00,122 | 25,971 | 0,182 |
| | | 74,151 | | |
| | | 07,245 | | |
| | | 11 | | |
| 97 | $N$ | 01,407 | 36,598 | 0,347 |
| | | 44,809 | | |
| | | 09,052 | | |
| | | 19 | | |
| 96 | $N$ | 53,880 | 54,065 | 0,465 |
| | | 99,815 | | |
| | | 12,928 | | |
| | | 17 | | |
| 95 | $N$ | 12,760 | | |

4. To construct the logarithm of $C\frac{1}{xy}$ when $xy = 8$. We shall here omit the indices, as is usual in practice.

| | Log. $dx$. | + Log. $vx$. | + Log. $vx + \frac{1}{2}$. | Log. $C\frac{1}{xy}$. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 04,13,927 | 65,76,245 | 07,91,812 | 77,81,984 |
| 99 | 94,43,900 | 69,10,482 | 21,74,839 | 85,79,221 |
| 98 | 50,16,375 | 72,44,720 | 35,21,825 | 57,82,920 |
| 97 | 98,94,312 | 75,78,957 | 48,42,998 | 23,16,267 |
| 96 | 32,59,584 | 79,13,195 | 60,74,550 | 72,47,329 |

5. Given the logarithm of $C\frac{1}{xy}$, to construct logarithm $M\frac{1}{xy}$.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | $M$ | 6 74,777<br>82,450<br>03,470<br>2 | 2,92,027 |
| 99 | $M$ | 85,922<br>54,487<br>08,187<br>6 | 31,435 |
| 98 | $M$ | 62,630<br>19,820<br>10,309<br>2 | 42,810 |
| 97 | $M$ | 30,131<br>69,131<br>14,841<br>0 | 61,000 |
| 96 | $M$ | 83,972 | |

From $M\frac{1}{xy}$ we immediately derive $A\frac{1}{xy}$, as follows:—

| | Log. $M\frac{1}{xy}$ | Log. $Dxy$ | Log. $A\frac{1}{xy}$ | $A\frac{1}{xy}$. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 74,477 | 84,515 | 89,962 | 7,936 |
| 99 | 85,922 | 96,980 | 88,942 | 7,752 |
| 98 | 62,630 | 74,151 | 88,479 | 7,672 |
| 97 | 30,131 | 44,809 | 85,322 | 7,132 |
| 96 | 83,972 | 99,815 | 84,157 | 6,943 |

6. To construct the logarithm of $D\frac{2}{xy}$ when $xy = 8$.

As a preliminary step, form logarithm $aw + \frac{1}{2}\frac{r}{x\frac{1}{2}}1$, which is readily to be done, by adding the constant 0,01,63,904 to the logarithms of the quantities in Mr. Neison's Table $xx = 111$; the further process is as follows:—

| | Log. $C\frac{1}{xy}$ | + Log. $dw\ \frac{1}{2}\frac{v}{v\frac{1}{2}}$, | = Log. $D\frac{2}{xy}$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 74,47,746 | 36,70,260 | 11,18,006 |
| 99 | 82,44,984 | 38,70,885 | 2,45,869 |
| 98 | 54,48,682 | 40,75,020 | 95,23,706 |
| 97 | 19,82,030 | 42,83,466 | 62,65,496 |
| 96 | 69,13,091 | 44,96,801 | 14,09,893 |

7. Given the logarithm of $D\frac{2}{xy}$, to construct the logarithm of $N\frac{2}{xy}$.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | $N$ | 7 11,180<br>8 21,159<br>03,320<br>1 | $\frac{1}{2}$ 90,021 |
| 99 | $N$ | 24,480<br>95,237<br>07,769<br>7 | 29,243 |
| 98 | $N$ | 03,013<br>62,655<br>09,793<br>12 | 40,358 |
| 97 | $N$ | 72,460<br>14,099<br>14,077<br>16 | 58,361 |
| 96 | $N$ | 28,192 | |

From

From $N\frac{2}{xy}$ we immediately derive $d\frac{2}{xy}$, as follows:—

| $x$ | Log. $N\frac{2}{xy}$ | Log. $Dxy$ | Log. $a\frac{12}{xy}$ | $a\frac{2}{xy}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 11,180 | 84,515 | 26,665 | 1,848 |
| 99 | 24,480 | 96,980 | 27,500 | 1,884 |
| 98 | 03,013 | 74,151 | 28,862 | 1,944 |
| 97 | 72,460* | 44,809 | 27,651 | 1,890 |
| 96 | 28,192 | 99,815 | 28,377 | 1,922 |

8. It will be observed that, in the foregoing examples, we have formed the fundamental values to seven places, but have used five places only. For all practical ends this is sufficient. The error, if any, will rarely exceed $\pm$ 3 in the fifth figure of the logarithm.

9. The processes here exhibited are simple and symmetrical. In forming a series of Tables, many material abbreviations are practicable, and the reader who may desire information on this subject should refer to Mr. Peter Grog's admirable Tables and Formulas, wherein several elegant devices are shown and explained.

10. We have now to show the application of the Tables to the valuation of the assets and liabilities of the fund. A single illustration will suffice, and, for the sake of comparison, it is taken from page 49 of Mr. Neison's Report of 1849.

Lieutenant commencing at age 25:—

For the Donations:

| | | | | | | | | Value. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | 2 | 56,490 | - | - | - | - | - | 180 – |
| 30 | 7 | 19,376 | 9 | 75,866 | 2 | 56,110 | 2 | 31,976 | 208 8 |
| 40 | 6 | 69,591 | 9 | 26,081 | 2 | 61,700 | 1 | 87,781 | 75 5 |
| 45 | 6 | 43,665 | 9 | 00,155 | 2 | 71,096 | 1 | 71,251 | 51 6 |
| 50 | 6 | 17,025 | 8 | 73,515 | 2 | 76,268 | 1 | 49,783 | 31 5 |

For the Subscriptions:

| | | | | | | | | | | | Value. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | 2 | 56,490 | 0 | 94,158 | 2 | 07,918 | 3 | 02,076 | - | - | 1,048 | 9 |
| 30 | 8 | 12,518 | 0 | 69,008 | 1 | 85,733 | 2 | 54,741 | - | - | 352 | 7 |
| 40 | 7 | 60,129 | 0 | 16,619 | 2 | 18,836 | 2 | 32,455 | - | - | 211 | 1 |
| 45 | 7 | 32,617 | 9 | 89,107 | 1 | 98,227 | 1 | 1,87,334 | - | - | 74 | 7 |
| 50 | 7 | 03,946 | 9 | 60,436 | 2 | 22,531 | 1 | 1,82,967 | - | - | 67 | 6 |

TOTAL of the Contribution - - - £. 2,302 4* * *Sic* in MS.

For the Pensions:

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | 2 | 56,490 | 0 | 25,917 | 2 | 93,162 | 3 | 19,079 | - | - | 1,551 | 7 |
| 30 | 7 | 48,834 | 0 | 05,324 | 2 | 46,240 | 2 | 51,564 | - | - | 327 | 8 |
| 40 | 7 | 01,464 | 9 | 57,954 | 2 | 75,754 | 2 | 33,708 | - | - | 217 | 3 |
| 45 | 6 | 75,500 | 9 | 31,990 | 2 | 75,754 | 2 | 07,744 | - | - | 119 | 5 |
| 50 | 6 | 48,329 | 9 | 04,819 | 2 | 75,754 | 1 | 80,573 | - | - | 63 | 9 |

TOTAL of the Pensions - - - £. 2,280 2* * *Sic* in MS.

The values of the contributions as here determined visibly correspond with those in Mr. Neison's example. The sum of the pension values also corresponds with that inserted opposite the age, 2,517, in his Table *x x i v*, viz., 2,279. The small difference observable is owing to a slight error in his Table *x v*, which has now been corrected.

11. The foregoing process is given in extreme detail, in order to show clearly how the results are obtained.

In the first compartment, the entry in the first column opposite the age of 25, is the compliment logarithm of $d$, and, at the higher ages, that of $d$ for those ages. The second column is deduced from the first by merely adding the comp. log. $d$ to the others. The third column contains the logarithm of the successive donations. The fourth is the sum of the second and third, and the last shows the corresponding natural numbers.

In the second compartment, the entry in the first column opposite the age of 25 is the co. log. of $d$, and, at the higher ages, the log. of $(N\,1\frac{1}{2}\,d)$ for those ages. In the second column, the first entry is log. $(\frac{1}{2} + d\,x\,y)$ for age 25, and the entries for the higher ages are deduced from the preceding column by adding the co. log. $d$ to the others. The third column contains the logarithms of the primary and incremental subscriptions; the fourth is the sum of the second and third; and the last shows the corresponding natural numbers.

The tabular column $(N + \frac{1}{2}\,d)$ requires a passing remark. The annuities deduced from it are obviously increased by half a year's purchase, and are therefore adapted to monthly subscriptions payable to the date of death. By this modification the formula for the deferred subscriptions is made symmetrical with ordinary forms. See Mr. Neison's note on this subject in page 48 of his first Report.

In the third compartment, the entry in the first column opposite the age of 25, is the co. log. of $d$, and at the higher ages, the log. of $N\frac{2}{xy}$ for those ages. In the second column, the first entry is log. $d\frac{2}{xy}$ for age 25, and the entries for the higher ages are deduced

deduced from the preceding column by adding the co. log. of $d$ to the others. Third column contains the logarithm of the primary and incremental pensions. The fourth column is the sum of the second and third, and the last shows the corresponding natural numbers.

It will here be proper to observe that the sum of the primary donations and subscriptions values 180 + 1048 9 = 1228 9, is less than the value of the primary pension 155 × 7 in the ratio of 20.8 per cent., as noticed in paragraph 6 of this Report.

12. The foregoing computation may seem lengthy, but so many of the quantities are constant, that by various artifices, to explain which in this place would be tedious, the results sought may be obtained with comparatively small labour, and the valuation embodied in this Report was, in fact, made in detail separately for each member, whose age and that of his wife were known. In this way also it is to be hoped that annual or biennial valuations will be made in the Fund office.

13. Of the minor points suggested by the details of the valuation, or otherwise brought to notice, the following claim attention.

1. The operation of rule 8, by which members are under certain restrictions permitted to subscribe in advanced rank. In respect of this, it becomes apparent that, before the age of 50, advance of rank is profitable to the Fund, but afterwards less profitable, and at last injurious. Subscriptions in advanced rank should therefore be allowed without reference to the period served, but in all cases health certificates should be required, and at advanced ages, under such fines or donations as the circumstances of each case may require. For the mode of determining the fine, see the formula, Article 22.

2. The whole of the contributions of married members having been applied to the valuation of reversionary pensions, no surplus to meet personal benefits and the passage-money of widows is at present found to exist. Personal benefits are therefore obtained gratuitously by the married members. It seems desirable that, until the condition of the Fund becomes improved, these benefits should rather be granted in the way of loan without interest.

3. During the low rates of subscriptions in Europe, marriages contracted there by members who have retired from the service being heavy and insufficiently compensated risks on the Fund, some amendment of the existing rules on this head may be recommended.

4. Although the aggregate present values of contingent contributions and benefits exhibit satisfactory relations, yet, in the grade of lieutenant colonel, the subscriptions bear a less proportion to the increase of benefit than they do in the other grades.

5. It seems necessary to determine the rate of mortality by which the value of the contributions in Europe should be measured. The choice at present lies between Mr. Christie's Table for retired officers and Mr. Neison's Table. As it stands on the present occasion, the latter has been used, and of its sufficiency for this purpose I have little doubt.

6. A question has been made, whether under Article 8, widowers should continue to pay the unmarried rates of the advanced rank? In answer to this, it may be stated that there is no theoretical necessity for such a payment, and therefore that it should not be required.

7. It has also been asked, on what terms a member subscribing under Article 8 should be permitted to revert to a lower grade? The answer to this is, that the permission should be unconditional. A subscriber in such case can have no claim to a refund of his extra contributions. They must be supposed to have just covered the risk undertaken (*ad interim*) by the Fund.

## Appendix III.

SHOWING the probable Progress of the Fund under existing Conditions.

| Middle of Year. | | Account. | Middle of Year. | | Account. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Rs.* | | | *Rs.* |
| 1853 | Capital - - | 38,70,000 | 1855 | Capital - - | 39,37,378 |
| | Interest - - | 3,09,600 | | Interest - - | 3,14,990 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 47,55,600 | | Sum - - - | 48,28,368 |
| | 526 Pensions - | 8,32,658 | | 576 Pensions - | 9,11,808 |
| 1854 | Capital - - | 39,22,942 | 1856 | Capital - - | 39,16,560 |
| | Interest - - | 3,13,835 | | Interest - - | 3,13,324 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 48,12,777 | | Sum - - - | 48,05,884 |
| | 553 Pensions - | 8,75,399 | | 599 Pensions - | 9,48,217 |

Showing the probable Progress of the Fund under existing Conditions—*continued.*

| Middle of Year. | | Account. | Middle of Year. | | Account. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Rs.* | | | *Rs.* |
| 1857 | Capital - - | 38,57,667 | 1863 | Capital - - | 26,54,061 |
| | Interest - - | 3,08,613 | | Interest - - | 2,12,324 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 47,42,280 | | Sum - - - | 34,42,385 |
| | 618 Pensions - | 9,78,294 | | 728 Pensions - | 11,42,424 |
| 1858 | Capital - - | 37,63,986 | 1864 | Capital - - | 22,99,961 |
| | Interest - - | 3,01,118 | | Interest - - | 1,83,996 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 46,41,104 | | Sum - - - | 30,59,957 |
| | 639 Pensions - | 10,11,537 | | 743 Pensions - | 11,66,169 |
| 1859 | Capital - - | 36,29,567 | 1865 | Capital - - | 18,93,788 |
| | Interest - - | 2,90,365 | | Interest - - | 1,51,503 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 44,95,932 | | Sum - - - | 26,21,291 |
| | 659 Pensions - | 10,43,197 | | 758 Pensions - | 11,89,914 |
| 1860 | Capital - - | 34,52,735 | 1866 | Capital - - | 14,31,377 |
| | Interest - - | 2,76,218 | | Interest - - | 1,14,510 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 43,04,953 | | Sum - - - | 21,21,887 |
| | 677 Pensions - | 10,71,691 | | 770 Pensions - | 21,08,910 |
| 1861 | Capital - - | 32,33,262 | 1867 | Capital - - | 9,12,977 |
| | Interest - - | 2,58,661 | | Interest - - | 73,038 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 40,67,923 | | Sum - - - | 15,62,015 |
| | 695 Pensions - | 11,00,185 | | 784 Pensions - | 12,31,072 |
| 1862 | Capital - - | 29,67,738 | 1868 | Capital - - | 3,30,943 |
| | Interest - - | 2,37,419 | | Interest - - | 26,475 |
| | Contribution - | 5,76,000 | | Contribution - | 5,76,000 |
| | Sum - - - | 37,81,157 | | Sum - - - | 9,33,418 |
| | 712 Pensions - | 11,27,096 | | 795 Pensions - | 12,48,485 |
| | | | 1869 | Deficit - - - | 3,15,067 |

This Account, without pretending to any minute accuracy, indicates very clearly the course that the Fund must run, if not relieved by addition to its income, or by reduction of its expenditure.

The number of pensions to be paid in each year has been deduced from Mr. Neison's Table *x y*, the agreement of which with the actual experience of the Fund is remarkable. Both are here exhibited.

| Years. | Fund Experience. | Neison's Table *x y*. | Years. | Fund Experience. | Neison's Table *x y*. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 - - | 0 4,933 | 0 4,882 | 16 - - | 12 5,477 | 11 5,557 |
| 1 - - | 1 4,532 | 1 4,077 | 17 - - | 13 1,553 | 12 0,430 |
| 2 - - | 2 3,602 | 2 2,972 | 18 - - | 13 7,505 | 12 5,119 |
| 3 - - | 3 2,391 | 3 1,477 | 19 - - | 14 3,323 | 12 9,632 |
| 4 - - | 4 0,828 | 3 9,622 | 20 - - | 14 8,954 | 13 3,974 |
| 5 - - | 4 8,831 | 4 7,480 | 21 - - | - - | 13 8,149 |
| 6 - - | 5 6,503 | 5 4,971 | 22 - - | - - | 14 2,163 |
| 7 - - | 6 4,022 | 6 2,113 | 23 - - | - - | 14 6,019 |
| 8 - - | 7 1,458 | 6 9,023 | 24 - - | - - | 14 9,721 |
| 9 - - | 7 8,738 | 7 5,664 | 25 - - | - - | 15 3,272 |
| 10 - - | 8 5,825 | 8 2,049 | 26 - - | - - | 15 6,676 |
| 11 - - | 9 2,766 | 8 8,183 | 27 - - | - - | 15 9,934 |
| 12 - - | 9 9,588 | 9 4,088 | 28 - - | - - | 16 3,052 |
| 13 - - | 10 6,313 | 9 9,769 | 29 - - | - - | 16 6,030 |
| 14 - - | 11 2,908 | 10 5,235 | 30 - - | - - | 16 8,872 |
| 15 - - | 11 9,287 | 11 0,495 | | | |

The meaning of this Table is, that, if one widow of any age above 17 were admitted yearly, the number of pensions to be paid in the first and following years would be as therein entered. The limit to which this number tends is the expectation of widowhood at the age of 18 being 20·767, whence, with 44 entries yearly, the ultimate number of pensions payable yearly would be 914; and, since the average amount of pensions is 1,583 rupees, we have for the pecuniary limit $1583 \times 914 = 14{,}46{,}862$ rupees, as is stated in para. 23 of this Report.

As to the number of entries, the actual experience of the Fund is as follows:—

| | Married Pairs at Risk. | Widows entered. |
|---|---|---|
| Colonel | 2,189 | 101 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 2,695 | 101 |
| Major | 4,048 | 113 |
| Captain | 9,343 | 230 |
| Subaltern | 7,434 | 155 |
| TOTAL | 25,806 | 700 |

which gives a mean per cent. of 31,123; and, with 1,467 married pairs constantly at risk, the yearly accession of widows will be 44.

The average amount of pension is $\frac{1108260}{700} = 1{,}583.\ 13.$

## Appendix IV.

MEMORANDUM of EXCHANGE ACCOUNT from 1850–1853.

| | 1. Amount of Advances adjusted in the following Years. | 2. Amount paid in Settlement of Advances at 2 *s.* 4 *d.* per Sicca Rupee. | 3. Equivalent of preceding Column in Co.'s Rupees. | 4. Amount that would have been paid, if adjusted at 2 *s.* per Rupee. | 5. Difference between the two last Columns, being Gain on the Settlement of Europe Advances. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | £. s. d. | *Sa. Rs.* a. p. | *Co.'s Rs.* a. p. | *Co.'s Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. | |
| 1850 | 51,509 10 11 | 4,41,510 6 2 | 4,70,944 6 7 | 5,15,095 7 3 | 44,151 – 8 | Three quarters advances adjusted. |
| 1851 | 78,128 9 4 | 6,69,672 9 1 | 7,14,317 6 6 | 7,81,284 10 8 | 66,967 4 2 | Four quarters advances adjusted. |
| 1852 | 81,773 8 9 | 7,00,915 2 9 | 7,47,642 13 7 | 8,17,734 6 – | 70,091 8 5 | Four quarters advances adjusted. |
| 1853 | 107,392 12 6 | 9,20,508 3 5 | 9,81,875 6 10 | 10,73,926 4 – | 92,050 13 2 | Five quarters advances adjusted. |
| | | | | *Rs.* | 2,73,260 10 5 | |
| | | | Average per Annum | - - - | 68,315 2 7 | |
| | | | Average Interest per Annum | - - - | 1,63,218 – 7 | |
| | | | | | 2,31,533 3 2 | |
| | | | Annual Donation | - - - | 24,000 – – | |
| | | | TOTAL DONATION from Exchange Interest, &c. | - - *Rs.* | 2,55,533 3 2 | |

MEMORANDUM of INTEREST ACCOUNT from 1850–1853.

| YEARS. | Amount of Interest credited. | Five-eighths Portion constituting Ordinary Interest. | Portion forming Donation Interest. | Amount of Interest credited by Transfer Debit of Sub-Treasurer. | Total Donation Interest. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. |
| 1850 | 4,19,279 15 2 | 2,62,049 15 6 | 1,57,229 15 8 | - - - | 1,57,229 15 8 |
| 1851 | 4,36,544 14 – | | | | |
| Deduct amount of ordinary interest included | 8,915 15 11 | | | | |
| | 4,27,628 14 1 | 2,67,861 12 9 | 1,59,767 1 4 | 5,349 10 8 | 1,65,116 12 – |
| 1852 | 4,29,483 4 8 | | | | |
| Deduct amount of ordinary interest included | 4,122 3 10 | | | | |
| | 4,25,361 – 10 | 2,65,850 10 5 | 1,59,510 6 5 | 2,474 5 6 | 1,61,984 11 11 |
| 1853 | 4,30,824 15 11 | | | | |
| Deduct amount of ordinary interest included | 11,170 3 6 | | | | |
| | 4,19,654 12 5 | 2,62,284 4 – | 1,57,370 8 5 | 11,170 2 6 | 1,68,540 10 11 |

Average per annum - - - *Rs.* 6,52,872. 2. 6 ÷ 4 = 1,63,218. 0. 7.

*N.B.*—It may be mentioned that, up to about April 1853, the ordinary interest on the Treasury notes used to be considered 5 per cent. per annum; but since that time 4 per cent. has been called the ordinary interest, and consequently the donation interest, which was formerly deemed to be 3 per cent., has, subsequent to the time alluded to, been held to be 4 per cent.

## Appendix V.

TABLE exhibiting the Fund's losses by exchange on Widow Pensions only. When the Sonauth rupee (*a*) was the standard, the Fund gave to the evidence 2/4 $\frac{1}{58}$, but got only 2/2 $\frac{46}{58}$. When the Company's rupee (*b*) was introduced, the Fund gave as before, but got only 2/2$\frac{1}{4}$. In the former case the Fund lost on each rupee $1\frac{53}{58}$ pence, and in the latter $2\frac{53}{116}$ pence—

Hence { wg $\frac{37}{4640}$ wg $\frac{259}{2320}$ = 7 90,16,837 - 9 04,78,117 = 8 85,38,720 (*a*) } log. ratio.
{ wg $\frac{19}{1856}$ wg $\frac{7}{64}$ = 8 01,01,756 - 9 03,89,180 = 8 97,12,576 (*b*) }

| Years. | (*a*) Original Conditions prior to 1836. | | (*b*) New Conditions from 1836. | | Additional Loss since 1836. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Principal Amount of Loss. | Principal and Interest till the close of 1853. | Principal Amount of Loss. | Principal and Interest till the close of 1853. | Principal. | Principal and Interest till the close of 1853. |
| | £. | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | | |
| 1826 | 785·71 | 6,276·33 | | | | |
| 1827 | 979·71 | 7,246·31 | | | | |
| 1828 | 1,091·28 | 7,478·64 | | | | |
| 1829 | 1,173·21 | 7,439·56 | | | | |
| 1830 | 1,314·28 | 7,716·78 | | | | |
| 1831 | 1,445·50 | 7,858·52 | | | | |
| 1832 | 1,515·21 | 7,627·34 | | | | |
| 1833 | 1,612·29 | 7,514·80 | | | | |
| 1834 | 1,767·59 | 7,630·16 | | | | |
| 1835 | 1,941·57 | 7,758·56 | | | | |
| | 13,626·35 | 74,542.00 | 13,626·35 | 74,542·00 | | |
| 1836 | 2,111·79 | 7,813·64 | 2,767·20 | 10,238·57 | 655·41 | 2,424·93 |
| 1837 | 2,357·64 | 8,077·15 | 3,089·35 | 10,583·85 | 731·71 | 2,506·70 |
| 1838 | 2,608·36 | 8,274·15 | 3,417·88 | 10,841·99 | 809·52 | 2,567·84 |
| 1839 | 1,187·93 | 3,489·18 | 1,556·61 | 4,572·03 | 368·68 | 1,082·85 |
| 1840 | 5,552·43 | 15,100·75 | 7,275·62 | 19,786·86 | 1,723·19 | 4,686·11 |
| 1841 | 1,523·21 | 3,835·71 | 1,995·93 | 5,026·17 | 472·72 | 1,190·46 |
| 1842 | 3,094·31 | 7,214·76 | 4,054·58 | 9,453·84 | 960·27 | 2,239·08 |
| 1843 | 3,360·56 | 7,255·05 | 4,403·41 | 9,506·66 | 1,042·85 | 2,251·61 |
| 1844 | 4,463·08 | 8,921·56 | 5,848·10 | 11,690·39 | 1,385·02 | 2,768·83 |
| 1845 | 3,958·57 | 7,327·04 | 5,187·09 | 9,600·96 | 1,228·52 | 2,273·92 |
| 1846 | 3,270·93 | 5,605·82 | 4,286·08 | 7,345·53 | 1,015·15 | 1,739·71 |
| 1847 | 4,332·01 | 6,874·34 | 5,676·41 | 9,007·87 | 1,344·40 | 2,133·53 |
| 1848 | 4,772·36 | 7,012·16 | 6,253·51 | 9,188·42 | 1,481·15 | 2,176·26 |
| 1849 | 4,976·36 | 6,770·28 | 6,520·77 | 8,871·43 | 1,544·41 | 2,101·15 |
| 1850 | 3,679·32 | 4,634·84 | 4,821·13 | 6,073·29 | 1,141·81 | 1·438·45 |
| 1851 | 5,552·22 | 6,476·05 | 7,275·43 | 8,485·99 | 1,723·21 | 2,009·94 |
| 1852 | 5,805·78 | 6,270·25 | 7,607·67 | 8,216·26 | 1,801·89 | 1,946·01 |
| 1853 | 7,589·86 | 7,589·86 | 9,945·33 | 9,945·33 | 2,355·47 | 2,355·47 |
| | 70,196·72 | 1,28,542·59 | 91,982·10 | 1,68,435·44 | | |
| TOTAL £. | 83,823·07 | 2,03,084·59 | 1,05,608·45 | 2,42,977 44 | 21,785·38 | 39,892·85 |
| TOTAL *Co.'s Rs.* 2/2$\frac{1}{4}$ | 18,56,773·39 | - - | 22,21,508·02 | - - | | 3,64,734·63 |

TABLE showing the Loss by difference of Exchange on Miscellaneous Home Disbursements from 1836..

| Years. | Amount. | (1). Log. : Amount. | (1) + Log. : $\frac{3}{148}$ = 8,30,68,595 | (2) + Log. : 108 n/ | w. Principal. | Principal Amount Interest till the Close of 1853. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | £. | | | | | |
| 1836 | 6,235 | 3 79,48,365 | 2 10,16,960 | 2 66,98,998 | 17 126·38 | 467·64 |
| 1837 | 647 | 2 81,09,043 | 1 11,77,638 | 1 65,25,439 | 16 13·11 | 44·93 |
| 1838 | 1,972 | 3 29,49,069 | 1 60,17,664 | 2 10,31,227 | 15 39·97 | 126·80 |
| 1840 | 4,834 | 3 68,43,066 | 1 99,11,661 | 2 42,56,749 | 13 97·99 | 266·49 |
| 1841 | 1,595 | 3 20,27,607 | 1 50,96,202 | 1 91,07,053 | 12 32·33 | 81·42 |
| 1842 | 2,504 | 3 39,86,343 | 1 70,54,338 | 2 07,31,551 | 11 50·76 | 118·34 |
| 1843 | 1,665 | 3 22,14,142 | 1 52,82,737 | 1 86,25,113 | 10 33·75 | 72·86 |
| 1846 | 1,778 | 3 24,99,318 | 1 55,67,913 | 1 79,07,576 | 7 36·04 | 61·77 |
| 1847 | 846 | 2 92,73,704 | 1 23,42,299 | 1 43,47,724 | 6 17·15 | 27·23 |
| 1851 | 397 | 2 59,87,905 | 0 90,56,500 | 0 97,24,975 | 2 8·05 | 9·39 |
| 1852 | 492 | 2 69,19,651 | 0 99,88,246 | 1 03,22,484 | 1 9·97 | 10·77 |
| 1853 | 1,140 | 3 05,69,049 | 1 36,37,644 | 1 36,37,644 | 0 23·11 | 23·11 |
| TOTAL £. | 24,105 | - - - | - - - | - - - - | 488·61 | 1,310·73* |

* *Sic* in MS.

TOTAL Company's Rupees at 2/2¼ - - - - - - - 11,983·82
To which add Loss on Widows' Account - - - - - - 3,64,734·63

TOTAL Loss for difference of Exchange from 1836 - *Rs.* 3,76,718·45

(A.)

STATEMENT showing the Amount of DONATION by Exchange, credited to the Honourable the Court of Directors in the Accounts of the Bengal Military Fund, for the Five Years from 1850 to 1854 inclusive, and the Amount that may be deemed actual Donation, the par of Exchange being 2/. the Company's Rupee.

| | Amount of Europe Advances, adjusted from 1850 to 1854, inclusive. | Amount of difference of Exchange received thereon between 1/11 and 2/4 per Sicca Rupee, or 1/9 $\frac{9}{16}$ and 2/2¼ per Company's Rupee. | Portion of Donation considered nominal, being difference between 1/9 $\frac{9}{16}$ and 2/ per Company's Rupee. | Portion deemed actual Donation, being difference between 2/ and 2/2¼ per Company's Rupee. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | £. s. d. | *Co.'s Rs.* a. p. | *Co.'s Rs.* a. p. | *Co.'s Rs.* a. p. |
| | 408,891 2 9 | 8,12,702 14 9 | 4,62,224 13 4 | 3,50,478 1 4 |
| | | Annual Average. | Annual Average. | Annual Average. |
| | | 1,62,540 9 4 | 92,444 15 5 | 70,095 9 11 |
| If the above amount had been adjusted with reference to the exchange prevailing prior to the introduction of the Company's rupee, say 2/2 $\frac{41}{58}$ per rupee, in place of 2/2¼ per rupee, there would have been paid to Government a less sum on the adjustment of advances, to the extent of Sonat *Rs.* 74,242. 15. 6., and the donation would be as follows : | - - - | 7,96,229 3 - | 4,52,855 7 7 | 3,43,373 11 5 |
| | | Annual Average. | Annual Average. | Annual Average. |
| | | 1,59,245 13 4 | 90,571 1 6 | 68,674 11 10 |

Showing that as compared to the original terms of adjustment there has been a loss of *Rs.* 74,242. 15. 6., and a nominal donation of *Rs.* 4,52,855. 7. 7. during the five years alluded to; or in other words, that if the full original rate of exchange had been given, and the full difference of five-pence per rupee granted with reference to the average exchange that has of late years been obtaining, the Fund should have got *Rs.* 5,27,098. 7. 1. more than it has, or on the average *Rs.* 1,05,419. 11. per annum, which, being added to the actual donation deemed to be realized,—

Of *Rs.* 3,43,373. 11. 5., or on the average annually - - - - *Rs.* 68,674. 11. 10., gives
A yearly donation, receivable by exchange, equal to - - - - - *Rs.* 1,74,094. 6. 10.

STATEMENT showing the Amount of DONATION INTEREST received from the Honourable the Court of Directors by the Bengal Military Fund during the Five Years from 1850 to 1854 inclusive, and the Amount that would have been received had the Fund possessed Assets to the Value of its Incumbent Pensions.

| YEARS. | Amount of Interest Credited. | Portion thereof considered Ordinary Interest. | Amount constituting Donation Interest. | Amount of Donation Interest Credited by Transfer to Debit of Sub-Treasurer. | TOTAL Donation Interest. | Additional Amount of Donation Interest that would have been receivable, had the Fund been possessed of Assets to the Value of the Incumbent Pensions. | TOTAL of Two last Columns. | YEARS. | Number of Widows on Old and Present Fund. | Annual Amount of Pensions, taking the Loss of Exchange into account, as respects Pensions of the present Fund, up to July 1853, and of the late Fund for the whole Period | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | | | *Rs. a. p.* | |
| 1850 - - | 4,19,279 15 2 | 2,62,049 15 6 | 1,57,229 15 8 | - - - | 1,57,229 15 8 | 67,777 10 2 | 2,25,007 9 10 | 1850 - - | 531 | 8,94,605 - - | |
| 1851 - - | 4,27,628 14 1 | 2,76,777 12 8 | 1,59,767 1 4 | 5,349 10 8 | 1,65,116 12 - | 73,365 10 - | 2,38,482 6 - | 1851 - - | 521 | 8,81,872 - - | |
| 1852 - - | 4,25,361 - 10 | 2,69,972 14 3 | 1,59,510 6 5 | 2,474 5 6 | 1,61,984 11 11 | 71,743 2 7 | 2,33,727 14 6 | 1852 - - | 544 | 9,23,950 - - | |
| 1853 - - | 4,19,654 12 5 | 2,73,454 6 6 | 1,57,370 8 5 | 11,170 2 6 | 1,68,540 10 11 | 84,266 10 - | 2,52,807 4 11 | 1853 - - | 567 | 9,38,227 - - | |
| 1854 - - | 3,83,869 2 9 | 1,97,508 1 5 | 1,91,934 9 5 | 5,573 8 1 | 1,97,508 1 6 | 92,705 4 9 | 2,90,213 6 3 | 1854 - - | 579 | 9,37,966 - - | |
| | | | | | For 5 years - - - | *Rs.* | 12,40,238 9 6 | | 2,742 | 45,76,620 - - | |
| | | | | | Average annual donation by interest - - - - - - | | 2,48,047 11 6 | Average of 5 years - | 548 | 9,15,324 - - | {1,669 for each widow. |
| | | | | | Ditto - ditto - by exchange - - - - - - | | 1,74,094 6 10 | | | | |
| | | | | | Cash - - - - - - - - - - - | | 24,000 - - | | | | |
| | | | | | Divided by average number of widows during the 5 years, 548 - | | 4,46,142 2 4 | | | | |
| | | | | | Gives an average of - - - - - - - - | *Rs.* | 817 - - | for each widow. | | | |

The average number of widows during the five years having been 548, and the average amount of their pensions 1,669 rupees, the full donation, if received, would have given about half the pension of each widow. But the donation deemed to have been actually received by exchange and interest, &c., during the five years, averaged annually about 2,64,000 rupees, which gives for each widow 482 rupees, or somewhat more than a fourth of the amount of average pensions of an annuitant during the last five years.

(B.)

| YEARS. | Value of Pensions, supposing those of the Military Fund to be equalised in Europe and India, as per Fund Officers' Estimate. | Value of Pensions, supposing them to be equalised in Europe and India, as per Mr. Neison's Estimate up to the End of December 1852. | Value of Pensions, supposing them to be equalised in Europe and India, as per Major Hannyngton's Estimate up to June 1853. | Estimate Net Capital. | Deficiency as compared with Fund Estimate. | Deficiency as compared with Mr. Neison's Estimate. | Deficiency as compared with Major Hannyngton's Estimate. | Annual Increase in Deficiency with reference to Incumbent Pensions and Estimated Capital. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| 1852 - - | 74,91,584 6 9 | - - - | - - - | 43,02,567 - - | 31,89,017 6 9 | — | — | — |
| | - - - | 75,09,672 - - | - - - | 43,02,567 - - | - - - | 32,07,105 - - | — | — |
| 1853 - - | - - - | - - - | 73,35,976 - - | 42,16,177 - - | - - - | - - - | 31,19,799 - - | — |
| 1853 - - | 78,88,531 - - | - - - | - - - | 43,10,335 - - | 35,78,196 - - | - - - | - - - | 3,89,178 9 3 |
| [illegible] - - | 81,24,095 - - | - - - | - - - | 43,21,900 - - | 38,02,195 - - | - - - | - - - | 2,23,999 - - |

The Directors of the Bengal Military Fund to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Military Department.

Sir, Calcutta, 29 September 1855 (No. 1117.)

In continuation of our letter, No. 1023, of the 7th instant, we have the honour to solicit the favour of your submitting, for the consideration of the Honourable the President in Council, the following further representation connected with the transactions of the Fund with Government.

2. In our Secretary's letter, No. 1171, of the 30th September 1853, paras. 20 to 25, we requested that the book debt system, by which the necessity would be obviated of remittances being forwarded by drafts on account of subscriptions realised from members by paymasters and collectors, might be introduced, and that a standard of 2 *s.* per Company's rupee, instead of 1 *s.* 11 *d.* per sicca rupee, be taken as the standard of exchange between England and this country, with reference to which the donation granted to the Fund might be reckoned in future; but, finding no allusion to either subject in the Honourable Court's Financial Despatch, No. 32, of 18th April last, acknowledged in our first-mentioned letter of the 7th current, we referred to the Accountant to the Government of Bengal in the General Department, to ascertain whether any instructions had been communicated to him with respect thereto.

3. From a reply just received from that functionary, it does not appear that he is able to afford us any information on the points alluded to; but he incidentally intimates that, when adjusting the Honourable Court's advances on behalf of the fund, 1 *s.* 11 *d.* per sicca rupee is still to be assumed as the standard of exchange, and that we are expected to grant receipts for the difference between this rate and 2 *s.* 3 *d.* per Company's rupee, as a donation granted to the Fund on its exchange account.

4. Under these circumstances, we would respectfully beg to bring the question of donation by exchange again under the notice of Government, and to repeat our hope that, instead of adhering to a nominal standard of conversion with reference to a currency no longer in use, a standard may be fixed in regard to the Company's rupee, more in accordance with the actual rate ruling of late years between this country and England; which, while it would render the nominal donation now received a real one, would at the same time enable us to discard the sicca rupee from our accounts altogether.

5. Pending the Honourable Court's orders on the application made in our letter of the 7th instant for the commutation of the present indirect gratuity to a direct one, we would therefore again venture to suggest, that 2 *s.* per Company's rupee may be adopted as the standard exchange, and that the difference between it and 2 *s.* 3 *d.* per Company's rupee be alone regarded as the donation by exchange, for which we shall be called on to grant receipts. In proof that 2 *s.* is not too high a standard to assume, we beg to refer to the annexed synopsis of average rates of exchange on London for the last 17 years, which has been carefully prepared, and which shows 2/0 $\frac{33}{100}$ to be the mean for the period adverted to.

6. As relates to the book debt system, we would likewise beg respectfully to repeat our solicitation that Government may be pleased to authorise its adoption in the case of this Fund, in like manner as it is already in operation in that of several other Service Funds; for we conceive the measure is one that, without being detrimental to the State, would prove of advantage to the institution under our management.

We have, &c.

*H. P. Burn*, Lieut. Col., President.
*K. Mackinnon*, M.D.
*T. D. Atkinson.*

## Synopsis of the Average Rates of Exchange upon London current in Calcutta, from the Years 1838 to 1854 inclusive.

| Years to 31st December. | Bullion, &c. Import. | Bullion, &c. Export. | January. | February. | March. | April. | May. | June. | July. | August. | September. | October. | November. | December. | Annual Aggregates. | Annual Averages. | —— |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Co.'s Rs.* | *Co.'s Rs.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | *s. d.* | |
| 1838 - | 12,02,042 | 17,000 | 2 0·04 | 2 0·86 | 2 1·29 | 2 1·30 | 2 1·44 | 2 1·66 | 2 1·80 | 2 1·62 | 2 1·46 | 2 1·43 | 2 1·45 | 2 1·80 | 25 4·15 | 2 1·35 | per Co.'s Rs. |
| 1839 - | 59,40,650 | 15,500 | 2 1·73 | 2 1·73 | 2 1·57 | 2 1·72 | 2 1·76 | 2 1·75 | 2 1·84 | 2 1·98 | 2 1·98 | 2 1·75 | 2 1·75 | 2 1·25 | 25 8·38 | 2 1·70 | „ |
| 1840 - | 25,86,357 | 3,230 | 2 1·31 | 2 1·60 | 2 1·25 | 2 1 | 2 0·70 | 2 0·31 | 2 0·06 | 2 0·45 | 2 0·56 | 2 0·75 | 2 1·12 | 2 1·62 | 24 10·73 | 2 0·89 | „ |
| 1841 - | 9,15,174 | 60,000 | 2 1·35 | 2 0·81 | 2 0·25 | 2 0·75 | 2 1 | 2 1·21 | 2 1 | 2 0·56 | 1 11·97 | 1 11·97 | 2 0·58 | 2 1 | 24 8·45 | 2 0·70 | „ |
| 1842 - | 26,88,326 | 26,000 | 2 1·02 | 2 1·68 | 2 1·75 | 2 2·06 | 2 1·75 | 2 1·22 | 2 1·35 | 2 1·75 | 2 1·81 | 2 1·20 | 2 0·92 | 2 0·95 | 25 5·46 | 2 1·46 | „ |
| 1843 - | 35,31,402 | - - | 2 0·13 | 2 0·37 | 2 0·56 | 2 0·78 | 2 0·69 | 2 0·50 | 2 0·02 | 1 11·97 | 2 - | 1 11·88 | 1 11·81 | 2 0·05 | 24 2·71 | 2 0·23 | „ |
| 1844 - | 12,94,754 | - - | 2 0·25 | 2 0·06 | 1 11·44 | 1 11·03 | 1 11·31 | 1 11·50 | 1 11·28 | 1 10·95 | 1 10·60 | 1 10·50 | 1 10·39 | 1 10·75 | 23 2·06 | 1 11·17 | „ |
| 1845 - | 3,27,635 | 32,708 | 1 10·69 | 1 10·33 | 1 10·50 | 1 10·38 | 1 10·77 | 1 11·13 | 1 11·19 | 1 10·95 | 1 11·09 | 1 10·96 | 1 11·04 | 1 11·54 | 22 10·57 | 1 10·88 | „ |
| 1846 - | 6,93,390 | - - | 2 0·84 | 2 0·76 | 2 0·92 | 2 1·15 | 2 1·10 | 2 2·38 | 2 2·20 | 2 0·50 | 1 11·04 | 1 11·22 | 1 11·56 | 2 0·09 | 24 7·76 | 2 0·65 | „ |
| 1847 - | 22,95,026 | 54,576 | 2 0·35 | 2 0·72 | 2 1·19 | 2 0·54 | 2 0·66 | 2 0·56 | 2 0·40 | 1 11·66 | 1 11·54 | 1 11·56 | 1 11 | 1 10·79 | 24 0·97 | 2 0·08 | „ |
| 1848 - | 7,66,709 | 36,05,066 | 1 10·91 | 1 10·94 | 1 10·70 | 1 10·36 | 1 10·24 | 1 10 | 1 9·86 | 1 9·44 | 1 9·49 | 1 9·54 | 1 9·80 | 1 10·28 | 22 1·56 | 1 10·13 | „ |
| 1849 - | 3,08,650 | 12,61,894 | 1 10·50 | 1 10·60 | 1 10·20 | 1 10·12 | 1 10·34 | 1 10 | 1 10·39 | 1 10·40 | 1 10·39 | 1 10·41 | 1 10·81 | 1 11·21 | 22 5·86 | 1 10·49 | „ |
| 1850 - | 16,28,381 | 6,499 | 1 11·43 | 1 11·45 | 1 11·77 | 2 0·18 | 2 0·73 | 2 0 | 2 0·51 | 2 0·50 | 2 0·89 | 2 1·46 | 2 1·84 | 2 2·30 | 24 7·29 | 2 0·61 | „ |
| 1851 - | 79,87,767 | 10,300 | 2 2·26 | 2 2·45 | 2 1·44 | 2 0·12 | 2 0·60 | 2 [illegible]6 | 2 0·84 | 2 0·94 | 2 1·43 | 2 1·43 | 2 2·41 | 2 2·35 | 25 5·63 | 2 1·47 | „ |
| 1852 - | 1,37,84,122 | 70,688 | 2 1·89 | 1 11·82 | 1 11·36 | 1 11·73 | 2 0·32 | 2 [illegible]96 | 2 1·12 | 2 0·79 | 2 0·54 | 2 0·82 | 2 0·85 | 2 0·92 | 24 7·12 | 2 0·59 | „ |
| 1853 - | 2,04,36,155 | 13,56,268 | 2 1·13 | 2 1·02 | 2 0·57 | 2 1·25 | 2 1·42 | 2 1·37 | 2 0·98 | 2 1·01 | 2 1·05 | 2 1·51 | 2 0·98 | 2 0·95 | 25 1·24 | 2 1·10 | „ |
| 1854 - | 28,91,225 | 1,40,052 | 2 1·05 | 2 0·84 | 2 0·77 | 2 0·83 | 2 0·65 | 2 0·24 | 2 - | 1 11·79 | 1 10·96 | 1 11·09 | 1 11·67 | 2 0·16 | 24 2·05 | 2 0·17 | „ |
| | Monthly Aggregate - - | | 34 8·88 | 34 8·04 | 34 5·53 | 34 5·30 | 34 7·48 | 34 8·82 | 34 6·84 | 34 3·26 | 34 0·57 | 34 1·43 | 34 3·78 | 34 8·91 | 413 7·99 | 34 5·67 | „ |
| | Monthly Average - - - | | 2 0·52 | 2 0·47 | 2 0·33 | 2 0·31 | 2 0·44 | 2 0·52 | 2 0·40 | 2 - 0·19 | 2 0·03 | 2 0·08 | 2 0·22 | 2 0·47 | - - | 2 0·33 | „ |

Thus, it appears that the average rate of Exchange upon London for the past year is 2 *s.* $0\frac{17}{100}$ *d.* per rupee lower than it has been since the closing of the Company's Export Warehouse, and not only considerably under the average of 1853 (2 *s.* $1\frac{1}{10}$ *d.*), but also below the aggregate average of the past 17 years, which is 2 *s.* $0\frac{33}{100}$ *d.* per rupee. As the published accounts of our commerce for 1854 do not present any adverse balance of trade, but actually the reverse (excess of Exports in 1854 being 4,39,73,062 rupees against 3,78,14,212 rupees in 1853), we must look for an explanation of this apparent anomaly to the extensive withdrawal of European capital from the Government stocks of this country, consequent upon the reduction of the rate of interest from five to four per cent. There is little further worthy of notice. The lowest point of Exchange was in September, when some purchases of coin were made for remittance, only, however, to a small extent. In the months of September, October, and November, the stock of gold lying in the Treasury, consisting of bars and mohurs, and valued at 32,96,018 rupees, was shipped by the Government per Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers to London. The alterations in the Company's rates of Exchange on Bengal are as follows:—

| | | *s.* | *d.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 December 1853 | - - - - - - - - | 2 | $-\frac{1}{4}$ | per rupee. |
| 15 March 1854 | - - - - - - - - | 2 | - | „ |
| 17 May 1854 | - - - - - - - - | 1 | $11\frac{1}{2}$ | per rupee. |
| 26 July 1854 | - - - - - - - - | 1 | 11 | „ |

And the Bank of England's minimum rate of interest was raised from five to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on 11th May, and reduced again to five per cent. on 3d August 1854.

Up to 1848, bills were drawn at 10 months' date; since that period, the usance has been six months' sight. The bullion operations are with Europe and the United States only.

The Directors of the Bengal Military Fund to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of *India*.

(Military Department.)

Sir, Calcutta, 15 October 1855 (No. 1191.)

In advertence to our letter, No. 1023, of the 7th ultimo, we have the honour to annex copy of a Resolution agreed to at the annual meeting of subscribers to this Fund, held on the 10th instant, expressive of concurrence in our application for the commutation of the present indirect and indefinite donation to a fixed and definite one; and we would respectfully solicit that the Honourable the President in Council will be pleased to bring this Resolution to the favourable notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors, in connexion with our application above alluded to, as being indicative of the general wish entertained on the subject by the members of the Fund.

We have, &c.

*H. P. Burn*, Lieut. Colonel, President.

*K. Mackinnon*, *T. D. Atkinson*, } Directors.

Copy of Resolution referred to.

That this meeting cordially supports the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund in their appeal to Government for a revision of the rules under which the donations in aid of pension are granted; and it earnestly solicits that a direct grant, of such amount as the Honourable the Court of Directors may deem suited to the wants of the widows of their officers, may be given to the Fund in future, in lieu of the donations by exchange, and additional interest; the real value of which depends, in the one case on the current rate of exchange, and in the other on the amount of *bonâ fide* capital that may be available for deposit in the General Treasury.

Resolution of the Government of *India*.

29 October 1855, No. 4315.

(Financial.)

The Honourable the President in Council is unable to comply with the prayer of the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund, that the monies of the institution trusted to their management should be regarded for the future as a book-debt of the Government, and that they should be allowed, with a view to enable them to accumulate additional capital, to take advantage in the meanwhile of the present depressed state of the money market to invest the cash balances of the Fund, now in the hands of the Sub-Treasurer, in Government 4 per cent. paper: his Honor in Council considers the book-debt plan is opposed to paras. 4 and 5 of the Despatch from the Honourable Court of May 1854 above referred to, and that the project of investing in 4 per cent. paper is totally inadmissible.

The application of the Directors for greater favours to the Fund than those conceded by the Honourable Court in their Financial Despatch, No. 32, datad the 18th April last, will be referred for the orders of the Honourable Court.

[The two following Despatches are those referred to in the Letter from the Government of India, No. 146.]

## The Court of Directors to the Government of *India*.

18 April 1855, No. 32.
(Financial.)

Letter, dated 12 January 1854, No. 2, forwarding copies of papers on the affairs of the Bengal Military Fund, in reference to the measures adopted by the subscribers for the improvement of its financial condition.

Military Letter, dated 4 February 1854, No. 30, reports the sanction by Government of the resolution of the subscribers for increasing the rates of contribution to the Fund, and solicits the favourable attention of Court to the request of the Directors of the Fund for the allowance of the same rate of interest on the increased as on the former subscription.

Military Letter, dated 14 March 1854, No. 60, submits for consideration and orders an application from the Directors of the Fund, that Government would undertake the management of the Fund.

Para. 1. The first letter mentioned in the margin announces the measures which have been adopted by the subscribers to the Bengal Military Fund for improving the financial condition of that institution; the second letter communicates the sanction of Government to carry out the Resolution of the subscribers for increasing the donations and subscriptions of the members from 1st July 1853; and the third letter forwards for our consideration an application from the Directors of the Fund to Government to "undertake the management of that institution."

2. With respect to the measures which have at length been adopted for the improvement of the financial condition of the Fund, we observed, in our Despatch, dated the 20th August 1845, No. 84, that we had no doubt there was an alarming deficiency in the means of the Fund, "and we can therefore have no hesitation in sanctioning such measures as may be just and necessary to put the Fund on a sound footing; but whether this shall be done wholly by increasing the amount of subscriptions and donations of the service, or partly by diminishing the pensions, will require serious consideration."

3. It is admitted by the Directors that, according to the most correct valuation which they have been able to obtain of the assets and liabilities of the Fund, the deficiency of the assets "amounted in December 1851, in round numbers, to about 37 lacs of rupees." With a view of remedying this state of things, the Directors submitted certain propositions for the votes of the subscribers at large, the object being to increase the contributions of the married class 25 per cent., and the unmarried class 12½ per cent., and to reduce the pensions payable in Europe about 9 per cent., by paying them at the exchange at which they are remitted, instead of at 2 *s.* 6 *d.* the rupee, as formerly.

4. The propositions of the Directors were agreed to by a very large majority of the subscribers who voted on the occasion. It is to be lamented, we think, that the retrogressive state of the Fund was not arrested at an earlier period, as soon in fact as it was discovered, when measures of a less stringent character than those now adopted might have sufficed. Presuming, however, that the measures which the subscribers have agreed to were absolutely necessary to uphold the integrity of the Fund, we have no hesitation in confirming them.

5. Various circumstances are referred to by the Directors to account for the deteriorated condition of the Fund. Defalcations on the part of the subordinate officers before the year 1840, to the extent of 2,50,000 rupees, would appear to have occurred from the want of proper check and audit, as it was not until that year those necessary measures were established. This serious loss to the Fund, with interest, cannot be less than 50,000 *l.* It is of little use now to offer any observations on the inattention of the Directors, who appear to have neglected even the ordinary means for preventing this disaster, the recollection of which, however, we hope will operate as a warning to their successors, and make them mindful of the importance of the trust reposed in them by their brother officers.

6. The next drawback on the Fund appears to have been the payment of the pensions in Europe at the exchange of 2 *s.* 6 *d.* the sicca rupee, whilst the remittances for that purpose have been made at only 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the rupee, being a difference of nearly 7 per cent., or a loss of about 5,500 *l.* per annum, reckoning

the amount of remittances at about 80,000 *l.* per annum. Upon the establishment of the Fund, the Directors appear to have expected that the Court would accede to their request to grant the necessary advances to pay the pensions in Europe at the rate of 2 *s.* 6 *d.* the sicca rupee. This was, however, refused in a Military Despatch, dated 30th August 1826, para. 96; and a rate of 2 *s.* 4 *d.* only was allowed, being the rate previously granted to the Orphan Society and the Military Widows' Fund. This should have led to the immediate substitution of a lower scale of pensions, instead of that based upon the higher rate which was previously established by the Directors.

7. Another cause to which the Directors attribute the deteriorated position of the Fund, is the alteration of the currency in 1836 by legislative enactment, which declared the Company's rupee as equivalent to the Sonat, and the consequent adjustment since that time of the Government donation for difference of exchange on more disadvantageous terms to the Fund than previously.

8. Our advances have been made at an exchange of 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the sicca rupee, in conformity with our Orders of the 30th August 1826, and we cannot after such a lapse of time reopen this question.

9. Approving, however, of the earnest desire recently evinced by the members of the Fund to restore it to a sound position, we allow the advances made in this country to be repaid to Government at the exchange of 2 *s.* 3 *d.* the Company's rupee, instead of 2 *s.* 4 *d.* the sicca, from 1st July 1853, the date from which the additional contributions of the Army and the reduction in the widows' pensions commenced.

10. We are also disposed to remit for a time the interest on advances in England, to meet the pensions and other home payments of the Fund; this remission of interest to take place from the 1st July 1853, and the continuance of this boon to be periodically taken into consideration when the accounts of the Fund are annually submitted to the Court. The yearly account of the Fund to be regularly sent for the information of the Court.

11. The next point to which, in your Military Letter of 4th February 1854, No. 30, you solicit our "favourable attention," is "the representation of the Directors regarding the rate of interest to be allowed on the additional sums which will now accrue to the Fund." Considering that those contributions are not levied for any new objects, but solely to enable the Fund to fulfil its obligations under the existing rules, without endangering its permanent security, we are willing to allow the same rate of interest on the whole of the contributions.

12. Having given our best consideration to the several claims urged by the directors on behalf of the Fund, and authorised as large a pecuniary concession in respect of them as we think can be fairly expected or justified, it only remains for us to communicate our decision upon the application to Government to undertake the management of the affairs of the Fund, a measure which we declined in our Military Despatch, dated 19th March 1851, No. 11, on the application of an individual member.

13. The present application is, however, founded on a proposition circulated by the Directors, for ascertaining the views of the subscribers at large on the subject; and the result is certainly conclusive as to their wishes, 1,335 votes having been recorded in favour of placing the management of the Fund in the hands of Government, and only 52 against it. We are not surprised at this result: for years past reports have been widely spread of mismanagement, and doubts entertained of the solvency of the Fund, while the opinions of actuaries have not allayed the anxiety of the subscribers on the latter point; hence they are no doubt desirous that Government should undertake the management of the Fund.

14. We do not consider it is the province of Government to interfere to that extent. It is true that, in consideration of the praiseworthy object for which those institutions

institutions are established, we patronise them and afford them pecuniary assistance; in return, we have a right to expect that they shall be properly managed; and, in reference to that question, you observe in your Military Letter, dated 14th March 1854, No. 60, that you "have no objection to offer to the Military Fund being put on the same footing as the Civil Fund, with regard to a certain number of *ex-officio* members being appointed to the management."

15. We will not, therefore, object to the nomination by the Government of *ex-officio* directors for the Fund, as obtains in the Civil Service Fund, but we do not at present see any valid argument to induce us to interfere to a greater extent in the management of the Fund: we, however, recommend the appointment by the Directors of two auditors, unconnected with the service, to examine the accounts and books of the Fund prior to the annual general meeting of the subscribers, held in accordance with the regulations, and that the accounts laid before such meeting, and subsequently published for general information, as required by Article 28 of the Regulations, should be authenticated by the signatures of the auditors.

We are, &c.
*E. Macnaghten.*
*W. H. Sykes*, &c.

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EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from the Court of Directors to the Government of *India*, dated 15 August 1855, No. 75 (Financial).

Letter from, dated 9 March 1855, No. 29, in continuation of letter dated 12 January 1854, No. 2. Forwards copy of papers on the subject of the affairs of the Bengal Military Fund, comprising a Report on the state of the Fund by Mr. F. G. P. Neison.

Para. 4. MR. NEISON'S Report on the state of the Bengal Military Fund was before us when we addressed your Government on the subject, in our Despatch dated 18th April last, No. 32; it must not, however, be understood that we acquiesced in Mr. Neison's views regarding the Fund, or admitted the justice of his observations on the claims of the Fund on your Government.

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The Court of Directors to the Government of *India*.

25 June 1856, No. 50.
(Financial.)

Letter from, dated 29 October 1855, No. 146. Transmits further communications from the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund, soliciting the concession of greater favours than those granted in the Court's Despatch of 18 April 1855, and reports proceedings in connection therewith.

Para. 1. FROM the papers now transmitted, we learn that the Directors of the Bengal Military Fund have determined to submit to the Army certain further proposals (including another reduction of the widows' pensions), in view to placing the institution in a perfectly solvent state.

2. We observe, however, from the statement of the estimated income and expenditure for the year 1855, which accompanied the Report of the Directors of the Fund, dated 10th August 1855, that the effect of the measures which received our sanction in our Despatch of the 18th April 1855, No. 32, has been to convert an estimted deficiency of 67,539 rupees into an estimated surplus of 6,546 rupees.

3. If, notwithstanding this ameliorated condition of the Fund, it be considered by the Directors and the Army that more stringent measures are required, we are decidedly of opinion that any further reduction of the pensions should be prospective only, as affecting widows hereafter admitted.

4. We cannot recognise on the part of the Fund any claim, as of right, to receive further assistance from the public revenues, especially after the concessions which we have recently made towards its support. Nevertheless, if, after the experience of two more years (from the 1st January 1856), it shall be found

that the income of the Fund is not equal to the charge upon it, we shall be prepared, upon condition of the Army determining still further to increase their donations and subscriptions, to take into consideration whether it will not be proper that we should make an additional contribution to the Fund.

5. In accordance with the views expressed in our Despatch of 30th May 1854, No. 19, we approve of your declining to open a book-debt account for the reception of the funds of the institution; and we also entirely concur in the propriety of your refusing to entertain the proposal for investing the cash balance of the Fund, by purchasing 4 per cent. paper in the market at a discount.

We are, &c.
*W. H. Sykes.*
*R. D. Mangles,* &c.

# EAST INDIA (BENGAL MILITARY FUND)

COPY of CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Honourable the Court of Directors, on the subject of a LETTER from the Directors of the BENGAL MILITARY FUND, No. 1023, of 7 September 1855, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department.

(*Sir FitzRoy Kelly.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
31 *May* 1864.



*Under* 8 *oz.*

108713

COPY of all CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *Bombay*, the Supreme Government of *India*, and the India Office, relative to the Grant of the MEDAL to the TROOPS and POLICE employed in Suppressing the MUTINY and REBELLION in the BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.

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(No. 256 of 1860.—Military Department.)

To the Right Hon. Sir *Charles Wood*, Bart., M.P., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for *India*.

Sir,

MEDAL rolls of officers and men of the Bombay Army, who claim the Indian Mutiny Medal, are herewith forwarded, accompanied by a letter from the Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, from which it will be seen that, in the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, all the claimants are entitled to the decoration in question, provided the 27th Bombay Native Infantry offered armed resistance at the time of the outbreak at Kolapore. Proceedings for July 1860, Nos. 628 and 629; proceedings for September 1860, No. 745.

This remark has reference particularly to the claims of the detachment of the 2d European Light Infantry, founded on the mutiny of the 27th Native Infantry.

There is nothing to show that the detachment of the 2d European Infantry was in actual conflict with the mutineers of the 27th Native Infantry; but they were in position before the enemy, as their presence at the Phoonda Ghat prevented the mutineers from descending into the lowlands, and compelled them to retrace their steps towards Kolapore. It may, therefore, be allowed that they directly took a share in the operation actually in progress, as when the presence of the detachment stopped the mutineers, the latter were in flight from Kolapore, when they were under attack from the British troops at that station, and had been making armed resistance.

Under these circumstances we deem the claim of the 2d European Light Infantry to be valid, and beg to recommend it to your favourable consideration.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Canning.*
*H. B. E. Frere.*
*C. Beadon.*

Fort William, 1 October 1860.

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(No. 2397 of 1860.—Military Department.)

From Captain *W. F. Marriott*, Acting Secretary to Government, to Secretary to the Government of *India*.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward to the Government of India copy of a letter from the Adjutant General, No. 1350, dated 29th ult., with the rolls, &c. which accompanied it of individuals considered by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to be entitled to the Indian Mutiny Medal. July 1860. No. 628.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. F. Marriott*, Captain,
Acting Secretary to Government.

Poona, 4 July 1860.

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(No. 1350.)

From the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, *Bombay*.

Sir,

1. I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to transmit, for the consideration of his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, the enclosed rolls of individuals who are considered by Sir William Mansfield entitled to the Indian Mutiny Medal, granted by Government General Order, No. 543, of the 16th June 1859; 2d European Regiment, Light Infantry; Major Montgomery, 14th Regiment, Native Infantry; Assistant Surgeon Wilson, Medical Establishment.

2. The Commander in Chief would draw special attention to the claim of Assistant Surgeon Wilson, whose services, as brought to notice in his letter appended to the roll, fully entitle him, in Sir William Mansfield's opinion, to the decoration.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. Stock*, Major,
Acting Adjutant General.

Adjutant General's Office,
Head Quarters, Poona, 29 June 1860.

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SECOND BOMBAY EUROPEAN REGIMENT LIGHT INFANTRY.

Roll of Claimants for the Medal for Service during the recent Operations in *India*, granted under the Provisions of Government General Orders, No. 543, of the 16th June 1859, and Paragraph 1, 21st September 1859.

FOR THE MEDAL ONLY.

| No. | RANK. | NAMES. | Field Services during the recent Operations in India. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lieut. Colonel | E. A. Guerin | Suppression of the mutiny of the late 27th Regiment, N. I., at Kolapore, August 1857. | |
| 2 | Captain | C. R. W. Hervey | ditto. | |
| 3 | Lieutenant | J. A. Gayer | ditto. | |
| 4 | " | F. Warden | ditto. | |
| 5 | Assistant Surgeon | N. T. Brigstock | ditto | Deceased. |
| 6 | Private | William Allison | ditto. | |
| 7 | Ditto | James Bree | ditto. | |
| 8 | Ditto | Michael Buckley | ditto. | |
| 9 | Ditto | William Clark | ditto. | |
| 10 | Ditto | William Campbell | ditto. | |
| 11 | Ditto | John Clarke | ditto. | |
| 12 | Ditto | James Dalton | ditto. | |
| 13 | Ditto | Daniel Donovan | ditto. | |
| 14 | Ditto | Michael Dunphy | ditto. | |
| 15 | Ditto | William Edwards | ditto. | |
| 16 | Ditto | Henry Tay | ditto. | |
| 17 | Ditto | John Finigan | ditto. | |
| 18 | Colour Serjeant | Daniel Gavin | ditto. | |
| 19 | Private | Daniel Goodwin | ditto. | |
| 20 | Ditto | Thomas Gambon | ditto. | |
| 21 | Ditto | William Green | ditto. | |
| 22 | Ditto | William Harrison | ditto. | |
| 23 | Ditto | Hugh Hendron | ditto. | |
| 24 | " | John Hollis | ditto. | |
| 25 | Serjeant | William Hill | ditto. | |
| 26 | Private | James Hogarty | ditto. | |
| 27 | Ditto | Joel Johnson | ditto. | |
| 28 | Ditto | Patrick Keefe | ditto. | |
| 29 | Ditto | John Kelly | ditto. | |
| 30 | Corporal | Daniel Kennedy | ditto. | |
| 31 | Private | William Leonard | ditto. | |
| 32 | Corporal | Henry Lairds | ditto. | |
| 33 | Private | John Macbeth | ditto. | |
| 34 | Ditto | William M'Evoy | ditto. | |
| 35 | Corporal | Michael Moore | ditto. | |
| 36 | Private | Patrick M'Nan | ditto. | |
| 37 | Ditto | Timothy Murphy | ditto. | |
| 38 | Ditto | William March | ditto. | |
| 39 | Ditto | John Nelly | ditto. | |
| 40 | Ditto | Patrick Nolan | ditto. | |
| 41 | Colour Serjeant | John O'Brian | ditto. | |
| 42 | Private | William O'Callaghan | ditto. | |

| No. | RANK. | NAMES. | Field Services during the recent Operations in India. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 43 | Private | Michael O'Connell | Suppression of the mutiny of the late 27th Regiment, N. I., at Kolapore, August 1857. | |
| 44 | Ditto | Simeon Parsons | ditto. | |
| 45 | Ditto | James Reilly | ditto. | |
| 46 | Ditto | William Rouse | ditto. | |
| 47 | Ditto | Jeremiah Rourke | ditto. | |
| 48 | Ditto | Thomas Reynolds | ditto. | |
| 49 | Serjeant | John Sullivan | ditto. | |
| 50 | Private | John Sharman | ditto. | |
| 51 | Ditto | Peter Shorlock | ditto. | |
| 52 | Ditto | John Shields | ditto. | |
| 53 | Bugler | Robert Toolee | ditto. | |
| 54 | Private | James Tobin | ditto. | |
| 55 | Ditto | William Watson | ditto. | |
| 56 | Ditto | Hugh Woods | ditto. | |
| 57 | Ditto | John Wilford | ditto. | |
| 58 | Ditto | William Adamson | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 59 | Ditto | William Archdeacon | ditto | Deceased. |
| 60 | Ditto | Samuel Atkins | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 61 | Ditto | Patrick Balfe | ditto | Deceased. |
| 62 | Ditto | Henry Burnett | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 63 | Ditto | James Byron | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 64 | Ditto | Thomas Clements | ditto | Deceased. |
| 65 | Ditto | John Cochran | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 66 | Ditto | George Cookson | ditto | Deceased. |
| 67 | Corporal | Daniel Cox | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 68 | Private | Alexander Calderwood | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 69 | Ditto | William Davis | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 70 | Ditto | James Dillon | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 71 | Ditto | Thomas Draper | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 72 | Corporal | Richard Farrell | ditto | Deceased. |
| 73 | Private | Michael Frawley | ditto | - ditto. |
| 74 | Ditto | John Gloyns | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 75 | Bugler | William Goss | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 76 | Private | Henry Hughes | ditto | Invalided. |
| 77 | Ditto | John Harper | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 78 | Ditto | George Hanley | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 79 | Ditto | James Hogan | ditto | Deceased. |
| 80 | Corporal | Daniel Hartigan | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 81 | Private | James Jesson | ditto | Pensioned. |
| 82 | Corporal | Charles Jackson | ditto | Invalided. |
| 83 | Private | Sheridan Knowles | ditto | Pensioned. |
| 84 | Ditto | Michael Livehan | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 85 | Ditto | Michael Lucey | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 86 | Ditto | Timothy Mack | ditto | Pensioned. |
| 87 | Ditto | John Madrick | ditto | - ditto. |
| 88 | Ditto | Michael Murray | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 89 | Corporal | George Manderson | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 90 | Private | John M'Laughlan | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 91 | Ditto | William M'Laughlan | ditto | Discharged. |
| 92 | Ditto | James Miller | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1869. |
| 93 | Ditto | Patrick Merigan | ditto | Discharged. |
| 94 | Ditto | George Malowney | ditto | Pensioned. |
| 95 | Ditto | Martin Mitchell | ditto | Deceased. |
| 96 | Ditto | John Mahoney | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |
| 97 | Ditto | John Murphy | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 98 | Ditto | Richard Mason | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 99 | Ditto | John Murphy | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 100 | Ditto | Richard Neville | ditto | - - ditto. |
| 101 | Ditto | Martin O'Brian | ditto | Pensioned. |
| 102 | Corporal | William Owen | ditto | Discharged. |
| 103 | Private | William Reilly | ditto | - ditto. |
| 104 | Ditto | William Ratcliff | ditto | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |

| No. | RANK. | NAMES. | Field Services during the recent Operations in India. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105 | Private - - | James Ryan - - - - | Suppression of the mutiny of the late 27th Regiment, N. I., at Kolapore, August 1857. | Discharged as a worthless soldier. |
| 106 | Serjeant - - | James Rayner - - - | - - ditto - - - | Deceased. |
| 107 | Private - - | John Stewart - - - | - - ditto - - - | Transferred; Artillery. |
| 108 | Ditto - - | Jeremiah Spillane - - - | - - ditto - - - | Pensioned. |
| 109 | Ditto - - | John Sullivan - - - | - - ditto - - - | - ditto. |
| 110 | Ditto - - | John Tenohig - - - | - - ditto - - - | Attached Commissariat. |
| 111 | Ditto - - | John Ure - - - - | - - ditto - - - | Discharged; G. G. O., No. 601 of 1859. |

## ABSTRACT.

| | |
|---|---|
| Men now present - - - - - - - - - - - - | 57 |
| Discharged since, under General Government Order, No. 601 of 1859 - - | 28 |
| Deceased - - - - - - - - - - - - | 9 |
| Discharged - - - - - - - - - - - - | 5 |
| Pensioned - - - - - - - - - - - - | 8 |
| Invalided - - - - - - - - - - - - | 2 |
| Transferred - - - - - - - - - - - - | 2 |
| TOTAL - - | 111 |

Colaba, 12 May 1860.

(signed) *E. A. Guerin*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commanding 2d European Regiment, Light Infantry.

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HER MAJESTY'S 14TH REGIMENT, NATIVE INFANTRY.

ROLL of Claimants for the Medal and the Medal and Clasps for Service during the recent Operations in *India*, granted under the Provisions of Government General Orders, Nos. 933 of the 20th September 1858, and 543 of 16th June 1859.

FOR THE MEDAL ONLY.

| No. | RANK. | NAME. | Field Service during the recent Operations in India. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel. | George S. Montgomery - | Captain, 14th Regiment, Bombay N. I.; when Lieutenant of Upper Scinde Police, assisted to suppress mutiny at Shikarpore, 23d September 1857; armed resistance. When Superintendent of Police, Ahmednuggar, commanded detachments of various corps in two engagements with rebel Bheels at Deegar, on 20th December 1857, and at Mendurer on 20th January 1858; wounded, and horse shot. | |

Camp, Ahmedabad, 14 May 1860.

(signed) *J. E. Francis*, Captain,
Commanding Her Majesty's 14th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry.

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ORIGINAL.

ROLL of Claimants for the Medal for Service during the recent Operations in *India*, granted under the Provisions of General Government Order, No. 933 of the 20th September 1858.

| No. | RANK. | NAME. | Corps or Department. | Capture of Delhi. | Defence and Relief of Lucknow. | Field Services during the recent Operations in India. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1st Class Assistant Surgeon. | H. Wilson, M.D. | Medical Department. | Not present | Not present | Central India - - | For special services during the mutinies of the Mahidpore, Indoor, and Augur Contingents. |

Kulladghee, 15 May 1860.

(signed) *G. Malcolm*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commandant, Southern Mahratta Horse.

From Assistant Surgeon *H. Wilson*, M.D., 1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Horse, to the Adjutant, 1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Horse.

Sir, Kulaldghee, 13 January 1859.

THE request which I herein have the honour to prefer, I would beg the favour of your making known to Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, commanding Southern Mahratta Horse.

I do myself the honour, through you, to solicit the officer commanding to forward my name as an applicant for the medal to be granted to those who have served in the field during the late crisis.

As, until lately, I have been at the disposal of the Government of India, holding an appointment in the late Gwalior Contingent, the officer commanding must necessarily be unacquainted with the grounds upon which I make this application, I would take the liberty of offering for his consideration the following brief narrative :—

While serving as surgeon with the Augur portion of Scindias, or the Gwalior Contingent, I was in May 1857 ordered to proceed to Persia, and left Central India on the 9th of that month; ere reaching Bombay, however, hostilities with Persia had ceased, and I was permitted to rejoin my appointment, *viâ* Ahmedabad; my route lay by Godia and Dohwol, but meeting with camels, laden apparently with loot, and escorted by sepoys, some with and some without arms, all in complete uniform, being deserted by my servant, and my camel having died, I was compelled to abandon the usual track and proceed on foot by bye-paths to Rutlam and Mehidpore. I had reached this latter place but a few hours when the Mehidpore or Malwa Contingent mutinied, the cavalry portion of it murdering both their officers, Messrs. Hunt and Brodie.

During that night the necessity for vacating cantonments was imperative, and at the desire of the commandant, Colonel Timins, I undertook to ride through to Indore, acquaint the Governer General's Agent, and solicit aid; and though twice attacked and pursued by sowars, the ride of 64 miles was completed on one horse, without a halt, in little less than 12 hours. From Indore I escaped in disguise, and reached Augur, which portion of the Gwalior Contingent remained staunch up to the morning of the 4th of June, when the artillery, cavalry, and infantry mutinied, murdering all those of their officers who did not seek refuge in flight; we had the good fortune to rescue all the children and ladies, save one, who was killed; and our little band of fugitives, after 14 days of weary wandering, daily peril, and repeated conflict, reached Hoshungabad, where we were safe. I have reason to believe that my conduct on this occasion was favourably noticed by Government. It certainly has been substantially rewarded. Hearing that the Central India Field Force was marching upon Mhow, after a few days' halt at Hoshungabad, I endeavoured to join it; I had the good fortune to do so after a journey of nine days, crossed the Nerbudda, and reported myself to Brigadier Stuart, for any service on which he might be pleased to employ me. I remained with the Central India Field Force until the latter end of August, when I was ordered to join Captain Keatinge in "Nimar," with whom, and with Captain Waterman, Commanding a detachment of the Malwa Bheel Corps, and with Lieutenant Gordon Cumming, for a time Official Political Agent at Mundlaiser, I served throughout the districts until appointed to the medical charge of the Guzerat Horse.

I respectfully submit that I think myself entitled to the decoration, and would therefore request that the Commandant be so good as to forward my name to Government as an applicant for it.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Wilson*, M.D., Assistant Surgeon,
1st Regiment, Southern Mahratta Horse.

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(No. 26.)

To the Assistant Adjutant General, Southern Division of the Army, Belgaum.

Sir, Kulladghee, 13 January 1859.

I DO myself the honour to forward the accompanying letter from First Class Assistant Surgeon H. Wilson, M.D., 1st Regiment, Southern Mahratta Horse, submitting that his services may be allowed to entitle him to the India medal.

2. Doctor Wilson's services, as detailed, seems to have been most conspicuous, and to have well earned for him what he asks for.

3. I beg to submit his application to the Major General Commanding Southern Division of the Army, for his favourable consideration, and submission to his Excellency the Commander in Chief and Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Malcolm*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commanding Southern Mahratta Horse.

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(No. 993—Military Department.)

To the Adjutant General of the Army.

Sir,

No. 629. I AM directed to transmit to you, for the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the accompanying letter from the Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, No. 2397 of the 4th instant, submitting documents having reference to the claim of certain individuals considered by the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army to be entitled to the medal granted for the suppression of mutiny in India.

2. The return of the enclosure is requested, with your reply.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. K. Burn*, Major,
First Assistant Secretary to the
Government of India.

Council Chamber,
Fort William, 25 July 1860.

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EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for September 1860.

(No. 745.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *D. M. Stewart*, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 565, dated Simla, 13 August 1860).

IN reply to your office letter, No. 993, dated 25th ult., submitting documents, herewith returned, having reference to the claims of the 2d Bombay European Light Infantry, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel G. S. Montgomery, and First Class Assistant Surgeon H. Wilson, M.D., to the medal for services performed during the recent mutiny in India, I am directed by Sir Hugh Rose to state, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, that all the claimants are, in the Commander in Chief's opinion, entitled to the decoration in question, provided the 27th Native Infantry offered armed resistance at the time of the outbreak at Kolapore.

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EXTRACT,—MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of *India*, No. 3, dated 8 January 1861.

Letter, dated 1 October 1860, No. 256.

8. IN this Despatch you forward for favourable consideration the claims of a detachment of the 2d Bombay European Light Infantry to receive the Indian Mutiny Medal for "suppression of the Mutiny of the late 27th Native Infantry, at Kolapore, August 1857."

9. The force in question does not appear to have been engaged in actual conflict with the mutineers of the 27th Native Infantry, but it is stated that the presence of the detachment at the Phoonda Ghaut stopped the flight of the mutineers from Kolapore, and compelled them to retrace their steps.

Para. 5. I agree with Lord Clyde, that some limitation of the general grant of the medal was advisable, and well calculated to add to the value of the distinction in the estimation of the troops.

10. Having regard to the views expressed in my Despatch, No. 411, dated 24th November 1859, in which the claim of the Peshawur Force to receive the medal was decided against, I do not consider that the service performed by the 2d Bombay European Regiment was of a nature to entitle them to the grant of the decoration.

11. Medals will be prepared for the other claimants, viz., Brevet Lieutenant Colonel G. S. Montgomery and Assistant Surgeon H. Wilson.

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EXTRACT of a MILITARY LETTER from *India*, No. 150, dated 8 August 1861.

Proceedings for Oct. 1860, No. 117; March 1861, No. 90; and August 1861, Nos. 135 to 39.

Para. 3. WE have the honour to forward herewith rolls of such portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse as were engaged in the operations against the insurgent Rajahs of "Shorapore" and "Nurgoond."

His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India considers such part of the Southern Mahratta Horse as was engaged at Shorapore to be entitled to the medal.

The reply of the Government of Bombay to the reference made to them in respect to the doubtful claims, will in due course be communicated to you.

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(No. 221.—Military Department.)

From the Deputy Secretary to the Government of *India* to the Adjutant General of the Army, dated 4 October 1860.

Sir,

I AM directed to transmit to you the accompanying letter from the Acting Secretary to Government at Bombay, No. 3291, dated the 14th ultimo, forwarding copy of one from the Acting Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, submitting medal rolls of such portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse as were engaged in the operations against the insurgent Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond, and to request that you will move his Excellency the Commander in Chief to favour the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council with his opinion on the claims for the medal.

The return of the original documents is requested with your reply.

I am, &c.
(signed) *F. D. Athinson*, Major,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

Council Chamber, Fort William,
4 October 1860.

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(No. 131.—Military Department.)

From the Deputy Secretary to the Government of *India* to the Adjutant General of the Army, dated 6 March 1861.

Sir,

I AM directed to transmit to you the accompanying letter from the Acting Secretary to Government at Bombay, No. 534, dated the 22d ultimo, forwarding rolls of claimants for the Indian Mutiny Medal, on account of operations against the Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, C.B., and to request that you will be so good as to move the Commander in Chief to favour Government with his Excellency's opinion on the subject.

The return of the enclosure is requested with your reply.

I am, &c.
(signed) *F. D. Atkinson*, Major,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William,
6 March 1861.

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EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for August 1861.

(No. 135.)

From Captain *W. F. Marriott*, Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 3201, dated Poona, 14 September 1860.)

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a letter from the Adjutant General, No. 2570, dated 12th instant, together with the medal rolls which accompanied it, of such portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse as were engaged in the operations against the insurgent Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond.

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From Major *T. Stock*, Acting Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Poona,—(No. 2570, dated Head Quarters, Poona, 12 September 1860.)

WITH reference to the resolution of Government, forwarded under your official, No. 2930, of the 17th ultimo, as also that transmitted under No. 2262, dated 22d June, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to inclose medal rolls of such portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse as were engaged in the operations against the insurgent Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond.

His Excellency, considering that the affair at Hullgullee belongs to the same category, has desired me to hand on rolls for that place also.

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(No. 136.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 534, dated Bombay Castle, 22 February 1861.)

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a letter from the Adjutant General, No. 856, dated 18th instant, with the rolls which accompanied it of claimants for the Indian Mutiny Medal, on account of operations against the Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, C.B.

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From Major *T. Stock*, Acting Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 856, dated Bombay, 18 February 1861.)

Adjutant General's letter, No. 1111, dated 15 June 1860, with accompaniment.
Resolution of Government, No. 2262, of 22 idem.
Resolution of Government, No. 2674, dated 31 July 1860.
Adjutant General's letter, No. 2570, dated 12 September.
Adjutant General's letter, No. 2294, dated 8 October 1860.
Resolution of Government, No. 3566, of 12 idem.
Resolution of Government, No. 4140, of 5 December last, with accompaniment.

REFERRING to the correspondence marginally noted, I have the honour, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to transmit, for the consideration of his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, the accompanying medal rolls of claimants for the Indian Mutiny Medal employed against Rajahs of Shorapoor and Nurgoond, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, C.B.

2. The medal rolls of the Southern Mahratta Horse were forwarded with my letter, No. 2570, of the 12th September 1860.

3. The names of the individuals of the regiment of artillery who formed part of the same force in the Southern Mahratta country are included in the general roll of the corps, also herewith transmitted.

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(No. 137.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *H. W. Norman*, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 891A, dated Head Quarters, Calcutta, 30 July 1861.)

WITH reference to your office letter, No. 131, of the 6th March last, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to acquaint you, for the information of Government, that, in His Excellency's opinion, the troops engaged at Shorapoor appear entitled to the medal; but I am to state, that sufficient is not known of the affair at Hulgullee, or of the circumstances attending the disarming of the 27th Bombay Native Infantry, to warrant Sir H. Rose in expressing his opinion, that presence at those services give a claim to the Indian Mutiny Medal.

The enclosures of the Despatch under reply are herewith returned.

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(No. 138.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *H. W. Norman*, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 892A, dated Head Quarters, Calcutta, 30 July 1861.)

IN returning the enclosure of your office letter, No. 221, dated the 4th October last, I am directed to state, for the information of the Governor General in Council, that the Commander in Chief considers such portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse as were engaged at Shorapoor to be entitled to the medal; but His Excellency thinks it doubtful whether those employed in the operations against the Rajah of Nurgoond and at Hulgullee have a fair claim to the decoration.

I am however to observe, that if it can be satisfactorily ascertained that the claimants enumerated in these rolls were all actually engaged against mutineers, Sir H. Rose would, in that case, consider them entitled to the medal.

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(No. 139.)

From the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department, to the Officiating Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 136, dated Fort William, 5 August 1861.)

WITH reference to your letters, No. 3291, dated the 14th September 1860, and No. 534, dated 22d February 1861, I am desired to annex, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, transcript of letters from the Deputy Adjutant General of the army, Nos. 891A and 892A, dated the 30th July 1861, and to request that His Excellency in Council may be moved to cause the information therein required to be afforded, in respect to the portions of the Southern Mahratta Horse, employed in the operations against the Rajah of Nurgoond and at Hulgullee, whose claim to the Indian Mutiny Medal is considered doubtful by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

The claims of the men deemed entitled to the medal are being transmitted to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India.

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EXTRACT MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of *India*; dated 15 November 1861, No. 436.

4. IN accordance with the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, conveyed in Colonel Norman's letter to the Government of India, of 30th July 1861, No. 891A, medals will be prepared for such portions of the troops, named in the margin,* as were engaged at Shorapore.

Para. 3.
* 1st Regiment Southern Mahratta Horse.
2d ,, ,,
2d Bombay European Regiment.
15th Bombay Native Infantry.
28th Bombay Native Infantry.
M. Phelan, Laboratory-man, Bombay Artillery.

5. The reply to the reference made to the Government of Bombay, regarding the claims of the men who were engaged at Hulgullu and Nurgoond, will be awaited.

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EXTRACT MILITARY LETTER to *India*, No. 350; dated 30 August 1861.

I FORWARD for your consideration a report copy of correspondence with Colonel Le Grand Jacob, respecting the omission of his name from a Return lately ordered to be made by the House of Commons.

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To Colonel *Baker*, Military Secretary, India Office.

Sir, Genoa, 6 May 1861.

I HAVE the honour to request the correction of an error in a document bearing your signature, dated 18th February last, purporting to be a Return "to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, of all officers who served in the Persian campaign and Indian rebellion, whose services have been brought to the notice of superior authority, &c." In this Return I find my name entered only as referring to Persia, and the officers whose services I from time to time brought to notice are unnamed.

It cannot be said that this arises from these services not having been noticed by the Indian Government, for the "London Gazette" of the end of October† published despatches from Lords Canning and Elphinstone, in which mine are said to have been frequently brought to notice, and the distinction awarded me (during the earlier part thereof) is termed an inadequate reward.

It cannot be from these services having been mainly rendered as Political Commissioner, for the disarming, decimation, and disbanding of the 27th Regiment Native Infantry, and the recapture of Kolapoor from the insurgents, were all done in my military capacity, and were a part of the same service for which Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross (entered in the Return, p. 118), the conclusion of which was the capture of Nurgoond, for which also, I perceive,‡ Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, entered page 120, as having received the Companionship of the Bath.

I may observe, in passing, that the movement of troops by whom the outbreak was so instantly suppressed, was made on my requisition, taking all risk on myself, as Lord Elphinstone, misled by an inaccurate report of the local native authority,§ had forbidden the march of troops; it is scarcely necessary to add that the movement was afterwards approved.

It is not for me to enlarge on the nature of my services; language could not easily give higher expression to their value than that I received from the Government I served. I was selected for the work at a most critical time, made a Brigadier General to facilitate it, and I only resigned my military duties when the rebellion had been trampled on, and my further services were needed only in the Political Department.

I chance to have with me a copy of one of the letters I have received referring to my services. I take the liberty of annexing it, because other names are also mentioned (ignored in this Return) throughout the troubles of 1857–58. Major Schneider rendered the most important service to Government, both in his military capacity as Commandant of the Local Battalion (brigades with the regular troops), and as a political officer. The native officer mentioned has since been promoted and honored in consequence.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Le Grand Jacob*,
Lately Brigadier General and Political Commissioner,
Southern Mahratta Country, Kolapoor.

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† I have no copy to refer to, but the date was, I think, 31st October or 1st November.
‡ Under the head of "General Service." Lord Elphinstone told me it was for his conduct there.
§ Himself probably in league with the chief.

(No. 162.)

From the Adjutant General of the Army to Colonel *Le Grand Jacob*, Commanding at Kolapoor.

Sir, Head Quarters, Bombay, 8 January 1859.

YOUR letter, No. 261 of the 11th ultimo, having, under the Commander in Chief's authority, been submitted for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, Secretary Colonel Melvill, in acknowledging this communication, requests that, under his Excellency's orders, the warm acknowledgments of Government may be conveyed for the promptitude and decision shown by you on the occasion of the recent insurrections at Kolapoor.

2. In carrying out the orders of Government, so entirely in accordance with the Commander in Chief's sentiments as to the prompt and energetic measures you adopted on the occasion in question, his Excellency desires me to tender to you his especial thanks for the manner in which you upheld the honour of this army, proving to all around you what a British officer can effect by gallantry and prudence in the face of the greatest difficulties.

3. The conduct of the troops on this occasion demands Sir Henry Somerset's warmest acknowledgments; you are requested to convey them in such manner as you may deem most suitable, assuring Rissaldar Shaik Reliman, Southern Mahratta Horse; Captain Schneider, Lieutenant Halberton, Artillery; and Captain Thompson, your staff officer, that your notice of them has not been overlooked, and will not be forgotten.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Edward Green*, Colonel,
Adjutant General.

(True copy.)
(signed) C. Thompson, Captain,
Staff Officer.

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From Colonel *G. Le Grand Jacob*, late Brigadier General, Bombay Establishment, and Political Commissioner South Mahratta Country, &c., to the Secretary of the Political Committee of the Council of *India*, dated 15, St. James'-square, London, 24 July 1861.

Sir,

OWING to absence on the Continent, I am only now in receipt of your letter of the 21st ultimo, No. 2977, in which you inform me that the services referred to in my letter of the 6th May, "were not considered to come within the terms of the Order of the House of Commons, which related to those of officers who had distinguished themselves in the field."

2. From this it would appear that the troops under my command during the disturbances in the Southern Mahratta country are supposed not to have been on field service, or that these disturbances were not connected with the general mutinies and rebellion of 1857-58, a mistake that surprises me, for they undoubtedly were so, as the following brief relation will show, and most probably your own official records will bear me out.

1st. The greater portion of the 27th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, mutinied at Kolapoor the night of the 31st July 1857, and killed three of their officers; they were acting in correspondence with the Bengal Sepoys, and with the conspirators of the country, and were stimulated by personal interview of their native officer with the younger Rajah of Kolapoor, by emissaries from the East of India, and other parts.

2d. It was the height of the monsoon, and except the Kolapoor local corps, no other troops were there; the 2d European Regiment Light Infantry, scarcely landed from Persia, were dispatched from Sind,* and for the first time in our history such a risk had ever been incurred, debarked on the coast, and marched through mud and water on Kolapoor, and other stations; the 4th Troop of Horse Artillery (marched on its way from Persia) were sent by land, and a detachment of the Southern Mahratta Horse made one of the most extraordinary marches known; the black soil of the country and numerous rivers offering during the rains gigantic difficulties; I also joined by land, but went on ahead by myself.

3d. These troops were to all intents and purposes, nominally as well as really, on field service, furnished with field establishments of all kinds, which were continued even longer than was required.

4th. They were exposed to harassing duties, unsheltered, night pickets in mud and rain, &c.

5th. The soldiers' kits were mostly destroyed.

6th. To save the men as much as possible, I housed them wherever I could find better shelter than sheds, in bullock sheds, &c., &c.

7th. Much

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* A couple of mountain guns, with artillery men, accompanied the first detachment.

7th. Much of the time between their arrival in August and the Kolapoor insurrection of 6th December 1857, all slept under arms; the only indulgence allowed was loosened belts and unbuttoned coats; such was the likelihood of night attack, sentries mounted loaded, as also outlaying guards, guns were prepared for action, &c.; and, for myself, I slept with a perfect battery of fire-arms under and around my head,* to the knowledge of which by the conspirators† I probably owe my life, as a gang of ruffians employed by the prince,‡ had, I afterwards found, lain in wait for several weeks to murder me, concealed in a garden near my quarters; and Captain Schneider's life was sought for at the same time.

8th. The country was generally hostile, and in communication with the Eastern rebels; Nana Sahib married into the family of one of its chiefs;§ several strongholds were filled with the material of war‖; one successful stand made by any of the chiefs, and thousands would have joined his standard; the telegraph and post office of Kolapoor were bribed to betray us; in short, we were in the midst of an enemy's country, unable to rely even on the reports of our own employés.

9th. A portion of the 27th Regiment (all Purdeeses) fought desperately, and no confidence could be placed in the remainder; most of whom had returned to their lines on finding the townsfolk unprepared to receive them.¶

10th. Of course they were all disarmed, but this was a serious undertaking, and they ever after added to my difficulties by the necessity of watching them whilst trials and executions went constantly forward.

11th. The constant readiness for action I have spoken of, enabled me to crush the town rebellion ere it had time to gain strength; one in the prince's confidence afterwards confessed to me, that an hour more of daylight and his party would have joined the insurgents who held the town, and who had entered it in league with them. Mahratta like, he was consulting his astrologers, when my cannon, battering in the gate, rendered the stars inauspicious.

12th. The troops employed against the Sawunt rebels were out the whole monsoon; when I mention that two to three hundred inches of rain fell on the line of ghâts that were haunted by these people, the hardship undergone may be imagined; there is no doubt from the correspondence found, that the chiefs gave up Portuguese protection, and again trusted to the chance of war, stimulated by hope of support from the country and of Nana Sahib's advent to power.

3. I cannot understand on what grounds the duties above set forth are not deemed field service against mutineers and rebels, or in what way they fell short of acts that, performed elsewhere, have been duly acknowledged; if I am suffered to exaggerate, I should be happy to be allowed a personal interview with Sir Charles Wood, or any Member of the Council, that I may be searchingly questioned; further, two Members of the Bombay Government, Messrs. Lumsden and Malet, and two of its secretaries, Sir Peter Melvill and Mr. Anderson, all more or less cognizant of what occurred, are now, I believe, in England, and could be called on to point out if I have overstated anything; on the contrary, I am conscious that I left much unsaid.

4. I am informed that the Indian medal has been refused to the troops under me; if this be so, I beg, with all deference, to claim it for them; the men who forced mutineers and rebels in arms, and went through what I have stated, will be unable to understand why it should be denied; will you, therefore, submit my respectful request to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India in Council, that he be pleased, as a simple act of justice, to reconsider the whole question; the Southern Mahratta country mutinies and disturbances were as much a portion of those commenced at Meerut and Delhi as any that occurred in India.

5. Lord Elphinstone's Minute, published in London Gazette of 29th November 1859, though strictly speaking referring to the Political Department, does in fact notice also purely military services; witness the reference to Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm and Lieutenant Kerr, and to previous favourable report made regarding Major General Roberts and myself, that must have been regarding our military service, for which alone a military honour can be an "appropriate" reward; the approval of the chief military authority of the Presidency is before you.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Le Grand Jacob.*

15, St. James'-square, London,
24 July 1861.

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* Mainly political motives; I abstained from employing an European guard.
† One of the Durbar sepoys about my person was of the number.
‡ Chimma Sahib. § Koocumdwar, near Kolapoor.
‖ For instance, stock; 11 tons of gunpowder from one place.
¶ They had risen prematurely, under idea that one of their number would betray them.

(No. 2977.)

Sir, India Office, 21 June 1861.

I HAVE received and laid before the Secretary of State for India in Council your letter, dated 6th ultimo, in which you state that in the return of the services of officers in Persia, and during the mutinies in India, lately presented to Parliament, you find your name is entered only as referring to Persia, and the officers whose services you from time to time brought to notice are unnamed.

Secretary Sir Charles Wood duly estimates the services rendered by you as Political Commissioner in the Southern Mahratta country, and by the officers to whom you refer, in times of much difficulty. Such services, however, were not considered to come within the terms of the Order of the House of Commons calling for the Return to which you allude.

The Minute of the Governor General and the Governor of Bombay, in which you observe your name was mentioned with approbation, related to the services of officers who had distinguished themselves otherwise than in the field. The Order of the House of Commons called for a Return of the officers employed on field service, and the Return, as presented, included the names of such officers only.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. E. Baker*, Colonel.

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EXTRACT MILITARY LETTER from *India*, dated 8 February 1862, No. 35.

1. WITH reference to paragraph 5 of your letter, No. 436, dated the 15th November 1861, we have the honour to forward the reply of the Bombay Government to the reference made to them in regard to the claims to the Indian Mutiny Medal of the parties who were engaged at Hulgalla and Noorgund.

Pro. for Oct. 1860, Nos. 647 and 648.
„ April 1861, Nos. 833 to 836.
„ July 1861, Nos. 881 and 882.
„ Sept. 1861, Nos. 186 to 188.
„ Jan. 1862, Nos. 632 and 633.

We also submit the claims to the medal of the parties named in the margin*, accompanied by copies of letters from the Deputy Adjutant General and Officiating Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, containing the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief on these claims.

Pro. for Sept. 1861, Nos. 534 to 536.
„ Oct. 1861, Nos. 1094 and 1095.
„ Nov. 1861, Nos. 108 and 109.
„ Jan. 1862, No. 634.

These further papers relate to the claims of certain corps† of the Hyderabad Contingent to the Indian Mutiny Medal, and to that of Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders.

The opinion of Sir Hugh Rose on the claims of the several corps of the Hyderabad Contingent will be found in the letter from the Officiating Adjutant General of the Army, No. 17 A, dated 8th January 1862. The reply to the reference made to the Commander in Chief in the case of Her Majesty's 74th Regiment, will be submitted to you when received.

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(No. 519.)

From the Assistant Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

IN returning the enclosures of your office letter, No. 201, of the 5th December last, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, that in deciding the claims of military persons to the India Medal, the Commander in Chief has only admitted those of individuals who have actually been under fire, and engaged with mutineers.

2. His Excellency considers that the claims of all civilians, whether in the service of Government or not, should be disposed of on the same principle.

3. I am, with reference to Assistant Secretary Major Burne's letter, dated the 25th ultimo, No. 862, to express the Commander in Chief's regret that this reply should have been so long delayed, owing to the papers having been inadvertently mislaid and overlooked in camp.

I have, &c.
(signed) *D. R. Stewart*, Lieut. Col.,
Asst. Adjt. Genl. of the Army.

Adjutant General's Office, Simla,
5 July 1860.

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* For service at Kolapore, Assistant Surgeon F. Broughton; for service at Shikarpore, Major G. S. Montgomery, Allee Mahomed Khan, Ressaldar, and 266 other native officers and men of various police corps in Sind; for service at Nurgoond, Messrs. A. E. D. Grey, A. L. Spens, G. W. Elliot, and Lieutenant G. E. Thomas.

† Officers and men, Hyderabad Contingent: 4th Company, Artillery; 4th Regiment, Cavalry; and 2d Regiment, Infantry.

(No. 1104.)

From the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department; dated Fort William, 27 October 1860.

Secretary to Government, Bombay, Political Department, No. 93, dated 16th June 1859, with enclosures; ditto, No. 141, dated 24th September 1859.

In transmitting the accompanying papers relative to the claims of civilians, officers in civil employ, and non-military persons in the Bombay Presidency to the India Medal, granted for the suppression of the mutiny, which were named through the Home Department of the Government of India, and have been submitted to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and received back from the Adjutant General's Department on the 18th July 1860, I am desired to observe, for the information of the Government of Bombay, that the rolls do not afford such information as will enable Government to judge of the validity of the claims.

2. The claims of all civilians and others, whether in the service of Government or not, who, from their position, are entitled to such a distinction, should be disposed of on the same principle which governs the grant to the troops, which is laid down in General Order by the Commander in Chief in India, dated 21st September 1850, that no men shall be included in the rolls who do not come under the following conditions:—"Soldiers who shall have been in actual conflict with the enemy, or who have formed part of a force in position and strength, have indirectly taken a share in an operation actually in progress requiring the presence of such a force."

3. Lord Clyde observed, in regard to the restriction of the grant of medals to those only who had been engaged with mutineers (as distinguished from rebels), that the terms "rebels" or "mutineers" had always been considered of equal weight in deciding claims to the grant, though one distinguishing merely the revolted soldier from the insurgent civil population which joined in their excesses, but that every tribe or clan, such as the Wagheers, the Sitana insurgents, the Bheels, the Wuzerees, &c., who have fought against us, and may thus have disturbed the peace locally, during the past three years, as in previous times, could hardly be included in this category as having made common cause with the rebels.

4. The Government of India so far concur in this view as to consider that the medal can only be granted under the conditions noted in the 2d paragraph of this letter, and to those who have been opposed to mutineers, or rebels who are shown to have made common cause with mutineers, or to have been instigated to revolt by their emissaries, and that it is claimable only by civilians and non-military persons holding corresponding position to those who receive medals in the army, who have in their own sphere been placed in circumstances under which it would be granted to the troops.

I am desired, therefore, to request that the Government of Bombay may be moved to cause these, and all other similar rolls that may have been preferred, to be revised, and returned at an early date to this department, for transmission to the Secretary of State, the circumstances under which the claim is considered valid in each case being clearly shown in the rolls.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. J. H. Birch*, Major General,
Secretary to the Government of India.

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(No. 833.)

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1959, dated 22 April 1861, transferred to the Military Department for disposal.

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From *A. Kinlock Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Fort William; No. 451,346, dated Bombay Castle, 5 April 1861.

No. 1670.

With reference to Major General Birch's letter,* No. 1104, dated 27th October last, I have now the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward the accompanying revised return, showing the names of persons who were actually engaged against mutineers at Kolhapoor and Shikarpoor, and against the rebels of Nurgoond, who may be said to have made common cause with the mutineers during the crisis of 1857–58.

2. These persons have, in the opinion of this Government, a fair claim to the Indian Medal, under the views expressed in the letter above quoted.

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* In the Military Department.

RETURN of Officers, Civil and Military, who were actually Engaged against Mutineers at *Kolhapoor* and *Shikarpoor*, and against the Rebels of *Nurgood*, during the Crisis of 1857–58.

| NAMES. | Designation of Office. | Occasion and Place of being actively Engaged before the Enemy. |
|---|---|---|
| *Kolhapoor:* | | |
| Assistant Surgeon F. Broughton. | Civil surgeon at Kolhapoor. | Engaged on the 9th August 1857 in the attack on the Paga, in the suburbs of the town of Kolhapoor, which had been occupied by the mutineers of the 27th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry; was also present when Brigadier General Jacob quelled the rising in the town on the 6th December 1857. |
| *Shikarpoor:* | | Engaged in the suppression of the mutiny of the Native Artillery at Shikarpoor in September 1857. The 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, who supplied the place of a portion of the Sind Irregular Horse on their withdrawal for service in Persia, were a source of much anxiety to this Government in 1857. Circumstances which transpired in the month of August showed that the corps was ripe for revolt. A plot had been formed by some of the Bengal troopers with two Belooch chiefs, Durya Khan and Dilmorad Khan, for the murder of the British officers at Jacobabad. Information of their proceedings had been received by Major Merewether from various sources. Durya Khan proceeded to Jacobabad on the evening of the 20th August to complete arrangements for the intended outbreak. At an appointed hour he was arrested; his chief confederate was also soon after arrested. Almost simultaneously with these occurrences a mutiny occurred among the Native Artillery at Shikarpoor, which was promptly suppressed. It afterwards appeared that the mutineers in Sind, as well as in the Punjab, had been in close communication with the Belooch chiefs, and that a general and simultaneous rising was intended. |
| Major G. S. Montgomery. | Lieutenant of Police - | |
| Allee Mahomed Khan | Russaldar, Mounted Police | |
| And 266 other Native officers and men, as per accompanying list. | Various Police Corps in Sind. | |
| *Nurgoond:* | | At Nurgoond, on the 2d June 1858, in taking the hill fort of that place. These gentlemen were present with Colonel Malcolm when that officer charged and defeated, with the troops under his command, a force which came from Nurgoond to attack them. They also accompanied the party that ascended the fort gate for the purpose of blowing it in with powder-bags. |
| Mr. A. E. D. Grey - | Acting Second Assistant Magistrate of Dharwar. | |
| Mr. A. L. Spens - | Supernumerary Third Assistant Magistrate of Dharwar. | |
| Mr. G. W. Elliot - | Assistant Judge at Dharwar. | |
| Lieutenant G. E. Thomas. | Superintendent of Police at Dharwar. | |

(True copy.)

(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*
Acting Secretary to Government.

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(No. 1196.—Military Department.)

To the Adjutant General of the Army.

Sir,

WITH reference to letter from your office, No. 519, dated the 5th July 1860, I am directed to transmit to you, for submission to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the accompanying letter* from the acting Secretary to the Government at Bombay No. $\frac{45}{1346}$, dated the 5th instant, forwarding a revised return, and a list showing the names of persons who were actually engaged against mutineers at Kolhapoor and Shikarpoor, and against the rebels of Nurgoond, during the crisis of 1857–58.

A copy of the letter to the Secretary to Government at Bombay, No. 1104, dated 27th October 1860, is also transmitted for reference.

* Received with Foreign Department docket, No. 1959, dated 22d April 1861.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. K. Burne*, Major,
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William, 29 April 1861.

(No. 1560 of 1861.—Military Department.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Deputy Secretary Major Atkinson's letter, No. 38, dated 1st instant, and in reply to the 2d para. thereof, to forward the accompanying copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Madras, No. 4194 A., dated 19th November 1860. No. 1711.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. F. Marriott*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Bombay Castle, 25 May 1861. Acting Secretary to Government.

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(No. 4194 A.)

To the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, Bombay.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt, on the 13th instant, of your letter,* dated the 12th ultimo, No. 3567, and to state, for the information of the Government of Bombay, that medal rolls of the detachment 47th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Major J. E. Hughes of that corps, were submitted to the Government of India, with a communication from this Department, dated 23d September 1859, and that up to this time, no objection appears to have been taken to the claims of the men of the detachment in question.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Marshall*, Colonel,
Fort Saint George, 19 November 1860. Secretary to Government.

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(No. 1138.—Military Department.)

To the Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter, No. 1560, dated 25th May last, forwarding copy of a letter from the Adjutant General of the Bombay army, to the effect that it did not appear that any exception had been taken to the claim of the detachment of the 47th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Hughes, to the medal given for the suppression of the mutiny, I am directed to point out that it is desirable that the claim of the 28th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry should be more clearly stated, as it is not shown how far the detachment of the 47th Native Infantry may have been employed exclusively on the service in which it was associated with the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, and the case of the letter should be complete in itself. No. 1712.

2. I am, therefore, desired to request that the Honourable the Governor of Bombay in Council, may be moved to cause a brief statement of the service in which the regiment was employed, showing against whom the operations were carried on, the nature of the resistance met with, &c., to be furnished for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, with the opinion of the Bombay Government as to whether the case does or does not come within the conditions laid down in the Secretary of State's letter, No. 120, dated 6th March last, paras. 9th and 10th, copy of which was transmitted to you with my letter No. 38, dated 1st May 1861.

I am, &c.
(signed) *R. J. H. Birch*, Major General,
Fort William, 30 July 1861. Secretary to the Government of India.

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(No. 906.)

From the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1196, dated 29th April last, forwarding revised returns of claimants to the India medal for services during the mutinies, and to acquaint you for the information of Government, that the Commander in Chief

* Inquiring whether the grant of the Indian mutiny medal has been extended to the force under the command of Major Hughes, &c.

Chief does not consider the troops present at Shikarpoor, on the occasion of the mutiny at that station, to be entitled to the medal, as his Excellency is not aware that any opposition was offered by the mutineers.

2. Respecting Assistant Surgeon Broughton's claim on account of his services at Kolhapoor, Sir Hugh Rose is of opinion that none of the troops employed on that occasion should receive the medal, save the detachment of Southern Mahratta Horse under Lieutenant Kerr, which stormed the position taken up by the mutineers in the town.

3. With regard to the claims put forward by the four civil officers named in one of the accompanying rolls, on account of their services at Nurgoond, I am desired to refer you to the opinion expressed in my letter, No. 891 A. of the 30th ultimo, respecting similar claims.

4. The enclosures of your letter under reply are herewith returned.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. W. Norman*, Lieut. Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

Head Quarters, Calcutta,
1 August 1861.

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(No. 204.—Military Department.)

To the Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department.

Sir,

With reference to letter from Acting Secretary A. Kinlock Forbes, Esq., No. 451,346, dated 5th April 1861, to the address of the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and to my communication, No. 136, dated the 5th August 1861, I am desired to annex, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, transcript of a letter from the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, No. 906, dated the 1st August last, regarding the claims to the India medal of parties who were engaged in 1857 and 1858 against mutineers at Kolhapoor and at Shikarpoor, and against the rebels at Nurgoond.

A copy of the Deputy Adjutant General's letter, No. 891 A., dated 30th July 1861, to which reference is made in the 3d paragraph of the one now sent, was transmitted to you with my letter, No. 136, dated the 5th August last, and copy of the same officer's letter, No. 892 A., dated 30th July last, expressing his Excellency the Commander in Chief's doubt, whether those employed in the operations against the Rajah of Nurgoond have a fair claim to the medal, is annexed to this letter.

I am, &c.
(signed) *R. J. H. Birch*, Major General,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William, 7 September 1861.

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Minute of Council.—Military Department, 7 September 1861.

(No. 205.)

Read a communication from the Under Secretary, Foreign Department, No. 1956, dated the 22d April 1861, transferring for disposal a letter from the Acting Secretary at Bombay, submitting a revised return, showing the names of persons who were actually engaged against mutineers at Kolapore and Shikarpore, and against the rebels of Nurgoond, during the crisis of 1857-58.

*Ordered*, That copies of the documents noted below* be sent to the Foreign Department for information with reference to the communication from that Department quoted above.

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Extract.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for January 1862.

(No. 632.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department, to Major General Sir *R. J. H. Birch*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—No. 2604 (dated Bombay Castle, 9 September 1861).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, No. 1138 of 30th July, and No. 136 of 5th August.

2. In reply to the first-mentioned letter, I am desired to submit the accompanying statement of the services of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, as desired, and to add that the conditions laid down in the Secretary of State's letter, No. 120, dated 6th March last, appear to be that the medal is only to be granted to those who contended with the rebels of Upper and Central India, or with those directly co-operating with them.

3. In

* Letter from Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, Nos. 891 A. and 892 A., 30th July 1861; letter to Officiating Secretary, Bombay, No. 136, dated 5th August 1861; letter from Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, No. 906 A., dated 1st August 1861; letter to Secretary to Government, Military Department at Bombay, No. 204, dated 7th September 1861.

3. In your second letter, No. 136, the claims of Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm's Force (including a portion of the 28th Native Infantry) which operated against the Shorapoor rajah seem to be admitted, whilst those of the force employed at Nurgoond and Hulgullee, are questioned as doubtful.

4. But these operations are exactly similar, as respects the claim to the medal, to those of the Shorapoor Force. The troops were engaged against rebels in open armed resistance, but these were not mutineer sepoys, nor acting in direct co-operation with the rebels in Upper or Central India.

5. I am desired to request the final decision of the Government of India, and—

STATEMENT showing the Services of the 28th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, during the recent Operations in the Southern Mahratta Country, with reference to a Claim for the Indian Mutiny Medal.

| Service on which Employed, and against whom the Operations were carried on. | Strength of Detachment Employed. | By whom the Operations were conducted, and Nature of Resistance. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| In suppression of rebellion in the Southern Mahratta country against the Chief of Nurgoond. | 108 rank and file, including havildars, commanded by Lieutenant Heisch. | This detachment formed a part of a field force, which, under the command of Colonel Malcolm, on the 1st June 1858, defeated the rebel chief of Nurgoond in the plain before the Fort, and on the same day stormed and occupied the Petah, and on the day following captured the Fort.<br>Colonel Malcolm reports, that the loss of the enemy in these operations could not be less than about 260 killed and wounded, and that 113 prisoners were taken. | |
| Operations against the Rajah of Shorapoor. | 2 European officers<br>5 Native officers.<br>2 Drummers.<br>55 Rank and file.<br>Lieutenant Duncan, commanding. | Part of a column, which, under the command of Colonel Malcolm, marched to the relief of the Contingent Force under the command of Major Wyndham, which had been attacked by the troops of the Shorapoor rajah, accomplishing the distance of 104 miles in 139 hours; the last 40 miles in 26 hours.<br>It was at the advance upon the Fort of Shorapoor that Major Hughes' Force, consisting of the 47th Regiment Madras Native Infantry and 74th Highlanders, joined Colonel Malcolm's column, and remained under his command from the 8th February to the 26th idem.<br>The Rajah's troops were driven within the Fort by the leading column from Kurnool, with the loss of an officer killed and several men wounded.<br>The Fort was evacuated the same night. | |

*T. Stock*, Lieut. Colonel,
Acting Adjutant General.

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Military Department, Fort William,—(No. 1096, under date the 30th September 1861).

FORWARDED to the Adjutant General of the Army, for the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, accompanied by the papers as per margin. C. May 1861, No. 57. C. July 1861, No. 1711–12.

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EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for January 1862.

(No. 633.)

From Major *A. Johnson*, Officiating Assisting Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department,—(No. 1319, dated Calcutta, 31 October 1861).

IN returning the documents received with your docket, No. 1,096, of the 30th ult., requesting the Commander in Chief's opinion on the claim of the portion of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry engaged at Nurgoond and Hulgullee, I am directed to state that his Excellency on consideration thinks the claim valid. Medals, 201 B.

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ROLL of Officers and Men of the 2d Regiment Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, who have been employed in the Suppression of the Mutiny in *India*.

Aurungabad, 25 June 1859.

| Number of Medals. | Rank and Names. | Services for which entitled to Medal. |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | Captain J. B. Speid<br>Serjeant Major Greany.<br>Quartermaster Sergeant Scanlan.<br>Assistant Apothecary Fruvall. | The wing of the 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, formed a portion of the field force. Hyderabad Contingent employed in Central India; one-half of it was summoned by the Governor General's Agent for the protection of Mhow from the threatened attack of the mutinous troops of his Highness Maharajah Holkur, of Indore, and thereby enabled the Nurbbuda Field Force, under Brevet Colonel (now Sir Charles) Stuart, K.C.B., to march on Dhar and Mundesoor; the remainder of the wing was employed under Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Orr, C.B., at Ragooghur and Pipleah. The wing was subsequently employed by Major General Sir Hugh Rose, G.C.B., for the protection of Mhow and Indore, at the central period of the retreat of the Gwalior rebels, and it furnished escorts for ammunition and stores to camp. |

(signed) *W. Hill*, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

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(No. 925 A.)

MEMORANDUM.

Adjutant General's Office, Head Quarters,
Calcutta, 3 August 1861.

FORWARDED to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, for the orders of Government.

The officers and men employed at Mhow, and who do not appear to have ever been engaged, are not considered entitled to the medal; but the claims of those engaged at Pipleah and Ragooghur are submitted for the decision of Government, with reference to this office letter, No. 891A, of the 30th ultimo.

By order of the Commander in Chief,
(signed) *H. W. Norman*, Lieut. Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

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(No. 96.—Military Department.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *C. Davidson*, C.B., Resident at Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, Military Department, Fort William.

Sir, Hyderabad Residency, 12 October 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ultimo,* and to forward for submission to Government the accompanying copy of a communication from Brigadier Hill, Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, of the 11th instant, No. 183, furnishing the information required.

2. Adverting to the concluding portion of the second para.† of Brigadier Hill's letter, I beg to state that the men of the 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, in the roll, who garrisoned Mhow, were never in action.

3. The enclosures of your letter‡ under acknowledgment are herewith returned as requested.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. Davidson*, Resident.

Hyderabad Residency,
12 October 1861.

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* No. 685.—Forwarding rolls of certain corps, and detaching Hyderabad Contingent who lay claim to the India mutiny medal, and requesting all available information in support of the claims, to enable a decision being passed thereon.

† I am not aware that the other men of the 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, in this roll who garrisoned Mhow, were ever in action.

‡ Rolls of 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent; 4th Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent; 4th Company Artillery, Hyderabad Contingent; Ordnance Department, for the India mutiny medal.

(No. 183 of 1861.)

From Brigadier *W. Hill*, Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, to the Military Secretary to the Resident, Hyderabad.

Head Quarters, Hyderabad Contingent,
Bolarum, 11 October 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter, number and date as per margin,* giving cover to a copy of a letter from Major General Birch, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, addressed to the Resident, dated 18th September last, requesting a report to be made upon the claims of the men included in the rolls submitted for the India Mutiny Medal,† now forwarded by you, and requesting any further information available in support of their claims.

* No. 811, dated 7th October 1861.

2. Regarding the claims of the men of the 2d Regiment Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, who were engaged in the taking of the Ghurry of Pipliah, Major Orr, in command of the Field Force, Hyderabad Contingent, in his despatch, which was submitted to the Resident, stated that the rebel, Dowlut Sing Tahkhoor, of Raghooghur, when called upon to surrender his Fort of Pepliah, fired upon our troops, upon which the gate of the fort was blown open, and the storming party, led by Captain John Sinclair, 3d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, met with a great opposition from the insurgents; but eventually, after killing a great many, succeeded in taking the place. The authorities will judge from the above whether the men named in the roll as present at Pepliah are entitled to the India Mutiny Medal. The remaining men in that roll were marched to Mhow, under the command of Captain Speid, and were under the command of Brigadier, now Sir Charles Stuart, K.C.B.; a small portion of those men were at the taking of Dhar, and will, I presume, be entitled to the medal. I am not aware that the other men of the 2d Infantry, in this roll, who garrisoned Mhow, were ever in action, but Sir Charles Stuart would be able to afford this information.

3. With regard to the men included in the roll of the detachment of 4th Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent, although they formed part of my force in the Japtee Valley, they took no part in the engagements with the rebels on the 8th and 9th of December 1858. The 6th Regiment Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, commanded by Major Scott, one squadron of 2d Cavalry, under Major Clogstone, Volunteer Cavalry (the rolls of both of which corps have been already forwarded), and the 4th Company Artillery, under Lieutenant Henchy, were all engaged with the enemy. I found it necessary to line the jungles with this small force, so as to intercept the rebels, when we were fired upon by their advance guard in this manner; besides killing and wounding parties of the enemy, prisoners were also taken, and ten were tried by a court-martial and shot. Thus my force was engaged for two days.

The only further information which I can afford, besides what has already been stated in my despatches of the 9th and 10th December 1858, is to the effect that one of the prisoners, a Brahmin, Pundit Ramkissen, acknowledged that he was one of Tantia Topee's moot-suddies, or secretary, and returns of a considerable body of men belonging to Tantia were found on his person; the band he was with amounted to about 400 men, commanded by Ressaldar Raheen Ali Khan, of Gwalior. I succeeded in entirely routing this party, with the assistance of Colonel Beecher, who was in the vicinity of the Satpoora range of hills, with whom I was in frequent communication about this party of rebels.

I marched through the valley of the Taptee, close to Baitool, where I received instructions from the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army, conveying a plan of operations to me, and directing me to co-operate with Major General Mitchell, K.C.B., north of the Nerbudda, and Major General Sir Hugh Rose, G.C.B., south of that river; and, on a requisition for troops from Sir Hugh Rose to Mr. Bullock, Chief Commissioner, Hyderabad Assigned Districts, who was in my camp, I made forced marches into the disturbed districts, and on my way I fought a severe and successful action at Chichumba, where great loss was inflicted upon the insurgents; my main force also suffered severely.

The Berar Field Force which I commanded was nearly six months in the field; and for a short time I had the honour of serving under the command of his Excellency General Sir Hugh Rose, G.C.B., until the Hyderabad country was considered by his Excellency to be perfectly tranquil.

4. The Lascar, Ramadoo, included in the roll of Ordnance Department, Hyderabad Contingent, was employed, with two guns of the Hyderabad Contingent, under Lieut. Pedler, at the taking of Copaul, who reported that all his men behaved exceedingly well; and I conclude his claim for a medal, under these circumstances, is valid.

The Resident is aware that Lieutenant Colonel Hughes' taking of Copaul was a very spirited affair, on which occasion the rebel, Dessage Beem Row, was killed.

5. I beg to return the rolls you forwarded, as requested by you.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. Hill*, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

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† 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent; 4th Regiment Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent; 4th Company Artillery, Hyderabad Contingent; Ordnance Department, Pipliah, Ringooghur, Taptee Valley, Berar, and Copaul.

No. 1,233—Military Department.

(To the Adjutant General of the Army.)

Sir,

* No. 925, and 965 to 967, dated 3d Aug. 1861.

WITH reference to your letters, as per margin,* I am directed to transmit to you, in original, for submission to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the accompanying communication from the Resident at Hyderabad, No. 96, dated 12th instant, furnishing information regarding the claims of the several corps of the Hyderabad Contingent to the Indian Mutiny Medal, and to request that Sir Hugh Rose may be moved to favour Government with an expression of his opinion on the claims in question.

The return of the enclosures is requested, with your reply.

I am, &c.
(signed) *F. D. Atkinson*, Lieut. Col.,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William,
28 October 1861.

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(No. 2977 of 1861.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Major General Sir *R. J. H. Birch*, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Military Department, Bombay Castle,
18 October 1861.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 686, dated 18th September last, and in reply to transmit the accompanying copy of a Report by the Adjutant General, No. 7451, dated 15th instant, containing a statement of the services of the detachment of Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders at the capture of Nurgoond.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. F. Marriott*, Lieut. Col.,
Secretary to Government.

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REPORT.

(No. 7451.)

Adjutant General's Office, Poona, 15 October 1861.

THIS department can give no information regarding the defeat of the rebels at Suhao, or the storm and capture of Copaul.

The following refers only to the capture of Nurgoond, by the field force under the command of Colonel G. Malcolm, C.B.:—

| Service on which Employed, and against whom the Operations were carried on. | Strength of Detachment Employed. | By whom the Operations were conducted, and Nature of Resistance. |
|---|---|---|
| In suppression of rebellion in the Southern Mahratta Country against the Chief of Nurgoond. | 1 nine-pounder gun - -<br>1 howitzer.<br>Captain Paget, Royal Artillery, commanding.<br>2 companies, Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders, 170 rank and file, including sergeant.<br>Captain Davies, commanding.<br>1 company, 28th Regiment, Native Infantry, 108 rank and file, including sergeant.<br>Lieutenant Heisch, commanding.<br>150 Southern Mahratta Horse.<br>Russuldur Sew Pursand Sing, commanding. | Field force under the command of Colonel Malcolm, on the 1st June 1858, defeated the rebel Chief of Nurgoond, in the plain before the fort; and the same day stormed and occupied the Petah; and on the day following captured the fort.<br>All accounts state that the enemy's force was 3,000 foot and 500 horse. Colonel Malcolm reports that he thinks this exaggerated, but the force having been wholly dispersed, the country was found strewed with arms.<br>Colonel Malcolm states, that the loss of the enemy during the separation could not be less than about 260 killed and wounded, and that 113 prisoners were taken.<br>On our side, two gunners and four horses, Royal Artillery, were wounded; one private, 74th Highlanders, severely wounded; and six men and horses, Southern Mahratta Horse, wounded. |

(signed) *T. Stock*, Lieut. Colonel,
Adjutant General Commanding.

(No. 151.)

MILITARY DEPARTMENT, 5 November 1861.

ENTER letter from the Secretary to Government at Bombay, No. 2977, dated the 18th October last, submitting copy of a report by the Adjutant General of the Bombay army, containing a statement of the service of the detachment of Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders, at the capture of Nurgoond.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to the Adjutant General of the army, with reference to letter from his office, No. 969, dated 3d August 1861.

By order,
(signed) *F. D. Atkinson*, Lieut. Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

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(No. 634.)

EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for January 1862.

From Lieutenant Colonel *H. W. Norman*, C.B., Officiating Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 17A; dated Head Quarters, Camp Hussun Abdul, 8 January 1862).

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to return the enclosures received with your letter of the 28th October last, No. 1233, and to request you will communicate to the Government the opinion of his Excellency on the claims to the Indian Mutiny Medal of the several corps of the Hyderabad Contingent, referred to in these papers.

1. The capture of the Fort of Peepliah, for which a medal is claimed on behalf of men of the 2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent, appears to his Excellency to be hardly an affair to entitle troops to this distinction. As far as Sir Hugh Rose is informed, the opposition was solely made by a rebel Thakoor and his retainers; and though the storming party is said, in Colonel Hill's letter, No. 183, to have met with great opposition, his Excellency has been informed that their loss was next to nothing.

If the information of the Commander in Chief is correct, he does not think men who were solely present in this affair have any claim to a medal.

2. The portion of the same regiment (2d Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent) who were present at the capture of Dhar are in his Excellency's opinion entitled to the medal, while those who simply garrisoned Mhow appear to have no claim.

3. The Detachment, 4th Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent, referred to in the third paragraph of Colonel Hill's letter, do not appear to Sir H. Rose to have established a claim to the medal; but the 6th Infantry Squadron, 2d Cavalry, and 4th Company Artillery of the contingent that belonged to the same force have, his Excellency considers, a valid claim to it.

4. The Lascar Ramadoo present at Copaul (*see* paragraph 4 of Colonel Hill's letter), is considered by the Commander in Chief to be entitled to the medal.

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EXTRACT MILITARY DESPATCH to the Government of India; dated 31 May 1862, No. 206.

LETTER dated 8 February 1862, No. 35.

2. HIS Excellency the Commander in Chief having, upon a consideration of the report called for from the Government of Bombay, respecting the claims of the troops engaged at Hulgullee and Nurgoond to receive the India medal, expressed his opinion that the claims are valid; medals will be prepared for the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, and for such portions of the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and the 1st and 2d Mahratta Horse, as likewise took part in the above-named actions. Para. 1.

3. The rolls of these corps accompanied your military letters of 22d November 1860, No. 321, paragraph 1, and 8th August 1861, No. 150, paragraph 3. The present correspondence, however, does not contain any further information respecting the claim of the 4th troop, Bombay Horse Brigade, whose roll was also included among those transmitted with your letter of 8th August 1861.

4. This claim was advanced on the ground that the troop was present at the disarming of the 27th Native Infantry, and the execution of the mutineers; but it was observed in Colonel Norman's letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, of the 30th July 1861, No. 891A, that sufficient was not known of the circumstances to warrant Sir H. Rose in expressing his opinion that presence at those services gave a claim to the medal.

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EXTRACT of a LETTER from the Government of India, No. 304; dated 22 August 1862.

Proceedings for May 1862, Nos. 247 and 248. Proceedings for August 1862, No. 374.

Para. 1. WE have the honour to forward for your consideration, correspondence relative to a claim advanced by Colonel Le G. Jacob, C.B., late of the Bombay army, for the India medal, on account of services performed at Kolapore.

We concur in the opinions expressed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief and his Excellency Sir W. Mansfield, that the services performed by Colonel Jacob do not fulfil the conditions laid down by Her Majesty's Government for the bestowal of the medal, and we regret therefore that we cannot accord our support to his application.

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(No. 247.)

EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for May 1862.

From Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department, to Lieutenant Colonel *H. W. Norman*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1165); dated Bombay Castle, April 1862.

* Of 25 February and 29 March.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir R. Birch's Letter, No. 561, of 16th December last, desiring certain information regarding the services of Colonel Le Grand Jacob, and am desired in reply to submit the accompanying copies of two letters* on the same subject, addressed by Colonel Jacob to this Government, and of a report by the Adjutant General, No. 311, of 17th January last, and of a Minute by his Excellency Sir William Mansfield, dated 22d March.

2. The Governor in Council desires me to say that this Government has already expressed, in the highest terms, its sense of the importance of the services rendered by Colonel Jacob; but concurring with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, as to the conditions on which the grant of the Indian medal must depend, the Governor in Council thinks it should be determined by the precedent case of the force under Sir Sydney Cotton, at Peshawur. The Governor in Council, therefore, recommends that the Government of India should ascertain the decision in that case, and be guided thereby in finally deciding the claim of Colonel Jacob's force.

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From Colonel *G. Le Grand Jacob*, Retired List, lately Political Commissioner, S. M. Country, &c. &c., and Brigadier General Commanding Troops in the Kolapoor, Sawuntwaree, Ratnagherry, Tasgaum, and Sanglee Districts, to Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Military Secretary to Government, Bombay; dated Sion Fort, Bombay, 25 February 1862.

ALTHOUGH no longer serving Government, yet I hope I may claim its attention to the following statement:—

2. As you are aware I was specially selected to deal with the Bombay regiment, that in communication with the native corps of Bengal, had followed their example at Kolapoor, and on the plot thickening, more and more of the surrounding country was placed under my control.

3. Order was preserved with small loss on our side, after some severe examples made of the disaffected, with the exception of the Sawunt rebels, who were protected by the dense jungles; every outbreak was crushed almost as soon as it began, whilst others were nipped in the bud before bursting forth; all betokened an unhealthy feeling in the country; we could depend on no one, and the utmost caution and circumspection were necessary.

4. It

4. It was, indeed, a crisis of great magnitude, and by God's mercy we passed through it unscathed, mainly from the reports of the time remaining secret; and also from the natural feelings as to past troubles entertained during subsequent calm, the restoration of peace in that quarter of India seems now lightly thought of, and to my surprise it is even considered doubtful, whether the troops employed have any claim to the Indian medal.

5. I care little myself for these sorts of things, but the soldier generally covets them, and, when he believes himself entitled thereto, expects the general, or other superior officer he served under, to urge his claim.

6. Knowing how entirely the disturbances in the S. M. country were part and parcel of the general rebellion that commenced on the other side of India, I took it for granted the medal would be given as a matter of course to all who withstood rebels in arms, on the preparation by their respective commanders, of medal rolls, and I left India without preferring any formal application on their behalf.

7. Whilst in Europe, I chanced to look at a Parliamentary Paper, viz., a Return of officers distinguished for good service in the Persian Campaign and Indian Mutinies, &c., and to my astonishment found myself entered blank for India, the military distinction conferred on me by Her Most Gracious Majesty made to appear as given for Persia, neither were the officers recommended by me for their services named.

8. I complained of the omission to the Secretary of State for India in Council, and was told on leaving England (end of last September) that the subject had been referred to the Governor General of India. In this correspondence I urged the claim of the troops under me to a medal, as I was given to understand that amongst others neither the 4th Troop of Horse Artillery nor the 2d Regiment European Light Infantry, were entered for it.

9. After reaching India and before my retirement, I twice applied to the Adjutant General's Department for information on the subject, and had an interview with his Excellency the Commander in Chief to press the claim; the Deputy Adjutant General informed me, "my claim with that of others had been forwarded to the Supreme Government, but that no reply had yet been received." Sir William Mansfield was unaware of any reference to this Government consequent on that above mentioned to the Governor General, but appeared disposed to view the events of 1857–58 on this side of India as purely local, and not, therefore, giving grounds for the medal; he compared them to some outbreak in the north of India, put down by Sir Sydney Cotton, which had been authoritatively decided to have been purely local, and the medal for the troops consequently withheld.

10. Sir William's opinion of the purely local nature of the crisis of 1857–58 on the Bombay side of India can only be attributed to his engagement in the larger transactions going forward on that of Bengal, which dwarfed and rendered ours of small account; but that they did not equal the dangers there encountered, is owing as much to our seaboard position, and to the timely precautions and vigorous measures taken by the Bombay Government, as to other causes, and it is a question of high State policy how far it is wise to depreciate the value of such measures by refusing military rewards for them.

11. There is abundant evidence before Government which his Excellency cannot of course know, proving the mutiny of the late 27th Regiment Native Infantry at Kolapoor, and the insurrectionary movements throughout the S. M. country, to have been stimulated by the mutineers and rebels of the Bengal side; to assert, therefore, that these disturbances were simply local is clearly a mistake, and to deny the medal on such grounds would be an injustice that I am confident the Bombay Government would never sanction.

12. Indeed, I am informed that, for one alone of these outbreaks, that of Shorapoor, and by no means the most serious one, the Indian medal has been awarded, whilst it has been refused to the troops employed against the Sawunt rebels; if this be so, I beg respectfully to observe, that it must have arisen from a misunderstanding of facts, the claim of the Goa Frontier Field Force to the medal on the score of connection with the general rebellion, is equal to that of the Shorapoor Force, whilst in every other respect, fighting, exposure, personal losses and sufferings, and duration of time, it is so much greater, that no comparison can be instituted between them.

13. It is now between four and five years ago that I was risking life and honour, sleeping for months, when sleeping at all, under arms; and I am now finally leaving India with a constitution thoroughly shattered, ignorant whether I am considered deserving of the medal or not, and whether the stigma of having my name entered blank in the Parliamentary Return is or not to be removed, I humbly conceive that a Supplementary Return should be framed to include all officers whom the several Governments might think it just to bring to notice for good military work done againt rebels and mutineers.

14. I am naturally desirous of being righted, and I feel that 40 years devoted to my country mainly in situations of trust and responsibility, during which I have received hard blows, warrant my asking the aid and protection of the Government I have so long served.

15. I was informed at the India Office, that the reason for the omission I complained of was my work being considered chiefly political; and I further understood it was owing to the absence of published despatches, and of any full report from this Government in the Military Department, of the work done by my force. State reasons, I conclude,

kept the Despatches unpublished; it was in keeping with Lord Elphinstone's policy of working secretly and without show, through the telegraph and by demi-official. I was not even gazetted to the charge of the S. M. country;* how the other point may be I know not, but my reports to the Adjutant General of the difficulties the troops had to overcome, of the fight at the Paga, of the disarming of the mutineers, and their execution in large numbers of the warlike and feverish state of the country, and of the way in which the rebellion was trampled out, could scarcely have been considered unworthy of notice.

16. The late Commander in chief thanked me in the most cordial manner for the way in which "I had upheld the honour of the Army, showing what gallantry and prudence could effect in the face of the greatest difficulties." I was directed to convey his "warmest acknowledgments to the troops under me," and "to assure the officers I had named that they would not be forgotten, &c."

17. General Lester, who commanded the division,† wrote to me "in all things you have done admirably," but he more especially referred to my treatment of the 27th Regiment.

18. The Governor General viewing the threatening state of the country, after the political agent's head had been hung over a rebel gateway, authorised my promotion to brigadier general, and there must have been some good soldier's work done, and more expected of me, ere the Local Government with whom it rested, would thus have honoured me.

19. Lord Elphinstone, with reference to the suppression of the Kolapoor insurrection, telegraphed to me: "I admire the vigor and promptitude of your proceedings," and in his Minute supported by the Governor General's published in "London Gazette," of 29th November 1859, speaks of my services having been inadequately rewarded by the military honour previously conferred on me. Lord Canning was pleased to thank me by direct communication, it is true, that my double functions are here blended together, but these were of incalculable benefit in diminishing the need of sheer force, and in employing it when required at the proper moment.

20. I should make a long list, were I to continue quotations, nor with the facts known to this Government, can I think them needed; it is difficult to reconcile these opinions and these facts with the denial of military services in the State Paper referred to, and with this demur about the medal, and I rely on the support of Government on both points, for I ask no favour, but simply justice for myself and those under me.

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From Colonel *G. Le Grand Jacob*, Retired List, late Political Commissioner, S. M. country, &c., &c., and Brigadier General Commanding Troop in the Kolapoor, Sawuntwaree, Rutnagherry, Tasgaum, and Sanglee Districts, to Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department; dated Bombay, the 29th March 1862.

As the time for my finally quitting India draws nigh, when any appeal must elsewhere be addressed, I feel more and more anxious that the one made to you on the 25th ultimo, should not miscarry from insufficient explanation, I beg, therefore, permission to add a few words.

2. Her Majesty's warrant grants the India medal to "all engaged in operations against the rebels or mutineers," even to non-military persons under conditions stated.‡

3. The troops under me were so engaged, both regular and irregular, line and local, and the value of military operations can best be tested by the celerity and completeness with which a troubled country is brought into order.

4. The treatment of the 27th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, from the time of its mutiny to its being struck off the Army, formed one of the many critical operations that were successfully carried through during the Indian crisis; the conspiracy that fed the mutiny had its roots deep in the country.

5. Under the instructions of the Secretary of State published in General Order above quoted, medal rolls were doubtless forwarded at the time, and I concluded that it is from authority elsewhere, not from this Government, that objections have arisen. I cannot suppose the present Government would cancel any recommendations then made, but I am ignorant of their§ extent, and being in Europe when these rolls were framed, my object is now to show how justly the troops engaged in the S. M. country and below Ghât operations are entitled

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* Colonel Melville, the late military secretary, in consequence, refused to acknowledge it; but, as no public inconvenience accrued, I did not, at such a time, think it worth a reference.

† During the crisis I was ordered to correspond direct with head quarters, but I sent duplicates of most letters to General Lester.

‡ *Vide* G. C O. of Bombay, No. 543, dated 16th June 1859, re-publishing G. O. by Government of India, No. 733, of 20th May 1859.

§ The Deputy Adjutant General's letter of 6th December last, informed me that my name had been included. I also found it registered for the medal at the India House.

entitled to the medal, and to remove the objections that have left the matter undecided; and I would urge that none should be omitted, who, in carrying out these operations, opposed rebels or mutineers in arms.

6. The line drawn on the other side of India, when our present Commander in Chief was chief of Lord Clyde's staff, created, I believe, a distinction whereby the S. M. country disturbances under the term local, were deemed unconnected with rebels or mutineers of 1857-58; but Government is well aware that they were so connected, indeed, viewing the critical state of the country, and the importance of prompt suppression of the first rebellious movement, its political importance would assign a clasp to the re-capture of Kolapoor. The dilly dallying at Samungur* in 1844, entailed the need of a large army for the Kolapoor State alone.

7. On my coming away ill, the then Commander in Chief did me the honour to call personally to thank me, and to express the high sense he entertained of what I had done. The idea of the medal being withheld from the troops under me, or of their not being considered on field service, never entered my head until I saw, when travelling last year in Italy, the Parliamentary Return before alluded to, and one of the motives that brought me for a while back to India, was that I might claim the aid of this Government in obtaining recognition of service, which its chief, civil, and military had acknowledged, but which was elsewhere denied or doubted, or misunderstood.

8. No doubt the union of political and military control, and the unusual power entrusted to me by both the Governor and Commander in Chief,† saved a deal of bloodshed, though there was quite enough to stamp the spots of 1857-58 in the memories of the people. The two local corps, moreover, admirably commanded, did important service; but to say nothing of myself, is it just to the regular troops to depreciate their services, because of the successful issue of my double functions?

9. There cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose that the European troops under me were not on field service; they were suddenly hurried from Sind to Kolapoor; underwent great hardship in getting there,‡ and most harassing work afterwards. Full field establishments and equipments of every kind were kept up even after I had reported they might be dispensed with; we were ready to move anywhere in an hour's notice, and for a considerable period to turn out ready for action in a few minutes. Yet, judging by the reply given me at the India Office, this mistake has arisen, and I prefer this appeal, in order that it may be removed, feeling confident that Government will not refuse such a mere act of justice.

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(No. 311).

REPORT on the Services of Colonel *Le Grand Jacob*, C.B., during the Disturbances at Kolapoor, in the Years 1857 and 1858.

COLONEL LEGRAND JACOB held the appointment of Political Agent in Kutch, in the year 1856, but being desirous of going on the Persian Campaign, was appointed to command a light battalion formed for service with that expedition, and proceeded to Persia early in 1857; shortly after the conclusion of peace with Persia, Colonel Jacob was especially appointed to command at Kolapoor, and investigate the circumstances connected with the mutiny of the 27th Regiment Native Infantry, and was subsequently appointed Political Commissioner in the Kolapoor and adjacent districts, with the temporary rank of Brigadier General.

The 27th Regiment Native Infantry mutinied on the 31st July 1857. Colonel Jacob reached Kolapoor on the 14th August, at which time all active operations against the mutineers, including the attack on the Paga by Lieutenant Kerr, had ceased. On the 16th August some European troops arrived, and the 27th Regiment was disarmed without any show of resistance.

Colonel Jacob's investigations were then commenced, and many military trials and executions of the mutineers took place.

On the 6th December 1857, a few rebels of the Kolapoor State made a disturbance in the city, two miles from camp, and held some of the gates.

The troops were turned out by Colonel Jacob; one of the gates was blown open without opposition; a few insurgents were killed; and the military held possession of the town for some time; there were no casualties amongst the troops.

Colonel

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* A much weaker fort than Kolapoor.

† The first gave me *carte blanche*. The second gave the power of an officer commanding a field force beyond the frontier.

‡ Such a risk as that of disembarking where they did in the height of the monsoon had never before been incurred.

Colonel Jacob mentions the names of the following officers as having done good service:—

Major Schneider, commanding local corps.
Lieutenant Holberton, commanding Horse Artillery.
Captain Thompson, 2d European Regiment Light Infantry, Acting Staff Officer.
Lieutenant Scott, 2d European Regiment Light Infantry, commanding 50 rank and file of his regiment.

The above gives all the information in possession of this department of Colonel Jacob's political services at Kolapoor; the steps which he took to put down rebellion would be more fully known in the Political Department; no further military operations took place under that officer.

Lord Stanley's Despatch, No. 40 of 17th December 1858.

For the above services Colonel Jacob received the decoration of the Bath.

None of the troops that arrived at Kolapoor after the taking of the Paga on the 10th August, received the medal, as it was not considered that the nature of their services entitled them to it.

(signed) *T. Stock*, Lieut. Col.
Acting Adjut. Genl. of the Army.

Adjutant General's Office, Poona,
17 January 1862.

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MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, dated 22 March 1862.

NOT having been in Bombay when the events took place to which Colonel Jacob, C.B., alludes, I can only be guided by the Report of the Adjutant General, which is prepared from the documents existing in his office.

It certainly appears to me that Colonel Jacob's appeal hardly comes within the definition laid down by the Government of India, on account of which the forces under Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B., in Peshawur, which destroyed a number of rebellious sepoys, and pursued the remnants of disaffected regiments out of cantonments, was, if I recollect rightly, denied the medal. The same decision also being made to affect Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain, C.B., who disarmed a mutinous regiment at Mooltan, when resistance was expected, but warded off by precaution.

I had always great doubts about the propriety of granting the medal to Colonel Malcolm's force, about which a good deal of correspondence took place.

I should think the question might be made to hinge on the fact of no one being either killed or wounded on our side after Colonel Jacob took command at Kolapoor, which, if the insurgents had arms in their hands, is a tolerably conclusive proof that they did not use them. If, on the other hand, the insurgents were not armed, the grant of the medal is absolutely forbidden under the orders of the Government of India.

I conceive that great as the political and judicial ability and rigour may be in stamping out the smouldering embers of a rebellion, that there are things apart from military action, for which alone I apprehend the medal to have been granted.

Much as I desire to further Colonel Jacob's views, I cannot help inclining to the opinion that the former character, viz., a judicial and political stamping out of rebellion, when there was no positive overt resistance is the one which belongs to his career at Kolapoor, such is of course quite compatible with the display of military vigilance and arrangement to guard against surprise and outbreak of the nature described by him.

I should mention that although the force under Sir Sydney Cotton did not obtain the medal, he himself received the K.C.B., and, I think, the thanks of Parliament for his conduct in very trying circumstances at Peshawur. This appears to me to complete the parallel with Colonel Jacob's case.

(signed) *W. R. Mansfield.*

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(No. 248.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *H. W. Norman*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Adjutant General of the Army (No. 456); dated Fort William, the 12th May 1862.

Consultation, December 1861, No. 936. Letter from Military Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 1165, dated April 1862, with enclosures.

I AM directed to transmit the correspondence noted in the margin, relative to a complaint preferred by Colonel LeGrand Jacob, C.B., late of the Bombay Army, that although his name was mentioned as having served in Persia in a Return to the House of Commons of officers whose services in Persia and on field service during the rebellion in India had been brought to the notice of superior authority, yet no mention was therein made of his services in India during the rebellion, nor of those of the officers who then served under him, whom he had recommended to superior authority, and for whom he claims the Indian medal, which he has reason to believe has not been awarded to them.

2. In requesting that his Excellency the Commander in Chief may be moved to favour Government with his opinion as to the claims to mention in the Return to the House of Commons,

Commons, and to the India medal preferred by Colonel Jacob on his own behalf, and that of the four officers mentioned by him, I am directed to observe that the names of Colonel Jacob and three of the officers were in the list of those who were recommended by the Government of Bombay (*see* Extract annexed), and on whose cases the opinion of the late Commander in Chief, Lord Clyde, was communicated in letter from the Officiating Adjutant General, No. 1001, dated 3d August 1859; and his Lordship's opinion on the claim to the medal preferred by the fourth of these officers, Captain Schneider, was contained in the Officiating Adjutant General's letter, No. 1259, dated 9th September following.

3. The return of the original enclosures with your reply is requested.

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EXTRACT—Fort William, Military Proceedings for August 1862.

(No. 374).

From Lieutenant Colonel *E. B. Johnson*, C.B., Officiating Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 485, dated Head Quarters, Simla, the 23d June 1862).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 456, of the 12th ultimo, transmitting for the opinion of the Commander in Chief, correspondence relative to a complaint preferred by Colonel Le Grand Jacob, C.B., late of the Bombay Army, that in a Return to the House of Commons, of officers whose services in Persia and on field service during the rebellion in India had been brought to the notice of superior authority, neither his own name, although included for service in Persia, nor those of the officers who had served under him, whom he had recommended to superior authority, were included in the Return for service during the rebellion in India, and that they had not received the India medal which he claims for them.

2. In reply, I am directed to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council that, after a careful consideration of the grounds on which Colonel Jacob prefers his claim, the Commander in Chief entirely concurs in the view taken by his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir W. Mansfield on the subject, as recorded in his Minute dated 22d March 1862, and, for the reasons therein stated, his Excellency is unable to support Colonel Jacob's claim.

3. The enclosures of your letter under reply are herewith returned, as requested.

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(Military, No. 1.)

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 8 January 1863.

PARA. 1. I HAVE considered in Council the correspondence transmitted in paragraph 1 of your letter dated 22d August last, No. 304, regarding the claim of the troops under Colonel Le G. Jacob, C.B., to the India medal, on account of services performed at Kolapore in 1857.

2. It is the opinion of your Government, and of the Commander in Chief of India and Bombay, that the services rendered do not fulfil the conditions laid down and approved by Her Majesty's Government for the bestowal of the medal.

3. These conditions included all "soldiers who shall have been in actual conflict with the enemy, or who formed part of a force in position, and therefore have indirectly taken a share in an operation actually in progress, requiring the presence of such force."

"It was likewise stated that this rule was to include all stations where open armed resistance had been made by mutineers, but was not to include those where there was no such open armed resistance."

"The rule was to comprehend all officers and men who had been engaged in the late campaign in the open field, excepting those who, from any cause whatever, had not been in actual conflict with the enemy."

4. It is clear from the report of the acting Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, dated 17th January 1862, and from other official records now before me, that open armed resistance "was made by the mutineers at the station of

Kolapore, that a series of military operations was undertaken against that portion of the mutinous regiment which deserted with their arms, and that the Government of India, on a former occasion, considered that the detachment of the 2d European Infantry, forming part of Colonel Jacob's force, although not brought into actual conflict with the mutineers," did yet, "by their presence at the Phounda Ghât, prevent them from descending into the low lands, and thus, directly, take a share in the operations in progress," and that they had, therefore, a valid claim to the medal.

5. It was with great reluctance that Her Majesty's Government felt themselves precluded, at that period, from acceding to the favourable recommendation of the Government of India, on behalf of this detachment, on the ground that they were not brought into actual conflict with the enemy; but it now appears that, subsequently to the services performed at the Phounda Ghât, the condition was fulfilled.

6. On the 16th December 1857, a body of insurgents, in connection with the brother of the Rajah, Chemma Sahib, took possession of the gates of the town of Kolapore, and came into actual conflict with the force of General Jacob, on which occasion several of the insurgents were killed and some of the British troops were wounded, and when, but for the prompt and energetic measures adopted by Colonel Jacob, and the gallantry of the troops under his command, a serious and widely-extended insurrection might have spread throughout the southern Mahratta country.

7. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government consider that the letter and the spirit of the conditions for obtaining the medal have been fulfilled, and that it is only a fitting acknowledgment of the services rendered by Colonel Jacob and the troops under his command, at a period of great danger to the State, that their claim should be admitted.

8. You will accordingly issue directions for the preparation and early transmission of medal rolls for the troops engaged under the orders of Brigadier General Jacob, at Kolapore, on the 6th December 1857.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Charles Wood.*

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EXTRACT BOMBAY MILITARY LETTER, dated 12 November 1863, No. 103.

12th. REFERRING to the concluding para. of your Despatch to his Excellency the Governor General of India, No. 1, dated 8th January last, we beg to transmit the accompanying medal rolls of the troops who served under Brigadier General Le Grand Jacob at Kolapore in 1857, and who have been declared entitled to the India mutiny medal.

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ABSTRACT of MEDAL ROLLS referred to in Bombay Military Letter, dated 12 November 1863, para. 12.

KOLAPORE FORCE.

Colonel George Le Grand Jacob, 31st Native Infantry, Commanding.

D Battery. 4th Brigade Royal Horse Artillery:

Lieutenant F. N. Holberton.
Assistant Surgeon G. C. Bell.
Apothecary—Thomas Rourke, 28th Foot.
55 European non-commissioned, and rank and file.
13 Natives.
Supplementary Roll—7 European non-commissioned, and rank and file.

2d Bombay European Regiment:

Lieutenant Colonel E. A. Guerin.
Captain C. K. Hervey.
Lieutenant J. A. Gazer.
Lieutenant F. Warden.
Assistant Surgeon Brigstock.
106 Non-commissioned, and rank and file.

18th Brigade Royal Artillery:

25 Non-commissioned, and rank and file.
1 Native.

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EXTRACT MILITARY LETTER to Bombay, dated 24 February 1864, No. 21.

Para. 13. THE medal rolls of the troops who served under Brigadier General Jacob, at Kolapore, in 1857, will be acted upon.

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(No. 38 of 1864.—Military Department.)

To Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, India Office, London.

Right Honourable Sir, Bombay Castle, 1 July 1864.

IN connexion with the correspondence regarding the claim of the force employed at Kolapore in 1857, under Major General (then Brigadier General) Le Grand Jacob to the India medal, concluded by your Despatch to the Governor General, No. 1, dated 8th January 1863, Major General Jacob has addressed the accompanying letter to our Government under date 25th February last, requiring decision on the two following points:—

1st. The claim of the Goa Frontier Field Force to the Indian medal.
2dly. His own claims to personal distinction.

2. As respects the first claim, it seems from the 3d para. of Major General Jacob's letter, that it has been admitted, and that the medal has been granted to the principal part of the force which belonged to the Madras Presidency, but that a portion of that field force was a body of civil troops under Major General Jacob as Civil Commissioner, and placed by him under the Commander of the Madras Force. Consequently, we have applied through the Madras Government for the opinion of the Commander of the Force on the claim, and no further notice of this part of Major General Jacob's letter is at present necessary.

3. On the second point, Major General Jacob's specific request is, that the India Office Return of 18th February 1861, may be corrected (*see* 12th para. of his letter); but the 6th to 9th paras. of his letter must be regarded as a complaint of inadequate recognition of his military service.

4. As a matter of fact, the India Office Return appears to be correct. Major General Jacob evidently supposes (*see* 8th para. of his letter) that Sir Henry Somerset forwarded the Despatch reporting the capture of Kolapoor with laudatory notice, and if this had been so, the return would have been incorrect. We append a copy of the letter from the Adjutant General's Office, forwarding the Despatch.

5. In reply to that Despatch, Lord Elphinstone's Government complimented Major General Jacob highly by letter, but no report was made to the Supreme Government or to the Secretary of State. Major General Jacob attributes this to a policy of secrecy; and on this point, and on the substantial merits of Major General Jacob's claim to honorary distinction, we submit the accompanying memo. by the Honourable Mr. Anderson, who was Secretary in the Political and Secret Departments during the rebellion, and a Minute by his Excellency Sir Bartle Frere, and commend the matter to the favourable attention of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(signed) *H. B. E. Frere.*
*W. R. Mansfield.*
*W. E. Frere.*
*J. D. Inverarity.*

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From Major General *G. L. Jacob*, Retired List, Bombay Establishment, to Lieutenant Colonel *W. F. Marriott*, Military Secretary to Government, Bombay; dated Bonchurch, Isle of Wight, 25 February 1864.

Sir,

I HAVE only now heard that medal rolls for the Kolapoor force have been received from Bombay, pending which information I delayed addressing you with reference to Major Merewether's letter, No. 83, of 10th January 1863. I beg to express my regret that in pointing out the inaccuracies of the Acting Adjutant General's statement of my services,* my language should be viewed as partaking of disrespect to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, none having been intended, it did not occur to me it might bear this construction. I trust a simple statement of facts will be free from this objection, and as my letter of the 17th November 1862 has in consequence thereof not been recorded, whilst Colonel Stock's report remains as an authoritative document, I avail myself of the permission to again address you, to transmit a list of corrections freed from other remark, hoping that its accuracy may be tested by the reports of the time,† and leaving it to his Excellency the Governor in Council to take whatever notice of it he may think fit.

* No. 311, dated 17th January 1862.

† Especially that on the capture of Kolapoor, dated 11th December 1857.

2. In my letters to you of the 25th February and 29th March 1862, unaware of what had then been said of me or I should have written more to the point, I urged three claims.

I. Right of the Kolapoor Force to the Indian medal.
II. That of the Goa Frontier Field Force to it.
III. Recognition of Military Services.

The first claim, whether as held to comprise the rest, or from whatever cause, has alone been decided, the two others have not been noticed, I therefore, most respectfully solicit the decision of Government upon them.

3. I will briefly state the grounds on which they are made; if it be said relative to the Goa Frontier Field Force that the claim should be preferred by the officer commanding it, I beg to say that a considerable portion consisted of civil troops under me as Political Commissioner, and all were latterly placed under the Madras commander, whose instructions when ordered to meet me at Goa‡ were, to assume command in case of my not taking it up, but as Brigadier Fitzgerald cordially co-operated with me, I thought it better to avoid the complications that my doing so would have created. This officer felt it his duty to report only to his own Presidency, and hence in all probability the absence of similar notice by the Bombay authorities to that taken by the Government and Commander in Chief of Madras on the dissolution of the force. Their troops have in consequence received the Indian medal, but no one who knows the whole history of the campaign will think their brethren of the sister Presidency less deserving of it.

‡ November 1856.

4. Applications for the medal were made by Captain Hewett, latterly commanding the Bombay detachments,‖ and rejected by his Excellency the present Commander in Chief for the reasons assigned in respect to the Kolapoor claim, but the decision on Sir Sydney Cotton's claim, held to oppose it forms no precedent for the Goa Frontier Field Force; and the telegram from the Supreme Government, dated 25th September 1862, replying to reference on this subject from your department, distinctly points out that each claim must rest on its own merits, according to which some of the Peshawar force would appear by this very telegram to have received the medal.

‖ And I believe by others.

5. A statement of the case has only to be made to prove that the Goa Frontier Field Force comes under the provisions regulating the grant of the medal. The insurgents were connected with the general rebellion of 1857–58, they fought and collected revenue in Nana Sahib's name as the Peshawa, they rejected the shelter, and held high language with the Portuguese Government in virtue thereof, and they offered a prolonged armed resistance commencing early in March and ending in November 1858.

6. I now advert to the claim for recognition of military services with reference to the Parliamentary Return, dated India Office, 18th February 1861. It is painful to me to reflect after all that I underwent and what I succeeded in doing during the trying period of 1857–58, that my services as well as those of others should be thus officially denied, of officers whom I was directed by the Commander in Chief warmly to thank and to assure that they would not be forgotten!

7. I have reason to know that the Secretary of State for War has opposed all recommendations regarding the Indian armies not reaching him through the channel of the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's forces in India, but at the time the services I refer to were performed, the local armies were under their own chiefs in subordination to their own Governments, to whom only their proceedings were by rule and usage reported. I submit for consideration whether national services of which the Government of Bombay was the constituted judge should be publicly ignored owing to change in the machinery of administration.

8. I have also reason to believe that had my Despatches, I will speak of one only, that on the capture of Kolapoor, 6th December 1857, been transmitted to the Supreme Government with his Excellency Sir Henry Somerset's opinion thereon, or been published in the Gazette, as scores of reports were of operations less important, my name and those of officers praised by the Commander in Chief would have been included in the India Office return above alluded to.

9. I have

9. I have always understood that none of my despatches were published consequent on the general policy of secrecy pursued by Lord Elphinstone's Government; the fire of rebellion was kept down by suppressing the knowledge of the existence of so much inflammable material, whilst local authorities were armed with the fullest powers to prevent its bursting out or to quench it; but the later consequences of his success could hardly have been anticipated by his Lordship, for if the approbation of his country be the chief reward of a statesman, here the reward is in inverse ratio to the success, this being turned into a reason for public denial of there having been any rebellion or mutiny to suppress.

10. It has been stated without contradiction in Parliament that there was no mutiny in the Bombay army, and a leading organ of public opinion maintains that there was neither mutiny nor rebellion in the Western Presidency, without so far as I know any one public writer or man either in Parliament or out of it correcting the error. "Edinburgh Review" for April 1863. Art. India under Lord Canning.

11. I respectfully submit for consideration whether it would be right for those cognisant of events, and whose official position enables them to speak with authority to share in this perversion of history by their silence, whenever fitting opportunity may occur for speaking out.

12. As a small step towards the re-establishment of truthful history, I pray that measures may be taken for correcting the error in the India House Return of 18th February 1861, whereby I am made to appear to have done nothing, and the recorded promise of the Commander in Chief is rendered a dead letter.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. L. Jacob,*
Major General.

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Enclosure to foregoing Letter.

STATEMENT of Facts reported on by the Acting Adjutant General, No. 311, date 17 January 1862.

| THE REPORT. | STATEMENT. |
|---|---|
| 1. "Colonel Jacob was especially appointed to command at Kolapore, and investigate the circumstances connected with the mutiny of the 27th Regiment N. I." | 1. I was especially appointed to quell the mutiny of the 27th Regiment, with the fullest powers, civil and military, that the Governor and Commander in Chief could give. Investigation into its causes and ramifications was a subsidiary duty. It must be remembered that this mutiny was the first wave that reached Western India of the great insurrection eastward. My command extended to Sawunt Waree and Rutnagerry; and, until order was restored, I was placed in direct communication with head-quarters. |
| 2. "And was subsequently appointed Political Commissioner in the Kolapore and adjacent districts." | 2. My appointment as Political Commissioner of Kolapoor and Sawunt Waree, and to command the troops, was simultaneously conferred. The Southern Maharatta Country was subsequently placed under my control, as also the southern districts of Rutnagerry. |
| 3. "With the temporary rank of Brigadier General." | 3. There was nothing in the order about temporary rank. |
| 4 & 5. "Colonel Jacob reached Kolapore on the 14th August, at which time all active operations against the mutineers, including the attack on the Paga by Lieutenant Kerr, had ceased." | 4. Active operations by the Sawunt Waree Local Corps continued for several months afterwards; that portion of the mutinous regiment that deserted with their arms, some 200 in number, commanded by Ramjee Sirsat, were marching on Rutnagerry, but finding themselves intercepted by the Europeans landing on the coast, one-fifth, all Purdesees, re-ascended the Ghats; four-fifths, with their leader, Ramjee Sirsat, chiefly Waree men, took to the jungles, where they were hunted down from cover to cover; and for the most part shot or captured.<br>5. Major Rolland commanded the attack on the Paga, re-occupied by the returned party above alluded to. Lieutenants Kerr and Ellis were the two officers who most distinguished themselves therein. |
| | 6 & 7. "On |

6 & 7. "On the 6th December, a few rebels of the Kolapore State made a disturbance in the city, two miles from camp, and held some of the gates."

6. The rebels in several hundreds, under command of an old servant of the State, named Feringoo, collected in the jungles of Geergam, a village 10 miles from camp; others came from Punallo under command of a well-known Chaoosh, whose name, I think, was Daoodjee. About 200 of these escaladed the town, and took possession of the gateways without opposition, nearly every armed man in the town only waiting the signal from Chimma Sahib to join them. I sent to sound the gateways, and found them in hostile possession; my only chance of success, therefore, was to force an entrance before the junction could be effected which the quiet surrender of the gates foretold. I therefore marched down silently in the dark to a rear gateway, making a show of attack on the main one opposite to camp. It should be remembered, further, that my scouts had brought me intelligence the previous day that the rebels intended to attack my camp that night. This prompt discomfiture of the rebel plans prevented this portion of the programme being carried out, those to whom it had been allotted retiring to their jungles.

7. All the gates of the town were in rebel possession.

8 & 9. "The troops were turned out by Colonel Jacob, one of the gates was blown open without opposition, a few insurgents were killed, and the military held possession of the town for some time. 'There were no casualties amongst the troops."

8. The above statement shows why the entrance was so easily gained. A few shots were fired on getting inside, but there were scarcely a dozen men in charge of this gate, who fled on the rush of the stormers.

9. Two men of the Kolapore Local Infantry were wounded, one of these in advance with Major Schneider, by a sabre-cut, whilst bayoneting a rebel. Captain Thompson was severely bruised and his horse injured at the gateway. Lieutenant Scott killed one of the enemy who was rushing on him.

10. "The above gives all the information in possession of this department of Colonel Jacob's political services at Kolapore. The steps which he took to put down rebellion would be more fully known in the political department; no further military operations took place under that officer."

10. This quotation follows the names of the officers praised in my report of 11th December 1857. The word "Political" is evidently an error of the pen for military. I regret to think that other soldier-like deeds, worthy of praise, may have been reported only in the Political Department, from their being done with civil troops, or preparatory to, and preventive of, military movement under my political control.

11. "None of the troops that arrived at Kolapore after the taking of the Paga, on the 10th August, received the medal, as it was not considered that the nature of their services entitled them to it."

11. So far from this being the case, medal rolls were sent direct to England on the first order, including my name, and I received a medal at the India House in consequence, to wear at Her Majesty's levee, to be exchanged when my name had been engraved on another; meanwhile a fresh order, directing rolls to be sent to the Governor General suspended issue. So late as the 6th December 1861, I was officially informed by the Deputy Adjutant General, in Letter No. 8485, that my name, with that of others claiming the medal, had been sent to the Supreme Government, but that no reply had been then received.

Dated Bonchurch, Isle of Wight, 25 February 1864.

*G. L. Jacob,* Major-General.

EXTRACT MEMORANDUM—Political Department.

THE chief secretary has the honour to state in reply to this reference, that the late Lord Elphinstone entertained a very high opinion of the value of Major General Jacob's services in Kolapoor and the Southern Murathà Country, in 1857–58. This opinion he very frequently stated to the chief secretary in conversation, and it found marked expression in his Lordship's Minute on the services of civil servants and military officers in civil employ during the mutinies. The chief secretary believes that some expression of this kind was employed: "The services of Major General Roberts and Colonel Jacob have been rewarded, in the latter case, I think, very inadequately, with the second and third class of the Bath."

2. With regard to silence, the chief secretary thinks Major General Jacob's statement is correct. The late Lord Elphinstone got through a great deal of the enormous work which pressed upon him from all sides, by notes and by oral communications. The chief secretary concurs with General Jacob in considering that Lord Elphinstone's policy was to put all the correspondence connected with the mutiny as much as possible in the Secret Department.

3. The chief secretary also feels it a duty to state, that had an officer of less promptitude and resolution than Major General Jacob been at Kolapoor during the mutinies of 1857, the result might have been very formidable. The chief secretary has served in the Southern Muratha Country, Kolapoor, and Sawant Waree, and he can testify that if outbreaks had not been very speedily stamped out, the whole country would have risen. Major General Jacob alludes to the siege of Samunghur in 1844; the chief secretary was then in political charge, and can well remember the effect upon the country of the miserable hesitation exhibited before that fort. The siege, of which at the distance of 20 years, it is difficult to speak without irritation, lasted for more than three weeks. The result was that all Kolapoor and all Sawant Waree rose, and the Government had to send 10,000 men to quell the insurrection. Had General Jacob been in command, he would have blown open the gate and have taken the fort on the day he first saw it.

4. It may be observed that General Jacob's services were rather political than military: this is perhaps true, but if the chief secretary may be allowed to say so, he would submit that they were political services rendered by a military officer, and they derived a greater value from this fact. The state of the country required not only an able man but a fighting man; and General Jacob's personal character had much to do with keeping down the turbulent and warlike races which inhabit Kolapoor and Sawant Waree.

*H. L. Anderson*, Chief Secretary.

2 June 1864.

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MINUTE by His Excellency Sir *Bartle Frere*, K.C.B., dated 6 June 1864.

THIS may now be sent to the Secretary of State. I can personally testify from communications with which I was honoured by the late Lord Elphinstone at the time to the high value which he placed on the services rendered by General Le Grand Jacob. I am unfortunately unable to refer to Lord Elphinstone's exact words, but I well remember that they attributed mainly to General Jacob's prompt action the suppression of the growing insurrection in the Southern Muratha Country. The cause of so little being on official record is, I think, correctly explained by Mr. Anderson.

*H. B. E. Frere.*

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(No. 8811.)

From the Acting Deputy Adjutant General, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay.

Head Quarters, Bombay,
Sir, 21 December 1857.

BY direction of the Commander in Chief, I have the honour to transmit, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, the enclosed letter, No. 261, dated the 11th instant, from Colonel Le Grand Jacob, on the subject of the recent insurrection at Kolapore.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. M. Glasse*, Major,
Acting Deputy Adjutant General.

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(Military, No. 133.)

To his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, Bombay.

Sir, India Office, London, 24 December 1864.

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council the Military Letter from your Government, dated 1st July, No. 38, with which you transmit a letter received from Major General Jacob, dated 25th February 1864.

2. The communications which have been received from Major General Jacob at different times embraced three points:—

1. The claim of the Kolapore Force to receive the India Mutiny Medal.
2. The claim of the Goa Frontier Field Force to be granted the same distinction.
3. His own personal claim to recognition of his services.

3. The claim of Major General Jacob, and of the force under his command engaged at Kolapore, to the medal has been admitted.

4. With respect to the Goa Frontier Force, you have sought further information from the Government of Madras, so that any notice on this point is not at present necessary.

5. On the third point, Major General Jacob complains of the omission of his name from the return of services of officers prepared at this office, and laid before Parliament on the 18th February 1861. Upon this, your Government observe that, as a matter of fact, the India Office return appears to be correct. Major General Jacob is under the impression that Sir Henry Somerset forwarded his despatch reporting the capture of Kolapore with laudatory notice, and if this had been so the return you state would have have been incorrect.

6. It appears by the letter of the Deputy Adjutant-General, dated 21st December 1857, transmitted by you, that the despatch of Colonel Jacob, on the subject of the insurrection at Kolapore, was sent to your Government without any expression of opinion on the part of the Commander in Chief.

7. In reply to a communication at that time received from him, General Jacob was informed, on the 21st June 1861, that the service rendered did not appear to come within the terms of the order of the House of Commons upon which the return in question was prepared.

8. Although no special recommendation was received from India, the services of Major General Jacob were not overlooked. At the instance of my predecessor, Lord Stanley, General Jacob was granted the Companionship of the Bath in March 1859, as a reward for his previous services, and particularly his recent services, civil and military, at Kolapore and Sawunt Warree.

9. It was upon the grant of this honour that Lord Elphinstone remarked, in the Minute recorded by him on the 18th August 1859, that Brigadier General Jacob had been appropriately, though inadequately, rewarded for his services in 1857.

10. The recommendations contained in this Minute were carefully considered with the recommendations received at the same time from the Governor General. The merits and claims of the officers named by Lords Canning and Elphinstone were fully recognised, but it was of course necessary to place a limit on the honours to be conferred. The services rendered had been of an extraordinary character, and it must be admitted that the extent of the rewards bestowed was commensurate with those services. Having due regard to the claims of other officers, it was felt that no further reward could be bestowed upon Major General Jacob.

11. Under these circumstances, I feel myself under the necessity of declining to re-open the question.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Charles Wood.*

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EXTRACT BOMBAY MILITARY LETTER, dated 24 January 1865, No. 7.

WE beg to transmit the accompanying supplementary India Mutiny medal roll of officers and soldiers of the late 2nd European Regiment Light Infantry, who served under Brigadier General Le Grand Jacob at Kolapore in 1857, together with copy of a letter from the Adjutant General, No. 99, dated 21st January, explaining why it was not forwarded with those submitted with para. 12 of our Despatch, No. 103, dated 12th November 1863.

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## 106TH LIGHT INFANTRY (LATE) 2D BOMBAY EUROPEAN REGIMENT LIGHT INFANTRY.

ROLL of CLAIMANTS for the Medal for Service during the recent Operations in India, Granted under the Provisions of Paragraph 8 of a Despatch from the Secretary of State for India, No. 1, dated India Office, London, 8 January 1863.

| No. | Regimental Number. | RANK AND NAMES. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | – | Captain | C. Thompson | – | Attached 4th N. I. Cadre 2d European L. I. |
| ,, | – | Lieutenant | S. Scott | – | Bombay Staff Corps. |
| ,, | – | ditto | E. S. Jervis | – | |
| ,, | 1,291 | Private | William Bosworth | – | |
| ,, | 2,382 | ditto | James Conway | – | |
| ,, | 1,434 | ditto | James Flemming | – | |
| ,, | 1,439 | ditto | Michael Gibbs | – | |
| ,, | 2,602 | ditto | Henry Jones | – | |
| ,, | 1,992 | ditto | Daniel Kelly | – | |
| 10 | 2,000 | ditto | William Law | – | |
| ,, | 2,516 | ditto | Alexander Lindsay | – | 106th Regiment Light Infantry. |
| ,, | 1,749 | ditto | Michael M'Manus | – | |
| ,, | 2,015 | ditto | James M'Kithnie | – | |
| ,, | 2,031 | ditto | John M'Carthy | – | |
| ,, | 2,012 | ditto | John Mahoney | – | |
| 16 | 1,276 | ditto | Henry Monk | – | |
| ,, | 2,170 | ditto | Peter Redmond | – | |
| ,, | 1,358 | ditto | William Robertson | – | |
| ,, | 1,775 | Sergeant | Peter Shannahan | – | |
| 20 | 2,174 | Private | Denis Sullivan | – | |
| ,, | – | Lieutenant | C. N. Grant | – | Deceased 25th March 1861. |
| ,, | 1,797 | Private | William Bishop | – | Discharged G.O.C., 6th October 1858. |
| ,, | 2,632 | ditto | Alexander Bryden | – | Deceased 20th January 1861. |
| ,, | 125 | ditto | Henry Cormack | – | Pensioned G.O.C., 25th April 1860. |
| ,, | 677 | ditto | Charles Corner | – | Discharged G.O.C., 383, 14th April 1860. |
| ,, | 127 | ditto | Daniel Collins | – | |
| ,, | 884 | ditto | Thomas Cooler | – | |
| ,, | 1,715 | ditto | Francis Cullerton | – | Pensioned 26th June 1863. |
| ,, | 2,095 | Sergeant | John Cox | – | ditto 29th December 1863. |
| 30 | 2,483 | Private | Edward Clohosey | – | Discharged G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 2,249 | ditto | Christopher Dowdall | – | Australia |
| ,, | 2,432 | ditto | John Dwyer | – | Pensioned G.O.C., 1067, 2d October 1860. |
| ,, | 207 | ditto | George Fitzpatrick | – | ditto. |
| ,, | 2,259 | ditto | John Fisher | – | Discharged G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 1,318 | ditto | John William Gibson | – | ditto 14th June 1859. |
| ,, | 2,442 | ditto | David Gunn | – | Deceased 20th June 1863. |
| ,, | 298 | ditto | James Houlham | – | Pensioned G.O.C., 5th May 1860. |
| ,, | 1,321 | Sergeant | Maurice Hartigan | – | ditto 9th June 1864. |
| ,, | 1,174 | Private | John Hobson | – | Discharged G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| 40 | 2,282 | ditto | Charles Houlding | – | Deceased 23d May 1859. |
| ,, | 2,364 | ditto | Patrick Hughes | – | Discharged G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 2,393 | ditto | Michael Hogan | – | |
| ,, | 2,284 | ditto | John Jones | – | |
| ,, | 1,993 | ditto | Thomas Kerrish | – | Deceased 1st June 1860. |
| ,, | 2,796 | ditto | William Kinnear | – | ditto 24th June 1858. |
| ,, | 1,999 | – | George Lock | – | Discharged G.O.C., 27th June 1859. |
| ,, | 2,003 | Bugler | George Linnet | – | ditto 11th October 1859. |
| ,, | 2,289 | Private | James Lee | – | Pensioned 27th May 1863. |
| ,, | 384 | ditto | John M'Notte | – | ditto G.O.C., 1067, 2d October 1860. |
| 50 | 418 | ditto | Ross Munro | – | ditto ditto 25th April 1860. |
| ,, | 1,754 | ditto | William Morris | – | Discharged G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 2,007 | ditto | John Mason | – | ditto 13th June 1863. |
| ,, | 2,019 | ditto | Bernard M'Donough | – | ditto 27th September 1859. |
| ,, | 2,020 | ditto | Bernard M'Grath | – | ditto 27th May 1863. |
| ,, | 2,249 | ditto | Peter M'Nair | – | ditto G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 2,307 | ditto | Charles M'Kennally | – | Deceased 4th March 1861. |
| ,, | 2,308 | ditto | William Middleton | – | Discharged 6th May 1863. |
| ,, | 2,213 | ditto | Arthur Murray | – | ditto G.O.C., 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 2,323 | ditto | John M'Cue | – | ditto ditto. |
| 60 | 792 | ditto | Thomas Murphy | – | Discharged G.O.C., 383, 14th April 1860. |
| ,, | 2,403 | ditto | John M'Donnell | – | Deceased 31st October 1860. |
| ,, | 1,274 | ditto | Thomas M'Menamy | – | Transferred to Artillery G.O.C., 25th August 1859. |
| ,, | 2,163 | ditto | William Nicholson | – | Discharged November 1860. |
| ,, | 468 | ditto | Patrick O'Rafferty | – | Pensioned G.O.C., 25th April 1860. |
| ,, | 1,762 | ditto | Terence O'Neil | – | Discharged 2d October 1863. |
| ,, | 494 | ditto | William Redman | – | ditto G.O.C., 5th May 1860. |
| ,, | 2,171 | Corporal | William Richards | – | ditto ditto, 601, 4th July 1859. |
| ,, | 502 | Colour Sergeant | Samuel Rose | – | ditto ditto 14th April 1860. |
| ,, | 2,173 | Sergeant | Matthew Sullivan | – | Deceased 19th June 1860. |
| 70 | 2,544 | Private | William Walker | – | Discharged 601, 4th July 1859. |

Suppression of the outbreak at Kolapoor on the night of the 6th December 1857, under Brigadier General LeGrand Jacob –

Nusseerabad,
12 December 1864.

*H. P. Syarne*, Major,
Commanding 106th Light Infantry.

(No. 99.)

From the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay, dated 2 January 1865.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to forward, for submission to his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, the accompanying supplementary Indian Mutiny Medal Roll of the late 2d European Regiment Light Infantry.

In submitting the previous rolls of officers and men of this Regiment claiming on account of services at Kolapore, the officer commanding considered that only those who were actually engaged in the suppression of the mutiny of the 27th Regiment Native Infantry should be included; but this appears to his Excellency decidedly erroneous, as the Secretary of State's decision on this case, as conveyed in Government resolution, No. 925, of the 30th March 1863, not only admits the claim of the detachment of the regiment who, "by their presence at the Phonda Ghât, directly took a share in the operations in progress," but granted the medal also to those of the regiment who were present at the attack of the town on the 6th December, and directed the preparation and transmission of medal rolls.

The roll now submitted is therefore intended to remedy the omission of these individuals from the original roll.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. H. Kirby*, Lieut. Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General, Bombay Army.

Adjutant General's Office, Head Quarters,
Poona, 2 January 1865.

# EAST INDIA (TROOPS AND POLICE).

COPY of all CORRESPONDENCE between th Government of *Bombay*, the Supreme Govern ment of *India*, and the India Office, relative t the Grant of the MEDAL to the TROOPS an POLICE employed in Suppressing the MUTIN and REBELLION in the BOMBAY PRESIDENCY

(*Mr. Adam.*)

Ordered, The House of Commons, *to be Printed*, 17 *May* 1865.

293.

*Under* 4 *oz.*

# ARMY (TROOPS FOR INDIA).

Ex. C.H.2
C.Y.M.47

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 8 June 1871; *–for*,

"RETURN of the AGES of the NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS and MEN of the following Regiments now under Orders for *India*, stating in Addition the Numbers between the Ages of 20 and 21, 21 and 22, viz., the 44th, 70th, 68th, and 48th Regiments."

| AGES. | 44th REGIMENT. | | | | | 70th REGIMENT. | | | | | 68th REGIMENT. | | | | | DEPÔT, 48th REGIMENT. | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Serjeants. | Drummers. | Corporals. | Privates. | TOTAL. | Serjeants. | Drummers. | Corporals. | Privates. | TOTAL. | Serjeants. | Drummers. | Corporals. | Privates. | TOTAL. | Serjeants. | Drummers. | Corporals. | Privates. | TOTAL. |
| Under 18 years | – | 3 | – | 18 | 21 | – | 7 | – | 16 | 23 | – | 2 | – | 15 | 17 | – | – | – | 7 | 7 |
| From 18 to 19 years | – | – | – | 165 | 165 | – | 1 | – | 97 | 98 | – | 2 | – | 124 | 126 | – | – | – | 33 | 33 |
| From 19 to 20 years | – | 1 | – | 164 | 165 | – | 1 | – | 109 | 110 | – | 6 | – | 132 | 138 | – | – | – | 80 | 80 |
| From 20 to 21 years | – | 2 | – | 80 | 82 | – | 1 | 1 | 67 | 69 | – | 2 | 2 | 112 | 116 | – | – | – | 26 | 26 |
| From 21 to 22 years | – | 3 | 4 | 66 | 73 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 67 | 73 | – | 1 | 4 | 70 | 75 | – | 1 | – | 13 | 14 |
| From 22 to 25 years | 6 | 3 | 14 | 164 | 187 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 156 | 167 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 136 | 147 | – | – | 1 | 30 | 31 |
| From 25 to 30 years | 6 | 3 | 5 | 69 | 83 | 12 | 2 | 16 | 106 | 136 | 6 | – | 10 | 54 | 70 | – | – | – | 5 | 5 |
| From 30 to 35 years | 29 | 6 | 8 | 109 | 152 | 20 | 4 | 8 | 98 | 130 | 22 | 3 | 17 | 131 | 173 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 17 |
| From 35 to 40 years | 2 | – | 4 | 38 | 44 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 39 | 51 | 18 | 1 | 2 | 77 | 98 | 3 | – | 5 | 8 | 16 |
| From 40 to 50 years | 3 | – | 4 | 13 | 20 | 2 | – | 2 | 15 | 19 | 1 | – | – | 11 | 12 | – | – | – | 1 | 1 |
| Upwards of 50 years | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 46 | 21 | 39 | 886 | 992 | 47 | 19 | 40 | 770 | 876 | 49 | 21 | 40 | 862 | 972 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 211 | 230 |

Adjutant General's Office, Horse Guards, 20 June 1871.

*Richard Airey*, Adjutant General.

War Office,
22 June 1871.

EDWARD CARDWELL.

# ARMY (TROOPS FOR INDIA).

RETURN of the Ages of the Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the following Regiments now under Orders for *India*, stating the Numbers between the Ages of 20 and 21, 21 and 22, viz., the 44th, 70th, 68th, and 48th Regiments.

(*Colonel North.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
23 *June* 1871.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society
CLASS

# EAST INDIA (OFFICERS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 1 June 1869;—*for*,

"COPY of a LETTER written by General Lord *Hill* to the President of the Board of Control, dated the 25th day of March 1834, with reference to the relative Position of the ROYAL OFFICERS and those of the late Honourable EAST INDIA COMPANY."

War Office, 7 June 1869.

EDWARD CARDWELL, Secretary.

My dear Mr. Grant, Horse Guards, 25 March 1834.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 31st January, transmitting, in reference to my official letters of the 31st December 1832, 19th January 1833, and 10th January 1834, two series of propositions, suggested with a view to overcome certain evils alleged to exist on the promotion of the higher ranks of the Company's Army; the one series purporting to emanate from the chairman and deputy chairman, and to be an amendment upon the other.

Having given the whole of the matter contained in these several propositions, and in your observations upon them, my most deliberate attention, and having looked into the voluminous mass of correspondence that has taken place on the subject of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the King's and Company's officers since 1796, I now beg leave to lay before you the following as the result of my best consideration.

The regulations which govern the promotion of officers in both Services in India have been framed, from time to time, under the joint consideration of the Court of Directors and the Commander in Chief for the time being; and, although it has not been practicable to prevent the occurrence of some cases of individual hardship, yet every such case has been rectified, as it might best be, when duly brought forward, without any material departure from the general principles under which the promotion in both services has hitherto been governed.

There cannot be any doubt, and in every discussion upon the point it has been fully admitted, that the King's troops employed in India are an auxiliary force; but it is equally true that it is the duty of the officer entrusted with the command of the King's forces to take care that, whatever arrangement may be made for the advancement and advantage of the Company's officers, the fair claims of the officers of the King's Army are equally considered, in a just participation of all matters regarding military rank, pay, and allowances, whether in garrison or in the field.

The difficulties which have always occurred, and which now again present themselves, to any arrangement that shall give unqualified satisfaction to the officers of both Services, are to be found in the difference of principle under which the system of promotion is respectively governed in each.

In the Army of the East India Company the promotion takes place by seniority, and consequently in an army of so large a size, few, if any, officers can attain to the rank of Major General until after a very protracted period of service in the subordinate ranks, and when they have reached an age which nearly disqualifies them for active employment; while in the King's Army, under a system of promotion wholly different, that rank has hitherto been

attained after a service of less duration, and at a time of life considerably less advanced.

It was in the hopes of removing some part of this inconvenience that the whole system of promotion of both Services underwent a full reconsideration in 1828–9; and it was then agreed that every Lieutenant Colonel of the East India Company's Service, who should at that time be commandant of a regiment of Cavalry or Infantry, or battalion of Artillery or Engineers, should be allowed the rank of colonel by brevet in the territorial possessions of the Company, and that every Lieutenant Colonel who should in future be appointed commandant of a regiment or battalion, be also promoted at the same time to the rank of colonel in India; and in order to provide for the interests of the officers of the King's Army in India, and to take care that their fair claims should not be passed over on such particular occasions, that the local rank of Colonel by brevet should be granted to any Lieutenant Colonel who should be superseded by a junior officer of the Company's Service on his nomination to the command of a regiment or battalion serving in the same Presidency.

It was also provided that the officers of the Company's Army should be allowed to participate in the advantages enjoyed by the King's officers for distinguished services in the field, and this is the regulation which now obtains with respect to the points of promotion under consideration.

The very slow rate of promotion under the system of seniority in the Company's Service is now felt in a nearly if not an equal ratio in the King's Army, although arising from a different cause, the continuance of peace for a period of 20 years; so that the Lieutenant Colonels date back to the year 1814, and the Majors to the same year; and it must be evident that no change of regulation could be acquiesced in by me which could have the effect either of superseding or of deteriorating the interests of the King's officers under such discouraging circumstances.

The nature of the different Services necessarily occasions a diversity in the rates of promotion of the officers of each Service respectively; and the employment of the King's Army, dispersed as it is over all parts of the world, consisting as it does of individuals of all classes and descriptions, liable as it is to perpetual variation of numbers and establishments, and to the system of promotion by purchase and sale, renders all comparison between the rates of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the officers of the King's Army with the rate of promotion to the same rank of the officers of any other Army quite useless.

The object of every regulation on the subject of promotion, in regard to the officers of the two Armies, ought therefore to be, as it has ever been, to keep each officer in his relative position with his brother officers of both Services from this rank forwards; and it is a principle long admitted in the Military Service, and which should never on any account be departed from, that officers holding commissions of the same denominations ought to rank according to seniority of date of that commission.

Allowing every commendation to the Army of the East India Company, to the utmost extent to which its most zealous advocates can desire, and to which that Army has upon every occasion proved itself to be justly entitled, it has never been doubted that the safety of the European dominion in India depends essentially upon the gallantry, efficiency, reputation, honour, and spirit of the European officers and troops, and particularly those in His Majesty's service.

The Company's Army in India being in fact principals, and that of His Majesty being only auxiliaries, the officers of the Company's Army must necessarily possess many important advantages over those of the King; they naturally fill all the efficient appointments of the General Staff of the Army, and, with few exceptions, all the situations of emolument; and however brilliant may be the services of His Majesty's troops, and however necessary and indeed indispensable in every enterprise of importance, any effort to alter this relative position would only tend to establish it the more firmly, it being rooted in the nature of the political Government, in its separation from that of His Majesty, and in the nature of the service, of the language of the country, and of the climate.

But in whatever view this wide and important subject may be regarded, too much care cannot be taken to uphold, by every practicable and just measure, the spirit of the auxiliary Army, and under no possible circumstances can it ever

ever be permitted that an officer who may have distinguished himself at the head of one of His Majesty's regiments at an important moment should be superseded by one junior to himself in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, either as Colonel, or subsequently as Major General. Such act of supercession would be quite at variance with the settlement of 1796, and wholly inconsistent with every arrangement and regulation which have been subsequently established.

As a reference has not unfrequently been made to the system of promotion by seniority of the officers of the King's Artillery and Engineers, with a view of assimilating it to the system of seniority of promotion of the officers in the East India Company's Army, by which a Lieutenant Colonel becomes a Colonel on succeeding to that rank regimentally, it may be useful to observe in this place, that no just comparative inference can be drawn from this consideration, for the following reasons:

These services in the King's Army are confined exclusively to their own arm. It very rarely happens that a sufficient body of Engineers or of Artillery, is employed to give occasion for the active employment of an officer of the rank of Colonel. If the body of Artillery or of Engineers is large, the nature of the service of those arms, the horses and the matèriel which must be sent with that body, generally require the employment of a General Officer of those arms, and in all probability the service of such bodies of Artillery and Engineers would be with an army with which there would be numerous general officers of all ranks.

The supercession, therefore, by the officers of the Artillery and Engineers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of those of the Army of the Line in His Majesty's service cannot occasion frequent or even inconvenient collision, as would most undoubtedly be the case if the Lieutenant Colonels of the King's Army in India were to be superseded by the Lieutenant Colonels of the Company's regiments of Artillery and Engineers on their respective promotions regimentally to the command of corps.

The only safe and unerring principle on which the system of promotion can be soundly and justly regulated, as between the King's and the Company's officers in India, appears to be that which has been already alluded to, that under no possible circumstances can it be permitted that a Lieutenant Colonel in the King's Service should be superseded by one junior to himself in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel, or subsequently as Major General.

It must here be observed, that it was a direct violation of this principle that induced me to call your attention to the supersession of Colonel Thomas, of His Majesty's 20th Regiment, by Colonel Gilbert, of the Company's Service, an officer not only junior to Colonel Thomas in the army, and superseding him in military rank, but who, by such act of supersession was placed in the command of the division in which the regiment of Colonel Thomas was actually serving.

As this principle appears to be the only safe rule upon which, as General Commander in Chief, I can rest my conduct in the arrangement of all Regulations regarding the promotion of King's officers in India, I propose to adopt it as the foundation of the detailed discussions upon each of the propositions which you have forwarded.

There is one point in the propositions in each of the projects which must, however, be first adverted to, as it cannot be passed over without a more particular notice, and this is that in which it is proposed to give a Colonel of the King's Army a pecuniary consideration on his being withdrawn from active duty, to avoid a collision, or, in other words, to pay him for the endurance of a military degradation. In all that has been said throughout the voluminous discussions which have taken place upon the subject of military promotions in India since 1786, the ruling principle has been to uphold the position of the King's officers, that they might not suffer in any collision, of interests with the officers of the Company's Army in their character or military dignity, and thus to maintain them in the enjoyment of their full share of just and reasonable professional emoluments and advantages; but it could never be contemplated that the personal, pecuniary, and private interests of any individual should be sustained at the expense of the general and infinitely more important interests of the King's Military Service; and were this proposition to be adopted, that a Colonel of the King's Army could be withdrawn from active duty in favour of a junior Colonel in the Company's Army, and a sum of money paid to him as a compensation, the transaction could bear no other construction, in a profes-

sional sense, than that he had by such act consented to compromise the prospects of military honour and reputation for the immediate enjoyment of pecuniary advantage, and, instead of tending to uphold the character of the King's officers, it must have a direct tendency to the contrary, and to deteriorate them individually and collectively in the estimation of their profession and of their country.

The proposition that such Colonel so superseded should be allowed to remain in India until otherwise provided for is liable also to very great objections in another point of view, inasmuch as the one act of supersession in his individual case would be the cause of an act of injustice to the officers to whose prejudice he might hereafter be posted to a vacancy, and thus the usual and expected course of promotion, in so far, be impeded.

My object is exactly the same as that avowed by you, "To secure to the "officers of each Service their fair proportion of commands, and, in so doing, to "remove, in as far as may be practicable, a fruitful source of jealousy between "the two Services"; but this desirable end would not be attained by laying down any precise rule, regulating the exact proportion of General officers to each of the two Services, as such a rule would be very soon be found to clash with the military rank of the claimants at each successive promotion or brevet. This end, therefore, can only be secured through the judicious and impartial conduct of the local and higher authorities, and by a close adherence to the principle laid down in the foregoing part of this letter.

With regard to the first proposition, that the General Officers of the Company's Army shall be increased to 90 from a combined list of the senior Colonels of the several Presidencies, and that their commissions shall be of the same validity, and be issued and signed in the same manner as such commissions now are, it must be observed that this measure would be in practice a partial brevet granted to the East India Company's Colonels at the expense of the Colonels of His Majesty's Army; or, if it should also be intended to include those Colonels of equal rank in the King's Service, conformably to the principle above laid down, the practical effect must inevitably be that, as there would be a greater number of claimants for the same number of commands, the inconvenience now complained of by the clashing of the interests of the two Services would be increased in a proportionate ratio.

I must likewise remark that this proportion is brought forward at the moment the most unfavourable for its discussion, inasmuch as the officers of the King's Army appear generally to entertain the apprehension that in attention to the recent recommendation of the Committee of the House of Commons upon Navy and Army Appointments, the system of periodical brevets will no longer be resorted to, and consequently that those who have not yet attained the rank of General Officer have little chance of ever reaching it.

The second proposition, depending upon the decision of the first, it is not necessary to enter upon the discussion of it.

The third proposition states, "That the rank of Brigadier-General be con-"tinued to be conferred as at present, to enable the Indian Governments to fill "the Division Commands, &c."; and to this there does not appear to be any objection, provided it be always understood that no supersession of a King's Officer take place, as in the case of Colonel Thomas by Colonel Gilbert, already alluded to, the military principle in all armies being that a Colonel shall not upon the same service be superseded by a junior Colonel.

Upon the fourth proposition there does not appear to be any objection, as far as the King's Officers are concerned, that the rank of Colonel should be given to all Lieutenant Colonels in India, whenever a junior obtains that rank regimentally, but with this understanding, that when the number of Field Officers may be too small in camp or quarters, Colonels not commanding brigades will be placed on the Field Officers' roster, adhering, of course, to the regulation as it now stands, that all King's Lieutenant Colonels so superseded should receive the brevet of Colonel.

The fifth and sixth propositions, containing the arrangements for the compensation of the Colonels of the King's Service who may happen to be superseded by the effect of any regulation, having been already admitted to, it is unnecessary to say more than that I could not, upon any view of the matter, concur in them.

The

The seventh proposition, that the number of Brigadier Commands to be held by His Majesty's and the Company's Officers respectively be in the proportion of one of His Majesty's to four of the Company's does not appear objectionable, being considered in proportion to the relative strength of the two Armies.

In so far as the King's Officers are concerned, there does not appear to be any objection to the eighth proposition of the Chair, " That local Colonels' " commissions be granted to all Lieutenant Colonels, whether of the King's or " the Company's Service, whose commissions as Lieutenant Colonel are of " anterior date to the Lieutenant Colonels' commissions of officers who have " succeeded to regiments under the present system, and that officers of the " rank of Colonel who have obtained regiments, shall have such an anterior " revised date of commission of Colonel, as will place them in the correct " relative seniority which they previously held as Lieutenant Colonels."

The rank of Colonel granted to a King's Aid-de-Camp is permanent Army rank, and entitles him to the advantages belonging to that rank, for all military purposes, wherever he may be employed, according to the date of his commission as Colonel, and the number of Colonels of this description forming so very small a proportion as compared with the whole number of Colonels, that it is not probable that any inconvenience can be found from interference on their part in India.

Having now, I believe, touched upon every material point contained in your letter and enclosures, I will at once conclude with the expression of my regret that I have been under the unavoidable necessity of occupying so much of your valuable time and attention.

I have, &c.

The Right Hon. Charles Grant. (signed) *Hill.*

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# EAST INDIA (OFFICERS).

COPY of a LETTER written by General Lord *Hill* to the President of the Board of Control, dated 25 March 1834, with reference to the relative Position of the ROYAL OFFICERS and those of the late Honourable EAST INDIA COMPANY.

(*Colonel North.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
8 *June* 1869.



*Under* 1 *oz.*

# ARMY IN INDIA (NUMBER OF OFFICERS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 19 June 1871;—*for*,

" RETURN showing the Number of OFFICERS in the different ARMS in *India*, European and Native Infantry, European and Native Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, and Invalids, by their several Ranks; distinguishing the British and Indian Forces, and giving both the Fixed Establishment and the Actual Number of Effectives in *India*, for the 1st day of April 1855, 1860, 1865, and 1870."

India Office,
19 January 1872.

T. T. PEARS, Major General,
Military Secretary.

*(Mr. William Henry Smit*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
21 *August* 1871.

RETURN showing the Number of OFFICERS in the different ARMS of HER MAJESTY'S EUROPEAN Forces in *India;* Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers, by their several Ranks, distinguishing the fixed Establishment, and the Actual Number of Effectives in India, for the 1st April 1855, 1860, 1865, and 1870. Prepared as far as possible from the Records of the Adjutant General's Office.

| DATE. | ARMS. | FIXED ESTABLISHMENT. | | | | | | | | | | | | | ACTUAL NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES IN INDIA. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | Regimental or Brigade Staff. | | | | | | | | | | | | | Regimental or Brigade Staff. | | | | | | | |
| | | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Pay-master. | Adjutant. | Quarter-master. | Surgeon. | Assistant Surgeon. | Riding Master. | Veterinary Surgeon. | TOTAL. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Pay-master. | Adjutant. | Quarter-master. | Surgeon. | Assistant Surgeon. | Riding Master. | Veterinary Surgeon. | TOTAL. |
| 1st April 1855 | Cavalry - | 2 | 2 | 9 | 16 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | 1 | 40 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 28 |
| | Infantry - | 46 | 46 | 253 | 391 | 92 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 69 | – | – | 989 | 35 | 32 | 198 | 313 | 95 | 17 | 23 | 20 | 21 | 54 | – | – | 808 |
| | TOTAL - | 48 | 48 | 262 | 407 | 96 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 71 | – | 1 | 1,029 | 36 | 33 | 205 | 322 | 99 | 18 | 24 | 21 | 22 | 55 | – | 1 | 836 |
| | | | | | | | 168 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 141 | | | | | | | |
| 1st April 1860 | Cavalry - | 18 | 18 | 81 | 72 | 90 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 18 | 9 | 9 | 351 | 11 | 10 | 46 | 58 | 41 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 13 | 7 | 8 | 223 |
| | Infantry - | 118 | 118 | 592 | 710 | 474 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 177 | – | – | 2,425 | 73 | 81 | 407 | 564 | 295 | 52 | 55 | 46 | 50 | 148 | – | – | 1,771 |
| | Artillery - | 22 | – | 56 | 84 | – | – | 3 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 1 | 13 | 197 | 9 | – | 48 | 55 | – | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 21 | 1 | 6 | 150 |
| | Engineers - | 2 | – | 7 | 13 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 22 | 1 | – | 6 | 9 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 16 |
| | TOTAL - | 160 | 136 | 736 | 879 | 564 | 68 | 71 | 71 | 72 | 206 | 10 | 22 | 2,995 | 94 | 91 | 507 | 686 | 336 | 61 | 67 | 56 | 58 | 182 | 8 | 14 | 2,160 |
| | | | | | | | 520 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 446 | | | | | | | |
| 1st April 1865 | Cavalry - | 11 | 22 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 22 | 11 | 11 | 352 | 29 | 65 | 68 | 60 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 25 | 10 | 8 | 293 | |
| | Infantry - | 54 | 108 | 540 | 648 | 432 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 108 | – | – | 2,106 | 151 | 405 | 509 | 379 | 50 | 49 | 44 | 144 | – | – | 1,731 | |
| | Artillery - | 96 | – | 240 | 360 | – | – | 16 | 16 | 16 | 84 | 11 | 50 | 889 | 58 | 177 | 279 | – | – | 12 | 14 | 87 | 7 | 8 | 642 | |
| | Engineers - | 49 | – | 112 | 168 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 329 | 42 | 90 | 126 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 258 | |
| | TOTAL - | 210 | 130 | 969 | 1,253 | 509 | 65 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 214 | 22 | 61 | 3,676 | 280 | 737 | 982 | 439 | 59 | 71 | 67 | 256 | 17 | 16 | 2,924 | |
| | | | | | | | 605 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 486 | | | | | | | |
| 1st April 1870 | Cavalry - | 9 | 9 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 9 | 9 | 9 | Not on regimental establishment. | | 9 | 9 | 225 | 19 | 48 | 60 | 49 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 25 | 6 | 7 | 237 | |
| | Infantry - | 50 | 100 | 400 | 500 | 300 | 50 | 50 | 50 | | | – | – | 1,500 | 133 | 399 | 514 | 409 | 48 | 48 | 46 | 140 | – | – | 1,737 | |
| | Artillery - | 96 | – | 240 | 360 | – | – | 16 | 16 | | | 11 | 45 | 784 | 74 | 195 | 251 | – | – | 12 | 13 | 71 | 9 | 2 | 651 | |
| | Engineers - | 49 | – | 112 | 168 | – | – | – | – | - | - | – | – | 329 | 37 | 85 | 122 | – | – | – | – | - | - | – | 244 | |
| | TOTAL - | 204 | 109 | 806 | 1,082 | 354 | 59 | 75 | 75 | | | 20 | 54 | 2,838 | 263 | 727 | 947 | 458 | 57 | 67 | 66 | 236 | 15 | 3 | 2,869 | |
| | | | | | | | 283 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 474 | | | | | | | |

Adjutant General's Office, Horse Guards,
3 August 1871.

*Richard Airey*, Adjutant General.

RETURN showing the Fixed Establishment of OFFICERS in the different ARMS of the INDIAN FORCES by their several Ranks for the 1st April 1855, 1860, 1865, and 1870.

| DATE. | ARMS. | BENGAL. | | | | | | | | | | MADRAS. | | | | | | | | | | BOMBAY. | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | TOTAL. | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | TOTAL. | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | TOTAL. |
| 1 April 1855 - | Artillery - - - | 12 | 12 | 12 | 72 | 132 | 60 | - | - | - | 300 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 42 | 70 | 35 | - | - | - | 168 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 30 | 50 | 25 | - | - | - | 120 |
| | Engineers - - | 5 | 5 | 5 | 30 | 55 | 25 | - | - | - | 125 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 18 | 30 | 15 | - | - | - | 72 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 18 | 33 | 15 | - | - | - | 75 |
| | Cavalry - - - | 10 | 10 | 10 | 60 | 80 | 40 | - | - | - | 210 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 48 | 64 | 32 | - | - | - | 168 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 18 | 24 | 12 | - | - | - | 63 |
| | European Infantry - | 4 | 6 | 6 | 36 | 60 | 30 | - | - | - | 142 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 36 | 60 | 30 | - | - | - | 142 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 36 | 60 | 30 | - | - | - | 141 |
| | Native Infantry - | 74 | 74 | 74 | 444 | 740 | 370 | - | - | - | 1,776 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 312 | 520 | 260 | - | - | - | 1,248 | 30 | 29 | 29 | 174 | 290 | 145 | - | - | - | 697 |
| | Medical - - - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 140 | 275 | 27 | 442 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 76 | 167 | 10 | 253 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 55 | 137 | 6 | 198 |
| | Invalids - - - | - | 7 | 13 | 45 | 19 | - | - | - | - | 84 | - | 2 | 13 | 45 | 15 | - | - | - | - | 75 | - | 2 | 7 | 12 | 10 | - | - | - | - | 31 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 3,079 | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 2,126 | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 1,325 |
| 1 April 1860 - | Artillery - - - | 12 | 24 | - | 144 | 168 | - | - | - | - | 348 | 7 | 14 | - | 84 | 98 | - | - | - | - | 203 | 5 | 10 | - | 60 | 70 | - | - | - | - | 145 |
| | Engineers - - | 5 | 10 | - | 60 | 60 | - | - | - | - | 135 | 3 | 6 | - | 36 | 36 | - | - | - | - | 81 | 3 | 6 | - | 36 | 36 | - | - | - | - | 81 |
| | Cavalry - - - | 10 | 10 | 10 | 60 | 90 | 40 | - | - | - | 220 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 56 | 72 | 32 | - | - | - | 184 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 21 | 27 | 12 | - | - | - | 69 |
| | European Infantry - | 7 | 12 | 12 | 84 | 132 | 60 | - | - | - | 307 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 42 | 66 | 30 | - | - | - | 154 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 42 | 66 | 30 | - | - | - | 153 |
| | Native Infantry - | 68 | 68 | 68 | 496 | 748 | 340 | - | - | - | 1,788 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 364 | 572 | 260 | - | - | - | 1,352 | 30 | 29 | 29 | 203 | 319 | 145 | - | - | - | 755 |
| | Medical - - - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 140 | 285 | 27 | 425 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 76 | 167 | 10 | 253 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 55 | 137 | 6 | 198 |
| | Invalids - - - | - | 3 | 10 | 27 | 12 | - | - | - | - | 52 | - | 5 | 17 | 31 | 23 | - | - | - | - | 76 | - | 1 | 6 | 19 | 7 | 1 | - | - | - | 34 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 3,275 | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 2,303 | | | | | | | | | | TOTAL Establishment - - - 1,435 |
| 1 April 1865 - | - - - - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1 April 1870 - | - - - - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | No fixed Establishment | | | | | - | - | - | - | - |

RETURN showing the Actual Number of OFFICERS in the different ARMS of HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES for the 1st April 1855, 1860, 1865, and 1870.

| DATE. | ARMS. | BENGAL. | | | | | | | | | | MADRAS. | | | | | | | | | | BOMBAY. | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | Total. | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | Total. | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Veterinary Surgeons. | Total. |
| 1 April 1855 - | Artillery - - - | 4 | 9 | 10 | 61 | 103 | 54 | – | – | – | 241 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 28 | 50 | 36 | – | – | – | 127 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 19 | 37 | 30 | – | – | – | 98 |
| | Engineers - - | – | 3 | 4 | 23 | 49 | 17 | – | – | – | 96 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 14 | 21 | 4 | – | – | – | 47 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 27 | – | – | – | – | 47 |
| | Cavalry - - - | 1 | 8 | 8 | 34 | 54 | 24 | – | – | – | 129 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 34 | 53 | 15 | – | – | – | 113 | – | 3 | 2 | 16 | 19 | 11 | – | – | – | 51 |
| | European Infantry - | 1 | 3 | 1 | 25 | 50 | 22 | – | – | – | 102 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 24 | 45 | 18 | – | – | – | 95 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 28 | 44 | 27 | – | – | – | 108 |
| | Native Infantry - | 14 | 44 | 60 | 348 | 598 | 293 | – | – | – | 1,357 | 16 | 42 | 43 | 258 | 394 | 177 | – | – | – | 930 | 3 | 24 | 27 | 130 | 239 | 120 | – | – | – | 543 |
| | Medical - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | 109 | 210 | 19 | 338 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 53 | 103 | 10 | 166 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 48 | 108 | 3 | 159 |
| | Invalids - - - | – | 7 | 8 | 34 | 17 | – | – | – | – | 66 | – | 2 | 8 | 36 | 13 | – | – | – | – | 59 | – | 2 | 6 | 9 | 6 | – | – | – | – | 23 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Total Effective - - - | | | | | | | | | | 2,329 | | | | | | | | | | 1,537 | | | | | | | | | | 1,020 |
| 1 April 1860 - | Artillery - - - | 1 | 18 | – | 109 | 144 | – | – | – | – | 272 | 1 | 12 | – | 61 | 73 | – | – | – | – | 147 | 2 | 8 | – | 43 | 49 | – | – | – | – | 102 |
| | Engineers - - | 3 | 7 | – | 43 | 43 | – | – | – | – | 96 | 1 | 6 | – | 31 | 29 | – | – | – | – | 67 | 2 | 6 | – | 32 | 29 | – | – | – | – | 69 |
| | Cavalry - - - | 6 | 8 | 3 | 46 | 72 | 24 | – | – | – | 159 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 45 | 53 | 3 | – | – | – | 117 | – | – | 2 | 16 | 19 | 9 | – | – | – | 46 |
| | European Infantry - | 2 | 5 | 8 | 64 | 105 | 12 | – | – | – | 196 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 33 | 58 | 18 | – | – | – | 121 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 32 | 51 | 16 | – | – | – | 110 |
| | Native Infantry - | 13 | 40 | 43 | 390 | 616 | 186 | – | – | – | 1,288 | 9 | 46 | 50 | 318 | 475 | 108 | – | – | – | 1,006 | 4 | 9 | 24 | 157 | 267 | 114 | – | – | – | 575 |
| | Medical - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | 113 | 233 | 24 | 370 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 65 | 152 | 9 | 226 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 50 | 115 | 5 | 170 |
| | Invalids - - - | – | 8 | 25 | 12 | – | – | – | – | – | 45 | – | 2 | 16 | 24 | 19 | – | – | – | – | 61 | – | 1 | 6 | 15 | 6 | – | – | – | – | 28 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Total Effective - - - | | | | | | | | | | 2,426 | | | | | | | | | | 1,745 | | | | | | | | | | 1,100 |
| 1 April 1865 - | Staff Corps - - | – | 41 | 187 | 210 | 143 | – | – | – | – | 581 | – | 42 | 90 | 126 | 72 | – | – | – | – | 330 | – | 24 | 63 | 107 | 125 | – | – | – | – | 319 |
| | Cavalry - - - | 2 | 7 | 5 | 31 | 40 | – | – | – | – | 85 | – | 5 | 4 | 30 | 23 | – | – | – | – | 62 | – | 3 | 2 | 15 | 11 | – | – | – | – | 31 |
| | Infantry - - - | 15 | 12 | 26 | 158 | 489 | – | – | – | – | 700 | 6 | 32 | 25 | 138 | 300 | – | – | – | – | 501 | – | – | 15 | 66 | 111 | – | – | – | – | 192 |
| | Medical - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | 115 | 260 | 16 | 391 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 72 | 75 | 5 | 152 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 63 | 64 | 7 | 134 |
| | Invalids - - - | – | – | 7 | 13 | 5 | – | – | – | – | 25 | – | 1 | 7 | 28 | 15 | – | – | – | – | 51 | – | 2 | 4 | 12 | 3 | – | – | – | – | 21 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Total Effective - - - | | | | | | | | | | 1,782 | | | | | | | | | | 1,096 | | | | | | | | | | 697 |
| 1 April 1870 - | Staff Corps - - | – | 214 | 197 | 268 | 256 | – | – | – | – | 935 | – | 137 | 134 | 186 | 79 | – | – | – | – | 536 | – | 80 | 92 | 138 | 86 | – | – | – | – | 398 |
| | Cavalry - - - | – | 4 | 5 | 33 | 16 | – | – | – | – | 58 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 27 | 14 | – | – | – | – | 48 | – | 3 | 1 | 9 | 11 | – | – | – | – | 24 |
| | Infantry - - - | 10 | 43 | – | 148 | 22 | – | – | – | – | 223 | 4 | 25 | 2 | 21 | 61 | – | – | – | – | 113 | – | 21 | 1 | 18 | 36 | – | – | – | – | 76 |
| | Medical - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | 107 | 256 | 9 | 372 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 84 | 65 | 5 | 154 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 69 | 57 | 5 | 131 |
| | Invalids - - - | – | – | 3 | 12 | 7 | – | – | – | – | 22 | – | 2 | 4 | 18 | 10 | – | – | – | – | 34 | – | – | 4 | 8 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 14 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Total Effective - - - | | | | | | | | | | 1,610 | | | | | | | | | | 885 | | | | | | | | | | 643 |

# ARMY IN INDIA (NUMBER OF OFFICERS).

RETURN showing the Number of OFFICERS in the different ARMS in *India*, European and Native Infantry, European and Native Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, and Invalids, by their several Ranks; distinguishing the British and Indian Forces, and giving both the Fixed Establishment and the Actual Number of Effectives in *India*, for 1st April 1855, 1860, 1865, and 1870.

(*Mr. William Henry Smith.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
21 *August* 1871.



*Under* 1 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (MILITARY COMMANDS IN CHIEF).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 21 April 1871;—*for*,

"COPIES of the MINUTES of General Lord *Sandhurst*, while Commander in Chief in *Bombay* and in *India*, recommending Changes in the MILITARY COMMANDS IN CHIEF in *India*:"

"And, of any other MINUTE or MINUTES on the same Subject."

India Office,
27 April 1871.

T. T. PEARS, Major General,
Military Secretary.

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EXTRACT of a MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army, Lieutenant General Sir *William Mansfield*, K.C.B., on the Consolidation of the General Staff of the Line and Local Armies.

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FIRST SECTION—COMMAND IN CHIEF IN INDIA.

Head Quarters, Bombay, 2 January 1861.

WHEN considering the large question of the consolidation of the general staff of the army, it is perhaps convenient to treat the two questions separately which are involved in it, as stated in paragraph 1 of my first minute on the subject. The minor question having been disposed of in that paper, the larger one affecting the whole system of staff in India, and involving the appointments of general officers, remains for reply. Here there is much difficulty. For a long period of time the general nominations to divisional and brigade commands have been in the hands of the several Governors, while those to the office of Commander in Chief, and to two divisions in each Presidency, were secured to the authorities at home. The nominations to divisional and brigade commands made by the Governor General for the great Presidency of Bengal, and by the Governors of Madras and Bombay respectively, for the two minor Presidencies, followed a rule of seniority* with the utmost servility.

This rule was held to be a right by the senior officers of the armies of the Company, and it was not infringed till the year 1857, when owing, in the first instance, to the imperious circumstances of the rebellion, and, secondly, to argument at home, it was finally abrogated. At the same time, in consequence of the large increase to Her Majesty's line forces serving in India, the number of general officers nominated by the Horse Guards was considerably augmented.

It may be well to consider the position of a Commander in Chief in India.

I believe it to be the custom of all the Governments, it certainly is of the two with which I am acquainted, to call on the Commander in Chief for the initiative opinion in all matters affecting the army, whether they be purely military, such as discipline, reliefs, and marches, the construction and defence of fortresses, or what may be called military civil questions, involving the whole range

* In respect to the few commands held by the colonels of Her Majesty's Service, the same rule of seniority was invariably followed whenever the nomination lay with the Government and Commander in Chief in India, and was particularly enforced in an injunction given, I rather think, in the late Lord Hardinge's time in India.

range of military finance, commissariat, medical, and pay departments, &c. &c. The Government is not bound to act on the opinion of the Commander in Chief, but it has hitherto generally found it convenient so far to treat him as Minister of War, as well as head of the army, as to make his opinion the initiative on which, previous to action, to ground argument and inquiry. Thus at the most critical times, it has happened that the head quarter officers of the Commander in Chief have been engaged in the consideration of difficult questions, emanating from Government, while the Commander in Chief with his principal staff officers was engaged in directing operations in the field. To such occupations had to be added reports on barracks, pay, medical, and commissariat departments, coming from the several divisions of the army, all of them demanding anxious attention before being forwarded with opinions to Government. It will be apparent that a Commander in Chief and his staff officers, with an active enemy in their front, could hardly do justice to the enormous amount of business passing through their hands, without neglecting the important affairs of the campaign directed under the Commander in Chief's own eye, and of the war in which the empire might be engaged on several different points, requiring his general directions at the same time. Such, however, was the task imposed on Lord Clyde and his head-quarter staff, during the war of 1857-58-59. The strain for many months in each of these years was almost too much for anyone, and I conceive, that when engaged in the remodelment of our establishments, we should take measures to secure an adequate division of labour, by which the whole mind and energies of the Commander in Chief in the field and of his staff may be secured for the war, while the permanent and ordinary business of the army shall be carried on without reference to the former.

It may be assumed that the Commander in Chief of each Presidency is sent out by Her Majesty's Government to be the principal military adviser of the Government to which he is attached. In the minor Presidencies his position is so inferior that a clash with the Local Government is not very likely, and if it should take place, the consequences are not very important. Far otherwise is it with the great functionary called Commander in Chief in India. Whenever the latter is a man of quick and powerful mind, he finds his position difficult, at times almost intolerable. He has a great responsibility, is much appealed to, as shewn above, while he often feels and knows that around the head of the Government are irresponsible and secret military advisers, who regard him with hostility. Hence it is, that many Commanders in Chief in India have always been most anxious to live away from the Government as much as possible, while others have been engaged in conflict leading to resignation. I conceive that the evil of divesting the head of the Government of India of his chief and *responsible* military adviser can hardly be exaggerated; yet, if that responsible military adviser is to be at the same time an executive Commander in Chief, who is ever engaged in traversing the country on tours of inspection in times of peace, or at the head of the active army in time of war, it is utterly impossible for him to be in his place at the side of the Governor General, except at rare intervals of time. Military feeling is so strong, and the prizes of war are so great, that no Commander in Chief in India can resist the temptation of putting himself at the head of an army in the field, if he has an opportunity. In like manner, for the maintenance of discipline, to gain a knowledge of the army, of the manner in which it is housed, cared for, and handled, it is absolutely necessary that a Commander in Chief should be ever on the move in peaceful times. Therefore, as said before, the constant presence of the Commander in Chief in India in his place as a member of the Supreme Government and the recognised responsible adviser of the Governor General in Council, is an impossibility under the present system. We must, besides, recollect that the Presidency of Bengal is so vast, its stations are so numerous, and the army is so large, that if the Commander in Chief devote his whole attention to his executive duties only, he cannot hope to see the troops under his command above once in his five years of office.

Taking all these circumstances into account, I incline to the opinion very strongly, that when it may be convenient with regard to a variety of considerations to which reference from me is unnecessary, we should adopt a system for India similar to that prevailing in France. In the place of a Secretary to Government in the Military Department, who, according to the present constitution

tution of the office, can hardly be called a responsible military adviser of the Governor General, and in the place of the military member of Council, who hitherto has often not been chosen on account of his military qualifications, but because of his long service and general reputation, I would have a responsible Minister of War whose relations to the Government of India should be the same as those of the Minister of War in France are towards the Emperor. Such a minister should in India always be a military man of high* rank and nominated by the Cabinet, as we have lately seen a Minister of Finance appointed in the same manner.

I would then divide the present Bengal command into three corps d'armée, to be commanded by Lieutenant Generals in Chief, each of whom would correspond with the Minister of War on all army matters, and with the Horse Guards† in the same manner as is now done by the officers commanding in the several Presidencies. The Minister of War should receive returns from the Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay. The whole establishment of military finance should be under him, and the questions connected with it should be laid by him yearly before the Legislative Council in the form of military estimates, &c., &c.

In like manner‡ all military public works, all establishments, &c., &c., would be passed by him, thus relieving the Governor General of the mass of petty military detail, of which more than one Governor General has drawn a vivid and despairing picture. I think if we have the Presidency of Bengal divided into three Lieutenant Generals Commanding in Chief, the troops will be better looked after in the vast area of the three Governments of Bengal, the North West Provinces, and the Punjab, than has been possible since the extension of our frontier took place, in consequence of the Punjab, Pegu, and Oudh annexations.

I am aware an opinion has been held, that while we should have five Lieutenant Generals to command the several corps d'armée, including Madras and Bombay, there should be a Commander in Chief in India over the entire mass of the Indian armies. To place an executive Commander in Chief over the whole of India would, I believe, entail one of two alternatives; either he might attempt so direct and immediate a command as seriously to cripple the energies and activity of the several Lieutenant Generals, and they would become so many channels of reference, to the great interference with the transaction of business, and the weakening of their sense of responsibility, or he would himself be a functionary for show rather than for use, if the Lieutenant Generals exercised such a real command over their corps d'armée as is demanded by their positions. I cannot conceive that in any case he would be nearly so useful and effective as the responsible Minister of War, who would come in that character to form part of the Government, and would be bound, therefore, to *review the civil, as well as the martial elements* of our *military strength throughout India.* The three Lieutenant Generals in command in chief for the Presidency of Bengal would be nominated at home according to the custom now prevailing for Madras and Bombay. The three new commands should generally follow the limits of the three Governments of Bengal, the North West Provinces and the Punjab. Thus one Lieutenant General should command in the Government of Bengal and in the Tenasserim and Burmah Provinces, another in the Government of the North West Provinces and in Oudh, and the third in the Government of the Punjab.

According to the custom of the Government of India, when it has been necessary to combine the forces of the three Presidencies, orders have been issued by the Governor General in Council. In the like manner the Commander

* In France a Minister of War is generally a marshal. His office is invested with the highest military consideration. So should it be with the Minister of War in India. In position, rank, and emoluments he should not be inferior to the Commander in Chief in India as at present constituted.

† It would probably be convenient for the Horse Guards to correspond with the Minister of War in India on subjects of general import to Her Majesty's regiments, as is now done in the communications between his Royal Highness the General Commanding in-Chief and the Commander in Chief in India.

‡ I must apologise for touching on the duties of a Minister of War; but it would have been difficult for me to explain the system for command and the transaction of military business without alluding to it.

mander in Chief in India, or in the minor Presidencies, has never had the power of moving troops, without the orders and sanction of his Government. Consequently, as regards military combinations and movements, but little change would ensue. The Lieutenant Generals Commanding in Chief would make their proposals to their respective Governments to move troops within their territories. Any movement requiring combination between the several commands would be ordered for the Supreme Government by the Minister of War, as is now done whenever a military combination is demanded between the several Presidencies, either by the departure of troops on foreign service or for home, and by the transfer of corps from one Presidency to another. No difficulty could possibly arise from these grounds, as the action of the Supreme Government, exercised through a Minister of War, *who would be conversant with and responsible for the establishments and corps of all the armies of India, including Madras and Bombay*, would be really more prompt than it is now, because the military departments attached to the Governor General, have, as I believe, but little cognisance of any army but that of Bengal. It is thus apparent, that while I would divide the military command, I propose to render the power residing in the Supreme Government for military action more effective, and to give it a greater concentration. It is on this account necessary that the Ministry of War for India should, as in France, be directed by a military man of rank and professional reputation, who would be really capable of advising the Governor General in war and in peace. There can be no necessity to give to the office the civil complexion demanded in England for the War Departments, to meet the convenience of constitutional government.

Such is the change I would venture to propose in the command of India, and the performance of the military business of the Supreme Government. In point of expense and number of appointments there would be but little difference, while I believe that the convenience of the Government of India would be most favourably affected by it, and that the discipline, the well-being, and the interests of the Army at large, would be alike advantageously consulted by the more immediate and personal superintendence in chief which would be established and made possible for the Army of the Presidency of Bengal, as it always has been possible for the minor Presidencies. I venture to add, that the necessity of such a change first became apparent to me when the late Sir Charles Napier was Commander in Chief in India, and when, as Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment, I had great opportunities of remarking on the evils arising from the immensity of the Bengal command, and the distances separating the Commander in Chief from his divisional officers. That opinion received the strongest confirmation from the experience gained during the two years and a half passed by me as Chief of the Staff in India in very critical times, under a Commander in Chief who never spared himself either in the field or in the labours of the office, in peace or war. I believe that the troops in the Bengal Presidency alone, including the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, amount to twice the number of Prince Gortshakoff's army in Poland, and to be about treble a French or Austrian corps d'armée in ordinary times, while the area occupied by the army of Bengal is almost immeasurably greater than the country held respectively by the forces alluded to. In recent years, what has been called the want of discipline in the late Bengal army has been a fruitful subject of discussion. Many high authorities go so far as to attribute the terrible mutiny and rebellion to that cause only. Although I entirely differ from that opinion, and hold it to be most unphilosophical to ascribe a great combined attempt at revolution to any one single cause, I cannot but admit the fact of laxity in the late Bengal army, as so often dwelt on in Sir Charles Napier's orders; but I am not prepared to admit that the fault could be wholly laid on subordinate officers, or on any Commander in Chief. I attribute much of it to a system which did not expand to meet altered circumstances, which still continued one command in chief for the Bengal Presidency, after the area of territory to be guarded had been nearly doubled, the number of the soldiery receiving a proportionate extension. The consequences were the necessary absence of personal command and supervision on the part of the head of the army, and an unavoidably exclusive reliance on paper reports, without sufficient acquaintance between the Commander in Chief and his divisional, brigade, and regimental commanding officers. As the Supreme Government found it necessary to divide the immense swollen Presidency of Bengal into

into three Governments, to ensure the reality and limitation of local authority, so I believe it to be necessary to divide the Bengal army into three corps d'armée for the maintenance of discipline and of personal command. Had the army of Bengal been so divided before 1857, it admits of a doubt whether the mutiny of one portion of it would have entailed the spread of the disorder throughout the other corps. Our experience of the manner in which it was possible to hold the Madras and Bombay armies together, in spite of the example and propaganda to which they were exposed, seems to show that safety would have been found in that division of commands and corps d'armée, which has now been recommended.

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EXTRACT of a MINUTE by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., dated 24th February 1861.

I HAVE no doubt that the proper solution of many difficulties which have frequently been displayed in the constitution of the command and the general control of the army in India is to be found in the appointment of a responsible Minister of War in India, and the consequent abolition of the three (3) appointments, by means of which the duties of that office are now in an inconvenient manner undertaken.

Lieutenant General Sir William Mansfield has in the accompanying minutes very clearly demonstrated the several advantages which would by such means be secured, and that these are unattainable in any combination of the appointments of Commander in Chief in India, Military Member of Council, and Military Secretary to the Government.

* * * * * *

While the Governments of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay continue to be constituted as they now are, it is not worth while discussing a question of abolishing the position of their local Commanders in Chief. They are in the independent positions of Members of Council; their subordination, therefore, in a greater degree than at present to the Commander in Chief in India would, I conceive, be inconvenient and anomalous.

On one point, as it seems to me, efficiency does not prescribe so divided a command as Sir William Mansfield considers requisite, on account of the extent of the army of the Bengal Presidency, and the area which it occupies; for, first, I do not think that it is advisable that its area should be so extended; and, secondly, that army is, I consider, considerably larger than it ought to be. In 1857, when called upon by Her Majesty's Government for an opinion regarding a revision of some measures of Indian administration, I suggested that the Eastern Settlements of Prince of Wales' Island, Arracan, Pegu, Singapore, &c., &c., should be formed into a separate colony, and brought directly under the Home Government, and I observed that the presence of Lord Elgin in that quarter would be advantageous for the formation of it on a proper footing, and that the termination of his mission would develope whatsoever of extended commercial or political relations it may be desirable to annex to the government of such a Colony. Since I stated these views, between three and four years ago, the events which have occurred to the eastward involve an extension of British interests, and a development of French relations, that, to my apprehension, render it still more expedient to sever those settlements from the Government of British India, and to place them under the more direct control of the Crown. In such case, the army of India need have nothing to do with that Colony. Its military occupation would be regulated as directly from England, by raising, I should say, three strong colonial regiments of natives, and adding a sufficient force of British troops. On the other side of India, I would relieve the Bengal Presidency from the burden of garrisoning the Nerbudda and Saugor division. This could be undertaken by the Bombay Government. I presume that the Punjab force, consisting of British troops,

regular Native troops, irregular horse and foot, with local corps of various sorts, has by this time been regarded by the Finance Committee to have been, during these last 10 years, so enormous in and covering that one Province, as to suffice, under a just Indian administration, comprising respect for ancient proprietory rights and chiefships, to hold in security almost all our dominions termed the "Bengal Presidency," the more so, that its police is on an ample scale.

Thus the Bengal army may be brought within limits which could not be considered to be too extensive for one command.

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EXTRACT of a MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, Sir *William Mansfield*, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated Simla, 17 October 1867.

To pursue the analogy drawn from the United States still further, I would point out that in that country there is but one War Ministry, whereas, in India, we have three military departments. It thus happens that the two minor governments have a position of independence with regard to military affairs which is unknown in any other constitution in the world.

The result is a competition for the maintenance of armies and establishments, instead of a combination under the Supreme Government for absolute economy in military expenditure, with regard only to the military wants of the empire at large.

This, again, I venture to submit, is an instance of decentralisation the wrong way.

There should be but one War Ministry of India, as there is at Washington, and the military departments of Bombay and Madras should be wholly affiliated to the War Ministry under the Government of India, instead of being separate establishments as they now are, owing fealty alone to their respective governments. Such argument may take place without in any manner interfering with the local character of the armies of Madras and Bombay, which, for important, political, and military reasons, should not be interfered with.

I would add that this opinion is not advanced by me now for the first time, but I gave expression to it, and to the mode of carrying it into execution, so long ago as 1861, when I was Commander in Chief, and a member of Council in Bombay.

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EAST INDIA
(MILITARY COMMANDS IN CHIEF).

COPIES of the MINUTES of General Lord *Sandhurst*, while Commander in Chief in *Bombay* and in *India*, recommending Changes in the MILITARY COMMANDS IN CHIEF in *India*; and, of other MINUTES on the same subject.

(*Sir Charles Wingfield.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
1 *May* 1871.



*Under* 1 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (RECRUITS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 14 March 1871;—*for*,

"COPY of the PROCEEDINGS of the COMMITTEE of which Mr. *Seccombe* was a Member, which sat at the end of last Year, to inquire into the EXPENSE of the RECRUITS for the REGIMENTS serving in *India*."

War Office,
23 March 1871.

EDWARD CARDWELL.

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REPORT of a COMMITTEE appointed by the Secretaries of State for War and for India to make Arrangements for adjusting from the 1st April 1869 the Charges for Effective Services of HER MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS on the EAST INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT, on the principle of actual Charges.

MEMBERS:

T. L. Seccombe, Esq.
H. W. S. Whiffin, Esq.
Major-General Jameson.
J. Milton, Esq.

1. IN proceeding to consider the subject committed to them, the Committee, after careful inquiry and deliberation, find that considerable difficulty must attend the preparation of an exact account of the charges against India in respect of recruiting the European army in that country, and that it would inevitably involve much correspondence with respect to the sanction of exceptional charges and otherwise, and especially with reference to the charge for artillery recruits, and for volunteers from regiments in England, called for immediately previous to the embarkation of troops for India.

2. In order to lay down, if possible, some plan whereby the constant preparation and examination of such an account might be obviated with due regard to the interests of the British and Indian Exchequers, the Committee have considered a suggestion for the settlement of the charge against India on the principle of a schedule of prices per man for regiments, batteries, drafts, and recruits of each arm of the service embarking for India, the War Office making a similar payment to India for each effective man returning to England.

3. The Committee are not at present able to submit a schedule of prices, as its preparation would involve an elaborate and careful inquiry and analysis of the charges included therein; and as that inquiry must occupy much time and care, in order to arrive at conclusions which could be expected to prove satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, the Committee venture to recommend that the present system of payment by a capitation rate should be continued for one year from the 1st April 1869 to the 31st March 1870.

4. If this proposition be agreed to, the investigation could, during the ensuing year, be fully entered on and brought to a conclusion, so that the Committee would be enabled to report the course they would recommend for the consideration of the Secretaries of State, whether by a schedule of prices, as before stated, for the cost of every effective man of each arm of the service embarking for or returning from India, or if that should prove to be impracticable, by a direct settlement of the accounts of actual charges.

5. In submitting this proposition the Committee feel it to be their duty to bring prominently to notice the very heavy charge attending the present system of Indian depôts, as shown in the cost to the Imperial Government of a recruit from the date of his enlistment to that of his embarking for India. This becomes very apparent when a comparison is made of the expenditure under the existing system

with that of the Warley depôt formerly maintained for recruiting the army by the East India Company.

6. The Committee feel bound to ask the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the expense of the Indian depôts, in order that it may be ascertained whether the system on which they are at present maintained could not be greatly modified.

7. In confirmation of the opinion above expressed the Committee annex three returns.

A. A return of the cost of the depôt at Warley for 10 years from 1850 to 1859, as shown in the actual accounts in the India Office.

B. A statement showing in detail the items composing the charges under each head at Warley, for the years 1854-55 and 1855-56, from which charges the totals in Statement A. and the charge for a recruit have been deduced.

C. A return from the years 1861-62 to 1867-68 of the estimated establishment of the Indian depôts kept up by the Imperial Government for cavalry and infantry, of the actual strength of those depôts, and of the actual number of recruits and drafts sent out thence to India.

8. The Committee would here remark that the War Office depôts include a very large staff, whilst the Warley depôt was conducted by a very small number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the supply of recruits to nine regiments of infantry and the whole of the artillery in India, including a small body of engineers.

9. The figures in the Return C. show a cost of about 205*l.* for each soldier sent by the War Office to India, but this must be modified as regards one or two exceptional years, during which, although the depôts remained at their full strength, very few recruits were required for India, in consequence of each regiment in that country having been very largely reduced, but the outlay, nevertheless, appears to demand inquiry with a view to its reduction. Returns A. and B. show that recruits were sent out from the Warley depôt for the years from 1850 to 1859 at an average cost of 19*l.* 15*s.* per man only, or, omitting the exceptional years of and after the mutiny, at an average cost of 26*l.* 7*s.* 5*d.* per man for all arms.

10. It is proper to add that the members of this Committee, representing the War Office, are of opinion that with reference to the statistical statements prepared at the War Office and laid before the Committee, the depôt and recruiting charges of regiments in India have been in excess of the amount repayable to Imperial funds as the capitation grant for the corresponding period, thus leaving a deficit to be borne by the Imperial revenues. The members of the Committee representing the India Office are not, however, at present in a position to confirm this view, as they have not had the means of scrutinizing those statements, or of arriving at a definite conclusion as to this point, but the Committee have no hesitation in expressing their unanimous opinion that the charge for a recruit, as shown in the War Office Return, is susceptible of very great reduction, and that whatever loss has resulted to the Imperial Government must be attributed mainly to the excessive amount of the depôt charges.

11. The Committee cannot conclude their Report without bearing testimony to the valuable assistance they have received throughout their inquiries from their secretary, Mr. Day, in the preparation of the returns and calculations relative to the expenditure in this country. Mr. Day's great intelligence and accuracy call for this recognition, and would be of great value in the prosecution of any further inquiries on this subject.

12. For the reasons given the Committee submit:—

That the capitation rate as at present paid shall be continued for one year from the 1st April 1869, and that during that period they should be authorized to consider and report as to the best mode of adjustment of the accounts of the expenditure for future years.

(signed) *T. L. Seccombe.*
*G. J. Jameson.*
*H. W. S. Whiffin.*
*John Milton.*

*Robert P. Day*, Secretary.

War Office, 11 March 1869.

(A.)

STATEMENT showing the NUMBER and COST of RECRUITS sent to India from Warley, in the Years from 1850 to 1859 inclusive.

| Year. | Recruits sent to India. | | | | | Cost of Depôt at Warley, and of Recruiting Staff, exclusive of Clothing, Arms, and Accoutrements, but including Expense of Sappers studying at Chatham. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Engineers. | Artillery. | Cavalry. | Infantry. | Total. | | |
| | | | | | | £. s. d. | |
| 1850 | 38 | 687 | – | 490 | 1,215 | 36,549 13 1 | |
| 1851 | 26 | 603 | – | 229 | 858 | 32,087 2 3 | |
| 1852 | 22 | 617 | – | 378 | 1,017 | 37,851 13 – | |
| 1853 | 27 | 724 | – | 1,522 | 2,273 | 41,760 13 – | |
| 1854 | 36 | 511 | – | 1,495 | 2,042 | 43,633 7 4 | |
| 1855 | 29 | 442 | – | 1,162 | 1,633 | 43,469 14 5 | |
| 1856 | 75 | 534 | – | 933 | 1,542 | 43,659 17 1 | |
| | | | | | 10,580 | 279,012 – 2 | Average per man during seven years, 26 *l.* 7 *s.* 5 *d.* |
| 1857 | 89 | 1,282 | 814 | 1,611 | 3,796 | 64,862 12 2 | |
| 1858 | 83 | 997 | 2,545 | 2,558 | 6,183 | 71,984 5 9 | |
| 1859 | 116 | 1,621 | 381 | 2,106 | 4,224 | 73,435 15 10 | |
| TOTAL | 541 | 8,018 | 3,740 | 12,484 | 24,783 | 489,294 13 11 | Average per man during 10 years, 19 *l.* 14 *s.* 10½ *d.* |

(B.)

STATEMENT of RECRUITING CHARGES for the Year 1854–55.

| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay to officers, non-commissioned officers, and recruits at the depôt at Warley :— | | | |
| Officers | 2,856 15 4 | | |
| Non-commissioned officers on the staff | 1,530 7 1 | | |
| Recruits | 9,874 2 3 | | |
| Sappers | 2,604 3 3 | | |
| | | 16,865 7 11 | |
| Expenses of instructing company's recruits as Sappers and Miners at Chatham | – – | 572 – 9 | |
| Drafts of officers at the several recruiting stations, expended as follows:— | | | |
| Pay of officers and non-commissioned officers | 2,965 19 7 | | |
| Rewards for recruits finally approved | 2,229 3 – | | |
| Marching money and contingencies | 1,774 12 11 | | |
| | | 6,969 15 6 | |
| Bounty money to recruits | – – | 11,207 3 – | |
| Embarkation expenses of recruits | – – | 1,780 14 8 | |
| Gratuity and pension to Sergeant-Major Sullivan | – – | 40 – – | |
| Rent of house in Soho-square used as the London recruiting rendezvous | – – | 89 17 9 | |
| Rates and taxes of depôt at Warley | – – | 221 11 11 | |
| Miscellaneous:— | | | |
| Allowance to recruits of 1 *d.* per diem beer money | 743 6 6 | | |
| Marching money | 48 8 6 | | |
| Sergeant-major's and sergeant's allowances for paying staff | 86 4 2 | | |
| Rewards for apprehending deserters | 82 14 10 | | |
| Allowance to Rector of Warley for performing duties of garrison chaplain | 83 – – | | |
| Allowance to Roman Catholic Minister | 40 – – | | |
| „ Presbyterian Minister | 20 18 1 | | |
| „ Clerk at depôt chapel | 6 6 – | | |
| Salary of assistant master at depôt school | 25 – – | | |
| „ mistress | 20 – – | | |
| Bibles, prayer-books, &c. | 205 14 7 | | |
| Barrack-master's contingencies | 1,362 18 1 | | |
| Allowed for excess in the price of meat and bread | 1,163 19 8 | | |
| Clothing for staff, non-commissioned officers, and buglers | 377 1 9 | | |
| Carried forward £. | 4,265 12 2 | 37,746 11 6 | |

| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brought forward | 4,265 12 2 | 37,746 11 6 | |
| Alteration of clothing | 228 2 – | | |
| Repairs of arms | 61 15 5 | | |
| Carriage of clothing and stores | 30 5 8 | | |
| Compensation in lieu of clothing | 31 5 – | | |
| Hospital contingencies | 60 – – | | |
| Stationery, books, and bookbinding | 142 6 8 | | |
| Postage | 22 12 6 | | |
| Travelling expenses of clerk of the works | 111 15 – | | |
| Annual grants to depôt charitable fund | 30 – – | | |
| Annual donation to poor fund, Congregational Chapel at Brentwood | 10 – – | | |
| Fire-grates for depôt at Warley | 27 18 – | | |
| Petty expenses | 865 3 5 | | |
| | | 5,886 15 10 | |
| | | | 43,633 7 4 |

(B.)

STATEMENT of RECRUITING CHARGES for the Year 1855–56.

| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay to officers, non-commissioned officers, and recruits at the depôt at Warley :— | | | |
| Officers | 2,946 9 1 | | |
| Non-commissioned officers on the staff | 1,551 1 11 | | |
| Recruits | 10,376 11 4 | | |
| Sappers | 3,741 15 4 | | |
| | | 18,615 17 8 | |
| Drafts of officers at the several recruiting stations, expended as follows :— | | | |
| Pay of officers and non-commissioned officers | 3,003 7 10 | | |
| Rewards for recruits finally approved | 1,657 7 – | | |
| Marching money and contingencies | 1,585 5 9 | | |
| | | 6,246 – 7 | |
| Bounty money to recruits | – – – | 10,949 8 2 | |
| Embarkation expenses of recruits | – – – | 1,374 12 5 | |
| Gratuity and pension to Sergeant-Major Sullivan | – – | 135 – – | |
| Rent of house in Soho-square used as the London recruiting rendezvous | – – | 121 17 6 | |
| Rates and taxes of depôt at Warley | – – | 238 – 3 | |
| Miscellaneous :— | | | |
| Allowance to recruits, 1 *d.* per diem beer money | 772 19 4 | | |
| Marching money | 54 14 2 | | |
| Sergeant-major's and sergeant's allowances for paying staff | 86 8 2 | | |
| Rewards for apprehending deserters | 127 8 11 | | |
| Allowance to Rector of Warley for performing duties of garrison chaplain | 83 – – | | |
| Allowance to Roman Catholic Minister | 40 – – | | |
| „ Presbyterian Minister | 34 12 6 | | |
| „ Clerk at depôt chapel | 6 6 – | | |
| Salary of assistant master at depôt school | 25 – – | | |
| „ mistress | 20 – – | | |
| Donation for purchase of books and stationery for use of depôt schools | 10 – – | | |
| Bibles, prayer-books, &c. | 403 12 – | | |
| Barrack-master's contingencies | 1,056 2 2 | | |
| Allowed for excess in the price of meat and bread | 1,109 14 4 | | |
| Clothing for staff, non-commissioned officers, and buglers | 362 16 11 | | |
| Alteration of clothing | 227 1 7 | | |
| Repairs of arms | 57 6 10 | | |
| Carriage of clothing and stores | 12 10 9 | | |
| Compensation in lieu of clothing | 7 10 – | | |
| Hospital contingencies | 308 5 – | | |
| Printing attestation papers | 8 18 6 | | |
| Postage | 28 5 11 | | |
| Travelling expenses of clerk of the works | 181 18 6 | | |
| Annual grant to depôt charitable fund | 30 – – | | |
| Petty expenses | 739 6 3 | | |
| | | 5,788 17 10 | |
| | | | 43,469 14 5 |

(C.)

RETURN for the Seven Years 1861-62 to 1867-68 of the Estimated Establishment of the Indian Depôts for Cavalry and Infantry, of the actual Strength of those Depôts, and of the actual Number of Recruits and Drafts sent out thence to India.

| Depôts. | 1861-2. | 1862-3. | 1863-4. | 1864-5. | 1865-6. | 1866-7. | 1867-8. | Total. | Average. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Establishment - - | 6,688 | 6,224 | 7,467 | 7,465 | 7,222 | 7,099 | 7,894 | 50,059 | 7,351 |
| Actual strength on monthly averages - | 9,638 | 6,190 | 7,543 | 7,811 | 8,826 | 8,881 | 10,572 | 59,461 | 8,494 |
| Number of men embarked in drafts - | 1,646 | 787 | 2,839 | 1,656 | 3,001 | 1,801 | 3,643 | 15,376 | 2,196 |
| Approximate amount of home charges for depôts, including recruiting expenses and pay on passage out and home - | £. 365,700 | £. 296,650 | £. 379,650 | £. 377,650 | £. 378,650 | £. 398,150 | £. 469,650 | £. 2,666,100 | £. 380,871 |
| Average cost of each recruit embarked - | 221 | 376 | 134 | 228 | 126 | 221 | 129 | - - | 205 |
| | General Average - - £. 205. | | | | | | | | |

SECOND REPORT of the COMMITTEE appointed by the Secretaries of State for War and for India to make Arrangements for adjusting the Home Charges for Effective Services of Her MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS on the EAST INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT, on the principle of actual Charges.

MEMBERS:

T. L. Seccombe, Esq.,
Financial Secretary, India Office.
H. W. S. Whiffin, Esq.,
Chief Auditor, War Office.
Major-General Jameson,
Auditor of Home Accounts, India Office.
J. Milton, Esq.,
Assistant Accountant-General, War Office.

1. IN their first Report, dated the 11th March 1869, the Committee recommended that the system of payment for the Effective Services of Her Majesty's Regiments on the East Indian Establishment, by a Capitation Rate, should be continued for one year, from the 1st April 1869, in order to afford time for a careful inquiry as to the best mode of settling the claim of the Imperial Government for the Home Charges on account of Regiments, Batteries, Drafts, and Recruits of the several Arms of the Service proceeding to India, either by a Schedule of prices per man, or, if that were not practicable, by a direct settlement of actual charges.

2. The Committee, in that Report, requested the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the very heavy charge imposed on India, and to the very large difference between the expenditure under the existing system, and that which was formerly incurred by the East India Company, in recruiting their European Artillery and Infantry.

3. The recommendation of the Committee having been adopted, another Committee, consisting of three Officers representing the India Office, War Office, and Horse Guards respectively, was appointed to consider to what extent the Depôt Establishments maintained for Regiments serving in India would admit of reduction.

4. That Committee recommended certain reductions, but these have not yet been ordered, and their effect cannot therefore be ascertained.

5. Under these circumstances, the Committee have not deemed it advisable to attempt to fix a Schedule of prices, as it would have to be based entirely on estimate, if the Depôt Establishments recommended in the Report in question be adopted, and would require modification, if it should be found practicable to carry reduction to a still greater extent.

6. They are, therefore, of opinion, that, from the 1st April 1870, the claims of the Imperial Government should be adjusted by repayment of the actual charges on the general principles which governed the settlement of the Accounts for Recruiting, Depôt, and other Home services, from the year 1824 to the date of the introduction of a Capitation Rate.

7. There are, however, certain charges, formerly included in that adjustment, which it would be expedient henceforth to exclude; the payments under the several heads to be in future made direct by the India Office, viz.:—

A. Pay of Officers on furlough from India, with the exception of the pay of Colonels of Regiments, and Colonels Commandants of Artillery, which should continue to be issued by the Agents and charged to India, through their Accounts with the War Office.

B. Advances in this country to Regiments proceeding to India, which should be accounted for by the Paymasters to the Local Government in India, the Paymasters rendering to the War Office a Pay List to the day preceding embarkation.

C. Advances in India to Regiments returning to England to be accounted for by the Paymasters to the India Office, a pay list being rendered to the day preceding disembarkation.

8. Advances to Drafts proceeding to, and Detachments returning from, India should be adjusted in the mode adopted previous to the introduction of the Capitation Rate.

9. The Committee would also recommend that the Remittances from India by Officers and Soldiers should be paid direct by the India Office, and that the present charge for Agency be revised.

10. Excluding the foregoing items, the charges which will have to be adjusted on the principle of actual Accounts, are detailed in the Schedule, Appendix A., and may be classified as follows:—

Class 1. Direct charges,
„ 2. Indirect, or assessed charges.

There are certain charges shown under Class 3, to which reference will be made separately.

11. The items in Class 1 do not require explanation.

12. In regard to Class 2, comprising the indirect or assessed charges, in respect of which India is liable for a proportion only, the expenditure for these services should be charged rateably on the net disbursements occurring in *each* of the several Recruiting Districts and Depôt Battalions, in which there may be recruits for India, with the exception of the charges for Barrack Accommodation, and for difference of numbers of men on passage to and from India.

13. The charge for Barrack Accommodation should be calculated on the average number of Officers and Men belonging to Regiments on the Indian Establishment, accommodated in Barracks on the 1st of each month.

14. With reference to the charge hitherto made for the difference of numbers of men on passage to and from India, and to a recent communication from the Horse Guards, copy of which is annexed (Appendix G), respecting the minimum time required for training Recruits of the several Arms of the Service, the Committee are of opinion that the following sums, details of which are given in Appendices B and C, should, for the present, be charged for every non-commissioned

sioned officer or soldier embarked, as reliefs for India, with regiments of the line, viz. :—

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry - - - | 45 | 16 | 10 |
| Infantry - - - | 27 | 7 | 11 |

and the Government of India will be entitled to credit, at the same rates, for every non-commissioned officer or soldier disembarked with regiments, who, at the date of disembarkation, shall not be within two years of the completion of his term of service.

15. This adjustment will not apply to drafts sent from this country to India, as India will have paid for them, nor to detachments of invalids or time-expired men returning from India.

16. Assuming that the expenses of the Indian depôts of Royal Artillery will, in future, be defrayed by the Government of India in the same manner as those for depôts of Cavalry and Infantry, the Committee consider that the amount chargeable for every non-commissioned officer or soldier of Artillery embarked for India should be as follows, viz. :—

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Horse Artillery - - - | 47 | 10 | 7 |
| Garrison and Field Artillery - - | 40 | 11 | 5 |

Details showing how these charges are arrived at are given in Appendices D and E.

17. These rates will be chargeable on the numbers embarked with troops or batteries of artillery as reliefs, and also on such non-commissioned officers or men, if any, as may be sent from troops and batteries not belonging to the Indian depôts, India being reimbursed at the same rates for every effective, non-commissioned officer or soldier disembarked with troops or batteries who shall not be within two years of the completion of his term of service.

18. As in the case of regiments of the line, drafts of artillery embarked for India will not be chargeable, nor will India be entitled to credit for invalids or time-expired men returning.

19. The practice at present adopted, of not sending out men who have less than two years to serve, should be continued; and in calculating the number on which the prescribed sums are to be paid for effective men going out or returning with their corps, the number of men left with the depôts who may not be within two years of the termination of their period of service should be added to the numbers embarking; and, in like manner, the number of soldiers and recruits of three months' service and upwards, serving with the depôt at the date on which the order was issued for the recall of the regiment from India, should be added to the number of men disembarking in this country with the corps.

20. The rates at present chargeable for non-commissioned officers of Royal Engineers required for special service in India, as fixed in the Report of the Committee which considered the subject in March 1867, should remain in force (Appendix F.).

21. The Committee recommend that the above rates, as well as the charges under Class 2, should be subject to revision every three years.

22. On the subject of these charges a separate minute is recorded by the members representing the India Office on this Committee.

23. In regard to the mode of payments, the Committee recommend that monthly udvances, based on the estimated expenditure, should be made by the India Office. The accounts should be kept distinct for each year, and the balance of each year's account should, if practicable, be declared within nine months of the expiration of the financial year.

24. The final adjustment of each year's accounts would be materially facilitated by the establishment of a system of concurrent audit, on behalf of India, of the direct charges as recorded in the books of the War Office, many of which charges are so well defined that they will hardly admit of objection;

and in recommending the adoption of that course, the Committee consider that the necessary detailed arrangements, to carry it into effect, might with advantage be left in the hands of the responsible officers of each department, charged with the duty of rendering and auditing the accounts.

25. With the view of facllitating the settlement of any questions which may arise in the course of the adjustment of the accounts, the Committee recommend that a standing committee should be formed, composed of members representing both the India Office and the War Office, and that the proceedings of the standing committee should from time to time be recorded in a minute book, to be kept by a gentleman on the establishment of the War Office, who should act as secretary; copies of such proceedings being submitted periodically to the Secretaries of State for War and for India.

26. The charges specified under Class 3, of Appendix (A.), having relation to the army generally, have not hitherto been matter of account between the Imperial Government and the Government of India.

27. The question as to the liability of India to bear a proportion of these charges was discussed by the committee, which arranged the existing capitation rate in 1861, and it resulted in the exclusion of those charges therefrom.

28. The subject has again been considered by this Committee; and it appears to them that, in conformity with long established usage, no adjustment is necessary on this account, such proportion of the expenditure for head quarter departments, general staff, &c., as might be considered applicable to Her Majesty's regiments on the Indian establishment being, in their opinion, fairly compensated for by the advantages derived by the Imperial Government from the presence of Indian depôts in this country. On this point, however, a separate Minute, by the members representing the India Office on the committee, is added hereto.

29. In concluding their Report, the Committee would again refer to the heavy expense of the Indian depôts as at present constituted. They are unanimously of opinion that the present rate of expenditure is too large when compared with that incurred prior to the mutiny in India; and, as shown in their former Report, excessive when compared with the charge incurred by the East India Company in the maintenance of their depôt at Warley.

30. The Committee are therefore of opinion that, without any sacrifice of efficiency, it is practicable to effect a very large reduction in these charges.

31. The Committee desire again to record their acknowledgments of the very valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Day as secretary to this Committee.

(signed) *T. L. Seccombe.*
*H. W. S. Whiffin.*
*G. I. Jameson*, Major General.
*J. Milton.*

(signed) *Robert P. Day*, Secretary.
24 November 1869.

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While concurring generally in the foregoing Report, the members appointed by the Secretary of State for India to serve on this Committee, feel it to be their duty to represent that they consider that the proposed arrangement is, in one respect, not just towards India.

They are of opinion that, as all expenses of raising, training, maintaining, and pensioning the troops whose services are lent to India are paid from Indian revenues, India is fairly entitled to a considerable credit for the value to the Imperial Government of the presence in this country of the staff and men engaged in course of training. The troops are available to meet any emergency for which a home garrison is required, and the resignation by the War Office of any charge for a proportion of the expenses of the General, Medical, and Commissariat Staff, &c., specified under Class 3, in Appendix (A.), as a set-off to that advantage, appears to the undersigned to be entirely inadequate.

They are also of opinion, that the periods of training, on which the charge for difference

difference of numbers of men is based, are longer than are necessary with reference to the requirements of India; and that, as the East India Company formerly found it safe and expedient to send soldiers to India after very short periods of training, the adoption of a somewhat similar course would tend greatly to reduce the charge on this account, an object that would be further facilitated by a reduction in the number and strength of the depôts.

We have, &c.
(signed) *T. L. Seccombe.*
*G. I. Jameson,*
Major General.

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# APPENDIX.

## (A.)

SERVICES chargeable against the Revenues of India in respect of Recruiting Districts and Depôts of Her Majesty's Regiments on the East India Establishment.

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### CLASS I.

DIRECT CHARGES.

VOTE 1.

Pay of Regimental Officers.
Additional pay „
Allowance in lieu of servants.
Pay of men.
Good-conduct pay.
Beer-money.
Command pay.
Non-effective allowance to Field Officers.
Contingent allowance to Captains.
Agency, including allowance for postage and stationery.
Regimental postage, stationery, &c.
Pay of non-commissioned officers and men invalided from India.
Passage pay of Officers and men to and from India.
Furlough pay.
Levy money for recruits.
Medical attendance on recruiting parties and recruits.
Marching and travelling allowances.
Cost of conveyance of recruits, escorts, &c.
Good-shooting pay, and pay for good sword-manship.
Railway and other expenses (including marching allowances to Officers) to troops moved from one station to another on regimental routes.
Rations to men whose pay has been mulct.
Mess allowance.
Payments for certificates of conviction by civil power.

VOTE 2.

Excess cost of bread and meat
Allowance to wives and children of soldiers separated from their families

VOTE 3.

Kits issued to recruits, and compensation in lieu thereof to re-enlisted soldiers.

VOTE 4.

Allowances for fuel and light (regimental).
Ditto, in lieu of lodgings to regimental Officers.
Ditto, to married soldiers.
Ditto, to men in stationary quarters.

VOTE 6.

Allowance to Acting Deputy Judge Advocates, and to members and witnesses.
Subsistence and expenses on routes for deserters, and their escorts, and rewards for apprehension of deserters.
Charge for escorting prisoners to and from civil and military prisons.

VOTE 7.

Payments to private medical practitioners.
Hospital expenses.
(Difference between the stoppage and actual cost of diets.)

VOTE 13.

Cavalry equipments.
Accoutrements.

VOTE 19.

Rewards for distinguished and meritorious service.
Victoria Cross annuities.

CREDITS.

Pay forfeited by sentence of Court-martial.
Contribution from Officers in aid of mess on board ship.
Stoppages from Officers for rations supplied to themselves and families on board ship.
Ditto, ditto from men.
Purchase money of soldiers discharged.
Effects and credits of deserters.
Smart-money from recruits.

## CLASS II.

### Indirect or Assessed Charges.

#### Vote 1.

Allowance to Riding-masters.
Farriery allowance.
Allowances to Officers and non-commissioned officers.
Instructors of musketry.
Allowance to non-commisioned officers acting as savings bank clerks.

#### Cavalry Depôt.

Pay, additional pay, command pay, and non-effective allowance of Commandant.
Assistant Commandant.
Majors.
Captain Instructors of Musketry (in addition to regimental pay).
Adjutant.
Paymaster.
Superintendent Riding Department.
Riding Master.
Quartermaster.
Surgeons.
Assistant Surgeons.
Veterinary Surgeon.
Non-commissioned officers.
Clerks, cooks, &c.
Farriery and riding money allowance.
Incidental expenses of riding-school.
Travelling expenses.
Postage and miscellaneous expenses of office.
Instruction in musketry and gymnastics.
Agency.
Mess wine allowance.
Beer-money.
Purchase of horses and expenses.
Cost of horse medicines, &c.

#### Depôt Battalions.

Pay and Allowances of Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.
Musketry Instruction.
Pay of Orderly-room Clerks of Depôt Battalions.
Allowance in lieu of Servants.
Travelling Expenses and Contingencies.
Postage and Miscellaneous Expenses of the Office.
Allowance to the General Agent for cashing Paymasters' Drafts.
Agency.

#### School of Musketry.

Pay and Allowances of Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.
Ditto, ditto, of Rank and File for Range Duties.
Good Service Pay and Beer Money to Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
Allowance in lieu of Servants.
Ditto, ditto, Lodgings.
Travelling Expenses.
Postage and Miscellaneous Expenses.
Allowance to Captains for paying Detachments.
Allowance in aid of Mess.
Agency.

#### Recruiting Establishments.

Pay and Allowance of Staff.
Pay of Clerks.
Allowance in lieu of Servants.
Rent of Recruiting Offices.
Travelling Expenses and Contingencies.
Postage and Miscellaneous Expenses of the Offices.
Allowances and Expenses of Superintending Officers.
Allowances to Recruiting Serjeants, &c., in Stationary Quarters.
Allowances to Staff Officers of Pensioners, and Pensioners employed upon Recruiting Services.
Agency.

#### Vote 2.

Proportion of Expense of Forage.
Ditto, ditto, Commissariat Staff.

#### Vote 3.

Clothing of Staff Non-Commissioned Officers of Districts, Depôt Battalions, &c.

#### Vote 4.

Charge for Barrack Accommodation.

#### Vote 5.

Allowance to Officiating Clergymen for performing Divine Service.
Rent of Buildings hired for the performance of Divine Service.

#### Vote 6.

Allowance to Non-Commissioned Officers acting as Provost Serjeants.

#### Vote 7.

#### General Hospital, Netley.

Pay and Allowances of Staff Officers and Clerks.
Pay and Allowances, Schoolmasters and Schoolmistresses, and Contingencies of Schools and Libraries.
Contingencies.
Cost of Medicine.

#### Vote 13.

Arms and Ammunition supplied for the use of the Depôts.

#### Vote 15.

Pay, Allowances, and Travelling Expenses of—
- Schoolmasters.
- Schoolmistresses.
- Pupil Teachers and Monitresses.
- School Orderlies.
- Soldier Assistants.

Purchase of School Material.
Repair of School Books.
Allowances to Librarians.
Carriage of School Books.

#### Vote 17.

Commission granted to Local Banks for the supply of Specie.
Expenses arising from the Contagious Diseases Act.
Charge for difference of numbers of Men on Passage.

#### Credits.

Proceeds of sale of Cast Horses at Cavalry Depôt.
School and Library Subscriptions.

## CLASS III.

EXPENSES affecting Depôts of Regiments in India which have not been matter of Account between the Imperial Government and the Government of India.

Proportion of the Expense of the—
- General Staff.
- Medical ditto.
- Commissariat ditto.
- Commissioned Chaplains.
- Military Departments.
- Chelsea College, Asylums, &c.

Expenses of Female Hospitals.

Billiard Tables and Rooms for Officers.
Recreation Rooms for Men, and cost of Games, &c.
Gymnastic Instruction, and cost of Utensils, &c.
School of Music, Kneller Hall.
School of Cookery.

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(B.)

## CAVALRY.

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay for nine months, at 1 *s.* 5 *d.* per diem | 19 | 7 | 9 |
| Beer money for nine months, at 1 *d.* per diem | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| Marching money, cost of conveyance of recruits, &c. (16 per cent. on pay) | 3 | 2 | – |
| Recruiting and depôt battalion Staff charges, 22 per cent. on foregoing charges and on levy money | 5 | 15 | 2 |
| Barrack accommodation for nine months, at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per man per annum | 4 | 12 | 2 |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for nine months | 1 | 2 | – |
| Charge for accoutrements for nine months | – | 1 | 2 |
| Clothing for nine months, at 4 *l.* 8 *s.* 9 *d.* per annum | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| Hospital expenses for ditto, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – | 13 | 2 |
| | 39 | 2 | 9 |
| Levy money | 2 | 11 | – |
| Cost of free kit | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| £. | 45 | 16 | 10 |

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(C.)

## INFANTRY.

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay for six months, at 1 *s.* 2 *d.* per diem | 10 | 12 | 11 |
| Beer money for six months, at 1 *d.* per diem | – | 15 | 2 |
| Marching money, cost of conveyance of recruits, &c. (16 per cent. on pay) | 1 | 14 | 1 |
| Recruiting and depôt battalion Staff charges, 22 per cent. on above charges and on levy money | 3 | 9 | – |
| Barrack accommodation for six months, at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per annum | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for six months | – | 14 | 8 |
| Accoutrements for six months | – | – | 10 |
| Clothing for six months, at 3 *l.* 1 *s.* 8 *d.* per annum | 1 | 10 | 10 |
| Hospital expenses for ditto, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – | 8 | 9 |
| | 22 | 7 | 8 |
| Cost of free kit (exclusive of extra articles formerly in the kit, but now issued as clothing) | 2 | 9 | 3 |
| Levy money | 2 | 11 | – |
| £. | 27 | 7 | 11 |

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(D.)

ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay for nine months, at 1 *s.* 7 ½ *d.* per diem | 21 | 19 | 1 |
| Beer money for nine months, at 1 *d.* per diem | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| Marching money, and cost of conveyance of recruits, &c. (16 per cent. on pay) | 3 | 10 | 3 |
| Barrack accommodation for nine months, at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per annum | 4 | 12 | 2 |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for nine months | 1 | 2 | – |
| Accoutrements for nine months | – | 1 | 2 |
| Charge for Staff expenses | 5 | – | – |
| Clothing for nine months, at 3 *l.* 17 *s.* 2 *d.* per annum | 2 | 17 | 10 |
| Hospital expenses for ditto, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – | 13 | 2 |
| | 40 | 18 | 5 |
| Levy money | 2 | 11 | – |
| Cost of free kit (exclusive of extra articles formerly in the kit, but now issued as clothing) | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| £. | 47 | 10 | 7 |

(E.)

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

| | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay for eight months, at 1 *s.* 5 ½ *d.* per diem | 17 | 9 | 9 |
| Beer money for eight months, at 1 *d.* per diem | 1 | – | 3 |
| Marching money, cost of conveyance of recruits, &c. (16 per cent. on pay) | 2 | 16 | – |
| Barrack accommodation for eight months, at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per man per annum | 4 | 2 | – |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for eight months | – | 19 | 8 |
| Accoutrements for eight months | – | 1 | 1 |
| Charge for Staff expenses | 5 | – | – |
| Clothing for eight months, at 3 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* per annum | 2 | 12 | 4 |
| Hospital expenses for ditto, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – | 11 | 8 |
| | 34 | 12 | 9 |
| Levy money | 2 | 11 | – |
| Cost of free kit (exclusive of extra articles formerly in the kit, but now issued as clothing) | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| £. | 40 | 11 | 5 |

(F.)

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

| | £. |
|---|---|
| For each Quartermaster-Serjeant | 190 |
| „ Colour Serjeant | 150 |
| „ Serjeant | 140 |
| „ Corporal | 125 |
| „ Second Corporal | 110 |
| „ Lance Corporal and Sapper | 90 |

(G.)

Sir, Horse Guards, 23 July 1869.

Referring to your letters of the 5th and 21st instant, I have the honour, by desire of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, to acquaint you that the following is the minimum time required for training recruits, prior to their embarking for service in India, of each of the following arms, viz.:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Royal Horse Artillery | 9 months. |
| Royal Artillery | 8 „ |
| Cavalry | 9 „ |
| Infantry | 6 „ |

I have &c.,
(signed) *C. R. Egerton,*
Deputy Adjutant General.

The Under Secretary of State,
War Office.

# THIRD REPORT of the COMMITTEE appointed by the Secretaries of State for War and for India to make arrangements for adjusting, from 1st April 1870, the Home Charges for Effective Service of Her Majesty's Regiments in India on the principal of Actual Charges.

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MEMBERS:

| | |
|---|---|
| T. L. Seccombe, Esq., C.B., Financial Secretary, India Office. | Major General Jameson, Auditor of Home Accounts, India Office. |
| H. W. S. Whiffin, Esq., Chief Auditor, War Office. | J. Milton, Esq., Assistant Accountant General, War Office. |

In compliance with the desire expressed by the Secretaries of State for War and for India, in a letter from Sir E. Lugard to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th January 1870, and the reply thereto of the 5th January, the Committee have re-assembled for the further consideration of the subject of the payment, by the Government of India, of the home charges for Her Majesty's troops serving in India.

Since the date of the Committee's second report, important changes have been proposed in the constitution of the army in India, and propositions have also been made for recruiting the army on a new principle, which involves the breaking up of the cavalry depôt and infantry depôt battalions, attaching, in lieu of the former, a home troop of each regiment on service to a regiment of similar equipment at home; and, of the latter, two companies of each battalion abroad to a battalion at home, eight companies to be on foreign service and 12 companies on home service.

A battalion of infantry, in India, would then consist of eight companies, each company having one captain and two subalterns; and there would be in respect of every battalion two companies at home, each with one captain and one subaltern, these two companies forming the depôt, and being attached to a home battalion of 10 companies.

The recruits annually required for each regiment of cavalry in India are estimated at 32, and for each battalion of infantry at 60. As under the proposed arrangement there would be nine regiments of cavalry and 50 battalions of infantry in India, the annual drafts required would be 288 cavalry and 3,000 infantry recruits.

The Committee have not before them at present any definite information as to the artillery.

The propositions placed before the Committee are, that ten months is to be regarded as the average period of training of each cavalry, and seven months of each infantry, recruit; and that payment should be made from Indian revenues for recruits, at rates per man to be calculated with reference to those periods.

It is proposed by the members appointed by the Secretary of State for War that a proportion of the staff charges of each regiment or battalion should be included in the calculation; but this is objected to by the members appointed by the Secretary of State for India, on the ground that the staff charges in question would not be increased in consequence of one troop or two companies being attached to each regiment or battalion, and that the object to be kept in view is the repayment to Imperial revenues of expenditure incurred for the purposes of the Indian Government, and not the relief of the Imperial Exchequer from charges which it would incur independently of any Indian requirements.

The Committee have, therefore, submitted two statements, one exclusive, the other inclusive, of the regimental or battalion staff.

Proceeding to ascertain the charge of a cavalry recruit under the arrangements above indicated, the Committee have taken into account the following items:—

| | £. s. d. | £. s. d. |
|---|---|---|
| Pay for 10 months, at 1 *s.* 5 *d.* per diem | 21 10 10 | |
| Beer money for 10 months, at 1 *d.* per diem | 1 5 4 | |
| Marching money and cost of conveyance of recruits, &c., 16 per cent. on pay | 3 8 11 | |
| Recruiting staff charges | 2 19 1 | |
| Barrack accommodation for 10 months, at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per annum | 5 2 5 | |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for 10 months | 1 4 5 | |
| Charge for accoutrements for 10 months | – 1 4 | |
| Charge for practice ammunition | – 8 1 | |
| Clothing for 10 months, at 4 *l.* 8 *s.* 9 *d.* per annum | 3 14 – | |
| Hospital expenses, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – 14 7 | |
| Forage for 10 months, providing one horse for three recruits | 11 2 8 | |
| Levy money | 2 11 – | |
| Cost of free kit | 4 3 1 | |
| | | 58 5 9 |
| **The charge of the Troop Depôt:** | | |
| 1 Captain | 266 2 11 | |
| 1 Lieutenant | 164 5 – | |
| 2 Troop Serjeant-Majors | 121 13 4 | |
| 3 Serjeants | 136 17 6 | |
| 1 Trumpeter | 28 17 11 | |
| 1 Artificer | 38 – 5 | |
| 10 rank and file | 258 10 10 | |
| Beer money | 25 17 1 | |
| Agency — Allowance £. 16 14 7; Poundage 2 13 9 | 19 8 4 | |
| Contingent allowance | 41 – – | |
| Postage, &c. | 7 – – | |
| Mess allowance | 25 – – | |
| Forage for 17 horses, at 1 *s.* 10 *d.* | 568 15 10 | |
| Cost of remount horses | 98 – – | |
| Forage for five officers' horses, at 1 *s.* 1½ *d.* a day each | 102 13 1 | |
| For 43 recruits £. | 1,902 2 3 | |
| At per recruit | – | 44 4 8 |
| | | 102 10 5 |
| **If the proportion of the pay of the Regimental Staff in England be added, viz.:—** | | |
| 1 Lieutenant Colonel | 419 15 – | |
| 1 Major | 351 6 3 | |
| 1 Paymaster | 228 2 6 | |
| 1 Adjutant (allowance) | 45 12 6 | |
| 1 Quartermaster | 155 2 6 | |
| 1 Surgeon | 273 15 – | |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon | 182 10 – | |
| 1 Veterinary Surgeon | 182 10 – | |
| Command allowance | 54 15 – | |
| Non-effective allowance | 40 – – | |
| Special allowance to Quartermaster | 30 – – | |
| Agency (1½ *d.* per £. on 1,963 *l.* 8 *s.* 9 *d.*) | 12 5 5 | |
| Forage for 21 officers' horses, at 1 *s.* 1½ *d.* a day each | 431 3 1 | |
| | 2,406 17 3 | |
| For one troop (one-eighth) | 300 17 2 | |
| For each recruit for 10 months | – | 5 16 8 |
| The rate per recruit would be | – | 108 7 1 |

On the same principles the charge for Infantry Recruits would be as follows :—

| | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pay for seven months at 1 *s.* 2 *d.* per diem | 12 | 8 | 5 | | | |
| Beer money for seven months at 1 *d.* per diem | – | 17 | 9 | | | |
| Marching money, cost of conveyance of recruits, &c. (16 per cent. on pay) | 1 | 19 | 9 | | | |
| Recruiting Staff charges | 2 | 19 | 1 | | | |
| Barrack accommodation for seven months at 6 *l.* 2 *s.* 11 *d.* per annum | 3 | 11 | 8 | | | |
| Excess cost of bread and meat for seven months | – | 17 | 1 | | | |
| Accoutrements for seven months | – | 1 | – | | | |
| Practice ammunition | – | 8 | 1 | | | |
| Clothing for seven months, at 3 *l.* 1 *s.* 8 *d.* per annum | 1 | 16 | – | | | |
| Hospital expenses for seven months, at 17 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum | – | 10 | 3 | | | |
| Cost of free kit (exclusive of extra articles formerly in the kit, but now issued as clothing) | 2 | 9 | 3 | | | |
| Levy money and bounty | 2 | 11 | – | | | |
| | | | | 30 | 9 | 4 |
| **The charge of the two Depôt Companies :—** | | | | | | |
| Pay of 2 Captains | 422 | 15 | 10 | | | |
| „ 2 Subalterns | 237 | 5 | – | | | |
| „ 2 Colour Serjeants | 97 | 6 | 8 | | | |
| „ 6 Serjeants | 237 | 5 | – | | | |
| „ 4 Drummers | 91 | 5 | – | | | |
| „ 6 Privates | 127 | 15 | – | | | |
| Beer money | 27 | 7 | 6 | | | |
| Contingent allowance | 36 | 10 | – | | | |
| Postage and stationery | 14 | – | – | | | |
| Mess allowance | 50 | – | – | | | |
| Agency | 18 | 5 | – | | | |
| Ditto poundage | 8 | 7 | 9 | | | |
| For 80 recruits | 1,368 | 2 | 9 | | | |
| Or, per recruit | – | | – | 17 | 2 | – |
| | | | | 47 | 11 | 4 |
| **If a proportion of the pay of the Regimental Staff in England be added, viz. :—** | | | | | | |
| 1 Lieutenant Colonel | 310 | 5 | – | | | |
| 2 Majors | 584 | – | – | | | |
| 1 Paymaster | 228 | 2 | 6 | | | |
| 1 Adjutant (allowances) | 63 | 17 | 6 | | | |
| 1 Instructor of musketry (allowances) | 45 | 12 | 6 | | | |
| 1 Quartermaster | 118 | 12 | 6 | | | |
| 1 Surgeon | 273 | 15 | – | | | |
| 1 Assistant surgeon | 182 | 10 | – | | | |
| Command allowance | 54 | 15 | – | | | |
| Non-effective allowance | 40 | – | – | | | |
| Special allowance to quartermaster | 30 | – | – | | | |
| Forage for seven horses | 234 | 4 | 2 | | | |
| Agency | 13 | 10 | 7 | | | |
| | 2,179 | 4 | 9 | | | |
| For two companies (one-sixth) | 363 | 4 | 1 | | | |
| For each recruit for seven months | – | | – | 2 | 12 | 11 |
| The rate per recruit would be | – | | – | 50 | 4 | 3 |

In the above calculation no provision is made for deaths or desertions among the recruits, nor for those who are unable through ill health to embark for India. Under the system hitherto existing, the charge on this account has been very heavy, as shown in the accompanying memorandum; but, in future, as the recruits would form part of a Home regiment or battalion instead of a depôt

battalion, it may be anticipated that their association with a larger body of trained men would reduce materially the extent of desertion.

The committee are of opinion that if to the expense of each recruit, as already shown, a sum equal to one-third thereof be added, adequate provision would be made for the charge consequent on deaths, desertions, or inability of recruits to proceed to India. The charge for each cavalry recruit would thus be 136 *l.* 13 *s.* 11 *d.*, and for each infantry recruit 63 *l.* 8 *s.* 5 *d.*, or 144 *l.* 9 *s.* 5 *d.*, and 66 *l.* 19 *s.* if the regimental staff charges are to be paid by India.

In regard to invalids or time-expired men awaiting their discharge, it appears to the committee that the expenditure actually incurred on that account should not be included in the rate per recruit.

They understand that all invalids will, in future, be sent to the invalid hospital at Netley, or to a consolidated depôt near the port of disembarkation, and they consider that the maximum period of remaining there should be six months; that at the expiration of that time, at the latest, the soldiers should either be discharged or brought on the strength of their regiments at home, the time-expired men and those incapable of further service being discharged as soon as possible after arrival in this country.

A statement of the charge on this account should be annually furnished by the War Office, and, after examination by the officers of the Secretary of State for India in Council, should be paid independently of the charge for recruits.

The charge for difference of men on passage should remain as specified in the second report of this committee, an addition of 10 *l.* 0 *s.* 5 *d.* per man being made on account of forage to the charge for each cavalry soldier, which was inadvertently omitted in the calculation annexed to the second report.

In addition to the above charges, India would have to pay directly the Colonels' allowances and furlough pay.

In this report, the committee have shown what would be the estimated cost of recruiting cavalry and infantry regiments in India under certain conditions placed before them. They have not entered upon the question how far those conditions are consistent with a due regard to economy. But they desire to express their concurrence in the view taken by the committee presided over by Major General Jameson, in their report, dated 5th August 1869, that, for the purpose of raising and training the number of recruits required for battalions of infantry in India, it is not necessary to maintain more than one company with the depôt in this country.

In a subsequent report, the committee, when supplied with information as to the artillery, will be prepared to recapitulate their recommendations as to the mode of adjustment of the several claims.

(signed) *T. L. Seccombe.* *G. I. Jameson,* Major General.
*H. W. S. Whiffin.* *J. Milton.*
(signed) *Robert P. Day,* Secretary.

India Office,
28 February 1870.

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We have agreed to the foregoing Report, as showing the cost of cavalry and infantry recruits under certain prescribed conditions, which include the following charges:—

*For Cavalry Recruits.*—The pay of two officers, seven non-commissioned officers, and 10 rank and file, for each cavalry regiment, as well as the levy money, free kit, pay, and all allowances of 43 men for 10 months, in order to provide 32 recruits for India.

*For Infantry Recruits.*—The pay of four officers, 12 non-commissioned officers, and six rank and file for two companies of infantry, as well as the levy money, free kit, pay, and all allowances for 80 men for seven months, in order to provide 60 recruits.

We consider that the mere enumeration of the strength in officers and men, with reference to the number of recruits to be provided, is sufficient to show that

that any scale of charge based thereon must be excessive; whereas among the advantages specified in the confidential "plan for carrying out certain reductions of expenditure upon the Army in India, and organising a system for training recruits for battalions serving abroad," it is expressly stated that the plan "affords a more economical mode than that now existing of training and supplying drafts."

How far the charge involved in the propositions before the committee may be justified by other considerations than the best and cheapest mode of training recruits, it is not our province to consider. But we feel it to be our duty again to refer to the fact, stated in the first report of the committee, that the East India Company were able to send efficient artillery and infantry recruits to India at a cost of 26 *l.* 7 *s.* 5 *d.* per man, instead of 136 *l.* 13 *s.* 11 *d.* for cavalry and 63 *l.* 8 *s.* 5 *d.* for infantry recruits, as now proposed.

We are fully aware that the changes made in the terms of enlistment, pay, clothing, &c., would have increased the charge as incurred by the East India Company, but the proposed establishments for, and the periods of, training, which have formed the bases of this third report of the committee, appear to us to be enormously in excess of what can be possibly required for the purpose of properly recruiting the British Army in India.

(signed) *T. L. Seccombe,*
*G. I. Jameson,*
Major General.

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# EAST INDIA (RECRUITS).

COPY of the PROCEEDINGS of the COMMITTEE, which sat at the end of last Year, to Inquire into the EXPENSES of the RECRUITS for the REGIMENTS serving in *India*.

(*Mr. Eastwick.*)

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
27 *March* 1871.



*Under* 2 *oz.*

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
*Royal Asiatic Society.*
Class

# EAST INDIA (BOMBAY).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 24 August 1860;—*for*,

"COPIES of LETTERS from the Government of *Bombay*, dated the 25th day of February and the 12th day of March 1860, with the Enclosures:"

"Of LETTER from the Secretary of State for *India* to the Secretary of State for War, dated the 12th day of May 1860, forwarding the same:"

"Of LETTER from the Under Secretary of State for War, dated the 22d day of August 1860, to the Under Secretary of State for *India*:"

"Of LETTER of the Adjutant General, dated Horse Guards, the 1st day of August 1860, to the Under Secretary of State for War, with its Enclosure, from the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery:"

"And, of LETTER from *J. C. Melvill* to the Secretary of the India Board, dated East India House, the 12th day of February 1858; and of the MEMORANDUM, dated the 22d day of April 1858, by Major General *Bonner*, Inspector of Stores, India Office."

War Office,
27 August 1860.

SIDNEY HERBERT.

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EXTRACT Bombay Military Letter, dated 25 February 1860, No. 15.

2d. WE have the honour to transmit copies of two letters from the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, dated 30th November and 31st January last, suggesting the advisability of no more gun carriages and harness for the Royal Artillery being sent out, unless on requisition.

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No. 8040 of 1859.

From the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, dated 30th November 1859.

Sir,

LARGE consignments of stores for the Royal Artillery serving under this Presidency, consisting of light field gun carriages and harness, having lately arrived in India, for which there is no immediate need, and which puts us to considerable straits for want of store room, and which will, of course, be liable to deterioration before being brought into use, I beg to suggest, for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, the expediency of soliciting the home Government to refrain from sending out any more supplies of this nature, unless on requisition from the Bombay Government, as I am of opinion that we may now safely trust to our own resources for maintaining the Royal Artillery serving under this Presidency complete in carriages and harness, at less expense to the State than the present system involves; and, if we may

form an estimate from the working of the battery brought from England by the "D" Troop of Royal Horse Artillery, already pronounced unserviceable, their efficiency will be in nowise impaired by the proposed arrangement.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. M. Glasse*, Lieut. Colonel,
Acting Inspector General of Ordnance
Bombay, 30 November 1859. and Magazines.

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No. 692 of 1860.

From the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines to the Secretary to Government.

Sir, Military Department, 31 January 1860.

WITH reference to my letter, No. 8040, dated 30th November last, reporting upon the unadvisability of obtaining Royal Artillery Carriages and stores from England, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, that the battery in charge of the "D" Troop, Royal Artillery, has become unserviceable, rendering necessary the issue of a complete new equipment of carriages.

2. A committee, consisting of two officers of the Royal and one of the Indian Artillery, were assembled at Mhow, on the 20th October last, by order of Major General Sir John Michel, and in reporting upon the condition of this battery, state—

"The committee having assembled according to order, after carefully examining the carriage equipment of 'D' battery, found that the wheels of all the carriages were much shaken; and although constant repairs have been carried on, and nearly the whole of the material allowed been expended, they consider they would not stand another severe March: the heads and butts of the spokes are in many cases quite gone, and the felloes much injured; the trails of some of the guns are split, the perches of the waggons damaged, and all the 'spare-wheel axletree arms' broken off: the whole of the ammunition boxes are shaken, and the sides warped, and the forage cart and hospital cart are unserviceable.

"Although they consider the repairs required as too extensive to be carried out, without returning the battery into store."

3. These proceedings were, on receipt, referred for the report and observations of the agent for gun carriages, as I was desirous of ascertaining if there existed a possibility of having these carriages efficiently repaired, though I was previously convinced that such an attempt would be useless.

Major Worgan's reply is as follows:—

"I do myself the honour to state, that it appears from the proceedings that the wood work of the whole of the carriages has deteriorated to an extent rendering it unadvisable to incur any expense in repairing the battery, and, under the circumstances, I think it preferable to break up the carriages, and to retain the iron work for use in repairing similar equipment."

4. This battery was issued to the "D" Troop from the Woolwich Arsenal, on the 30th September 1857, and arrived in India on the 20th December following, leaving only two years to accountfor its deterioration on service; and, considering it probable that I might at some future date be called upon to account for this rapid change, I requested the officer commanding the Royal Artillery to inform me if these carriages were new on their issue from store; when the subjoined copy of a letter from the officer commanding "D" Troop was received in reply:—

"In compliance with your memorandum, No. 2090, I have the honour to state, for the information of the officer commanding, that the battery took over the guns and carriages in Woolwich Arsenal (a few days previous to embarkation), newly painted and lettered; but I am informed they had an appearance of

of having been in use before (although but slight), but were then in an apparently serviceable and efficient state.

"I beg also to state, that the carriages have had during their period of field service (nearly eight months), some extraordinary and unparalleled marches in pursuit of the rebels in Central India."

5. It will be observed from the preceding, that if the carriages were not new on their issue from store, they were evidently thought to be in a perfectly serviceable and efficient state, and it is but fair to suppose that the marches performed by the Indian batteries in pursuit of the enemy in Central India were equally as severe as those of the "D" Troop, but there is no instance of an entire battery having become worn out in consequence.

6. In proof of the superiority of the Indian batteries over those received from England, may be shown the fact that the battery with the 1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, on their return from field service in 1843, having performed the whole tour of Scinde, Affghanistan, Punjaub, and Scinde again, traversing about 3,500 miles, over every variety of ground, being engaged in repeated actions with the enemy, with nearly three years' constant exposure to every degree of climate, suffered far less than the battery now under consideration, and I would therefore, in bringing the matter to the notice of his Lordship in Council, merely reiterate my opinion, that the practice of obtaining these supplies from England will, I fear, prove a very expensive one.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. M. Glasse,*
Acting Inspector General of Ordnance
and Magazines.

Bombay, 31 January 1860.

(True copies.)
(signed) *W. F. Marnett,* Captain,
Acting Secretary to Government.

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No. 19 of 1860.—Military Department.

To Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, London.

Right Honourable Sir,

REFERRING to the second paragraph of our letter, No. 15, of 25th February, we have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a further letter from the Inspector General of Ordnance, dated 1st December, containing a report on the condition in which the harness sent out for the Royal Artillery arrived in this country.

On further inquiry, we learn that the harness, the condition of which is so unfavourably described in the accompanying report, and which, however good, is liable rapidly to deteriorate, cost about 3 lakhs of rupees, irrespectively of freight and storage, and other incidental expenses, and is in quantity sufficient for 15 years' supply of the Royal Artillery.

Some of it has, however, been sent to China, and it will be issued to the Indian Artillery rather than allow it to rot in the stores; but we deem it our duty to draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the loss attending such enormous supplies, and to beg that no more may be sent.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Elphinstone.*
*H. Somerset.*
*A. Malet.*
*H. Reeves.*

Bombay Castle, 12 March 1860.

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No. 8075 of 1859.

From the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, dated 1 December 1859.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter, No. 8040, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to subjoin, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, copy of a letter received from the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, No. 4316, dated 30th ultimo.

Agreeably to the instructions contained in your letter, No. 7627, dated 14th instant, I beg to report upon the state of the harness recently arrived from England; I have had it very carefully examined, and find it in the following condition :—

| NAMES OF ARTICLES. | No. 6 Battery. | | | No. 7 Battery. | | | K Battery. | | | Y Battery. | | | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | S. | R. | U. | S. | R. | U. | S. | R. | U. | S. | R. | U. | |
| Officers' Appointments: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Repairs required: |
| Pannels, saddle - - | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | New lining and stuffing. |
| Non-commissioned Officers' Appointment: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bridles, curb, portmouth - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | New buckles and billets, two new nose bands. |
| Breastplates, martingale - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | New neck strap. |
| Collars, head-stall - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 1 new back. |
| Pannels, saddle - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | – | 8 | – | New stuffing and lining. |
| Gunners' Appointments: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bridles, harness - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | New headstall and buckle |
| Collars, head-stall - - | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | - - ditto - ditto. |
| Collars, neck - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | 4 | – | New points and buckles. |
| Cruppers, harness - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | New belly-piece. |
| Girths, white - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | New buckle and chip. |
| Leggings - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | New buckle and strap. |
| Pannels, luggage - - | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | 16 | – | – | – | – | New stuffing and lining. |
| Pannels, riding - - | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | – | – | 4 | – | - - ditto - ditto. |
| Reins, bridle - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | Eaten through by the iron rust of buckles. |
| Reins, leading - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | - - ditto - ditto. |
| Straps, flank - - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | - - ditto - ditto. |
| Straps, luggage - - | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | - - ditto - ditto. |
| Traces, leading - - | – | 2 | 3 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | New buckle pieces. |

The whole of the pannels are more or less moth-eaten, and unless put into wear, will rapidly deteriorate and become unserviceable: most of the harness has a soiled appearance, and has every indication of having been made up some years.

I have, &c.

(signed) *T. M. Glasse*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Acting Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines.

Bombay,
1 December 1859.

(True copy.)

(signed) *W. F. Marnett*, Captain,
Acting Secretary to Government.

North West Provinces.

(54—Artillery—5211.)

Sir, India Office, 7 May 1860.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward, for the consideration of Mr. Sidney Herbert, and for such observations as he may wish to offer, copies of communications received from the Government of Bombay, with their enclosures, relating to the superfluous quantities of stores sent out from this country to Bombay (without any previous reference to the India Office), for the use of the Royal Artillery, and the deteriorated condition of some of the equipments.

With reference to the report of the Inspector General of Ordnance, dated 31st January, I am to add, that Sir C. Wood does not consider it advisable to send out any more gun carriages from this country, unless it should become necessary to furnish a new pattern of carriage suited to rifled ordnance; and in this case it might be arranged to send one or two pattern carriages complete, with the ironwork only of the remainder.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State for War. (signed) *W. E. Baker*, Colonel.

(This letter is supposed to be that referred to in the Address as of the 12th of May.)

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Sir, War Office, 22 August 1860.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Herbert to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 7th May last, forwarding copies of communications from the Governor of Bombay, and their enclosures, complaining that surplus quantities of stores had been sent out from this country to Bombay for the use of the batteries of Royal Artillery in that Presidency, without any previous reference to the India Office, and that some of the equipment was in a deteriorated condition. 54—Artillery—5211.

With reference to the alleged surplus supply, I am directed to transmit to you a copy of a report dated 1st instant, from the Adjutant General, to whom your letter was referred, in which that officer explains the grounds upon which the supply was made, and the necessity for guarding against the possibility of any deficiency, and points out that the principle of keeping these equipments complete by supplies from this country received the concurrence of the Court of Directors, as shown by their letter, dated 12th February 1858, and I am to express Mr. Herbert's hope that the Secretary of State for India will concur with him in considering the letter of the Adjutant General as satisfactory. 54—Artillery—5707. 54—Artillery—1343.

But I am further to observe, that so far from there being any reason to complain that the supplies were excessive, the very reverse may have been concluded to have been the case, from the single fact that reserve harness, saddlery, &c. were ordered in 1857 and 1858 for the East India Artillery in Bombay, on special requisitions from the India Office, dated 23d September 1857 and 6th January 1858, in value nearly equal to one-fourth of the supplies made for the Royal Artillery.

The Secretary of State for War may therefore naturally have considered that if such were the wants of the Government of India for the equipment of their own artillery, it was incumbent on him to provide in a similar manner for the probable requirements of the Royal Artillery, and that a duplicate set of harness was not more than sufficient for the occasion, seeing that no supplies were likely to be obtained from the Indian reserves, as shown in the memorandum of General Bonner, the Inspector General of Ordnance, dated 22d April 1858, recommending "that the troops and batteries of Royal Artillery should be provided with a full war establishment, and also with ample reserves to meet every probable contingency." 54—Artillery—1693.

With respect to the assertion that the supplies in question were sufficient for 15 years' requirements of the Royal Artillery, I am to observe, that it does not appear whether the calculation refers to 15 years of war or of peace. If a period of war was contemplated, the objection is, in Mr. Herbert's opinion, entirely groundless, as the whole quantity of harness, &c., sent to Bombay did not amount to a double supply for the number of horses on the war establishment of the batteries in that Presidency; while if a time of peace is referred to, the objection is of course irrelevant, the issue having been made to meet the actual necessities and casualties of war. But even for the ordinary expenditure during peace the statement is much exaggerated, as the average period for which articles of this description are calculated to last, does not exceed four years, so that a complete duplicate supply would not be sufficient to meet the wants of more than eight years.

It is no doubt true, as stated by the Adjutant General, that, owing to the early termination of hostilities, a surplus beyond the immediate wants of the service remained on hand, but this would not have been the case had the mutiny been less speedily suppressed.

Since the letter of 7th May was received, Mr. Herbert's attention has been drawn to the following passage in the dissent of Mr. Willoughby, contained in pages 11 and 12 of Papers (No. 442, East India Local European Forces) laid before the House of Commons; and, with reference to those remarks, I am to point out to you the fact, that the passage quoted by Mr. Willoughby as an extract from the report of the Inspector General of stores and magazines, is in reality composed of two distinct extracts, one from the letter of the Bombay Government, the other from the report of the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, which are put together in this dissent, as if taken from one document. Mr. Willoughby, probably quoting from memory, appears to have overlooked this circumstance; but it is right to observe, that the latter part of the extract derived from the report of the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, refers only to a very limited portion of the entire supply of harness, namely, to that which arrived about November 1859, and not to the whole, as would appear to be implied in Mr Willoughby's minute; and it is further to be noticed, that the supply which was examined by the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, and reported as containing 76 damaged pieces, consisted of many thousand articles.

With reference to the statement that the pannels were moth eaten, and that the harness had a soiled appearance, I am to add, that the whole supply was issued new from store, and that the pannels were only stuffed just before being packed: it must therefore be assumed, that whatever damage the articles complained of had sustained, occurred after shipment.

To conclude, Mr. Herbert deems it unnecessary on the present occasion to enter into the question of the practice of obtaining supplies from England. He would desire, however, to draw your attention to the fact, that it is only so recently as the 30th November 1859 that the Inspector General of Ordnance (Bombay) states, that he is of opinion that "we may *now safely* trust to our own resources for maintaining the Royal Artillery serving in India complete," and that a system has recently been established between the two departments, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, which it is considered will meet all such cases in future.

I have, &c.
(signed) *de Grey and Ripon.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

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(54—Artillery—5707.)

Sir, Horse Guards, S. W., 1 August 1860.

In returning the accompanying papers on the subject of supplies of stores sent from this country to Bombay for the use of the Royal Artillery in that Presidency, referred to me for any observations I might wish to make thereon;

I have

I have the honour, by desire of the General Commanding in Chief, to state, for Mr. Secretary Herbert's information, that the question as to the means by which the equipments of batteries of Royal Artillery in India should be kept up, was fully considered in the year 1857; and the proposition of His Royal Highness, that the necessary supplies should be sent out from this country, having been submitted by the then Secretary of State for War (Lord Panmure) to the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, it received the concurrence of that body, as communicated in a letter dated East India House, 12th February 1858, a copy of which accompanied the communication dated War Office, the 25th February 1858. 54—Artillery—1343.

The decision of the Secretary of State for War as to equipments being taken to India by the batteries, and spare saddlery and harness (for each battery a set), was communicated to me in a letter dated War Office, the 22d September 1857. 4410 M.

There were in all one troop of Horse Artillery and seven Field Batteries sent to Bombay, and the enclosed Table shows the number of sets of saddlery and harness supplied for the service of each, and as a reserve for the Presidency.

It therefore appears that the quantity of saddlery and harness sent out falls short of a double set for the number of horses of which the batteries in question would consist when completed to take the field; and when it is considered that the batteries were to have depended entirely on supplies from England for keeping them efficient, and that there was every prospect of their being on war service for a lengthened period, this proportion cannot be deemed excessive; indeed for European warfare a reserve nearly equal to a spare set of saddlery or harness for each horse would be in charge of the military storekeeper at the base of operations.

As to certain stores of descriptions not used in India being forwarded to that country, I am to observe, that the officers of Royal Artillery were particularly anxious that their battery equipments should be complete in all respects as for service in Europe, and, with the approval of His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, no article whatever in use at home was held back, unless it was known to be quite useless for Indian service.

The suppression of the mutiny it was to be expected would cause a surplus of harness, &c., to appear; but I am inclined to think, in estimating it as sufficient for the consumption of 15 years, some mistake must have been made, as it is found that the batteries in England taking their share of the ordinary service at the camps of instruction, wear out their harness in about four years, and on active service the wear and tear is, of course, much greater.

In conclusion, I am to state, that the General Commanding in Chief having given this representation from the Bombay Government His Royal Highness's consideration, he is of opinion that, under all the circumstances, it would not have been judicious to have left the batteries of Royal Artillery in the Bombay Presidency with a more limited proportion of reserve harness and saddlery than that despatched from this country by order of Major General Peel, the late War Minister, with his Royal Highness's concurrence.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. Yorke Scarlett*, A. G.

The Under Secretary of State,
War Office, Pall Mall.

TABLE showing the Quantities of SADDLERY and HARNESS sent to *Bombay* for Service of the Batteries of Royal Artillery.

| | Sets of Saddlery. | | Sets of Harness. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers. | Non-commissioned Officers and Men. | Lead. | Wheel. |
| D Troop, Royal Horse Artillery new equipment from Woolwich | - | 72 | 82 | 44 |
| V Battery, new equipment from Woolwich | 6 | 18 | 80 | 40 |
| X Battery, new equipment from Woolwich | 6 | 18 | 80 | 40 |
| C Battery from Ireland, the equipment it had in use | | 18 | 80 | 40 |
| For No. 6 Battery (sent out without equipment), from Woolwich | 6 | 18 | 80 | 40 |
| For No. 7 Battery (sent out without equipment), from Woolwich | 6 | 18 | 80 | 40 |
| A spare set of saddlery and harness for each of the above | 30 | 162 | 482 | 244 |
| K Battery, from Cape of Good Hope, an equipment from Woolwich | 6 | 24 | 130 | 50 |
| Y Battery, new equipment from Woolwich | 6 | 24 | 130 | 50 |
| To complete No. 6 Battery to 210 horses | - | 6 | 50 | 10 |
| To complete No. 7 Battery to 210 horses | - | 6 | 50 | 10 |
| As a store for the Presidency | 3 | 50 | 300 | 100 |
| A spare set of saddlery and harness for Y Battery | 6 | 24 | 130 | 50 |
| TOTAL sent | 81 | 458 | 1,754 | 758 |

Being equipment for 3,051 horses.

The Number of horses for the War Establishment:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Battery of horse artillery | 240 |
| 7 Field batteries, each 210 | 1,470 |
| | 1,710 |

(signed) *C. Bingham*,
Deputy Adjutant General.

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(54—Artillery—1343.)

Sir, East India House, 12 February 1858.

HAVING laid before the Court of Directors of the East India Company Sir George Clerk's letter of 30th ultimo, with its enclosed copy of correspondence with the War Department, relating to the system to be adopted for keeping up the equipments of troops and field batteries of the Royal Artillery serving in India, I have received their commands to state, in reply, that they entirely approve of the proposal on this subject made by the War Department, viz., that the requisite stores be sent from this country to the charge of the storekeepers of the Company at the principal military stations in the different Presidencies. The Court observe, that the stores should be sent by the authorities at Woolwich to the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, at Fort William, Fort St. George, and Bombay respectively, which officer will attend, under the instructions of the Inspector General of Ordnance, at each Presidency, to the allotment of the same to the outstations. The Court will give orders to this effect to the several Governments in India; and they would suggest that similiar arrangements be made for the saddlery of Her Majesty's dragoons serving in India, upon which subject inquiry was made by the Court in my letter to the Under Secretary of State for War of 27th ultimo.

I have, &c.

The Secretary, India Board. (signed) *James C. Melvill.*

(54—Artillery—1693.)

MEMORANDUM upon Letter from the War Office, dated 13 April 1858.

22 April 1858.

I AM of opinion that the points raised in this correspondence should be entirely left to the decision of the War Department. The letter of Major General Dupuis, dated so far back as 6 January last, enters into no detail of the amount and particular description of the additional equipments, and that he considered it necessary and desirable should be sent from this country for the service of the troops and field batteries of Royal Artillery serving in India, nor does it appear that he had ascertained how far or to what extent the public establishments of the Local Government (such as the grand arsenal, gun-carriage manufactory, Cossipore foundry, &c.), could have supplied, or would have undertaken to supply, any requisition that might have been made upon them. No satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at in this country upon these points; and, looking to the differences that exist in the system and organization of the artillery of the two services, and at the patterns of gun carriages, ammunition waggons, stores, implements, &c., I think the authorities of the War Department, and the stores of the Royal Arsenal, should be depended on both for information and supply; at any rate, at present, to hazard a very general opinion, it might be said that if the troops and batteries alluded to have not already been provided with a full war establishment, it might be desirable they should be so, and also with ample reserves in light field ordnance, carriages, &c., to meet every probable contingency; such additional supplies and reserves being of the pattern used in the Royal Artillery, would, if not immediately required for issue, form a useful store, which the certain casualties of service would sooner or later render it, if not indispensable, at least a wise precaution to command.

(signed) *John George Bonner*,
Inspector General.

Inspector General of Stores Office,
22 April 1858.

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# EAST INDIA (BOMBAY).

COPIES of LETTERS from the Government of *Bombay*, dated 25 February and 12 March 1860, with Enclosures; of LETTER from the Secretary of State for *India* to the Secretary of State for War, dated 12 May 1860, forwarding the same; of LETTER from the Under Secretary of State for War, dated 22 August 1860, to the Under Secretary of State for *India*; &c.

(*The Judge Advocate.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
28 *August* 1860.

612.

*Under* 2 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (RETIRED OFFICERS, &c.).

RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 25 March 1858;—*for*,

COPIES "of the DESPATCH addressed by the Court of Directors to the Government of *India*, on the 3d day of September 1856, and of the Letter addressed to Her Majesty's Government, regarding the Advantages held out to RETIRED OFFICERS of the INDIAN ARMIES on settling in Her Majesty's Colonies; and of the REPLY received to it, referred to in the above-mentioned Despatch:"

"And, of the MILITARY LETTER from the Government of *India*, dated 5th day of October 1857 (98 and 99), and its accompanying Reports from the several Local Governments, on the Project of holding out Advantages to EUROPEAN OFFICERS and SOLDIERS, Retired or Discharged, to settle in *India*."

East India House, 28 March 1858.

J. D. DICKINSON, Secretary.

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MILITARY LETTER to India, dated 3 September 1856, No. 140.

1. WE forward to you copy of a communication addressed by us to Her Majesty's Government, on the subject of the advantages held out to retired officers of the Indian armies on settling in Her Majesty's colonies, together with the copy of a reply we have received from the Colonial Office on the subject.

2. In reference to this correspondence, we are desirous that you should take into consideration whether it may not be practicable and desirable to hold out advantages to officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the Indian armies, who from their age and circumstances may be qualified as settlers, to induce them to settle in those localities in India which may, after due inquiry, be deemed best adapted to Europeans. We desire to have your views upon this subject as soon as possible.

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Sir, East India House, 9 May 1856.

1. WITH reference to the announcement made in the despatch to the Government of India, dated the 5th December last, I have the honour to forward copy of the communication from that Government, to which the despatch above referred to replies, on the subject of retired officers of the East India Company's service not being allowed a remission of purchase money in the purchase of Crown lands on settling in New South Wales. No. 166, para. 4, dated 11 August 1856.

2. The advantages enjoyed by Her Majesty's retired officers, with respect to the purchase of Crown lands in the colonies, were offered by Her Majesty's Government to the retired officers of the East India Company's armies in the year 1836. The offer originated in a desire expressed by the Governor of Western Australia, that the settlement of such officers in the colony under his government should be encouraged. The boon thus offered was announced to the armies by the Government of India in general orders, and its advantages were enjoyed by the Company's officers from this date until 1847, when they were withdrawn from them. These advantages have since been restored, so far as regards the colonies of Van Diemen's Land and Western Australia.

3. In forwarding this communication, I am instructed by the Court of Directors to express their hope that the present may be deemed a fitting occasion for a re-consideration

of the subject by Her Majesty's Government, with the view of restoring to the officers o the Indian armies the advantages of obtaining a remission in the purchase of land, on settling in Her Majesty's colonies generally, which they enjoyed from the year 1836 to 1847, thus removing any distinction in this respect between the officers of Her Majesty, and those of the Company.

I have, &c.

To the Secretary, India Board. (signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

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Sir, Downing-street, 27 June 1856.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Labouchere to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, with its enclosures, calling attention to the disadvantage at which retired officers of the East India Company's service are placed, as compared with those of Her Majesty's forces, in not being allowed, on becoming settlers in the colonies, similar advantages in respect of the acquisition of land.

In reply, I am to request that you will state to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, that Mr. Labouchere is prepared at once to extend the advantages thus enjoyed by Queen's officers to the officers of the East India Company, so far as the colonies of Western Australia and Natal are concerned, and that he will communicate with Sir Henry Ward, the Governor of Ceylon, as regards the expediency of including that colony in the arrangement.

With respect to New South Wales, to which you particularly refer, and the colonies of Victoria and New Zealand, I am to inform you that the control over the waste lands of the Crown in those colonies has been transferred by Parliament, any enactments to the local legislatures, and that the same is about to take place in South Australia; and consequently, that, although the advantages hitherto held out to officers of Her Majesty's service are still obtainable in those colonies, until the local legislatures may think fit to make other provision, the Secretary of State has no power to extend those advantages to other applicants.

The same observation applies to the Cape of Good Hope, where the control over the waste lands of the Crown has also been recently surrendered to the local Government. Mr. Labouchere will transmit to the respective Governors a copy of your letter, in order that they may take such steps as they may think advisable.

I am, &c.

To Sir G. Clerk. (signed) *John Ball.*

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EXTRACT Military Letter from Bengal (No. 259), dated 5 October 1857.

Cons., 6 February 1857, Nos. 64, 65. Cons., 6 March 1857, No. 68. Cons., 17 April 1857, Nos. 116. 118. Cons., 15 May 1857, No. 46. Cons., 4 September 1857, Nos. 295–297.

98. As requested in your Honourable Court's letter (No. 140) dated the 3d September 1856, we have now the honour to transmit the reports of the several local Governments on the project of holding out advantages to European officers and soldiers, retired or discharged, to settle in India.

99. The reports, it will be observed, are not favourable to such a project.

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EXTRACT Fort William Military Consultation of 6 February 1857.

No. 64.

No. 2408.

From Captain *H. R. James*, Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, to Colonel *R. J. H. Birch*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Fort William.

Sir,

General. I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 840) of the 30th ultimo, together with copy of one in the Military Department from the Honourable the Court of Directors (No. 140), of 3d September last, regarding the practicability of holding out advantages to retired officers and soldiers desirous of settling in suitable localities in India.

2. The Chief Commissioner desires me to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council, that there is no arable land available in the mountainous districts of the Punjab within British territory; indeed, there is not sufficient for the native population; and in the greater part of those

those tracts the best land is in the valleys, where the climate is more or less insalubrious.

3. I am to add that, in the Chief Commissioner's judgment, little could be done, even by good agriculturists, without considerable capital.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. R. James*,
Officiating Secretary.

Lahore, 15 November 1856.

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No. 4. No. 65.

From Major *A. P. Phayre*, Commissioner of Pegu and Agent to the Governor-general, to Colonel *R. J. H. Birch*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Fort William.

Sir,

In answer to your letter (No. 841), dated 30th October 1856, transmitting copy of military letter (No. 140 of 1856), dated 3d September 1856, from the Honourable the Court of Directors, and requesting my opinion as to the practicability of holding out advantages to officers or soldiers retired or discharged from service to settle in Pegu, I have the honour to state, for the information of Government, that though Pegu is a healthy country, waste land plentiful, and to be had on advantageous terms, yet the province cannot be expected to attract Europeans as colonists; *i. e.* induce them to settle down with their families, and employ themselves personally in agricultural pursuits. Military.

2. If they are men of capital they could take grants of land, especially in the northern parts of the province; but labour is so very high, that they would certainly have to lay out very considerable sums in importing labourers.

3. On the whole, I am decidedly of opinion that, except for capitalists who can command the labour of others, there is no field for the occupation of waste land in Pegu by Europeans.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. P. Phayre*,
Commissioner of Pegu and Agent
to the Governor-general.

Pegu, Commissioner's Office, Camp Yaigoo,
9 January 1857.

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EXTRACT Fort William Military Consultation of 6 March 1857. No. 68.

No. 943 of 1857.

From *C. B. Thornhill*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the North-Western Provinces, to Colonel *R. J. H. Birch*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Fort William.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Honourable the Lieutenant-governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 222), dated the 6th February 1857, on the subject of granting lands to officers or soldiers who may retire from the service and desire to settle in India. Revenue.

2. In reply I am desired to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India in Council, that the reply of this Government is deferred pending the receipt of the report of the Commissioner of Kumaon, whose attention has again been called to the subject.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. B. Thornhill*,
Officiating Sec. to the Govt. N. W. P

Head Quarters, Camp,
2 March 1857.

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EXTRACT Fort William Military Consultation of 17 April 1857.

No. 116. No. 1603 of 1857.

From *R. C. Oldfield*, Esquire, Assistant Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, to Colonel *R. J. H. Birch*, C. B., Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

Sir,

Revenue Department. IN continuation of Mr. Officiating Secretary Thornhill's letter, No. 943, dated 2d instant, relative to grants of lands to retired officers or soldiers, I have the honour to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India in Council, copy of two reports on the subject, as noted in the margin,* from the Commissioners of Meerut and Kumaon, and to state that the Lieutenant-governor concurs in the tenor of the opinion which is expressed by both these officers.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. C. Oldfield*,
Assistant Secy. to Govt. North-Western Provinces.

Agra,
21 March 1857.

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No. 117. No. 1 of 1857.

From *H. H. Greathed*, Esquire, Commissioner of the First Meerut Division, to *O. B. Thornhill*, Esquire, Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, Agra.

Sir,

Revenue Department. IN offering the opinion called for in your letter, No. 2387 A, of the 24th ultimo, on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers or soldiers, retired or discharged, to settle on localities in these provinces, I propose to confine my observations to the districts of the Meerut division.

Saharunpore, Moozafurnuggur, Meerut, Boolundshahur, Ally Gurh. 2. Among the five plain districts in this jurisdiction, named in the margin, there are three integral villages and portions of nine villages in the Ally Gurh zillah, of which the proprietary title belongs to Government by right of purchase at sales for arrears of revenue. These properties are at present under lease, and on the expiry of their terms are to be either sold by auction, or made over on certain conditions in proprietary tenure to the present lessees. The remaining 8,452 estates are private property, and there are no unappropriated lands in this portion of the division, excepting the southern slopes of the Sewalick range, which are unfit for cultivation.

3. I apprehend that the idea of inducing British soldiers or officers to locate themselves in the plains will not be entertained. The manual part of agricultural operations could not be carried on by Europeans in this climate, and the general character and social position of the pensioners from the ranks, who are to be found about our military cantonments, do not encourage a wish to see more of that class settled in India. In the transfer of landed property from the hands of the original proprietors that is going on throughout the country, it would be desirable to find a larger proportion passing under the proprietorship of Englishmen, but the successful management of an estate by an Englishman in India demands, besides capital, much strength of constitution and elasticity of spirit; and these qualifications are not likely to be found among officers who have passed the better part of their lives in the Indian service. Moreover, failure in management, and consequent default, would be visited by the revenue laws by transfer or sale of the property, and the defaulter, if a Government settler, would find himself deprived, by the act of Government, of the property he had been encouraged to acquire.

4. In

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* From Commissioner, Meerut, No. 1, dated 10 January. From Commissioner, Kumaon, No. 45, dated 8th instant.

4. In Dehra Doon there is still a large portion of unappropriated land at the disposal of Government, and the climate is, in part of the valley, more suitable to the English constitution for out-door work. The eastern Doon, however, is so insalubrious that the idea of reclaiming it through the agency of natives of the country, except by gradual encroachments on its borders, has been abandoned. In the western Doon a colony of Portuguese and Anglo-Indians, discharged from Scindiah's military service, was planted at Herbunswala, and received much encouragement, but it languished and failed.

5. The Englishmen who took grants of lands have, with one exception, either been compelled as public servants to give up, under orders of Government, or have seceded from the speculation; and at present the only thriving property in the Doon, under English management, is the tea plantation of Colonel Elwall, a retired officer, who has rented zemindaree lands, and carried on his operations without any assistance from Government.

6. The grant terms might be altered to admit of the bestowal of the pecuniary advantage afforded to military settlers in Her Majesty's colonies, or a fee-simple title to plots of unappropriated land in the Doon, or rent-free tenure might be conferred on English settlers; but even under such conditions I do not anticipate that any real benefit would be conferred on the settlers or on the country, and I would recommend that colonization be left to private enterprise, unaided by special immunities.

7. In the mountains within our jurisdiction private proprietary rights extend over every acre, and though culturable land has been positively brought into existence, with rare exceptions, by manual labour employed in constructing terraces, and in levelling the surface.

8. There consequently appears no opening in this division for the extension of the system of encouragement to military settlers in force in the Crown colonies.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. H. Greathed*,
Commissioner.

Commissioner's Office,
First or Meerut Division,
10 January 1857.

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No. 45 of 1857.

From Captain *H. Ramsay*, Commissioner of Kumaon, to *C. B. Thornhill*, Esq.,
Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, Agra.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2388 A, dated 24th December, with enclosures.

2. In the province of Kumaon there is no available land that could be profitably cultivated by Europeans, as in the Australian Colonies. There are no extensive unappropriated tracts; such lands as are at the disposal of Government are covered with heavy forest; and in a square mile of such forest, probably more than half of it, from the steepness of the hill or the stony nature of the ground, would be quite uncultivable. The portion that could be made use of would require to be terraced; and after much labour the average size of a field would not exceed (100) one hundred yards. All the good land of the province has come under settlement engagements. The waste land of the low valleys is unhealthy, and altogether unsuited for the residence of Europeans.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Ramsay*,
Commissioner.

Kumaon, Commissioner's Office,
8 March 1857.

(True copies):

(signed) *R. C. Oldfield*,
Assistant Secy. to Govt. North-Western Provinces.

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No. 118.

No. 896.

General.

From the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Military Department.

Sir,

No. 838, dated 30 October 1856.

THE Government of India, in the Military Department, having, in October last, called for the opinion of the Lieutenant-governor on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers and soldiers, retired or discharged from the army, to settle in localities in Bengal, the officers noted in the margin* were requested to report what localities, if any, under their respective superintendence, were, in their opinion, adapted for the purpose referred to.

2. The reports of the officers who were consulted on the subject having been received, I am now directed by the Lieutenant-governor to submit, for the information of his Lordship in Council, the following observations.

3. It appears, from the Report by Colonel Jenkins, that the only suitable localities in the North-East Frontier Agency, for European settlers, are the higher ranges of the Cossyah and Jynteah Hills. But even these high tracts do not seem to be well adapted for European settlers who have to work in the open air; for although the temperature in the shade is said to be at all times moderate, and even positively cold, during a long portion of the year, the altitude of the hills is not sufficient to render exposure to the sun free from danger. Colonel Jenkins is, however, of opinion that, though not adapted for discharged soldiers, these ranges would afford most eligible retreats, as far as climate alone is concerned, for retired officers of moderate circumstances, who would propose to employ themselves in farming the land.

4. Mr. Allen, the Commissioner of Chota Nagpore, states that there is not any locality in the division under his superintendency, adapted for the settlement of Europeans. One of the junior assistants of the division is, however, at present making personal observations on the variations of climate on the high lands of Sirgoojah, called the Mayneepat, with a view to ascertain the most suitable localities for the settlement of Europeans in that quarter. Upon the receipt of a Report on this subject, the result will be duly submitted to his Lordship in Council.

5. Captain James, the Officiating Superintendent of Darjeeling, speaks very highly of the capabilities of that locality as a place for European settlers. He states that there are many places in the neighbourhood of Darjeeling where European labour and energy might be most advantageously introduced. The climate of the Darjeeling Hills is represented as admirably suited for the European constitution. The temperature is very uniform throughout the year, varying only eight degrees in the 24 hours; and this seems to be one of the chief causes of its great salubrity.

6. One of the most remarkable features of the Darjeeling Hills, and one which would hold out to European settlers strong inducements to reside there, is the total absence of those epidemics which, in other parts of the world, commit such fearful ravages. The fact that cholera is unknown at Darjeeling and in the neighbouring villages, is one which alone proclaims the climate superior to most hill localities; and the small-pox very rarely makes its appearance; cases of measles, hooping-cough, and scarlet fever have never occurred among the European children at Darjeeling; and inflammation of the lungs, so common in other hill stations, does not prevail there more than in the plains.

7. Vegetable produce of all kinds, both European and tropical, can be cultivated at Darjeeling with every chance of success. Copper and coal are found in various parts of the hills, and their working might probably repay the European artisan and mechanic.

8. The whole area of the hilly portion of the district is stated to be 2,81,673 acres, out of which about 70,000 have been given away in grants, and are

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* Governor-General's agent, North-East Frontier, Superintendent of Darjeeling, and Commissioner of Chota Nagpore.

partially under cultivation. European settlers may find occupations suited to all their tastes. Cows, sheep, goats, and pigs thrive admirably; and there would always remain a large portion of forest land, unsuited to cultivation, on which these animals might procure food in abundance.

9. Captain James concludes his Report in the following terms:

"Looking, then, to the climate, the productions, and the facility of access to a ready market from these hills, there is little doubt as to the success of an attempt to introduce European settlers; their broken health will be speedily restored; they will see their children with rosy cheeks, rivalling those of the most favoured parts of Europe; they will be able to cultivate in their gardens those plants which are associated with home in their childhood; and they will find in the abundant crops around their dwellings, ample reward for the toil expended in their cultivation."

10. With his Report Captain James has forwarded a very interesting paper, drawn up by Mr. B. H. Hodgson, a retired civilian, whose opinions on this subject carry with them the weight of the experience of 30 years' residence in the Eastern and Western Himalayas. A transcript of this document is annexed; and I am directed to add that, so far as the Lieutenant-governor's inquiries and information extend, the Darjeeling Hills fully answer to the representations of Captain James and Mr. Hodgson, and offer great advantages for the settlement of Europeans.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. R. Young*,
Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

Darjeeling,
25 March 1857.

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My dear Captain James,

My head is too full of ethnological details just now to enable me to turn to the interesting subject of your Report to Government on the fitness of the Himalaya for European colonization, except in a very hurried way. But I must not detain your Report, and there is the less reason why I should do so, inasmuch as you have given, I think, a very just general opinion on the subject, and have fortified it, perhaps, by a sufficiency of facts and details. It may be worth while, however, to state distinctly my own conviction on the fitness of the Himalaya generally for colonization, because I have resided some 30 years in the central and eastern parts of the range, and have also served awhile in the western, and all that time my attention has been directed to studies calculated to make my observation and experience more effective.

I say then, unhesitatingly, that the Himalaya generally is very well calculated for the settlement of Europeans; and I feel more and more convinced that the encouragement of colonization therein is one of the highest and most important duties of the Government.

In the long gradation of heights, from the plains to the snows, every variety of climate is found, with correspondent capabilities for the successful culture of various products suited to the wants of Europeans; for their own consumption or for profitable sale. And in this extraordinary gradation of heights, the high and low are juxtaposed in a manner alike favourable to the labours of the healthful, and to the relief of the ailing.

A healthy cultivator of our race could have his dwelling at 4 to 6.000, and his farms both there and at various higher and lower elevations, yet still close to his abode, so that quasi-tropical and quasi-European products might be raised by him with the greatest facility, and in defect of health and strength the colonist, like the visitor, would enjoy the vast advantage of entirely changing his climate without cost and fatigue of journeying, besides having the additional resource of easy access to medicinal waters of universal diffusion, and of proved efficacy in many kinds of ailments. The greatest variety of climate has, of course, relation to the transverse section of the Himalaya, or that from plains to snows; but the longitudinal section, or the south-east and north-west one, likewise presents as much and the same variety of climate as is proper to the plains in Bengal, Benares, and the North-West Provinces, and it is quite a mistake to allege of the South-East Himalaya or of Bengal that their climate differs only for the worse from the drier climate of the hills or plains further west and north.

Undoubtedly the South-East Himalaya has much less sun and much more moisture than the North-West Himalaya, but those Europeans who have experienced the effects of the climate of both, frequently prefer that of the former; and it is quite certain that, in the past 20 years, the South-East Himalaya has suffered much less from epidemics, and has also enjoyed a complete exemption from those severe dysenteries and fevers which have afflicted the denizens of the North-West Himalaya. It is as certain that the obscured sun of the South-East Himalaya is the cause of the difference, and that, though our clouds and mists may hurt our popular reputation with strangers, they are welcome to ourselves from their experience and admitted beneficialness.

That the Himalaya, generally speaking, is a region eminently healthful can be doubted by no competent judge, and is demonstrable at once and readily by pointing to the finely developed muscles, pure skins, cheerful countenances, and universally well-formed, strong-boned bodies of the native inhabitants, whose health and strength, and capacity of enduring toil and carrying heavy burdens, are as notorious as are their exemption from bodily malformations, and from most of the direct diseases to which flesh is heir, as well in the tropics as in the high latitudes of Europe, results owing to the pre-eminent equability and temperateness of the climate, added to simple active habits.

The fearful epidemics of the plains seldom penetrate the Himalayas, which, moreover, seem to have a positive exemption from epidemic diseases, or those proper to any given country. For 40 years cholera has ravaged the plains continually almost; but in all that period Nipal has been visited only twice, and Darjeeling scarcely at all. In the same 40 years, at Kathmundu only two deaths * have occurred among Europeans, and both those were occasioned by diseases wholly apart from local influences; and in the escort of the Resident the salubrity, in my time, was so great, that promotion came hardly to be calculated on at all, and a sipahee would be a sipahee still after 15 to 20 years' service. The civil medical statistics of Nipal, as of Darjeeling, have always told the same story; and if the military statistics of the latter place have been till lately less favourable, the reasons for this had nothing to do with the hill climate, but resulted wholly from the senseless selection of cases sent up; the absurd neglect of seasons in the sending up and taking down of the invalids; and lastly, the shameful abandonment of all care and supervision of the men on the way up and down.† The appearance of the European children at Darjeeling might alone suffice to prove the suitableness of the climate of the Himalaya, at 6-8,000 feet for European colonization, confirmed as such evidence is by that of the aspect and health of such adult Europeans as come here with uninjured constitutions, and have led an active life since their arrival. Finer specimens of manly vigour the world could not show, and though none of the individuals I allude to have lately toiled all day in the open air at agricultural labours, yet I am credibly informed that some of them did so for several years after their arrival here, and with perfect impunity, their agricultural pursuits having been abandoned for reasons quite apart from either injured health or inability to support themselves and families comfortably by such labour.

That Europeans would sustain injury from exposure during agricultural labours at any period‡ of the year seems therefore refuted by fact; and when it is remembered that such persons would be working here as at home, amid an indigenous arboreal vegetation of oaks, chesnuts, hornbeams, birches, alders, willows, and more westerly pines, such a fact derives from such an analogy double strength; and the attempted inference from both is further justified by the healthful growth in the Himalaya of such of our own cereals and vegetables and fruits as we have thus far tried to introduce, with the sole exception of delicate and soft-pulped fruits, not of an early or spring-maturing kind, such as peaches, grapes, and the like: these rot instead of ripening in the central region of the Himalaya, owing to the tropical rains. But such soft fruits as become mature before the rains set in, as strawberries, come to perfection, as do all hard fruits, such as apples. There is, in fact, no end of the mineral and vegetable wealth of the Himalaya; and if the absence of flat ground, with the severity of the

* Mr. Stuart and Lieutenant Young.

† I have more than once myself seen the road from Siligori to Titalyah strewn with drunken soldiers.

‡ Agriculture does not require much exposure at the hottest season, when the crops are growing.

the tropical monsoon rainy season, presents considerable drawbacks to agricultural success; on the other hand, the endless inequalities of surface offer a variety of temperature and of exposure, together with signal modifications even of the element of moisture and rain, all highly conducive to the advantageous cultivation of numerous and diverse products proper to the soil, or imported from elsewhere.

Temperature changes regularly in the ratio of 3 diminution of heat for every 1,000 feet of height gained, and every large ridge crossing the course of the monsoon modifies almost as remarkably the amount of rain in the several tracts covered by such ridges.

The fertility of the soil is demonstrated by the luxuriance of the arboreal and shrub vegetation, a luxuriance as great in degree as universal in prevalence. True, this luxuriance has its evils, and in its present unpruned state may be one great cause why the feeding of flocks and herds is scantily pursued by the people, and without much success, speaking generally; for there are exceptions even now, and European energy would soon multiply these exceptions, besides grappling successfully with the presumed source of the evil, or too much rank vegetation. Not to add that, in the districts next the snows and Tibet, that hyper-luxuriance ceases, and herds and flocks abound, and the latter yield fleeces admirable for either fineness or length of fibre.* The soil consists of a deep bed of very rich vegetable mould, from two to five feet deep, to preserve which from being carried away by the tropical rains after the removal of its natural cover of forest and undergrowth by terracing and other known expedients, must be the colonist's first care, for the underlying earth is almost always a hungry red clay; but, happily, one whose tenacity and poverty are much qualified by better ingredients derived from the debris of the gneisses and schists that constitute the almost sole rock. The argillaceous constituents of the soil are perhaps in good proportion; the siliceous, perhaps, rather too abundant; the calcareous deficient. Heretofore the superficial mould has been the sole stay of the agriculturist and floriculturist. How far that would continue to be the case under abler culture I know not; but so long as it did continue, the caution above given would demand the most vigilant and incessant attention.

The common European cereals, or wheat, barley, rye, and oats, are little heeded in the Himalaya, where I never saw crops equal those grown in various parts of the plains. But I have no doubt this is owing to the preference for rices, maizes, sorghums, and panicums, or millets, on the part of the people, whose cultivation of even wheat is most careless, without manure even in double cropped and old lands: and the plant allowed to be overrun whilst growing by wild hemp or artimesia, or other weed of most frequent occurrence in Himalaya. As already said, the infinite variety of elevation and of exposure, both as to heat and moisture, together with the indefinite richness of the soil, as proved by the indigenous tree and shrub and other vegetation, are premises one can hardly fail to rest soundly upon in prognosticating the high success of European culture of the Himalaya slopes, notwithstanding the drawbacks I have enumerated. There need hardly be any end to the variety of the products, and good success must attend the cultivation of many of them after a little experience shall have taught the specialities of the soil and climate, so that the subject should be incessantly agitated till the Government and the public are made fully aware of its merits. How much iteration is needed may be illustrated by the simple mention of the fact that the fitness of the Himalaya for tea-growing was fully ascertained 25 years ago, in the valley of Nipal, a normal characteristic region, as well in regard to position as to elevation.† Tea seeds and plants were procured from China through the Cashmere merchants, then located at Kathmandu. They were sown and planted in the Residency garden, where they flourished greatly, flowering and seeding as usual, and moreover, grafts *ad libitum* were multiplied by means of the nearly allied camellia tersi, which, in the valley of Nipal, as elsewhere throughout the Himalaya, is an indigeneous and most abundant species. These favourable results were duly announced at the time to Dr. Abel, physician to the Governor-General; an accomplished person, with

* The samples I sent to Europe of the wool of the sheep and goats of the northern region of Himalaya and of Tibet were valued at 7 *d.* to 9 *d.* per pound.

† It is equidistant from snows and plains, and has a mean elevation of 4,000 feet,

with special qualifications for their just appreciation. And yet, in spite of all this, 20 years were suffered to elapse before any effective notice of so important an experiment could be obtained.

I trust, therefore, that the general subject of the high capabilities of the climate and soil of the Himalayas, and their eminent fitness for European colonization, having once been taken up, will never be dropped till colonization is a *fait accompli*, and that the accomplishment of this greatest, surest, soundest, and simplest of all political measures for the stabilitation of the British power in India may adorn the annals of Lord Canning's administration.

But, observe, I do not mean wholesale and instantaneous colonization, for any such I regard as simply impossible; nor, were it possible, would I advocate it. The distance and unpopularity of India, however, would preclude all rational anticipation of any such colonization, whatever might be the wish to effect it. What I mean is, looking to these very obstacles and drawbacks, seeming and real, that some systematic means should be used to reduce their apparent and real dimensions; to make familiarly and generally known the cheapest methods and actual cost of reaching India; to afford discriminating aid, in some cases, towards reaching it, and to show that in regard to the Himalaya the vulgar dread of Indian diseases is wholly baseless; to show also that its infinite variety of juxtaposed elevations, with correspondent differences of climate, both as to heat and moisture, and the unbounded richness of its soil at all elevations, offer peculiar and almost unique advantages (not a fiftieth part of the surface being now occupied) to the colonist, as well on the score of health as on that of opportunity, to cultivate a wonderful variety of products ranging from the tropical nearly to the European.

Located himself at any elevation he might find most conducive to his health, the colonist might, on the very verge of the lower region (*see* Essay on Phy. Geogr. of Himalaya, J. A. S. B. for 1847), effectually command the greatest resources for traffic in timber, drugs, dyes, hides,* horns, ghee, and textile materials, not excluding silk, which that region affords; whilst, if he chose to locate himself further from the plains, and devote himself to agriculture and sheep-breeding, he might make his election among endless sites, in the central and higher regions (*see* Paper above referred to) of Himalaya, of a place where these or those sorts of cereal flourished best, and where cattle and sheep could be reared under circumstances of surface, vegetation, and temperature as various as the imagination can depict, but all more or less propitious; the sheep-slopes and abundant vegetation (rank, but nutritious) of the central region giving place in the higher region to a drier air, a more level surface, and a scanter and highly aromatic vegetation, peculiarly suited to sheep and goats, whose fleeces in that region would well repay the cost of transport to the most distant markets.

Not that I would in general hold out to the colonist the prospect of growing rich by the utmost use of the above-indicated resource for the accumulation of wealth, to which might, and certainly in due course would, be added those of trans-Himalaya commerce,† but would rather fix his attention, primarily at least, upon the certain prospect of comfort, of a full belly, a warm back, and a decent domicile; or, in other words, of food, clothes, and shelter for himself, his wife, and children, unfailing with the most ordinary prudence and toil, and such, as to quantity and quality, as would be a perfect godsend to the starving peasantry of Ireland and of the Scotch Highlands. These are the settlers I would, but discouraging the others, primarily encourage by free grants for the first five years,

* Countless herds of cattle are driven for pasturage annually during the hot months from the open plains into the Tarai and Bhaver, and of the thousands that die there, the hides and horns are left to rot for want of systematic purchase, and this whilst the demand is so urgent that cattle-killing has become a trade in order to meet it.

† In 1832 I furnished to Government a statement of the amount of this commerce, as then conducted through the channel of Nipal Proper. The exports and imports reached 30 lakhs, and this under circumstances as little encouraging to commercial enterprise as can well be imagined; for monopolies were the order of the day, and men in power were often the holders of these monopolies, as I believe is still the case in Nipal, and also in Cashmere. In the paper adverted to I also pointed out by comparative statements how successfully Britain could compete with Russia in regard to this commerce. The subject is one well deserving of the attention of Government at all times, and more especially at the present juncture.

years, and by a very light rent upon long and fixed leases; then, after looking to compensation in the general prestige* of their known forthcomingness on the spot, and assured that, with the actual backing upon occasions of political stress and difficulty of some 50,000 to 100,000 loyal hearts and stalwart bodies of Saxon mould, our empire in India might safely defy the world in arms against it.

I am, &c.
Darjeeling, 20 December 1856. (signed) *B. H. Hodgson*

(True copy.)
(signed) A. R. Young,
Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

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EXTRACT Fort William Military Consultation of the 4th September 1857.

No. 2715. No. 295.

From the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lieutenant-governor to acknowledge the receipt of Captain Atkinson's letter (No. 456), dated the 13th instant, and to state in reply that no further report has been received from the Commissioner of Chota Nagpore regarding the high lands of Sirgoojah as a settlement for retired and discharged officers and soldiers. It was proposed by the Officiating Commissioner that the junior assistant at Karuda should remain at Mainepot, which is the name of the locality referred to, till the commencement of the approaching rainy season; and it is probable that a further report, which has this day been called for, will now soon be received In the meanwhile, I am directed to lay before the Governor-General in Council the extracts of letters noted in the margin,† which contain all the information possessed by this Government on the subject, and it is possible that this information may be sufficient for the purpose in view. General.

I have, &c.
Darjeeling, 28 May 1857. (signed) *A. R. Young,*
Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

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EXTRACT from Para. 25 of a Report (No. 69), dated 18 November 1840, from the Governor-General's Agent, South West Frontier, to the Secretary to the Government of India.

THE Myneput lying on the line, I took advantage of it to have some shooting, and got some gour elks and deer, &c. The scenery is beautiful beyond description on the table land, which must be 5,000 feet above the sea; so cold, that in March and April the sun is rather pleasant than disagreeable, even at mid-day. The land is undulating, covered at all seasons with green grass, flowering shrubs, and plants innumerable, small streams flowing in every direction. The extent of the table land is conjectured to be 25 or 30 miles wide north and south, and 40 or 50 west and east. Within four or five miles of the foot of the western ghat I ascended is the Rehar river, running to the north. All other rivers had taken a western and southern course. In the Rehar is coal; I brought away some very good specimens of it.

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* We are, it should never be forgotten, *rari nantes in gurgite vasti*, occupying a position quite analogous to that of the Romans, when one of their ablest statesmen exclaimed, "*Quantum nobis periculum si servi nostri numerari nos cepiscent.*" We cannot, for financial reasons of an enduring kind, create an adequate guard against the perils of such a position, nor materially alter it for the better, *quoad* physical security, save by having such a body of our countrymen as above contemplated within call. (signed) *B. H. Hodgson.*

† Extract, para. 25, of a report, No. 69, dated 18 November 1840. Extract, para. 14, of a report, No. 25, dated 15 May 1847. Extract, para. 2, from a report by Mr. W. J. Allen, Commissioner of Chota Nagpore, dated 22 January 1857.

EXTRACT from Para. 14 of a Report (No. 25), dated 15 May 1847, from the Governor-General's Agent, South West Frontier, to the Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

THE highest part of the Myneput is not above 3,700 feet above the sea by measurement, but the air and scenery totally different from the plains below. There are 17 inhabited villages on the Myneput, but traces of extensive cultivation remain. I have been unable to find remains of brick or stone buildings of any kind. In December and January I saw ice of considerable thickness, that, exposed to the action of the sun, did not dissolve before mid-day.

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EXTRACT, Para. 2, from a Report by Mr. *W. J. Allen*, Commissioner of Chota Nagpore, dated 22 January 1857.

THE high lands of Sirgoojah will be found, I think, well adapted to the cultivation of coffee, and perhaps of tea; but there is a great deal of jungle, and that part of the country is not reputed to be salubrious. When the jungle is cleared, the climate no doubt will improve; but the hot winds prevail there, I believe, during the months of April, May, and June, and the locality is not suitable to field labour by Europeans.

(True extracts.)

(signed) *A. R. Young*,
Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

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No. 296.

No. 776.

From the Secretary to the Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

General. IN continuation of my letter, No. 2715, dated the 28th May last, I am directed to submit the following further observations of the Lieutenant-Governor on the suitableness of the highlands of Sirgoojah for the settlement of retired European officers and soldiers.

2. From a report furnished by the Assistant Commissioner Captain Birch, who was residing for some time on the Myneput, it appears that there are two tracts of table land, one called the Maymepat, about 28 miles in length, and having an average breadth of eight to ten miles, and another called the Jameeraput, of the same breadth, and comprising about 45 square miles. The height of these table lands is about 3,500 feet above the level of the sea.

3. Captain Birch found the ascent to Myneput very steep, and he considers that the nature of the soil presents many difficulties against making a tolerable road between the table land and the plains. Provisions are not easily obtained on the Mayneput, and there are no means of communication with the nearest marts below; water appeared to be abundant on the Maymepat, though not so on the Jameeraput; and the general soil of the former Captain Birch thinks to be well adapted to supplying good pasturage, and for the growth of cereals, but too stiff for the cultivation of various kinds of pulses grown all over India.

4. With regard to climate and temperature, showers are frequent throughout the year, and the average range of the thermometer during the hot months is from about 61 to 94, but the variations are very sudden, and frequently occasion attacks of fever. The slight elevation of these hills above the surrounding country is not sufficient to make any sensible difference in the power of the sun; and Captain Birch notices, "that even during the cold season the solar rays seem to strike with an increased intensity on these hills, and the natives complain of this apparent increase in their power very much." Under these circumstances, the Lieutenant-governor fully concurs with the Officiating Commissioner of Chota

Chota Nagpore, who in forwarding Captain Birch's letter remarks, that neither the Maymepat or the Jameeraput appear to be superior in salubrity to Hazareebagh, or other more accessible localities in that part of India, and that the shattered constitutions of retired Europeans require a more bracing climate than is to be found in that latitude at an elevation of only 3,500 feet.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. R. Young*,
Fort William, 7 July 1857. Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

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EXTRACT Military Letter from Fort St. George, dated 6th July 1857, No. 70.

Para. 1. WITH reference to your Honourable Court's despatch of 3d September 1856, No. 94, on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the army, to settle in localities at Madras, we have the honour to forward copy of a communication from the Board of Revenue, and of one from the Adjutant-general of the army, with abstracts of reports from officers commanding divisions and forces, &c., containing observations on the subject.

Dy. 1857, Nos. 53 & 54. Dy. Cons., 2d June 1857, No. 60 to 63.

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Fort Saint George, Military Consultation of 20 January 1857.

No. 53.

EXTRACT from the Minutes of Consultation in the Revenue Department, under date 13 January 1857, No. 53.

READ the following extract from the proceedings of the Board of Revenue, dated 5th January 1857, No. 44.

Read extract Minutes Consultation, dated 2nd December 1856, Revenue Department.

(Here enter No. 1271.)

In the above extract Minutes Consultation the Board are requested to offer any observations they may wish to make on the suggestion of the Home authorities that encouragement should be held out to the European officers and soldiers of the Honourable Company's army to settle on the hill tracts of this Presidency.

2. The Board are fully sensible of the advantages which would result from the permanent location of such parties in this country. They fear, however, that in regard to officers at least there is some misapprehension both as to the extent of land available for their occupation and the other considerations which induce such persons to emigrate to the colonies of England. The localities suited for this purpose are the Neilgherries, the Pulneys, the Shervaroys, and portions of the hill ranges in Canara, Malabar and Tinnevelly. A great portion of these, however, except the first, are within fever range, and this consideration alone would, the Board fear, prevent their being generally selected for permanent residence by this class of persons. Of the area available on the Neilgherries the Board have no exact knowledge, but they apprehend it is not sufficient for settlement on any large scale, particularly as many portions are unfit for culture, and the native inhabitants have rights of occupancy and pasturage over others.

3. In the other inducements which have so great weight with settlers of this class, such as the facility of educating and providing for a family, this Presidency is greatly wanting at present, and these are the considerations which, next to that of climate, most influence such persons in the selection of a permanent place of settlement on withdrawing from a career of active service in this country.

4. At present the rule in granting land for other than building purposes on the hill tracts is to sell it at (usually) not less than eight years' assessment, subject moreover to its annual assessment, and a number of minor reservations and restrictions. The whole or a portion of the former may be remitted, and the

annual asssesment might be reduced. This latter measure, however, is attended with this difficulty, that it would probably be necessary to attach conditions as to occupancy and cultivation, and to restrict the proprietors' power of alienation to parties possessing similar claims on Government. Such terms, however, would tend to discourage permanent improvements, and greatly lessen the value of such grants. Besides a remission of the purchase money, the Board consider that it would also be necessary either to give the fee-simple of the land, or at least to grant long leases. At present, leases cannot be granted for more than 30 years ordinarily; at the end of that period the land is liable to re-assessment, and waste portions of lands leased cannot be alienated by the lessees.

*See* C. O. B., Vol. 1, page 586.

5. As regards European soldiers the case is somewhat different, and they are a class who possess strong claims on the Government. Such parties would not require large holdings, and a sufficiently extensive area could, perhaps, be secured to give the experiment a fair trial. It would be desirable generally to locate such settlers in the neighbourhood of places like Ootacamund, Coonoor, &c., where they would find a ready market for their agricultural produce, medical aid, and an opportunity of engaging in any trade or profession to which they may have been accustomed in early life, or for which they may possess aptitude. In such situations, moreover, they would enjoy facilities for educating and providing for their families, and the society of others would exercise a beneficial influence on their habits and conduct.

6. In proposing that a sufficient area should be secured for such settlers, the Board do not intend that they should be debarred from selecting their place of residence, or be located in townships by themselves; any attempt to isolate them in this manner would, the Board think, lead to failure; all the Board propose is to secure what appear eligible sites at once, for such land, on the Neilgherries in particular, is now much sought after.

7. The encouragement held out would necessarily be of the same nature as suggested in the case of officers in para. 4.

8. There are other places, such as Palmanair, Ramanully, &c., where a limited number of such settlers could be located, and in these as well as, if necessary, on the Neilgherries, Shervaroys, Palneys, &c., Government could extend additional encouragement, by affording medical aid, and contributing towards religious and educational objects.

9. It will of course rest with the military authorities to determine the class of persons and the other conditions on which grants such as those contemplated shall be made.

10. The Board resolve to circulate these proceedings and the extract Minutes Consultation under acknowledgment to the several collectors, with a view of ascertaining what localities in their districts are suitable for such purposes, and what extent of land is known or believed to be available. They will also be glad to receive any suggestion the Collectors may wish to offer on the subject.

11. The Collectors of Coimbatore and Salem will be requested to furnish a return of the lands occupied by settlers (other than natives) for agricultural purposes, and the terms in regard to payments, length of lease, &c.

Ordered also, that a copy be submitted for the information of Government, and to the Collectors noted in the margin,* for their information, and any observations they may wish to offer.

(True extract.)

(signed) *J. D. Sim*, Acting Secretary.

Ordered to be communicated to the Military Department, with reference to an extract from the Minutes of Consultation in that department dated 28th October 1856, No. 2770.

(signed) *J. D. Bourdillon*,
Secretary to Government.

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* Cuddapah, Bellary, North Arcot, Salem, Madura, Tinnevelly, Malabar, Canara.

No. 54.

Order, No. 179, 15 January 1857.

Communicated to the Commander-in-chief with reference to M. C. 28th October 1856, No. 2770.

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Fort St. George, Military Consultation of 2 June 1857.

No. 60.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Fort William, 13 May 1857, No. 455, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department.

I AM instructed to advert to an unanswered communication from this department, No. 836, dated 30 October 1856, calling for the opinion of the Government of Madras on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the army to settle in localities of that Presidency.

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No. 61.

The Adjutant-General of the Army, 20 May 1857, No. 519, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department.

IN acknowledging the receipt of extract from Minutes of Consultation,* dated 18 November last, No. 3028, I have the honour, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, the accompanying abstract of reports from officers commanding divisions and forces, &c., respecting the localities that are best suited, in the Madras Presidency, for the settlement of officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the army.

2. I am directed by Lieutenant-general Sir P. Grant to state that his Excellency feels persuaded, from former experience, that it will be found quite impossible to induce European pensioners to abandon their present localities in the plains to become settlers in the hills or other places where the climate may be considered better adapted to the European constitution.

3. His Excellency is aware that every effort was made, and strong inducements were held out some years ago to the pensioners at Chunar (the very hottest and most uncongenial station in the Bengal Presidency) to remove to the hills, and in every instance without success.

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ABSTRACT of REPORTS from Officers commanding Divisions and Forces, &c., reporting what Localities are best suited in the Madras Presidency for the Settlement of Officers and Soldiers retired or discharged from the Army.

*Major-General D. Macleod, commanding Ceded Districts,*—States that he is acquainted with no place within the Ceded Districts suited to the purposes of colonization. The tops of the ranges known and found to possess climates suited to the European constitution present so restricted an area that one good-sized farm would be more than sufficient to occupy the whole space. In most cases, if not all, water has to be brought from a distance, there being no springs on the tops, added to which, the depth of the soil is generally most superficial.

Conceives, if none of these objections existed, Europeans can never succeed as colonists in India, it being impossible for them to compete with the natives, the expense of whose domestic establishment is as the shadow to the substance when compared

* Communicating a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30 October 1856, No. 886, annexing copy of a despatch from the Court of Directors, and requesting the opinion of the Madras Government on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the army to settle in localities at Madras, which may, after due inquiry, be deemed best adapted to Europeans.

compared with that of Europeans. The former would also have a very decided advantage over the latter in the labour market.

*Major-General J. W. Cleveland, commanding Southern Division,*—Is of opinion that the advantages held out would be considered a boon to officers and soldiers, and that various localities in the Southern Division are most desirable for agricultural purposes, and where Europeans would enjoy a congenial climate, such as the Neilgherries, the Pullaney, the Sillimally and Shevroy Hills.

Speaks more particularly of his own knowledge regarding the Neilgherries. Coffee plantations there (some of the property of retired and invalid officers in the Honourable Company's service), where not too high, thrive well, and are on the increase; many steady old European soldiers might find employment on them as overseers and labourers, as well as on other ranges of hills where coffee is cultivated, and it is evident that the more industrious, well-behaved Europeans there are, in all the mountainous regions of India, the more is agriculture and other work generally likely to thrive and increase; the advantages of obtaining remission of the purchase-money of land would be great, and especially to those officers who are now settlers, and already encouraged in agricultural pursuits. States that many old officers, with large families, cannot afford to live in Europe, and would be glad to spend the remainder of their lives on the hills, and any advantages offered would certainly tend to increase the number.

*Major-General M. Beresford, commanding Mysore Division,*—Observes, that the entire of the Mysore Division, saving the areas of the cantonment occupied by troops, is nominally the territory of the Rajah of Mysore; any project of encouraging military settlers therein while the land they would have to occupy is admitted to belong to this native prince would be seriously complicated by such sovereignty, however nominal it may be considered. Feels that Lieutenant-general Sir M. Cubbon, the enlightened and experienced Commissioner of Mysore, can give far more useful information than he can. Solicits his Excellency's permission to defer replying to this subject for a short time longer; at the same time, if an immediate reply is desired, he will be prepared, on being so informed, to give one.

States, that the climate of Mysore is far cooler than most other divisions in this Presidency, but that there are very few Europeans who can with impunity expose themselves constantly to the sun, and that the strongest and healthiest suffer from even a frequency of such exposure, and believes that none can do so constantly without danger in the lands upon the general level. Even if this most serious obstacle did not exist, no European could compete with the native agriculturist, who, with his whole family, brings his own manual labour and endurance of climate in aid of his farming, working and living frugally upon the produce of his own labour, and without any other wants; does not therefore think that either officer, or his inferior in rank the non-commissioned officer, or private soldier of European race, could gain a livelihood, or keep their health, upon the plains of Mysore as working military settlers.

States, that he was informed, while ascending the Baba Boodun hills, by intelligent persons, that the cultivator of coffee had not succeeded there; the plant throve fairly, but coolie labour was next to impossible to procure; there are no natives of these hills, and all reasonable sacrifice to induce the low-country labourer to settle there seems to fail: many agree, obtain all they can from the employer, and abscond suddenly, by which far more loss than the profit will cover is incurred. This difficulty of procuring labour appears far less in the approaches to and actual gorge of the Mungerabad Ghaut. The outlay in coffee cultivation is not large, either at first or yearly, though the return produce does not commence for four or five years. Coffee plantations there become very remunerative.

To an officer with even small yearly income, a grant of land about this ghaut would be an advantage which men of energy retiring from the service ought to avail themselves of. The carriage down this ghaut to the western coast is easy and quick, and shipment thence obtainable; the same may be said of all Coorg, with a superior climate, and the further and very important advantage of being under the Government of India, without the unfortunate intervention of the rule of a native prince, as is Mysore.

States inability to suggest any locality or occupation which with any encouragement would be available for a military settler of an inferior grade; does

not

not think the abilities and conduct of these men are sufficiently availed of in the public works; observes that if small patches of ground were granted to several pensioners, now existing in poverty and apathy in the small cottages they generally inhabit in Bangalore, they would soon make them profitable as gardens.

*The Secretary to the Medical Board*,—Observes that the lands in this Presidency most suitable for the purposes of colonization would appear to be the Neilgherries, the Puloney, and Shevroy Hills, all in the Southern Division; the extent of ground available in each of these localities the Board have no means of ascertaining, but it is very considerable. The climate of the Neilgherries has long been known to be highly salubrious, and peculiarly adapted to the European. The Puloney Hills are not so well known, but it is believed that the summit level, nearly 6,000 feet, has offered a most healthy place of retreat for the American missionaries located for a long series of years, during which time these hills have been found equally salubrious. The Shevroy Hills have been much frequented by Europeans, and by people of mixed blood from the Presidency, for a long series of years for a period of 30 years up to 1854; these hills continued remarkably healthy, but at that time epidemic disease, in the form of fever of a severe type, broke out, and prevailed more or less extensively on them as well as over the greater part of the Salem district; at the same time a peculiar and fatal form of fever broke out in certain parts of the Neilgherry Hills; in fact epidemic disease was unusually prevalent in that year over the greater part of Mysore, and Malabar, and Canara.

Mentions Coorg and several parts of the Western Ghauts as localities healthy and eligible for the purpose.

*Major-General J. Bell, Commanding Pegu Division*,—Encloses letter from Major Phayre, Commissioner of Pegu, and states that the opinion which he had previously formed of the utter unsuitableness of Burmah in its present state for the settlement of Europeans has been fully confirmed by the opinion which the Commissioner has expressed, and which, from his long experience and intimate knowledge of its localities, may be looked upon as conclusive.

*Major Phayre, Commissioner of Pegu, &c.*,—Is certainly of opinion that there is no place within the limits of the province where Europeans could settle as working agriculturists. At some future time healthy spots may be found on the range of hills to the eastward of Tonghoo where Europeans might live; but in the present state of information with regard to that country, it is not known whether any produce could be raised for their support, and it is not probable that they would be able there to labour for their own livelihood.

*Brigadier P. Thomson, Commanding Malabar and Canara*,—Is of opinion that there is no place within the limits of his command where it would be desirable for Europeans to settle, excepting Manantoddy and its neighbourhood, and at a few stations north of Cannanore, on the line of the Western Ghauts; and even there the offspring of Europeans would sadly degenerate.

Is of opinion that the climate of the Malabar coast is not suited for Europeans; it might agree with some old hardy weather-beaten soldiers of sober habits, but doubts if they even could labour out of doors during the greater part of the day; certainly their children, if Europeans, never could be expected to do so.

The only tracts of land which such settlers could get would be pieces of jungle land, and the clearing it away would require more money, skill, and patience than old European soldiers are in the habit of possessing before they could even commence operations. The simple fact of all those Europeans who began their labours with the view of settling in the country betwixt the ghauts and the sea, having left the localities they at first fixed upon, and located themselves at Manantoddy and its neighbourhood, where they find the climate agree with them, and realize a good return for their labour, points out very clearly and unmistakeably that no place within the limits of his command, excepting Manantoddy and the top of the range of the Western Ghauts, would be suitable for European officers or soldiers as settlers.

*Major-General A. Tulloch, Commanding Northern Division*,—States that it is the concurrent opinion of the Collectors of the several districts in the division whom he has consulted, that there are insuperable objections to retired officers and

soldiers holding land or settling in it; because, in the first place, the heat of the plains is very great, and the climate of the hills most insalubrious; the want of medical aid too, and schools for the education and religious instruction of their children, are obstables which could not be well overcome.

In the Vizagapatam District the land belongs generally to the native villagers, and cannot be bought; the Collector of Ganjam is of opinion that an officer with some capital might make a profitable investment in the cultivation of sugar cane and arrowroot, and there is a good opening for one or two steady men at or near the different ports along the coast, which are now being most frequented for the cultivation of vegetables and the supply of live stock, &c.; but these are exceptional and doubtful cases.

The Collector of Rajahmundry is of opinion that in many parts of the delta of the Godavery, with a little capital to start with, the cultivation of sugar cane, and perhaps indigo, might be embarked in with every prospect of advantage; but the tracts in this division above the level of the plains are so detrimental to the European constitution, that they could not with safety be located in any of the more elevated sites among the hills, where the climate, though agreeable, is most noxious to health.

The only places within the limits of this Presidency most suited for the location of retired officers or soldiers are the Neilgherries and Shevroy Hills; the Pulney Hills, near Madura; Coortallum, in the Tinnevelly District, and the hills adjacent; where coffee and indigo, &c. might be extensively cultivated with every prospect of success.

The land in the Madras Presidency is the property of the ryot, and it would be difficult to purchase or acquire it on a freehold tenure; and this of itself would operate as a discouragement to capital being applied by European settlers for the improvement of land in India to any great extent. In the case of the soldiery, supposes Government would allot land to them on the principle of Enams grants, or on long low leases renewable at will; but old worn-out soldiers would, from their habits, turn out but indifferent settlers as cultivators of the soil, and the scheme of colonizing them to any extent in this country would prove but a hopeless experiment, and end in disappointment.

*Major-General P. E. Craigie, Commanding Centre Division,*—Is of opinion that the only locality in his division decidedly favourable for the settlement of Europeans is the high land about Palmanair; the temperature and climate of which is suited to the European constitution, and is generally very healthy, and the soil well adapted for cultivation.

The Yailagherry Hills, situated about 40 miles to the south of Vellore, were reported on by Captain Best of the Engineers (*vide* "Gazette," pages 682 and 692 of 1857,) favourably; but that officer died a few years after from a fever contracted thereon. The table land to the south-west of Vellore, distant about 10 miles, is from the soil, very favourable to the cultivation of vegetables, and a garden was established there by the officers of the 52d Regiment, N. I., but it was found feverish; the same with the Naggerry Hills: but doubtless on being cleared to some extent they would prove more salubrious.

Near Guntoor there is some table land, but of very limited extent—at Condavee, where the thermometer ranges a few degrees lower than in the plains; and near it, ground, well adapted for the cultivation of tobacco and other products, is obtainable. Also along the coast, which has the advantage of the sea breeze, and so cooler than further inland, ground for the cultivation of indigo can be found in abundance, as also for the palmyra, from which sugar is manufactured. There is also a good cloth trade along there; but the advantages of climate are not of a decided character. He has, however, considered it advisable to bring them, such as they are, to notice; but he is of opinion that, excepting Palmanair, there is no locality in the Centre Division sufficiently salubrious to hold out inducement to Europeans generally to settle on.

(signed) *W. G. Woods*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Adjutant-General's Office, Fort St. George,
20 May 1857.

No. 62.

ORDER, No. 1788, 30 May 1857.

ORDERED, that the Adjutant-general's letter be communicated to the Honourable the Court of Directors and to the Government of India.

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No. 63.

From the Secretary to Government, Military Department, 30 May 1857, 1789, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

IN reply to your letters dated 30th October 1856, No. 836, and 13th May 1857, No. 455, on the practicability of holding out advantages to officers and soldiers, retired or discharged from the army, to settle in localities at Madras, I am directed to forward, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a communication from the * Board of Revenue, and of one from the † Adjutant-general of the Army, with abstracts of reports from officers commanding divisions and forces, &c., containing observations on the subject.

(True copies.)

(signed) *J. D. Marshall*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to Government.

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o. 55 of 1857,-Military Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable the East India Company, London.

Honourable Sirs,

WE have the honour to acknowledge your Honourable Court's despatch, No. 71, of the 3d September last, on the subject of advantages held out to retired officers in Her Majesty's colonies, and of the possible benefit to be derived from the similar offer of advantages to induce officers and soldiers retired or discharged to settle in certain localities in India.

2. In considering this question, we have regarded it from two points of view, first, as a question of general policy, and secondly, as a question of military policy.

3. Upon the first point we beg to attach a series of correspondence in the Revenue Department, and to express our opinion that there are no tracts suitable for colonization by Europeans under this Presidency, and that the expediency of encouraging Europeans to occupy land as cultivating colonists is very doubtful; but at the same time we consider that European capitalists, or houses of agency scattered through the Presidency, would tend greatly to ameliorate the condition of the country by becoming purchasers of agricultural produce, and giving the cultivators the advantage of a more equitable system of dealing than they can now command from native capitalists.

5. Upon the military part of the question we beg to refer to the Adjutant-general's letter of the 25th March, conveying the sentiments of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief; and we have only to add our unanimous opinion that no advantage is to be expected from European colonies in this Presidency.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Elphinstone.*
*J. G. Lumsden.*
*A. Malet.*

Bombay Castle, 23 May 1857.

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* 5 January 1857, No 44, recorded in Mins. of Cons., 15 January 1857, No. 179.
† 20 May 1857, No. 519.

No. 1244 of 1857.

Transfer from the Revenue to the Military Department.

No. 430 of 1856.

From Lieutenant-Colonel *J. Jacob*, C. B., Acting Commissioner in Sind, to the Right Honourable Lord *Elphinstone*, G. C. H., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

My Lord,

ADVERTING to Mr. Officiating Chief Secretary Young's endorsement marginally cited,* I have the honour to state for the information of your Lordship in Council, that I am of opinion that there are no districts in the province of Sind in which military European retired officers and pensioners might advantageously settle. The climate is so hostile to the European physical constitution as to preclude the possibility of many successive generations of Europeans dwelling permanently in Sind without wholly degenerating; and, in brief, I am of opinion that, as a general assertion, no European would select this province for his permanent habitation.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John Jacob*, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Commissioner in Sind.

Commissioner's Office,
Camp Buchanee, Kurrachee Collectorate,
9 November 1856.

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No. 238 of 1857.—Territorial Department, Revenue.

From *E. G. Fawcett*, Esq., Revenue Commissioner, Northern Division, to *H. Young*, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Sir,

IN reply to your memorandum, No. 4246, dated 28th October 1856, I have the honour to inform you that the Collectors of the northern division have reported that there are no tracts of country within their respective jurisdictions suitable for colonisation by Europeans.

2. Mr. Inverarity, the late Collector of Broach, observes that "where the physical character of the country should render such a course practicable or desirable, it ought not on any account to be admitted unless the settlers are made amenable to the same jurisdiction as the natives in all civil and criminal matters, and this question it appears to me should be well considered before the home Government promulgate any general rules on the subject."

I have, &c.

(signed) *E. G. Fawcett*,
Revenue Commissioner, N. D.

Khandeish Districts,
Revenue Commissioner's Office,
Camp Arvee, 30 January 1857.

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No. 512 of 1857.—Territorial Department, Revenue.

From *H. W. Reeves*, Esq., Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division, to *W. Young*, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to Government.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum, dated 28th October, No. 4247, in which I was requested to state whether there are in this Presidency any districts in which military retired officers and pensioners of

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* No. 4248, dated 28 October 1856. Forwarding copies of correspondence for report as to whether there are any districts in this Presidency in which military retired officers and pensioners might advantageously settle.

of European birth might advantageously settle, and whether the country would be benefited by its being so colonised by military settlers.

2. As cultivators, men of European birth would settle only on or in the neighbourhood of the Ghauts, or on mountains which are off-shoots from the Ghauts, climate being the first requisite; I therefore referred the questions to the Collectors of Belgaum, Sattara, Ahmednuggur, and Poona, and I forward a letter,* from Mr. Seton Karr, which is perhaps the fullest of the replies which have been sent me. Mr. Tytler writes much to the same purpose as Mr. Seton Karr, adding that it is as purchasers of produce, rather than as producers, that settlers would succeed; "as merchants rather than as farmers." He thinks our railways and good roads, when they are made, will bring European purchasers into the interior, who by improving the demand will improve the supply; and he would rather look to this than to any example of superior farming, for which there is little room.

* No. 1826 of 7 November 1856.

3. Mr. Tytler very justly remarks that the benefit or otherwise to the country would depend very much on the character of the settlers. Colonists able and anxious to benefit the ignorant masses around them would gain much influence, and act most beneficially on the people. Others of a different stamp would have a most baneful effect on the country, and evil is so easily disseminated, that the injury done by such characters would perhaps outweigh the good to be expected from the better colonists.

4. I have not much of my own to add to what these gentlemen advance. That the country would be benefited by the settlement of European officers and pensioners of really respectable character, and possessed of capital, is of course beyond question. But in the first place, the climate is prejudicial to the European constitution; and in the next place, colonists of bad character are far more numerous than those of good; I should expect as the first fruits of European colonization, a great amount of evil to the natives from the vicious example and tyranny of the settlers; we should also have European pauperism to contend with; our criminal and civil business would increase.

5. I do not think there is any necessity for increasing the facilities which European settlers at present enjoy; men of small income of all classes go and live at the Neilgherries or on the Hymalayah mountains comfortably enough, I believe. They cannot do so continuously at Mahableshwar, because during four months in the year the rain is incessant; but there are Englishmen possessing houses there who do live eight months and a half on the hills, and three and a half at Sattara, and are getting on well.

6. At Belgaum and at Poona there are a good many pensioners engaged in trade, many of whom are thriving.

7. On the whole I am disposed to think that there is no evident call for interference, and no prospect of good result from it; at the same time I am an advocate for giving the natives fair play. India is their own country, and in it they should be as little interfered with as possible; whatever Government do for them, let it be of such a character that it can be pronounced to be on the whole good. Now the natives appear to me very much awake to their own interests. Cultivation is everywhere extending, even over the tops of the mountains, and capital is accumulating. Irrigation must increase greatly, so soon as Government multiply the number of roads throughout the country to the requisite extent. It is better that the natives should possess the land than Europeans, who will succeed better and effect more good to the country as purchasers and merchants than as producers. Colonization in India needs not to be artificially stimulated; it should be left to itself, for it will thus be far more likely to answer a good purpose. Men of respectability and substance will come to the country, or will remain in it, and occupy themselves in every possible manner, and while things take their natural course we shall ensure to India as much of the good, and as little as possible of the bad, leaven of British manners and customs.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. W. Reeves*,
Revenue Commissioner, S. D.

Revenue Commissioner's
Camp, Ahmednuggur,
20 February 1857.

No. 1826 of 1856.

From *G. B. Seton Karr*, Esquire, Collector of Belgaum, to *H. W. Reeves*, Esquire, Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to receive your communication, No. 3280, dated the 31st ultimo, requesting my opinion on the points mentioned by Government in Mr. Chief Secretary Young's memorandum, No. 4247 of the 28th idem, viz., whether there are in this collectorate any districts in which military European retired officers and pensioners might advantageously settle, and whether the country would be benefited by being colonized by military settlers.

2. With regard to the first point, I have the honour to observe that the attractions which would chiefly influence European gentlemen would, in addition to grants of land, be doubtless those of climate and means of education; married men with families being generally those who colonize. A sufficiency of good waste land is the first requisite. Now, in this collectorate the whole of the best, even the second-best land is already appropriated; and this fact would seem of itself to dispose of the question. But I may also mention that I am not aware of any locality here in which gentlemen would, of their own choice, elect to bring up their families.

3. With regard to pensioners, the same want of unoccupied land would militate against the plan; and although persons in humble circumstances have not so great a latitude of choice as those who are better off, I doubt whether, in regard also to climate, &c., there is any place in this collectorate that would prove attractive to European settlers of any class. The western parts of Podshapoor and Beree are far too poor, and also too wild, and the fall of rain is too great, to admit of any hope that pensioners would settle there. The other districts are, in climate, &c., not much dissimilar from other parts of the Deccan plateau.

4. What I have above stated makes it unnecessary for me to discuss the question of whether the country would be benefited by the colonization of military settlers; but I may say generally that I believe the country would derive a good deal more advantage than the colonists.

I have, &c.,

Belgaum Collector's Office, Sowunduttee, 7 November 1856. (signed) *G. B. Seton Karr*, Collector.

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No. 1243 of 1857.—Territorial Department, Revenue,

To the Revenue Commissioner, S. D.; the Revenue Commissioner, N. D.; and the Acting Commissioner in Sind.

Copy of the Resolution passed by Government on the Papers noted in the margin.*

THESE reports to be communicated to the Honourable Court, with reference to their despatch in the Military Department, No. 71 of the 3d September 1856.

2. It may at the same time be stated that this Government concur in the general opinion expressed by their officers as to the absence, under this Presidency, of any tracts suitable for colonization by Europeans, and more especially in the observations made by the Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division, as regards the doubtful expediency of encouraging Europeans to occupy land as cultivating colonists.

3. European capitalists, on the other hand, would, if scattered through the Presidency, tend greatly to ameliorate the condition of the country by becoming purchasers

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* Letter from the Acting Commissioner in Sind, No. 430, dated 9 November 1856. Letter from the Revenue Commissioner, N. D., No. 238, dated 30 January 1857. Letter from the Revenue Commissioner, S. D., No. 512, dated 20 February 1857, with enclosure.

purchasers of agricultural produce, and giving the cultivators the advantage of a more equitable system of dealing than they can now command from native capitalists.

(signed) *H. Young*,
Officiating Chief Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle,
14 March 1857.

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RESOLUTION, 14th March 1857.

ORDERED that copy of the above Resolution, and of the Papers on which it has been passed, be transferred to the Military Department, in order that the necessary Report may thence be made to the Honourable Court.

(signed) *H. Young*,
Officiating Chief Secretary to Government.

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No. 2217.

From the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour of submitting to the Commander-in-Chief your letter, No. 3250, dated the 24th October last, with annexments (to the address of the Quartermaster-general, transferred to this department), on the subject of holding out encouragements to officers and soldiers to retire and settle in the country, and, in reply, am directed to communicate for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the following observations of his Excellency thereupon.

2. The inducements for settling in India are not defined in Sir George Clerk's letter to the address of Sir J. C. Melvill, dated the 4th July last.

3. If it be expected that worn-out officers and soldiers may be transformed into successful agriculturists, the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion the expectation will be disappointed; all experience and, his Excellency believes, all reason is against it. Discharged soldiers may thrive in a mixed community, where at stations such as Belgaum, Poona, and Ahmednuggur, by following the trades of carpenters, shoemakers, and in handicraft generally, they amass a little money and become proprietors of one or more small houses, and apparently thrive; but a community of discharged or pensioned soldiers, whether in the vigour of health or otherwise, would, in his Excellency's opinion, become one of paupers.

4. Delusion to an unfortunate extent prevails amongst soldiers and sailors of every grade, that anybody is competent to farm, and often as this confidence has been rebuked by failure, it still prevails; farming, like every other profession or trade, is learned only by an apprenticeship, which few of the soldiers, while none of the officers, have served, and, therefore, few amongst them are qualified for the undertaking.

5. The hill stations of India, the Commander-in-Chief believes, would meet the wishes of those discharged officers and soldiers who would be satisfied to dream away their days in mere existence, without interest or aim, but his Excellency entertains the strongest doubts if colonization from such a source would succeed from a class not sufficiently industrial or energetic, and whose previous habits and thoughts unfit them for the occupation of farmers.

6. The suggestions, emanating from authority so high as Sir George Clerk, whose acquaintance with the countries referred to renders him able to speak of their fertility and salubrity, and of the advantages they hold out to European soldiers, is deserving the attention of officers; and some there are, no doubt, who would be found ready to adopt it on liberal terms; but as respects the settlement of pensioned soldiers, his Excellency believes that, however liberal the terms, and great the advantages, the scheme, whether adopted by officers or soldiers, would in the end be a failure. Emigration was at one time

very popular with the European soldiery, many of whom took their discharge and proceeded to Australia; but his Excellency believes the measure to have been unattended by any beneficial result, and that the soldiery was hired there, not from the desire to follow agricultural pursuits, but from the delusive hope of amassing wealth from the gold diggings; and that while none, it is believed, became landowners, most of them returned to England, some to India, where they re-enlisted, and the few that remained were mere agricultural labourers, or worked at the trades or handicraft to which in their youth they had been brought up.

7. Emigration to Australia, whose climate is more congenial to the constitutions of Europeans than that of India, having proved a failure, and labour, while compared with the prices of the necessaries of life, being now as valuable in England as in the colonies, the Commander-in-Chief entertains the strongest conviction that the same system and failure would prevail were the hilly parts of India thrown open to the European officers or soldiers.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. Green*,
Colonel, Adjutant-general.

Head Quarters, Bombay,
25 March 1857.

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Military Department.

MEMORANDUM by the Secretary to Government.

THE question proposed by the Honourable Court is this: whether it may not be practicable and desirable to hold out advantages to officers and soldiers retired or discharged from the Indian armies, who from their age and circumstances may be qualified as settlers, to induce them to settle in those localities in India which may, after due inquiry, be deemed best adapted to Europeans.

The nature and object of the inquiry are further explained in the letter from Sir G. Clerk to Sir James Melvill; the localities are there indicated to be "the various mountainous tracts in Madras and Central India, and also in the whole range of the Himalaya mountains, from Cashmere to Sikhim." The system is contemplated as applicable to "soldiers of certified good character, as well as officers;" the benefit to be derived is from the occupation of land, whereby "cultivation and civilization may be encouraged in various parts of India, hitherto unfrequented by Europeans."

The localities to be thrown open for colonization by settlers from the army are not situated within the territories of the Bombay Presidency, and therefore that part of the question which refers to the benefit to be derived by the country from such a system of colonization can be treated only in general terms. The only class that can effect successful colonization in wide tracts of waste land is the agricultural; the manufacturing may be mingled, but in a small proportion; the farming must constitute the bulk. In the army there are many skilful artisans, men who have been brought up to trades of all kinds, and who have been able, whilst performing their military service, to keep up their skill and knowledge of their early handicraft; such men frequently take their discharge, and establish themselves in the cities and towns of India, and sometimes maintain for a while a thriving business. But it is vain to seek in the ranks of the army for agriculturists. Even supposing a certain proportion of the recruits to be drawn from the farming class, there is no opportunity for them to practise agriculture whilst serving as soldiers, and whatever they may have known or acquired in their youth, they must have lost long before the time comes when they can take their discharge. If colonization is to be attempted from this source, alone and by itself, the plan presents no valid hope of success.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has justly observed in the Adjutant-general's letter of the 25th March, that if it be expected that worn-out officers and soldiers may be transformed into successful agriculturists, the expectation will be disappointed. The fact seems to be, that although a few discharged soldiers may thrive in a mixed community by the exercise of trades and the accumulation of a little property invested in small houses or garden grounds, as is the case at present at several of the army stations, yet it is to be apprehended that a society of such individuals would very soon become unmanageable and sink into a community of pauperism and vice.

The

The advantages offered to settlers in the Crown colonies made emigration popular for a period with the European soldiery in India. But his Excellenc the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the many who have taken thei discharge and proceeded to Australia have been lured there, not by the desire t follow agricultural pursuits, from which alone the colony could benefit from thei residence, but by a delusive hope of amassing wealth from the gold diggings and that while none have become landed proprietors, many have found their wa to England, or back to India (where they have re-enlisted), and the few that hav remained are, it is said, mere agricultural labourers, or workers at trades to whic they have been brought up in their youth.

If encouragement to colonise presented a certain promise of benefit to th country as well as to the settlers themselves, it would perhaps not be necessar to go further, and to consider what the effect of such a system would be upon th army itself. But as this promise is something more than doubtful, it must b added as an argument against the proposition, that it would unquestionably b very prejudicial to the interests of every regiment to have temptations freel offered to the best men serving in its ranks to take their discharge and leave i This was experienced when the desire to emigrate to Australia was ripe amon the men; an unsettled spirit was excited among the soldiery, who are alway fond of change, and the loss of numbers of excellent men was seriously fel The difficulty of getting to Australia, the long voyage intervening, and the tie of family operated as a check; but if a settlement were open close at hand, wit the prospect of a life of ease, and possibly idleness on the one hand, and the con tinuance of military duty on the other, the ranks would soon be thinned; i would be scarcely possible to restrain discharges within safe or reasonabl limits, and very grave injury both to the discipline and efficiency of al European regiments in India would, it is greatly to be feared, be the inevitabl result.

With respect to officers, it is difficult to understand what advantages could b held out to encourage them to remain and spend the latter part of their lives i India. Military men have no superior qualifications for becoming useful membe of colonial settlement; on the contrary, their qualifications are in genera inferior for such a purpose to those of civilians; and if inducements to th Indian services to settle in India be offered, they should not be confined to th army. If a system of colonization by Europeans in India is to be established, i will require to be placed on a larger basis than the present proposition. Wer colonies established, discharged soldiers and their officers might be induced t join and assist such colonies, but the initiative should be taken by the civilia rather than by the military classes.

(signed) *P. M. Melvill*, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

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MINUTE by the Right Honourable the Governor.

I DO not agree in all the remarks contained in this memorandum; for instance that, as a general rule, military men have no qualifications for becoming usefu members of a colonial society; but I think that there are few places in Indi which are at all adapted for European colonization, and none in this Pre sidency.

Whether it is desirable to attempt to form a colony of discharged soldiers i the Deyra Doon, or in some other places in the North-west, I am unable to say but I doubt extremely whether a colony could be formed on the Nilgherrie with much prospect of advantage. Perhaps a few settlers might do very well. Coffee cultivation, rearing silkworms, and breeding cattle, might afford the means of living to a few; but, in my humble opinion, there is not room fo anything worthy of being called colonization. I agree so far with the memo randum, that a few settlers may for a time be able to carry on a thriving busines in towns, and, I will add, in particular localities; but as a general scheme, Euro pean colonization would not succeed in India.

(signed) *Elphinstone.*

13 April 1857.

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MINUTE by the Honourable Mr. *Lumsden.*

ANY systematic attempt to promote colonization will fail in India, I firmly believe, because the climate is against it. A colony confined to the hill ranges would prosper no better, I think, in the long run, than if it had been established on the plains. The confinement and seclusion implied by such a plan would hardly be tolerated by Europeans or their descendants. As respects military settlers, the remarks in the memorandum appear to me to be generally very just; but if the Honourable Court desire to see if such an experiment would succeed, they need do no more than hold out the inducements of granting tracts of hill land to officers applying for such grants who have resigned the service, whether military or civil, and to privates who have taken their discharge. I do not think that, in the long run, much inconvenience would result from such a temptation.

(signed) *J. G. Lumsden.*

14 April 1857.

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MINUTE by the Honourable Mr. *Malet.*

I AGREE very much with the views in the memorandum. As far as this Presidency is concerned, I have no hope of any benefit from the mode of colonization proposed, nor in more favourable localities of anything beyond a very inconsiderable and temporary success.

(signed) *A. Malet.*

15 April 1857.

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MINUTE by the Right Honourable the Governor, subscribed by the Board.

I THINK we are all agreed that no advantage is to be expected from European colonies in this Presidency.

(signed) *Elphinstone.*

21 April 1857.

(True copies.)

*P. M. Melvill*, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

(True copies and extracts.)

*Philip Melvill,*
Secretary, Military Department.

East India House,
28 March 1858.

# EAST INDIA (RETIRED OFFICERS, &c.)

COPIES of the DESPATCH addressed by the Court of Directors to the Government of *India*, on 3 December 1856, and of the LETTER addressed to Her Majesty's Government, regarding the Advantages held out to RETIRED OFFICERS of the INDIAN ARMIES on settling in Her Majesty's Colonies; and of the REPLY referred to in the Despatch; also, of the MILITARY LETTER from the Government of *India*, dated 5 October 1857, with Reports from Local Governments, on the same Subject.

*(Colonel Sykes.)*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
13 *April* 1858.



*Under 4 oz.*

# EAST INDIA (NAVY).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 7 July 1863;—*for*,

A "RETURN, in the following Form, of the PENSIONED and DISCHARGED INDIAN NAVAL OFFICERS:

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. | | | | | | |
| B. | | | | | | |
| C. | | | | | | |
| &c. | | | | | | |

India Office,
24 June 1864.

J. C. MASON,
Secretary, Marine and Transport Department

*(Colonel Sykes.)*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
28 *June* 1864.

## RETURN of the PENSIONED and DISCHARGED INDIAN NAVAL OFFICERS.

NOTE.—The figures in *italic* in the column for "length of service" indicate the Officers' absences on leave in Europe and in India; and such absences were (by the rules of the Service) deducted from the "length of service," to ascertain ACTUAL SERVICE IN INDIA, by which their claims to pension were regulated.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. (a) |
| Captain - - | J. J. Frushard - - | 36 10 27 | *Rs.* 2,700 per mensem - | 450 per ann., with right of succession to 800 *l.* per ann. in his turn. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | *E. | *1 5 19* | | | | |
| | †I. | *2 1 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | Griffith Jenkins, C.B. - | 35 11 22 | 1 *l.* per diem - - | 550 per ann. | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *7 9 26* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 19* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. W. Young, C.B. - | 34 11 7 | *Rs.* 1,380 per mensem - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 0 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 11 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. D. Campbell - - | 34 11 0 | 360 *l.* per annum - - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *7 9 7* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 0 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. W. S. Daniell - | 34 11 0 | 1 *l.* per diem - - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *7 0 27* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 9 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. F. Jones - - | 34 9 18 | 1 *l.* „ - - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 5 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | John Stephens - - | 34 6 11 | 1 *l.* „ - - | 450 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *10 1 28* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 1 3* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | B. Hamilton - - | 33 8 6 | 1 *l.* „ - - | 450 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *11 3 28* | | | | |
| Commander - | C. J. Cruttenden - | 33 0 9 | 16 *s.* „ - - | 450 „ | - - | 360 „ (b) |
| | E. | *7 1 22* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 8 24* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. B. Selby - - | 33 0 14 | *Rs.* 850 per mensem - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 6 4* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 1 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Balfour - - | 33 0 8 | *Rs.* 1,550 „ - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *6 4 8* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 5 0* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. W. Grounds - - | 32 10 25 | 16 *s.* per diem - - | 550 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *6 9 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. Foulerton - - | 24 2 6 | 16 *s.* „ - - | 400 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *5 11 2* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 8 0* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe. † Absent on leave in India.

(*a*) The Pension for Captains, after 22 years' actual service in India, was 360 *l.* per annum. There were, however, four Senior List Pensions of 800 *l.* a year each; and, upon the death of one of the Senior List pensioners, the first or senior Captain on the Active List of the Indian Navy was to be retired on the vacated 800 *l.* a-year pension, instead of 360 *l.* per annum; or a Captain, of *seven* years' standing in that rank, might retire at once on 360 *l.* per annum, with the right of succeeding, in his turn, to one of the four 800 *l.* per annum pensions, on a vacancy; and, when he did so succeed, his pension of 360 *l.* was to merge in the 800 *l.* per annum.

(*b*) The Pension for Commanders, after 22 years' actual service in India, was 290 *l.* per annum. All officers of the late Indian Navy, after an actual service of 30 years in India under the old furlough rules, or of 26 years' actual service under the new furlough rules (which allowed four years' leave of absence to count as service), without reference to the rank they may have attained, were eligible to retire on 360 *l.* per annum at once, with the privilege of eventually succeeding to one of the Senior List pensions of 800 *l.* per annum, on the occurence of a vacancy in such list, the former pension merging in the latter.

| RANK. | NAMES. | | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Commander - | G. N. Adams - - | - | 24 3 23 | *Rs.* 900 per mensem - | 400 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | | *E. | *1 9 17* | | | | |
| | | †I. | *0 3 28* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Tronson - - - | - | 23 10 18 | *Rs.* 700 „ - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 11 20* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 7 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | M. B. Worsley - - | - | 23 11 1 | *Rs.* 700 „ - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 4 24* | | | | |
| | | I. | *4 9 24* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Batt - - - | - | 23 11 1 | *Rs.* 300 „ - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 11 13* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. W. Hopkins - | - | 23 9 18 | 16 *s.* per diem - - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 1 20* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 8 7* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. A. Stradling - | - | 23 8 30 | 270 *l.* per annum - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 11 13* | | | | |
| | | I. | *1 1 28* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. G. Constable - | - | 23 8 30 | 270 *l.* „ - - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 0 13* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 7* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. S. H. Twynam - | - | 23 8 30 | 16 *s.* per diem - - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 2 24* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 7 3* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. A. Fraser - - | - | 23 7 4 | 270 *l.* per annum - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 10 1* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 1 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. Peevor - - - | - | 23 7 12 | 16 *s.* per diem - - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 0 28* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 7 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. W. Etheridge | - | 23 5 23 | *Rs.* 600 per mensem - | 400 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 3 29* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 11 16* | | | | (*c*) |
| Lieutenant - | A. W. Chitty - - | - | 23 0 3 | *Rs.* 500 „ - | 300 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 11 28* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 17* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. Giles - - - | - | 23 0 2 | *Rs.* 595 „ - | 300 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 2 11* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 4 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. F. T. Fergusson | - | 23 0 2 | *Rs.* 600 „ - | 300 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 2 7* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 2 6* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. M. Pengelley | - | 22 10 15 | *Rs.* 500 „ - | 300 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 7 18* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 7 9* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Sedley - - | - | 22 10 17 | *Rs.* 430 „ - | 300 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 2 6* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 20* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

(*c*) Note 1.—The pension for Lieutenants after 22 years' actual service in India was 190 *l.* per annum.

2.—The Indian Navy, however, was a strictly "seniority" service, and promotion went gradually from midshipman up to captain; therefore the midshipmen, mates, lieutenants, and commanders could, if they remained on the Active List long enough, attain the pensions of Captain eventually.

| RANK. | NAMES. | | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Lieutenant - | C. H. Walker - - | - | 22 8 22 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 300 per an$^{n}$. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | | *E. | *6 6 23* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. B. Hellard - - | - | 22 5 21 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 6 7* | | | | |
| | | †I. | *0 11 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. Lloyd - - - | - | 21 11 11 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 2 16* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 7 10* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. T. Robinson - | - | 21 8 11 | *Rs.* 775 per mensem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 0 23* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 3 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. T. Holt - - | - | 21 7 5 | *Rs.* 175 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 10 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. D. Taylor - | - | 21 5 2 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 3 29* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 6 15* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. Y. Ward - - | - | 21 2 27 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 11 2* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 4 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | P. W. Mitcheson - | - | 20 10 9 | *Rs.* 416. 10. 2. p'mensem | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 11 24* | | | | |
| | | I. | *4 1 11* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. Child - - - | - | 20 10 9 | *Rs.* 587. 2. 8. „ | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *7 9 13* | | | | |
| | | I. | *1 8 13* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. G. Nixon - - | - | 20 10 9 | *Rs.* 600. „ | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 0 27* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 6 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. E. Brooman - | - | 20 10 9 | *Rs.* 809. 9. 3. „ | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 4 7* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 9 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. H. James - - | - | 21 0 7 | *Rs.* 265. „ | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 10 17* | | | | |
| | | I. | *1 1 18* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. E. Lewis - - | - | 20 8 2 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 7 6* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 1 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. W. Aylesbury - | - | 20 8 7 | *Rs.* 310 per mensem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 1 6* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 3 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. H. W. Davies - | - | 20 8 7 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 0 12* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 4 9* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. Gardiner - - | - | 20 5 16 | *Rs.* 500 per mensem - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 5 7* | | | | |
| | | I. | *1 5 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. N. P. Mason - | - | 20 5 16 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *4 10 9* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 6 7* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pensions. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Lieutenant - | R. W. Whish - - | 20 7 24 | *Rs.* 585 per mensem - | 300 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum |
| | *E. | *1 4 30* | | | | |
| | †I. | *0 4 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. B. Dickson - - | 20 2 15 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 300 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 7 23* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 9 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. A. Cookson - - | 19 5 2 | 165 *l.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 10 29* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 1 18* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. T. Windus - - | 18 8 26 | 165 *l.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *8 8 27* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 3 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. A. H. Heathcote - | 18 5 6 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 1 15* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 9 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | M. A. Sweny - - | 17 11 20 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 0 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. H. Barker - - | 18 6 3 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 5 22* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 6 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | D. L. Duval - - | 17 10 4 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 6 27* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. W. Clarkson - - | 17 10 4 | *Rs.* 400 per mensem - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 3 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. R. Hunter - - | 17 11 22 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *7 5 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 7 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. L. Searle - - | 17 8 0 | *Rs.* 600 per mensem - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 18 9* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. W. C. Wood - - | 17 2 1 | *Rs.* 400 „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 3 28* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. O'Brien Carew - | 16 2 8 | *Rs.* 400 „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 9 27* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. J. R. B. Brazier - | 16 2 8 | *Rs.* 161 8. 1. „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 4 7* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 6 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Jackson - - | 16 1 14 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 4 4* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 9 7* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. A. Dyer - - | 15 9 14 | 165 *l.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 9 3* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 21* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. Forster - - - | 15 9 11 | 165 *l.* „ - | 250 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 1 23* | | | | |
| | I. | *2 1 27* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Lieutenant - | T. C. R. Carpendale - | 15 4 3 | *Rs.* 400 per mensem - | 250 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | *E. | *4 4 24* | | | | |
| | †I. | *0 4 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. H. Trollope - - | 15 4 3 | *Rs.* 300 „ - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 1 29* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 10* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | P. W. Fendall - - | 15 4 3 | *Rs.* 600 „ - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 2 23* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 4 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Collingwood - - | 16 11 2 | *Rs.* 161 8. 1. „ - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 2 24* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 2* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. B. Templer - - | 14 2 28 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 2 13* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 23* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. Handley - - | 14 0 4 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 7 5* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 5 21* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. De Belin - - | 14 0 4 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 0 30* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 6 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. W. Stiffeo - - | 14 2 5 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 6 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 7 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | M. P. S. Tozer - - | 13 10 18 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 250 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 9 1* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 11 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. H. Davis - - | 15 11 7 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 4 24* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 8 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. J. Clarke - - | 13 10 25 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 10 3* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 10 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. R. May - - - | 13 8 30 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 8 5* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 7 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. M. Philbrick - - | 13 8 28 | | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 6 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. G. Hurlock - - | 13 10 18 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 6 2* | | | | |
| | I. | *7 0 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. M. Chester - - | 13 6 20 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 0 0* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 1 13* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. T. Crockett - - | 13 4 21 | 165 *l.* „ - - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 6 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. H. B. Barron - - | 13 4 19 | 10*s.* 6*d.* per diem - | 200 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 8 19* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 22* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

| RANK. | NAMES. | | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Y.* *m.* *d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Lieutenant - | R. B. Leefe - - | - | 13 4 19 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 200 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | | * E. | *1 5 23* | | | | |
| | | † I. | *0 3 6* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. J. Edwards - | - | 13 6 20 | *Rs.* 145 „ - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 9 4* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 9 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. H. J. Harries | - | 14 2 10 | 165 *l.* per annum - - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 4 14* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 6 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. Williams - | - | 12 10 | *Rs.* 740 per mensem - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | I. | *0 7* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. W. Dawson - | - | 13 11 10 | 165 *l.* per annum - - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *6 4 24* | | | | |
| | | I. | *1 0 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. P. Georges - | - | 15 1 6 | 165 *l.* „ - - - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *5 11 26* | | | | |
| | | | *3 1 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. C. Carey - | - | 12 0 5 | *Rs.* 450 per mensem - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | I. | *0 2 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. W. H. Burnes | - | 12 4 25 | *Rs.* 450 „ - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *1 6 10* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 2* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. M. Liardet - | - | 11 10 25 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *1 9 5* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 5 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Strong - - | - | 11 10 24 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* „ - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 9 28* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 1 11* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. F. Yates - | - | 15 4 3 | *Rs.* 265 per mensem - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *1 11 21* | | | | |
| | | I. | *2 2 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. B. Hewett - | - | 11 10 24 | *Rs.* 430 „ - | 200 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *3 3 22* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 3 25* | | | | |
| Mate - - | T. R. Rogers - | - | 11 10 26 | *Rs.* 145 „ - | 150 „ | - - | 360 (*d*) „ |
| | | E. | *3 2 5* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 4 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. C. Sconce - | - | 12 1 24 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | I. | *0 8 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. G. Lakes - | - | 11 9 21 | *Rs.* 145 „ - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 7 4* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 6 9* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. B. Bewsher - | - | 11 10 16 | 265 *l.* per annum - - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | I. | *2 1 19* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. L. Lewis - | - | 11 10 14 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | E. | *2 0 0* | | | | |
| | | I. | *0 11 12* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe. † Absent on leave in India.

(*d*) Note.—The Regulations did not provide any pension for a Mate on retiring from the Indian Navy; but *see* Note 2, opposite the Lieutenants above.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowance at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pensions. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pensions. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £ | £. | £. |
| Mate - - | F. L. Seaton - - | 11 3 6 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 150 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum |
| | * E. | *2 0 26* | | | | |
| | † I. | *0 5 3* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. H. Ogilvy - - | 11 1 18 | 6*s.* 6*d.* per diem - - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 8 9* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. Warden - - - | 10 10 12 | 6*s.* 6*d.* „ - - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 3 29* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Ellis - - - | 10 11 26 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *0 11 2* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 6* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Morland - - - | 10 7 15 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 3 17* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 17* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Burn - - - | 10 6 15 | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 10 4* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 18* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. P. Wilson - - | 10 5 19 | 6*s.* 6*d.* per diem - - | 150 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 0 15* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 5 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. M. Lambarde - - | 10 2 26 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *4 4 16* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. H. Hall - - - | 10 2 6 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 13* | | | | |
| Ditto- - | C. V. D'Arcy - - | 9 10 23 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. C. Parker - - | 9 9 12 | *Rs.* 175 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. O. Rutherfurd - | 9 11 9 | *Rs.* 175 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 0 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. N. Law - - - | 9 9 12 | *Rs.* 195 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 18* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. L. Bonham - - | 10 0 26 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 6 5* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 7* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. Dawkins - - | 11 3 6 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. A. Bruce - - | 9 4 29 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 8 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 2 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Brebner - - - | 9 1 2 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 10 20* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 8 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | B. C. S. Clarke - - | 10 6 15 | *Rs.* 100 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 3 0* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. E. Beddome - - | 9 2 7 | *Rs.* 145 „ | 125 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 10 14* | | | | |
| | | *0 0 13* | | | | |

*Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £ | £. | £ |
| Mate - - | J. G. Du Boulay - | 9 1 16 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 125 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| Ditto - | J. D. Budd - - *E. | 8 9 22 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | †I. | *2 1 17* | | | | |
| | | *0 3 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. F. Hewison - - I. | 8 5 9 | *Rs.* 175 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 1 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. C. Booth - - E. | 8 2 3 | 5 *s.* 3 *d.* per diem - - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *2 9 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. P. Arnot - - I. | 7 11 10 | *Rs.* 235 per mensem - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 2 15* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. J. Arabin - - I. | 7 11 10 | *Rs.* 430 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 1 19* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Leishman - - | 7 9 26 | *Rs.* 110 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. F. Finnis - - I. | 8 2 8 | *Rs.* 145 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 2 27* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. G. Greig - - - I. | 7 4 19 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 1 3* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. G. F. Cotgrave - | 7 3 9 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. S. Armstrong - I. | 6 9 19 | *Rs.* 110 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 0 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. M. Lane - - | 6 9 19 | *Rs.* 140 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | T. W. Burt - - | 6 9 19 | *Rs.* 175 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | A. L. Brown - - | 6 9 16 | *Rs.* 200 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. H. Oldham - - | 6 9 22 | *Rs.* 110 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. C. Loraine - - I. | 6 10 26 | *Rs.* 110 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 0 24* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Marshall - - I. | 6 3 19 | *Rs.* 400 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 0 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | D. B. King - - | 6 4 11 | *Rs.* 145 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. J. Powell - - I. | 6 9 27 | *Rs.* 145 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 3 5* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. W. Campbell - - | 6 0 12 | *Rs.* 430 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. Cuthell - - | 6 2 8 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. T. H. Wilson - | 6 0 26 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. C. Nicholetts - - I. | 5 9 21 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| | | *0 6 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | B. H. Clark - - | 5 8 2 | *Rs.* 80 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | F. W. Fry - - - | 5 7 18 | *Rs.* 110 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. Leishman - - | 5 6 10 | *Rs.* 145 - „ - | 100 „ - | - - | 360 „ |

* Absent on leave in Europe.

† Absent on leave in India.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Mate - - | H. Warner - - - | 5 5 11 | *Rs.* 145 per mensem - | 100 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | *I. | *0 1 19* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. P. Young - - | 5 3 26 | *Rs.* 235 „ - | 100 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Midshipman - | J. F. McCarty - - | 8 1 27 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 (e) „ |
| | †E. | *1 5 10* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 2 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. A. Wetherall - - | 7 4 19 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 80 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 7 21* | | | | |
| | I | *0 1 6* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. R. Low - - - | 7 7 27 | 75 *l.* „ - - | 80 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 3 19* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 21* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. A. Wray - - | 7 2 14 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. B. Morgan - - | 6 5 12 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 11 12* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 5 9* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. A. Foley - - | 6 0 26 | 75 *l.* „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 7 4* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 21* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. Mayo, v.c. - - | 5 11 10 | 75 *l.* „ - - | 80 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 1 4* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 11* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | D. M. Scott - - | 5 5 11 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 80 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 28* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. J. Ketley - - | 5 5 9 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *3 7 17* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 8 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. H. E. Hornby - | 5 3 3 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 5 3* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. R. A. Capel - - | 5 1 29 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. H. D. Howe - | 5 0 20 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | E. Dawes - - - | 5 0 7 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. Grant - - - | 5 3 8 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 100 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | F. X. Lloyd - - | 4 11 27 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. W. A. Edwards - | 4 9 22 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | S. Smith - - - | 4 11 1 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | C. McLeod Paradise - | 4 10 15 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. N. Foster - - | 4 10 26 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 24* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. D. Mercer - - | 5 0 5 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |

* Absent on leave in India. † Absent on leave in Europe.

(e) The Regulations did not provide any pension for a Midshipman on retirement; but see Note 2, opposite the Lieutenants, above.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Midshipman - | F. H. Mickleburgh - | 5 0 5 | ‡ | 60 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | *E. | *0 11 20* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. H. Pulman - - | 4 9 18 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | †I. | *0 0 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. May - - - | 4 9 18 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. F. Price - - - | 4 8 14 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 15* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. W. Booker - - | 4 8 14 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | A. T. Forde - - | 4 8 14 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | M. Chapman - - | 4 8 27 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 18* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. S. Mainwaring - | 4 7 23 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *1 0 13* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. A. Cheek - - | 4 9 23 | 75 *l.* „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 1 11* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 0 8* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. Bishop - - - | 4 7 3 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | C. H. E. Morton - | 4 8 25 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. E. Moultrie - - | 4 5 13 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | H. L. Gower - - | 4 5 13 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | F. C. Turner - - | 4 5 13 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 4 12* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Lowder - - | 4 5 13 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | Henry Boys - - | 4 7 3 | 75 *l.* per annum - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | E. | *2 7 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. J. G. Beaumont - | 4 3 12 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. T. Fry - - - | 4 3 12 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | F. B. Girdlestone - | 4 2 27 | *Rs.* 110 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | A. C. Williams - - | 4 0 17 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. M. Richmond - | 3 11 12 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. L. Leckie - - - | 4 1 20 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | D. Campbell - - | 4 0 3 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 11* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. King - - - | 3 7 22 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. G. Lowder - - | 3 8 2 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | F. W. Williams - - | 3 8 2 | *Rs.* 110 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |

* Absent on leave in Europe. † Absent on leave in India.

‡ He was absent on leave from the Government of Bombay without pay.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pensions. | Amount of Pension, had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Midshipman - | C. J. Rudd - - - | 3 8 2 | *Rs.* 50 per mensem - | 60 per ann. | - - | 360 per annum. |
| | *E. | *1 5 12* | | | | |
| | †I. | *0 0 24* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Roper - - - | 3 5 0 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | E. T. Hurd - - | 3 5 25 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | A. B. Daniell - - | 3 3 12 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | H. D. C. Hooper - | 3 6 3 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | E. Nicholson - - | 3 1 5 | *Rs* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | H. J. Chalke - - | 3 2 0 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | W. A. Wheler - - | 2 10 28 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | E. Bradbery - - | 2 6 11 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. D. Eades - - - | 2 5 8 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. C. Needham - - | 1 9 21 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | A. Fuller - - - | 1 5 4 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| Ditto - - | G. B. Barrett - - | 0 10 19 | *Rs.* 50 „ - - | 60 „ | - - | 360 „ |
| | | | | | | (*f*) |
| Purser - - | J. C. Ibbs - - - | 34 3 13 | *Rs.* 600 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *1 8 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. G. Bone - - - | 31 4 26 | *Rs.* 700 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *3 4 13* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. A. Keys - - - | 30 5 19 | *Rs.* 420 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *1 8 22* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 5 3* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. G. Betham - - | 28 10 15 | *Rs.* 850 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 19* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. N. C. Beyts - - | 23 5 20 | *Rs.* 619. 5. 7. „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *3 1 12* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | R. Bennett - - - | 23 3 18 | *Rs.* 550 „ - - | 300 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *3 0 0* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 1 14* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. H. D. Williams - | 22 11 23 | *Rs.* 700 „ - - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *1 7 11* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. Barker - - - | 17 11 0 | 165 *l.* per annum - - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *2 8 16* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 6 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | L. J. F. C. Ford - - | 14 0 4 | *Rs.* 491. 15. 4. p' mensem | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *1 11 16* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | W. Johnston - - | 13 11 7 | *Rs.* 550 „ - - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 13* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. Wilson - - - | 14 3 19 | 165 *l.* per annum - - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *3 10 6* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 4* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | G. Ingle - - - | 20 3 15 | *Rs.* 715 per mensem - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 0 24* | | | | |

* Absent on leave in Europe. † Absent on leave in India.

(*f*) The pension for Pursers, after 22 years' Actual Service in India, was 190 *l.* per annum.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension, had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Purser - - | R. J. Mignon - - | 19 6 23 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 250 per ann. | - - | 190 per annum. |
| | *E. | *4 3 27* | | | | |
| | †I. | *0 9 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | P. Jones - - - | 19 3 10 | *Rs.* 250 per mensem - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *2 4 8* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 0 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. S. Litchfield - - | 19 1 7 | *Rs.* 120 „ - | 250 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *2 7 17* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 5 1* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | E. A. S. Mignon - | 15 7 22 | *Rs.* 315. 2. 8. „ - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *1 7 25* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 4 25* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | C. C. B. Daniell - | 8 5 28 | 165 *l.* per annum - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *1 1 0* | | | | |
| | I. | *0 3 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | James Handley - - | 8 3 15 | *Rs.* 1,106. 6. 2. p' mensem | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 8 2* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | T. D. Hewett - - | 17 2 23 | *Rs.* 410. 10. 9. „ - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 2 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. P. Antram - - - | 7 5 7 | *Rs.* 514. 0. 11. „ - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 3 29* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | M. B. Williams - - | 7 11 0 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *0 8 5* | | | | |
| | I. | *1 5 2* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | F. W. Daniell - - | 8 3 9 | *Rs.* 607. 11. 7. p' mensem | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 8 21* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. W. Farley - - | 7 10 3 | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | 200 „ | - - | 190 „ (*g*) |
| | E. | *0 10 8* | | | | |
| Captain's Clerk | H. Barrett - - - | 7 2 19 | *Rs.* 374. 4. 5. p' mensem | 90 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 15* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | A. T. Shuttleworth - | 7 0 10 | *Rs.* 167. 6. 10. „ - | 90 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto - - | H. W. W. Ellis - | 6 10 20 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 90 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto - - | R. H. M. Ellis - - | 6 10 20 | 5 *s.* 3 *d.* per diem - | 80 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | E. | *0 10 22* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | S. A. Gliddon - - | 6 11 10 | *Rs.* 224. 0. 2. p'mensem | 80 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 0 26* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. T. Eaton - - | 6 7 12 | *Rs.* 138. 13. 5. „ - | 80 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto - - | J. M. Dunn - - | 6 5 12 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 80 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 3 6* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | H. Robinson - - | 6 0 12 | *Rs.* 50 „ - | 80 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| | I. | *0 1 17* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. W. M'Gee - - | 5 1 25 | *Rs.* 248. 13. 5. „ - | 70 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto - - | S. Wilson - - - | 5 1 16 | *Rs.* 118. 1. 1. „ - | 70 „ | - - | 190 „ |

* Absent on leave in Europe. † Absent on leave in India.

(*g*) NOTE.—There was no pension for a Captain's Clerk under the Regulations of the Service; but, as in the Indian Navy the Captain's Clerks succeeded by the rule of seniority to the rank of Purser, each could, if he remained in the Active List long enough, attain the Pension of a Purser eventually, viz., 190 *l.* per annum.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | £. | £. |
| Captain's Clerk | A. K. Arnot | 4 2 23 | *Rs.* 204. 8. 9. per mensem | 60 per ann. | - - | 190 per annum |
| Ditto | L. J. L. Preyre - *I. | 4 0 28<br>*0 1 24* | *Rs.* 50 „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | R. C. H. Phelips | 3 10 22 | *Rs.* 161. 15. 6. „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | A. N. Pendlebury | 3 10 20 | *Rs.* 188. 15. 5. „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | M. F. Ingle - I. | 4 0 25<br>*0 4 2* | *Rs.* 50 „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | J. G. Linskill | 3 5 12 | *Rs.* 70 „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | K. M. Smith | 3 1 5 | *Rs.* 50 „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | A. G. Maury | 3 1 3 | *Rs.* 248. 13. 5. „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | T. D. Smart | 2 9 3 | *Rs.* 50 „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Ditto | W. E. J. Hilliard | 2 3 4 | *Rs.* 115. 12. 8. „ | 60 „ | - - | 190 „ |
| Acting Master | H. N. M'Laurin - †E. | 20 7 25<br>*0 8 11* | *Rs.* 355 „ | 150 „ | - - | Nil. |
| Ditto | J. D. Freeman | 20 1 8 | *Rs.* 250 „ | - - | (*a*) — | — |
| Ditto | Charles Tickell | 20 10 16 | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | — | — |
| Ditto | William Sandison - E. | 21 0 26<br>*2 0 0* | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | — | |
| Ditto | A. Holland | 29 0 0 | *Rs.* 205 „ | 150 „ | — | — |
| Ditto | J. K. Linton | 19 0 4 | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | | — |
| Ditto | John Howe | 17 4 17 | *Rs.* 295 „ | - - | (*a*) — | — |
| Ditto | D. J. Kennelly | 13 3 13 | *Rs.* 570 „ | - - | (*a*) — | — |
| Ditto | E. Nash | 14 2 14 | *Rs.* 540 „ | - - | *Rs.* 3,500 | |
| Ditto | F. Forster - E. | 17 4 15<br>*1 11 19* | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | — | — |
| Ditto | C. T. French | 18 1 29 | *Rs.* 250 „ | 150 „ | — | — |
| Ditto | T. Fletcher | 12 3 18 | *Rs.* 250 „ | - - | 3,000 | — |
| Ditto | E. S. H. Neale | 13 1 0 | *Rs.* 250 „ | - - | 3,125 | — |
| Ditto | J. B. Butler - E. | 15 1 14<br>*2 6 10* | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | - - | £. *s.* *d.*<br>312 10 - | — |
| Ditto | A. Harrison | 8 9 12 | *Rs.* 250 per mensem - | - - | *Rs.* 2,000 | — |
| Ditto | R. L. Lawson - E.<br>I. | 10 5 27<br>*2 7 5*<br>*0 1 5* | 10 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem - | - - | £. 200 | — |
| Ditto | W. M'Gaa | 4 3 22 | *Rs.* 175 per mensem - | - - | *Rs.* 600 | — |
| Ditto | D. White | 4 3 17 | *Rs.* 250 „ - | - - | 1,000 | — |
| Ditto | E. Davies | 11 6 28 | *Rs.* 250 „ - | - - | 3,000 | — |
| Ditto | W. K. Thynne | 3 6 2 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 450 | — |

* Absent on leave in India. † Absent on leave in Europe.

(*a*) These officers have joined the Uncovenanted Service, and have not, therefore, claimed any gratuity.

| RANK. | NAMES. | Length of Service. | Amount of Pay and Allowances at the Time of Dismissal. | Amount of Pension. | Amount of Gratuity or Compensation in lieu of Pension. | Amount of Pension had Full Service been completed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Y. m. d.* | | £. | *Rs.* | £. |
| Acting Master | W. R. Marsh - - | 8 0 7 | *Rs.* 250 per mensem - | - - | 1,375 | Nil. |
| Ditto - - | J. C. Flemming - - | 3 1 2 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 450 | — |
| Ditto - - | C. H. Brown - - | 4 3 28 | - - - | - - | 675 | — |
| Ditto - - | G. Peck - - - | 5 6 0 | *Rs.* 250 „ - | - - | 1,250 | — |
| Ditto - - | T. O. Jones - - | 5 11 12 | *Rs.* 250 „ - | - - | 1,375 | — |
| Ditto - - | William Barrass - - | 3 5 6 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 450 | — |
| Ditto - - | William Walton - - | 4 10 20 | *Rs.* 250 „ - | - - | 1,000 | — |
| Ditto - - | W. G. Swain - - | 4 7 9 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 600 | — |
| Ditto - - | H. R. G. Salmon - | 8 7 15 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 1,200 | — |
| Ditto - - | J. Stephenson - - | 3 2 12 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 450 | — |
| Ditto - - | J. Athey - - - | 4 3 22 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 600 | — |
| Ditto - - | D. Milne - - - | 1 11 22 | *Rs.* 175 „ - | - - | 450 | — |
| Acting 1st Class 2d Master. | John Plummer - - | 4 9 4 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 400 | — |
| Ditto - - | F. M'Kensie Hooper - | 4 7 2 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 400 | — |
| Ditto - - | C. H. O'Brien - - | 4 4 15 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 400 | — |
| Ditto - - | H. Ash - - - | 2 11 8 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | S. S. Ridge - - | 3 9 20 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | J. Shaw - - - | 3 5 20 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | W. Guthrie - - | 1 11 10 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | T. B. Talputt - - | 2 2 25 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | C. E. Purrier - - | 4 5 0 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| | ** I.* | *0 1 0* | | | | |
| Ditto - - | J. Gaskin - - - | 3 0 10 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | W. Downing - - | 2 11 29 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | W. Robinson - - | 2 1 19 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | F. H. Jollye - - | 2 6 12 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | A. A. Laughlin - - | 2 5 26 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | William John - - | 2 5 24 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | J. Williams - - | 0 10 2 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Ditto - - | E. B. S. Powell - - | 3 0 10 | *Rs.* 100 „ - | - - | 300 | — |
| Acting 2d Class 2d Master. | Charles Grant - - | 15 8 19 | *Rs.* 70 „ - | *Rs.* 26. 4. 0. per mensem | — | — |

* Absent on leave in India.

# EAST INDIA (NAVY).

## RETURN of the Pensioned and Discharged Indian Naval Officers.

(*Colonel Sykes.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
28 *June* 1864.

436.

*Under* 2 *oz.*

# SIMLA COURT MARTIAL.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 9 July 1867;—*for*,

"COPIES of a DESPATCH of the 17th day of January 1867, from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to the Commander in Chief in *India* relative to the SIMLA COURT MARTIAL, with the Answer thereto:"

"And, of any CORRESPONDENCE between the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for *India* relative to the proposed GRANT to Captain *Jervis* of the Price of his Commission."

War Office, 16 July 1867.

JOHN S. PAKINGTON.

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COPY of a DESPATCH from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to the Commander in Chief in India.

Sir, Horse Guards, 17 January 1867.

THE Field Marshal Commanding in Chief has directed me to acknowledge the receipt of the various letters and papers which your Excellency has forwarded from time to time, in explanation of the course which you have adopted with reference to the conduct of your late aide-de-camp, Captain E. S. Jervis, 106th Foot, and of the reasons which in your judgment rendered it incumbent on you to bring that officer to trial by general court martial.

2. These documents further explain for his Royal Highness's information, the grounds [redacted] which you felt it be your duty to set aside the Court's recommendation to mercy, and to carry out the sentence of dismissal passed on Captain Jervis, entering, in your remarks on the proceedings, an opinion strongly adverse to the finding of the court martial on the charges affecting that officer's honour.

3. These papers, together with those on the same subject which have been received by the Adjutant General of the Forces from Captain Jervis himself, have occupied his Royal Highness's very earnest attention, and as the proceedings of the trial have been officially submitted by the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General, it becomes necessary for his Royal Highness, in reply to your reference on the subject, to express and communicate to you the opinions he has formed on this very distressing and embarrassing case.

4. The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief has not himself entertained any doubt as to the competency of your Excellency to bring Captain Jervis to trial on the charges which you preferred against him in reference to his alleged fraudulent and dishonourable conduct; but as that officer has protested against this exercise of your authority on the ground that certain of the offences with which he was charged were of a non-military nature, and therefore not within the cognizance of a military court, his Royal Highness deemed it necessary to refer the case to the Judge Advocate General, the Right Honourable J. R. Mowbray, in view to obtaining an official legal opinion on the point in question.

5. That gentleman, after analysing the several instances of the first charge (which allege fraudulent and dishonest appropriation), expressed his opinion as follows:

"I am of opinion that such conduct (of which there was some evidence against Captain Jervis) amounted in law to scandalous behaviour, unbecoming

the character of an officer and a gentleman, and that it was therefore legally competent for the Commander in Chief in India to bring Captain Jervis before a military court upon this charge.

" This opinion is independent of the question whether the duties entailed by the confidential position which Captain Jervis occupied in the Commander in Chief's household, are to be considered military duties.

" I incline to the opinion that an officer on the staff of the Commander in Chief, taking charge of the Commander in Chief's household, does not do so as a military duty in the proper sense of that term, but that he voluntarily accepts such charge as a social or domestic duty which is annexed by the custom of the service to his position, or which is imposed as a condition of his tenure of office by the Commander in Chief, who can remove him at pleasure. I am further of opinion that Captain Jervis's letter of the 16th April 1866, acknowledging the receipt of a memorandum from the Commander in Chief, directing him to understand that he was to continue in charge of Sir William Mansfield's establishment as a military duty, could not increase the measure of his responsibility to military criminal law.

" But it is in my view immaterial to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court on this charge, whether the true view of the duties in question is that they were military or that they were civil. The charge was essentially a charge of fraud and dishonourable conduct, and was on this ground in my judgment within the legal cognisance of a court martial."

6. In regard to the second charge, the Judge Advocate General records his opinion that it does not disclose any legal offence, and his Royal Highness thinks it right to communicate to your Excellency that gentleman's reasons for this opinion in his own words :

" I have come to the conclusion that this charge does not disclose any legal offence. Assuming that it was part of the military duty of Captain Jervis to keep the books, accounts and vouchers, in question, and to produce them when so ordered by the Commander in Chief, I consider that Captain Jervis was nevertheless privileged to decline producing those documents to a Court which was inquiring into his conduct upon a criminal charge. The letter of Colonel Longden (the Adjutant General) to Captain Jervis, requesting him to attend at the court of inquiry with all the accounts, books, papers, &c., in his possession, if considered as an order to produce these documents to the court of inquiry, was in my opinion not a lawful order upon the principle which is fully recognised in the administration of military as well as civil justice, that a man is not bound to criminate himself, whatever be the nature of the charge.

" It is in my opinion incorrect to designate Captain Jervis as a witness before the court of inquiry; he was the accused person, and the court, as Colonel Longden's letter stated, was held for the purpose of inquiring into the accusations against him. By the custom of the service, which is in conformity with the principles of law above stated—

> " Although an officer cannot refuse to obey an order directing him to appear before a court of inquiry charged to inquire into his conduct, yet he may object to take any part in the proceedings, and has a right to decline answering any questions or making any statement which may, in his opinion, be prejudicial to him in the course of any ulterior proceedings.

" This rule would clearly entitle Captain Jervis, in law, to decline producing any documents, although ordered or requested to do so.

" An order, I may add, may no doubt be in the form of a request, and Colonel Longden's letter, so far as it requested Captain Jervis simply to attend at the court of inquiry, was in my judgment a military order, for such an order was valid ; but so far as it requested him to bring all the papers, books, &c., as such an order would not be valid, it was in fact, as in law, no order to Captain Jervis, but only an offer to him of an opportunity to clear his character, and an intimation that the production of the books was considered indispensable for that purpose. In my opinion, however, the production of the books before the court of inquiry was not, as stated in the charge, essential to the clearance of his character as an officer and a gentleman, for Captain Jervis was entitled in law to reserve his defence for a court martial. But in saying this, I must not be understood to mean that I approve of his conduct in availing himself of that strict legal right."

So

So fully does his Royal Highness concur in this latter view, that he cannot bring himself to understand why Captain Jervis, if he were strong in the conviction of his own integrity, did not voluntarily produce the books in question.

7. But, whilst admitting in its fullest sense your Excellency's competency to bring Captain Jervis to trial on the first charge, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief cannot divest himself of the duty which is imposed on him of considering the question with reference to the expediency and propriety of such a procedure; and after a most anxious review of the whole case, and with a very decided wish to uphold to the fullest extent the high office and authority of the Commander in Chief in India, his Royal Highness, with great reluctance, feels himself compelled to dissent from your Excellency as to the advisability of the measure, and to inform you that the course you adopted was not one of which he can approve.

8. His Royal Highness is aware that it is quite in accordance with custom, especially in India, for an aide-de-camp to be entrusted with the control and management of the household of the Commander in Chief, or General on whose staff he is serving, and his Royal Highness is not prepared to express any opinion on this practice, further than to state, that he concurs generally in the legal views expressed by the Judge Advocate General on this point, and that he considers such duties to be of a purely social and domestic nature, undertaken voluntarily by the aide-de-camp, though accepted as a condition of the confidential domestic post he occupies, which he holds at the pleasure of his general; and his Royal Highness is very decidedly of opinion that they cannot be regarded as strictly military duties entailing in their execution military responsibility and military subordination.

9. Entertaining these views, therefore, the Duke of Cambridge is unable to concur in the propriety of the instructions contained in your Excellency's memoranda, dated 30th March and 14th April last, drawn up for the guidance of the officers of your personal staff, similar documents to which have never before come to his Royal Highness's notice, nor can his Royal Highness admit that Captain Jervis's acknowledgment of the receipt of your instructions directing him to understand that he was to continue in charge of your establishment as a military duty, could, to use Mr. Mowbray's own expression, "increase the measure of his responsibility to military criminal law."

10. But granting even that your Excellency's views as to the position and duties of an aide-de-camp were correct, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief greatly deplores that the first steps taken by you in reference to Captain Jervis, should have been of a nature so calculated to lead to opposition to your authority, and eventually to the necessity for bringing him to trial. His Royal Highness cannot help thinking, that had you, in the earliest stage of these proceedings, acted in a more conciliatory manner towards him—and, considering the long and personal intimacy of your relations with that officer, his Royal Highness is impressed with the conviction that your aide-de-camp had a claim to such consideration at your hands—much of what afterwards occurred might have been prevented, and a great and deplorable scandal averted.

11. His Royal Highness conceives that the course to have adopted on its becoming known to you that the management of your household and farm was not in accordance with your belief and intention, was for your Excellency to have recalled Captain Jervis from his temporary leave of absence, and to have invited him to explain personally to you any matter in which it appeared to you that his conduct was questionable; a private invitation on your part to enter into a full and unreserved explanation was far more calculated to lead to a satisfactory result than the semi-official demand conveyed to Captain Jervis through your military secretary.

12. The Duke of Cambridge makes every allowance for your feelings of surprise and mortification at believing yourself to have been deceived by an officer of your personal staff, in whom for years you had placed such entire reliance, and his Royal Highness understands how distasteful it would have been to you to have had to avow personally to that officer that your confidence in him was shaken. Notwithstanding, however disagreeable to your feelings the adoption of such a course, his Royal Highness is convinced that it was the

proper and judicious one, and deeply regrets that you did not follow it. Still more does he regret your having entered into a personal examination of your servant on matters so materially affecting Captain Jervis's character, without inviting that officer to be present personally to explain or refute the accusations made against him. It appears to his Royal Highness that it was only due to Captain Jervis to give him this opportunity of entering into a personal explanation; and that this apparent want of consideration for his feelings as an officer and a gentleman was eminently calculated to lead to continued misunderstanding, and to rash and ill-considered action on the part of your aide-de-camp.

13. His Royal Highness does not overlook the fact remarked on by your Excellency, that Captain Jervis never did, in so many words, ask for an interview, but his wishes on the subject appear to his Royal Highness unmistakeably shown in his note to your military secretary, dated 3rd May, in which he says, "I only beg to be afforded an opportunity of explaining, before measures are carried into effect which must prove the most utter ruin to me professionally."

14. In making these observations, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief does not seek to palliate the insubordinate conduct of Captain Jervis, which is in every respect reprehensible, and which he condemns in the strongest terms; but, in reviewing the case, it is incumbent on his Royal Highness to take all its bearings into consideration, and to point to the causes which led to that insubordination, and to show how in his opinion it might have been averted.

15. But as these inquiries proceeded, and the conviction gradually forced itself on your Excellency's mind, that in Captain Jervis's conduct there was something more than mere irregularity, and that he had been guilty of fraudulent acts impossible to overlook, or to be visited by mere dismissal from your staff, the question as to the nature of the proceedings to be adopted required the gravest consideration, and before determining to arraign him before a military court, it was of all things incumbent on your Excellency to weigh the consequences of that measure with reference to your own position as Commander in Chief and its effect on the discipline of the army.

16. That these considerations were not entirely overlooked by your Excellency, his Royal Highness freely admits, for in your memorandum dated 4th June, you drew attention to the fact, that a military trial would lay you open to the misconstruction that you would be a judge in your own cause; but his Royal Highness feels it difficult to suppose that when you resolved on this course you had fully appreciated the gravity of these objections, and foreseen the extent to which the dignity and authority of your high office would be compromised by an appeal to a court before which you would appear as prosecutor and witness, and the proceedings of which would be submitted to yourself clothed with all the powers of a revising officer.

17. Had these difficulties presented themselves to you with the force they ought to have done, it is impossible, his Royal Highness conceives, that you would have allowed your better judgment to have been overruled by the opinions of the officers of the staff at head quarters whom you consulted, and in whose reasons for recommending a military trial his Royal Highness is unable to concur.

18. Having thus, as briefly as the important nature of the subject will admit of, expressed to you the opinions of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief on the preliminary measures adopted, it is now my duty to convey to you his Royal Highness's views on the action taken by your Excellency with reference to the proceedings of the court before which Captain Jervis was arraigned.

19. His Royal Highness willingly accepts your assurance of having been actuated by conscientious motives in the conduct of this case, and believes that in thus bringing a criminal charge against Captain Jervis, you were prompted by the conviction that you were performing a duty forced upon you by the requirements of the service.

20. It is impossible, however, to forget that, considering the very unusual circumstances of this trial, the personal interest you had in it, and the intimate professional

professional connection which had existed between yourself and Captain Jervis, it was peculiarly incumbent on you to be guarded in your course of action, with the special object of shielding yourself from all suspicion of being influenced in the slightest degree by interested or personal feelings.

21. In such a matter your Excellency might well have been satisfied, unless the case disclosed the gravest and clearest cause to the contrary, which, in his Royal Highness' opinion, it did not, to leave it in the hands of a Court composed of officers of rank and experience, taking the assurance to yourself that, so far as their duty would permit them, they would defend your Excellency's interests and high position, judging the case on its own merits as the facts came before them in evidence.

22. It is difficult to suppose that such a Court would have entered on its duties without a deep conviction of its responsibility and of the difficulties which were before it in conducting this trial. It might have been anticipated, therefore, that the officers composing that Court would apply themselves with an earnest endeavour, and with an unbiassed judgment, to arrive at a verdict which would at the same time satisfy justice, and maintain your Excellency's authority.

23. The Duke of Cambridge fully anticipated that these considerations would have had their due weight with your Excellency in your final disposal of these proceedings, and it was with the deepest regret, therefore, that his Royal Highness found that his anticipations had not been realised.

24. After a patient and protracted sitting, in which every fact and argument that could be adduced in support of the prosecution had been brought forward, the Court acquitted the prisoner of the charge of scandalous conduct, found him guilty of insubordination, and whilst recording a sentence of dismissal, and thus marking their sense of his military misconduct, recommended him to mercy "in consideration of the extenuating circumstances disclosed in the proceedings."

25. Differing with the Court in their conclusions, your Excellency directed a revision of their finding on the first and second charges, forwarding for their consideration a careful analysis of the evidence drawn up by the Judge Advocate General of the Bengal Army, together with his opinion on that evidence, on the admissions of the prisoner, and on the force of the presumptions of law as liable to affect a verdict in his case.

26. The Court having carefully reconsidered the whole of the evidence, and also the communication which you caused to be made to it, adhered to their original finding. In confirming this finding, your Excellency announced in your General Orders why you were unable to concur in the acquittal on the first and second charges, and why you felt yourself precluded from attending to the Court's recommendation to mercy.

27. It becomes the duty of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, under these circumstances, to inform your Excellency that he cannot approve of the remarks which you have thought fit to publish in your General Orders; for his Royal Highness cannot ignore the fact that those remarks have a practical tendency to weaken the independence of courts martial, to bring contempt on military tribunals in the eyes of the public, and to affect the discipline of the army in a very material degree.

28. In respect to the verdict of acquittal on the first charge, on which your Excellency has animadverted, I am directed to forward the following remarks on the subject by the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General. These remarks, I am to state, have reference only to the first charge, Mr. Mowbray's opinion on the second charge having been given in a previous portion of this letter.

"Speaking generally, the prisoner admitted the facts which were specified in the several instances of the first charge, and which were given in evidence by the prosecution, but he denied the fraudulent intent, which was the gist of the charge. The Court accordingly, in acquitting him, must be deemed to have taken the facts as proved and admitted, and to have come to the conclusion that the fraudulent intent alleged was not established.

"This question of Captain Jervis' intention was very difficult and complex; it was to be determined only by a fair and just consideration of all the evidence which the Court had heard and seen, and of all the surrounding circumstances, and as such was a question within the special province of the Court.

"The evidence, as it appears to me, admitted reasonably of a conclusion either of the prisoner's guilt or of his innocence. No point which could possibly be urged in favour of a conviction was omitted in the very able reply for the prosecution, and all the arguments which could tell against the prisoner were accumulated with remarkable subtlety and ingenuity in the minute and accurate analysis of the whole case drawn up by the Judge Advocate General of Bengal, when the Court were ordered to re-assemble for the purpose of revision; and this last document was submitted to the Court with the further sanction and authority of the Commander in Chief.

"The Court deliberately found in favour of the prisoner, and I do not feel myself justified in saying that such finding was wrong."

* * * * *

"I think it right to add, that I have confined myself to reviewing the case as it was presented to the Court upon the trial."

29. In this opinion his Royal Highness entirely concurs, feeling sure, from a perusal of the proceedings, that the Court had every opportunity of arriving at a just judgment, and only formed it after a most anxious consideration of every fact and argument brought before them.

30. In rejecting the recommendation of the Court in the prisoner's favour, his Royal Highness considers your Excellency to have allowed yourself to enter into observations which he extremely regrets with reference to their probable effect on the army at large.

His Royal Highness' long experience of the practice of courts-martial, and of the feelings which influence the great body of officers of the army in the exercise of this most important duty, convinces him that had a non-commissioned officer or soldier been arraigned before a court martial for an act of insubordination into which the Court believed he had been led by circumstances which might be considered in extenuation, as in the case of Captain Jervis, the Court, whether regimental, district, or general, would have awarded a sentence commensurate with the offence, accompanying it with such recommendation to mercy as would lead to a mitigation or remission of the punishment.

31. In this conviction his Royal Highness cannot accept your Excellency's remark, that to attend to the Court's recommendation in favour of Captain Jervis would lead to the belief that there is one law for the officer and another for the soldier.

32. Your Excellency draws the attention of his Royal Highness to the fact of the prisoner not having received a "full and honourable" acquittal, and that the absence of these words in the verdict leaves him not entirely free from the imputation conveyed in the preamble of the charge. His Royal Highness admits that, according to the custom usually observed in the case of officers tried on charges affecting their honour, the addition of the words "fully and honourably" would have been a more satisfactory acquittal, as recording a more complete vindication of Captain Jervis' character; but, on the other hand, it must be observed that the Court did record a recommendation to mercy.

33. But, in truth, without pursuing these arguments further, his Royal Highness greatly deplores that when you found yourself unable to concur with the Court and to act on their recommendation, you did not altogether refrain from dealing with the case yourself, and adopt the proper and obvious course of referring the proceedings to England, for submission to the Queen, to be disposed of according to Her Majesty's pleasure.

34. Had your Excellency done this, following the precedent afforded in the case of the trial of Captain ————, in which your predecessor, unable to concur in the decision of the Court, submitted the proceedings to his Royal Highness for Her Majesty's consideration, you would have acquitted yourself of all responsibility in the matter, and extricated yourself from a most exceptional and anomalous position.

35. In

35. In conveying to you his views as to the part taken by your Excellency with reference to this trial, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief has performed a very painful duty, but there is still one point to which he must advert in justice to the Court whose proceedings are under review.

36. It is only due to the President and Members of that Court to state that, although in the opinion of the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General there were some irregularities admitting of observation, unnecessary to advert to in detail, inasmuch as nothing took place to affect the legality of the trial, the perusal of the proceedings enabled him to say that he considered the Court to have performed their difficult functions with "marked impartiality and sound judgment."

37. His Royal Highness entirely concurs in this opinion; and as he considers it only right and an act of justice to the officers composing the Court that this opinion should be made known to them, his Royal Highness requests you will take measures for giving effect to his wishes in this respect, leaving it to your Excellency to do so in such manner as may appear called for under the circumstances.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. F. Forster*, Lieut.-General,
Military Secretary.

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(No. 7924.)

From His Excellency General Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, Commander in Chief in India, to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards, London, S.W.

Head Quarters, Fort William,
19 February 1867.

Sir,

IT is with feelings of the deepest disappointment that I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 17th January 1867, in which the opinions and orders of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief are conveyed, with regard to the case and trial of Mr. Jervis, late captain in the 106th Foot.

2. I had ventured to flatter myself that although there might be differences of opinion on matters of detail, there would be none with respect to the action pursued for the maintenance of discipline and integrity among the officers of the army, in one of the most difficult cases which ever tried the endurance and patience of a general officer in high command, and appealed to the first principles of discipline, on which rests the security of Her Majesty's military forces.

3. Notwithstanding my extreme discouragement, I may give expression to one feeling of satisfaction, on the ground that in spite of the great difference of opinion between the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General and myself, his Royal Highness having been pleased to express his disapproval of the advice tendered by the former, there is no suggestion of even the shadow of illegality in the treatment of this difficult case.

4. Before proceeding to consider your letter in detail, I beg to submit with the greatest deference to his Royal Highness my declaration that from the beginning to the end of the affair forming the subject of the correspondence, I and those who have advised me were pre-occupied with but one idea, viz., to follow the law with the greatest exactness, no possible official precaution having been omitted for the preservation of unbiassed judgment, and the affording every reasonable means of explanation to the accused officer. It was considered that in strict adherence to law and usage alone could the way be found out of the dilemma in which I was placed by the strange and persistent misconduct I was unhappily required to meet.

5. Accordingly the law, as understood by the Judge Advocate General of the Bengal Army, was followed in the minutest particular.

6. As regards my own sentiments, I will only say that I have felt as one without free agency or option. Certain offences involving charges of fraud and insubordination were apparently established on very full and sufficient

 evidence,

evidence, and I was advised, not only by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, but by the Adjutant General and Deputy Adjutant General.

7. These gentlemen, all like myself, most anxious to avoid a difficult business and a scandal, were not able to advise me that the matter could be dropped, but, on the contrary, whilst warning me of the consequent misrepresentation, delivered their opinion that Mr. Jervis should be put on his trial. I may mention in illustration of the above, that, in addition to the very strong and uncompromising opinions to which I have alluded, the following conversation took place between the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, and myself, shortly before the trial. Impressed with the odium inherent to the whole matter, I put this question to the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army. "Has anything been forgotten? Could it have been possible to have let the man get away without a trial?" The answer was, "I do not think so; you must have brought him back for trial if he had gone away."

8. Now I would ask his Royal Highness to understand that I do not in any manner wish to devolve my proper responsibility on others, or to make an unworthy attempt to shift blame to other shoulders.

9. But I think his Royal Highness will recognise the necessity of a general officer in high command generally adopting the legal view placed before him by his constituted legal adviser. In the letter under reply, it is to be observed that his Royal Highness himself leans on the advice tendered by the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General. It is surely not too much to say that the Commander in Chief in India cannot be held to have acted arbitrarily and of his own will only, when he has done that of which his Royal Highness gives the example in this letter. It is true that the Right Honourable Mr. Mowbray is a Minister of the Crown, but it is also true that the Judge Advocate General of the Bengal Army is my constituted legal adviser, and the legal adviser of Government in affairs military, just as Mr. Mowbray is the adviser of Government and of the Commander in Chief at home.

10. For the ability displayed by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, in the exercise of his office, I would appeal as a witness to Mr. Mowbray himself.

11. I would, therefore, with great submission, suggest to his Royal Highness, that however much his Royal Highness might be induced to differ with me in opinion, and to regret my conduct, it might have been noted in justice to me, that I had sought the best advice placed at my disposal by the Government under which I am serving, with regard to the courts martial and courts of inquiry which preceded it.

12. Having thus stated these general considerations, I would now proceed to show, as briefly as I can, what may in my humble opinion be said against the conclusions of Mr. Mowbray, and the opinion of his Royal Highness.

13. I am not altogether without hope that it will become apparent that much may be reasonably advanced in answer to the argument and opinions which cause me so much pain.

14. In the 5th and 6th paras. of your letter, a quotation from Mr. Mowbray discusses certain legal points. He first gives an opinion on a point which has been much argued, viz., the military character or otherwise of certain duties imposed upon aides-de-camp under my orders. He disagrees with the view taken by me on this matter, but dismisses it as being "immaterial to the question of jurisdiction of the Court on the first charge." With regard to that charge he says, "the charge was essentially a charge of fraud and dishonourable conduct, and was, on this ground, within the legal cognizance of a court-martial," the same opinion having been fully entertained by the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, *Vide* 4th para.

15. In the 6th para. the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General records his opinion that the second charge does not disclose any legal offence, for reasons given.

16. I would submit that in those reasons I fail to discover that an important item of the charge has received the attention of the right honourable gentleman. That charge distinctly sets out that the books, vouchers, &c., are the property of the Commander-in-Chief. I am not aware that an officer can on

any

any ground whatever decline to surrender the property of another when it is legally demanded by the owner. If the owner is a lawful commanding officer, it would seem to follow that the retention of the property in spite of formally conveyed orders, does constitute a disobedience, or, in other words, a neglect amounting to a military offence.

17. The charge was carefully framed by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, to avoid arguments as to the definition of lawful command as used in the Mutiny Act and Articles of War.

18. If the charge be referred to, it will be seen that Mr. Jervis is required to produce nothing of his own.

19. It appeared to the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, that so much of the charge ending with the words "the property of the Commander in Chief in his (Captain Jervis) possession" was a perfectly valid one. The succeeding sentence "the production of which was essential to the clearance of his character as an officer and a gentleman" was added by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, to strengthen the charge with regard to the obligations held to rest on an officer in his character of a gentleman.

I would ask if the charge is to be invalidated because of the presence of these words.

20. But assuming for the sake of argument that the books and papers concerned were the property of Mr. Jervis, and not of his superior officer, I have learned in conversation with a gentleman learned in the law, that to have rendered the objection valid in the sense of Mr. Mowbray's opinion, the objection, viz., that the production of the books might criminate himself, should have been made when Mr. Jervis was before the court of inquiry. This he did not do. Had he done so, the objection though legally valid would have operated strongly against him in the judgment of the court of inquiry.

21. Having refrained from making his objection at the time, and having, so far as the charge of fraud is concerned, thus saved himself before the court of inquiry, can he be in law entitled to the advantage of both sides of the dilemma in which he was placed, when it might subsequently suit him to plead the objection? The best opinions I can obtain indicate a negative to the question.

22. These observations seem to dispose of the questions of law as stated by the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General, the paragraphs treating of them being concluded by Mr. Mowbray's opinion that he did not approve of Captain Jervis' conduct in availing himself of a strict legal right (which, for the reasons stated, I venture to think did not exist), that opinion being most forcibly concurred in by his Royal Highness.

23. I may here say that this conduct on the part of Mr. Jervis which is thus strongly condemned, led to the whole unfortunate consequences, there being at the time no reasonable, I might even say no plausible excuse, which I would not have gladly accepted for his extrication from the difficulty in which he was placed. For then there had been no question of trial; Mr. Jervis was not under arrest, and he would not have been placed under arrest if he had not thus absolutely forced it on. The non-production of the books and vouchers left no alternative, according to the Articles of War and the usage of the service.

24. In the 7th, 8th, and 9th paras. his Royal Highness is pleased to discuss the duties incumbent on aides-de-camp as officers. As in duty bound, I most willingly defer to his Royal Highness' superior judgment. I will only say that I have generally found that with young men, written directions are satisfactory to them, for then they know exactly what is expected from them, this rather adding to their free agency than not—a matter always held in view by me as a matter of common courtesy and kindness to them. What might appear peculiar in these instructions was solely induced by my wish to spare no pains to save Mr. Jervis from the results of his temper or eccentricity, whichever it may be termed, and not with regard to any of the other young men about me.

25. I am obliged to say, in justice to myself, that the conviction entertained

by his Royal Highness that a more conciliatory bearing on my part might have saved much that ensued, is hardly borne out by the facts of Mr. Jervis' conduct to me, as shown in the papers attached to the proceedings of the trial, and also forwarded in the " compilation " to the Adjutant General.

26. I venture to say that the truth is, I have been strangely tolerant of bad temper and even rudeness in my house in the instance of Mr. Jervis. When a man has been about for me some time he must go great lengths before he can be dismissed by me, partly from my dislike to change, but principally owing to my wish to help a man as I would a relative when he has once been a member of my personal staff. In point of fact, this annoyance may be said to have been caused by a too great tolerance on my part, when I thought that Mr. Jervis' faults or eccentricities were merely the results of uncertain temper, and that he was a man of ability and good habits of business.

27. After this assertion it will be understood how difficult it would have been for me to have acted as suggested by his Royal Highness in para. 11. To have done so would certainly have been most obnoxious to me, when I found on irrefragable evidence that I had been most grossly duped by a man I had greatly trusted, and that a slur was actually being cast upon my own name by his practices. For it was not a mere mismanagement of household or farm, as supposed in your letter, which caused my indignation, but it was the starting of a shop on my premises for his (Mr. Jervis') purposes, the customers being led to believe that they were conferring favours on me as well as receiving them, I in my ignorance having been included among his customers. Before he had time to elaborate excuses, he admitted the affair quite sufficiently to establish the truth of the testimony on which I was prepared to act.

28. I think it must be admitted that a superior officer labouring under such provocation, with regard to his own dignity and to avoid a painful scene of recrimination between the opposing parties, would be naturally inclined to refer the matter concerned, as I did, for investigation by unbiassed officers. If Mr. Jervis was perfectly clear in the matter, he had merely to explain himself and procure the expulsion of the man who had wronged him. This he would not do.

29. I may here say that it is suggested that I should have done what no colonel of a regiment permits himself to do when an officer misbehaves seriously, more especially when it is an offence against himself.

In the matter of officers it is the invariable custom of the service, for the purpose of avoiding unseemly altercation, pain to the accused, or insult offer superior officer, to cause the accused to be addressed in writing, and to to a him redress, if the matter be serious, by means of organised and perfectly disinterested inquiry.

30. A like principle was followed in the personal examination of my servant. It is true that Mr. Jervis was away in the country at the time, but the most anxious care was displayed to cause the very words uttered in his disfavour to be conveyed to him as soon as possible, as also a memorandum written by myself of the impression thus caused in my mind.

31. In this manner, moreover, was the accuser held absolutely responsible for his accusation, Mr. Jervis being invited to confront him. Thus, without committing me to a painful scene, Mr. Jervis was made aware of the only mode by which my confidence in him could be restored, according to the custom of the service.

32. I assert with entire confidence that these measures were taken with the calmest deliberation, and in the best temper, for the purpose of rendering absolute justice to Mr. Jervis and to others.

33. But the truth is, that the proof thickened so fast against him that the matter, in spite of my precautions, assumed an appearance of precipitation.

34. After this explanation I would express a hope that it may be considered that the insubordinate conduct of Captain Jervis, which is condemned in the strongest terms by his Royal Highness, was the result, not in any manner of my acts, but of his perverseness, which would not allow him to see that if he could clear

clear himself of the allegations laid to his charge, those acts would have been his best assistance. As he could not clear himself, the request for him to do so was naturally disagreeable to him. But that is surely not the fault of the person who has been wronged.

35. Considering the heaviness of the charge brought against me of having been the original cause of Mr. Jervis' insubordination, it is right to illustrate this matter still further.

If in private life, of two gentlemen one commits an act involving the personal honour of the other, and attaching a slur to his own, do they meet to make up the difference, running the risk of violent personal quarrel, or do they manage the investigation through third parties, and ultimately, if necessary through a magistrate?

If to the position be added an element of obligation from an inferior to a superior, there is even less doubt about the course to be pursued and less consideration is shown. If, finally, the further element of military subordination, with the consequence of the obligation on the inferior to do nothing either by word or deed which might bring disrepute on his chief be superadded, the superior officer being bound by the orders and usage of the Army to avoid personal interviews under circumstances which might lead to violent and disrespectful words from the subordinate and therefore to another military offence on his part, we have, I submit, the exact position which absolutely prescribed the course pursued by me.

36. It is to be noted that the treatment of the farm business had nothing whatever to do with the charges on which Mr. Jervis was brought to trial.

37. In answer to paras. 15, 16, and 17, I would beg to refer to my Memorandum dated Agra, 17th November 1866, as also to the papers forwarded to the Adjutant General, in which are displayed the several opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Bengal Army. As already stated, the latter in my opinion left me no choice, and after prolonged deliberation in which the questions involved were very carefully weighed, as shown in the Memorandum of 17th November I followed the course which on the whole appeared to be the best for the public service, although contrary to my own interests. I could not, of course, accurately foretell the course of public opinion or how it might be worked, but I had been warned, and I felt that I should be the mark of misrepresentation; those who warned me, and myself, alike believing that my official obligations could in no respect be trifled with or slurred over for my personal convenience as Commander in Chief of the Army.

*Vide* papers forwarded to the Adjutant General.

38. Having thus encountered the criticism respecting my conduct in the matters preliminary to the court martial, I follow the arrangement pursued in your letter, and address myself to the comments on my action affecting the trial itself.

39. I would, in passing, tender my respectful acknowledgments to his Royal Highness for his recognition of the conscientious motives by which my conduct, whether expedient or not, has been actuated.

40. From the 20th to the 27th paras. of the letter under reply, reasons are given for the purpose of supporting the opinion of his Royal Highness, that I should have implicitly followed the finding of the Court, the pith of those reasons being found in the sentence "that it was incumbent on you to be guarded in your course of action, with the special object of shielding yourself from all suspicion of being influenced in the slightest degree by interested or personal motives."

41. The proposition is undeniable, but I would submit that it cannot be taken alone. A Commander in Chief has a higher duty than shielding himself from suspicion of unworthy motives. He is bound to set aside the personal effect of such suspicions, if unhappily, in the exercise of his office, they interfere with the due discharge of his duty.

42. It is the portion of all men in high place at times to undergo such suspicions. It is an obvious, an easy, and a common line of defence for a prisoner to attempt to give form and effect to such suspicions, for the purpose of distracting the attention of a Court before which he may be in the course of appearing, or

before the public; in short, in a manner to cause the accuser to change places with himself.

43. I venture to submit, with the greatest deference, while allowing the utmost possible weight to the proposition above quoted, that had I acted on it solely without paying the most careful attention to the considerations now stated, I should have laid myself open in an unanswerable manner, to the imputation of cowardice and dereliction of duty; and I feel confident that my conduct would have been so viewed by his Royal Highness, and the educated portion of the public.

44. I will now proceed to consider this question in another manner, viz. on its merits, and I shall avail myself chiefly of Mr. Mowbray's own words.

45. In the first place, then, it is to be observed that I was most forcibly advised by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, that a revision of the proceedings of the court martial was necessary, the finding on the first and second charges being distinctly contrary to the evidence which was adduced to the Court before which Mr. Jervis was arraigned.

To the strength of the argument of the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, Mr. Mowbray bears testimony.

46. That functionary is my constituted legal adviser, and therefore, technically speaking, it is unnecessary for me to adduce any facts in support of his advice.

47. But, further, I think it is not improper for me to state, that as soon as the case for the prisoner had been fully disclosed by his rejoinder, three gentlemen, learned in the law, who had followed the case from its commencement, expressed to me a strong opinion, in emphatic language, that the evidence for the prosecution was complete, and in no way invalidated by the defence. I will add, that since the proceedings have been known to the public, a variety of opinions from legal authorities, entirely unsolicited by myself, have reached me, both from India and England, absolutely to the same effect.

48. Consequently, reserving any opinion of my own, which was not expressed, I had very strong reason for relying on the soundness of the opinion officially communicated to me by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army.

49. I was also informed by official report, that the Court had been much divided, a majority of nine having voted for acquittal, against a minority of six on the first charge, and of eight against seven on the second.

*Vide* letter of Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, ordering revision.

50. It was thus evident that revision could not be avoided. The order was accordingly given, while I carefully guarded myself from uttering even a hint of personal opinion.

51. The Court adhered to its finding. I do not in the least contest the soundness of Mr. Mowbray's sentiments, as expressed in the long quotation set out in your 28th para. I am aware that in some cases it may, and that it does happen, that notwithstanding the entirely technical completeness of evidence, a Court exercises a proper discretion in acquitting a prisoner.

52. In this particular case, as shown by the official advice which I had peculiar reasons for thinking sound, I could not but entertain the strongest doubts of the correctness of a verdict which was carried by nine members out of 15.

53. The Court evidently laboured under the very difficulties which are apparent in the mind of the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General, whose words I now set out.

*Note.*—This opinion would seem to establish the absolute necessity of bringing this case to trial. It is thus further evident that this business was of such gravity that it could not be affected by the personal bearing of the Commander in Chief, it being one which could alone be decided in a Court of Justice.

"The evidence as it appears to me, admitted reasonably of a conclusion either of the prisoner's guilt or innocence;" and again, "the Court deliberately found in favour of the prisoner, and I do not feel myself justified in saying the finding was wrong.

"I think it right to add, that I have confined myself to reviewing the case as it was presented to the Court upon trial."

54. It is thus evident from the guarded language of Mr. Mowbray that, while he does not feel himself justified in saying the finding was wrong, he does experience considerable doubt about the matter.

55. The

55. The concluding sentence, quoted from Mr. Mowbray's opinion, must now be taken into consideration. It is of great importance.

56. It so happens that Mr. Jervis' conduct since the trial affords an opportunity of applying a crucial test for ascertaining whether the penetration and insight of the court martial were sufficient, and as to whether the advice given by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, on which I have acted, was correct or not.

57. This test is found in the printed correspondence which I attach to this letter, the same having passed on the subject of Mr. Jervis' accounts before and after the trial. It is brought down to the latest date, since when Mr. Jervis has quitted India.

For the sake of brevity I attach also a memorandum originally compiled by my advisers for private circulation among my friends. This will more especially elucidate the matter of the correspondence.

58. I submit these papers without comment, beyond the remark, that in my opinion, and as I believe in that of all others who have seen them, they incontestably prove that the estimate of the evidence as taken by the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, was not only technically but absolutely and practically correct, and that, as we almost invariably find, a careful attention to the law of evidence has saved him from an error into which the majority of the Court was led by the ability with which Mr. Jervis' defence was conducted.

59. I venture to solicit the great favour of a personal perusal of these papers on the part of his Royal Highness.

60. It is thus I think firmly established, that the doubts entertained by Mr. Mowbray as shown by his own words are justified, and that the official legal opinion on which I have acted has been sound. I am particular in saying "the official legal opinion on which I have acted," because both in the revision of the Court and in my remarks on the trial, I have sedulously refrained from uttering or even hinting any personal opinion. This I conceived to be required from me by the circumstances of the case.

61. Although up to this point I have assigned reasons to his Royal Highness for adopting the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, that the finding of the Court on the charge of scandalous conduct was contrary to evidence, I must guard myself against misconstruction by affirming in the most emphatic and positive manner, that I did not believe that the recommendation to mercy could be attended to, even though the acquittal of the Court were justified by the facts adduced before it.

62. With respect to my remarks on the court martial, I must express my deep regret that they have not the approval of his Royal Highness.

63. While bowing to the superior judgment and wide experience of his Royal Highness, I may perhaps be permitted to observe that it would be impossible to find in the annals of Her Majesty's Service, any instance of repeated, prolonged, violent, and most deliberate insubordination on the part of a private soldier being admitted to mercy on the ground of alleged provocation. An isolated act of insubordination or violence may be and is so treated, and by no one more often than by myself, whether with or without the recommendation of a Court. But I venture to think, and to state with some approach to confidence, that prolonged insubordination which is deliberate and aforethought is, according to the custom of Her Majesty's Service, never so treated, whether in the case of commissioned officers or of private soldiers in the ranks.

At least such treatment is contrary to my experience and that of my advisers, and to the testimony given by the records of cases in the law books and the archives of the Judge Advocate General's Department.

64. It has been a frequent custom in India for the Commander in Chief to give his reasons for disapproval of a verdict when confirming the proceedings of a court martial after revision. This has been generally done by the most eminent of my predecessors. Considering the unlearned character of courts martial, the custom has been held to be necessary, and it has never, so far as I am aware, been declared to interfere with the independence of courts martial.

When such remarks are uttered, judgment has been passed, the Court has been dispersed, and it is out of the power of the revising officer to interfere either with verdict or sentence, except in mitigation or commutation of the latter according to law.

I have constantly conformed to the custom myself.

65. During the time occupied by Mr. Jervis' trial, I twice so acted in the case of officers.

Ensign ————th Foot, was cashiered and recommended to mercy. I carried out the sentence, giving reasons for setting aside the recommendation to mercy. During the same time Major ———— was brought to trial for scandalous conduct. The verdict being, as I was advised and believed, contrary to the evidence, the Court was ordered to reconsider its verdict. The verdict of acquittal having been adhered to by the Court, my opinion of the error thus committed was published in General Orders.

In the case of private soldiers when arraigned before general courts martial, the like occurs.

66. Such being the custom, even-handed justice would seem to demand that what is practised to all others should not have been overlooked in the case of Mr. Jervis, merely because of my personal relations to that officer.

67. As stated briefly in the remarks, I deny the existence of the so-called extenuating circumstances. The reasons for the same were fully shown in my memorandum of 17th November, and in the early paragraphs of this letter as well as in my letter to the Adjutant General of 21st September 1866.

68. It can hardly be said that the accident of grave offences of insubordination having been committed against the Commander in Chief in person is a reason for the latter to forget his duty of maintaining the discipline of the army according to law and usage, when the conduct of the accused person has compelled the Commander in Chief to the last resource of a public trial.

69. My view has been, on the contrary, that it was for the Commander in Chief simply to elevate himself above the whole matter, as if he were not a party concerned, and to treat it as it would have been treated in the case of any other superior officer who had been insulted and met with the grossest insubordination by one under his immediate command, it being recollected that the protection of his office on the part of the Commander in Chief is a positive obligation on him.

70. This was evidently the view of the late Marquis of Hastings, who when Commander in Chief in India acted on such principles and in a manner similar to mine, but with a more pronounced action when he was insulted by an officer under his command.*

* *Vide* case of Lieut. Colonel ——, who was tried by general court martial, at Bombay, on 1st October 1852, by order of the most noble the Commander in Chief in India.

The case was peculiarly personal to the Marquis of Hastings.† This did not prevent his Lordship from protecting his office, and from uttering a severe reprimand to the court martial for neglecting to award a sufficient punishment.‡

† *Vide* all the charges, but especially the third charge, and Lord Hastings' remarks on the trial.

‡ *Vide* Hough's Courts Martial, edition 1825, pp. 67 and 68.

His late lamented Majesty King George the IVth confirmed the action of the Marquis of Hastings in most impressive remarks, which were published under the orders of His Royal Highness the Duke of York.§

§ *Vide* Hough's Precedents in Military Law, p. 129, edition of 1855.

71. Again, if we turn to Hough's Precedents,‖ we find remarkable rules and precedents for the guidance of courts martial in the sense of the decision of the Marquis of Hastings and his late Majesty.

‖ Page 125.

I would especially solicit the gracious notice of his Royal Highness to those precedents and rules which apply in an exact and forcible manner to the conduct pursued towards me as Commander in Chief in India by Mr. Jervis, as duly reported and established by most sufficient documentary evidence.¶

¶ *Vide* my letter to the Adjutant General of the forces, dated 21st September 1866, No. 389, and Captain Jervis's letter to the Adjutant General, Bengal, dated 10th September 1866.

72. It is thus apparent that if I have acted injudiciously I have at least not acted without the weight of great authority and precedent on my side in the application of general and most important principles to the particular case.

73. For

73. For the purpose of completing the argument in support of my view that I was bound by law and reason to exercise an independent discretion with regard to the approval of the proceedings of the Court, I would ask leave to put the converse of the case which has actually happened.

Suppose that an officer in whom I was greatly interested, that interest being patent to the world, had been found guilty in the face of strong evidence of innocence, and as a consequence subjected to severe and unmerited punishment. Suppose further that the Court on revision adhered to the unjust verdict. Should I, because of my personal interest in the officer concerned, allow him to be led out to the severest punishment, perhaps to death, in the face of an unalterable conviction of his innocence according to the evidence on record?

It appears to me that friendship or relationship in such circumstances would be the means of the most crying injustice, to be tolerated neither by law, common sense, nor public feeling. Yet if the infallibility of a court martial is to be officially admitted as a necessity by a Commander in Chief in such a case as that with which I have had to deal, I fail to see how the rule can be avoided in the hypothetical case just stated.

74. With regard to the matter contained in your 32nd paragraph, in which the recommendation to mercy is balanced against the absence of "full and honourable" acquittal of the prisoner, it is my duty now to place on record a fact with which I have long been acquainted.

75. It was through no accidental omission that the court martial which tried Mr. Jervis, recorded a simple acquittal on the first charge. It was reported orally by the Deputy Judge Advocate General, who conducted the proceedings, to the Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army, that some members did actually propose the addition of the words "fully and honourably" to the acquittal.

This proposal was, however, snmmarily put aside by the Court, and not even put to the vote.

I was acquainted with this fact when I forwarded the finding and sentence of the Court to you, for the information of his Royal Highness, but it has only now become necessary, in justice to myself, and in answer to your argument, to place it on record.

76. The special importance of it is the more marked if it be recollected that in the course of his defence and rejoinder, the prisoner appealed in the most emphatic manner to the Court, to the effect that if a full and honourable acquittal were not recorded in his favour, he would be branded in society. He fully accepted the alternative that the absence of full and honourable acquittal was tantamount to conviction.

77. In your 33rd and 34th paragraphs you indicate that as I was unable to concur with the Court and to act on their recommendation, I should have altogether refrained from dealing with the case, and that I should have forwarded the proceedings to England for submission to the Queen to be disposed of according to Her Majesty's pleasure.

It is further said that this course would have relieved me from all responsibility, and would have extricated me from a most anomalous and exceptional position.

78. In answer I have to submit, with great deference, that this course did not escape my consideration, but that I did not feel myself justified in evading my due responsibility according to my warrant, and the commission I hold as Commander in Chief in India.

79. It did not occur to me that in the application of the principles I have acted on and have above elucidated by reference to authority, there could be any possible difference of opinion with respect to the non-admission of the recommendation to mercy.

80. I advisedly thought, this being my conviction, that it would be pusillanimous in me to shrink from the performance of a painful duty, and by a most unusual course to devolve the responsibility of it on his Royal Highness, it having been assumed by me that the decision of Her Most Gracious Majesty would be guided by the recommendation of his Royal Highness.

81. I was myself the mark of a great, but I trust an unmerited and passing obloquy for the performance of an odious duty, the obligations of which were,

according to my view, such as I could not escape from. I therefore deliberately elected to stand the brunt of the public outcry, whether my views might be right or wrong, rather than in any manner devolve responsibility on my superiors.

82. His Royal Highness will, I feel confident, do me the justice to recollect that this is by no means the first time on which I have grappled with my responsibilities in the face of an adverse public opinion, and that on a memorable occasion my action and opinions were finally justified after I had suffered from the censure of Government and the dissatisfaction of the public. On that occasion my object was identical with that I have had before me now, the maintenance of the honour and discipline of the army under my command.

83. With respect to the case of Captain ————————, quoted by you in the 34th paragraph, I am led to believe that Lord Strathnairn forwarded it to England contrary to his usual custom, not owing to a disagreement with the court-martial which tried Captain ————————, but because his Lordship desired the commutation of a sentence of cashiering, the power for which is not vested in the Commander in Chief in India, when he thought that the offence should not pass altogether without punishment.

84. With respect to the remark in your final paragraphs on the sound judgment and impartiality of the Court which tried Mr. Jervis, it is not for me to offer any comments on the opinions of his Royal Highness and the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General.

85. I purpose to address you in a separate communication by this mail, conveying a request for a further order from his Royal Highness before I give execution to that conveyed in the 37th paragraph.

86. In bringing this long argument to a conclusion, I trust his Royal Highness will give me credit for being actuated by no vain spirit of controversy, but by the desire of placing what I believe to be sound and truthful views in the most respectful manner before him, and so to vindicate myself from the serious errors of judgment laid to my charge.

87. I have the honour to request that my memorandum of 17th November 1866, may be read with this letter. I attach a copy for more easy reference.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. R. Mansfield*, General,
Commander in Chief in India.

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(No. 21 c.)

COURTS MARTIAL.

From His Excellency General Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, Commander in Chief in India to the Adjutant General of the Forces, Horse Guards, London.

My Lord, Head Quarters, Calcutta, 22 February 1867.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the letter from the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate General, dated 4th January 1867, transmitted with your Lordship's communication of the 18th January.

The Right Honourable Mr. Mowbray's letter has reference to, but only partially meets, the five questions on which I solicited his legal opinion in my letter No. 2 c, dated 22nd November 1866, and as his letter, if not met, seems to me calculated to prejudice me seriously, his Royal Highness will, I trust, hold me excused for submitting a reply to it.

I would respectfully submit, in the first place, that the learned gentleman's opinion, as given in his 3rd paragraph, bears upon a point not referred to him by me. At the same time I may express my satisfaction at finding that, although unable to concur in some of my reasons for bringing Mr. Jervis before a military court, Mr. Mowbray admits the force of other reasons adduced.

In

In his 4th paragraph, the Right honourable the Judge Advocate General, while he gives no reply on the abstract point referred, states his opinion that the 100th (now 101st) section of the Mutiny Act "had no application to the first charge against Captain Jervis."

The question turns on the technical distinction between felony and misdemeanor. On a point like this, not properly making part of military law or usage, I have been justified, I conceive, in relying on the opinion of my constituted legal adviser, and I will only say that, after being again consulted by me, he adheres to his view that certain of the facts alleged against Captain Jervis would, if proved, and if innocent intention were not shown, constitute an offence contemplated in section 101 of the Mutiny Act. I may add, however, that, if this view be erroneous, there are special reasons why the error is pardonable in India. The Right honourable the Judge Advocate General is doubtless aware that, though the distinction between felony and misdemeanor is the test of amenability under the above section, the law under which the accused person is actually tried is the Indian Penal Code, which (with the general approval, as I am informed, of jurists) neglects these technical distinctions of English law, which have no existence in the nature of the offences discriminated.

In his 5th paragraph the Right honourable Mr. Mowbray replies to my question as to the position of a general officer, who, being interested in a case and also a witness, brings the accused person to a court martial.

The Right honourable gentleman's remarks on this subject are so worded as to convey, though doubtless unintentionally, a personal attack on myself; and I am, therefore, constrained to meet them, though very far from wishing to enter upon any controversy on the subject.

I venture still to maintain "that a general officer in command who relegates a case in which he is concerned to the decision of a court martial places the accused and himself on a footing of equality with a view to the furtherance of the interests of justice."

This abstract opinion may be illustrated by a reference to the case of Mr. Jervis.

The Right honourable the Judge Advocate General has elsewhere recorded his opinion that the court martial displayed "marked impartiality." There was, therefore, no leaning on the Court's part towards the general officer who ordered the trial, and his Royal Highness is now aware that if any bias whatever is to be suspected, it was against rather than for the convening authority.

Again, acting under legal advice, and in opposition to his own personal wishes, the general officer ordered the court martial to revise its finding of acquittal. The Court nevertheless adhered to its finding; and thenceforward the power of the general officer to influence the Court, if it ever existed at all, absolutely ceased.

I respectfully urge that, until the proceedings of a trial are closed, the officer who orders it is in reality a prosecutor, whether personally interested or not.

The procedure of courts martial, unlike that of ordinary courts, permits the prosecution to be pressed after the verdict has been recorded; and the arguments submitted by a revising officer are nothing more or less than a continuation of the case for the prosecution.

It does not, therefore, appear to me that the convening and revising officer can be considered in the light of "a judge presiding at an ordinary criminal trial by jury," and still less can he be so considered in the matter of sentence, which, at a criminal trial, is delivered by the judge, but at a military trial rests with the Court alone.

After sentence, the revising officer, being then in a different position can, in his capacity of command, carry out, mitigate, or remit a sentence, though he can in no case add to or alter it, and his disposal of the sentence is quite as often influenced by reasons of general expediency, as by the features of the case itself.

Thus, the character of a prisoner, the necessity of example, the general conduct of the troops, and many other considerations, all have their weight and influence with a general in command, when he is called upon to dispose of a court martial sentence.

I venture to submit for his Royal Highness's consideration that the doctrine, which the Right honourable Mr. Mowbray would seem to lay down, is, if sound, susceptible of a very wide and unusual application; for if a general officer, as such, is precluded from prosecuting and pressing charges of scanda-

lous conduct and gross insubordination, because himself their object, he would also be precluded from all action in case of more direct and palpable offences against himself.

The views expressed in the Right honourable the Judge Advocate General's 6th paragraph are matter of opinion only, on a subject upon which, as he himself shows, various opinions are held. I would only mention that there are few points on which confirming authorities have been so much at variance with courts martial as on that of "Recommendations to Mercy," by which the onus of apparent severity is thrown upon the confirming authority when courts martial shrink from the full performance of a painful duty.

I have the honour to annex a list of some of the cases in point which occur to me.

It is a matter of extreme regret to me that the Right honourable the Judge Advocate General did not consider my last two questions to be "properly legal questions," and that I should thus lose the advantage of his opinion on them.

His Royal Highness is fully aware that when we pass beyond the rank of private soldier, a great proportion of courts martial rest upon neglects in the proper enforcement of the Articles of War and regulations of the Service.

My inquiry was, whether a Commander in Chief is not himself bound to follow the same course in the case of offenders as he compels others to follow; and whether he can permit an officer to rejoin his regiment while under the unremoved stigma of fraud and insubordination.

I would venture to state my opinion that such a matter cannot properly be judged only by the special circumstances of a particular case, or with regard to individual convenience; but that the only general rule which can be laid down with regard to a Commander in Chief is that he is bound, like any other commanding officer, to deal with both the fraud and the insubordination (*see* the 18th, 38th, 75th, and 79th Articles of War, as applying to Mr. Jervis' case).

The 18th and 79th Articles taken in conjunction appear to remove part of Mr. Jervis' case beyond the option of the Commander in Chief.

I would, therefore, submit that the true view of the duty of a Commander in Chief, when placed under the circumstances in which I found myself, is that he must regard himself as absolutely bound, unless in the most exceptional cases, to compel an inculpated officer to clear his character. I admit, though with the utmost misgiving, that there may be such exceptional cases; but I venture to deny that they should be kept in view in any general definition of a Commander in Chief's duty; and I think it most dangerous to lay down that his course is to be guided in each instance by a "consideration of the particular circumstances."

I requested the opinion of the Right honourable the Judge Advocate General on the general rule, which I thought it just to myself to have ascertained, because, until it is clearly stated, it is impossible to apportion the degree of blame which attaches to a Commander in Chief, for omitting, in a particular case, to depart from it.

The Right honourable gentleman has however apparently, as in a former instance which I have noticed, laid down a rule intended to apply to the case of Mr. Jervis, rather than meant to be of general application. I understand him to imply that I should have "considered the particular circumstances" of the charge against Mr. Jervis; for the reason I have given, I think it unfair to put forward this proposition, either directly or indirectly, until the general rule has been laid down; but I am willing to discuss the error, which I cannot doubt is imputed to me, of not having, under the particular circumstances of the Jervis case, pursued a special and exceptional course.

I admit that if I could have foreseen all that has followed the step of putting the ordinary machinery of military courts in motion for the purpose of eliciting an explanation of Mr. Jervis' conduct; if I could have foretold the extraordinary lengths to which he would proceed, the extraordinary character of his defence, the mode in which it would be conducted, the success with which the Indian press would be worked to my disadvantage, the extent to which it would be echoed by the English press, and the unfavourable impression of my acts which would be produced, I will not say on Indian public opinion, which is always at the disposal of anybody who will attack authority; but on English public opinion, which, though I have been little in England, I have always supposed

supposed to be juster and fairer; I might have thought a case had arisen where my duty of protecting the honour and the morality of the army might for once excusably be put aside; but I should have come to this conclusion with the greatest hesitation, and with extreme doubt whether I was not sacrificing the interests committed to my charge to a cowardly fear of personal annoyance.

But I venture to affirm with some confidence that the true question is whether any such foresight as I have described could reasonably be expected from me. Before I am censured, the person who censures me should be able to place himself in the exact position in which I stood. Now, when the facts, which were ultimately alleged as the first charge of scandalous conduct against Captain Jervis, were first disclosed, they appeared to me and to all about me to constitute, until they were explained, as simple a case of fraud as had ever come before us. The alternative of calling on an officer in the recognised mode to clear his character, or of allowing him to rejoin his regiment with stained character, presented itself in the simplest form.

I submit that the only questions which I and my advisers could be expected to ask ourselves were these: Were the facts brought to light capable of ready proof? If they were proved, did they, till explained, amount to scandalous conduct in an officer? Was there any such simple explanation of them as we were bound to reach by conjecture, and thus to entertain doubts of their *primâ facie* interpretation?

On the first point I must observe, that the facts were not only proved, but admitted by Mr. Jervis throughout his trial.

On the second, I conceive that nobody will deny, and I understand the Right honourable Mr. Mowbray to allow, that, till explained away, they did constitute scandalous conduct.

On the third, I must beg to appeal to the Right honourable the Judge Advocate General himself. I am sure that he has sifted Mr. Jervis' defence with the utmost care; that he has observed that, where it does not consist of counter accusation, it consists wholly of explanation; that he has noticed that Mr. Jervis in making his defence, had not only the usual advantage possessed by every prisoner tried before a military court, and assisted by counsel, of laying before his judges in the form of a personal statement and appeal, what is really a dexterous and carefully arranged legal argument, but that Mr. Jervis had also the unusual advantage of combating the reasoning adduced against him in a rejoinder of extraordinary length; yet the ultimate result at which the Right honourable Mr. Mowbray has arrived is, that the arguments for and against Mr. Jervis' guilt are evenly balanced. Whether they really are so balanced is a point on which it would not be proper for me to enter on controversy; but I submit that I could not possibly have been expected to divine beforehand the explanation which, presented with every advantage, has produced so ambiguous an impression on Mr. Mowbray's mind. I could not have foreseen that I, who always supposed myself to be surrounded by men of honour, should be told that a custom of misappropriating my property on a vast scale had always existed in my household; and I could not have foretold a series of positive assertions, that I was in my aide-de-camp's debt, when in fact I knew that I was not, and had never been, indebted to him.

I trust that you will assure his Royal Highness that I have written this letter in no spirit of controversy or complaint, but solely from a desire to guard myself from further misconstruction.

I beg you to lay it before his Royal Highness with the greatest respect and deference on my part, and that it may be read in continuation of my letter to the Military Secretary of 19th February 1867, which is despatched by the same mail.

I have, &c.

(signed) *W. R. Mansfield*, General,
Commander in Chief in India.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces,
Horse Guards, London.

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CORRESPONDENCE relating to the Non-Settlement of the Accounts kept by Captain *Jervis* in Sir *WilliamMansfield's* behalf.

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From Captain *Scott Jervis* to Sir *William Mansfield*; dated 20 April 1866.

ALL the books are complete to date. At any time that you would wish to go over them I shall be happy to attend you for the purpose. The general statement of accounts you have seen to a recent date. The other shall be completed, and shown to you very shortly.

There is full work for one clerk in the establishment. I would gladly learn from you that one had been told off for the duty. I could not hold out a hope that Abbey will be able to continue to act as clerk as well as do his other work. Attention to the one can only be given by neglecting the other.

The books, which you can see at a moment's notice, will convince you that everything is right.

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As shown by the court-martial, Mr. Jervis had been in vain importuned for his accounts from May 1st to 14th. After that date Mr. Jervis, being under arrest, was ordered to submit them for audit by a confidential committee, which he finally declined to do on May 22nd, this absolute refusal having led to his court-martial.

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From Captain *Scott Jervis*, 106th Light Infantry, to the Adjutant General of the Army; dated Simla, 10th September 1866.

I HAVE the honour to request you will do me the favour to submit the following statement for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

When, in the beginning of May last, the accumulation of charges preferred against me by his Excellency had distressed and completely overwhelmed me, I brought against his Excellency, in the civil court, two suits; one for the recovery of the balance I considered due to me on account of the house I was building for his Excellency; the other for the balance due to me on the house-expense account. These suits are now pending in the civil court.

I will not enter into the reasons which prompted me at the time to institute those suits; I will only say that, whether right or otherwise, I believed then, and I conscientiously believe still, that the amount for which I sued was really due to me; but that I was at the time, and have been since, under the influence of an excitement which may, perhaps, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, be understood.

The court-martial, which was the consequence of the events of May last, now, however, is over; the events which occurred subsequently, and for which I have expressed my contrition, have led me to reflect upon the whole proceedings of the case, and I have been brought to the conclusion that my conduct in instituting civil suits against the Commander in Chief of the Army was, at least, unmilitary and improper. It is not, perhaps, too late now to make the only amends in my power.

In that view, I beg you will do me the favour to inform his Excellency of my intention to withdraw the two suits in question, and to leave their settlement unreservedly to his Excellency's sense of what is fitting and correct.

Similarly, I beg you will inform his Excellency of my intention to withdraw the suit I have instituted against his Excellency for libel, and to express my regret for having entered it.

In making this communication I have only, in addition, to express an earnest hope that my motives in submitting it may not be misunderstood. They are simply what I have stated them to be, the conviction now forced upon me that it was wrong and unmilitary on my part, no matter what might have been my idea of the treatmeut I had received, to institute civil suits against the Commander in Chief. I may perhaps be permitted to add that my feelings were wrought up to a pitch at which I could not control them, by the idea that his Excellency, to whom

whom I had devoted myself entirely for so long a period, and whose every interest I had regarded pre-eminently as my own, should have considered me guilty of the offences charged against me. On the charges so preferred I have been brought to a court-martial. To the finding of that court I must submit. But whatever it may be, I beg permission to assure his Excellency that the accumulation of charges utterly overwhelmed me, and that the revolting nature of the principal charge, which I again solemnly declare to have had no foundation whatever, alone drove me to the course of resistance which I adopted.

With respect to the military charges, I trust it may not be considered an impropriety if I take this opportunity of expressing my regret that I should have comported myself in any other way than as a soldier owing military obedience to competent authority.

I take this opportunity, likewise, of expressing my regret for, and retractation of, any reflections or imputations which might have been considered to have been made or implied against his Excellency in the course of this trial.

In conclusion, I will only express a hope that this acknowledgment of the errors I have, under an excitement which was perhaps natural, committed, and my atonement, the only one in my power, which I have made, may be as satisfactory to his Exellency to receive as it is to me to make it.

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From Colonel *H. E. Longden*, Adjutant General, to Captain *E. S. Jervis*, Her Majesty's 106th Light Infantry; dated Head Quarters, Simla, 13 September 1866.

COURTS-MARTIAL.

I AM desired by the Commander in Chief to acknowledge your letter of 10th September 1866.

2. In that communication you intimate that you have become aware that your recent conduct in laying suits against his Excellency in the civil courts has been unmilitary and improper.

2ndly.—That you withdraw those suits.

3rdly.—That you regret, and retract, all imputations recently cast on his Excellency by you.

3. Notwithstanding the great provocation given to the Commander in Chief in the matters above referred to, I am desired to express his Excellency's satisfaction that this tardy avowal of error in the several particulars should have come voluntarily from you.

4. There are certain passages in your letter which demand notice.

5. Thus you would seem to imply that his Excellency had hastily yielded to *ex parte* representations without due investigation, before the formal inquiry was ordered regarding the alleged misappropriation.

6. I am to take the present opportunity of re-stating this part of the case.

7. Certain allegations, supported by documentary evidence, and what in law are held to be very strong presumptions against an accused person, were urged against you.

8. You were earnestly desired to clear yourself in the only manner possible according to military regulation and custom, without doing which you could not possibly have entered one of Her Majesty's regiments.

9. In this matter the official responsibility of the Commander in Chief was directly involved. When scandalous or criminal matter is alleged against any officer in the army, the Commander in Chief, with regard to the action he is bound to pursue, as must be well known to you, is without choice. Consequently, until the allegations might be successfully explained or removed, it was simply out of his Excellency's power to treat you otherwise than as an accused person.

His Excellency devised the expedient of the confidential Committee of Audit, in the earnest hope of extricating you from your difficulties, with due regard to the morality and honour of the army of which he is the guardian.

10. It is necessary to add that, as shown by the dates of certain occurrences prior to the assembly of the first court of inquiry, you had already committed yourself to open resistance to military authority. This occurred many days before the matter of misappropriation had been in any manner alleged against you, in fact, before the circumstances demanding explanation under this head had been discovered.

11. Even to the last, his Excellency would have been willing to accept a proper military offer from you to extricate yourself from the charge of misappropriation according to such means as had been already proposed.

12. His Excellency has ever most sincerely deplored that such an offer did not come from you.

13. In the mean time the fatal measure of filing the civil suits had been executed.

14. His Excellency could then only believe that an attack was being advisedly made on the due exercise of military authority by means of a struggle in the civil courts. The Commander in Chief, being charged with the duty of maintaining that authority, was thus compelled to review this attack in his official capacity, and more specially with regard to the manner in which it might be intended to bear on the military inquiry he had been compelled to order.

15. This consideration was not at all weakened by the fact that his Excellency has known all along that the several matters of the three suits filed against him presented no ground of action, which could cause a passing feeling of uncertainty in his mind, his belief having been fortified by the opinions of the eminent legal advisers consulted by his Excellency.

16. The Commander in Chief now accepts the entirely voluntary withdrawal of these suits in the sense proposed in your letter, while he expresses his deep regret that you should have been advised to a course fraught with so much injury to yourself.

17. His Excellency is glad for your sake that you now desire to leave the unreserved settlement of the money claims to him. Measures will be immediately taken to have this settlement of accounts, according to such data as may be available. If without his knowledge your late management has ended in indebtedness to you on his Excellency's household accounts, this will be ascertained at once, as it ought to have been long ago, by means of the Committee of Audit, the intervention of which was rejected by you. I am to observe, however, that according to his previous impressions, and the facts lately collected, his Excellency is unable to conceive that any such indebtedness can possibly exist.

18. With regard to the house-building claim, the withdrawal of the civil suits rendered that easy which was precluded by a hostile action at law. Your old experience must convince you that it would have been odious to his Excellency to have allowed you to have incurred any charges on his account, notwithstanding that the legal obligation of a contract might be against you as shown by documentary proof in one of your suits. Accordingly, so soon as his advisers are in a position to declare a settlement of the account, you will have the full benefit of this feeling on his Excellency's part.

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*In re* the Withdrawn Money Suits of *Jervis* v. Sir *William Mansfield.*

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From *G. Plowden,* Esq., Counsel for Sir *William Mansfield,* to *William Tayler,* Esq., &c. &c. (dated Simla, 26th September 1866).

I SEND herewith the account sheets of Sir William Mansfield's household expenditure under the management of Captain Jervis, from September 1865 to April 1866 (both inclusive), made out by Major Gordon, A.D.C., from the several house books and other papers in the possession of Sir William Mansfield.

The payments made to Captain Jervis, entered in the Abstract Statement under the head of "Receipts," are derived from Sir William Mansfield's cheque book. The disbursements made by Captain Jervis, under the head of "Expenditure,"

penditure," have been adopted in the case of every item, precisely as exhibited in the books and papers kept, or attested, by Captain Jervis.

It remains for Captain Jervis—

1st. To produce the bills and receipts, supporting the several items of disbursement marked with a blue pencil cross.

2nd. To add in each month's sheet any disbursements made by him which do not appear in the books and papers in the possession of Sir William Mansfield, supporting them by the necessary vouchers.

3rd. To fill in, under the head of "Receipts," in the Abstract Statement, the value of any wines, or stores, and stable equipments, belonging to Sir William Mansfield appropriated to his own use, and the amount of his own travelling expenses, charged to Sir William Mansfield.

4th. To fill in, under the head of "Expenditure," in the Abstract Statement, the balance of actually disbursed sums due to him on the building account.

If Captain Jervis desires to see the books and papers from which the monthly sheets of expenditure have been prepared, and the cheque books from which the cheques paid to him have been derived, they can be transmitted to you.

As what is required from Captain Jervis can obviously be supplied in a few hours, I trust to receive back the sheets from you, duly completed, as proposed, in a day or two, in order that the account between the parties may be finally settled without any further delay.

As I am leaving Simla for Court business at Kussowlie, please to return the sheet, when completed, to Major Gordon, and any letters that you may find it necessary to address to me in this matter, please to forward through Major Gordon.

*P. S.*—Major Gordon's letter to me accompanies the account sheets.

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From *W. Tayler,* Esq., Counsel for Captain *Jervis*, to *G. Plowden*, Esq., Counsel for Sir *William Mansfield*; dated Kennedy House, Saturday, 29th September 1866.

In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, I am instructed by Captain Jervis to say, that he is not inclined, at the present crisis, to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield.

It is indeed a matter of extreme surprise to Captain Jervis, that the books and papers have not all been sent by last mail to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge; all these documents are connected more or less with important questions which arose and were discussed during the proceedings of the court martial, and it will be impossible for His Royal Highness to form a proper judgment in the case unless they are before him.

After the close of the proceedings in England, Captain Jervis will be happy to aid you in the completion of the accounts, by supplying any information that may be required.

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*In re* the Withdrawn Money Suits of *Jervis* v. Sir *William Mansfield.*

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From *G. Plowden,* Esq., Counsel for Sir *William Mansfield,* to *William Tayler,* Esq., &c., &c.; Dated Kussowlie, 12 October 1866.

I duly received, on the 3rd instant, yours of the 29th ultimo, replying to mine of the 26th idem. Illness has prevented me from noticing it earlier.

2. It seems necessary, first, to remind you, that Mr. Jervis, in his letter to the Adjutant General of the Army, dated the 10th ultimo, expressed his "intention to withdraw the two suits* in question, and to leave their settlement unreservedly to his Excellency's sense of what is fitting and correct," and that the Adjutant General, in his reply, dated the 13th ultimo, stated, among other remarks upon this intention, that measures would be "immediately taken to have this settlement of accounts, according to such data as might be available."

3. Accordingly, the said money suits having been formally withdrawn by Mr. Jervis, on the 15th ultimo, the account sheets of Sir William Mansfield's household expenditure, from September 1865 to April 1866 (both inclusive), were immediately made out by Major Gordon,† from the several house books and other papers in Sir William Mansfield's possession, in the manner described in my letter of the 26th ultimo, and they were transmitted to you for the purposes indicated in that letter.

4. It is obvious that any corrections or additions Mr. Jervis was able to make, might have been done in a few hours, and that, so, the accounts between the parties might have been finally settled within two days from the receipt of my letter.

5. But, instead of assisting the settlement left by himself unreservedly to Sir William Mansfield, Mr. Jervis, you inform me, now says, that "he is not inclined, at the present crisis, to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield;" and you conclude your letter by saying, that after the close of the proceedings in England, Captain Jervis will be happy to aid me in the completion of the accounts, by supplying any information that may be required.

6. The reason assigned for this indefinite postponement of any settlement on Mr. Jervis' part is, that "the books and papers have not all been sent by last mail to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge." This has excited Mr. Jervis' "extreme surprise," inasmuch as "all these ‡ documents," he says, "are connected more or less with important questions which arose, and were discussed during the proceedings of the Court Martial, and it will be impossible for His Royal Highness to form a proper judgment in the case, unless they are before him." Without entering into the correctness or merits of this objection, so far as it concerns the court-martial case, it is sufficient to observe, that it is transparently beside the question of a settlement of the accounts between the parties. Thus it would be a waste of words to notice it, further than to point out that the transmission of the books and papers to England might, with some show of plausibility, have been pleaded as an excuse for postponing a settlement, but that the fact that the books and papers are at hand and available, should be made a handle for declining to enter into the question of accounts until the proceedings of the court-martial are closed in England, is quite incomprehensible. This is seen with absolute clearness, when it is added, that these said proceedings disclose nothing in connection with the accounts, except Mr. Jervis' admission that he appropriated to his own use the stores belonging to Sir William Mansfield, specified in the court-martial charges, and now therefore proposed to be debited against him in the accounts. There is, besides, the fact that Mr. Jervis made no attempt, by evidence of any kind, documentary or oral, to prove his allegations of Sir William Mansfield's indebtedness to him. It is then quite obvious, that there is nothing to hinder an immediate settlement of the accounts, and that nothing

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* Meaning suits on account of money claims.

† This had at length become possible, in consequence of the return to Sir William Mansfield from Mr. Jervis through the medium of the court martial, according to a decree of the civil court, of certain household account books, the property of his Excellency, which had hitherto been illegally detained by Mr. Jervis, notwithstanding frequent requests and orders from him to deliver them up.

‡ Mr. Jervis has been informed by the Adjutant General of the Army, that all the books and papers forming the Appendix of the Court Martial Proceedings have been forwarded to England; but that that Appendix does not include all the numerous books examined by the court martial, that court not having considered it necessary to attach the said books to its proceedings, but having contented itself with examining them as far as considered requisite, and taking evidence on oath as to parts of them, which bore upon the issues under investigation.

nothing but further and indefinite delay is to be gained by postponing a settlement until the proceedings of the court-martial are closed in England.

7. Such being the present circumstances, it seems necessary here to recapitulate the several occasions on which Mr. Jervis has been invited to produce and close his accounts, and the courses by which any settlement has been effectually prevented so far, and is now sought to be indefinitely postponed, notwithstanding the opportunities afforded to Mr. Jervis of proving his allegations of Sir William Mansfield's indebtedness to him, and in spite of my client's untiring efforts to bring these allegations to an issue, and to obtain from Mr. Jervis, some account of the large sums advanced to him by his Excellency.

8. First, then, Mr. Jervis was repeatedly invited, so far back as May last, by the Military Secretary to his Excellency, and again by the committee of audit, to produce and close his accounts. Refusing these invitations, he instituted two money suits against Sir William Mansfield, one in May, and the other in June last, claiming in the one case *Rs.* 1,444. 5. 6. as due to him on a building account; and in the other about 2,500 rupees as due to him on other accounts; and he alleged before the court-martial Sir William Mansfield's indebtedness to him, resting his defence mainly on that plea. On the 13th September, just when the two money suits were in a state to be shortly decided, Mr. Jervis suddenly and unreservedly withdraws both his suits, while at the court-martial no attempt was made to prove or to show Sir William Mansfield's indebtedness. Now, when in accordance with his own unreserved proposition, the best account that could be made up from the data available is presented, and his correction solicited, he refuses to "enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield," upon a pretext to which it is quite impossible to assign any other object than an indefinite postponement.

9. I must not omit to add, on this bject, that Mr. Jervis, having entered upon the management of Sir William Mansfield's expenditure on the 1st September 1865, with a clean sheet, has to this day, after the lapse of more than 13 months, rendered his Excellency no account whatever of his charge, or of the large sums, aggregating about 16,500 rupees, which have passed through his hands for household purposes; that having persistently withheld Sir William Mansfield's books and papers, my client was compelled to institute a suit in the civil court for recovery of the same; that my client, after encountering various obstacles, having obtained a decree, fresh obstructions were opposed to his execution of the decree; so that, although the decree was obtained two months ago, he is still kept out of possession of some of the papers (as distinguished from account books) decreed to him; that Mr. Jervis, having stated in his answer to the suit that he had no books belonging to the plaintiff then in his possession, "all such books having been lodged in the court-martial," subsequently filed before the court-martial several books, confessedly the property of Sir William Mansfield; and, finally, that to this day, in spite of the decree against him, and to the great inconvenience of my client, Mr. Jervis retains possession of many receipts, bills, vouchers, &c., belonging to payments made by him from Sir William Mansfield's funds, in discharge of his trust as manager of his Excelleney's household expenditure, on the plea that such papers are his own property.

10. It requires no elucidation to make it plain that the person who is aggrieved by such determined obstruction to any settlement of the accounts is not the person who indulges in vague allegations of indebtedness, which in one court he withdraws at the last moment from proving, and in the other court does not attempt to prove, but the person who has advanced large sums of money, of which he seeks in vain to obtain an account, and who, equally in vain, earnestly and anxiously seeks to discharge any sum which can be shown to be due by him, although, according to all the facts before him, he is unable to conceive that any indebtedness on his part can possibly exist, or ever has existed, but who has, on the contrary, the best grounds for concluding that the sums advanced by him, cover considerably more than has been expended on the purposes for which they were given.

11. As Mr. Jervis declines to correct the accounts presented to him, or to furnish other data, it only remains for me, as Sir William Mansfield's counsel, to

 declare

declare the account which I forwarded to you to be a final one, and to proceed to a settlement accordingly, in pursuance of Mr. Jervis' previous unreserved offer, which was accepted by my client.

12. I therefore enclose the account. You will perceive from it that Mr. Jervis received for the household charges 16,495 rupees in all, and that his expenditure on the same account amounted to only *Rs.* 14,080. 6. 11., leaving a balance of *Rs.* 2,414. 9. 1. due to Sir William Mansfield on that account. To this has been added *Rs.* 920. 10. 8., value of stores belonging to Sir William Mansfield, appropriated by Mr. Jervis to his own use, as admitted before the court-martial, and *Rs.* 47. 14. on account of Mr. Jervis' travelling expenses, included in the account of the Commander in Chief's table expenses for March, as also admitted before the court-martial, making a total of *Rs.* 3,183. 1. 9. due by Mr. Jervis to Sir William Mansfield on the household accounts.

13. As regards the building account, it will be seen that although my client was liable, under his contract,* for only 2,000 rupees towards the construction of the aide-de-camp's house, Mr. Jervis appropriated, according to his own showing, *Rs.* 3,618. 1. 6. of the monies received by him from Sir William Mansfield, to that purpose, and that Sir William Mansfield, notwithstanding his contract to the contrary, has, as a matter of grace, credited Mr. Jervis with the full excess amount of *Rs.* 1,618. 1. 6. claimed by him as having been expended on the house in question; and further, with the sum of 400 rupees expended by Mr. Jervis on that building, according to his own agreement, of the total sum of *Rs.* 2,018. 1. 6. thus allowed as an act of grace, 200 rupees are included in the 2,600 rupees deducted on the debit side, on account of cheques given for building purposes, and the remaining *Rs.* 1,818. 1. 6. appear on the credit side: this latter amount being deducted from the total sum of *Rs.* 3,183. 1. 9. due on the household accounts, still leaves a balance of *Rs.* 1,365. -. 3. payable to Sir William Mansfield.

14. It is necessary to add, that besides paying, as above shown, all sums charged by Mr. Jervis in excess of the 2,000 rupees, for which alone Sir William Mansfield was liable, his Excellency has completed the construction of the house at his own expense, has discharged all the heavy outstanding liabilities incurred by Mr. Jervis, and not included in his account, and has refunded to Mr. Jervis, as likewise to another of the aides-de-camp, on leaving his staff, the sums contributed by them towards the enlargement of the building for their own convenience, and according to their own proposition and agreement. Thus a house, on which my client proposed and agreed, as an act of favour, to expend 2,000 rupees, that sum

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* The following is a transcript of the agreement:

It having been my intention to make for my aides-de-camp detached rooms with bath-rooms, leaving them to provide their own out-offices, stables, &c., at Woodville, they have now asked me for permission to put an upper storey on the rooms in question at their own expense. I see no objection to this, as I suppose the cost to them cannot be much, seeing that no additional roofing is thereby required.

To avoid confusion of accounts, it will be better for me to say that I will give the sum of 2,000 rupees (two thousand), which I understand to be rather in excess of what would have been required to carry out my original design.

The house and offices can thus be completed by Captain Jervis according to his wish, and that of his brother aides-de-camp, the difference of expense being borne by them.

The plan of ground floor to be maintained as already skeletoned and commenced, and the verandah being carried up to the roof to protect the walls of the upper storey, according to the usual plan of building in Simla.

It is understood that this does not give any future lien on my estate or the house concerned, to those who now by their expressed desire undertake to add to the original design of the latter.

(signed) *W. R. Mansfield.*
(signed) *Hy. D. Christie.*
(signed) *W. Harbord.*
(signed) *O. E. Scott Jervis.*

4 September 1865.

sum being fully sufficient for such a building as he desired to construct, has in fact been made to cost him 7,365 rupees*.

15. The account shows plainly enough, that Mr. Jervis' allegations of Sir William Mansfield's indebtedness to him are entirely without foundation, there being still a balance in his Excellency's favour of *Rs.* 1,365. –. 3., after giving Mr. Jervis credit, as an act of grace, for the sum of *Rs.* 2,018. 1. 6., of which *Rs.* 1,618. 1. 6. were advanced to him for house and other ordinary expenses, but were alienated without Sir William Mansfield's knowledge, towards the construction of the aides-de-camp's house, in excess of the amount which he had agreed to pay, as a free gift for the benefit of his aides-de-camp, and had already paid in full, his Excellency having been studiously led to believe to the last moment, that there had been no excess of expenditure beyond the sum covenanted and paid. The obvious inference is, that the house-building suit was, in fact, an action brought against Sir William Mansfield to recover money which had already been improperly alienated from him. It is obvious also, that but for Sir William Mansfield's admission, as an act of grace, of the funds alienated in excess, to the construction of the aides-de-camp's house, and but for his allowing a refund of the sum expended by Mr. Jervis for his own convenience, according to his own agreement, towards the enlargement of that building beyond the original design, the balance in favour of his Excellency would have been, not *Rs.* 1,365. –. 3. only, but the much larger sum of *Rs.* 3,183. –. 3.,† not an inconsiderable proportion of advances, amounting altogether to 16,295 rupees, exclusive of 2,600 rupees given for building purposes.

16. The value of the stable necessaries and horse furniture, amounting, as charged and admitted before the court-martial, to 275 rupees, or thereabouts, has not been debited to Mr. Jervis in the present account; the saddlers, Messrs. Monteith & Co., have been instructed to act, on Mr. Jervis' own admission, at the court-martial, with respect to the articles obtained from them for his own use, under the Commander in Chief's name.

17. In conclusion, I have to inform you that I feel myself bound, in justice to my client, to publish this correspondence, showing Mr. Jervis' indebtedness to the Commander in Chief, the measures taken by me, on Sir William Mansfield's behalf, to close the account, Mr. Jervis' further and indefinite postponement of any settlement, and the settlement which I now declare, as his Excellency's counsel, in default of any corrections or further data from Mr. Jervis.

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* *Cost of Aides-de-Camp's house.*

| | | *Rs.* |
|---|---|---|
| Sum given originally by Commander in Chief | | 2,000 |
| Expended by Mr. Jervis, without authority, from a cheque given for other building purposes | | 200 |
| Excess paid by Mr. Jervis from the Commander in Chief's funds, given for other purposes | | 1,418 |
| Outstanding liabilities incurred by Mr. Jervis and since paid by the Commander in Chief | | 1,397 |
| Sums returned to Captains Christie and Jervis | | 800 |
| Cost of completing the house | | 1,550 |
| | *Rs.* | 7,365 |
| Add 400 rupees paid by Captain Harbord, Aide-de-Camp | | 400 |
| TOTAL | *Rs.* | 7,765 |

† While owing this amount to the Commander in Chief, Mr. Jervis instituted his second money suit against his Excellency for 2,500 rupees, stated to be due to him on the household account.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT prepared from the detailed Account Sheets as furnished to Mr. *Jervis*, on the 27th September.

| Date. | RECEIPTS. | Rs. | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Oct. 1865 | Cheque on Simla Bank | 2,000 | – | – |
| 13 „ „ | „ „ „ | 3,000 | – | – |
| 28 „ „ | „ „ „ | 600 | – | – |
| 20 Dec. „ | „ Oriental „ | 3,356 | – | – |
| 5 Jan. 1866 | „ Simla „ | 500 | – | – |
| 18 „ „ | „ Oriental „ | 1,000 | – | – |
| 19 Feb. „ | „ „ „ | 2,000 | – | – |
| 21 March „ | „ „ „ | 4,000 | – | – |
| 18 April „ | „ Simla „ | 2,000 | – | – |
| | Balance from Captain Christie — Rs. 87 – – | | | |
| | Recovery from Cook — 100 – – | | | |
| | Pay of six Chuprassies for months of September, October, November, and December, 1865, and January, February, and March, 1866, included in servants' wages on credit side — 252 – – | | | |
| | | 439 | – | – |
| | TOTAL — Rs. | 18,895 | – | – |
| | Deduct given in above cheques for the A. D. C.'s house — Rs. 2,000 – – | | | |
| | Ditto, ditto, for Woodville Ice House, &c., of which only 400 rupees were so applied, the remaining 200 being shown as expended on the A. D. C.'s house — 600 – – | | | |
| | | 2,600 | – | – |
| | TOTAL — Rs. | 16,295 | – | – |
| | Balance, debtor, on household account | 2,214 | 9 | 1 |
| | Value of wines and stores taken | 920 | 10 | 8 |
| | Travelling expenses included in the Commander in Chief's table expenses for March | 47 | 14 | – |
| | TOTAL — Rs. | 3,183 | 1 | 9 |

| Date. | EXPENDITURE. | Rs. | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| October 1865 | Paid house expenses, servants and bills, for September | 2,540 | 10 | 10 |
| November „ | „ „ „ „ „ October | 1,548 | 10 | 2 |
| December „ | „ servants for November and bill | 1,262 | 8 | – |
| January 1866 | „ „ December and bill | 665 | – | – |
| February „ | „ „ January, table expenses for February (9th to 28th) and bills | 1,757 | 15 | 2 |
| March „ | „ servants for February, table expenses, and bills for March — Rs. 2,191 6 2 | | | |
| „ „ | „ table expenses, and bills for November and December 1865, and January 1866 — 2,740 – – | | | |
| | | 4,931 | 6 | 2 |
| April „ | „ servants for March, and table expenses for April, &c. | 1,374 | 4 | 7 |
| | Balance, debtor | 2,214 | 9 | 1 |
| | TOTAL — Rs. | 16,295 | – | – |
| | Sum allowed as an act of grace on a building account, notwithstanding a contract to the contrary, Rs. 1,618. 1. 6., of which 200 are included in the 2,600 rupees deducted on the debit side of the above abstract | 1,418 | 1 | 6 |
| | Sum returned to Mr. Jervis, the same having been paid by him towards the enlargement of house for his, Mr. Jervis' use, according to an agreement | 400 | – | – |
| | Balance, debtor | 1,365 | – | 3 |
| | TOTAL — Rs. | 3,183 | 1 | 9 |

NOTE.—The cheques, a list of which Mr. Jervis handed into the court-martial, and represented that they had been given on the Commander in Chief's account out of his own funds, are included in the credits shown above, although there is good reason to believe that more than one of them could not be proved as paid entirely for his Excellency.

Simla, 26 September 1866.

(signed) *T. E. Gordon.*

From Captain *Scott Jervis*, to the Editor of the "Englishman;" dated Calcutta, 27th October 1866.

THE letters which you published yesterday from Mr. William Tayler, and from Mr. Plowden, with another from the latter gentleman to the address of my counsel, contained in your issue of to-day, form only a portion of the correspondence which has taken place on the subject to which they relate. I have no copies with me of those letters which are wanting, but I have asked my counsel, Mr. Tayler, who is now at Lahore, to forward you copies of the same for publication.

The abstract of accounts appended to Mr. Plowden's letter, published yesterday, is merely a portion of the account it is intended to represent. It has been forwarded to the professional accountant at Simla, who was employed in May last to draw up a separate statement of each of the two accounts. The building account he completed at once, the details of that account being in my possession. It was presented in that month to Sir William Mansfield for settlement, but it has remained to this day unsettled by his Excellency, though Sir William Mansfield, as I gather from Mr. Plowden's letter, acknowledges it to be perfectly correct. This account shows a balance due to me by his Excellency of 1,800 rupees and upwards. The other account, viz., the house account, was made out by the accountant to the extent of the information in my possession, but could not be finally closed, as his Excellency Sir William Mansfield was unwilling to hand over to me that portion of it which remained in his hands, which unwillingness on his part has prevented the account from being closed up to the present. This account shows likewise a balance in my favour. I advert to this, as it would appear from Mr. Plowden's statements that no such indebtedness on his Excellency's part exists.

I desire to point out the above to avoid any erroneous impression being formed, pending the completion of the publication of the entire correspondence and accounts.

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From *W. Tayler*, Esq., Counsel for Captain *Jervis*, to *George Plowden*, Esq., Counsel for Sir *W. Mansfield*; Calcutta, dated 9th January 1867.

WITH reference to your letter of 26th September, forwarding a statement of accounts between Sir William Mansfield and Captain Jervis, I have now the honour to send you a statement drawn out by the latter gentleman from data in his possession, which exhibits a result considerably different from that which is shown by your calculation.

I regret to observe that in publishing your last letter you omitted to insert the answer which I wrote to you from Lahore, on the receipt of your communication.

I would remark that the present statement does not profess to be entirely accurate, though sufficiently correct to show that there is a large balance in favour of my client.

There are, doubtless, items which may be subject to further discussion and future adjustment; the books in which the details are comprised being in the possession of the Judge Advocate General in England, and other papers which might have thrown future light upon the subject, having been taken possession of by the friendly committee at the outset of the discussion.

*P.S.*—As Captain Jervis intends to proceed to England by the next mail, and I shall myself go very shortly afterwards, your next communication should be addressed to our attornies, Messrs. Dawson and Bryan, 33, Bedford-square, London, W.C.

*W. T.*

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OPEN SKETCH.

| | Rs. | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|
| By amount received by cheque in October - - - | 3,000 | – | – |
| „ „ „ December - - | 3,356 | – | – |
| „ „ „ January - - - | 500 | – | – |
| „ „ „ „ - - - | 1,000 | – | – |
| „ „ „ February - - - | 2,000 | – | – |
| „ „ „ March - - - | 4,000 | – | – |
| „ „ „ April - - - | 2,000 | – | – |
| „ Balance received in September 1865 - - - | 87 | – | – |
| „ Amount credited to Sir Wm. Mansfield pending adjustment of accounts to meet sums expended on my account - - - - - - - - | 600 | – | – |
| Balance in my favour - - - - - - | 1,843 | 15 | 10 |
| | 18,386 | 15 | 10 |
| „ Amount credited in building account - - | 3,426 | 4 | – |
| Balance in my favour - - - - - - | 1,818 | 1 | 6 |
| | 5,244 | 5 | 6 |
| To amount of household expenses and bills for September 1865 as per cheques and vouchers - - - - | 163 | 10 | – |
| „ Amount of household expenses and bills for October 1865, as per cheques and vouchers - - - - - | 1,517 | 14 | 4 |
| „ for October 1865, vouchers not yet received - - | 500 | – | – |
| „ „ November 1865, as per cheques and vouchers - | 2,100 | 8 | 3 |
| „ „ December 1865, - ditto - ditto - - | 1,447 | 8 | 9 |
| „ „ January 1866, - ditto - ditto - - | 1,701 | – | – |
| „ „ February „ - - ditto - ditto - - | 1,756 | 15 | – |
| „ „ March „ - - ditto - ditto - - | 5,653 | 2 | 6 |
| „ „ April „ - - ditto - ditto - - | 3,546 | 5 | – |
| | 18,386 | 15 | 10 |
| „ Amount debited in building account - - - - | 5,244 | 5 | 6 |
| | 5,244 | 5 | 6 |
| Total balance in my favour (1,843. 15. 10. + 1,818. 1. 6.=) - - - - *Rs.* | 3,662 | 1 | 4 |

9th January 1867. *Scott Jervis.*

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From *George Plowden*, Esq., Counsel for Sir *William Mansfield*, to *W. Tayler*, Esq., Pleader, Calcutta; dated Umballa, 22nd January 1867.

I HAVE come to see in the "Englishman" newspaper a letter from you to my address, dated the 9th instant, written with reference to my letter to you of the 26th of September last. It is a novel mode of conducting a professional correspondence to send a reply, not to the counsel to whom it is addressed, but to a newspaper for publication. The public will naturally have been led to conclude that your letter was sent first to the person to whom it is addressed, and afterwards for publication, but you know the fact to be that the letter, though addressed to me, has never been sent to me at all.

You regret to observe that, in publishing my last letter, that is, my letter to you of the 12th of October last, I omitted to insert the answer which you wrote to me from Lahore, on receipt of my communication. Here, again, anyone would be led to suppose that I had suppressed a letter of importance, but you know the fact to be that your answer was of no importance whatever, inasmuch as it simply communicated that, as Mr. Jervis was in Calcutta and you were at Lahore, you could "neither do nor say anything" till you received his instructions. But, if you considered this letter, which is dated the 24th of October last, to be of so much importance as to warrant the expression of your regret that it was not published with the other correspondence, why, I may ask, did not you supply

supply the omission at the time, and why, failing that, did you not publish it with your present letter? The inevitable conclusion is, that you well knew the answer to be of no consequence, though it suited you to exhibit the omission as a grave suppression on my part.

Nor is it possible to understand why your present letter is written with reference to my letter of the 26th of September, seeing that that letter was definitively answered by you on the 29th of September, and that the letter which remained to be answered, and is still unanswered, is my letter, dated the 12th of October. In your letter of the 29th of September, you distinctly informed me that Captain Jervis was not inclined to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield, at the present crisis, or until after the close of the proceedings in England. What, then, has moved him to change his resolve and furnish the present account? Obviously, my letter to you of the 12th of October, which you ignore.

I may here state that the reason why your letter of the 24th October was not published with the other correspondence is, as you must have known, that it was not received until after that correspondence had been published, nor until after Mr. Scott Jervis' own letter in regard to that correspondence, dated the 27th of October, and addressed to the editor of the "Englishman," had appeared in the "Englishman" of the same date. Your letter, as I have already shown, simply stated that you could "neither do nor say anything" until you received Mr. Jervis' instructions, and that you had forwarded my letter of the 12th of October to him by that day's post, under a registered cover.

Captain Jervis, in the meantime, had seen, and himself noticed that letter in the "Englishman." It must surely have been obvious to you, when you expressed your regret that I omitted to insert the answer you wrote to me from Lahore, that to publish such an answer after Mr. Jervis had himself noticed, in a letter to the "Englishman," the very letter which you have referred to him, expressly because you could "neither do nor say anything" yourself concerning it, would have been a work of the clearest supererogation on my part.

And this seems the fitting place to notice Mr. Jervis' said letter of the 27th October. He commences by saying, that the letter published formed "only a portion of the correspondence which had taken place on the subject to which they relate," and that Mr. Jervis had no copies with him of those letters which were wanting, but that he had written to Lahore to you, as his counsel, to forward copies of the same to the "Englishman" for publication. Upwards of three months have elapsed, and no other letters have been published, for the very good reason that the correspondence, as originally published, was quite complete, except as to your letter from Lahore, of the 24th October, which had not been received at the time, of which Mr. Jervis could have had no knowledge when he wrote in Calcutta, on the 27th of October, and which, in fact, as already shown, contained nothing.

Mr. Jervis next states, that the abstract of accounts appended to my letter (of the 12th of October) "is merely a portion of the account it is intended to represent," and the "professional accountant" at Simla is again brought to the rescue.

If my account was incomplete, it was in Mr. Jervis' power to complete it when it was sent to you on the 26th of September last, expressly that Mr. Jervis might make any corrections, and supply any omissions in it. Your reply, however, with Mr. Jervis at your elbow, was, that you were entrusted by Mr. Jervis to say, that he was not inclined to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield at all, until after the close of the proceedings in England. This fact was ignored by Mr. Jervis in his letter, dated the 27th of October last, to the editor of the "Englishman," and is equally ignored in your present communication to my address, not sent to me but published in the "Englishman;" and it might be supposed from these letters, contrary to the fact, that Mr. Jervis had never distinctly declined to enter into the question of accounts, but had all along been quite ready to assist in settling them. Then, as to the "professional accountant," who, we are told, has been employed ever since May last, in unravelling these intricate accounts; is it to be understood that the "open sketch" annexed to your letter is the produce of his nine months' gestation? If so, it would have been satisfactory if his name had been appended to it.

I now return to your letter of the 9th of January, and its "open sketch," and on this production I have first to observe, that it does not reply, and does not pretend to reply to my last letter of the 12th of October, recapitulating the several

several occasions on which Mr. Jervis has been invited, in vain, to produce and close his accounts. The damning facts remain that Mr. Jervis instituted two money suits against Sir William Mansfield, alleging indebtedness; that having prosecuted these suits for several months, he suddenly, when the case for the defence was about to be opened, abandoned and withdrew them, and, at the same time, voluntarily proposed to leave the settlement of the accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield, unreservedly, to his Excellency; that in accordance with his own unreserved proposition, the best account that could be made from the data available was presented to him, and his correction solicited; and that he, thereupon, withdrew from his written word, and refused to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield, upon a pretext, the futility of which was fully exposed in my letter of the 12th of October, and to which it is quite impossible to assign any other object than an indefinite postponement.

To these have now to be added a few other significant facts. Forced into the action which he had declined by the publication of the correspondence, Mr. Jervis addresses a letter to the editor of the "Englishman," with reference to that correspondence, on the 27th of October last, and leads the editor and the public to suppose that he has been misrepresented; that there is other correspondence which has been withheld; that the account appended to my letter of the 12th October is only a fragment; and that the missing correspondence and a complete statement, and balance sheet, prepared by a professional accountant, would be published "very shortly."

Two months and a-half pass away, and then, when Mr. Jervis is on the eve of leaving the country, and you are about, very shortly, to follow him, as you yourself inform me, I am favoured with a letter in the "Englishman," dated the 9th of January, with an "open sketch" annexed to it, to which, practically, no reply is possible, because Mr. Jervis would have left India before I could even see the letter, the "open sketch" being, at the same time, unattested by any professional accountant, and palpably worthless as an account, while the promise to publish the portion of the correspondence said to be wanting, and the copies of which were said to be with you, is not redeemed at all. I forbear to comment upon such proceedings; but it would be preposterous to suppose that, under such circumstances, I would permit my client to depart from the settlement of accounts declared in my letter of the 12th October.

Before, however, dismissing your letter of the 9th of January and its "open sketch," I would draw your attention to two points, namely, first, that the balance alleged by Mr. Jervis to exist in his favour is partly produced by the sum of money on the building account which had been credited to Mr. Jervis as an act of grace, notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, and, second, the account itself manifests that, when the appropriation of Sir William Mansfield's property took place (which has been the subject of so much investigation), the balance of Sir William Mansfield's money in Mr. Jervis' hands was largely in his Excellency's favour.

When your letter of the 26th September was received, in which Mr. Jervis, withdrawing from his written word, declined to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield, I strongly advised that a suit should be instituted against him for the sum shown by my account to be due by him, but my client was averse to originating any law proceedings if it could possibly be avoided.

The result has shown how right I was in my opinion, that nothing but a fruitless correspondence would ensue, unless Mr. Jervis' mere allegations of my client's indebtedness to him, which he had himself withdrawn from the Court into which he had carried them, were again subjected to the searching scrutiny of a court of justice. It is quite obvious that the only mode of bringing these mere allegations to an issue, is to put Mr. Jervis into court, since he has abandoned his own suits, and withdrawn from his expressed intention "to leave their settlement, unreservedly, to his Excellency's sense of what is fitting and correct;" but, as you will see, this only course has been effectually closed to us by your delaying a reply to my last letter for three months, and then only forwarding one, through the channel of a newspaper, so timed, that it could not possibly be seen by me until after Mr. Jervis had left the country. It is true you are so good as to ask me to address my next communication to your attornies, Messrs. Dawson & Bryan, 33, Bedford-square, London, as you are yourself proceeding to England

land very shortly; but this proposition sounds so ludicrous, upon the top of all the past proceedings, that I can scarcely suppose you to be serious; at all events, I am not disposed to avail myself of this very useful privilege, or to pursue as far as England the vain shadows so persistently presented to my grasp. Accordingly, I have no intention of continuing this correspondence; the only further action I will consent to take in this matter is to put Mr. Jervis into court, and to bring the allegations of my client's indebtedness to him, to which he so carefully confines himself, once more to the test, which Mr. Jervis found it expedient first to apply and then to abandon.

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MEMORANDUM of the Circumstances connected with the Trial of Captain *Jervis* by General Court Martial, compiled from Official Papers, Civil and Military.

ALTHOUGH the press has largely discussed the trial of Captain Jervis at Simla for scandalous conduct, no complete and connected narrative of the circumstances out of which that trial arose, and of the events which accompanied and followed it, has yet appeared; and it is believed that from the want of such a narrative much misconception is abroad.

In the following memorandum it is proposed to trace the case from its origin, and to omit no important particular. It may perhaps be thought that some of the matters adverted to are unimportant, but it may be found that subsequent events have been influenced by them, and the necessity for mentioning them will thus be explained.

Captain Jervis was one of three aides de camp on the personal staff of the Commander in Chief in India, and in September 1865 assumed charge of his Excellency's household. Shortly after this an estate was purchased at Simla by Sir William Mansfield, but in consequence of his approaching departure for Calcutta, it was proposed not to occupy the house on that estate until his return in the following spring. It had been the custom of previous Commanders in Chief not to provide their aides-de-camp with house room at Simla, unless there happened to be accommodation under their own roof; but Sir William Mansfield was unwilling that his staff should be put to expense on such account, which was now a heavy one, owing to the great rise in rents. He proposed, therefore, to build on his new estate a small range of quarters close to his own house, capable of affording for each of the three aides-de-camp such accommodation as single men think sufficient at a club. A sketch was accordingly prepared, and it was considered that the proposed building could be completed for something under 2,000 rupees. Captain Jervis and the other aides-de-camp thought, however, that it would be convenient to them to have more accommodation, and knowing that the Commander in Chief could not be expected to be at any expense on their account, they asked permission to add an upper storey to the proposed ground plan at their own cost, Captain Jervis, who assumed charge of the whole affair, having intimated to all the parties concerned that the additional expense would be moderate. Sir William Mansfield saw no objection to the arrangement, provided this outlay on the part of each aide-de-camp were clearly understood not to constitute a lien on his estate. He accordingly wrote a memorandum signifying his assent, and stating that, to save confusion, he would give 2,000 rupees, and that they could then complete the building as they desired. This memorandum was signed by Sir William Mansfield and the three aides-de-camp as a record of the terms of the agreement between them. The work was accordingly put in hand by Captain Jervis, and the 2,000 rupees were paid by the Commander in Chief in two instalments of 1,000 rupees each.

*Vide* proceedings in Civil Court, Simla, in building suit withdrawn and abandoned by Mr. Jervis.

At the beginning of April 1866, his Excellency returned to Simla from Calcutta, and took up his residence in his own house. Captain Jervis had arrived a few days previously. It may here be mentioned that Sir William Mansfield had also taken for the season a country house at Mahasoo, distant six miles from Simla, and which had been rented during the previous autumn by Captain Jervis on his own account. It was on these premises that the sheep farm mentioned hereafter was established.

During the month of April one or two events took place which, unimportant in themselves, are not without value in their bearing on subsequent occurrences.

*Vide* papers elicited by Mr. Jervis on the court martial

in matters constantly declared to be irrelevant, but which he insisted on bringing before it.

It has been stated that Captain Jervis assumed charge of the household in September 1865. This charge included the management of every department in a very large establishment which had to be kept in complete order, not only when stationary, but while marching over enormous distances. It so happened that Sir William Mansfield had occasion to find fault with Captain Jervis for an omission, in connection with his charge of the stable, which had occurred twice before. A very kind note was addressed to him on the point, but the tone of the reply showing considerable misapprehension of the position of an aide-de-camp and of the military duty he bore to his chief, his Excellency wrote to Captain Jervis through the military secretary. In the correspondence which ensued, Captain Jervis displayed a strong desire, which appeared at the time singular, to have everything under his own control, although he afterwards pleaded press of work as an excuse for the neglected state of his accounts. On his being directed to hand over charge of part of his duties to another aide-de-camp, he demurred, and expressed a desire to give up the whole charge of the household, rather than retain a portion only. It then became necessary to point out that certain duties were assigned to him as military duties, and that so long as he remained an aide-de camp he had no option in the matter. It ended in an official acknowledgment being recorded by Captain Jervis, that he accepted his position as a military one, and was prepared to obey orders.

An explanation of very obvious facts, in view to the removal of misapprehension as to the duties of an aide-de-camp.

It may here be useful to explain the position of Mr. Jervis as aide-de-camp in charge of the Commander in Chief's household, with reference to the point that has been a good deal discussed by the newspapers, of the supposed analogy of his functions to servile duties. This idea is entirely erroneous. According to the custom observed by governors and general officers in high command, one of the aides-de-camp is invariably appointed to perform the office of comptroller of the household, and this custom holds in the establishment of the Commander in Chief, where it has always been assumed that the number of aides-de-camp allowed by the State was purposely so proportioned as to admit of this duty being discharged. The household of the Commander in Chief in India, it may be observed, ranks in size and importance only after that of the Viceroy. It has to meet the demands of continual public entertainments of different kinds, as required by one of the highest official positions in the country; the officer in charge, or comptroller, directs two or three houses in different parts of the country, the personal camp of the Commander in Chief when his Excellency marches, and is responsible for the military guard and escort, besides perhaps 100 servants. He has under him head-servants of every description, and such other assistants as may be necessary. Unlimited trust is placed in him regarding household expenditure, and it would be his duty to check any irregularities in the house, whether on the part of officers of the personal staff or of the servants. If the position of the Commander in Chief of India, and the absorption of his time in public business, be considered, it becomes clear that such official control and assistance in the establishment by the officers paid by the State and allowed for the purpose, is simply a necessity which could not be escaped from. It follows that the position of an aide-de-camp who assumes charge of the household of a commander in chief or governor, is one of great trust, and that the duties involved by the acceptance of such a post are by no means derogatory to the status of an officer and a gentleman, but are rather of such a nature as to require an officer and a gentleman for their proper performance.

When the true nature of the post is considered, it is obvious that a breach of trust on the part of such an official, when entrusted with control, takes rank in criminality with the breach of trust of the manager or confidential agent of any other large business or concern. Thus in military language does it arise that such breach of trust amounts to "conduct unworthy of an officer and a gentleman." And it must always be remembered that all dishonourable conduct on the part of a military officer, wherever committed and under whatever circumstances, is triable as a military offence, and that there is an obligation to try it.

*Vide* proceedings of court martial as above noted.

About a week after the occurrences mentioned above, it was necessary again to point out to Captain Jervis an omission in his duty. His conduct was in this instance so annoying, that he was told in a private letter from Major Flood, that the Commander in Chief was quite tired of these constantly recurring little disagreeables, and that if he was not prepared to accept his duties as aide-de-camp, it would be much better if he left the staff on friendly terms. This was answered by

by a note in which he expressed a regret that he should have failed in the performance of his duty. The tone of this letter was so good, that Sir William Mansfield hoped, that when his aide-de-camp returned from a short leave of absence he had asked for and obtained, there would be nothing to prevent his resuming his position on the old terms of familiarity. But it was during this short absence that certain facts transpired in connection with a matter which it will be necessary to describe in some little detail. Its bearing on the charge of scandalous conduct, ultimately brought against Captain Jervis, lies in the fact that it led to the discoveries upon which that charge was based. This matter has been industriously confounded with the accusation submitted to the court-martial which afterwards assembled, although it had no connection with it, except that it was the means of strengthening suspicion against Captain Jervis.

This matter was originally published at Mr. Jervis's instance, and has consequently formed the subject of constant misrepresentation against the Commander in Chief, both here and in England.

It had long been desired by his Excellency that a private farm should be established for supplying his table with mutton and poultry. It is a common practice in large households in India to keep such an establishment, and thus be independent of the local markets. The arrangement had existed in Sir William Mansfield's household when Commander in Chief in Bombay, and Captain Jervis, who had charge of the establishment in that Presidency, was well acquainted with the system. Captain Jervis has stated that, in accordance with his Excellency's frequently expressed wish, a flock of sheep had been purchased in 1865, but it appeared that this had never been done. Very shortly, however, after his arrival at Simla in the spring of this year, Captain Jervis did establish a farm at Mahasoo. But the system was very different from that formerly adopted. All purchases were now made in Captain Jervis's name; the sheep were branded with his initials, and books were kept in which Sir William Mansfield himself appeared as a retail customer of Captain Jervis, the prices charged to him for stock, which had been but a week or two on the premises, being greatly in advance of the rate at which the purchases had been made. All this was going on without the knowledge of Sir William Mansfield, and the true state of the case was not discovered until an English servant of Sir William Mansfield's, named Abbey, who had acted as Captain Jervis's agent in making purchases for the farm, reported them because of his feeling that all was not right. When this disclosure was made, Captain Jervis was absent on leave as above stated. The facts appeared at first sight so damaging to the character of Captain Jervis, that his Excellency declined to hear more from the butler, except after due caution in presence of the military secretary. The examination was accordingly made and recorded in the shape of question and answer, Captain Jervis being at once informed of its nature, and requested to return to Simla, when the papers, together with what the Commander in Chief had written on the subject, would be shown him.

In reply, he wrote to say he would return immediately to offer any explanation that might be required. At the same time, he acknowledged that the farm was his own, as appears from the following extract :—

"The whole, or whatever portion his Excellency wishes of the farm, such as it is, Sir William can have at any time, or take it over with its accounts from its commencement, should he so desire.

"Abbey mentioned to me the other day, that Lady Mansfield thought, that in taking charge of the establishment herself, she should take over the farm; I told him that when her ladyship mentioned the matter again, to tell her that I did not desire her to take over any more than was convenient to her, but that anything she wished to have, might of course be taken."

It will thus be seen, that when the matter was first communicated to Captain Jervis, when he was taken by surprise, and when he had had no time for elaborating excuses, he plainly admitted that he had established a farm of his own, which he offered to make over wholly or in part to Sir William Mansfield; subsequently, Captain Jervis explained the keeping the farm in his own name as "a necessary consequence of his agency;" but this explanation is obviously inconsistent with his offer to hand over part of it to Sir William Mansfield. The note which has been quoted, appeared therefore to corroborate Abbey's statement, so far as the establishment of the farm on Captain Jervis's own account was concerned, the Commander in Chief himself being constituted one of his retail customers. But at this very time a circumstance occurred which tended to show matters in a much more unfavourable light. Early on the morning of

the 3rd of May, the very day of Captain Jervis's return, a paper was brought to the Commander in Chief's house by a native servant, and both Captain Jervis and the butler Abbey being absent, came into his Excellency's hands. This turned out to be a regular note for supplies addressed to the butler by an officer, and it included, amongst other things, a joint of beef. This led to an inquiry, and it was found that, at the invitation of Captain Jervis, gentlemen in the neighbourhood had been in the habit of sending for supplies under the impression that they were as much conferring as receiving a favour. It appeared further, that the supplies given to them were not wholly the produce of the farm. The farm was one for sheep and poultry, and no beef had ever been killed on it; so that any joints of beef given on requisition, must have been purchased from butchers in the bazar.

It thus appeared, that not only had Captain Jervis established a sheep farm on his own account, of which he had retailed the produce to the Commander in Chief and officers resident in Simla, but that he had entered on a general speculation in dead meat. Meantime the officers purchasing the meat, most indubitably believed themselves to be dealing with Sir William Mansfield. The transaction will probably be considered to speak for itself, and it may be well to say that it has never been defended, except by supposed analogy to a practice which prevails in India, of allowing neighbours to receive on payment, superfluous joints of mutton when a sheep is killed,—a practice sufficiently explained by the fact, that the joints in the climate of the plains of India would otherwise be spoiled. But these occurrences took place in the hills.

For proceedings which must be admitted to have amounted to very gross impertinence, even if they did not constitute "scandalous conduct," Captain Jervis was removed from Sir William Mansfield's staff, an opportunity being however afforded him of explaining his acts to two of his brother officers. Of this opportunity he neglected to avail himself, and placed the case in the hands of counsel, apparently with the view of disputing his removal. The question was thus placed on a new footing. The duties of an aide-de-camp are, as has been stated, official duties, and thus the Commander in Chief was led to consider that an award in which he was himself concerned being disputed, the grounds of the summary action taken by him should be investigated by a court of inquiry. A court of inquiry, composed of officers unconnected with the personal staff, was therefore directed to assemble, which Captain Jervis was, with much difficulty, and after much manifestation of contumacy, prevailed on to attend. Captain Jervis took no part in the proceedings, but the finding of the Court entirely justified the Commander in Chief in removing him from the staff.

*Vide* proceedings of court martial.

Just at this time the matters come to light which formed the subject of the first charge on which Captain Jervis was arraigned before the general court martial. As these are well known, it will be unnecessary to notice them here further than to say that the common notion that the alleged misappropriations were petty, is quite unfounded; the alienation of the Commander in Chief's property, together with the misuse of his credit, did in fact amount to about 200 *l.*, as shown in the charges.

Advantage was taken of the court of inquiry, then under adjournment, to submit these matters for investigation, and Captain Jervis was called upon to rebut the presumption of fraud which they created.

But it is well known to all military men, that when an officer rests under imputations affecting his character, he invariably has an opportunity of removing them before being brought to trial; but if he should decline to explain, there is no option left to the Commander in Chief, whose plain duty it becomes to submit the matter for investigation by a court where the evidence can be taken upon oath. This was the course pursued in the present case. The facts were placed before the court of inquiry, but the accused declined to explain, and he was accordingly placed under arrest. But although the next step would ordinarily have been a court martial, the Commander in Chief, in the earnest hope of extricating Captain Jervis from his difficulties, devised the expedient of a confidential committee of audit. If Captain Jervis could show that his accounts were in a proper state, it was still possible that a trial involving such serious consequences might be avoided. Even to the last the Commander in Chief would have been willing to accept a proper military offer from Captain Jervis to extri-

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cate himself from the charges of misappropriation, and of fraudulently pledging the credit of another, according to the means now proposed. But this opportunity was repelled like the former, and there was absolutely no course left to the Commander in Chief than to order the arraignment of the accused on a charge of scandalous conduct, based on the facts of embezzlement. There were now no hopes that a trial could be avoided at this moment.

Under the Mutiny Act a court martial is the ordinary criminal court for the trial of soldiers charged in India with criminal offences at a distance of more than 120 miles from a Presidency town; a provision easily explained by the fewness and remoteness of the courts empowered to try European British subjects in India. As Sir William Mansfield was personally concerned in the matter, he left it to the principal staff officers to determine whether Captain Jervis should be tried by the court martial on the military or the non-military charge, the evidence being sufficient to support either a charge of criminal breach of trust under the penal code, or a charge of scandalous conduct according to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War. They decided for the charge of scandalous conduct. The proceedings of the court martial have been made sufficiently public, and need not be recapitulated at any length. The court first assembled on the 25th June, and the charges were as follows:—The first for scandalous conduct in four instances, embracing the misappropriation of wines and stores, the ordering from a tradesman (with whom the prisoner had an account of his own) articles of horse-gear on the credit of Sir William Mansfield, and two cases of fraudulently charging to the Commander in Chief his (Captain Jervis's) own private expenses. The second charge was for disobedience of orders in not producing the Commander in Chief's books and papers to the court of inquiry. The third was for disobedience of orders in not attending the committee of audit. The fourth charge set out the disobeying of a lawful command to give up his sword, and the fifth was for refusing to be tried. Owing to the slow routine of military law, and perhaps to other causes, the proceedings, with unusually long adjournments, were not brought to a close until the end of August.

The finding was, on the first charge, "not guilty," amounting, in military usage,* in the absence of an accompanying "full and honourable acquittal" on a charge of scandalous conduct, to the Scotch verdict of "not proven." On the second charge, "not guilty," and on the remaining charges "guilty." The sentence was dismissal from Her Majesty's service, followed by a recommendation to mercy. The sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief, who in his remarks on the trial gave his reasons at length for not attending to the recommendation of the court, and the result was finally promulgated on the 18th of September in a General Order.

General Birch, late Judge Advocate General in India, recently gave evidence in this sense in a court of law in England in the case of Keighly and Bell.

During the interval that elapsed between the sitting of the court of inquiry and the commencement of the proceedings of the court martial, the course of insubordination and contumacy pursued by Captain Jervis is probably without parallel, but it was, no doubt, deliberately intended to intimidate. A threat was conveyed to his Excellency that the press, both in India and England, would be worked to his disadvantage, and it was endeavoured to deter him from the performance of his strict duty as Commander in Chief, by the institution of three suits against him in the civil courts. The first of these was to recover money, alleged to be due on account of the house that was being built, which we have seen was exactly contrary to the agreement Captain Jervis signed; the second was to recover a sum of money said to be due on account of the household expenditure, the debt having since been proved to be the other way, viz., from Captain Jervis to Sir William Mansfield; and the third was an action for damages, laid at 10,000 *l.*, for what was called defamation of character, although no defamatory matter was set forth, and the plaintiff apparently expected to elicit the defamation of which he complained by cross-examination of Sir William Mansfield. Probably no grosser examples of scandalous, irrelevant, and impertinent allegations have ever been seen than are to be found in some of the documents filed in these suits. As all three suits went sufficiently far to show that they were completely frivolous and vexatious, they probably had for their object, first,

*Vide* proceedings in the civil court at Simla.

to

* This distinction was fully appreciated by Mr. Jervis in his defence, *vide* Proceedings of court martial.

to intimidate the Commander in Chief, next, to give colour to certain statements which it was intended to make before the court martial, and lastly, to get those statements early before the public, and so to prepossess public opinion. The amount of truth in these statements will be seen presently. Part of the plan, it should be stated, was defeated by a successful attempt of Sir William Mansfield to get the suit for defamation, instituted at Simla, transferred to the chief court of the Punjab.

*Vide* proceedings in the civil court at Simla.

It now became necessary for the Commander in Chief to employ counsel to defend the civil suits thus heaped upon him; but this could not be done until after the assembly of the general court martial, as there was no practising lawyer resident in Simla except Captain Jervis's counsel. The gentleman ultimately retained strongly urged the necessity of bringing an action against Captain Jervis for the recovery of his Excellency's books and papers, which the former illegally retained, notwithstanding military orders. These books and papers, besides being urgently required by the Commander in Chief for his own private affairs, might be supposed to give valuable documentary evidence regarding the charge of scandalous conduct, considering with what persistent tenacity they were withheld by Mr. Jervis. Accordingly, with his Excellency's consent, a suit was filed for the recovery of the papers, but it was not pressed until after Captain Jervis's defence had been delivered, in order that his action in this respect might be in no way hampered. When the suit was brought on, a decree followed, as a matter of course, for all books, papers, and other documents, the property of Sir William Mansfield, either in possession of the defendant, or handed by him to the court martial. But although the decree was obtained, its execution was impeded by every possible technical obstruction, and it has been successfully evaded up to the present time. Captain Jervis's first answer in the suit was, that he had no books belonging to the plaintiff, all such books having been lodged in the court martial. But notwithstanding this, he subsequently filed with the court martial several books confessedly the property of his Excellency. The delivery of all the Commander in Chief's bills, vouchers, files of receipts, &c., for sums paid out of money received for the purposes of the household, was refused, on the plea that all such papers represented transactions between himself and third parties, and were his own private property. Of course this ground was not tenable for a moment, but the object was to obtain delay, and to this day the Commander in Chief has been unable to obtain execution of a decree passed two months ago, though he has recovered possession of the books given in by Captain Jervis to the court martial. These books are not without value, but it must be held that the papers, including vouchers and receipts, which were affected by the decree, are of greater importance still.

*Vide* proceedings in civil court and court martial.

The possession and retention by Captain Jervis of the bills and receipts representing the expenditure, is an important feature in the whole of the proceedings, and governs and overshadows the entire case. It is necessary to show clearly the possession by Captain Jervis of papers which would, if produced, disclose the exact state of the accounts, and prove conclusively whether the Commander in Chief was, at any given moment, indebted to him or not, an allegation on which Captain Jervis mainly rested his pretended right to empty Sir William Mansfield's cellars, and to pledge his credit indefinitely. From the first there was no attempt to deny this possession, and it is a curious feature that no explanation was offered by Captain Jervis for not producing them at the court martial, where it would, without doubt, have been of inestimable advantage to him to be able to prove his charge of indebtedness. The reason given before the court of inquiry for their not being forthcoming was that they were in confusion; to the committee of audit he stated that he did not desire to produce them, and afterwards, in a letter to the Adjutant General, he says—"With regard to the delivery to the Committee of other books and papers in my possession, connected with these accounts, I regret I must, notwithstanding his Excellency's commands, decline to give them up. . . . . Those papers are the only proof I possess of Sir William Mansfield's liability to me for a considerable sum of money expended by me on his Excellency's account, and now due to me. They also form proof of the accuracy of my accounts, and the integrity of my dealings, and on this ground I claim a lien upon them, until I have done this; as in the event of my being driven to sue for a balance in the civil court, they are the only proof that I possess."

These

These documents then contained the proofs on which the second suit for 2,500 rupees, the alleged amount of the debt, was to depend. The defence before the court martial was likewise made to rest chiefly on the Commander in Chief's alleged indebtedness to the prisoner, and it was boldly asserted that a large balance was due to him. Indeed, a passage in his rejoinder, in which he comments on an implied denial of the indebtedness by Sir William Mansfield, is headed by Captain Jervis "Perjury of the Commander in Chief." Notwithstanding the absence of all proof of these assertions, and many circumstances tending to disprove them, it can well be understood that this determined assertion of indebtedness, backed as it was by an action in the civil Court, had a considerable effect on the public mind. It was thus not only the interest, but the duty of the Commander in Chief, believing as he did that the allegation was wholly false, to push the civil suits to a hearing as soon as the court martial was concluded, and to compel the plaintiff to produce his proofs. But the object of the civil suits now became apparent, for, so soon as the court martial was about to close its final sitting on revision, notice was given that all the suits were about to be abandoned, and this was done immediately afterwards. Very shortly before, a compromise on the money suits had been proposed, but was of course resolutely declined, the next step being their unreserved abandonment, accompanied by an intimation of the plaintiff's intention "to leave their settlement unreservedly to his Excellency's sense of what is fitting and correct." A balance sheet accordingly was prepared in Sir William Mansfield's household, from such books and papers as had been restored to him on the close of the proceedings of the court martial, and from other sources. Such a statement of accounts, however carefully prepared, could only be approximate, through Captain Jervis's continued retention of so many documents. But it was framed on the principle of solving every doubtful question in respect to items in the late comptroller's favour, and it is all but certain that if it contains errors, they are errors adverse to Sir William Mansfield and favourable to Captain Jervis.

*Vide* proceedings in civil court and court martial.

This sheet was sent to Mr. Jervis through the medium of counsel. It might have been supposed, from the tenor of the letter quoted above, that Mr. Jervis would have cordially assisted in the settlement according to the information and papers in his own possession, but instead of doing this he returned a reply through his counsel to the effect that he was "not inclined at the present crisis to enter into the question of accounts between himself and Sir William Mansfield," and it concluded by saying that after the close of the proceedings in England, Captain Jervis would be happy to assist in the completion of the accounts by supplying any information that might be required. The day after this note was written, Mr. Jervis quitted Simla, without having given up the papers, the property of the Commander in Chief, as above referred to.

*Vide* published correspondence.

If there could be any doubt of the general correctness of the accounts which had been prepared, it must be held to have been absolutely removed by the fact that after receipt of the balance sheet a consideration of it was finally evaded by Captain Jervis. There is therefore really nothing left but to believe that the sheet is either correct, or, if incorrect, only incorrect in its debts to Sir William Mansfield. The result of the investigation is therefore that at the present time, instead of the Commander in Chief being indebted to his late aide-de-camp in the sum of 250 *l.*, as the latter has alleged, and for which he instituted a suit at law, since abandoned, he is a debtor to Sir William Mansfield for the sum of about 320 *l.*

*Vide* published correspondence.

Now, when it is considered that the defence of his conduct throughout, including that on the charges of embezzlement, hinged upon the allegations of the Commander in Chief's indebtedness to him, the circumstances of this final refusal to enter upon a settlement, and the plain figures of this balance sheet, assume an importance and significance that cannot be too highly regarded. From the latter it appears that, so far from there being or having been indebtedness on the part of the Commander in Chief, there was no single month during Captain Jervis's recent control of the household in which he was without funds belonging to his Excellency; and also that when his charge ceased, there was and still is a considerable balance of money in his possession, the same being the property of the Commander in Chief.

This indebtedness, then, the foundation of Captain Jervis's defence from beginning to end, is now proved never to have had an existence. The very effron-

tery of the plea took such a hold on the public mind, that the clearest arguments were unable to bring home a conviction of what was the real truth in a contrary sense. Whether the strenuous assertion in any manner affected the mind of the court martial, it is not worth while to inquire.

*Vide* proceeding in magistrate's court at Simla.

With regard to the other two suits, the abandonment of which has already been noticed, nothing more is required to be said; further than to note a circumstance connected with that on account of the building, which is of some importance as affording an answer to the complaint, frequently urged against the Commander in Chief, that he declined to see Captain Jervis when the matter of the farm first transpired. The building suit had been under hearing for some days. Mr. Plowden, Sir William Mansfield's counsel, had occasion, in the course of his cross-examination of the witnesses, to put several questions tending to prove that Captain Jervis's deposition on oath with regard to the suit was in several particulars incorrect. The replies were not palatable to the plaintiff, who was present in court, and on the adjournment of a sitting at which these questions had been put, Captain Jervis deliberately assaulted Mr. Plowden at the door of the court-house, though not until he had stated the motive of the assault, that it was intended to deter Mr. Plowden from asking questions injurious to the plaintiff's credibility.

During this or the following day he committed similar assaults on three other individuals, who either had or were thought to have taken some part in the prosecution against him. A summons was of course taken out by Mr. Plowden and Abbey, one of the others who had been assaulted, and the result was that Captain Jervis had to tender most ample apologies to both in open court, and was bound over to keep the peace to Her Majesty's subjects for six months.

These circumstances, together with the events related at the commencement of this paper as having happened in the month of April, and Captain Jervis's own plea in defence on the fourth charge before the court martial, viz., his ungovernable temper, afford an answer to the complaint above mentioned, and clearly justify the prudence of the Commander in Chief in declining to see one who, having so little control over himself, might have been led in a moment of forgetfulness to a grave aggravation of his offence. To a military man the necessity of a special reason for not according an interview to an accused officer will scarcely present itself. Whatever may have been the terms of intimacy previously existing between a commanding officer and an officer resting under imputations affecting his character, the customs of the service require that all communications shall be made through the recognised official channels, and this applies with the greater force in proportion to the disparity of rank. It is to be remarked, however, that Captain Jervis never asked for an interview, from which it may be fairly gathered that he did not desire to face the Commander in Chief under the circumstances.

The foregoing narrative, it is believed, presents a tolerably complete account of this complicated case, so far as such an account is necessary to correct or supplement the statements of the case already before the public. It has not been attempted to argue on the facts or to draw inferences, but simply to give the history of the case in a connected manner down to the time of Mr. Jervis's leaving Simla.

*G. W. Plowden,*
Counsel for Sir William Mansfield.

22nd October 1866.

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*Note.*—This paper was originally compiled for the information of my friends, who were fairly mystified by the persistent misrepresentation continued for many months in the public prints. Through inadvertence it was despatched to my friends at first without the signature of my counsel. That omission is now rectified, the paper having been duly authenticated by Mr. Plowden.

The 19th Frbruary 1867. *W. R. M.*

MEMORANDUM by the Commander in Chief in *India*, on the Official Treatment of the *Jervis* case.

HAVING noticed the points to which public criticism has been recently directed as regards the official management of the Jervis case, I think it right to place on record certain arguments and facts which have either entirely escaped attention, or are unknown except to those who may be connected with Government in India, or have had to give practical execution to the Mutiny Act in that country.

I observe in the first place that I am much blamed because I did not proceed against Mr. Jervis, late a captain in the 106th Foot, by means of one of the ordinary criminal courts.

In answer to this I would say, that so far as I myself was personally concerned, it was my wish to do so.

Having, however, personal interests in the matter of the prosecution, it appeared to me that this was hardly a point on which I should decide for myself.

Accordingly, for the first time during my lengthened period of military command, I devolved the responsibility of a decision on the officers appointed under the Crown to advise me in matters of discipline and law.

For reasons which are officially set out in the Memorandum of the Committee composed of the Adjutant General, the Deputy Adjutant General, and the Officiating Judge Advocate General of the Army, it was determined to submit the case to a military court, *vide* paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of the Committee, dated 4th June 1866.

The same Committee determined that Mr. Jervis should not be prosecuted for felony under the 100th section of the Mutiny Act, but that he ought to be arraigned for trial on a charge of scandalous conduct, which would not bar charges on account of the military crime of disobedience, *vide* paragraph 3 of the Memorandum. Contrary to my own personal wish I acceded to this decision, while I placed on official record that it would lay me open to the misconstruction of being a judge in my own cause.

There were, however, strong reasons for countenancing the decision of the Committee, which occurred to me, in addition to those it stated, the great weight of the reasons of the Committee being incontestable.

These reasons are as follows:—According to the Mutiny Act, officers and soldiers against whom crimes of felony are alleged in India are tried by military court martial if the crime has been committed at a distance of more than 120 miles from the Presidency towns.

The discovery of the misappropriation alleged against Mr. Jervis took place at a distance of 1,100 miles from Calcutta.

It is true that, exceptionally, crimes may be transferred for trial by the Criminal Court in Calcutta, notwithstanding the 100th Section of the Mutiny Act. But such a course is of the rarest occurrence.

On a recent occasion, viz., in the case of Captain , and Commissary of Ordnance, who was charged with misappropriation of Government stores, this exceptional course was followed at my instance, and with the consent of the Government, because of the very difficult character of the evidence, which rendered it necessary, in my opinion, that the case should be investigated by a learned tribunal. I do not know of any other case which has thus been transferred. When the order was given for the transfer of that case to the magistrate from the military authorities, it was objected to by Captain , who has always maintained, notwithstanding his acquittal by a special jury, that an injustice was practised towards him by the removal of his case from the cognizance of a court martial.

In the matter of Mr. Jervis, on the contrary, as regarded the nature of the evidence, there was, as I was advised, no difficulty while the *primâ facie* case, explanation being resolutely denied by the prisoner, was very clearly established.

It has been noticed that Simla is 1,100 miles from Calcutta.

If a criminal prosecution had been resorted to in the High Court of that city, the only civil tribunal before which it could have been tried, the business of the

head quarters of the large army under my command must have been intermitted for a lengthened period, owing to my necessary absence at Calcutta, or I must have taken the head quarters with me.

But further, the Commander in Chief is a member of the Government of the Governor General, which was then at Simla. He has, in my person, received the positive instructions of the Secretary of State for India and of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, not to absent himself from his place in the Government more than is absolutely necessary for executive army purposes.

During the last year and a half, I have consistently acted up to those instructions, and by the exertion of great personal activity and not inconsiderable labour, I have managed to unite the two functions, viz., of attendance in my seat of Government, and of the executive duties of military inspection and command. With a few exceptions, this has not been the practice of my predecessors in command, so far as I am aware.

It may now be asked, considering the recorded opinions of my constituted advisers, and the personal nature of the entanglement caused by Mr. Jervis's conduct, whether I should have been justified in causing a great delay in business, and in disregarding my instructions, for the purpose of escaping the misconstruction and odium which I knew would attend the performance of my duty in the matter concerned,

That this was foreseen by me is shown by the last sentence of the 3rd paragraph of my memorandum, dated 4th June 1866, the same being No. 5 of the printed papers.

I venture to think, that it must appear that, whatever the painful results to myself, I acted on this occasion with a proper regard to a sense of duty, which is demanded from one in my position.

I would now invite attention to the further consideration of the error by which the public mind has been misled, viz. that a general officer who orders a court martial on a case in which he is concerned and is an evidence, is a judge in his own cause.

It is not necessary to travel beyond Mr. Jervis's trial to show the fallacy herein contained, the prisoner having been acquitted on the scandalous charge, notwithstanding the evidence of the officer who ordered the court martial, and whose property had been misappropriated.

But in truth it is an absolute confusion of ideas to attribute the character of judge to a general officer in such a position.

He cannot change a verdict; he cannot commute a sentence, except in the case of certain crimes, as defined in the Mutiny Act, although he can point out to the court martial errors in its finding and sentence.

His action is simply that of an executive officer and not of a judge.

Thus, as a matter of expediency, it is in his power to mitigate a sentence, and if a finding of guilty be contrary to proof, he can in his executive capacity annul the court martial. But if a verdict of not guilty be contrary to proof, and if the court martial decline to admit his reasoning on revision, such a general officer has simply no power in the matter.

In like manner, the admission or rejection on his part of a recommendation to mercy, is merely an executive act, grounded on what, in his opinion, may be a right expediency with respect to the interests of Her Majesty's Service and the personal deserts of an individual officer who has incurred a penal sentence.

It must, therefore, be said that a general officer in command, who relegates a case in which he is concerned to the decision of a court martial, places the accused and himself on a footing of equality, with a view to the furtherance of the interests of justice.

This brings me to a third consideration. It has been said, over and over again, that I have acted hastily; that I had pre-conceived the prisoner's guilt; that I would not allow him to answer or to plead facts in extenuation or explanation.

What are the facts? When Mr. Jervis was first accused of misconduct involving allegations of gross duplicity on his part, it was proposed to him to confront his accuser and the evidence before a confidential court composed of his two brother officers and comrades on the staff.

He persistently evaded this inquiry, and by his conduct led me to believe that he admitted the justice of his removal from the staff.

When,

When, however, I discovered that he disputed the justice of my personal award, I determined to have the matter officially inquired into, for my own satisfaction as well as his, that it might not be possible to be said hereafter, that any officer could be punished by me without due inquiry.

If the result of the investigation had been against my previous decision, there could have been but one consequence, viz., that Mr. Jervis must have re-entered my family if he liked.

I cannot say that I thought that this would follow, so complete did the evidence seem ; but it is obvious that Mr. Jervis would take no means of clearing himself in the manner offered him.

It is, however, but fair to me to show how anxious I was, at the commencement of all this disturbance, that there should be no action on my part until it had received the sanction of unbiassed inquiry.

When a crime of swindling was alleged against Mr. Jervis, I having been the person who was swindled, the same anxious course was followed, he having had the opportunity of two confidential courts to clear himself, viz., the Court of Inquiry and the Committee of Audit.

My patience was even then not exhausted. It is seen that on the 12th June 1866, the Adjutant General again appealed to Mr. Jervis to attend the Court of Inquiry to hear fresh evidence which was alleged against him.

It is thus evident that the superior officer, who has been so freely accused before the public of hastiness and oppression, made no less than five distinct efforts to induce Mr. Jervis to clear himself of the allegations to his disadvantage before the final order was given by which such charges were conveyed to him.

It must be admitted that courts martial in India often place themselves in a false position by their recommendations to mercy, as well as the general officers who are obliged to reject such appeals to clemency. This has been frequently remarked on by successive Commanders in Chief.

Thus, for the majority of offences, a wide margin of sentence is left by the law to the discretion of a general court martial. It often happens that such a court awards the severest sentence permissible by law, and then tacks on a recommendation to mercy. It is evident that if a general court martial would avoid self-stultification, it should, in the exercise of its discretion, award the sentence which it really considers merited. It is logically correct to say that a recommendation to mercy should find no place in the proceedings of a court martial, except in the case of certain crimes for which the punishment, viz., cashiering, is absolutely prescribed by law. Thus, in the case of Mr. Jervis, if the court thought him worthy of mercy, it was its duty not to have sentenced him to dismissal from the service, but to such a minor punishment as it really thought commensurate with the offences of which it found him guilty. The range of sentence open to the court extended from one of death to one of simple reprimand.

Such are the salient points which appear to me to be worthy of notice from myself, in answer to the prolonged hostile criticism to which I have for many months submitted in silence. If, however, more be required, I would ask that careful attention may be given to the detailed analysis, which, at my request, the Judge Advocate General of this army has been so good as to undertake of the papers connected with the court martial, and the matters which preceded the sitting of the court.

The more all these documents are sifted and examined, the more obvious will, I think, it become, that with respect to the most solemn obligation of duty, according to the trust reposed in me as Commander in Chief in India, the adoption of the recommendation to mercy in favour of Mr. Jervis was simply an impossibility.

(signed) *W. R. Mansfield.*

Camp, Agra, 17 November 1866.

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CORRESPONDENCE between the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for India relative to the proposed GRANT to Captain *Jervis*, of the Price of his Commission.

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Captain *Jervis* to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

Grosvenor Hotel, S.W.,
6 May 1867.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that I have now been for two months in England, and am exceedingly anxious to ascertain whether any decision has been yet passed in the matter of my late trial by court martial.

I should be much obliged if, with the permission of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, you could give me any information on the subject, that I may, if possible, be relieved from the present anxious suspense, and be enabled to shape my course for the future.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Scott Jervis*,
Captain 106th Light Infantry.

Lieutenant General W. F. Forster, K.H.,
Military Secretary, Horse Guards, S.W.

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The Under Secretary of State for War to the Under Secretary of State for India.

War Office, 13 May 1867.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir John Pakington, to transmit to you for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter which has been received by the Military Secretary to the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief from Captain S. Jervis, 106th Regiment.

Sir John Pakington having been in communication with his Royal Highness on the subject of this application, has arrived at the conclusion, that with a view to meet the case of Captain Jervis, it is desirable to make such arrangements in mitigation of the sentence on that officer, and in deference to the recommendation to mercy by the court martial, as may be equivalent to permitting him to sell his commission as if he were an officer in one of the purchase regiments in the British Army.

His Royal Highness has expressed his concurrence in this proposition, and I am to request that should Sir Stafford Northcote see no reason to dissent from it, you will move him to cause the necessary arrangements to be made accordingly.

I am, &c.
(signed) *E. Lugard.*

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

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Major General *T. T. Pears* to the Under Secretary of State for War.

India Office, 24 May 1867.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, forwarding a letter from Captain Jervis of the 106th Regiment, and stating that Sir John Pakington having been in communication with his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, on the subject of that officer's application, has arrived at the conclusion that with a view to meet his case, it is desirable to make such arrangements in mitigation of his sentence, and in deference to the recommendation to mercy by the court martial, as may be equivalent to permitting him to sell his commission, as if he were an officer in one of the purchase regiments in the British army, and requesting

ing that in the event of Sir Stafford Northcote concurring in this view, he will cause the necessary arrangements to be made accordingly.

2. In reply, I am desired to state, that as far as Sir Stafford Northcote has been made acquainted with the present position of Captain Jervis, that officer has been sentenced by court martial in India to be dismissed the service, but with a recommendation to mercy, and that the sentence has been confirmed by the Commander in Chief in India, but that effect has not yet been given to the sentence in this country, either by its publication in the "Gazette," or by the removal of Captain Jervis's name from the regiment in the Official Army List.

3. Captain Jervis, although he retained, on transfer to the 106th Foot, a prospective claim to pension under India rules, is not yet entitled under those rules to any pension, having entered the army as recently as 1856, but I am desired to state, that should the sentence of the court martial be carried out, and this officer be removed from the service, the Secretary of State in Council will be prepared, on the recommendation of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State for War, to grant him from Indian Revenues a sum equivalent to the selling value of his commission.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. T. Pears*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State for War.

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The Under Secretary of State for War to the Under Secretary of State for India.

Sir, War Office, 7 June 1867.

WITH reference to your letter of the 24th ult., relative to the case of Captain Jervis, 106th Regiment, I am directed by Secretary Sir John Pakington to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Military Secretary to the Field Marshal Commander in Chief.

Sir John Pakington, with the concurrence of Sir Stafford Northcote, proposes to agree to the recommendation of his Royal Highness.

I am, &c.
(signed) *E. Lugard.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

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(Enclosure.)

"Sir, "Horse Guards, 5 June 1867.

"With reference to your letter of the 29th ultimo, and to previous correspondence on the case of Captain Jervis, 106th Regiment, I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State, that his Royal Highness proposes to give effect to the sentence of dismissal passed on that officer by the general court martial which sat on his trial at Simla last year.

"But with reference to the recommendation of the Court in Captain Jervis's favour, and to the peculiar circumstances of the case, his Royal Highness desires me to suggest that a sum equivalent to the full value of his commission, viz. 1,800 *l.*, may be granted him.

"On receiving your reply to this communication, measures will be immediately taken for succeeding Captain Jervis in the 106th Regiment.

"I have, &c.
(signed) "*W. F. Forster.*"

"The Under Secretary of State,
"&c. &c. &c.
"War Office."

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Major General *T. T. Pears* to the Under Secretary of State for War.

Sir, India Office, S.W., 8 June 1867.

1. I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th June, enclosing, with reference to a letter from this Office dated the 24th May (No. 306 W. 1835), copy of a letter from the Horse Guards, in which his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief suggests that a sum equivalent to the value of his commission, viz., 1,800 *l.*, should be granted to Captain Jervis, H.M.'s 106th Regt., and stating that Sir John Pakington, with the concurrence of Sir Stafford Northcote, proposes to agree to the proposal of his Royal Highness.

2. In reply, I am directed to acquaint you that Sir Stafford Northcote concurs in the course proposed, and I am to request that Captain Jervis may be informed that the sum of 1,800 *l.* will be paid to him on application at this Office.

I am, &c.
(signed) *T. T. Pears*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State
for War.

# SIMLA COURT MARTIAL.

COPIES of a DESPATCH of 17th January 1867, from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to the Commander in Chief in *India*, relative to the SIMLA COURT MARTIAL, with the Answer thereto; and, of CORRESPONDENCE between the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for *India*, relative to the proposed GRANT to Captain *Jervis* of the Price of his Commission.

(*Mr. Brett.*)

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
22 *July* 1867.

[*Price* 6*d.*]

464—I. *Under* 8 *oz.*

# EAST INDIA (EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 25 July 1867;—*for*,

"COPIES of the Series of MINUTES, REPORTS, DESPATCHES, and other DOCUMENTS relating to the Strength, Composition, Distribution, and Description of TROOPS, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Increase of the formed and Decrease of the latter, considered to be required for the Internal Defence and Permanent Occupation of *India*, as well as for successful resistance against External Aggression, recorded by Lord *William Bentinck*, Governor General of *India*, between 1830 and 1835:"

"Of MINUTES* on the same subject by Sir *Charles Metcalfe*, both as Governor General and as Member of the Supreme Council, by Messrs. *Prinsep, Ross, Blunt*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Morison*, as Members of the Supreme Council, and of the Governors and Commanders in Chief of *Madras* and *Bombay*:"

"ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, Regular and Irregular, of every Description, such as Contingents, Subsidiary Forces, Frontier Forces, Local Corps, &c., distinguishing the European and Native, Regulars and Irregulars, as also the Arms and Grades, viz., Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File, and showing the Divisions of *India* to which belonging, the Stations at which severally located, and whether employed on actual Service on the 1st day of May 1837, 1st day of May 1847, 1st day of May 1857, and at the latest Date for which Returns are available:"

"Separate RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades serving on the 1st day of May 1857, and at the latest date, in those Territories which, on the 1st day of May 1837, were not under the direct Authority of the Government of *India*:"

"And, STATEMENT of the AREA and POPULATION of the several TERRITORIES acquired by the British Government between the 1st day of May 1837 and the 1st day of May 1857, and since that Date."

* So far as can be found.

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*Note.*—Where dates for the Returns different from those called for have been given, Returns for the 1st of May have not been available.

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India Office,
13 March 1868.

T. T. PEARS,
Major General, Military Secretary.

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(*Mr. Henry Seymour.*)

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*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
1 *August* 1867.

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# PAPERS

RELATING TO

# EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS

## (EAST INDIA).

LETTER from the Governor General of India, in Council, dated 9 August 1834.

WE have the honour to submit, in this Despatch, a Minute, with various memoranda and statements, recorded by the Right Honourable the Governor General, containing a full exposition of his Lordship's sentiments on the important question of re-organising the Indian Army. Cons., 9 Aug. 1834. Nos. 1 to 6.

2. While the plan submitted by the Governor General is calculated to improve the efficiency of the army, particularly in its infantry and cavalry branches, it will at the same time effect a considerable immediate, and a large prospective reduction of our military expenditure.

| Immediate Saving. | Rs. | a. | p. | Rs. | a. | p. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 5,25,055 | 10 | – | | | |
| Cavalry | 4,33,445 | 10 | – | | | |
| Artillery | 4,22,869 | 9 | – | | | |
| Total immediate Saving | | | | 13,81,370 | 13 | – |

| Prospective Saving. | Rs. | a. | p. | Rs. | a | p. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 29,89,452 | 1 | – | | | |
| Cavalry | 10,63,337 | 6 | – | | | |
| Artillery | 6,45,952 | 8 | 6 | | | |
| Total prospective Saving | | | | 46,98,741 | 15 | 6 |
| Grand Total per Annum | | | | 60,80,112 | 12 | 6 |

3. Without increasing or decreasing the total numerical strength as at present established, it is simply proposed to raise the complement of each regiment of infantry from 640 to 800 privates, and of cavalry from 420 to 600 troopers, both retaining their present organisation, the former of eight companies, and the latter of six troops, per regiment.

4. The number of regiments of the proposed complement required to give the total numerical strength of the army as it now exists, in infantry and cavalry, or nearly so, would be—

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal | 60 | 7 |
| Madras | 42 | 5 |
| Bombay | 21 | 2 |
| | 123 | 14 |

leaving to be reduced in

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal | 14 | 3 |
| Madras | 10 | 3 |
| Bombay | 5 | 1 |
| | 29 | 7 |

| | Infantry. | | Cavalry. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Present. | Fuure. | Present. | Future. |
| Bengal | 74 | 60 | 420 | 600 |
| | 640 | 800 | 10 | 7 |
| | 47,360 | 48,000 | 4,200 | 4,200 |
| Madras | 52 | 42 | 420 | 600 |
| | 640 | 800 | 8 | 5 |
| | 33,280 | 33,600 | 3,360 | 3,000 |
| Bombay | 26 | 21 | 420 | 600 |
| | 640 | 800 | 3 | 2 |
| | 16,640 | 16,800 | 1,260 | 1,200 |

5. The Governor General further proposes that the privates of the reduced corps shall be drafted to complete the establishment of the regiments retained; that the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers be borne as supernumeraries on the strength of the army at large, to be absorbed as casualties occur; and that the European officers be considered as forming so many skeleton corps, their promotion continuing as if their regiments still existed, but, for the purpose of duty, being attached to such of the effective regiments as Government might direct. No young officers would be posted to these skeleton corps, and the plan suggested in Colonel Salmond's reply to Mr. Villiers, dated 2nd of October 1832, might, in his Lordship's opinion, be

employed with advantage in effecting the prospective saving at an earlier period.

6. With regard to the Artillery, the Governor General submits, that the same principle upon which it is proposed to re-model the infantry and cavalry, be applied to this arm likewise; the detail of the measure will be found contained in his Lordship's memorandum upon the Artillery at the three Presi- Packet No. 10. dencies, one of the numbers in the packet.

7. The alterations which will be effected in the Artillery by the proposed arrangement, are as follows:

HORSE ARTILLERY.

BENGAL.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates: | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Brigades of 3 European and 1 Native Troop each: | | 2 Brigades of 3 European and 1 Native Troop each: | |
| 9 Troops, European, of 80 Gunners each | 720 | 6 European Troops, of 100 Gunners each | 600 |
| 3 Ditto, Native, of 90 Privates each | 270 | 2 Native ditto, of 100 Privates each | 200 |
| 12 Ditto, making a Total of Gunners and Privates | 990 | 8 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates | 800 |

8. The reduction will consist of one brigade, that is, of three European troops and one Native.

MADRAS.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates: | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Brigades, 1 of 4 Troops of Europeans, and 1 of 2 Troops of Natives: | | 1 Brigade of 4 European Troops: | |
| 4 Troops, European, 84 Gunners each | 336 | 4 European Troops, of 100 Gunners each | 400 |
| 2 Ditto, Native, 84 Privates each | 168 | | |
| 6 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates | 504 | | 400 |

9. There will be a reduction of one brigade of European officers, and of two roops of Natives; it is universally admitted that the low stature and inferior strength of the Madras Sepoy totally unfit him for this arm.

BOMBAY.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates: | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Brigade of 4 European Troops: | | 1 Brigade of 4 European Troops: | |
| 4 Troops, European, 80 Gunners each | 320 | 4 European Troops, 100 Gunners each | 400 |

10. There will thus be a diminution of 120 European Artillerymen in the Bengal Horse Artillery, which will be more than met by the increase at—

| | |
|---|---|
| Madras | 64 |
| Bombay | 80 |
| | 144 |

11. With respect to the Foot Artillery, a modification of the existing organisation has been suggested to, and approved by, his Lordship, as referred to Packet No. 7. in his Minute, it is proposed that each battalion shall be organised after the manner of the Bengal Horse Artillery, of three companies of Europeans, and two of Natives, the two companies of Natives having the same complement of officers as one company of European Foot Artillery, and one troop of Native Horse Artillery.

12. The advantage of this plan is, that the Europeans and Natives will always act together; and to those who are of opinion (an opinion from which the

the Governor General totally dissents), that this powerful weapon should never be entrusted to Natives, it will be satisfactory that the great majority of each battalion is European.

13. Uniformity also in the constitution of the Foot Artillery at the three Presidencies will be thus introduced.

FOOT ARTILLERY.

BENGAL.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates: | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: | | 6 Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 20 Companies, European, 80 Gunners each | 1,600 | 18 European Companies, 100 Gunners each | 1,800 |
| Battalions of 8 Native Companies each: | | | |
| 16 Companies, Native, 104 Privates each | | | |
| 7 Battalions, 36 Cos., | | Total of | 3,000 |
| 3 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: | | Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 12 Companies, European, 100 Gunners each | 960 | 9 European Companies, 100 Gunners each | 900 |
| 1 Battalion of 6 Native Companies: | | | |
| 6 Companies, Native, 92 Privates each | 552 | 6 Native Companies, 100 Privates each | 600 |
| 4—18, making a Total of | 1,512 | 3—15, making a Total of | 1,500 |

BOMBAY.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Battalions of 4 European Companies each: | | 2 Battalions of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 8 Companies, European, of 80 Gunners each | 640 | 6 European Companies, 100 Gunners each | 600 |
| 1 Battalion of 8 Native Companies: | | | |
| 8 Companies, Native, of 70 Privates each | 560 | 4 Native Companies, 100 Privates each | 400 |
| 3—16, making a Total of | 1,200 | 2—10, making a Total of | 1,000 |

14. In Bengal there will be an increase of 200 Europeans in the Foot Artillery, in Madras a decrease of 60, and in Bombay of 40.

15. The total number will then stand as follows, leaving five skeleton corps of Artillery officers to be prospectively reduced under the operation of the same principle as proposed for the infantry and cavalry.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

| Present: | | Proposed: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 Brigades of | 22 Troops. | 4 Brigades of | 16 Troops. |
| 14 Battalions of | 70 Companies. | 11 Battalions of | 55 Companies. |
| 20 | 92 | 15 | 71 |
| Europeans | 4,576 | Europeans | 4,700 |
| Natives | 3,214 | Natives | 2,400 |
| TOTAL | 7,790 | TOTAL | 7,100 |

16. As respects the Horse Artillery in Bengal, the Governor General suggests an immediate saving, without awaiting the result of this reference, to the extent of 1,07,244 rupees per annum, by reducing the number of guns with each troop to the scale specified in his Lordship's Minute. As this measure appears judicious and cannot in any way affect the organisation of the corps, either as it

it is at present or may hereafter be constituted, we shall consider it our duty to give early effect to the suggestion.

Packets, No. 8, 9, and 10.

17. Separate memoranda and statements, explanatory of the grounds of the proposed reductions, and exhibiting the financial results in each branch, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, form numbers in the packet. To these documents we solicit the particular attention of your Honourable Court, they are so full and explicit as leave us nothing to add to the information they contain.

Packet No. 11.

18. Colonel Morrison being of opinion that the arrangements submitted in this Despatch are injudicious, as reducing the number of corps in each arm below what, in his judgment, the public interest require should be maintained, has r[illegible]ed his sentiments on the subject at considerable length in a minut[illegible] whi[illegible] in the packet.

[illegible]tion which Colonel Morrison [illegible] [illegible]ery consideration, as [illegible] has re[illegible] [illegible]cer of his long receive[illegible] [illegible]hem, we deem experience a[illegible] it necessary merely [illegible]t of the minute, in which an apprehension is [illegible] the Native officers, commissioned and non-commissio[illegible] reduced, into those intended to be increased in strength, [illegible]ate dissatisfaction among the troops, his Lordship has it [illegible]pose a plan for obviating this objection. The same opportunity [illegible] for considering Colonel Morrison's remarks upon the organisation of th[illegible]ery.

---

(Military Department.)

MINUTE by the Governor General.

I HAVE the honour to lay before Council a plan for imp[illegible]ng the efficiency of the Indian Army, and of effecting at the same time so[illegible] immediate and a large prospective reduction of our military expenditure.

Appendix No. 1.

It is simply proposed, without interfering with the constitution of regiments of infantry or cavalry, as fixed by the Court, and without increasing or decreasing the total numerical strength of the army, to raise the complement of each regiment of infantry from 640 privates to 800, which latter number had been the average peace establishment of all the Presidencies for many years, and in the cavalry from 420 to 600 troopers; I have no data to which I can immediately refer for the exact strength of regiments in each period of peace, but as far as I am informed, the amount has never been below 750 men a regiment in the infantry and 540 in the cavalry. This process will have the effect of leaving without men the following number of corps in the three Presidencies:

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal | 14 | 3 |
| Madras | 10 | 3 |
| Bombay | 5 | 1 |
| | 29 | 7 |

and I propose that these corps shall be reduced, transferring the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as supernumeraries, to be absorbed by vacancies in the army at large, and allowing the European officers of each regiment to remain a distinct body, obtaining their promotion as before, but doing duty with the other effective regiments of the army.

In the Artillery the same process has been followed, care being taken not to disturb the European part of the organisation; but as there exists considerable dissimilarity in the formation of the Native branch in the three armies, I have introduced

introduced an uniformity of system by taking as an example the constitution, under the Court's sanction, of the Horse Artillery in Bengal, where the European and Native troops are united in one brigade. The same principle has been adopted for the construction of the battalions, and the idea not being my own, I may venture to pronounce it a very great improvement.

The saving, immediate and prospective, will be as follows—

Immediate Saving:

| | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 5,25,055 | 10 | – | | | | App. Nos. 5 to 8, Infantry Mem. |
| Cavalry | 4,33,445 | 10 | – | | | | App. to Cav. Mem. |
| Artillery | 4,22,869 | 9 | – | | | | App. No. 3, Art. Mem. |
| Total Immediate Saving | | | | 13,81,370 | 13 | – | |

Prospective Saving:

| | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 29,89,452 | 1 | – | | | | App. Nos. 5 to 8, Infantry Mem. |
| Cavalry | 10,63,337 | 6 | – | | | | App. to Cav. Mem. |
| Artillery | 6,45,952 | 8 | 6 | | | | App. No. 3, Art. Mem. |
| Total Prospective Saving | | | | 46,98,741 | 15 | 6 | |
| Grand Total per Annum | | | *Rs.* | 60,80,112 | 12 | 6 | |

The preceding propositions require the sanction of the Honourable Court prior to their execution. But there is a saving of some amount, independent of the plan I have proposed, which I would recommend to be carried into immediate effect, and that is, to reduce the number of guns with each troop of Horse Artillery within the Provinces under the Bengal Presidency; those at Meerut, Muttra, and Cawnpore to four guns each, and the troop at Dum Dum to two guns, leaving the troops which are on or beyond the frontier, viz., at Loodianah, Kurnaul, Neemuch, and Mhow to retain their full complement. This plan has, in part, been adopted by the Madras Government, at the recommendation of Mr. Lushington, and has been approved by the Court. It may perhaps appear practicable to Sir Frederick Adam to extend it further; the immediate saving will amount to 1,07,244 rupees per annum. Appendix No. 2.

By this reduction of guns there will be disposable the horses by which they were drawn, amounting to 400. It strikes me that these horses might be transferred to the cavalry in Bengal, and an equal number of the next year's re-mounts from the Bengal stud might be allotted to the cavalry in Madras and Bombay. Estimating these horses at the moderate value of 450 rupees per horse, there will be a diminution of expenditure in the purchase of horses of about two lacs of rupees.

Colonel Morrison has suggested to me the great advantage of substituting a proportion of camels for horses for the service of the Horse Artillery in Upper India. In the open sandy plains between the Sutledge and Indus, where the communications are heavy and difficult, the transport of a part of the ammunition on the backs of animals would always be useful, and occasionally of the first importance. It would also be the substitution of a very cheap for a very dear conveyance. I have requested Colonel Morrison to prepare a paper with the details, and I have begged him also, at the same time, to give an opinion whether the establishment of horses allotted to a troop of Horse Artillery is not more than sufficient. Appendix No. 2.

A separate Memorandum, with statements explanatory of the grounds of the proposed reductions, and exhibiting the financial results in each branch, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, is hereunto annexed.

(signed) *W. E. Bentinck.*

Ootacamund, 23 July ~~1834~~ 1834.

## Appendix, No. 1.

MEMORANDUM of the Reduction in the Number of Combatants, exclusive of Commissioned Officers, European and Native which will be occasioned by the proposed Organization of the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

| | EUROPEANS. | | | | | NATIVES. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Serjeants. | Corporals. | Bombardiers and Drummers. | Privates or Gunners. | TOTAL. | Havildars. | Naicks. | Drummers or Trumpeters. | Privates. | TOTAL. | GRAND TOTAL. |
| **Bengal:** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillery - Horse | 29 | 19 | 48 | 120 | 216 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 70 | 88 | 304 |
| Artillery - Foot | 15 | 10 | 24 | – | 49 | 35 | 35 | 10 | 464 | 542 | 591 |
| Native Cavalry | 6 | – | – | – | 6 | 81 | 75 | 42 | – | 198 | 204 |
| Ditto Infantry | 20 | – | – | – | 20 | 400 | 400 | 180 | – | 980 | 1,000 |
| **Madras:** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillery - Horse | 10 | – | – | – | 10 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 168 | 206 | 216 |
| Artillery - Foot | 26 | 21 | 36 | 60 | 143 | – | – | – | – | – | 143 |
| Native Cavalry | 6 | – | – | – | 6 | 93 | 72 | 78 | 360 | 603 | 609 |
| Ditto Infantry | 20 | – | – | – | 20 | 400 | 400 | 180 | – | 980 | 1,000 |
| **Bombay:** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillery - Horse | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Artillery - Foot | 12 | 10 | 24 | 40 | 86 | 26 | 25 | 10 | 160 | 221 | 307 |
| Native Cavalry | 2 | – | – | – | 2 | 30 | 24 | 24 | 60 | 138 | 140 |
| Ditto Infantry | 10 | – | – | – | 10 | 200 | 200 | 90 | – | 490 | 500 |
| Total Reduction | | | | | 568 | – | – | – | – | 4,446 | 5,014 |
| Deduct Increase: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bengal Foot Artillery | | | | 200 | | – | – | – | – | | |
| Ditto Native Infantry | | | | – | | – | – | – | 640 | | |
| Madras Horse Artillery | | | | 64 | | – | – | – | – | | |
| Ditto Native Infantry | | | | – | | – | – | – | 320 | | |
| Bombay Horse Artillery | | | | 80 | | – | – | – | – | | |
| Ditto Native Infantry | | | | – | | – | – | – | 160 | | |
| | | | | | 344 | | | | | 1,120 | 1,464 |
| Net Reduction of Combatants | | | | | 224 | – | – | – | – | 3,326 | 3,550 |

## Appendix, No. 2.

SUPPOSING the distribution of the Horse Artillery to remain as it is as present, the following modification regarding the ordnance is suggested for consideration: —

BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | troop at Loodianah | each, 6 pieces | | 6 |
| 1 | „ at Kurnaul | „ 6 „ | | 6 |
| 1 | „ at Neemuch | „ 6 „ | | 6 |
| 1 | „ at Mhow | „ 6 „ | | 6 |
| 4 | „ at Meerut | „ 4 „ | | 16 |
| 1 | „ at Muttra | „ 4 „ | | 4 |
| 2 | „ at Cawnpore | „ 4 „ | | 8 |
| 1 | „ at Dum Dum | „ 2 „ | | 2 |
| 12 | | | Take | 54 |
| | | | From | 72 |
| | | | | 18 |

The complement of horses allotted to a gun in Bengal is—

| | |
|---|---|
| For the gun | 14 |
| For its waggon | 8 |
| | 22 |

Therefore the reduction of 18 pieces of ordnance with their attached waggons would admit of a reduction of the number of horses in the whole corps, amounting to 396. The expense of each horse, including his equipments, amounts monthly to *Rs.* 20. 12. The expense, in point of horses, therefore for one gun would be $20\frac{3}{4} \times 22 = 456\frac{1}{2}$ per month and for 18 guns 8,217 rupees per month, or 9,860 rupees per year.

For one gun, independent of wear and tear, the expense is

| | |
|---|---|
| Tar and grease | |
| Two spare waggons | |
| One ca[illegible] | |
| For one G[illegible] | |
| For 18 Guns | |
| Ditto - per | |

For Shoeing -
For Repairs of th
For Horse-keep
For Grass C
For Feed
For

The artificers allowed for a troop of si[illegible]upees per month, the proportion for one gun, say 10 rupees, her[illegible] 18 guns 180 rupees per month, or 2,100 rupees per annum.

The saving per annum therefore would amount to—

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| In horses | 98,604 |
| In guns | 6,480 |
| In establishment | 2,160 |
| Per Annum - - - *Rs.* | 107,244 |

In the purchase of horses likewise it may be considered that the saving o an immediate outlay would be the effect of the proposed measure, as it would leave 400 horses disposable, which, being valued at 450 rupees each, is equal to 1,80,000 rupees.

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

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(No. 2.)

MEMORANDUM on the Regular Native Infantry.

THE regular infantry of the armies of the three Presidencies consists of 152 regular regiments, each regiment formed into 8 companies of 80 men, or 640 privates.

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Bengal - | 74 |
| Madras - | 52 |
| Bombay | 26 |
| *Rs.* | 152 |

This constitution of the army was probably recommended by two considerations:

First. The establishment of officers as it stood at the conclusion of the war was thereby retained, and individual interests protected and saved.

Secondly. The skeleton of a war establishment complete in commissioned and non-commissioned officers, European and Native, was preserved, which might be filled up to any extent, and a large and effective force could be thus furnished for immediate service.

In England, similar considerations have generally, at the conclusion of a war, had their influence upon the extent of the peace establishment; but this reasoning and practice, so just at home, has been most erroneously applied to the British dominions in India. In Europe, war may break out of a sudden, the contending parties are generally in close proximity, and the greatest state of preparation may be required both for attack and defence, as the first successes often lead to important results.

In India, on the contrary, as will be hereafter explained, when the distribution of the army is considered, there is not within the large sphere controlled our paramount authority a single chief possessing any military power ; and with regard to the substantive States on this side of the Indus our western, northern, and eastern frontiers, they are utterly ny offensive aggression, which one-fourth of our army would not

which our dominion can be endangered are far distant; a, or beyond it; and timely notice must always be A military organisation, therefore, formed upon lways ready to meet the attack of enemies as lled for; while the e which it entails on our inadequat and further, of extr ipment and n a state o to appear that its present co stitution of of privates, is totally incompatible with regiment separately, and the army colnds of any exigency requiring even the ns.

Appendix No. 1. Hereunto [illegible] prepared by the Adjutant General of the Bengal Army, from the [illegible]s in 1833, showing the disposable force that could be collected upon an emergency from the principal stations of the Bengal army, after providing all the guards required for the head quarters of corps, sick, baggage, &c. Two periods have been taken, the 1st of January when all the men were present; the 1st of August when the usual proportion* were absent on furlough. Those corps at distant out-stations in the several divisions are excluded. This statement presents the following curious results, that 45 regiments of Native Infantry, consisting of their full establishment, 31,320 drummers, rank and file, could only furnish in the first period a disposable force of 16,833, or not more than one-half; and in the second, of only 13,213. No officer coming to India for the first time can look at a return from any of the greatest stations of the army, without perfect astonishment at the multitude of men and guards that are on duty. He has seen nothing to be compared to it in Europe. No doubt the indulgence, or abuse as it may be more properly called, of complying with requisitions for guards from officers, civil and military, whether for the sake of consequence, or upon the plea of protection to public and private property, had been carried to a very unjustifiable length; but during the last few years my two immediate predecessors in command and myself had very much limited the practice; and it is subsequently to these revisions and reductions that the Adjutant General's statement has been prepared.

This great demand for the employment of Native troops is easily explained by the peculiarities of the Indian service. In this country of universal poverty, where the local resources are totally inadequate to the supply of any emergent large demand, the troops are necessarily surrounded by establishments (of course upon a minor scale) as if they were in the field. At every one of

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* *Bengal.*—From corps in the Presidency, Saugor and Sirhind Divisions, and in the Malwah, Meywar, and Rajpootana Forces, 15 privates per troop or company, and from all other stations, 10 per troop or company, with a due proportion of native officers. Six months in each year is the average period during which furlough is granted, generally commencing in April, and ending in October.

*Madras.*—From each corps, 4 men per troop or company. To men belonging to the Provinces within the Madras Presidency, from January to the end of August, and to the Purdesees to the end of October.

*Bombay.*—From each corps, 5 men per troop or company throughout the year.

The native soldier throughout the Madras and Bombay armies receives the same scale of pay when on furlough as when present with his corps. A deduction is made from the Bengal soldier when on furlough, to the following amount:—Monthly, subadar, 15 rupees; semadar, 7-8 rupees; havildar, naick, or drummer, 5 rupees, and sepoy, 1-8 rupees.

of the large stations mentioned in the statement there are Government establishments of all kinds, commissariat, ordnance, magazines, public cattle, pay-office, bazaars, and other deposits of public property requiring protection, and their separate guards. The largeness of the country, its perfectly open state, the extent of jungle, and the large bands of dacoits, against whose attacks effectual means of resistance must always be at hand, require that all detachments going with treasure, or any other escort, should be large and efficient. The distance intervening also between stations is a cause of great delay in the return of such detachments to their head quarters. When, also, European troops are upon their march, with their vast amount of baggage, sick, and followers, which are exclusively protected by the Native troops, the calls of the service are very great. It is unnecessary to observe that the head quarters and staff of a large and small regiment have precisely the same regimental guards. It may also be noticed that, in many of the great cantonments, and none more than at Barrackpore, the Native infantry are extremely harassed by their duties. This effect might be in some degree remedied by a greater concentration of the force; but the main cause lies in the small establishment of privates in each corps, which leaves so small a surplus for general service, after providing for all duties of a regimental and local nature. The remark is scarcely necessary, that no greater political error can be committed than that of imposing upon the sepoy during peace excessive duty, or by tormenting him with an overstrained system of drill and discipline, which too frequently occurs. Under this hot sun the Native character, like that of the European, is disposed to inertness. The comparative slightness and weakness of the human frame in these latitudes are the best proofs of the enervating effects of the climate, particularly in Bengal proper; and with the view, that always should be uppermost, of providing the best possible security for the allegiance of the Native army, in their contentment and happiness, care should be taken when estimating the total amount of force required, that the ordinary duty should never fall hard upon the [redacted]. We may then be assured, when the hour of trial and extra exertion [redacted] that this indulgence, or rather just consideration, will be amply repaid.

The operation in Coorg appeared to me at the time likely to furnish a practical example of the correctness or otherwise of many of the preceding remarks; and, with a view to this object, I requested Sir Robert O'Callaghan to preserve for me the weekly states of each regiment during the progress of the campaign. The results afford the strongest illustration of the inconveniences of weak battalions, and show the very small proportion contrasted with the total strength, which, after deductions made for absentees from sickness or guards, remain for actual encounter with the enemy. The campaign lasted only seven weeks. The troops were very healthy, and the confined theatre of Coorg precluded the necessity of those numerous and distant detachments which are required in the ordinarily protracted and extensive course of Indian warfare.

The Return shows,—

1st. The total of the force. Appendix, No. 2.
2nd. The present and absent of the whole force. Appendix, No. 4.
3rd. The present and absent of two regiments, taken indiscriminately, each of which, it may be remarked, had 90 men more than its complement. Appendix, No. 3.

From these statements it appears that the two regiments separately, and the whole force collectively, did not in any one week bring much more than one-half of their numbers into the field. In one of the weeks the amount was less than one-half. In the fifth week hostilities had terminated. The troops passed the Coorg frontier on the 2nd of April, and the Rajah gave himself up on the 12th of May. It is easy to conceive to what skeletons the whole of the regiments would have been reduced if the war had continued, and had been attended with the usual accompaniments of hard work, hard fare, and hard fighting.

I venture, therefore, to think that the inefficiency of the Native army, as at present constituted, has been indisputably proved, and it now becomes me to offer an opinion as to the best mode of correcting this defect. The complaint is not that the army is not sufficiently numerous, but that it is so organised as

to create unnecessarily an excessive multiplication of guards and duties, which reduce the disposable numbers of every regiment to so low a scale as to leave no effective force for any particular exigency. The obvious remedy would be to reform the present weak and inefficient regiments into a lesser number of large ones; and in order to do this without adding to the present numerical force of the army, it would be only necessary to reduce so many entire corps, the privates of which would exactly complete the remaining regiments to the proposed increased establishment of each.

The question then arises, what is the proper establishment for a regiment in peace and war, due regard being had to the circumstances peculiar to the Indian Service, so different from that of Europe. I have no hesitation in fixing that amount at 1,000 privates in peace, and 1,200 in war. Napoleon's establishment for a corps was 960 privates, formed into eight companies, which was calculated to give 800 men in the field. In India, the same strength would not give at first, according to preceding statements, anything like the same amount, which a continuation of the service would still greatly diminish. There are different formations of a regiment into more or less companies. I shall reserve my opinion upon this question till I come to consider the *composition* of the armies of the three Presidencies.

But though I have thought it right to state what appears to me to constitute the most suitable and efficient establishment, I am quite aware that so great and sudden a change would be productive of great inconvenience, and I would therefore recommend, as a first and immediate measure, that the strength of Native infantry regiments should be augmented from 640 to 800* privates per regiment. This formation would make the following reduction of entire regiments in the three armies:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal | - - - - - - | 14 regiments. |
| Madras | - - - - - - | 10 „ |
| Bombay | - - - - - - | 5 „ |

Appendix, Nos. 5 to 8.

The financial result of this plan of more efficient organisation offers, as per annexed Statements, an immediate saving of about five lacs, and a prospective one of about thirty. The principle of not injuring the interests of any of the officers, Native and European, has been adopted; the Native officers to retain their present rank and pay, and being attached to the army generally, to be admitted on the strength as vacancies may occur. The European officers to be considered as forming so many skeleton corps, their promotion continuing as if their regiments still existed, but, for the purposes of duty, being attached to such of the effective regiments as Government might direct; to these skeleton corps no young officers would in future be posted, and the plan suggested in Colonel Salmond's reply to Mr. Villiers, dated 2nd October 1832, might be advantageously employed to reduce the expense at an early period. I may return to this point hereafter.

Ootacamund,
23 July 1834.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

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* *Note.*—During both the periods of peace, prior to the Mahratta and Burmese wars, each regiment of Native infantry in Bengal consisted of 10 companies of 80 men, or 800 privates. The present formation of eight companies is much to be preferred.

The Peace establishment of a regiment on the Madras Establishment, from 1814 to 1828, has varied from 750 to 850 men.

| *Bengal.* | | *Madras.* | | *Bombay.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Present. | Future. | Present. | Future. | Present. | Future. |
| 74<br>640 | 60<br>800 | 52<br>640 | 42<br>800 | 26<br>640 | 21<br>800 |
| 47,360 | 48,000 | 33,280 | 33,600 | 16,640 | 16,800 |

## Appendix, No. 1.

STATEMENT showing the disposable Force that could have been collected from each of the large Stations of the Army on the 1st January and 1st August 1833; the Head Quarters of Corps, Sick, Baggage, &c. remaining at Head Quarters of Stations.

| | | 1st January 1833. | | | | | | | | 1st August 1833. | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Europeans. | | | | Native Commissioned Officers. | Europeans and Natives. | | | Europeans. | | | | Native Commissioned Officers. | Europeans and Natives. | | |
| | | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Medical Officers. | | Serjeants and Havildars. | Drummers, Rank and File. | | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Medical Officers. | | Serjeants and Havildars. | Drummers, Rank and File. | |
| Barrackpore | 4 regiments Native Infantry | – | 7 | 11 | 3 | 39 | 85 | 1,115 | Barrackpore – 6th Regiment Native Infantry | – | 11 | 19 | 4 | 45 | 86 | 1,249 | |
| Dum Dum | 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 69 | Dum Dum – 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 55 | |
| | 6 companies of European Foot Artillery | 3 | 3 | 19 | 4 | – | 25 | 330 | 6 companies European Foot Artillery | 2 | 4 | 23 | 4 | – | 26 | 312 | |
| | 7 – ditto – of Native Foot Artillery | – | – | – | – | 16 | 24 | 270 | 7 – ditto – Native Foot Artillery | – | – | – | – | 14 | 18 | 195 | |
| Berhampore | A detail of Native Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | 28 | Berhampore – A detail of Native Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | 28 | |
| | 1 regiment European Infantry | 1 | 2 | 12 | 1 | – | 37 | 540 | 1 regiment European Infantry | 1 | 3 | 11 | 1 | – | 38 | 540 | |
| | 1 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 3 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 25 | 382 | 1 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 2 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 11 | 221 | |
| Dinapore | 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | 4 | 66 | Dinapore – 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 5 | 61 | |
| | Honourable Company's European Regiment | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | – | 36 | 566 | Honourable Company's European Regiment | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | – | 35 | 550 | |
| | 2 regiments Native Infantry | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 15 | 27 | 364 | 2 regiments Native Infantry | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 14 | 27 | 485 | |
| Benares | 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | 54 | Benares – 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | 56 | |
| | 2½ regiments of Native Infantry | 1 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 26 | 45 | 724 | 2½ regiments Native Infantry | 2 | 3 | 12 | 2 | 17 | 36 | 510 | |
| Allahabad | 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 4 | 69 | Allahabad – 1 company European Foot Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | – | 4 | 68 | |
| | 1½ regiment Native Infantry | – | 3 | 7 | 1 | 15 | 30 | 433 | 1½ regiment Native Infantry | – | 4 | 7 | 1 | 14 | 35 | 474 | |
| Cawnpore | 2 troops Horse Artillery | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 64 | Cawnpore – 2 troops Horse Artillery | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 157 | |
| | 3 companies European and 7 companies Native Foot Artillery | 2 | 3 | 16 | 2 | – | 10 | 138 | 3 companies European and 7 companies Native Foot Artillery | 3 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 173 | |
| | | | | | | | 19 | 242 | | | | | | | 17 | 315 | |
| | 1 regiment European Lancers | 1 | 4 | 13 | 1 | – | 40 | 430 | 1 regiment of Lancers | 1 | 6 | 6 | 1 | – | 41 | 406 | |
| | 2 – ditto – Native Cavalry | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 21 | 43 | 740 | 2 – ditto – of Native Cavalry | – | 2 | 9 | 2 | 18 | 30 | 517 | |
| | 1 – ditto – European Infantry | 3 | 5 | 22 | 2 | – | 40 | 670 | 1 – ditto – European Infantry | 1 | 4 | 20 | 2 | – | 41 | 656 | |
| | 3 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 3 | 14 | 1 | 36 | 84 | 1,086 | 3 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 4 | 5 | 2 | 28 | 69 | 1,049 | |
| Lucknow | A detail Native Foot Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | 2 | 57 | Lucknow – A detail Native Foot Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | 4 | 52 | |
| | 2 regiments Native Infantry | 1 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 24 | 55 | 708 | 2 regiments Native Infantry | 1 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 22 | 53 | 610 | |
| Meerut | 4 troops Horse Artillery | 1 | 6 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 12 | 184 | Meerut – 4 troops Horse Artillery | – | 2 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 287 | |
| | 1 company European Foot Artillery | | | | | | 15 | 206 | 1 company European Foot Artillery | | | | | | 3 | 61 | |
| | 1 Dragoon Regiment | 1 | 8 | 16 | 2 | – | 45 | 441 | 1 Dragoon Regiment | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | – | 40 | 438 | |
| | 1 regiment Native Cavalry | 1 | – | 7 | 1 | 10 | 21 | 355 | 1 regiment Native Cavalry | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 18 | 261 | |
| | 1 – ditto – European Infantry | 1 | 5 | 15 | 1 | – | 36 | 647 | 1 – ditto – European Infantry | 1 | 4 | 12 | 1 | – | 35 | 600 | |
| | 3 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 6 | 13 | 2 | 34 | 60 | 988 | 3 – ditto – Native Infantry | – | 5 | 14 | 3 | 33 | 75 | 1,197 | |
| Delhi | 1 company Native Foot Artillery | – | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 5 | 41 | Delhi – 1 company Native Foot Artillery | – | – | 1 | – | 1 | 5 | 47 | |
| | 3 regiments Native Infantry | – | 4 | 15 | 3 | 34 | 83 | 979 | 3 regiments Native Infantry | – | 5 | 9 | 4 | 24 | 58 | 653 | |

STATEMENT showing the disposable Force that could have been collected from each of the large Stations of the Army on the 1st January and 1st August 1833, &c.—*continued*.

| | | 1st January 1833. | | | | | | | 1st August 1833. | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Europeans. | | | | Native Commissioned Officers. | Europeans and Natives. | | Europeans. | | | | Native Commissioned Officers. | Europeans and Natives. | | |
| | | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Medical Officers. | | Serjeants and Havildars. | Drummers, Rank and File. | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Medical Officers. | | Serjeants and Havildars. | Drummers, Rank and File. | |
| Muttra | 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 4 | 64 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 4 | 66 | Muttra |
| | 1 regiment Light Cavalry | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 17 | 212 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 19 | 307 | |
| | 2 - ditto - Native Infantry | – | 4 | 11 | 2 | 28 | 65 | 1,113 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 19 | 39 | 609 | |
| Agra | 2 companies European Foot Artillery | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | – | 8 | 125 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | – | 5 | 118 | Agra |
| | 1 regiment European Infantry | 1 | 7 | 16 | 1 | – | 30 | 608 | 1 | 6 | 17 | 1 | – | 36 | 574 | |
| | 2 - ditto - Native Infantry | – | 3 | 13 | 1 | 21 | 38 | 617 | – | 4 | 11 | 1 | 17 | 32 | 613 | |
| Barreilly | A detail of Native Foot Artillery | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | 56 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | 56 | Barreilly |
| | A corps of Local Horse | 1 | – | 2 | 1 | 24 | 64 | 207 | 1 | – | 2 | 1 | 14 | 39 | 118 | |
| | 2 regiments Native Infantry | – | 2 | 7 | 1 | 28 | 65 | 984 | – | 3 | 4 | 1 | 17 | 36 | 613 | |
| Kurnaul | 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | 3 | 7 | 1 | – | 8 | 88 | – | 2 | 5 | 1 | – | 8 | 79 | Kurnaul |
| | 2 companies European Foot Artillery | | | | | | 9 | 124 | | | | | | 10 | 116 | |
| | 1 regiment of European Infantry | – | 5 | 17 | 1 | – | 32 | 764 | – | 5 | 14 | 1 | – | 30 | 745 | |
| | 2 - ditto - of Light Cavalry | – | 4 | 11 | 2 | 15 | 31 | 466 | – | 5 | 11 | 2 | 11 | 20 | 351 | |
| | 2 - ditto - of Native Infantry | – | 4 | 9 | 1 | 24 | 47 | 764 | – | 5 | 6 | 1 | 20 | 31 | 594 | |
| Loodihana | 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 68 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 45 | Loodhiana |
| | 2 regiments Native Infantry | – | 2 | 12 | 1 | 24 | 54 | 911 | – | 2 | 6 | 3 | 18 | 31 | 633 | |
| Saugor | 1 company European and detail Native Infantry | – | – | 3 | 11 | – | 4 | 104 | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | 54 | Saugor |
| | 1 corps Local Horse | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 14 | 45 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 44 | |
| | 3 regiments Native Infantry | – | 4 | 18 | 3 | 25 | 52 | 914 | 2 | 6 | 19 | 3 | 21 | 29 | 623 | |
| Nusseerabad | 1 company European Foot Artillery | 1 | – | 2 | 1 | – | 6 | 70 | 1 | – | 4 | 1 | – | 6 | 67 | Nusseerabad |
| | 1 regiment Light Cavalry | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 20 | 293 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 171 | |
| | 4 - ditto - Native Infantry | – | 5 | 20 | 4 | 41 | 90 | 1,401 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 3 | 33 | 63 | 1,068 | |
| Neemuch | 1 troop Horse Artillery | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 103 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 104 | Neemuch |
| | 1 company Native Foot Artillery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 regiment Light Cavalry | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 14 | 191 | – | 3 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 11 | 160 | |
| | 1 corps Local Horse | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 32 | 164 | – | 1 | – | 1 | 4 | 11 | 53 | |
| | 4 regiments Native Infantry | – | 4 | 18 | 4 | 48 | 109 | 1,869 | – | 6 | 15 | 3 | 37 | 64 | 1,222 | |
| Mhow | 1 troop Horse Artillery | – | 2 | 3 | 1 | – | 9 | 95 | – | 2 | 4 | 1 | – | 8 | 125 | Mhow |
| | 1 company Native Foot Artillery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 regiment Light Cavalry | – | 2 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 18 | 259 | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 13 | 187 | |
| | 3 - ditto - Native Infantry | 2 | 5 | 18 | 2 | 31 | 64 | 1,031 | 2 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 24 | 30 | 790 | |

Adjutant General's Office,
Presidency of Fort William,
24 January 1834.

(signed) *J. R. Lumley*, Colonel,
Adjutant General of the Army.

## Appendix, No. 2.

COORG FIELD FORCE, from 7th April to 5th May 1834.

Detachments European and Native Artillery.
Corps of Sappers and Miners.
Three King's Regiments.
Nine Regiments Native Infantry.
Two Rifle Companies.
Wynaad Rangers, with Detachments 51st Native Infantry.

His Majesty's 39th Regiment.
His Majesty's 48th Regiment.
His Majesty's 55th Regiment.
European Artillery.

Golundauze and Gun Lascars.
Sappers and Miners.
4th Regiment Native Infantry.
9th - ditto - ditto.
20th - ditto - ditto.
31st - ditto - ditto.
32nd - ditto - ditto.
35th - ditto - ditto.

36th Regiment Native Infantry.
40th - ditto - ditto.
48th - ditto - ditto.
Rifle Companies 24th and 51st Native Infantry.
Wynaad Rangers and Detachments 51st Native Infantry.

## Appendix, No. 3.

WEEKLY STATE of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

| DATE. | FORCE. | European Officers. | Medical Officers. | European Non-Commissioned Officers. | Native Officers. | Native Non-Commissioned, Drummers, Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 April 1834 | Available | 5 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 530 |
| | Sick and absent | 10 | 1 | — | 2 | 122 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 1 | — | — | 1 | 84 |
| | TOTAL | 16 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 736 |
| 14 April „ | Available | 6 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 416 |
| | Sick and absent | 10 | 1 | — | 2 | 139 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | — | — | — | 4 | 180 |
| | TOTAL | 16 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 735 |
| 21 April „ | Available | 7 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 393 |
| | Sick and absent | 9 | 1 | — | 2 | 149 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | — | — | — | 5 | 192 |
| | TOTAL | 16 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 734 |
| 28 April „ | Available | 6 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 444 |
| | Sick and absent | 9 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 141 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 1 | — | — | 2 | 149 |
| | TOTAL | 16 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 734 |
| 5 May „ | Available | 6 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 428 |
| | Sick and absent | 9 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 156 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 1 | — | — | 2 | 149 |
| | TOTAL | 16 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 733 |

WEEKLY STATE of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry.

| DATE. | FORCE. | European Officers. | Medical Officers. | European Non-Commissioned Officers. | Native Officers. | Native Non-commissioned, Drummers, Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 April 1834 | Available | 7 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 375 |
| | Sick and absent | 7 | – | 1 | 3 | 205 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 1 | – | – | 2 | 152 |
| | TOTAL | 15 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 732 |
| 14 April „ | Available | 7 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 407 |
| | Sick and absent | 7 | – | 1 | 3 | 226 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 1 | – | – | 2 | 99 |
| | TOTAL | 15 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 732 |
| 21 April „ | Available | 6 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 398 |
| | Sick and absent | 9 | – | 1 | 3 | 225 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | – | – | – | 2 | 109 |
| | TOTAL | 15 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 732 |
| 28 April „ | Available | 6 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 368 |
| | Sick and absent | 9 | – | 1 | 4 | 257 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | – | – | – | 2 | 105 |
| | TOTAL | 15 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 730 |
| 5 May „ | Available | 6* | 1 | 1 | 12 | 428 |
| | Sick and absent | 3 | – | 1 | 3 | 217 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | – | – | – | 1 | 85 |
| | TOTAL | 15 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 730 |

* *N.B.*—Seven unposted Ensigns did duty with this corps from 14th April to 5th May.

## Appendix, No. 4.

WEEKLY STATE of the Coorg Field Force.

| DATE. | FORCE. | European Officers. | Medical Officers. | Native Officers. | European Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Native Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 April 1834 | Available for duty | 143 | 10 | 96 | 1,014 | 4,287 |
| | Sick and absent | 87 | 7 | 37 | 159 | 1,663 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 19 | 1 | 26 | 200 | 1,279 |
| 14 April „ | Available for duty | 143 | 24 | 83 | 906 | 3,878 |
| | Sick and absent | 92 | 9 | 50 | 215 | 2,553 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 23 | – | 34 | 258 | 1,561 |
| 21 April „ | Available for duty | 157 | 25 | 97 | 724 | 4,265 |
| | Sick and absent | 82 | 8 | 40 | 319 | 1,891 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 17 | – | 32 | 220 | 1,569 |
| 28 April „ | Available for duty | 82 | 15 | 56 | 539 | 2,422 |
| | Sick and absent | 63 | 4 | 28 | 149 | 1,362 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 12 | – | 15 | 189 | 789 |
| 5 May „ | Available for duty | 68 | 10 | 53 | 634 | 2,370 |
| | Sick and Absent | 61 | 5 | 13 | 106 | 1,605 |
| | Regimental and camp duty | 10 | – | 33 | 179 | 714 |

## Appendix, No. 5.

MEMORANDUM of the Saving to be effected by the proposed Reductions of the Infantry in the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

| | Per Annum. | Total. |
|---|---|---|
| Immediate Saving: | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| Bengal - 14 Regiments reduced - - - - | 2,57,666 8 – | |
| Madras - 7 Ditto on half batta, *Rs.* 1,20,232 14 | | |
| 3 Ditto on full batta, 58,035 – | 1,78,267 14 – | |
| Bombay - 5 Ditto - - - - - - | 89,121 4 – | |
| Total Immediate Saving per Annum - - - | | 5,25,055 10 – |
| Prospective Saving: | | |
| Bengal - 14 Regiments reduced - - - - | 15,49,607 8 – | |
| Madras - 7 Ditto on half batta, *Rs.* 6,55,131 5 | | |
| 3 Ditto on full batta, 3,22,482 – | 9,77,613 5 – | |
| Bombay - 5 Ditto - - - - - - | 4,62,231 4 – | |
| Total Prospective Saving per Annum - - - | | 29,89,452 1 – |
| Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum - - - | | 35,14,507 11 – |
| *Cavalry:* | | |
| Immediate saving - - - - - - - - | 4,33,445 10 – | |
| Prospective saving - - - - - - - | 10,63,337 6 – | |
| Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum - - - | | 14,96,783 – – |
| GRAND TOTAL, per Annum - - - | | 50,11,290 11 – |

## Appendix, No. 6.

### Bengal Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 60 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| Lascars and Bheesties | 86 – – | 86 – – |
| Regimental command allowance | 400 – – | |
| Companies - ditto - ditto | 240 – – | |
| Allowance for repair of arms | 160 – – | |
| | 800 – – | |
| Adjutant's allowance | 212 7 – | |
| Quartermaster's ditto | 137 – – | |
| Proportion of surgeon's ditto, assistant surgeon | 255 – – | |
| | 604 7 – | |
| Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant | 96 10 4 | 96 10 4 |
| 8 Pay havildars | 40 – – | |
| 1 Drill - ditto | 5 – – | |
| 1 Drill naick | 2 8 – | |
| | 47 8 – | |
| Quartermaster's establishment | 71 8 – | |
| Bazar - ditto | 25 – – | |
| Hospital - ditto | 35 – – | |
| | 131 8 – | |
| Camp equipage, repair of | 27 – – | |
| Proportion of allowance for a mess | 60 – – | |
| Doolie bearers | 21 – – | |
| | 108 – – | |
| Clothing for 1 tindal and 8 lascars | 2 8 – | |
| | 1,876 9 4 | |
| Less—Proportion of the expense in pay and clothing of 640 privates required to complete the regiments to 800 men each | *342 13 8 | |
| On 1 regiment per mensem | 1,533 11 8 | |
| On 14 - ditto - ditto | 21,472 3 4 | |
| Immediate Saving per Annum | *Rs.* | 2,57,666 8 – |

| | Men. | Regts. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| * Present establishment | 640 | × 74 | = 47,360 |
| Proposed - ditto | 800 | × 60 | = 48,000 |
| Difference, Men to be raised | | | 640 |

| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
|---|---|
| Pay of 640 privates, half batta | 4,480 – – |
| Clothing of - ditto - at 8 annas per man | 320 – – |
| The number of corps to be reduced | 14) 4,800 – – |
| Proportion for each Corps | *Rs.* 342 13 8 |

## Bengal Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Prospective* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 60 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers - - - - - - - - - | *7,000 5 8 | |
| Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and drummers - - - - - - - - - - | 1,973 – – | |
| Native doctors and staff allowance to the drum and fife majors | 40 – – | |
| Clothing of the European serjeants, Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and drummers - - - - | 210 8 – | |
| On One Regiment per Mensem - - - - - | 9,223 13 8 | |
| On Fourteen Regiments per Mensem - - - | 129,133 15 4 | |
| Total Proportion of Saving per annum - - - *Rs.* | | 15,49,607 8 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. | Pay only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| $\frac{1}{3}$ | $\frac{2}{3}$ | 1 Colonel - - - - - | 431 12 4 | 202 14 8 |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Lieutenant colonel - - - | 688 – – | 81 2 8 |
| $\frac{7}{10}$ | $\frac{3}{10}$ | 1 Major - - - - - - | 552 6 8 | 54 12 6 |
| 4 | 1 | 5 Captains - - - - - | 1,661 8 – | 121 12 – |
| 7 | 1 | 8 Lieutenants - - - - - | 1,798 6 – | 60 14 – |
| $3\frac{3}{4}$ | $\frac{1}{4}$ | 4 Ensigns - - - - - | 760 5 – | 12 5 10 |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Surgeon - - - - - | 276 14 8 | 40 9 4 |
| 1 | - - | 1 Assistant Surgeon - - - | 256 10 – | — |
| | | | 6,425 14 8 | 574 7 – |
| | | | | 6,425 14 8 |
| | | Total Saving - - - *Rs.* | | 7,000 5 8 |

## Appendix, No. 7.

### Madras Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 42 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | In each Regiment. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Half Batta. | Full Batta. |
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| 8 Puckaulies | 85 14 8 | 123 4 – |
| Adjutant's and quartermaster's allowances | 234 – – | 466 – – |
| Surgeon's allowance (average) | 232 – – | |
| Serjeant-major and quartermaster serjeant | 72 10 – | 81 13 6 |
| Native adjutant, drill havildar, and drill naick staff allowances | 26 4 – | |
| 8 Pay havildars | 14 14 8 | |
| 2 Totties, 14 rupees; moonshee, 30 rupees | 44 – – | |
| Mess allowances | 63 – – | 809 2 8 |
| Command allowance for 8 companies | 240 – – | |
| Command allowance, regimental | 400 – – | |
| Regimental school | 21 – – | |
| Vakeel and artificers | 106 – – | 155 – – |
| Lascars and bazar servants | 160 5 4 | 245 8 4 |
| | 1,700 – 8 | 1,880 12 6 |
| Less—Proportion of expense in pay and clothing of 320 men, required to complete the regiments to 800 men each | 268 11 2 | *268 11 2 |
| On One Regiment, per Mensem | 1,431 5 6 | 1,612 1 4 |
| On 10 Regiments: 7 on half, and 3 on full batta per Mensem | 10,019 6 6 | 4,836 4 – |
| On 10 Regiments: 7 on half, and 3 on full batta per Annum | 120,232 14 – | 58,035 – – |

Total Immediate Saving per Annum - - - *Rs.* 178,267 14 –

| | Men. | Regts. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| * Present establishment | 640 | × 52 | = 33,280 |
| Proposed ditto | 800 | × 42 | = 33,600 |
| Difference, Men to be raised | | | 320 |

| | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pay of 123 privates, on full batta | 1,148 | – | – |
| Ditto 197 ditto on half batta | 1,379 | – | – |
| Clothing of 320 privates, at 8 *a.* each | 160 | – | – |
| The number of Corps to be reduced | 10) 2,687 | – | – |
| Proportion for each Corps | *Rs.* 268 | 11 | 2 |

## Madras Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Prospective* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 42 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Half Batta. | Full Batta. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers | * 5,664 – 3 | 6,407 10 8 |
| Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers | 1,526 – – | 1,932 – – |
| Recruit and pension boys | 245 – – | 270 – – |
| Subadar major's staff allowance | 25 – – | |
| Regimental havildar major | 20 8 – | 22 13 4 |
| Colour havildar | 16 – – | 16 – – |
| Drum and fife majors, apothecary and dresser | 78 2 8 | 84 13 4 |
| Clothing, assumed | 224 8 – | 224 8 – |
| On one Regiment, per Mensem | 7,799 2 11 | 8,957 13 4 |
| On 10 Regiments, 7 on half and 3 on full batta, per Mensem | 54,594 4 5 | 26,873 8 – |
| On 10 Regiments, 7 on half and 3 on full batta, per Annum | 655,131 5 – | 3,22,482 – – |
| | | 6,55,131 5 – |
| Total Prospective Saving per Annum | *Rs.* | 9,77,613 5 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. | | Pay only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Half Batta. | Full Batta. | |
| | | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| $\frac{1}{4}$ | $\frac{3}{4}$ | 1 Colonel | 323 13 4 | 323 13 4 | 152 3 – |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Lieutenant Colonel | 551 12 – | 688 – – | 81 2 8 |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Major | 427 4 4 | 526 2 – | 60 14 – |
| $3\frac{1}{3}$ | $1\frac{2}{3}$ | 5 Captains | 1,246 14 – | 1,384 9 4 | 202 10 8 |
| 6 | 2 | 8 Lieutenants | 1,354 8 – | 1,539 12 – | 121 12 – |
| $3\frac{3}{4}$ | $\frac{1}{4}$ | 4 Ensigns | 637 3 9 | 760 6 6 | 12 7 10 |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Surgeon | 245 6 – | 276 14 8 | 12 4 8 |
| 1 | – | 1 Assistant Surgeon | 225 12 – | 256 10 – | — |
| | | | 5,012 9 5 | 5,756 3 10 | 651 6 10 |
| | | | 651 6 10 | 651 6 10 | |
| | | Total Saving - *Rs.* | 5,664 – 3 | 6,407 10 8 | |

## Appendix, No. 8.

### Bombay Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 21 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| Regimental command allowance | 400 – – | |
| Adjutant's allowance | 162 – – | |
| Quartermaster's allowance | 120 – – | |
| Surgeon's allowance (proportion) | 200 – – | |
| 2 Serjeants | 52 – – | |
| Staff allowances to 17 Native commissioned, and European and Native non-commissioned officers | 141 3 – | |
| 8 Puçkallies | 60 – – | |
| Bazar chowdry and peons | 26 – – | |
| Artificers | 50 – – | |
| Pundit and regimental school | 42 2 8 | |
| Mess | 80 – – | |
| Company command allowances and lights | 304 – – | |
| Hospital followers | 88 – – | |
| | 1,725 5 8 | |
| Less,—Proportion of expense in pay and clothing of 160 men, required to complete the regiment to 800 men, each | *240 – – | |
| On One Regiment, per Mensem | 1,485 5 8 | |
| On Five Regiments, per Mensem | 7,426 12 4 | |
| Immediate Saving per Annum — *Rs.* | | 89,121 4 – |

| | Men. | | Regts. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * Present establishment | 640 | × | 26 | = | 16,640 |
| Proposed ditto | 800 | × | 21 | = | 16,800 |
| Difference, Men to be raised | | | | | 160 |

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Pay of 160 privates, at 7 rupees per month | 1,120 |
| Clothing of ditto, at 8 rupees per month | 80 |
| The number of Corps to be reduced — 5) | 1,200 |
| Proportion of each Corps — *Rs.* | 240 |

## Bombay Native Infantry.

Particulars of the *Prospective* Saving to be Effected by the Reduction of the Native Infantry to 21 Regiments of 800 Privates each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers | * 5,832 13 8 | |
| Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers, and fifers | 1,472 – – | |
| Hospital assistants | 45 – – | |
| Pension or recruit boys | 145 – – | |
| Clothing of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers | 209 – – | |
| On one Regiment per Mensem | 7,703 13 8 | |
| On five Regiments per Mensem | 38,519 4 4 | |
| Prospective Saving per Annum *Rs.* | | 4,62,231 4 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay Only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. | Pay Only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Rs.* *a.p* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| $\frac{1}{5}$ | $\frac{4}{5}$ | 1 Colonel | 259 1 – | 244 8 – |
| $\frac{4}{7}$ | $\frac{3}{7}$ | 1 Lieutenant Colonel | 472 14 8 | 104 5 9 |
| $\frac{7}{9}$ | $\frac{2}{9}$ | 1 Major | 496 6 4 | 40 9 – |
| 4 | 1 | 5 Captains | 1,496 4 – | 121 12 – |
| $6\frac{4}{7}$ | $1\frac{3}{7}$ | 8 Lieutenants | 1,483 8 – | 86 15 3 |
| $3\frac{3}{4}$ | $\frac{1}{4}$ | 4 Ensigns | 682 11 6 | 12 5 10 |
| $\frac{3}{7}$ | $\frac{4}{7}$ | 1 Surgeon | 96 12 – | 69 10 – |
| $\frac{1}{3}$ | $\frac{2}{3}$ | 1 Assistant Surgeon | 124 8 4 | 40 10 – |
| | | *Rs.* | 5,112 1 10 | 720 11 10 |
| | | | | 5,112 1 10 |
| | | Total Saving *Rs.* | | 5,832 13 8 |

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

MEMORANDUM on the Regular Native Cavalry.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| OF this arm there are in | Bengal - - - - | 10 | regiments |
| „ „ | Madras - - - - | 8 | „ |
| „ „ | Bombay - - - - | 3 | „ |
| | | 21 | regiments, |

each regiment consisting of six troops, and each troop of 70 privates.

The expense of this part of our establishment is very great. In peace its services are never required for ordinary civil or military duties, like the Native infantry, while a doubt is entertained by many whether in war they are of equal value, as a military force, with the irregular horse; and further, whether on the ground of efficiency and economy, the first cost and feed of horses, as well as of all equipments, being the same, a portion of the regular Native cavalry might not be advantageously exchanged for an addition to our European cavalry. But leaving these questions aside for the present, the preceding considerations and doubts are so many additional reasons to those which have already been given in favour of an augmentation of the strength of each infantry regiment, for dealing in like manner with the regular cavalry. Proceeding, therefore, as I did with the infantry, I shall first state my opinion that the most efficient and least expensive establishment for each regiment of cavalry would be eight troops of 100 privates each, forming four squadrons.

But with the same object of not interfering with the existing organisation, or of making too violent and sudden a change, I would recommend only that each troop should be increased from 70 to 100 privates; the same mode of disposing of the officers and men being adopted as in the infantry.

*Vide* Annexed Statements.

The immediate saving would be above four lacs, and the prospective above 10, making an aggregate of about 15 lacs. There would remain for—

| | Present. | Future. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal - | 420 | 600 |
| | 10 | 7 |
| | 4,200 | 4,200 |
| Madras - | 420 | 600 |
| | 8 | 5 |
| | 3,360 | 3,000 |
| Bombay - | 420 | 600 |
| | 3 | 2 |
| | 1,260 | 1,200 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal | - - - - - - | 7 | regiments |
| Madras | - - - - - - | 5 | „ |
| Bombay | - - - - - - | 2 | „ |
| | | 14 | regiments. |

I shall, in a future paper regarding the composition of the Indian Army, enter at length upon the very great importance of the irregular cavalry.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

Ootacamund, 23 July 1834.

MEMORANDUM of the Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reductions of the Cavalry in the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

| | | Per Annum. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Immediate Saving: | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| Bengal.—3 Regiments reduced | | 1,09,685 4 – | |
| Madras.—1 Regiment on full batta | *Rs.* 91,465 6 – | | |
| 2 Regiments on half batta | 1,65,225 8 – | | |
| | | 2,56,690 14 – | |
| Bombay.—1 Regiment on half batta | | 67,069 8 – | |
| Total Immediate Saving per Annum | | | 4,43,445 10 – |
| Prospective Saving: | | | |
| Bengal.—3 Regiments reduced | | 4,34,739 12 – | |
| Madras.—1 Regiment on full batta | *Rs.* 1,77,990 8 – | | |
| 2 Regiments on half batta | 3,13,032 – – | | |
| | | 4,91,022 8 – | |
| Bombay.—1 Regiment on half batta | | 1,37,575 2 – | |
| Total Prospective Saving per Annum | | | 10,63,337 6 – |
| Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective per Annum | | | *14,96,783 – – |
| Infantry: | | | |
| Immediate saving | | 5,25,055 10 – | |
| Prospective „ | | 29,89,452 1 – | |
| Total Saving, Immediate and Prospective, per Annum | | | 35,14,507 11 – |
| Grand Total per Annum | | *Rs.* | 50,11,290 11 – |

* In this calculation the riding masters lately attached to the Madras and Bombay cavalry are not included.

BENGAL CAVALRY.

PARTICULARS of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Seven Regiments of 6 Troops and 600 Privates each.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| Adjutant's allowance | 212 7 – | |
| Interpreter and quartermaster ditto | 137 – – | |
| Surgeon's ditto | 300 – – | |
| Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant | 98 12 8 | |
| Staff allowance to Native non-commissioned officers and pay havildar | 73 8 – | |
| Quartermaster's establishment | 158 – – | |
| Bazar establishment | 25 – – | |
| Hospital - ditto | 35 – – | |
| Repairs of camp equipage | 22 – – | |
| Mess allowance (proportion) | 80 – – | |
| Dooley bearers | 21 – – | |
| Regimental command allowance | 400 – – | |
| Allowance for command of troops and repair of arms | 300 – – | |
| Ditto - for concessions to riding master | 30 – – | |
| Ditto - for grain pots | 120 – – | |
| Syces and grass cutters of 76 supernumerary horses | 570 – – | |
| Remount, at 10 per cent., the horses, at 400 rupees each | 254 – – | |
| Feeding of 76 horses, at *Rs.* 2. 14. 4. | 210 1 4 | |
| One Regiment per Month *Rs.* | 3,048 13 – | |
| One Regiment per Year | | 36,561 12 – |
| Three Regiments for One Year *Rs.* | | 1,09,685 4 – |

BENGAL CAVALRY.

***Particulars*** of the *Prospective* Saving in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing Seven Regiments of 600 Men each to remain.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers - - - - - - - - - - | * 9,956 – – | 1,19,472 – – |
| Native officers, non-commissioned officers, trumpeters and farriers - - - - - - - - - - - | 1,682 – – | |
| Riding master - - - - - - - - - - | 122 7 – | |
| Trumpet major, farrier major, and native doctors - - - | 65 – – | |
| Clothing for the reduced officers - - - - - - - | 250 10 8 | |
| | 2,120 1 8 | |
| | | 25,441 4 – |
| One regiment per Month - - - | 12,076 1 8 | |
| One regiment per Year - - - | | 1,44,913 4 – |
| Three Regiments for One Year - - - *Rs.* | | 4,34,739 12 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. | Pay only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| $\frac{9}{10}$ | $\frac{1}{10}$ | 1 Colonel - - - - - | 1,040 14 2 | 118 – – |
| $\frac{3}{5}$ | $\frac{2}{5}$ | 1 Lieutenant Colonel - - - | 694 3 3 | 111 – – |
| $\frac{4}{5}$ | $\frac{1}{5}$ | 1 Major - - - - - | 743 8 – | 46 8 – |
| $3\frac{1}{2}$ | $1\frac{1}{2}$ | 5 Captains - - - - - | 1,970 9 2 | 269 – – |
| 6 | 2 | 8 Lieutenants - - - - | 2,190 8 – | 319 – – |
| $3\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 Cornets - - - - - | 1,087 4 2 | 48 8 – |
| 1 | - - | 1 Surgeon - - - - - | 563 – 4 | — |
| 1 | - - | 1 Assistant Surgeon - - - | 365 4 – | — |
| 1 | - - | 1 Veterinary Surgeon - - - | 389 10 9 | — |
| | | | 9,044 13 10 | 912 – – |
| | | | | 9,044 13 10 |
| | | TOTAL Saving - - - *Rs.* | | 9,956 13 10 |

## Madras Cavalry.

Particulars of the *Immediate* Saving to be Effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Five Regiments, of Six Troops, and 600 Privates each.

| | In each Regiment. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Full Batta. | | | Half Batta. | | |
| | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* | *Rs.* | *a.* | *p.* |
| Adjutant's allowances | 147 | – | – | 526 | – | – |
| Quartermaster's allowances | 147 | – | – | | | |
| Surgeon's allowances (average) | 232 | – | – | | | |
| Serjeant major and quartermaster serjeant | 94 | 1 | 6 | 70 | 14 | – |
| Staff allowance to the native adjutant, havildar major, drill havildar, and drill naick | 45 | – | – | 2,065 | 5 | 4 |
| Native riding master, rough riders, and pay havildars | 81 | 3 | – | | | |
| Moonshee, Vakeel, gram conicopoly and measuring men | 93 | – | – | | | |
| Totics, artificers, bazar servants and lascars | 244 | 13 | 4 | | | |
| Troop and saddle contract on 221 horses of supernumeraries, at *Rs.* 4. 8. 9. each | 1,000 | 5 | – | | | |
| Troop command allowance, at 30 rupees each | 180 | – | – | | | |
| Regimental school | 21 | – | – | | | |
| Regimental command allowance | 400 | – | – | | | |
| Pay of 74 horsekeepers, and 221 grasscutters | 560 | 10 | 4 | 389 | 12 | – |
| | 1,620 | 10 | 8 | 1,105 | – | – |
| Pay of 6 puckallies | 92 | 7 | – | 92 | 7 | – |
| Pay of 6 horsekeeper chowdries | 66 | 8 | – | 52 | 8 | – |
| Pay of 6 grass cutter chowdries | 66 | 8 | – | 52 | 8 | – |
| Mess allowance | 63 | – | – | 2,530 | – | – |
| Feeding 221 horses, at 7 rupees per horse | 1,547 | – | – | | | |
| Remount assumed at 10 per cent., and at 500 rupees per horse | 920 | – | – | | | |
| One Regiment per Mensem | 7,622 | 1 | 10 | 6,884 | 6 | 4 |
| One Regiment per Annum | 91,465 | 6 | – | 82,612 | 12 | – |
| One Regiment on full, and two on half Batta per Annum | 91,465 | 6 | – | 165,225 | 8 | – |
| | | | | 91,465 | 6 | – |
| Total immediate Saving per Annum | | | *Rs.* | 2,56,690 | 14 | – |

## Madras Cavalry.

Particulars of the *Prospective* Saving in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing Five Regiments of 600 Men each to remain.

| | In each Regiment. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Full Batta. | Half Batta. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers | * 9,138 – – | 8,487 10 – |
| Native commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and trumpeters | 2,952 – – | 2,303 – – |
| 120 troopers, at 14 rupees | 1,680 – – | 1,260 – – |
| Recruit and pension boys | 140 – – | 140 – – |
| Trumpet major, farrier major, farriers and veterinary pupils | 348 – – | 285 14 – |
| Assistant apothecary and dressers | 74 8 8 | 66 8 – |
| Clothings assumed at | 500 – – | 500 – – |
| One Regiment per Month | 14,832 8 8 | 13,043 – – |
| One Regiment per Year | 1,77,990 8 – | 1,56,516 – – |
| One Regiment on full, and two on half Batta per Year | 1,77,990 8 – | 3,13,032 – – |
| | | 1,77,990 8 – |
| Total Prospective Saving per Annum *Rs.* | | 4,91,022 8 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. Full Batta. | Indian Pay and Allowances. Half Batta. | Pay only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| $\frac{7}{10}$ | $\frac{1}{10}$ | 1 Colonel | 739 3 6 | 739 3 6 | 198 12 – |
| $\frac{3}{5}$ | $\frac{2}{5}$ | 1 Lieutenant Colonel | 723 2 – | 595 6 3 | 107 11 6 |
| $\frac{4}{5}$ | $\frac{1}{5}$ | 1 Major | 464 11 2 | 390 8 11 | 116 6 8 |
| $3\frac{1}{2}$ | $1\frac{1}{2}$ | 5 Captains | 2,111 5 3 | 1,956 6 6 | 224 3 11 |
| 6 | 2 | 8 Lieutenants | 2,191 8 – | 2,006 4 – | 218 – – |
| $3\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 Cornets | 771 9 10 | 744 15 4 | 146 – – |
| $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 Surgeon | 281 8 2 | 260 13 8 | 89 11 2 |
| 1 | — | 1 Assistant Surgeon | 365 4 – | 334 6 – | — |
| 1 | — | Veterinary Surgeon | 389 10 9 | 358 12 9 | — |
| | | | 8,037 14 8 | 7,386 12 11 | 1,100 13 3 |
| | | | 1,100 13 3 | 1,100 13 3 | |
| | | Total Saving *Rs.* | 9,138 11 11 | 8,487 10 2 | |

## Bombay Cavalry.

Particulars of the *Immediate* Saving to be effected by the Proposed Reduction of the Cavalry to Two Regiments of Six Troops, and 600 Privates each.

| | | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. | *Rs.* a. p. |
| Staff allowance to commanding officer | 400 – – | | |
| Ditto - to adjutant | 177 – – | | |
| Ditto - to quartermaster | 150 – – | | |
| Ditto - to surgeon | 300 – – | | |
| Ditto - to veterinary surgeon | 49 – – | | |
| | | 1,076 – – | |
| Staff allowance to 28 Native commissioned and European non-commissioned officers | | 268 – – | |
| Serjeant-major and quartermaster serjeant | | 60 – – | |
| 6 Puckalies | 68 – – | | |
| 1 Bazar chowdrie | 16 – – | | |
| 2 Peons | 10 – – | | |
| | | 94 – – | |
| Artificers | 107 2 – | | |
| School pundit | 15 – – | | |
| | | 122 2 – | |
| 6 Maccadums of horsekeepers | 60 – – | | |
| 118 Horsekeepers of supernumeraries | 708 – – | | |
| 6 Maccadums of grasscutters | 60 – – | | |
| 158 Grasscutters, at 5 rupees | 790 – – | | |
| Saddle and troop contract, at 4 rupees each for 158 horses | 632 – – | | |
| Mess allowance | 90 – – | | |
| Troop command allowance and lights, at 38 rupees | 228 – – | | |
| Regimental school | 27 – – | | |
| Hospital establishment | 118 – – | | |
| Feeding 158 horses, at 5 rupees per horse | 790 – – | | |
| Remount, at 10 per cent. | 526 – – | | |
| | | 4,029 – – | |
| Per Month - - - *Rs.* | | 5,589 2 – | |
| Per Year - - - *Rs.* | | | 67,069 8 – |

## Bombay Cavalry.

Particulars of the *Prospective* Saving in each Regiment by its Reduction, supposing Two Regiments of 600 Privates each to remain.

| | IN EACH REGIMENT. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Per Month. | Per Year. |
| | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| European officers | * 7,877 9 6 | |
| Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers | 2,448 – – | |
| 60 Troopers | 630 – – | |
| 2 Hospital assistants | 45 – – | |
| Clothing | 376 – – | |
| Subadars major's allowance | 25 – – | |
| 18 Boys | 63 – – | |
| One Regiment for One Month - - - *Rs.* | 11,464 9 6 | |
| One Regiment for One Year - - - *Rs.* | | 1,37,575 2 – |

* Explanation of the Prospective Saving by the European Officers.

| Proportion on Indian Pay and Allowances. | Proportion on Pay only. | Number and Rank. | Indian Pay and Allowances. | Pay only. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* | *Rs.* *a.* *p.* |
| – | 1 | 1 Colonel | – – | 397 8 – |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Lieutenant colonel | 635 1 4 | 92 12 – |
| 1 | – – | 1 Major | 781 1 10 | — |
| 3 | 2 | 5 Captains | 1,565 2 – | 358 12 8 |
| 6 | 2 | 8 Lieutenants | 2,006 4 – | 219 – – |
| $2\frac{2}{3}$ | $1\frac{1}{3}$ | 4 Cornets | 726 10 2 | 129 12 5 |
| 1 | – – | 1 Surgeon | 521 11 – | — |
| $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{3}$ | 1 Assistant surgeon | 222 14 8 | 36 7 8 |
| $\frac{1}{3}$ | $\frac{2}{3}$ | 1 Veterinary surgeon | 119 9 7 | 64 14 2 |
| | | | 6,578 6 7 | 1,299 2 11 |
| | | | | 6,578 6 7 |
| | | Total Saving - - - *Rs.* | | 7,877 9 6 |

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,
Secretary to Government of India, Military Department.

## Memorandum on the Artillery.

The establishment of artillery, horse and foot, at the three Presidencies, is as follows:—

### Horse Artillery.

*Bengal.*—There are three brigades, each brigade consisting of four troops, three European and one native; each European troop having 80 gunners, each native troop 90 men; six guns, four 6-pounders and two 12-inch howitzers being attached to each troop, European and native. App. No. 1.

*Madras.*—Two brigades, one consisting of four European troops and one of two native troops; each troop, European and native, is composed of 84 gunners or privates. A troop beyond the frontier has six guns (all 6-pounders), and within it four guns (6-pounders). App. No. 1.

*Bombay.*—One brigade of four troops of European, constituted as in Bengal. There is no native horse artillery. Each troop has four guns (6-pounders). App. No 1.

### Foot Artillery.

*Bengal.*—Five battalions of Europeans, each battalion consisting of four companies, and each company of 80 gunners; two battalions of natives, each battalion consisting of eight companies, and each company of 104 privates. App. No. 1.

The complement of European officers is precisely the same in a regiment of infantry, of cavalry, a brigade of horse artillery, and a battalion of foot artillery.

*Madras.*—Three battalions of Europeans, constituted as in Bengal, and one of natives, consisting only of six companies instead of eight, and each company of 92 privates instead of 104, as in Bengal; but with the same complement of officers as a battalion of eight companies. App. No. 1.

*Bombay.*—Two battalions of Europeans, constituted as in Bengal, and one native battalion consisting of eight companies, and each company of 70 privates, differing both from Bengal, 104 privates, and Madras, 92 privates. App. No. 1.

It appears from the preceding statement that all the troops of European horse artillery at the three Presidencies have the same constitution,* but the brigades differ.

In Bengal, each brigade consists of three troops of European and one native.

In Madras, one brigade consists of four European troops; the two native troops, being the remaining half of a native brigade reduced by Mr. Lushington, act separately.

In Bombay there is one brigade of four troops of Europeans, and no native troop.

I have now to submit that the same principles upon which I have proposed to remodel the infantry and cavalry shall be applied to the horse and foot artillery.

1st. That the establishment of European officers, non-commissioned officers, and bombardiers, in each troop and battalion, shall remain as at present.

2nd. That in the total number of privates in the horse and foot artillery collectively there shall be no alteration, excepting such as the systematic and uniform organization of the corps on the principle assumed may render unavoidable. (*See* Appendix, No. 5.)

3rd. That the total number of privates shall be formed into companies of 100 instead of 80 men each, and that the officers of the troops and companies, rendered superfluous by this consolidation, shall be disposed of in the same manner as in the infantry and cavalry.

The

* There is a trifling difference in Madras, where each troop has four additional gunners.

The changes that this arrangement will effect are as follows:—

App. No. 2.

HORSE ARTILLERY.

BENGAL:

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Brigades of 3 European and 1 native troop each. | | 2 Brigades of 3 European and 1 native troop each. | |
| 9 Troops Europeans, of 80 gunners each | 720 | 6 European troops, of 100 gunners each | 600 |
| 3 Troops natives, of 90 privates each | 270 | 2 Native troops of 100 privates each | 200 |
| 12 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates | 990 | 8 Troops, making a Total of Gunners and Privates | 800 |

The reduction will consist of one brigade; that is, of three European troops and one native.

App. No. 2.

MADRAS.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Brigades; 1 of 4 troops of Europeans, and 1 of 2 troops of natives. | | 1 Brigade of 4 European troops. | |
| 4 Troops, Europeans, 84 gunners each | 336 | 4 European troops, of 100 gunners each | 400 |
| 2 Ditto, natives, 84 privates each | 168 | | |
| 6 Troops, making a Total of gunners and privates | 504 | | 400 |

There will be a reduction of one brigade of European officers, and of two troops of natives. It is universally admitted that the low stature and inferior strength of the Madras Sepoy totally unfit him for this arm.

App. No. 2.

BOMBAY.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Brigade of 4 European troops. | | 1 Brigade of 4 European troops. | |
| 4 Troops, European, 80 gunners each | 320 | 4 European troops, 100 gunners each | 400 |
| | 320 | | 400 |
| Total horse artillery | 1,814. | Total horse artillery | 1,600. |

There will thus be a diminution of 120 European artillery-men in the Bengal Horse Artillery, which will be more than met by the increase, at—

| | |
|---|---|
| Madras | 64 |
| Bombay | 80 |
| | 144 |

App. No. 2.

With respect to the foot artillery, a modification of the existing organization has been suggested which strikes me as being a great improvement, while it does not interfere with the present distribution of the European officers. It is proposed that each battalion shall be composed, after the manner of the Bengal Horse Artillery, of three companies of Europeans and two of natives, the two companies of natives having the same complement of officers as one company of European foot artillery, and one troop of native horse artillery.

The advantage of this plan is that the Europeans and natives will always act together; and to those who are of opinion (an opinion from which I totally dissent) that this powerful weapon should never be entrusted to natives, it will be satisfactory that the great majority of each battalion is European.

Uniformity

Uniformity also in the constitution of the foot artillery in the three Presidencies will be thus introduced:—

### Foot Artillery.

#### Bengal. App. No. 2.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each: | | 6 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 20 Companies, Europeans, 80 gunners each | 1,600 | 18 European companies, 100 gunners each | 1,800 |
| 2 Battalions, of 8 Native companies each: | | | |
| 16 Companies, Native, 104 privates each | 1,664 | 12 Native companies, 100 privates each | 1,200 |
| 7—36 Companies, making a Total of | 3,264 | 6—30 Companies, making a Total of | 3,000 |

#### Madras. App. No. 2.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each: | | 3 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 12 Companies, European, 80 gunners each | 960 | 9 European companies, 100 gunners each | 900 |
| 1 Battalion, of 6 Native companies: | | | |
| 6 Companies, Native, 92 privates each | 552 | 6 Native companies, 100 privates each | 600 |
| 4—18 Companies, making a Total of | 1,512 | 3—15 Companies, making a Total of | 1,500 |

#### Bombay. App. No. 2.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners or Privates. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Battalions, of 4 European Companies each: | | 2 Battalions, of 3 European and 2 Native Companies each: | |
| 8 Companies, of 80 gunners each | 640 | 6 European companies, 100 gunners each | 600 |
| 1 Battalion, of 8 Native Companies each: | | | |
| 8 Companies, Native, of 70 privates each | 560 | 4 Native companies, 100 privates each | 400 |
| 3—16 Companies, making a Total of | 1,200 | 2—10 Companies, making a Total of | 1,000 |
| Total Foot Artillery | 5,976 | Total Foot Artillery | 5,500 |
| Total Horse and Foot Artillery | 7,790 | Total Horse and Foot Artillery | 7,100 |

In Bengal there will be a gain of 200 Europeans, and a loss in Madras of 60, and in Bombay of 40. The total numbers will then stand:—

### Horse and Foot Artillery.

| Present: | | Proposed: | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 Brigades of | 22 troops. | 4 Brigades, of | 16 troops. |
| 14 Battalions, of | 70 companies. | 11 Battalions, of | 55 companies. |
| 20 | 92 | 15 | 71 |
| Europeans | 4,576 | Europeans | 4,700 |
| Natives | 3,214 | Natives | 2,400 |
| Total | 7,790 | Total | 7,100 |

The financial result of the proposed measures, as per annexed statement, exhibits an immediate saving of four lacs, 22,000 rupees, and prospective, of six lacs, 45,000 rupees, giving a total of 10 lacs, 68,000 rupees. App. No. 3.

It only now remains to be considered how far the proposed organization will provide

provide a force adequate to the service of that number of guns, which should be in due proportion to the strength of the army in infantry and cavalry.

The amount fixed by Napoleon, and adopted, I believe, by other powers, is four guns for every thousand men in the infantry, and an additional one-seventh for the cavalry. It might be assumed that a much smaller proportion would be sufficient for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and for the subjection of any power contiguous to our frontier; but with the immensity of our territory, and with the great, immediate, and overwhelming effect produced by artillery, I should be sorry to see any great reduction below the recognised standard in other armies, however appearances, and a reasonable calculation of probable danger, might seem to justify the measure. It must always be recollected also that the instruction and formation of good officers and men for the artillery requires science and long practice, and that upon the perfection of this arm success in modern warfare has very much depended.

In the proposed organization six guns are allotted to each troop, and eight to each company of artillery.

In the memorandum will be found a statement of the rank and file in the three Presidencies.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | BENGAL. | |
| | Cavalry - - - - - | 5,720 |
| | Infantry - - - - - | 56,930 |
| Guns - - 250 | | 62,650 |
| | MADRAS. | |
| | Cavalry - - - - - | 4,192 |
| | Infantry - - - - - | 41,972 |
| Guns - - 184 | | 46,164 |
| | BOMBAY. | |
| | Cavalry - - - - - | 1,972 |
| | Infantry - - - - - | 21,304 |
| Guns - - 92 | | 23,276 |
| TOTAL - - 526 pieces. | | |

The proposed new establishment will give, for Bengal—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| BENGAL. | | BENGAL. | |
| 8 Troops, 6 guns each - - - | 48 | Proposed - - - - - - | 288 |
| 30 Companies, 8 guns each - - - | 240 | Proportion, 4 per mille - - - | 250 |
| | 288 | Surplus - - - | 38 |
| MADRAS. | | MADRAS. | |
| 4 Troops, 6 guns each - - - | 24 | Proportion - - - - - - | 184 |
| 15 Companies, 8 guns each - - | 120 | Proposed - - - - - - | 144 |
| | 144 | Deficit - - | 40 |
| BOMBAY. | | BOMBAY. | |
| 4 Troops, 6 guns each - - - | 24 | Proposed - - - - - - | 104 |
| 10 Companies, 8 guns each - - | 80 | Proportion - - - - - - | 92 |
| | 104 | Surplus - - - | 12 |

Or,

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Number required - - - - - - | 526 |
| Total Number proposed - - - - - | 536 |
| Surplus - - - | 10 |

I do not trouble the Council with other combinations, by which results nearly similar might be obtained; I have confined myself to that plan which, after much

much consideration, seems best adapted to the double purpose of efficiency and economy.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*
" *Wm Casement*, Col.,
Secretary to the Governor of India,
Military Department.

23 July 1834.

## Appendix, No. 1.

### MEMORANDUM on the ARTILLERY of the three Presidencies.

The *personnel* of the Artillery of the armies of the three Presidencies amounts in the aggregate to—

17 Troops of European, and
5 Troops of Native Horse Artillery.

22 Troops of Horse Artillery.

10 Battalions of European, and
4 Battalions of Native Foot Artillery.

14 Battalions, consisting of 70 Companies in all.

Each Troop or Company mans 6 Field Guns, hence 552 Field Guns might be manned by this body of Artillery, giving very nearly 4 Guns for every 1,000 rank and file, European, and native, of the three armies.

The *materiel*, so far as that term is applicable to guns equipped and ready for service, cannot be exactly ascertained from any official documents or other resource to which access can be had at present. The number of guns and howitzers attached to each troop of horse artillery at the three Presidencies is known, and likewise the number of field batteries manned from the foot artillery in Bengal; but of the number of field guns thus retained in a state of preparation, or their distribution at Bombay and Madras, no precise information can be obtained without incurring the delay of references; indeed, with respect to the latter, Colonel Morison, in his able memorandum on Ordnance and Ordnance Equipment, complains that even in the call of the Supreme Government in 1831 " no returns of the light field artillery had been received, and he was therefore obliged to defer making any remarks on the existing equipment." With regard to Bengal and Bombay, it appears from Colonel Morison's memorandum, drawn up early in 1833, that there were 275 pieces of ordnance then in use at those Presidencies.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | BENGAL. | |
| 48 | 9-Pounders | Royal Pattern. |
| 48 | 6-Pounders | Royal Pattern. |
| 20 | 24-Pounder Howitzers | Royal Pattern. |
| 4 | 12-Pounders | Old Pattern. |
| 54 | 6-Pounders | Old Pattern. |
| 14 | 5½-inch Howitzers | Old Pattern. |
| 188 | | |
| | BOMBAY. | |
| 85 | 6-Pounders. | |
| 2 | 12-Pounders. | |
| 87 | | |
| 275 | TOTAL. | |

The complement of European officers allotted to each brigade of horse and battalion of foot artillery* is, by the Court's orders, the same under all the three Presidencies, and corresponds in every respect with that of a regiment of cavalry or infantry of the line. Their strength and formation, with the exception of the Golundauze, or native battalion, are also nearly the same; where differences exist, they will be noticed in considering the subject as it refers to each Presidency separately.

The immediate charge and control of the artillery at each Presidency is exercised by a commandant, who is generally the senior artillery officer present. In Bengal and Madras he is allowed an assistant adjutant general†; in Bombay, an ordnance assistant and a brigade major.

### BENGAL.

THE artillery regiment in Bengal consists of three brigades of horse and seven battalions of foot artillery.‡ Each brigade of horse artillery is composed of four troops, three European and one native. Of the seven battalions, five are exclusively European, consisting of four companies each, and two, denominated Golundauze, battalions of natives, consisting of eight companies each; so that there are on the Bengal establishment 12 troops of horse and 36 companies of foot artillery. To the corps of artillery is attached

* 1 Colonel; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel; 1 Major; 5 Captains; 8 First Lieutenants; 4 Second Lieutenants.

† The duty of this officer is understood to be the keeping of the accounts of stores received of the corps from the arsenals, there being no "Expense Magazine" or Depôt of Instruction.

‡ The complement of Officers, therefore, is; 10 Colonels; 10 Lieutenant-Colonels; 10 Majors; 50 Captains; 80 Lieutenants; 40 Second Lieutenants.

tached a body of Gun-Lascars, organised into the grades of subadar,* jemadar, havildar, naick, and privates. They are clothed and armed as soldiers, and are entitled to the benefits of the pension establishment. Likewise a body of ordnance drivers, consisting of 48 sirdars and 44 drivers.† These (the gun lascars and drivers) are distributed amongst and attached to troops, battalions, and batteries in the proportions that will be shown hereafter.

Military Statements 1831-32.

The established strength of a troop of European horse artillery is—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Captain. | 2 Rough Riders. |
| 2 First Lieutenants. | 80 Gunners. |
| 1 Second Lieutenant. | 3 Ordnance Drivers { For the carts drawn by bullocks. |
| 1 Staff Serjeant. | |
| 6 Serjeants. | 1 Havildar } |
| 6 Corporals. | 2 Naicks } Gun Lascars. |
| 10 Bombardiers. | 24 Privates } |
| 2 Trumpeters. | 169 Horses } |
| 2 Farriers. | |

And for a Native troop, the proportion of European officers being the same—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Staff Serjeant } | 2 Farriers } |
| 1 Farrier } peans. | 90 Troopers } Paid the same as Native Cavalry. |
| 1 Subadar | 3 Drivers } |
| 1 Jemadar | 1 Havildar } |
| 6 Havildars d the same as | 2 Naicks } Gun Lascars. |
| 6 Naicks Native Cavalry. | 24 Privates } |
| 2 mpeters | 169 Horses } |
| 2 Rough Riders } | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Guns, at 14 each | 84 |
| 6 | Ammunition Waggons, 8 each | 48 |
| 4 | Spare ditto, 7 each | 28 |
| 1 | Staff Serjeant | 1 |
| 2 | Trumpeters | 2 |
| 2 | Farriers | 2 |
| 2 | Rough Riders | 2 |
| 1 | Saddler Serjeant | 1 |
| 1 | Native Doctor | 1 |
| | For one troop | 169 |
| | There are men | 109 |
| | Remaining | 60 |

Each troop, European and Native, has an establishment of syces and grass-cutters (one of each for every horse) and artificers, and each brigade a staff, consisting of—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant and Quartermaster. | 1 Schoolmaster Serjeant. |
| 1 Surgeon. | 1 Hospital Serjeant. |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Rough Rider Serjeant. |
| 1 Veterinary Surgeon. | 1 Farrier Major. |
| 1 Riding Master. | 1 Trumpeter Major. |
| 1 Sergeant Major. | 1 Drill Corporal. |
| 1 Quartermaster Serjeant. | 3 Saddler Serjeants } Non-effective. |
| 1 Drill Serjeant. | 3 Pay Serjeants } |

Every

* Gun Lascars.—10 Subadars; 10 Jemadars; 52 Havildars; 62 Naicks; 1,088 Privates.

† Military Statements, 1831-32:

*Note.*—One driver is allowed for 2 bullocks and 6 spare for a battery, making 59 for each battery, viz:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Guns each, 8 bullocks | 48 |
| 6 | Ammunition Carts, each 6 | 3[illegible] |
| 1 | Store Cart | [illegible] |
| | Spare | 1[illegible] |
| | Bullocks | 10[illegible] |
| | Drivers | 5[illegible] |
| | Spare | [illegible] |
| | Drivers | 59 |

Every troop of Horse Artillery, European and Native, and in all situations, is equipped with four six-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers,* forming a battery of 48 six-pounders, and eight ammunition carts, and one store cart, and 24 howitzers, or 72 pieces. G. O. No. 4 of 1834.

The annexed statement (No. 1) shows the comparative formation and strength of a troop of horse artillery of each Presidency.

Each of the five battalions of European foot artillery, as has been observed, consists of four companies. Its established strength is—

24 Serjeants, including four Staff Serjeants.
20 Corporals.
40 Bombardiers.
8 Drummers.
320 Gunners.

2 Subadars
2 Jemadars
8 Havildars
8 Naicks
160 Privates
} Gun Lascars.

Hence a company—

1 Staff Serjeant.
5 Serjeants.
5 Corporals.
...bardiers.
...ers.

STAFF.

1 Adjutant and Quartermaster.
1 Surgeon.
1 Assistant Surgeon.
1 Serjeant Major
1 Quartermaster Serjeant
1 Drill Serjeant
} Effective.

1 Hospital Serjeant
1 Schoolmaster ditto
1 Drill Corporal
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major
} Effective.

An establishment of golundauze to be attached to each European company was first authorised by Minutes of Council, 15th October 1798. They were formed into five companies, and a staff authorised in 1806.

Augmented to eight companies in 1808, and a captain to command, authorised in 1816. An irregular corps of golundauze was formed from those who came over from the Mahratta service.

The strength of each of the two golundauze battalions of eight companies each is) the European officers being the same as allotted to a brigade or battalion)—

1 Subadar Major.
7 Subadars.
16 Jemadars.
64 Havildars.

64 Naicks.
16 Drummers.
832 Privates.

A company—

A Subadar.
2 Jemadars.
8 Havildars.

8 Naicks.
2 Drummers.
104 Privates.

STAFF.

1 Adjutant
1 Surgeon
1 Assistant Surgeon
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster
1 Serjeant Major
1 Quartermaster Serjeant
1 Drill Serjeant
} Effective.

1 Havildar Major
1 Quartermaster Havildar
1 Drill Havildar
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major
1 Native Doctor
} Effective.

The pay, &c. of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of these corps is the same in every respect as that of the same grades in a regiment of Native infantry.

Independent of park guns, and guns mounted in fortresses, the number of which cannot at present be ascertained, 12 batteries of light field artillery are retained in a state of complete equipment. Ten of these batteries consist of four nine-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder Howitzers, to which are attached Europeans, and two of four six-pounders, and two Howitzers, manned by Native foot artillery drafted with their ammunition and store carts, by 106 bullocks for each battery, driven by 59 drivers. Hence, there are 72 pieces of field ordnance manned by the foot artillery and 72 by the horse, making in all 144 pieces of field ordnance.

It is believed that five battering trains are kept up and deposited in the several magazines: one of these trains consists of,

12 24-Pounders.
12 18-Pounders.
12 Mortars, and
12 Howitzers.

48

240

The foot artillery batteries are distributed as follows, at—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dum Dum | 2 | Delhi | 1 |
| Dinapore | 1 | Nusseerabad | 1 |
| Benares | 1 | Mhow | 1 |
| Cawnpore | 1 | Neemuch | 1 |
| Saugor | 1 | | |
| Agra | 1 | | 12 |
| Kurnaul | 1 | | |

Statements Nos. 5 and 6 will show, the first, the distribution of the corps of artillery by brigades, battalions, and companies; and the second, by divisions and stations, with the ordnance at each.

The magazines under the Bengal Presidency are,

The arsenal in Fort William, under the superintendence of the principal and principal deputy commissary of ordnance.

The Expense Magazine, for the supply of the artillery at Dum Dum, superintended by a commissary.

| | |
|---|---|
| Chunar | by a Deputy Commissary. |
| Allahabad | by a Commissary. |
| Cawnpore | by a Commissary. |
| Agra | by a Commissary. |
| Delhi | by a Commissary. |
| Nesseerabad | by a Commissary. |
| Saugor | by a Deputy Commissary. |
| Fort Cornwallis | by a Deputy Commissary. |

## MADRAS.

At Madras the artillery regiment consists of four troops of European horse artillery, and two of native, and four* battalions of foot artillery.

*3 European. 1 Native.

Considering the six troops of horse artillery as two brigades, though, in point of fact, since the reduction of two troops of the Native brigade, they are equivalent to no more than one and a-half, the complement of officers for the whole corps is:

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 Colonels | 30 Captains |
| 6 Lieutenant Colonels | 48 First Lieutenants |
| 6 Majors | 24 Second Lieutenants |

Three of the battalions of foot artillery are European, of four companies each, and one battalion Native or golundauze, of six companies. There are, therefore, on the Madras establishment, six troops of horse and 18 companies of foot artillery.

GUN LASCARS.—The whole body, there, amounts to eight companies, viz:

| | |
|---|---|
| 8 Subadars | Statement 1831-32. |
| 8 Jemadars | |
| 48 Havildars | |
| 460 Privates | |

There are no Naicks either here or at Bombay: they are in Bengal.

A body of gun Lascars is attached to the artillery in Madras, organized, as to rank and grades, the same as in Bengal, except that there are no Naicks.

Two companies are attached to each battalion, European and Native, differing in the latter respect from the Bengal system, where no Lascars are attached to the Native battalions; but agreeing with Bombay, where they are. Attached to and belonging to the European foot artillery is the "Khar Khana Establishment;" its use and object is, I believe, to provide for the draughting of the artillery. The number of cattle maintained in it is not stated.

Military Statements, 1831-32.

The establishment appears to consist of—

10 Dangalis,
27 Chowdries, and,
600 Drivers.

Appertaining to the artillery generally, there is an institution designated the Depôt of Instruction, under the superintendence of a director, assisted by a small establishment.

Besides instructing in the practical knowledge of their duties the young officers and men as they join the regiment, the director has many important duties to perform; they are particularized at length in Statement No. 7.

The institution likewise seems to admit of an advantageous arrangement in a division of the official duties performed in Bengal, by the assistant adjutant general of the artillery, whose duties in Madras are confined to the discipline, pay, arms and accoutrements of the regiment, the ordnance branch falling entirely to the director of the depôt, who likewise performs all the duty assigned in Bengal to the Commissary of the Presidency Expense Magazine.

## Horse Artillery.

The horse brigade of artillery is of the following established effective strength:— Military Statement, 1831–32.

### European.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 Colonels. | 24 Serjeants. |
| 2 Lieutenant Colonels. | 24 Corporals. |
| 2 Majors. | 48 Bombardiers. |
| 20 Captains. | 336 Gunners. |
| 20 First Lieutenants. | 6 Trumpeters. |
| 8 Second Lieutenants. | 409 Horses. |
| 4 Troop Quartermasters. | |

### Staff.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant.* | 1 Schoolmaster Serjeant. |
| 1 Quartermaster.* | 4 Drill Corporals (non-effective). |
| 1 Surgeon. | 1 Trumpeter Major. |
| 4 Assistant Surgeons. | 1 Farrier Major. |
| 1 Regimental Serjeant Major. | 4 Farriers. |
| 4 Troop Serjeant Majors. | 4 Rough Riders. |
| 1 Regimental Quartermaster Serjeant. | 1 Serjeants. |
| 4 Troop Quartermaster Serjeants. | 1 Hospital Serjeant. |
| 1 Riding Master Serjeant. | |

* These two appointments are in the same [illegible] in Bengal.

A troop then has—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Captain. | 22 Trumpeters. |
| 2 First Lieutenants. | 120 Horses. |
| 1 Second Lieutenant. | 1 Assistant Surgeon. |
| *1 Troop Quartermaster. | 1 Troop Serjeant Major. |
| 3 Serjeants. | 1 Troop Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 3 Corporals. | 1 Drill Corporal. |
| 12 Bombardiers. | 3 Farriers. |
| 4 Gunners. | |

* Troop quartermasters are warrant officers, and rank as conductors; there is such officer either in Bengal or Bombay, attached to the horse artillery.

Cost $161 \times 6 \times 12 = 11{,}592$ rupees per annum.

### Native, Two Troops:

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 Troop Quartermasters. | 12 Naicks. |
| 6 Serjeants. | 4 Trumpeters. |
| 2 Subadars. | 168 Privates. |
| 4 Jemadars. | 16 Recruit Boys. |
| 12 Havildars. | 218 Horses. |

, with the above proportion of European officers, has—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Troop Quartermaster. | 6 Naicks. |
| 3 Serjeants. | 2 Trumpeters. |
| 1 Subadar. | 84 Privates. |
| 1 Jemadar. | 8 Recruit Boys. |
| 6 Havildars. | 109 Horses. |

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Drill Naick. |
| 1 Troop Serjeant Major. | 3 Farriers. |
| 1 Troop Quartermaster Serjeant. | 1 Veterinary Pupil. |
| 1 Troop Havildar Major. | 2 Rough Riders. |
| 1 Drill Havildar. | |

### Staff.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 Assistant Surgeons. | 2 Drill Havildars. |
| 2 Troop Serjeant Majors. | 2 Drill Naicks. |
| 2 Troop Quartermaster Serjeants. | 6 Farriers. |
| 1 Subadar Major. | 2 Veterinary Pupils. |
| 2 Troop Havildar Majors. | 4 Rough Riders. |

With an establishment of horse-keepers and grass-cutters, but not as in Bengal a horse-keeper for each horse, either in the European or Native-Horse Artillery. No gun lascars or drivers as in Bengal and Bombay.

There are besides, an establishment of artificers, lascars, measuring men, &c., and vakeil conicopolers, bazaar men &c.

*Vide* Statement No. 2, Appendix.

The proportion of officers, as above given, is that fixed by the Court, for two brigades of horse artillery of four troops each; but since the reduction of half the Native brigade horse a proportion of these officers who are in effect an excess to the strength of the brigade in artillery corps; and the corps in general are attached to the foot artillery, though b[illegible] the strength of the horse artillery brigade.

The horse-artillery at Madras are armed with six-pounder guns only. [illegible]; and the three stationed at Nagpore, Jaulnah, and S[illegible]erabad, having six pieces each[illegible]ore, only four guns troops within the frontier stationed at [illegible]homas's Mount and Bangal[illegible] each, making in all 30 guns.

Both at Madras and Bombay the s[illegible]nœuvring prac[illegible]used in the Royal Horse Artillery is, I believe, adopted as t[illegible]ereas in [illegible]Bengal they have a system of their own, introduced by Lieut.-Co[illegible]he principal distinction between them is, that in the former the gun is unl[illegible]t is wheeled into battery, the advantage of which is that the danger of ups[illegible]oided, and less space required; in the latter the gun is wheeled into battery [illegible]himbering, having an advantage in gaining time, and therefore opening its fi[illegible]

In Bengal also each horse [illegible]ght is mounted, whereas in Madras and Bombay only one horse of each pair is ridden.

### [illegible]OOT ARTILLERY.

The three battalions of Eu[illegible] Foot Artillery consist of four companies each, the strength of each battalion being [illegible]lusive of the European officers:—

| | |
|---|---|
| 28 Serjeants, including four Brigade Serjeants. | 2 Subadars. |
| 28 Corporals. | 2 Jemidars. |
| 40 Bombardiers. | 8 Havildars. |
| 10 Drummers. | 120 Lascars. |
| 320 Gunners. | 16 Lascar Boys. |
| | } Gun Lascars, two C[illegible]anies. |

*A Company.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Brigade Serjeant. | 10 Bombardiers. |
| 6 Serjeants. | 2 Drummers. |
| 7 Corporals. | 90 Gunners. |

*Staff.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant. | 1 Hospital Serjeant (non-eff |
| 1 Quartermaster. | 1 Drill Serjeant. |
| 1 Surgeon. | 4 Pay Serjeants (non-effect |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Drill Corporal. |
| 1 Serjeant Major. | 2 Drum and Fife Majors. |
| 1 Quartermaster Serjeant. | * 1 Subadar Major. |
| 1 Schoolmaster ditto | |

Perhaps of the Gun Lascars.

*Vide* Statement No. 3, appended.

With an establishment of moonshee, vakeel, apothecaries, artificers, bazaar men,

The Golundauze, or native battalion of six companies, consists of—

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 Subadars. | 70 Recruit and Pensioned B |
| 12 Jemidars. | 2 Subadars. |
| 48 Havildars. | 2 Jemidars. |
| 48 Naicks. | 12 Havildars. |
| 12 Drummers. | 120 Lascars. |
| 552 Privates. | 16 Lascar Boys. |
| | } Gun Lascars, two Companies. |

*A Company.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Subadar. | 8 Naicks. |
| 2 Jemidars. | 2 Drummers. |
| 8 Havildars. | 92 Privates. |

*Staff.*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant. | 1 Regimental Havildar Major. |
| 1 Interpreter and Quartermaster. | 1 Native Adjutant. |
| 1 Surgeon. | 6 Pay Havildars (non-effective). |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Drill Havildar. |
| 1 Serjeant. | 1 Drill Naick. |
| 1 Quartermaster Serjeant. | 6 Colour Havildars (non-effective). |
| 1 Subadar Major. | 2 Drum and Fife Majors. |

*Vide* Statement No. 4, appended.

With an establishment of vakeel, moonshee, apothecaries, artificers, bazaar men, lascars, &c.

Hence

Hence it would appear that a company of Golundauze at Madras, has 12 privates less than a company of Golundauze in Bengal, and 22 more than in Bombay; gun lascars being attached to those battalions, both at Madras and Bombay, but not in Bengal.

Bengal 104; Madras 92; difference 12. Bombay 70; difference 22.

There are no guns in use, either with the horse or foot artillery, but six-pounders, with exception of the Mount; it is believed that the whole of the foot artillery is completed with guns, carriages, and cattle,* but only about three-fourths are completed with waggons. A considerable portion of the field artillery carriages, perhaps more than a half, however, are of the old condemned pattern.

Memo. from Colonel Cullen.

Exclusive of the guns attached to the horse artillery, there are perhaps 172 pieces of field ordnance mounted and in use, or in store; of these 90 are six-pounders, 80 of which are in use with the foot artillery, and 10 or perhaps 12 might be equipped for field service at the Mount; eight or nine pounders mounted but not in use, and about 70 of different calibres in store.

Memo. from Colonel Cullen.

The distribution of the field guns manned by the foot artillery is as follows, viz.—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| At Nagpore | 16 | At Cannanore | 8 |
| „ Jaulush | 8 | „ Trichinopoly | 8 |
| „ Secunderabad | 8 | „ Palamatta | 2 |
| „ Musilipatam | 8 | „ Moulmein | 8 |
| „ Bellary | 8 | | |
| „ Bangalore | 8 | TOTAL | 80 |

There are also on the establishment 37 12-inch howitzers, but the state of equipment they are in is not mentioned, nor whether they are mounted or not.

With the 30 horse artillery guns there are, therefore, 110 six-pounder field pieces in a state of equipment, at the Madras Presidency.

A statement (No. 8), showing the distribution of the artillery regiment at Madras, is annexed.

The magazines under the Madras Presidency are [redacted] at George, the arsenal Bellary, Nagpore, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Trichinopoly, and Cunnanore.†

## BOMBAY.

THE Bombay regiment of artillery consists of one brigade of horse artillery of four troops, exclusively European, two battalions of European foot artillery, and one battalion of native or Golundauze. Each battalion of European consists of four companies, and the Golundauze battalion of eight companies, so that there are four troops of horse, and 16 companies of foot artillery on the Bombay establishment.

The complement of officers for the whole corp is—

| | |
|---|---|
| 4 Colonels. | 20 Captains. |
| 4 Lieutenant Colonels. | 32 First Lieutenants. |
| 4 Majors. | 16 Second Lieutenants. |

The whole body of gun lascars is formed into six companies,‡ two of which are attached to each battalion of foot artillery, European and native, and a havildar's party to each troop of horse artillery. A subadar major is allowed to the body, and a pay havildar to each company, differing in its distribution and formation both from Bengal and Madras; for in Bengal there are no gun lascars attached to the Golundauze battalion, and in Madras there are none attached to the horse artillery. Neither in Bengal or Madras§ are pay havildars allowed, and in Bombay and Madras there is no grade of naick, though in Bengal there is.

Captain Johnstone's Memo.

The foot artillery guns in Bombay are drafted by hired bullocks, provided on contracts with their drivers by the Commissariat, which is found to be an economical system.‖

The Depôt of Instruction at Bombay has, I believe, been abolished by orders from home.

A troop of horse artillery consists of—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Captain. | 80 Gunners. | |
| 2 First Lieutenants. | 3 Farriers. | |
| 1 Second Lieutenant. | 3 Trumpeters. | |
| 6 Serjeants. | 1 Havildar. } Gun Lascars. | |
| 6 Corporals. | 24 Privates. } | |
| 12 Bombardiers. | 1 Native Farrier. | |
| | 160 Horses. | |

Horse Artillery, Military Statement, 1831–32.

* This is corroborated in a memo. from the commandant of artillery, wherein it is stated that "regimental guns had been attached to every company as well as troop." The number is not given, but it is believed to be eight.

† The situation of this place on the Malabar coast suggests the idea that the magazine could be more conveniently and economically supplied from the Bombay than the Madras arsenal.

‡ It consists of 6 subadars, 6 jemadars, 28 havildars, 456 privates, 24 boys.

§ At Madras and Bombay it seems from the military statement, that a Subadar major of gun lascars is allowed at those Presidencies. There is no such officer at Bengal.

‖ Mules at Booj, about 39 in number, are kept, but are to be done away.—Captain Johnstone.

STAFF.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant and Quartermaster. | 1 Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Ridingmaster Serjeant. |
| 1 Serjeant Major. | 1 Drill Corporal. |
| | 2 Rough Riders. |

One adjutant and quartermaster in the same person in Bengal, and an adjutant and quartermaster in Madras, are attached to each brigade, but not to each troop, in Bombay. The extra expense is $177 \times 4 \times 12 = 8496$ rupees per annum.

With an establishment for the hospital of horse-keepers, grass-cutters, watermen, washermen, artificers, hollalkores, &c.

And a brigade consists of—

*Vide* Statement No. 1, Appendix.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Colonel. | 5 Captains. |
| 1 Lieutenant Colonel. | 8 First Lieutenants. |
| 1 Major. | 4 Second Lieutenants. |

With the staff and establishment as detailed for each troop, and the following additional as regimental or brigade staff—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Interpreter | 1 Veterinary Surgeon. |

Each troop of horse artillery is equipped with four guns, 6-pounders.

A battalion of European foot artillery, exclusive of the European officers, which are the same under all the Presidencies, consists of—

Foot Artillery, Military Statement, 1831-32.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 Brigade Serjeants. | 8 Drummers. | |
| 16 Serjeants. | 2 Subadars. | Gun Lascars. |
| 20 Corporals. | 2 Jemidars. | |
| 40 Bombardiers. | 8 Havildars. | |
| 320 Gunners. | 120 Privates. | |

A company—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Brigade Serjeant. | 2 Drummers. | |
| 4 Serjeants. | 1 Subadar or Jemidar. | Gun Lascars. |
| 5 Corporals. | 2 Havildars. | |
| 10 Bombardiers. | 30 Privates. | |
| 80 Gunners. | | |

STAFF.

*Vide* No. 3, Appendix.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant. | 1 Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 1 Interpreter and Quartermaster. | 1 Drill Serjeant. |
| 1 Surgeon. | 1 Drill Corporal. |
| 1 Serjeant Major. | 2 Drum and Fife Majors. |

With the establishment of waterman, washermen, peons, sweepers, hollalkores and artificers.

The Golundauze battalion has eight companies, and, exclusive of officers, consists of the following effective establishment:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8 Subadars. | 2 Subardars. | Gun Lascars. |
| 16 Jemidars. | 2 Jemidars. | |
| 48 Havildars. | 8 Havildars. | |
| 48 Naicks. | 120 Privates. | |
| 16 Drummers and Fifes. | | |
| 560 Privates. | | |

Captain Johnstone's Memo.

A company—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Subadar. | 6 Naicks. |
| 2 Jemidars. | 2 Drummers. |
| 6 Havildars. | 70 Privates. |

STAFF.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Adjutant. | 1 Native Adjutant. |
| 1 Interpreter and Quartermaster. | 1 Havidar Major. |
| 1 Assistant Surgeon. | 1 Drill Havildar. |
| 2 Serjeants. | 2 Drum and Fife Majors. |

With an establishment of artificers, &c.

The number of field guns kept in a state of equipment under the Bombay Presidency is stated to be 62 6-pounders, and eight 5½-inch howitzers, manned by the Foot Artillery. Captain Johnstone's Memo.

Their distribution is as follows:

| | | | Six Pound. | Howitzers. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Battalion, four Companies, at | - - - | Ahmednugger - | 10 | 2 |
| 2nd Battalion European Artillery. | Detachment at - - - | Belgaum - - | 6 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - | Booj - - | 6 | — |
| | Head Quarters at - - - | Bombay - - | 6 | 4 |
| Golundauze | Ditto at - - - - | Ahmednugger - | 14 | 2 |
| | Detachment at - - - - | Baroda - - | 6 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - - | Hindoor - - | 4 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - - | Surat - - - | 2 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - - | Rajcole - - | 2 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - - | Malgoram - - | 4 | — |
| | Ditto at - - - - | Sattarah - - | 2 | — |
| | | TOTAL - - - | 62 | 8 |

| | Guns. | Howitzers. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal - - - - | 96 | 48 |
| Madras - - - - | 110 | Uncertain. |
| Bombay - - - - | 78 | 8 |
| | 284 | 56 |
| | 340 | |

Hence the total field ordnance in use at Bombay, with the Horse and Foot Artillery, is 78 6-pounders, and eight howitzers.

The magazines and depôts are, one grand arsenal at Bombay, three principal magazines of Poonah, Belgaum, and Ahmedabad; eight depôts at Surat, Ahmednugger, Bhooj, Deesah, Rajcole, Baroda, Sholapore, and Malagaum.

Annexed (No. 9) will be found a Comparative Statement of the Ordnance Commissariat Departments of the three Presidencies.

## No. 1.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength and Formation of a Troop of European Horse Artillery at each Presidency.

| Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | ——— | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | ——— |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | STAFF: |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Captain. | Regimental | Brigade | 1 | Adjutant. |
| | | | | Brigade - | 1 | – | Quartermaster (Warrant Officer). |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | First Lieutenants. | Ditto - | 1 | 1 | Assistant Surgeon. |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Second ditto. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Serjeant Major, or Staff Serjeant. |
| | | | | Brigade - | 1 | 1 | Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 6 | 6 | 6 | Serjeants. | Ditto - | Brigade | 1 | Riding Master or Riding Master Serjeant. |
| 6 | 6 | 6 | Corporals. | Ditto - | 1 | – | Drill Corporal. |
| 10 | 12 | 10 | Bombardiers. | 2 | 2 | 2 | Rough Riders. |
| | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | Pay Serjeant - |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | Trumpeters. | 1 | - - | – | Saddle Serjeant - } Non-effective. |
| 2 | 3 | 3 | Farriers. | – | 1 | 1 | Assistant Apothecary. |
| 80 | 82 | 80 | Gunners. | – | – | 1 | Hospital Apprentice. |
| | | | | 1 | - - | – | Native Doctor. |
| 1 | – | 1 | Havildar - } Gun Lascars. | | | | |
| 1 | – | – | Naicks - } Gun Lascars. | | | | ESTABLISHMENT: |
| 24 | – | 24 | Privates - } Gun Lascars. | – | – | 1 | Waterman. |
| 1 | – | 1 | Native Farrier. | – | – | 1 | Washerman. |
| | | | | – | – | 1 | Peon for detecting Diseased Women. |
| 2 | 2 | – | Puckallies. | – | – | 1 | Kalalkore (Sweeper). |
| 1 | – | – | Hand Bheestre. | 1 | – | – | Lascar. |
| | | | | 2 | - - | – | Sweepers. |
| 3 | – | – | Ordnance Drivers. | – | 32 | – | Artificers. |
| – | 2 | 1 | Muccadams, or Chowdries of Horse-keepers. | 1 | - - | – | Maisty Carpenter. |
| | | | | 2 | - - | 1 | Carpenters. |
| 161 | 50 | 109 | Horse-keepers, or Syces. | 1 | - - | – | Maisty Smith. |
| | | | | – | – | 1 | Smith. |
| – | 2 | 1 | Muccadams, or Chowdries of Grass cutters. | 2 | - - | – | Fireman. |
| | | | | 2 | - - | – | Filemen. |
| 169 | 120 | 149 | Grass cutters. | – | – | 1 | Armourer. |
| 169 | 120 | 160 | Horses. | 2 | - - | 1 | Hammermen. |
| | | | | – | – | 1 | Bellows Boy. |
| | | | | – | – | 1 | Sicklegghur. |
| | | | | 1 | - - | 1 | Moochhie. |

## No. 2.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength and Formation of a Troop of Native Horse Artillery at each Presidency.

| Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Officers as in foregoing Statment, No. 1. | | | | STAFF : |
| | | | | 1 | 1 | | Serjeant Major, or Staff Serjeant. |
| – | 1 | | Troop Quartermaster. | – | 2 | | Serjeants. |
| 1 | 1 | | Subadars. | – | 1 | | Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 1 | 2 | | Jemidars. | 1 | – | | Farrier Serjeant. |
| 6 | 6 | | Havildars. | 2 | 2 | | Rough Riders. |
| 6 | 6 | | Naicks. | 1 | – | | Staff Havildar - } Non-effective. |
| 2 | 2 | | Trumpeters. | 1 | 2 | | Pay - ditto - } |
| 2 | 3 | | Farriers. | – | 1 | | Havildar Major. |
| 90 | 84 | | Troopers. | – | 1 | | Drill Havildar. |
| – | 8 | | Recruit and Pension Boys. | – | 1 | | Drill Naick. |
| – | 2 | | Horsekeeper Chowdries. | – | 1 | | Veterinary Pupil. |
| 169 | 74 | | Horsekeepers, or Syces. | – | 1 | | Vakeel. |
| – | 2 | | Grass-cutter Chowdries. | – | 1 | | Assistant Apothecary. |
| 169 | 109 | | Grass Cutters. | – | 1 | | Totie. |
| 1 | 3 | | Puckallies. | – | 1 | | Gram Measuring Man. |
| 3 | – | | Drivers. | 1 | 2 | | Lascars. |
| 1 | – | | Havildar. | 1 | – | | Native Doctor. |
| 1 | – | | Naick. | 11 | 16 | | Artificers. |
| 24 | – | | Privates. | | | | |
| 169 | 109 | | Horses. | | | | |

No Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.

No Native Horse Artillery at Bombay.

## No. 3.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength, and Formation, and Establishment of a Battalion of European Artillery at each Presidency.

| Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | The Officers are the same for all Presidencies. | | | | STAFF: |
| 4 | 4 | 4 | Brigade or Staff Sergeants. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Adjutant, or Adjutant and Quarter master. |
| 20 | 24 | 16 | Sergeants. | | | | |
| 20 | 28 | 20 | Corporals. | – | 1 | 1 | Quartermaster. |
| 40 | 40 | 40 | Bombardiers. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Surgeon. |
| 8 | 10 | 8 | Drummers. | 1 | 1 | – | Assistant Surgeon. |
| 320 | 320 | 320 | Gunners. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Serjeant Major. |
| 8 | 8 | – | Puckaullies. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 8 | – | 4 | Sweepers. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Drill Serjeant. |
| – | – | 1 | Head Washerman. | 1 | 1 | – | Hospital Serjeant. |
| – | – | 12 | Washermen. | 1 | 1 | – | Schoolmaster Serjeant. |
| – | – | 12 | Watermen. | 4 | 4 | 4 | Pay Serjeants } Non-effective. |
| – | – | 4 | Halalkores. | 4 | – | – | Staff ditto } Non-effective. |
| – | – | 1 | Chowdry. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Drill Corporal. |
| – | – | 2 | Peons. | 2 | 2 | 2 | Drum and Fife Majors. |
| | | | GUN LASCARS: | – | 1 | – | Moonshee. |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | Subadars. | – | 1 | – | Vakeel. |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | Jemidars. | – | 1 | – | Apothecary. |
| 8 | 8 | 8 | Havildars. | – | 1 | – | Second Assistant Apothecary. |
| 8 | – | – | Naicks. | – | 1 | – | Second Dresser. |
| 160 | 120 | 120 | Privates. | – | 2 | – | Toties. |
| – | 16 | – | Lascar Boys. | 3 | 5 | – | Bazaar Servants. |
| – | 4 | – | Bheestres. | – | 8 | 7 | Artificers. |
| | | | ORDNANCE DRIVERS: | | | | |
| 16 | – | – | Sirdars. | | | | |
| 236 | – | – | Drivers. | | | | |
| 4 | – | – | Bheestres. | | | | |

## No. 4.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Strength, Formation, and Establishment of a Battalion of Golundauze at each Presidency.

| Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | The Officers are the same as for a European Battalion or Brigade. | | | | STAFF: |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Subadar Major. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Adjutant. |
| 7 | 5 | 7 | Subadars. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Quartermaster and Interpreter. |
| 16 | 12 | 16 | Jemidars. | – | 1 | – | Surgeon. |
| 64 | 48 | 48 | Havildars. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Assistant Surgeon. |
| 64 | 48 | 48 | Naicks. | – | 1 | 1 | Native Adjutant. |
| 16 | 12 | 16 | Drummers. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Serjeant Major. |
| 832 | 552 | 560 | Privates. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Quartermaster Serjeant. |
| 8 | 14 | – | Lascars. | 1 | – | – | Drill Serjeant. |
| 8 | 12 | 16 | Bheestres. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Havildar Major. |
| – | 70 | – | Recruit and Pension Boys. | 1 | – | – | Quartermaster Havildar. |
| | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | Drill Havildar. |
| | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | Drill Naick. |
| | | | ORDNANCE DRIVERS: | 2 | 2 | 2 | Drum and Fife Majors. |
| 8 | – | – | Sirdars. | 8 | 6 | 8 | Pay Havildars } Non-effective, |
| 118 | – | – | Drivers. | 8 | – | – | Brigade ditto } |
| 2 | – | – | Bheestres. | – | 1 | – | Vakeel. |
| | | | | – | 1 | – | Moonshee. |
| | | | | – | – | 1 | Pundit. |
| | | | GUN LASCARS: | – | 1 | 1 | Assistant Apothecary, or Hospital Assistant. |
| – | 2 | 2 | Subadars. | – | 1 | 1 | Dresser, or Assistant. |
| – | 2 | 2 | Jemidars. | 1 | – | – | Native Doctor. |
| – | 12 | 8 | Havildars. | – | 2 | – | Toties or Sweepers. |
| – | 120 | 120 | Lascars. | – | 9 | 7 | Artificers. |
| – | 16 | – | Lascar Boys. | 5 | 5 | – | Bazaar Servants. |
| – | 4 | 4 | Bheestres. | – | – | – | Regimental Lascars. |
| – | – | 2 | Pay Havildars. | | | | |

No. 5.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT of the Regiment of Artillery, Bengal.

| | Brigade or Batallion. | Commanding Officer. | Head Quarters. | Troop or Company. | Where Stationed. | Guns. 6-pounders. | Guns. Howitzers. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Horse Artillery. | 1st - | Lieut.-Col. Boileau - | Meerut - | 1st and 2nd European - | Meerut - | 8 | 4 |
| | | | | 4th Native - - - | | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | 3rd European - - | Dum Dum | 4 | 2 |
| | 2nd - | Lieut.-Col. Whish - | Cawnpore - | 1st and 2nd European - | Cawnpore - | 8 | 4 |
| | | | | 3rd European - - | Meerut - | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | 4th Native - - - | Loodianah - | 4 | 2 |
| | 3rd - | Lieut.-Col. Rodbor - | Kurnaul - | 1st European - - - | Kurnaul - | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | 2nd „ - - - | Mhow - | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | 3rd „ - - - | Muttra - | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | 4th Native - - - | Neemuch - | 4 | 2 |
| | | | | | | Battery | |
| | 1st - | Lieut.-Col. Shaw - | Mhow - | 1st Company European - | Benares - | No. 11 | L. |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | Dinapore - | „ 12 | M. |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | Mhow - | „ 7 | G. |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | Saugor - | „ 8 | H. |
| | 2nd - | Lieut.-Col. Briggs - | Nusserabad | 1st Company European - | Nusserabad | „ 1 | A. |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | Meerut - | „ — | „ |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | Kurnaul - | „ 5 | E. |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | | | |
| | 3rd - | Colonel Faithfull - | Cawnpore - | 1st Company European - | Cawnpore - | „ 9 | I. |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | Allahabad. | | |
| | 4th - | Lieut.-Col. Lindsay - | Dum Dum - | 1st Company European - | Dum Dum | No. 4 | D. |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | | | |
| Foot Artillery. | 5th - | Colonel Parker - | Agra - | 1st Company European - | Agra - | „ 10 | K. |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | Dum Dum | „ 3 | C. |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | | | |
| | 6th - | Lieut.-Col. Pollock - | Cawnpore - | 1st Company Native - | Cawnpore. | | |
| | | | | 3rd „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 4th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 5th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 6th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 8th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 2nd „ „ - | Neemuch - | No. 2 | B. |
| | | | | 7th „ „ - | Delhi - | „ 6 | F. |
| | 7th - | Lieut.-Col. Frith - | Dum Dum - | 1st Company Native - | Cawnpore. | | |
| | | | | 2nd and 3rd Co. Native - | Dum Dum. | | |
| | | | | 4th and 5th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 6th and 7th „ „ - | | | |
| | | | | 8th - „ „ - | | | |

No. 6.

STATEMENT showing the Artillery and Ordnance at each Station.

| Division. | Station. | Troop, or Company. | Guns. 9-pounders. | Guns. 6-pounders. | Guns. Howitzers. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Presidency - | Dum Dum - | 3rd Troop 1st Battalion Horse Artillery. | 4 | – | 2 | The head quarters of the regiment and of the 4th and 7th Battalions furnishing detachments to Assam, Cuttack, Dacca, Berhampore, Chittagong, Arracan, Garokpore and Mullye. |
| | | 4th Batallion - - - - - - | 4 | – | 2 | |
| | | 3rd and 4th Companies 5th Battalion 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Companies, 7th Battalion. | 4 | – | 2 | |
| | | Total, 1 Troop 6 Companies European and 7 Native Field Artillery - - - - | 12 | – | 6 | |
| Dinapore - | Dinapore - | 2nd Company 1st Battalion - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| Benares - - | Benares - | 1st Company 1st Battalion - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| Cawnpore - | Cawnpore - | 1st and 2nd Troop 2 Brigade - - | 8 | – | 4 | Horse Artillery. |
| | | 1st 2nd and 3rd Companies, 3rd Battalion. | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | | 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th Companies of the 6th, and 1st Company 7th Battalion. | | | | |
| | Allahabad - | 4th Company 3rd Battalion. | | | | |
| | | Total, 2 Troops Horse Artillery and 11 Companies Foot Artillery - - - - - - | 12 | – | 6 | |
| Saugor - - | Saugor - - | 4th Company 1st Battalion - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| Meerut - - | Meerut - - | 1st and 2nd Troop European - - | 8 | – | 4 | Horse Artillery. |
| | | 4th Native 1st Brigade - - - | – | 4 | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| | | 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade - - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | | 2nd Company 2nd Battalion. | | | | |
| | | Total, 3 European Troops, 1 Native and 1 European Company - - - - | 12 | 4 | 8 | |
| | Agra - - | 1st and 2nd Companies 5th Battalion | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | Muttra - - | 3rd Troop 3rd Brigade - - - | 4 | – | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| | Delhi - - | 7th Company 6th Battalion - - | – | 4 | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| Kurnaul Sirhind | Kurnaul - | 1st Troop 3rd Brigade - - - | 4 | – | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| | | 3rd and 4th Companies 2nd Battalion | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | | Total, 1 Troop and 2 Companies European - - - - | 8 | – | 4 | |
| | Loodiana - | 4th Troop 2nd Brigade - - - | – | 4 | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| Rajpootanah Field Force. | Nusserabad - | 1st Company 2nd Battalion - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | Neemuch - | 4th Troop 3rd Brigade - - - | – | 4 | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| Malwa Field Force. | Mhow - - | 2nd Troop 3rd Brigade - - - | 4 | – | 2 | Horse Artillery. |
| | | 3rd Company 1st Battalion - - | 4 | – | 2 | Foot Artillery. |
| | | Total, 1 Troop and 1 Company European Artillery - | 8 | – | 4 | |

No. 7.

THE Director of the Depôt of Instruction superintends—

1st. The instruction in the practical knowledge of their duties of the young officers and men who arrive from Europe.

2nd. The annual artillery practice at head quarters.

3rd. The proof of all gunpowder made at the powder mills.

4th. The proof of all gun carriages and mortar beds constructed at the manufactory.

5th. All experiments.

6th. All laboratory works, *i. e.* the preparation of portfires, fuzes, matches, &c., for general service.

He has charge of—

1st. All models.

2nd. All drawings of artillery carriages.

3rd. The field train of the presidency which was removed to the Mount in 1828, now consisting of ordnance carriages, 180 of different descriptions, including mortar and other carts.

He keeps records—

1st. Of all proceedings, &c. of the permanent Artillery Select Committee.

2nd. Of all correspondence relating to the ordnance and equipments of the regiment.

3rd. Of all subjects referred from the Military Board for the Report of the Commandant of Artillery, and his reply thereto.

4th. Of all plans and reports of practice at head quarters, and out-stations.

5th. All indents for equipments for the use of the regiment are checked in the department, ensuring thereby regularity and econony in the regimental expenditure.

No. 8.

DISTRIBUTION of the Madras Artillery, per Returns, 1 September 1833.

| Division of the Army. | Station. | Head Quarters. | Troops. | Rank and File. | Guns, 6-prs. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centre Division | Fort St. George | - - - | European Foot Artillery Detachment | 25 | – |
| | | | Native „ „ | 54 | – |
| | St. Thomas's Mount | Horse Artillery and Foot Artillery, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions | European Horse Artillery, 2 troops | 188 | 8 |
| | | | Native ditto, dismounted Detachment | 172 | – |
| | | | European Foot Artillery, 3 companies | 295 | – |
| | | | Native „ „ | 223 | – |
| | Vellore | - - - | European Foot Artillery Detachment | 12 | – |
| | Vellore | - - - | Native Horse Artillery, dismounted Detachment. | 100 | – |
| Northern Division | Musulipitam | - - - | European Foot Artillery, 1 company | 97 | 8 |
| Southern Division | Trichinopoly | - - - | European Foot Artillery | 76 | 6 |
| | Palamootta | - - - | „ „ Detachment | 18 | 2 |
| Mysore Division | Bangalore | - - - | Native Horse Artillery, 1 troop | 86 | 4 |
| | | | European Foot Artillery, 1 company | 77 | 8 |
| Malabar and Canara | Cannanore | - - - | Native Foot Artillery, 1 company | 100 | 8 |
| Ceded Districts | Bellary | - - - | European Foot Artillery, 1 company | 78 | 8 |
| Subsidiary Force | Nagpore | - - - | European Horse Artillery, 1 troop | 106 | 6 |
| | | | European Foot Artillery, 2 companies | 177 | 16 |
| Hyderabad Subsidiary Force | Secunderabad | - - - | Native Horse Artillery, 1 troop | 94 | 6 |
| | | | European Foot Artillery, 1 company | 110 | 8 |
| | Jaulnah | - - - | European Horse Artillery, 1 troop | 97 | 6 |
| | | | Native Foot Artillery, 1 company | 97 | 8 |
| Tenasserim Provinces | Moulmein | - - - | European Foot Artillery, 1 company | 69 | 8 |
| | Mergin | - - - | „ „ Detachment | 7 | – |
| | Tavoy | - - - | „ „ „ | 17 | – |
| Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies | Penang | - - - | European Foot Artillery, Detail | 48 | – |
| | | | Native „ „ | 28 | – |
| | Singapore | - - - | „ „ „ | 35 | – |
| | Malacca | - - - | „ „ „ | 36 | – |

No. 9.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Ordnance Commissariat Establishments of the Three Presidencies.

| Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | RANK. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | Principal Commissary. |
| 1 | 1 | – | Deputy Principal Commissary. |
| – | – | 1 | Senior Deputy Commissary of Stores. |
| – | – | 1 | Junior Deputy Commissary of Stores. |
| 6 | 7 | 3 | Commissaries. |
| 2 | 4 | 2 | Deputy Commissaries. |
| 5 | 1 | – | Deputy Commissaries (Warrant Officers). |
| – | – | – | Assistant Commissaries. |
| 6 | 2 | – | Assistant Commissaries (Warrant Officers). |
| – | – | – | Deputy Assistant Commissaries. |
| 4 | 4 | 3 | Deputy Assistant Commissaries (Warrant Officers). |
| 43 | 40 | 17 | Conductors. |
| 21 | 31 | 22 | Sub-Conductors. |

*N.B.*—In this number of Conductors on the Madras Establishment are included six Troop Quartermasters attached to the Horse Artillery.

## Appendix, No. 2.

## ARTILLERY.

| Present Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates. | | | Proposed Formation and Strength in Gunners and Privates. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Horse Artillery.** | | | **Horse Artillery.** | | |
| Bengal: | | | Bengal: | | |
| Three brigades of three European and one Native troop each. | | | Two brigades of three European and one Native troop each. | | |
| 9 troops, European, of 80 gunners each | 720 | | 6 troops, European, of 100 gunners each | 600 | |
| 3 troops, Native, of 90 privates each | 270 | | 2 ditto, Native, of 100 privates each | 200 | |
| 12 troops, making a Total of | | 990 | 8 troops, making a Total of | | 800 |
| Madras: | | | Madras: | | |
| Two brigades, one of four troops, European, and one of two troops, Native. | | | One brigade of four troops, European. | | |
| 4 troops, European, of 84 gunners each | 336 | | Four troops, European, of 100 gunners each | | 400 |
| 2 troops, Native, of 84 privates each | 168 | | | | |
| 6 troops, making a Total of | | 504 | | | |
| Bombay: | | | Bombay: | | |
| One brigade of four troops, European. | | | One brigade of four troops, European. | | |
| Four troops, European, of 80 gunners each | | 320 | Four troops, of 100 gunners each | | 400 |
| Total Horse Artillery | | 1,814 | Total Horse Artillery | | 1,600 |
| **Foot Artillery.** | | | **Foot Artillery.** | | |
| Bengal: | | | Bengal: | | |
| 5 battalions of four European companies each. | | | Six battalions of three European and two Native companies each. | | |
| 20 companies, European, of 80 gunners each | 1,600 | | Eighteen companies, European, of 100 gunners each. | 1,800 | |
| 2 battalions of eight Native companies each. | | | Twelve companies, Native, of 100 privates each | 1,200 | |
| 16 companies, Native, of 104 privates each | 1,664 | | | | |
| 7 battalions, 36 companies, making a Total of | | 3,264 | Six battalions of 30 companies, making a Total of | | 3,000 |
| Madras: | | | Madras: | | |
| 3 battalions of four European companies each. | | | Three battalions of three European and two Native companies each. | | |
| 12 companies, European, of 80 gunners each | 960 | | Nine companies, European, of 100 gunners each | 900 | |
| 1 battalion of six companies, Native, of 92 privates each. | 552 | | Six companies, Native, of 100 privates each | 600 | |
| 4 battalions of 18 companies, making a Total of | | 1,512 | Three battalions of 15 companies, making a Total of | | 1,500 |
| Bombay: | | | Bombay: | | |
| 2 battalions, of four European companies each. | | | Two battalions of three European and two Native companies each. | | |
| 8 companies, European, of 80 gunners each | 640 | | Six companies, European, of 100 gunners each | 600 | |
| 1 ditto, of 8 companies, Native, of 70 privates each. | 560 | | Four companies, Native, of 100 privates each | 400 | |
| 3 battalions of 16 ditto, making a Total of | | 1,200 | Two battalions of 10 companies, making a Total of | | 1,000 |
| Total Foot Artillery | | 5,976 | Total Foot Artillery | | 5,500 |
| Total Horse and Foot Artillery | | 7,790 | Total Horse and Foot Artillery | | 7,100 |
| Europeans | | 4,576 | Europeans | | 4,700 |
| Natives | | 3,214 | Native | | 2,400 |
| Total | | 7,790 | Total | | 7,100 |

## Appendix, No. 3.

FINANCIAL RESULT of the 2nd Proposition.

| ABSTRACT. | Increase. | Decrease. Immediate. | Decrease. Prospective. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| Bengal Horse Artillery | - - - | 2,88,783 - - | 1,52,052 - - |
| „ Foot Artillery | 19,432 5 - | - - - | 1,52,420 - - |
| Madras Horse Artillery | - - - | 80,112 15 - | 1,38,677 15 6 |
| „ Foot Artillery | - - - | 51,951 7 - | 83,886 15 - |
| Bombay Horse Artillery | - - - | 21,454 8 - | 1,18,915 10 - |
| „ Foot Artillery | - - - | | |
| TOTAL - - - *Rs.* | 19,432 5 - | 4,42,301 14 - | 6,45,952 8 6 |
| Deduct immediate Increase - - - - - | | 19,432 5 - | |
| Net immediate Saving per year - - - - - | | 4,22,869 9 - | |
| Add prospective Saving per year - - - - - | | 6,45,952 8 6 | |
| TOTAL Immediate and Prospective Saving - *Rs.* | | 10,68,822 1 6 | |

The particulars of the above Abstract are shown in the annexed Schedules marked (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E).

(A.)

BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Saving to be effected by the Reduction of the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Staff, and Establishments, of a Brigade of Horse Artillery.

| | Immediate. | Prospective. |
|---|---|---|
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| The officers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | - - - | 10,772 - - |
| Pay of European non-commissioned officers, farriers, and trumpeters - - | 1,896 11 - | |
| Pay of syces, grass-cutters, and ordnance drivers, 3 European troops - - | 3,847 8 - | |
| Contract allowance of the 3 European troops - - - - - - | 2,291 4 - | |
| Gun lascars attached to the 3 European troops - - - - - - | - - - | 487 8 - |
| Artificers and establishments of 3 European troops - - - - - | 438 - - | |
| Allowance for tar and grease of ditto - - - - - | 345 - - | |
| Pay of staff and farrier sergeant of the Native troops - - - - - | 101 10 4 | |
| Pay of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of Native troops | - - - | 406 - - |
| Pay of the syces, grass-cutters, and drivers of Native troops - - - - | 1,282 8 - | |
| Staff and pay havildars, and troop contingent allowance of Native troops - | 768 - - | |
| Pay of gun lascars attached to the Native troops - - - - - - | - - - | 162 8 - |
| Artificers, tar and grease for Native troops - - - - - - - | 213 - - | |
| Allowances of the Brigade Staff, effective and non-effective, adjutant, quarter-master, &c. - - - - - - - - - - - - | 2,471 5 9 | |
| Brigade command allowance - - - - - - - - - | 400 - - | |
| Bazaar servants and quartermaster lascars - - - - - - - - | 82 - - | |
| Victualling 98 non-commissioned officers, at *Rs.* 4. 5. 8. each - - - | 426 11 4 | |
| Clothing - ditto - - - - - - - - - - - | 342 8 - | |
| Clothing 128 Native non-commissioned officers - - - - - - | - - - | 108 - - |
| Feeding 685 horses, at *Rs.* 5. 8. 6. each - - - - - - - | 3,788 14 6 | |
| Remount at 10 per cent. on the value, 450 rupees - - - - - - | 2,568 12 - | |
| Hospital establishment, dooly bearers, and head money - - - - - | 562 12 - | |
| Per Month - - *Rs.* | 21,826 8 11 | 11,936 - - |
| Pay, clothing, and victualling of 120 Europeans, reduced - - - - | 2,238 11 1 | |
| Pay and clothing of 70 Natives, reduced - - - - - - - | - - - | 735 - - |
| TOTAL per Month - *Rs.* | 24,065 4 - | 12,671 - - |

(B.)

BENGAL FOOT ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Financial Effect of Organizing this Corps into Six Battalions, consisting of Five Companies each, Three of Europeans and Two of Natives.

| | Increase. | Decrease. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Immediate. | Immediate. | Prospective. |
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| The officer of one battalion reduced | - - - | - - - | 7,063 3 - |
| Pay of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of two European companies reduced | - - - | 879 6 6 | |
| Pay of 200 gunners increased | 2,254 1 11 | — | |
| Clothing and victualling of Europeans | 1,439 9 4 | 387 12 11 | |
| Puckalies, sweepers, command allowance, &c. of two companies Europeans reduced | - - - | 172 - - | |
| Pay of gun lascars of two companies Europeans reduced | - - - | - - - | 665 8 - |
| Command allowance of one battalion | - - - | 400 - - | |
| Allowance to European women and children | 252 - - | 62 - - | |
| Head money to Europeans | 50 - - | 12 8 - | |
| Pay of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of four companies of Golundauze | - - - | - - - | 1,396 - 8 |
| Pay of 464 privates, reduced to seven rupees each | - - - | - - - | 3,248 - - |
| Lascars, bheestries, and command allowance of four companies | - - - | 243 - - | |
| Mean proportion between the allowances of the effective and non-effective staff and establishments of a European and Native battalion | - - - | 666 10 1 | |
| Two pay sergeants and four pay havildars | - - - | 34 - - | |
| Two staff sergeants and four brigade havildars | - - - | 19 8 - | |
| Clothing of Golundauze reduced | - - - | - - - | 389 - - |
| Hospital established for one battalion | 500 8 - | — | |
| TOTAL - - - *Rs.* | 4,496 3 3 | 2,876 13 6 | 12,701 11 8 |
| Deduct immediate Saving | 2,876 13 6 | | |
| Immediate Increase per month | 1,619 5 9 | | |
| Ditto - ditto per year | 19,432 5 - | | |
| Prospective Saving per annum | 1,52,420 12 - | | |
| Net Saving per annum *Rs.* | 1,32,988 7 - | | |

(C.)

MADRAS HORSE ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Saving which would be effected by the Reduction of the Officers of one Brigade and both Native Troops, and increasing the European Troops to 100 Gunners each.

| | Increase. | Decrease. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Immediate. | Immediate. | Prospective. |
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| The officers | - - - | - - - | 7,860 8 11½ |
| Pay and clothing of 64 Europeans raised | 2,113 12 7 | — | |
| Troop quartermaster and sergeants on half batta | - - - | 501 13 1 | |
| Pay of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers | - - - | - - - | 3,246 15 - |
| Pay of boys, puckallies, horsekeepers, and grass-cutters | - - - | 2,403 7 - | 56 - - |
| Effective and non-effective staff | - - - | 981 - - | |
| Troop contracts for 276 horses | - - - | 768 15 - | |
| Command allowance for two troops | - - - | 60 - - | |
| Clothing of Europeans and Natives | - - - | 50 - - | 393 - - |
| Feeding 276 horses, at seven rupees each | - - - | 1,932 - - | |
| Remount at 10 per cent. | - - - | 1,035 - - | |
| Full batta of one troop | - - - | 1,057 10 9 | |
| TOTAL - - - *Rs.* | 2,113 12 7 | 8,789 13 10 | 11,556 7 11½ |
| Deduct immediate Increase | - - - | 2,113 12 7 | |
| Net Saving per month | - - - | 6,676 1 3 | 11,556 7 11½ |
| Net immediate Saving per year | - - - | 80,112 15 - | 1,38,677 15 6 |
| Add prospective Saving ditto | - - - | 1,38,677 15 6 | |
| TOTAL Saving - - - *Rs.* | | 2,18,790 14 6 | |

(D.)

MADRAS FOOT ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Immediate and Prospective Financial Effect of reducing the Officers of One Battalion and organizing this Corps into Three Battalions of Five Companies, Three European, and Two Native, of 100 Gunners each, everything else remaining as at present.

| | Increase. | Decrease. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Immediate. | Immediate. | Prospective. |
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| The officers on half batta | - - - | - - - | 6,160 5 3 |
| Pay and clothing of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of three companies, and of 60 gunners reduced | - - - | 3,265 14 – | |
| Pay of six puckalies for three companies | - - - | 64 7 – | |
| Pay of proportion of gun lascars | - - - | - - - | 830 4 – |
| Mess-room allowance | - - - | 73 8 – | |
| Command allowance of three companies | - - - | 90 – – | |
| Battalion command allowance | - - - | 400 – – | |
| Pay and clothing of 48 Golundauze, raised | 420 – – | — | |
| Mean proportion between the staff and establishment of an European and Native battalion | - - - | 855 7 7 | |
| TOTAL *Rs.* | 420 – – | 4,749 4 7 | 6,990 9 3 |
| Deduct immediate Increase | - - - | 420 – – | |
| Net Decrease per month | - - - | 4,329 4 7 | 6,990 9 3 |
| Net immediate Decrease per annum | - - - | 51,951 7 – | 83,886 15 – |
| Add prospective Decrease per annum | - - - | 83,886 15 – | |
| *Rs.* | | 1,35,838 6 – | |

(E.)

BOMBAY ARTILLERY.

PARTICULARS of the Financial Effect of increasing the Troops of Horse Artillery to 100 Gunners each, and organizing the Foot Artillery into a Corps of Two Battalions, each Battalion to consist of Five Companies, Three European and Two Native, everything else remaining as at present.

| | Decrease. | |
|---|---|---|
| | Immediate. | Prospective. |
| | *Rs. a. p.* | *Rs. a. p.* |
| The officers on half batta | - - - | 6,518 – 2 |
| Pay and clothing of the non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, and drummers of two companies, and of 40 gunners reduced | 1,838 10 6 | |
| Gun lascars for two companies | - - - | 539 8 – |
| Followers for two companies | 134 12 – | |
| Battalion command allowance | 400 – – | |
| Clothing of lascars reduced | - - - | 32 8 – |
| Two pay sergeants | 14 – – | |
| Mean between the effective and non-effective staff followers and artificers of an European and Native battalion | 644 15 6 | |
| Stationery and petty stores | 90 – – | |
| Mess tent | 90 – – | |
| Native Battalion: | | |
| Pay and clothing of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of four companies, and of 160 privates | - - - | 2,558 8 – |
| Pay and clothing of gun lascars | - - - | 216 2 – |
| Stationery and petty stores for four companies | 180 – – | |
| Pay havildars of four companies | 20 – – | |
| Hospital assistants | - - - | 45 – – |
| TOTAL *Rs.* | 3,412 6 – | 9,909 10 2 |
| Deduct pay and clothing of 80 Horse Artillery gunners increased | 1,624 8 – | |
| Net Saving per month | 1,787 14 – | 9,909 10 2 |
| Net immediate Saving per year | 21,454 8 – | 1,18,915 10 – |
| Add prospective Saving per year | 1,18,915 10 – | |
| TOTAL Saving *Rs.* | 1,40,370 2 – | |

## Appendix, No. 4.

### Memorandum.

Rank and File of the Armies of the Three Presidencies.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal.—European Cavalry | | 1,280 | |
| Native „ | | 4,440 | |
| | | | 5,720 |
| European Infantry | | 6,612 | |
| Native „ | | 50,320 | |
| | | | 56,930 |
| Total | | | 62,652 |
| Madras.—European Cavalry | | 640 | |
| Native „ | | 3,552 | |
| | | | 4,192 |
| European Infantry | | 6,612 | |
| Native „ | | 35,360 | |
| | | | 41,972 |
| Total | | | 46,164 |
| Bombay.—European Cavalry | | 640 | |
| Native „ | | 1,332 | |
| | | | 1,972 |
| European Infantry | | 3,624 | |
| Native „ | | 17,680 | |
| | | | 21,304 |
| Total | | | 23,276 |
| Total of Cavalry and Infantry | | | 1,32,092 |
| „ Cavalry only | | | 11,884 |
| „ Infantry only | | | 1,20,208 |

At the rate of four field guns for every 1,000 rank and file, according to the above statement—

| | |
|---|---|
| The Bengal Army requires | 250 guns. |
| The Madras „ | 184 „ |
| The Bombay „ | 92 „ |
| Total Field Ordnance | 526 pieces. |

By the suggested organization of the Artillery, supposing each troop to man 6 and each company 8 pieces:

| | Guns. | |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal.— 8 troops of horse artillery man | 48 | |
| 30 companies of foot artillery man | 240 | |
| | 288 | Required 250; excess 38. |
| Madras.— 4 troops of horse artillery man | 24 | |
| 15 companies of foot artillery man | 120 | |
| | 144 | Required 184; deficient 40. |
| Bombay.— 4 troops of horse artillery man | 24 | |
| 10 companies of foot artillery man | 80 | |
| | 104 | Required 92; excess 12 |
| Or, | | |
| Total number required, as above | 526 | |
| 16 troops of horse artillery man — 96 | 536 | |
| 55 companies of foot artillery man — 440 | | |
| Excess | 10 | |

It would, therefore, appear that the suggested arrangement regarding the artillery, independent of the financial effect which it would produce, in all probability an annual saving, immediate and prospective, of 10 lacs, would likewise have the effect of making the corps much more efficient in the increased strength of the troops and companies, and not only afford the means of bringing into the field the full proportion of ordnance prescribed, with reference to the amount of rank and file composing the army, but fix an excess of that proportion when it is most likely to be called for, and the deficit when artillery is the least wanted.

The proportion of 4 guns for 1,000 men is that fixed by Napoleon for the infantry of an army; a larger number, according to his rule, would be allotted to the cavalry, but however correct or adapted this may be to European warfare, it will probably be thought that the general proportion above adopted of 4 guns for every 1,000 rank and file, cavalry and infantry, is quite sufficient for an Indian army.

## Appendix, No. 5.

MEMORANDUM of the Reduction in the Number of Combatants (exclusive of Commissioned Officers, European and Native), which would be occasioned by the proposed organization of the Artillery of the Three Presidencies.

| | EUROPEANS. | | | | | NATIVES. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sergeants. | Corporals. | Bombardiers, Drummers, Farriers, &c. | Gunners. | TOTAL. | Havildars. | Naicks. | Drummers, Trumpeters, Farriers, &c. | Privates. | TOTAL. | GRAND TOTAL. |
| BENGAL: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Horse Artillery | 29 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible]0 | 216 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 70 | 88 | 304 |
| Foot Artillery | 15 | [illegible] | [illegible] | – | 49 | 35 | 35 | 10 | 464 | 544 | 593 |
| MADRAS: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Horse Artillery | 10 | – | – | – | 10 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 168 | 206 | 216 |
| Foot Artillery | 26 | 21 | 36 | 60 | 143 | – | – | – | – | – | 143 |
| BOMBAY: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Horse Artillery | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Foot Artillery | 12 | 10 | 24 | 40 | 86 | 26 | 25 | 10 | 160 | 221 | 307 |
| TOTAL Reduction | – | – | – | – | 504 | – | – | – | – | 1,059 | 1,563 |
| Deduct augmentation in the Bengal Foot Artillery | – | – | – | 200 | | | | | | | |
| Ditto Madras Horse ditto | – | – | – | 64 | | | | | | | |
| Ditto Bombay Horse ditto | – | – | – | 80 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 344 | | | | | | |
| Net Reduction | | | | | 160 | – | – | – | – | 1,059 | 1,219 |

(signed) *Wm. Casement*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

MINUTE by Colonel *Morison.*

IT is with the utmost diffidence that I offer my observations on the subject of the Right honourable the Governor General's Minute of the 23rd ultimo; I am satisfied of the necessity of making great reductions, and should therefore have at once concurred in those which have been recommended if I could see that the same object could not be accomplished by other means and within a shorter period, for I am of opinion that the reduction of any of the regular regiments should be resorted to only as a last resource.

Supposing, however, that this measure should become indispensable, I am afraid that to draft the whole of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the regiments to be reduced into those intended to be increased to 800 men, would be liable to cause dissatisfaction throughout the native service, by putting a stop to all promotion in the native ranks for years to come. The old officers of every grade, and the old sepoys now looking forward to promotion, could not fail by such an event to be greatly disappointed, and even those who expect no promotion would feel for the situation of their comrades placed in such circumstances. Amongst the native officers themselves the disappointment would not be less than would be experienced by the European officers if others were placed into each of the grades above their own, stopping promotion until the drafts were absorbed by casualties; I can hardly, therefore, imagine any measure more likely to deteriorate the temper and good feeling of the native army to a degree which I fear might not be compensated by the proposed reduction. The disappointment would probably be the more felt in the native ranks by seeing that the European officers of the reduced regiments were provided for either by a gratuity or by the continuance of their proportion in skeleton regiments. If this disappointment could in any degree be prevented, either by restoring the companies which were reduced in the year 1828, officering them by the native commissioned and non-commissioned of the reduced regiments, the evil would be less, though in my mind it would still [redacted] he one hand a considerable body of strangers would be intro[redacted]ry corps, where much jealously would naturally be felt towards[redacted]n the other, much time would elapse before they would feel confid[redacted]ing the same consideration from the European officers as the men [redacted] to them by daily intercourse; in short, whatever bad feelings might arise, and it would be difficult to suppose that none such would exist under such circumstances, the same would probably be general in every native corps by consequence of the measure having simultaneous effect throughout the service.

These and other considerations induce me to suggest, if the reduction of regiments be indispensable, that not more than one of native infantry should be eventually reduced annually at each Presidency; that that corps should be divided into four parts, each consisting of two unbroken companies, to be drafted with their officers into four of the oldest regiments. These corps, which would thus consist of 10 companies, might revert to the present formation of 8 companies at some distance of time, by which means the intended reductions would be gradually accomplished, probably with less risk; while the supernumerary European officers might also be more easily disposed of without placing too many at once in the predicament of having to choose between the alternatives of remaining supernumerary or of accepting a gratuity on resigning the service. A progressive arrangement would probably not only not prolong the period by which the reductions would be finally accomplished, but would afford the opportunity of arresting at any moment the further reduction of regiments, if such should be recommended by the actual state of affairs.

I would next observe, that the Indian army is now on a far more reduced scale in point of effective strength than for many years past, and I entertain great doubt how far that strength, however modified, can be considered proper as a fixed establishment. It will, I think, be found that we have far fewer men in our ranks than any state in Europe in proportion to the population, while our position in a conquered country of vast extent, peopled by various races, all so different from ourselves, would appear to indicate the necessity of our employing a higher proportion of troops than any other country; and what country, being a foreign possession, is so peculiarly situated as our empire in India? The distribution of the regular army at the most important points

might

might indeed be facilitated by the employment of local corps; but such corps do not add to our real military strength, nor should we run the risk of any compromise of our military character by being forced to employ irregular infantry on any important service which may occur at any time where least expected. I believe it is generally admitted that regular troops in the end are the least expensive; and if we advert to the strength of the armies of the states which have fallen under our rule, it will be found that a few of our regulars now occupy the place of many times their own number. Our system, wherever we have gone, has had the effect of reducing numerous native armies, who, with their dependants, have been driven back on the agricultural population, the effect of which has probably not yet been felt to its full extent. We ought, I think, to employ as many regular troops as we can afford to pay, while by taking them from the military classes only of our own provinces, we could the more easily and speedily provide new levies when required, and by that means attach to our interest those who are not only the most useful for military purposes, but otherwise the most likely, sooner or later, to disturb the tranquillity of our possessions.

I am quite sensible that a corps of 640 men is less effective, and, in proportion to its numbers, far more expensive than one of 800; but the former is our lowest peace establishment, and so long as we have to maintain in time of peace a war establishment of European officers, this must be the result; corps even of 800 men would not be efficient for long and extended operations, and in corps of 640 the troops individually should not be less inefficient, as the recruits ought to be more select, and as the same establishment of officers might be expected to do greater justice to the discipline of the smaller corps. If I am not mistaken, the infantry regiments in England are, or were, still further reduced than ours now are, and are probably therefore in a higher state of discipline than if they were on a full war establishment. For any casual service within confined limits, the reduced corps, if duly looked after, ought to be quite equal without any temporary increase of numerical strength. It only requires in such cases that a sufficient number of corps should be brought to act; but in the event of general war we should probably have occasion, as has been the case before, to increase the corps to 1,000 men, or even more. If, however, 29 regiments have been previously reduced, we should eventually be deficient of 29,000 men at least in the ranks of the infantry alone, when it might be necessary to re-embody some of the reduced regiments; nor do I think it extremely improbable that circumstances may arise to occasion an increase of regiments even beyond their present numbers, which, however expensive, are probably not too many.

The same observations are applicable, less or more, to the regular regiments of cavalry, which appear to be disproportioned to the infantry, even if we include the irregulars, of whose services we can avail ourselves. In no army is it necessary that all the cavalry should be of the same description. Napoleon employed five different classes. The cavalry, including all classes, should be on the proportion of one fourth of the infantry, but it will, I think, be found that the whole are much below that proportion, and while this is the case, I feel great doubt if we should reduce any of our regiments, unless the regulars are on too high a scale in comparison with the irregulars, which we can reckon as available. I know not how it may be at the other Presidencies with regard to reliefs, but at Madras the native cavalry do not carry their families beyond the frontier, which requires their being relieved within a reasonable time. All of them indeed are expected to come back in their turn to the Carnatic, where their homes generally are, and I should hardly think it practicable to relieve the corps in the manner which has hitherto been deemed necessary, if reduced from eight to five regiments.

With regard to the artillery, which has always been considered of vital importance, it is already on a scale very far below the proportion considered necessary with regular armies in any other country. The whole of the Indian army, cavalry, and infantry, as now reduced, amount to 132,000 men, European and Native, and if one-eighth of that number, viz., 16,500, be deemed the proper proportion for the Indian army, while we have only 8,790, the deficiency, viz., 5,710, will be merely one-third of the proper complement for an army reduced to the lowest peace establishment. I should, therefore, humbly conceive that any reduction of this army, except perhaps in the native horse artillery and Golundauze, is

altogether impracticable; yet, including Mr. Lushington's reductions at Madras, it will have to contribute about one-fifth of a reduction of 60 lacs. It is true that the artillery reductions are principally in officers, equal to five corps out of 20, or one-fourth of the whole, the effect of which I shall beg leave to notice hereafter.

It is proposed to fix the equipment of light field artillery at the rate of four guns for every 1,000 men, cavalry and infantry. I see no great reason to object to this proposition generally, although, probably, on too low a scale for the cavalry, which requires to be provided with its due proportion of horse artillery, independent of the infantry; but the cavalry and infantry are already reduced to the lowest peace establishment, and it should be held in view that, although both these arms can be speedily augmented, this is not the case with the artillery, for long preparation is required both for the men and their equipments. For these reasons I would, with great deference, submit that the artillery in India, especially its European branches, ought rather to be fixed in a moderate war establishment, which seems to be only the more necessary as its strength is already so far below the most approved proportion. Whatever arguments can be adduced in support of the necessity of maintaining at all times a war establishment of European officers, the same will, I think, be found to apply even more forcibly as relates to that of the artillery; moreover, every European artillery soldier, wherever he may be placed, has an intrinsic value which more than repays his expense; and, considering the great moral effect of artillery on the minds of the people of India, this arm ought not to be viewed as the most expensive. If we were destitute of artillery, or maintained it on too reduced a scale, we should probably have to incur a still greater expense by increasing the other branches, with much less general efficiency; for that army will be the cheapest, as well as the most perfect, whose several arms are in just proportion to one another. What that proportion ought to be in India is a different question. Whatever may be the proportion of guns for every 1,000 men, or gunners for their service, I am persuaded that much advantage would arise from viewing the whole of the artillery as one regiment liable to serve, especially the Europeans, in every part of India. By the proposed distribution, however, and by allotting 288 pieces of light field artillery exclusively to Bengal, the proportion (within 25) will be five guns for every 1,000 men; Bombay, instead of 92 will have 104, being (within 12) in the proportion of five to every 1,000 men; while Madras, instead of 184, will only have 144 guns, being (within four) in the proportion of three guns only for every 1,000 men. In other words, while Bengal and Bombay will have nearly five guns for every 1,000 men, Madras will have three guns, or only three-fifths of the proportion of the other Presidencies.

The latter Presidency had long maintained 14 companies of European foot artillery, which were found inadequate, and that number was allowed by the Supreme Government, in the year 1818, to be increased by two additional, in all, 16 companies, which may not be considered too many, when we advert to the extent of country, the difficulty and delay of collecting at any point, any considerable body of this most indispensable part of the corps, the difficulty of conducting the reliefs of the detachment companies, and the expediency of having upon this coast a sufficient number to meet any call for service beyond seas. But, unfortunately, instead of the additional companies of European foot artillery, sanctioned in 1818, a body of native horse artillery was then formed at more than double the cost, though not of half the value;

| | English Horse. | Native Horse. | European Foot. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Former troops in companies - - - - | 2½ | 3 | 14 |
| Ordered in 1824 - - - - - - | 4 | 4 | 12 |

and in 1824 two companies of the 14 were actually reduced, and 2½ additional troops of horse artillery allowed instead, apparently for the purpose of equalising the several corps of horse and foot artillery then ordered. The whole of the native horse artillery at Madras, which has thus been maintained by the sacrifice of

of the more indispensable European foot artillery, will now probably be reduced; a brigade of the former costs more than double that of a whole battalion of the latter. It seems worthy, therefore, of consideration whether the European foot artillery should not now be completed to 16 companies, for I cannot help being of opinion, though I offer it with the utmost deference, that the nine companies now proposed for Madras, are altogether inadequate; and on this subject I beg to refer to the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th paragraphs of a minute of Sir Thomas Munro, dated the 25th July 1825, where this question and the comparative value of the European foot artillery will be found fully discussed.

With respect to our having horse artillery troops in time of peace, some with two guns, some four, and others with six guns each, I would beg to submit with the utmost deference, that it might be more convenient for reliefs that every troop should be of the same strength. If any are to have two guns only, they should perhaps be considered depôt troops, to be left at the head quarters of brigades for the purposes of instruction, but that the whole should have their guns, waggons, and harness ready in store; a complement of four pieces for every troop, as a peace establishment, would perhaps be the most efficient, while the reduction of expense would be nearly the same, although I entertain the opinion that every company of foot artillery should be of sufficient strength to manage eight light field guns, yet if a battalion is to consist of five such companies, with 40 guns, as proposed by his Lordship, it will require a higher complement of officers than at present. By the orders of 1824, when a new organisation was given to the three armies, each battalion and each horse brigade of artillery were allowed respectively the same number of officers of each rank as a regiment of cavalry or infantry, and indeed, unless this were the case, the junior officers of artillery would not on entering the service have the same prospect of promotion as those of other branches. The number of the cavalry and infantry officers is now fixed on the same scale noted in the margin.* Every pair of guns on service should have an European commissioned officer, so that 20 pairs, the proposed equipment of a battalion, would require 20 captains and subalterns, but only 17 are now allowed; and supposing four of these officers to be absent, there will remain 13, leaving at least 14 guns of each battalion of the proposed strength destitute of officers; and it seems evident that the present strength of troops and companies, with respect to officers, must have been fixed for an equipment of six guns only. For 20 pairs of guns we should require, allowing the same proportion as above for absentees, at least 25 officers, as per margin†; but in order to preserve to the lower rank the same chance of promotion as the rest of the army, which appears to have been an object of attention with the home authorities, there should still be maintained the same proportion of field officers, so that if there be three of the latter for every 17 captains and subalterns, there ought to be 4½ field officers for every 25 captains and subalterns, or about nine for every two battalions instead of six, a result which would make a saving from the reduction of artillery officers considerably less than computed. For my own part I am inclined to the opinion that a battalion of artillery should consist of eight companies, but if such an organisation or any other be deemed inconvenient in consequence of our requiring such a number of companies as cannot be divided into equal battalions, this would seem to be of little consequence so long as each company is complete in itself, and the whole provided with the proper complement of officers.

* For a regiment:—
1 Colonel.
1 Lieut.-Colonel.
1 Major.
3
5 Captains.
8 Lieutenants.
4 Second do.
17
20

† 7 Captains.
12 First Lieutenants
6 Second Lieutenan
25

The officers of artillery and engineers are educated at the expense of the Company on equal terms. When entertained they know not to which Presidency their services may be appropriated, and they are supposed to set out with equal prospects. It seems under such circumstances, as well as from the unequal or other disproportionate augmentations and reductions liable to take place, that the whole of the Indian artillery should form one regiment, when every rank would benefit or suffer alike when the regiment might be required to be increased or reduced, which would obviate the distaste which must be felt by young officers when posted to a Presidency where they know that their prospects are unfavourable. It would not be less advantageous if the engineers were in like manner to form one regiment, when, if any great works should be required, the scope of selection would be much extended, greatly to the advantage of Government. The whole of the artillery and engineers ought to be liable to take their turn of service in any part of India, as the royal artillery and engineers are liable to serve in any part of the globe. The experience and notions of both branches would be much improved and expanded by this arrangement.

| | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ordered in 1834: | | | | |
| Horse Brigades - - | 3 | 2 | 1 | - |
| Battalion Foot Artillery - | 5 | 3 | 2 | - |
| Golundauze - - - | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| | 9 | 6 | 3 | 18 |
| Since ordered - - - | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| | 10 | 6 | 4 | 20 |
| Proposed to be reduced - | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Proposed Establishment - | 8 | 4 | 3 | 15 |

The inequality above alluded to, as affecting the Indian artillery, will be briefly shown in the statement given in the margin. It is known that when the organisation of 1824 took place, the number of colonels was doubled in every branch of the service. There were then four artillery colonels in Bengal (I write from memory, and may be mistaken), and one more was added to make up the nine corps fixed by the home authorities, and a tenth corps has since been added. At Bombay the colonels were also doubled; and one added to make up the three corps ordered, to which a fourth corps has been added. At Madras the colonels were doubled only to make up the six corps, without any addition since, as at Bengal and Bombay. The proposed reductions will bring back the Bengal artillery to what it was before 1824. At Bombay there will still be one corps in excess of the establishment at the same period; while at Madras two of the former corps would fall to be reduced. The proposed artillery reductions at the several Presidencies, falling in the proportion of one-fifth at Bengal, one-fourth at Bombay, and one-third at Madras.

The distribution of the army of India involves so many considerations that it will be difficult to say precisely what it ought to be, and still more so to fix its precise strength in order to meet all probable contingencies. There is one point, however, with respect to which there can hardly be much difference of opinion, which is that the three armies should be distributed as a whole without much reference to the limits of either of the Presidencies; at all events, the objections which apply to the removal of native corps far from their homes cannot apply to their European officers. If, then, the troops are considered too many at one Presidency and too few at another, a revised distribution would seem to be all that is required to remedy the error, having as little recourse as possible to augmentations at one Presidency or reduction at another. If this principle had been attended to, even after the time when the territories of the several Presidencies became united, it is probable that the relative strength of the three armies might have been very different, although I am not prepared to assert that the general number of regiments would have been less than at present.

To elucidate this question, I would, in this place, beg leave to submit a brief comparative view of the strength of the three armies, as referable only to the extent of the territory of each Presidency, including of course, the subsidized and protected states following within their limits. For this purpose I propose to consider Bombay (including Guzerat, Cutch, Sattara, &c.) as one; when Bombay will be to Madras (including Nagpore, the Nizam's country, Mysore, Travancore, &c.) as to 2, 5, 2; and Bombay will be to Bengal (including Arracan, Munipoor, Oude, Scindia and Holkar's country, the protected Sikh States, &c. &c.) as 1 to 4, 6. These results have been obtained in a rough way, but are, perhaps, sufficiently correct for my present purpose.

Supposing then the strength of the Bombay army to be as noted in the margin,* including the European regiments as two corps of infantry, being double officered, the other two armies if in the same proportion, would stand as below, excluding fractions, and taking the nearest whole number.

* Corps:

| | |
|---|---|
| Infantry - | 28 |
| Cavalry - - | 3 |
| Artillery - | 4 |
| Engineers - | 2 |
| Total Corps - | 37 |

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Artillery. | Engineers. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal, in proportion to Bombay, would have | 129 | 14 | 18 | 9 | 170 |
| Instead of - - - - - | 76 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 99 |
| Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Bombay, of - - - | 53 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 71 |
| Madras, in proportion to Bombay, would have | 71 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 94 |
| Instead of - - - - - | 54 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 70 |
| Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Bombay, of - - - | 17 | - | 4 | 3 | 24 |

(*N.B.*—Perhaps the Engineers should be excluded.)

Supposing next that the number of corps in Bengal to be sufficient, the proportion at Madras and Bombay would stand thus:—

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Artillery. | Engineers. | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Madras, in proportion to Bengal, instead of - | 54 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 70 |
| Would have only - - - | 42 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 54 |
| Giving a surplus, in comparison with Bengal, of - - - | 12 | 3 | 1 | - | 16 |
| Bombay, in proportion to Bengal, instead of - | 28 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 37 |
| Would have only - - - - | 17 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 22 |
| Giving a surplus, in comparison with Bengal, of - - - - | 11 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 15 |

And supposing the proportion at Madras to be sufficient, the proportion at Bengal and Bombay would be as follows:—

| | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Artillery. | Engineers. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal, in proportion to Madras, would have | 91 | 15 | 11 | 5 | 122 |
| Instead of - - - - - | 76 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 99 |
| Giving a deficiency, in comparison with Madras, of - - - | 15 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 23 |
| Bombay, in proportion to Madras, instead of - | 28 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 37 |
| Would have only - - - | 21 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 27 |
| Giving a surplus, in comparison with Madras, of - - - | 7 | - | 2 | 1 | 10 |

1st. From the foregoing it appears that Bengal and Madras have fewer corps in comparison with Bombay, by 71 at the former and 24 at the latter.

2nd. That Madras and Bombay, in comparison with Bengal, have at the former a surplus of 16 corps, and at the latter 15.

3rd. That Bengal and Bombay, in comparison with Madras, the former is deficient of 23 corps, while Bombay has a surplus of 10.

It is evident therefore that the three armies, in comparison with the extent of the territory occupied by each, have been regulated under very different views. It may fairly be concluded, however, either that Madras and Bombay have too many troops, or that Bengal has too few.

But the extent of territory alone is far from affording a just criterion in deciding the question.

Madras and Bombay (the former in particular) are the quarters from whence will probably be met the demands for the service of native troops for foreign expeditions; nor can we overlook our subsidiary engagements with the Nyzam, which in a measure locks up in his dominions a considerable proportion of the Madras army, while another considerable proportion is allotted to the coast of Tenasserim and the Straits of Malacca. Bombay has, besides, an exposed frontier of small extent to protect, but Bengal has a very extensive frontier on the east from Gowhutty to Cape Negrais, and on the west from Loodiana to Deesa; and I much doubt if the Bengal army be adequate to provide effectually for the defence of these frontiers consistently with the due military occupation

of the central provinces, which must always have sufficient troops to repel any aggression from Nepal, as well as to maintain tranquillity in these extensive provinces.

On the whole, then, I am induced to conclude that Bengal has too small an army, a question, however, which will be more clearly understood when the distribution of the reduced army comes under consideration, for until the distribution of the army of India can be disposed of, supposing that 41 of the present corps are to be reduced, I should hardly be prepared to concur in recommending the reduction of regiments, unless indeed the state of the finances should render the measure imperative, and that there can be found no other means of meeting the same object with less risk to our military power.

For whatever may be the necessity for reductions, I am humbly of opinion that any reduction of the number of regiments should only be had recourse to after every other practicable reduction has already been considered. When the exigencies of the State require it every individual in its service ought to share in the sacrifice necessary to be made; and I am persuaded we should meet with little discontent if every one—from the highest to the lowest, the troops only excepted—were at once reduced in the same proportion.

While the Honourable Court have before them the proposed plan for military reductions, it would seem to be advisable that they should see at the same time calculations of the time by which the reductions may probably be completed, and of the probable amount of the gratuities which would be required for the supernumerary officers. The Honourable Court should also have access to calculations of all other reductions capable of being effected, including an equal proportion from every individual engaged in the public service of the Company (the troops only excepted), in whatever way their allowances may have been fixed.

In this manner we should know what the reductions would probably amount to in a given time. If it should fall short of what may be indispensably necessary, and if the vigilance and activity of the officers of revenue cannot discover and prevent the abuses which probably exist, less or more, in every unsettled district, to the detriment of the finances, it might be preferable to reduce a proportion of officers of all ranks rather than regiments. It would be easy, if necessary, to reduce a proportion of colonels, without any gratuity, by transferring them to a senior list, without depriving them of a single advantage they now enjoy, and by fixing a period when the casualties in that list should cease to give promotion in the line. By not reducing regiments there would be no supernumerary lieutenant colonels or majors to provide for, and under such circumstances a liberal gratuity might be given to a certain extent to old captains and subalterns disposed to accept of the same on quitting the service, measures being provided for the equalization of each grade in each regiment as retirements might occur. A very considerable reduction might thus be accomplished, I should hope, without materially affecting efficiency, and still allowing the present number of regiments to remain untouched.

(signed) *W. Morison.*

Ootacamund, 7 August 1834.

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(No. 24 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Cons., 24 Feb. 1835. Nos. 10 to 18.

Para. 1. In continuation of the separate letter to your Honourable Court, dated Ootacamund, the 9th August 1834, we have the honour to submit for your consideration a minute recorded by the Governor General, under date the 7th instant, offering an opinion upon the joint remarks of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal army, and upon those of Colonel Morison, on the proposed re-organisation of the armies of the three Presidencies.

2. A copy of Colonel Morison's minute, adverted to by his Lordship in the accompanying paper, was transmitted to England with the separate letter abovementioned. We therefore deem it unnecessary on the present occasion to furnish

furnish another copy of the document, but we beg to forward, as numbers in the packet, copies of an explanatory minute by that gentleman, and of Mr. Ross's minute on the same subject, respectively dated the 16th and 10th current.

3. The proposed reduction of the establishment of guns with each troop of Horse Artillery adverted to in the 7th paragraph of his Lordship's minute will be carried into immediate execution, and we have to add that this measure has enabled the Bengal Government studs to supply 400 superior remounts for the service of the Madras and Bombay mounted corps, in the proportion of 300 to the former, and 100 to the latter Presidency. Cons. 7th January 1835, Nos. 37 to 40.

We are, &c.
(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*
*A. Ross.*
*W. Morison.*

Fort William, 26 February 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

1. MY Minute of 2nd instant contained a reply to the objections made to my proposition for equalizing the pay and allowances of the European officers of the armies of the three Presidencies. In the present paper I shall offer my opinion upon the joint remarks of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General of Bengal, and upon those of Colonel Morison upon that for the re-organization of the Indian Army.

2. I shall commence with the former, continuing in this half page an extract from their letter, and placing on the other my own observations.

(*a.*) "WE now proceed to the consideration of your Lordship's separate minute on the organization of the army of India, and to offer such observations on that measure as are applicable to this presidency:

(*b.*) "The present formation of the army into 10 regiments of cavalry, and 74 weak regiments of infantry, we think is open to the objections your Lordship has enumerated, and we are not aware of any circumstances, either external or internal, that would justify the continuance of the present system, which is found to bear so heavily upon the resources of the country. The contemplated reduction of three cavalry and 14 infantry regiments, by embodying the native officers and men with the regiments to be retained, and leaving the European officers in skeleton corps, appears to us to be the most equitable and judicious way of effecting the measure, and if the suggestion offered by Colonel Salmond to The Honorable the Board of Control, regarding the mode of providing for such a portion of the officers as become supernumerary, by purchasing out those who do not feel disposed to remain in the service, be adopted, the disheartening effect of the reduction will be less felt by the European officers:

(*c.*) "The adoption of the proposed new organization will leave the aggregate strength nearly the same in privates as at present, but it will have the advantage of contributing greatly towards a diminution of the duties that have long borne so heavily on the native infantry, but more particularly since two companies per regiment were reduced in 1829. This object ought still to be kept in view, and a further alleviation of the calls upon the troops effected, since it must be evident to your

(*b.*) No remark.

Lordship that our native infantry are worn down (1) and harassed to a degree that materially interferes with their discipline and efficiency.

(1.) This is perfectly true.

(*d.*) "We are aware that measures are in progress for relieving the native infantry from some of the frequent demands for treasure escorts, but we humbly conceive that much remains to be done in lightening the several station duties throughout the country, and putting a total stop to escorts unless when sanctioned by Government. These measures, with the change in the amount of regimental guards consequent to the new organization, will give some relief to the native infantry, but there is still in existence a mode of employing sepoys in this presidency which, we respectfully submit to your Lordship, may be put an immediate stop to; we mean the practice of night guards (1) to European officers. We do not assert that the thing exists in every corps, but we can state that it is prevalent in a certain degree, occupying from 40 to 50 men in each regiment on night duty, after the performance of which they generally go direct to a parade or field-day. We need only refer to the table showing the very small disposable force available in January and August of last year, for a confirmation of the opinion we have come to, that the aggregate strength of the infantry is barely adequate to maintain tranquillity within the widely extended territories of the presidency, with due regard to the efficiency and comfort of the troops, and nothing but the conviction that the organization proposed will, to a certain extent, relieve and partly remove these embarrassing duties, prevents us respectfully suggesting to your Lordship an establishment of 1,000 (2) men per regiment.

(1.) This practice has been discontinued. *Vide* general order by Major General Watson, dated 12th August 1834. Copy annexed.

(*e.*) "In noticing such points as appear to us essentially necessary towards securing the energies and allegiance of the native troops in times of difficulty, we have been actuated by a sincere desire to make the native soldier sensible of the interest taken in his behalf, and to restore the service to the estimation it was held in when duty was less severe, and before other causes combined to make it less attractive than formerly, arising chiefly from the wide extent (1) of our empire, and the depreciated value of the pay (2).

(2.) No native corps even in time of peace ought to be less than 1,000 men. Under all circumstances of leave of absence, which might then be extended both as to the time and numbers, of unusual sickness, or of great demands for escorts or detached service, the regiment would always be efficient and the duty never severe.

(1.) The service is certainly less attractive and the army deteriorated. There are many causes, but I should doubt the wide extent of our empire being one of them, as the Hindostanees seek service in all parts of India, and form one half of the whole Bombay army.

(2.) This is explained by the assertion of prices being higher than formerly, the correctness of which, as a general average, I doubt; and further, that upon many occasions articles were forcibly taken and not paid for, which I believe.

(*f.*) "Your Lordship must, we presume, be aware that this Presidency never has had a regular and well organised body of light infantry or riflemen, an advantage which every other service enjoys. The utility of a force of this kind embodied in separate regiments, we believe will not be questioned, and as the natives of Upper India possess many of the qualities adapted for this description of arm, we respectfully avail ourselves of the present intention of organising the army to suggest to your Lordship that out of the sixty regiments at least five of them be formed into light infantry.

(*f.*) I entirely concur in the propriety of this recommendation. It will be found discussed in my minute upon the composition of the army in India.

(*g.*) "We are also impressed with a belief that the rifles might be beneficially introduced

(*g.*) This subject will also be considered in the same minute.

duced into the army of this Presidency, and beg to suggest that at least ten regiments of the line have a rifle company substituted for the present light companies. The only rifle company, as far as we are aware, which this service ever possessed belonged to the Honourable Company's European regiment, was broken up on the separation of the wings of that corps in 1824, and on the reunion of the wings, was not re-established. The opportunity which now presents itself for restoring that useful arm in the European regiment, more particularly since its present constitution of eight companies with ten captains, admits of its being done so readily, ought, we think, to be made available.

(*h.*) "The tables which accompany your Lordship's Minute show so clearly the immediate and prospective saving to the State, that we need not dwell on the great financial benefit which such an organisation will effect. But there is one point of view in which we contemplate the change that, we will not conceal from your Lordship, in our humble judgment is fraught with danger, that is, the throwing a body of 224 native commissioned and 1,120 non-commissioned officers at once on the supernumerary list of the army, which must be felt by that class throughout the whole body as utterly stopping promotion, and rendering every man's situation hopeless, since it affects all who look forward to advancement as the only reward for long and tried services to the State, and we cannot but fear it will give rise to a feeling of chagrin and disappointment certainly calculated to alienate the affections of that class from the service, unless some steps are devised to obviate the entire stand there must be in promotion."

(*h.*) The same objection is very strongly urged by Colonel Morison, and I confess myself compelled to yield to its force. I am much opposed on principle to a different mode of dealing with the European and Native officer when, in the opinion of the latter, their cases are precisely similar. I therefore recommend that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the reduced corps shall, like their European officers, continue to be borne on the strength of their former corps, and have their promotion in the same till the whole are absorbed. For the purpose of doing duty they will, like their officers, be divided amongst all the corps of the army, care being taken that in drafting the men, their choice of corps being consulted as much as possible, they shall be accompanied by a portion of the officers, European and Native, of their old regiments.

3. I now proceed to consider some of the remarks in Colonel Morison's Minute* of the 7th August 1834.

4. Colonel Morison has proposed a different mode of reduction, but it partakes in a greater degree of the main objection to my own plan, consisting in the tardiness of the operation, and in the length of time before its results will be fully accomplished; and I shall, therefore, not further advert to it.

5. Colonel Morison has proposed a new organisation for the artillery, and the amalgamation of the three distinct corps into one. One of the objects of this plan is to place the Madras officers upon a par, in point of promotion, with those of Bengal and Bombay, who have been much more benefited by the various augmentations that have been made in former wars. I should be happy to see justice done to that meritorious body even at this late hour; but all my calculations and propositions having been made upon the existing organization, which has the great merit of uniformity in the three arms of the service, and is, I think, as good as any other, I am not disposed, for the present, to advocate any change in the established constitution of our army.

6. I will only remark, in passing, that I think Colonel Morison over-estimates the proportion of artillery required for the army of India. It is the most irresistible and imposing part of our military force; but, on the other hand, as I have often observed, there is no longer among the Native States any artillery establishment deserving of the name; and it is a curious historical fact, that almost all our great battles have been decided by the infantry alone, without the aid of a single gun. This is no reason for excluding artillery from our service, or for not rendering that which we have as efficient as possible, but it is strongly against

* Copy forwarded to England with separate letter from Ootacamund, dated 9th August 1834.

against any increase, or not introducing the greatest economy into this very expensive branch.

7. One improvement upon my plan, namely, of not giving a different number of guns to the troops beyond and within the frontier, but of reducing indiscriminately, in all the horse artillery troops, their present establishment of six to four guns, has my entire assent. It will effect a somewhat larger saving, and will be very much more convenient.

8. The intention of immediately making this change has already been announced* to the Court, and I have only now to propose that the Military Secretary to Government, in conjunction with the Adjutant General of the Army, may be directed to prepare the details for the sanction of Government.

* In separate Letter from Ootacamund, 9th August 1834.

Calcutta, 7 February 1835. (signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

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GENERAL ORDERS by Major General *J. Watson*, C.B.

Head Quarters, Calcutta,
12 August 1834.

UNDER instructions from his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the Major General in command of the forces is pleased to prohibit a practice which is understood to obtain in some native regiments under this Presidency, of allowing night-guards to European officers. This custom is unauthorized, and the Major General, in directing its discontinuance, deems it necessary to declare that officers in command of regiments will be held responsible that it is not revived.

By order of Major General Watson,

(signed) *J. R. Lumley*, Colonel,
Adjutant General of the Army.

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MINUTE by Mr. *Ross*.

IN regard to the merits in a military point of view of the plan proposed by the Right Honourable the Governor General for the re-organisation of the Indian army, I do not consider myself competent to give an opinion. I cannot, however, but think that the objection urged by the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal army has much weight. Those officers say that by throwing a body of commissioned and non-commissioned native officers at once on the supernumerary list of the army, and thereby utterly depriving the private soldiers of all hope of advancement, the plan must tend to alienate the affections of that class from the service. Perhaps this objection may be removed in the way proposed in the Governor General's Minute of the 7th instant. All I can say is, that if the plan would in the smallest degree deteriorate the condition of the private soldiers of the native army, that would be an objection to it, in my opinion, which the financial benefit expected from it would be insufficient to obviate.

(signed) *A. Ross.*

10 February 1835.

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MINUTE by Lieutenant Colonel *Morison*.

I BEG to explain, with reference to the 6th paragraph of his Lordship's Minute of the 7th instant, now in circulation, that the proportion of artillery adverted to in my Minute of the 7th August was intended rather to show what is generally considered necessary with regular armies in other countries, than to recommend any fixed proportion for India. I remarked, in general terms, that "that army will be the cheapest as well as the most perfect, whose several arms are in just proportion to one another," adding, "what that proportion ought to be in India is a different question."

I will

I will only now beg to observe, that an army whose peace establishment of cavalry and infantry is proposed to be fixed at 132,000 rank and file, and which may possibly be required to be doubled on emergency, will, in my opinion, be very ill provided with artillery, if that corps be fixed at 8,790 men only, who are moreover to be deprived of one-fourth of their officers, whose numbers are already on a scale rather under than above the most approved standard. And even supposing that the requisite additional men for a war establishment could at once be provided, which would be conceding too much, two years would still be required for their training as they ought to be trained, in order to obtain the utmost advantage derivable from their services.

The expense of artillery in the field is no doubt very great in comparison with that of the other arms, but the extra expense is occasioned mainly by providing the means of moving the guns and their equipments, which expense in many cases need only be temporary. In time of peace, the horse and foot artillery respectively cost but little more than the cavalry and infantry, while the moral effect of the artillery on the minds of the people goes much further in proportion to numbers than either of the former, and as necessity in due proportion in time of war will not be disputed. A battle may have been gained without the aid of a single gun, and many have been gained in India with a very inadequate number on the side of the British troops, who have often with great loss been required to carry the enemy's batteries by the bayonet, and even by the sabres of the light cavalry. But every officer who has seen that operation, and remarked the broken condition of our ranks on arriving at the enemy's guns, must be well aware that it only required a small effort of cavalry at that critical moment to have accomplished our complete discomfiture; an event which sooner or later may be expected to happen if we continue to rely on the success of such attacks unsupported by a sufficient artillery.

If it be supposed in the event of the assembly of a hostile army in any part of India that it will be provided with a less proportion of guns than on former occasions, I think we shall be disappointed, nor is it our interest that it should be otherwise, because it is a system of predatory movements (which are incompatible with trains of artillery) which we have most reason to apprehend. Every petty chief in Hindostan is in possession of some field guns which may be united against us, and I doubt not that with a little pains taken to ascertain the fact, we should find that there are still many hundreds of mounted field artillery in the interior of this country, besides the extensive parks which we know of in several of the native States. But if such were not the case, we cannot maintain the tranquillity of the country by better or cheaper means than by a proper distribution of an imposing and efficient artillery. In the event of the disposable army being called to the frontier, we shall still have to maintain a complete military ascendancy in our own territories as well as in those of our protected allies, but which, should any disaster happen to the field army, might become rather a difficult task. In such an event, an efficient artillery (more especially in those districts which are destitute of fortresses) would be more than ever indispensable in support of the reduced number of regular troops left, or of the new levies that may be raised for the care of the provinces. But our artillery on the scale proposed will not, I conceive, be nearly sufficient for our permanent safety.

Nothing, in my mind, would be more conducive to the efficiency of the Indian artillery than to form the whole into one regiment, with one Ordnance Department, acting on one fixed system. Having three of each must not only entail an unnecessary heavy expense, but continue to prove subversive of that uniformity which is so essential to military efficiency and public economy. Many discrepancies now exist, which I apprehend can only be eradicated by having one corps only, and one Ordnance Department. It was with these objects in view, and not merely for the sake of the Madras artillery, whose claims are sufficiently known to the Honourable Court, that I before alluded to the expediency of forming the Indian artillery into one regiment, and I can hardly doubt that the time will arrive when the advantages of this change will be acknowledged both at home and in India. The siege of Asseergurh, and other cases might also be mentioned, exhibited the evil effects of the present system, if such it can be called, when three different divisions of artillery, separate and independent of each other, all differently equipped, and acting under different rulers, were employed together to effect one and the same object. If the public money which must have been wasted on that and other occasions were ascertained, it could not

fail to explain in a striking manner how deeply the public interests are concerned in giving uniformity to the Ordnance Department in India, both in its establishments and equipments.

Calcutta, 16 February 1835. (signed) *W. Morison.*

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(No. 36 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Cons. 13th March 1835, Nos. 1 to 5, and No. 11.

We do ourselves the honour to submit, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, two important Minutes by the Right Honourable the Governor General, respectively dated the 28th ultimo and the 13th instant, the former treating of the distribution, and the latter of the composition of the army of India.

2. We beg to refer to the papers themselves for his Lordship's sentiments on these highly interesting subjects.

3. The other members of the Government have not had leisure, previously to his Lordship's departure, to record their opinions on the important military arrangements suggested therein; but their sentiments on the measures proposed and recommended by the Governor General will be forwarded as early as practicable.

4. The several papers adverted to in his Lordship's Minute, including a Minute by Sir R. O'Callaghan, with remarks thereon by Sir F. Adam, are herewith transmitted.

We have, &c.
(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*
*A. Ross.*
*W. Morison.*

Fort William, 16 March 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General and Commander in Chief.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY OF INDIA.

BEFORE I proceed to describe what the constitution of the army is, and to offer an opinion as to what it ought to be, a necessary preliminary inquiry seems to be as to the specific dangers by which our dominion may be assailed. It is easy enough to determine upon the general principles to be followed, and the great end to be attained, viz., that the military body should be so constituted and regulated, that by its imposing moral attitude, by its established fidelity and allegiance, it should render hopeless all internal rebellion; as also that by the adequacy of its numbers, and by its reputation for discipline and valour, it should be able as well in the general opinion as in reality to overcome any foreign attack.

But the elements both of our danger and of our security are of more difficult estimation, and without an exact knowledge both of the one and the other, it is very possible that the precautions adopted for our security may become the very means of our subversion.

Of internal danger, nobody I believe entertains less alarm than myself. In answer to those almost universal representations from public authorities of the existence of danger, and of the consequent necessity of maintaining a large native army, I have in vain asked to have pointed out to me what the danger is, where are the horse, foot, and artillery by which we are to be ejected. The most recent document of this kind that I have seen, is the Minute of the Commander in Chief at Madras, who describes disaffection as everywhere prevailing, and argues in consequence against any reduction of the army, and thinks necessary an augmentation of it. Indeed, there are those who contend for the same establishment now as when Hyder and Tippoo were in the plenitude of their power, and when several substantive States existed in other parts of India. But in Madras, as in Bengal, there no longer exists a single chief or combination of chiefs, who

possess

possess even the semblance of a military force. Nor are there any large masses of the population who have the least disposition to rebel against our authority. A vague expression is often used, that ours is a government of opinion. Our security rests upon a very much better foundation; upon the fact, which every one from his own observation and experience is thoroughly convinced of, and which is true, that our power is irresistible.

But though no danger appears in any real or tangible shape, it must be allowed when one hundred millions of people are under the control of a Government which has no hold whatever on their affections, when out of this population is formed that army, upon the fidelity of which we rely principally for our preservation; when our European troops, of whose support under all circumstances we are alone sure, are so exceedingly limited in number and efficiency as to be of little avail against any extensive plan of insurrection; then indeed the truth of that expression of Sir John Malcolm is not without force: "That in an empire "like that of India, we are always in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture "the form in which it may approach." This state of uncertainty is greatly aggravated by our condition of peace, by the spread of knowledge, and by the operations of the press, all of which are tending rapidly as well to weaken the respect entertained for the European character and the prestige of British superiority, as to elevate the native character, to make them more alive to their own rights, and more sensible of their power, of the dangers of our *old* position, upon which men's minds continue to harp, and against which they see no security but the largest possible native army. I have no apprehension; but there is much more reason to fear the changes incidental to our *new* position of peace; a more enlightened state of mind, a higher elevation of character, knowledge, improved morality, courage; all concurring causes that must produce effects to be dealt with by a very different philosophy from that which has hitherto obtained. So much for internal evils.

I shall now consider the danger from without; thinking of this, as of the other, that there is no ground for present alarm, but that we do not know the time or the quarter when and where it may appear; but thinking in like manner of both, that it is by immediate preparation only that security can be obtained, and that relief will be too late if we wait, as would be most convenient, the actual occurrence of the mischief.

The following is a brief abstract of our military position.

British India may be assailed from the north by the Goorkhas; from the east by the Burmese; from the north-west by the Sikhs, the Afghans and the hordes of Central Asia, in co-operation or otherwise with Persia and Russia; from the sea on all the other sides of her territory.

An attack from the Goorkhas might partially succeed as a diversion against our hill provinces, but without cavalry or artillery their efforts on the plains could only terminate in disgrace and defeat.

The Burmese have proved themselves totally unequal to compete with our forces in the field.

An attack from the sea, even supposing a momentary superiority against us on that element, could only produce an insulated debarkation, devoid of all the necessary requisites for taking the field, or to subsist in a fixed position.

The only real danger with which we may be threatened must come from the north-west, and consequently to that important line of operation our main attention should be turned.

Under its present able and judicious leader it is not probable that the forces of the Punjab will be ever directed against us; Runjeet Singh is old and infirm, and there is no apparent probability that the wisdom of his rule will be inherited by his successor. Troubles, upon his decease, will certainly arise, and it is impossible to forsee the result, as relates to the line of conduct which we may be called upon to pursue.

The present state of Afghanistan presents no cause of alarm to India. The success that attended the wretched army of Shah Shuja under his feeble guidance, affords the best proof of the real weakness of the Afghan power. The assumption of the supremacy by Dost Mahomed Khan may possibly give greater strength and consolidation to the general confederacy. It is much to be desired that this State should acquire sufficient stability to form an intermediate barrier between India and Persia.

Persia, in its distracted state since the death of the late king, is unequal to any

great effort unassisted by Russia; but the co-operation of 20,000 Russians from the Arras would speedily terminate the civil war, and the advance of the combined force would give them in the first campaign possession of Herat, the key of Kabul.

It is the interest of Russia to extend and strengthen the Persian empire, which occupies a central position between the double lines of operation of the Autocrat to the eastward and to the westward; and as Persia can never be a rival of Russia, the augmentation of her strength can only increase the offensive means of Russia.

From the days of Peter the Great to the present time, the views of Russia have been turned to the obtaining possession of that part of Central Asia which is watered by the Oxus and joins the eastern shore of the Caspian. The latest accounts from Kabul state that they are building a fort between the Caspian and Khiva. This is their best line of operation against India, but it can only be considered at present as a very distant speculation.

The line of operation for a Russo-Persian army to advance upon Herat is short and easy. The distances are as follows:—

| | *Miles.* |
|---|---|
| From the Arrah to Tabreez - - - - - - - | 60 |
| Tabreez to Tehran - - - - - - - - | 300 |
| Tehran to Muschid - - - - - - - - | 601 |
| Muschid to Herat - - - - - - - - | 228 |
| Total - - - | 1,189 |

In the campaigns against the Turks the army of Georgia supplied Paskewitch with 30,000 men. It may, therefore, be assumed that the same army could assist Persia with an equal number as an auxiliary force. With a good understanding between the two Governments, with time for preparation, and with good management, there could be no difficulty in transporting this force to Herat. The Russians are accustomed to move in countries similarly circumstanced. In Turkey, the Russian army always carried with it two months' supply of grain, and hand-mills for grinding it; but they never issue any part of this supply until all other means of obtaining it have failed.

What the policy of Russia might be after taking possession of Herat, it is unnecessary now to consider; but it is impossible to deny that she might arrive at that point in legitimate support of her ally, the King of Persia, and it is equally difficult to deny that from that point she may proclaim a crusade against British India, in which she would be joined by all the warlike restless tribes that formed the overwhelming force of Timour.

The distances from Herat to Attock, are—

| | *Miles.* |
|---|---|
| Herat to Kandahar - - - - - - - - | 560 |
| Kandahar to Ghizni - - - - - - - - | 190 |
| Ghizni to Kabul - - - - - - - - | 82 |
| Kabul to Attock - - - - - - - - | 200 |
| Total - - - | 1,032 |

The Afghan confederacy, even if cordially united, would have no means to resist the power of Russia and Persia. They probably would make a virtue of necessity and join the common cause, receiving in reward for their co-operation the promise of all the possessions that had been wrested from the by Runjeet Singh, and expecting also to reap no poor harvest from the plunder of India. But however this may be, it will be sufficient to assume the possibility that a Russian force of 20,000 men fully equipped, accompanied by a body of 100,000 horse, may reach the shores of the Indus; that Runjeet Singh has no means to resist their advance; and that the invaders having crossed the Indus into the Punjab, would find themselves in possession of the parts of India the most fertille in resources of every kind, and secure on every side from being harassed and attacked even if they had not on their side a body of irregular cavalry much more numerous and efficient than any we have to oppose to them. I shall assume, then, that the attack against which we have to provide is to consist of the above-mentioned force.

I shall

I shall now proceed to inquire into the composition of the army of India, of the physical and moral qualities of the native armies of the different Presidencies, and the adequacy and efficiency of the present proportion of our European force to our security and defence against all dangers.

In the margin is inserted an abstract of the rank and file of all descriptions in the Native armies of the three Presidencies, their height and weight, and the countries from whence they are recruited.

It appears from the annexed statements, that the whole of the Bengal army, and one-half of that of Bombay, including all the cavalry, are Hindoostanees. The Madras army is recruited principally from their own territories, and has also a small portion of Bengal men in their ranks.

When at Ootacamund all the Governments were requested to submit to a military committee the following question:—"Whether "the order of the Court of Directors issued about three years ago, "restricting the recruiting of each of the three armies to the limits of "its own Presidency, had operated beneficially, or whether it would "be better to permit the Madras and Bombay armies to recruit, as "formerly, in the Bengal territory?" The question did not apply to the Bengal army.

The Madras Committee recommend that in the cavalry no alteration should be made, the men being chiefly Mussulmans, from the Carnatic. The number of Hindoos in each regiment amount to about 50, which it is proposed to increase to 100. In the infantry they think that a proportion of Bengal men, about 100 per regiment, might be introduced with advantage. In the Golundauze one-fourth of the whole are from the Bengal Provinces.

The Bombay Committee report that the Court's restrictive Order has been totally inoperative, because, though the Order had been so far obeyed that no recruiting parties had been sent to Bengal, yet the Bengal men having voluntarily presented themselves for enlistment, they had been engaged as before.

The only change recommended by the committee is that, for the purpose of getting a better description of men, recruiting parties shall, as before, be sent to Bengal.*

One of the members, Major Robertson, dissents from his colleagues. He prefers recruiting exclusively from the Bombay territories, with the exception of the cavalry and Golundauze, "who, "requiring a much larger description of men, must have recourse to Hindoostan."

From the preceding statements it appears that the Hindoostanee is larger and more robust than the Native south of the Nerbudda, and the presumption must be that he is considered a more powerful, if not a better, soldier. His habits, indeed, are much more military. For not only, as appears above, does he go to seek service in Bombay, but the infantry in the service of the Rajah of Nagpore, as well as the Nizam's Contingent, consist entirely of Hindoostanees. In a late letter from the Resident at Hydrabad, he mentions that one of the Arabs, or of the horsemen from our Bengal Province of Rohilcund, was equal to 10 or 20 of the other men of the Nizam's force; and, in the attempt recently made by Shah Shaja to recover his territories, it was the battalion of Hindoostanees and the Rohillas, under an officer of the name of Campbell, that were particularly distinguished.

I have not read without surprise the pretensions set forth in behalf of the Madras

Rank and File of the Three Armies.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Regular Infantry.** | | |
| Bengal, 74 regiments | 50,320 | |
| Madras, 52 regiments | 35,360 | |
| Bombay, 26 regiments | 17,680 | |
| | | 103,360 |
| **Regular Cavalry.** | | |
| Bengal, 10 regiments | 4,440 | |
| Madras, 8 regiments | 3,552 | |
| Bombay, 3 regiments | 1,332 | |
| | | 9,324 |
| Total Regular Native Troops | | 112,684 |
| **Irregulars.** | | |
| **Infantry.** | | |
| Bengal, 10 regiments | 7,504 | |
| Bombay, 1 regiment | 680 | |
| | | 8,184 |
| **Cavalry.** | | |
| Bengal, 4 regiments | 2,526 | |
| Bombay, 1 regiment | 832 | |
| | | 3,358 |
| Total Irregulars | | 11,549 |

Average of Heights and Weights.

| | Height. | Weight. |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal Infantry. | *Ft. in.* | *St.* |
| Recruited generally in the Upper Provinces of Bengal. | 5 7·82 | 9 0·8 |
| Madras Infantry. | | |
| Men, formerly Recruit Boys. | 5 5·36 | 7,9·73 |
| Madrassees recruited | 5 6·34 | 8 1·10 |
| Hindoostanees recruited | 5 6·59 | 8 5·28 |
| Bombay Infantry. | | |
| Men, formerly Recruit Boys. | 5 4·75 | 8 5·25 |
| Konkanees recruited | 5 5·5 | 8 5·5 |
| Deccanees recruited | 5 5·5 | 8 9·25 |
| Hindoostanees recruited | 5 6·5 | 9 0·5 |

*Note.—The following statement would seem to support the opinion that the Hindoostanees engaged at Bombay are inferior in stature and character to those of the Bengal Army.

*Infantry.*

| | *Height.* |
|---|---|
| Bengal | 5 $7\frac{82}{100}$ |
| Bombay | 5 $6\frac{1}{2}$ |

*Cavalry.*

All Hindoostanees.

Corporal punishment in four Years:

| | *Per Cent.* |
|---|---|
| Bengal | $1\frac{4}{10}$ |
| Bombay | 42 |

A more severe discipline is supposed to prevail in the Bombay army.

Madras army. Sir Thomas Munro, upon many occasions, advocates their occupation of the whole of the peninsula south of the Nerbudda. I submit the following extracts from his correspondence (A. D. 1820).

"The Nerbudda is unquestionably the proper boundary between Bengal and "Madras, not only on account of its natural barrier formed by the river and the "broad range of hills which accompany it, but of its being the line of separation "between the Deccan and Hindoostan, and between natives speaking different "languages. The Bengal armies, composed of men from Hindoostan, dislike "serving south of the Nerbudda, and do not readily assimilate either with the "Natives of the country or with the Madras troops."

I must presume that the Bombay army was at that time upon a very low establishment, and had no Hindoostanees in its ranks. The dislike of the Natives of Hindoostan to serve south of the Nerbudda, has subsequently been proved to be entirely unfounded. The Government and army of Bombay are quite disregarded.

Again (A.D. 1820): "When Hyderabad and Nagpore were great foreign and "independent States, and more likely to act against us than with us, the immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did not affect the "authority of the Madras Government over its army, of which only two battalions "were for several years at Hyderabad; but both Hyderabad and Nagpore are as "completely dependent upon us as Mysore; they must, at some period or other, "fall entirely into our hands, and the internal administration must, in the meantime, be chiefly directed by our Resident. At present the discipline of our "army is much injured by our having about 20,000 men beyond our frontiers, "removed in a great measure from our control."*

Again (A. D. 1804): "I am sorry to hear it reported that it has been in "agitation to relieve the subsidiary force at Hyderabad with Bengal troops. "I think there are many strong public grounds for having no Bengal troops "either there or at Poonah. It is easier to carry on war in all the countries south "of the Nerbudda from Mysore than from Bengal. Where troops are in all "respects equal, there is still an advantage in having those who are to act "together drawn from one and not from different establishments; but the local "troops are, perhaps, in some respects, superior to those of Bengal; they are "more regular, more tractable, more patient under privations, and they have "been more accustomed to military operations."

These remarks are more applicable to 1804 than to 1835; there are no enemies to war against. The greater experience in military operations now rather belongs to the Bengal troops, and the preference assigned to the Madras sepoy for certain qualities would not now be as readily admitted.

I have quoted largely from Sir Thomas Munro, because I consider his authority superior to all others; but allowance must be made in the present case for a spirit of partiality, if not of partisanship, which as a Madras officer it was natural for him to feel.

But it is impossible for any dispassionate observer who has seen the Madras sepoys, not to say that their physical defects, their small stature and delicate frame, supposing all other qualities equal, render them very inferior to the northern Hindoostanees, and that consequently, as a body of men, they are inferior to either of the other armies. The regulated standard of each army is noted in the margin.

*Bengal.*—M. C. 8th August 1796. Carrol's Code, Chap. LX. sec. 42. No Sepoy is to be entertained who is not 5 feet 6 inches high, or who is under 16 or above 30 years of age, unless, in the latter case, he shall have served before.

*Madras.*—The standard of the Madras Army was raised in 1829 from 5ft. 4 in. to 5 ft. 6 in. for Horse Artillery and Cavalry, and to 5 ft. 5 in. for Infantry of the Line. Before 1829 the standard for all appears to have been 5 ft. 4 in.

*Bombay.*—The lowest standard for the Cavalry is 5 ft. 6 in.; age 24 years. For Infantry, 5 ft. 3 in.; age not exceeding 22 years. For Grenadiers, 5 ft. 6 in. and upwards.

I come next to the Bombay army, composed in equal proportions of Hindostanees and of men from their own proper territories. It would have been satisfactory if the Committee, who do not recommend any change in this divided composition had stated their reasons for it. The Bombay men seem to have no advantage in strength and size over the Madras sepoy.

I have often had occasion to remark upon the expensive character of the Bombay establishment, urging always the expediency of a compulsory order for the adjustment of their expenditure to their income, and in no instance has this assertion such strong confirmation as in respect to the formation of the military establishment.

The

* *Note.*—This will be in part obviated by the transfer of a general officer from ceded districts to Hyderabad.

The army of Bombay consists of—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Native Infantry - - - - - - - - - - - | 17,680 |
| Native Cavalry - - - - - - - - - - - | 1,322 |
| | 19,012 |

To superintend th[redacted] force, they have one lieutenant general and three *major generals, the s[redacted] staff as in the other Presidencies, with all the appendages of commis[redacted]nce establishments, pay and audit departments, &c. belonging to a larg[redacted]*

I beg a reference to [redacted]on abstract of the Bengal army furnished by the Quarterm[redacted]it will appear that there are three divisions, almost equal i[redacted]mbay army, under the charge of one major general, vi[redacted]

| | |
|---|---|
| Presidency [redacted] - | 17,308 |
| Cawnpor[redacted] | 11,798 |
| Meerut [redacted] - - | 16,551 |
| Bombay [redacted] - - - - - - | 19,012 |

This arrangement wa[redacted]ed by a different order of things, when the Bombay Presidency was disconn[redacted]d with the others, and when separate establishments were indispensable to its efficiency. The necessity no longer exists, and it seems practicable to substitute for it another, which will save a very great charge, and will, I venture to think, not be unacceptable to all the individuals concerned.

I would propose that the Bombay army, as such, should be at once abolished, the Hindoostanee half of it being transferred in complete regiments to the Bengal army; the Bombay* half to remain as a separate corps, to be recruited always within the territories, to be commanded by a major general, with the the staff as any other division of the army, and the commissariat and ordnance departments being incorporated with those of Bengal or Madras, as may be most convenient. I am, of course, supposing the previous adoption of the general equalization of all allowances.

To the officers I conceive that the larger field of employment and the superior healthiness of many of the stations in the Upper Provinces would be agreeable. To the men it would be much more satisfactory to be brought nearer their homes, and to be saved the dangers of the long journey which has been so fatal to many when returning on furlough. The State, besides the saving from the reduction of the staff, would also make a great gain in the comparative cheapness of all camp establishments, of followers, &c. It is an extraordinary fact, not yet accounted for, that in all the stations occupied alternately by Madras, Bombay, and Bengal troops, the bazaar prices have invariably fallen with the latter, and risen with the two former.

The Bombay division would, under this alteration, occupy only the stations within their frontier, transferring the Southern Mahratta country to Madras, Nagpore† and Deesa to Bengal.

In considering the question of internal danger, those officers most conversant with Indian affairs who were examined before the Parliamentary Committee, apprehend no danger to our dominion as long as we are assured of the fidelity of our native troops. To this opinion I entirely subscribe. But others again view in

* As this separate corps would be liable to degenerate into a sort of militia, it might perhaps be a better arrangement to incorporate the Bombay half in the Madras army, in the same manner as the Hindoostanee half would be drafted into that of Bengal.

† The following table of distances shows that Nagpore is as conveniently placed for support from three of the great military stations in Bengal, as from Bombay, and much nearer to the divisions in Malwa and Saugor than even to Bombay :—

| | Miles. | | Miles. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nagpore to Bombay - - - | 560 | Nagpore to Sau[redacted]) - - | 181 |
| „ Madras - - - | 735 | „ Bena[redacted] - - - | 446 |
| „ Mhow (*a*) - - | 351 | „ Allaha[redacted] - - | 450 |
| „ Neemuch (*b*) - - | 505 | „ Agra - - - | 669 |

(*a*) Left Cantonment of the Rajpootanah Force.
(*b*) Centre of - - ditto.
(*c*) Head quarters of Saugor Division.

in the native army itself the source of our greatest peril. In all ages the military body has been often the prime cause, but generally the instrument of all revolutions, and proverbial almost as is the fidelity of the native soldier to his chief whom he serves, more especially when he is justly and kindly treated; still we cannot be blind to the fact that many of those ties which bind other armies to their allegiance are totally wanting in this. Here is no patriotism, no community of feeling as to religion or birth-place, no influenci[illegible]ttachment from high consideration or great honours and rewards. Our [illegible]rmy also is extremely ignorant, capable of the strongest religious ex[illegible]and very sensitive to disrespect to their persons or infringement of [illegible]s. I shall quote from the evidence a few of those passages bea[illegible]bject, which appear to me to have the greatest force and t[illegible]ussell observes: "The "greatest danger we have to appr[illegible]ve army. Our military "force is the exclusive tenure h[illegible]ernment, and the fidelity "of the troops of whom th[illegible]ssarily precarious. They "are foreigners and me[illegible]a Government that pays "them well, and trea[illegible]hold upon them through "either national h[illegible]xpect from them what "we do from English so[illegible]ighting for [illegible] They are peculiarly "susceptible of being practised upon, and may [illegible]ed, either by our own "mismanagement or by the artifices of designi[illegible]ons, to turn against us "those very arms which now constitute our only [illegible]ength." This intelligent officer makes a remark, too true at the present day, with respect to the Madras army: "The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the "hands of a school which thought that everything depended on show, and that "no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uni-"formity." There are parts of Mr. Holt Mackenz[illegible]'s evidence well worthy of attention, for no man of his time in India possessed the same general knowledge, or could form a more accurate and enlightened judgment upon all subjects connected with our rule. He observes, "I do not think the sepoys ha[illegible] "attachment to the English as a nation; on the contrary, I apprehend [illegible]a "considerable number of that part which consists of Moslems must ge[illegible]lly "have a national, or rather I should say, a religious dislike to the Eng[illegible]sh." He thinks, "The sepoys have a great deal of attachment to their officers, but "that this rests upon personal character rather than upon anything that may be "called attachment to the nation generally." He thinks, "The Sepoys, as long "as they are well paid, will have a strong sense of the duty of being faithful "to those who so pay them, to be only overcome by some powerful cause of "discontent or excitement." He thinks, "A large native army is quite essential "for maintaining the tranquillity of the country, but he would be very sorry to "see its defence entrusted to them without a large European force. He is not "aware of any circumstance causing immediate danger, but he thinks on general "principles that there is much prospective danger."

It is only since I recorded different minutes enforcing the prudence and expediency of bettering the condition of the Native army, and of preventing discontent by timely concession and precaution, that I have read a passage in a letter from Sir Thomas Munro, written in 1817, in which I find a view of our future situation, and the consequences appertaining to it, quite in unison with the sentiments I have so often expressed. He observes: "But even if all India could be "brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a "change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One "effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any "warlike neighbours to control, would gradually lose its military habits and "discipline, and that the Native troops would have leisure to feel their own "strength, and, for want of other employment, to turn it against their European "masters." He concludes a long and able argument upon the question whether, in the event of our c[illegible]nquest of the whole of India, the condition of the people would be better th[illegible]nder their Native princes, which he doubts, with this remark:—"The[illegible] perhaps, no example of any conquest in which the natives "have been so [illegible]mpletely excluded from all share in the government of their "country, as in British India."

The only conclusion that I wish to establish from the preceding remarks, which contain indisputable truths, is, that in the Native army alone rests our internal danger, and that this danger may involve our complete subversion.

But

the fidelity of our Native army, though wonderfully great, and deserving of confidence, cannot be considered exempt from the possibility of seduction, that an adequate European force is the sole security against this, the greatest that could befall us. What should be the proportion of our European to our force will be presently considered. The external danger comes next under the The capability of the Native army to meet it, and the manner in which are su tive military means of India can be turned to the greatest advantage, jects of the first magnitude.

As far as experince can teach us, the prospect is discouraging as to any great degree of direct and positive assistance in the field, that is, in actual conflict, to be expected from the sepoy in a contest with the stronger and bolder races of Central Asia with or without the co-operation of a Russian force. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has given an opinion upon the question before us, which quite coincides with my view of it:—"My impression is that, as far as regards any "Indian enemy, the Native army may be considered to be very efficient. I am "not equally confident of their efficiency if placed in any new and unusual posi- "tion, and exposed to encounter enemies that may possible come upon us from "without. I think the result of the war with the Burmese seems to show that "when brought against enemies superior in physical strength to those with whom "they have been accustomed to contend; and required to surmount obstacles of "a different kind from what they have been accustomed to surmount, the Native "troops, however well led, will be found to want resolution and nervous vigour, "so as to be inferior to European troops in a degree not ordinarily to be per- "ceived in Indian warfare. Consequently, I should apprehend that if they were "called upon to meet an European enemy in the north of India they might fail "partly from the want of physical strength, and partly from the want of moral "energy."

The defects of the native of India are a want of physical strength and of moral energy. The first is beyond our remedy; it only depends upon ourselves to raise the latter to a much higher standard. Our system has, I fear, tended to depress it.

The late wars have brought the sepoy in contact with enemies of a more masculine character, and have shown the justice of the preceding opinion.

Sir David Ochterlony, in his confidential report to Government during the Nepaul war, has recorded his opinion that the sepoys were unequal to contend with the Ghoorkhas in the hills.

The Burmese war was exclusively carried on by British troops. The Madras troops entirely failed. It is understood that Sir Archibald Campbell was strongly prejudiced against them, and, when granting the request of their officers to be permitted to lead their men to the attack, neglected the practice invariably adopted upon all other occasions, of joining with them a proportion of European troops. To this their ill-success may be in part owing. My own impression is also that in the short war against Coorg the Madras sepoys showed the same want of energy.

With respect to the inability of the sepoy to contend with a European enemy, the concurrent opinion of all the evidence, to which may be added the inference to be drawn from all our own conquests in India, seems to be decisive upon the question.

For my own part I am not quite disposed to come to the same desponding conclusion, because if the bolder and larger man of the north were mixed with a due proportion of European troops, and excited to acts of valor by sufficient encouragement, I know not why he should not acquire the same superior bearing as the Portugese and the Neapolitans under British and French direction.

But of the sepoys of the south of India, of those of the territories proper of Madras and Bombay, I entertain no such favourably put for them than by supposing them to be Europeans and to have all the advantages of the European character, and then let it be asked if men of such physical inferiority would be received as recruits in any European army, or if an army so constituted would not be considered perfectly inefficient.

All these facts and opinions seem to me to establish incontrovertibly that a large proportion of European troops is necessary for our security under all circumstances of peace and war. It surprises me to find how little attention was paid by the Committee to one of the most important parts of the inquiry, the relative proportion between the Native and European force. But we fortunately

possess the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro, the first of authorities, confirmed by another only second to his, that of Colonel John Munro, who filled the office of Quartermaster General when I was at Madras. The opinions on both these questions are worthy of being noted:

"The native troops are in an excellent state of discipline, but of course
"Europeans are always superior to the natives."

1109. Question 2. "What should be the relative proportions of the European
1110. "infantry to the native infantry." Answer: "I should say one-third of European,
"that was the proportion that was observed at Madras, indeed we had sometimes
"rather more, now we have considerably less. I once conversed with Sir Thomas
"Munro on that point, and he expressed his opinion very decidedly that the should
"be that proportion." This is also my own opinion, but I think that it would suffice at present to fix it at one-fourth, being careful that the establishment should be always kept complete, and that on the most remote indication of danger it should be increased to one-third. The abstract in the margin, taken from the statements annexed to this Minute, shows the actual proportion of Europeans to Natives in the army of each Presidency, and in the whole army.

| Proportion. | |
|---|---|
| Bengal Army. | |
| Infantry, $\frac{1}{7}$ - | 3119 / 6733 |
| Cavalry, $\frac{1}{3}$ - | 1020 / 1710 |
| Madras Army. | |
| Infantry, $\frac{1}{6}$ - | 1178 / 3697 |
| Cavalry, $\frac{1}{2}$ - | 572 / 598 |
| Bombay Army. | |
| Infantry, $\frac{1}{2}$ - | 1499 / 3238 |
| Cavalry, $\frac{1}{2}$ - | 424 / 604 |
| Total Infantry of India, in round numbers, as $\frac{1}{7}$: Ditto, Cavalry, as $\frac{1}{4}$. | |

The raising the European proportion to one-fourth would require an establishment of 28,171 rank and file. The present establishment of King's troops consists of 20 regiments of infantry and four of cavalry. The numbers wanting to complete amount to 1,945* rank and file, and the effective strength consists only of 15,587† rank and file. The three European regiments in the Company's service amount to 2,429‡ rank and file. They exceed their proper complement.

| Statement. | |
|---|---|
| Native Infantry | 103,360 |
| Native Cavalry | 9,324 |
| | 4)112,684 |
| | 28,171 |

The total effective force, both King's and Company's, amounts to 18,016 rank and file, and the deficit required to complete the whole to one-fourth, would be 10,155 rank and file, of which 8,599 would be in excess of the present establishment, supposing the King's regiments to be complete, and the Company's European corps reduced to their proper complement.

In order to maintain the proportion of one-fourth in a state of efficiency, it is necessary to advert to the very great difference there is, and must always be, between the apparent and real force, that is, between the number of men actually borne on the rolls, and those, if the regiment took the field, who would be forthcoming. Many, from the effects of climate, must be left behind in hospital and quarters.

I called upon Dr. Burke, the Inspector General of Hospitals, an officer of great experience and intelligence, for an opinion of the deductions that ought to be made on this score: his answer gives eight per cent. for sick left behind, and four per cent. more for the effects of even a long march, or a very short service.

In order to keep up this one-fourth to its proper quota, I think the establishment of rank and file should be fixed at 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, and to effect it at the least possible charge I would raise each of our 23 regiments of infantry to 1,000 rank and file, and add to our establishment two regiments as I have already proposed in a former Minute, of King's infantry. The cavalry, file, and the establishment augmented from should be raised to 800 rank and 00 men short of the force proposed. three to five regiments, being 1,00 onal regiments of infantry and two of cavalry,

I would station these two additi galore, making three regiments at that station, as follows: one of infantry at Ba venient position for a reserve, to be applicable which I consider as the most con regiment of infantry and one of cavalry to be to all exigencies in India. One onment in Rajpootana, proposed to be established placed in the great centrical can er regiment of cavalry at Hyderabad. on the Bunass river, and the oth 10,000 native troops without any European

In Rajpootana there are above objectionable in many points of view. force, which I consider to be highly e Nerbudda and Jumna, or rather between

This tract of country between th portant in the whole line of our military Nagpore and Agra, is by far the most i occupation.

I do not feel called upon to suggest the means by which this extra expense shall be defrayed; my duty is performed in stating the imperfections of our present military defence, and the measures that are necessary for the security of our empire. At the same time it appears to me that the reduction of one captain in every regiment of native infantry and cavalry may be made without any compromise of efficiency. When two companies were reduced in each regiment, the former complement of captains remained unaltered. I consider the

* Statement No. 1.
† Statement No. 2.
‡ Statement No. 3.

the establishment of European officers in a native regiment to be far more than is necessary, and it is their number and high pay which swell to such an immense amount the military expenditure. Men differ very much as to the proper proportion; some contending that the amount cannot be too great; others again, that the Sepoy army was never in a better state than when there were not more than three or four officers with each corps; I am much inclined to be of this opinion. The connection between the European and native officers was much closer, their dependence upon each other greater, and a more cordial intimacy and union existed between all ranks. I believe the sepoys have never been so good as they were in the earliest part of our career; none superior to those under De Boyne; and at the present day none better than the Nizam's Contingent, where the same proportion, I believe about six officers, is maintained. There is one fact that is universally admitted, that no number of European officers will make a Sepoy corps equal to an European regiment, and in my opinion that establishment would be sufficient that assumed the presence of one officer to a company. The saving proposed would go far to meet the charge in addition to the changes that have been suggested in respect to the Bombay army.

There are two points adverted to in the reports of the Committee that are well deserving of early consideration.

Both the Madras Committee and the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the Bengal Army have recommended the augmentation of each Native corps to 1,000 men, without any increase of officers, and I would strongly support its adoption as soon as the finances will allow. It would give great relief to the duty devolving upon all sepoy corps, which is often very harasssing and distressing as military duty, and increased by the interference and interruption often caused to their religious customs. This increase would permit the extension of a much valued indulgence, that of furlough, to a much larger proportion of every regiment, say one-fifth, and for a longer period, say one year. I should think it would, in any new general regulation, be advisable to reduce the amount of pay received during absence. There is at this time a great difference of practice in this respect between the Bengal sepoy and those of Madras and Bombay, to the advantage of the latter.

The same Bengal officers have urged the formation of a portion of the regular regiments into light infantry. As there is not a single chief in India, or on the frontier, who can resist us in line, an army, formed principally for that purpose, is in a great degree useless within our territories; all insurrections must be confined to hills and jungles, without we have either the Nepaul hills or the jungles and stockades of Ava, where soldiers well trained in irregular fighting, and in the expert use of a light musket, can alone be useful. I am of opinion that one cause of the defeat of the two columns in the late Coorg war may be ascribed to the ignorance of both men and officers in this species of warfare, which requires a particular and constant instruction as well as experience.

The irregular cavalry is the arm of all others in India that may be placed on a par with any of the military means that we could command for our defence against foreign invasion, not even excepting the European cavalry. I need not repeat what has been so often stated, that the Rohillas and all the other highest caste and bravest men in India, who will not enter our ranks from dislike to our rigid discipline, and from the fear of personal disrespect from our young inconsiderate officers, have no repugnance to serve in the irregular cavalry. The irregular cavalry is of peculiar importance in India; it is the favourite arm of the Native; it attaches him to our service by the strong ties of interest and affection; it prevents his being eagaged against us, and, if the system were sufficiently extended, it would at a trifling expense afford us all the advantages, moral and military, which the Russians have derived from the Cossacks, who, from being the bitterest enemies of Russia in the time of Peter the Great, have become the most faithful subjects of the emperor. This force should be increased to 20,000 men.

Steam-power must be included among the most powerful means of reducing the difficulties of protection and support to such extensive and distant lines of defence, and of multiplying the military resources that we already possess. In illustration of the practical use that might be made of this power, I take the liberty of introducing here an opinion that I have elsewhere expressed: " But an efficient marine steam establishment in India is called for by considerations more powerful even than those of commercial advantage, or improved political

control. It would muitiply, in a ratio little understood, the defensive means of the empire. Let me advert to an event, the particulars of which are within your recollection, the Burmese war. If five powerful steamers had then been at our command, to bring up in quick succession all necessary reinforcements and supplies, the war would probably have terminated in a few mouths, and many millions of treasure, many thousands of lives and extraordinary misery and sickness would have been spared. Allow me to submit another estimate of advantages, of the correctness of which you can all likewise judge. The proper station for the principal reserve of our European troops in India is at Bangalore, Madras the place of embarkation. In a few days at any period of the monsoons the same five steamers would carry this force to the most distant part of the shores of the empire. In five weeks, with the aid of the river steamers, this reserve would reach Allahabad, the most centrical point of our territories, one of our most commanding positions. The same steam-power that would enable us to baffle any invader in war would be ample in time of peace to carry into complete execution the whole plan of the Bengal Steam Committee, for which I continue to be a decided advocate. I will only offer a remark, that if such power be provided it should be exclusively appropriated to the transport of troops and to the maintenance of the communication with Europe. From all purposes of less utility, as passage or tug vessels, it should be interdicted as uselessly expensive, and as affecting, without any adequate return of benefit, the efficiency and readiness for constant service of the steam machinery.

I shall only now take the liberty of suggesting the advantage that would accrue from including the military establishments of Ceylon in those entertained for the defence of our Indian empire. Ceylon could well spare one regiment of infantry, which would be, *pro tanto*, a relief to her finances. For the ordinary duties of the colony a sepoy corps, at one-half of the expense, would probably answer every purpose; and, in case of more urgent service, the regiment at Trichinopoly might be held at the disposal of the Government of Ceylon, and would be able to cross the Straits in a very short time. The Ceylon regiment, if stationed at Bangalore, would be of much more extended benefit, could march down to replace the Trichinopoly regiment if necessary, and could move on to Ceylon in case of increasing urgency. There is a Malay corps in Ceylon, an element of defence not known in our Indian establishment, and which might be most usefully employed in our provinces on the eastern coast, and perhaps in the Lower Provinces, which are so hateful to the up-country sepoy. If the experiment succeeded this corps would afford a nucleus for the formation of a larger force. It is a great desideratum in our military arrangements, the obtaining a mode of defence for Bengal proper at once efficient for the State and satisfactory to the individuals employed. I had much conversation with Sir Edward Barnes on this subject. I possess, indeed, a written memorandum from him strongly concurring in the view here taken, but I cannot immediately lay my hand upon it. I regret that these observations should have run to such extreme length, but no one before me has had the opportunity of a season of peace to reflect upon the alterations that the union of our Presidencies into one government, and of our territories into one empire, imperatively call for. It would have ill become me upon a subject so momentous as the safety of this great possession to have been prevented by any motive of delicacy from the full development of my opinion. I fearlessly pronounce the Indian army to be the least efficient and most expensive in the world. The realization of the hypothesis with which I started, of the presence of 20,000 Russian infantry on the Indus, with its accompanying multitudes, would now find us in a state utterly unable to resist them. The national resources at home might possibly rescue us from the impending ruin; but we must recollect that we are not likely to have again the same large armies to supply us with great reinforcements, and that men recruited for the occasion would be very inefficient, and quite inadequate to bear the effects of the climate. But, even if we could command this aid, it would be utterly inexcusable if, with ample time for preparation, with the sum of ten millions sterling appropriated to our military establishment, we were not able to secure ourselves against every calculable danger.

Calcutta,
13 March 1835.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

## No. 1.

STATEMENT of the Strength of a Regiment of Cavalry and Infantry in India, showing also the Number of Officers and Men wanting to Complete each of His Majesty's Regiments serving in the Three Presidencies.

| | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Staff. | Serjeants. | Trumpeters or Dummers. | Farriers. | Corporals. | Privates. | TOTAL. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Establishment of a Regiment of Cavalry | 4 | 8 | 24 | 7 | 45 | 8 | 8 | 32 | 608 | 744 |
| Ditto - - ditto - - Infantry | 4 | 9 | 27 | 6 | 41 | 13 | – | 36 | 700 | 836 |
| *Cavalry:* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wanting to Complete: | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4th Light Dragoons | – | – | 2 | – | 1 | – | – | 1 | 35 | 39 |
| 11th „ | 1 | 1 | 6 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 36 | 46 |
| 13th „ | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 44 | 44 |
| 16th „ | – | – | 5 | – | – | – | 1 | – | 103 | 109 |
| TOTAL Cavalry wanting | 1 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | 218 | 238 |
| *Infantry:* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wanting to Complete: | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Bengal:* | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3rd Foot | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 124 | 127 |
| 13th „ | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | – | – | 11 | 15 |
| 16th „ | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 129 | 129 |
| 26th „ | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 72 | 72 |
| 31st „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 |
| 38th „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 |
| 44th „ | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 37 |
| 49th „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | 175 | 176 |
| 62nd „ | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | 252 | 254 |
| TOTAL Infantry wanting | – | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | – | 1 | 800 | 812 |
| Wanting to Complete: | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Madras:* | | | | | | | | | | |
| 39th Foot | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | 2 |
| 41st „ | – | – | 3 | – | 1 | – | – | 1 | 87 | 92 |
| 45th „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | 2 | – | – | 136 | 139 |
| 54th „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 11 |
| 55th „ | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | 2 | 4 |
| 57th „ | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 93 | 94 |
| 63rd „ | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | 113 | 114 |
| TOTAL wanting | – | – | 6 | 1 | 3 | 4 | – | 1 | 441 | 456 |
| *Bombay:* | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2nd Foot | – | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | 94 | 101 |
| 6th „ | – | – | 1 | – | 4 | – | – | 3 | 91 | 99 |
| 20th „ | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | 4 | 72 | 78 |
| 40th „ | – | – | 2 | 1 | 5 | – | – | 3 | 150 | 161 |
| TOTAL wanting | – | – | 3 | 1 | 13 | 1 | – | 14 | 407 | 439 |

### SUMMARY of the above.

| | |
|---|---|
| Cavalry in India, Officers and Soldiers | 238 |
| Infantry in Bengal | 812 |
| „ Madras | 456 |
| „ Bombay | 439 |
| TOTAL wanting | 1,945 |

*N.B.*—Colonels omitted, being General Officers.

(signed) *R. Torrens,*
Colonel, A.G.K.I.

No. 2.

STATEMENT of the present Strength of His Majesty's Regiments serving in India.

| | Present Strength. | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Serjeants. | Trumpeters or Drummers. | Farriers. | Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| *Bengal:* | | | | | |
| 11th Dragoons | 46 | 8 | 8 | 603 | |
| 16th „ | 45 | 8 | 7 | 537 | |
| 3rd Foot | 42 | 13 | — | 614 | |
| 13th „ | 36 | 16 | — | 721 | |
| 16th „ | 42 | 13 | — | 610 | |
| 26th „ | 42 | 13 | — | 667 | |
| 31st „ | 41 | 13 | — | 817 | |
| 38th „ | 41 | 13 | — | 791 | |
| 44th „ | 42 | 15 | — | 704 | |
| 49th „ | 42 | 13 | — | 564 | |
| 62nd „ | 42 | 11 | — | 489 | |
| TOTAL | 461 | 136 | 15 | 7,115 | 7,727 |
| *Madras:* | | | | | |
| 13th Dragoons | 45 | 8 | 8 | 596 | |
| 39th Foot | 42 | 11 | — | 739 | |
| 41st „ | 40 | 13 | — | 648 | |
| 45th „ | 41 | 10 | — | 600 | |
| 54th „ | 41 | 13 | — | 726 | |
| 55th „ | 40 | 13 | — | 778 | |
| 57th „ | 41 | 13 | — | 646 | |
| 63rd „ | 41 | 13 | — | 626 | |
| TOTAL | 331 | 94 | 8 | 5,359 | 5,792 |
| *Bombay:* | | | | | |
| 4th Dragoons | 48 | 8 | 8 | 604 | |
| 2nd Foot | 39 | 12 | — | 638 | |
| 6th „ | 37 | 13 | — | 645 | |
| 20th „ | 43 | 13 | — | 663 | |
| 40th „ | 37 | 13 | — | 583 | |
| TOTAL | 204 | 59 | 8 | 3,113 | 3,404 |
| GRAND TOTAL | | | | | 16,921 |

*King's:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Rank and File, Cavalry | 2,340 |
| Rank and File, Infantry | 13,247 |

*Company's:*

| | |
|---|---|
| European Infantry, Rank and File | 2,429 |
| Total British Infantry in India, Rank and File | 15,676 |

(signed) *R. Torrens,* Colonel, A.G.K.I.

No. 3.

STATEMENT of the present Strength of each of the Honourable Company's European Infantry Regiments in India, taken from the last Returns received in the Adjutant General's Office.

| | Colonels. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | 2nd Lieutenants or Ensigns. | Surgeons. | Assistant Surgeons. | Serjeant Major. | Quartermaster Serjeant. | Serjeants. | Drummers. | Half Pay Drummers. | Rank and File. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal European Regiment - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 16 | 8 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 44 | 18 | 28 | 768 | Return dated 1st February 1835. |
| Madras - - ditto - - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 17 | 8 | 2 | – | 1 | 1 | 40 | 19 | – | 934 | - ditto - 1st October 1831. |
| Bombay - - ditto - - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 35 | 16 | – | 727 | - ditto - 1st October 1834. |

Adjutant General's Office, 24 February 1835. (signed) *J. R. Lumley*, Colonel, Adjutant General.

## MINUTE by the Governor General and Commander in Chief.

### GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY OF INDIA.

IN a former Paper * I treated of the formation of the Army of India, and I hope satisfactorily proved, upon the concurrence of the best military authorities, that the present system of small regiments was incompatible with efficiency and economy. The distribution of the army has been regulated upon a similarly erroneous but more fatal error. The dispersion of the whole of our military force throughout every part of the country into small bodies produces universal weakness, is opposed to every established principle of military tactics, is productive of great additional expense, is injurious to discipline, and objectionable in policy. The measures I have to recommend will be founded upon the very opposite doctrine, union and concentration; that is, the collection of the troops in large bodies, and so centrically placed as to reach in the shortest time every part of the circle for the safety of which each corps is intended to be the guard, being entrusted with the military defence only of our territories, and wholly divested of any interference with civil and police duties.

* Minute of 7 February.

I purpose beginning with the Madras Presidency, proceeding thence through the centre of India and Bombay, and terminating with Bengal.

I prefer commencing with Madras, because the subject of the disposition of the army of that Presidency has been fully discussed by Sir Frederick Adam and Sir Robert O'Callaghan; and the maxims laid down by these experienced officers are so sound and judicious, and of such general application, that it will be only left for me to express my concurrence with one or the other. There will be found a difference of opinion upon the political state of parts of the country, and of the greater or less precaution that may in consequence be required; but upon the main outline and general system of defence there is a complete harmony of sentiment.

I propose extracting from Sir Robert O'Callaghan's minute such parts as embrace the most important points in this general discussion. These I shall place on one half of the margin, and opposite Sir Frederick Adam's, with my own subjoined.

I shall take each division of the Madras army separately, giving the present and proposed force. I shall begin with the Mysore division, containing Bangalore, by far the most important military position in that Presidency. It may, indeed, be termed the key of it.

It is impossible to describe in more correct and forcible terms the advantage of this station than has been done by Sir Robert O'Callaghan, and I shall give

at length all the paragraphs of his minute relating to it. His remarks are also entitled to especial attention, as containing an epitome of the right considerations and views with which all the other great stations throughout India, for similar purposes, should be selected.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

35. IN all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore, it is impossible not most fully to concur.

And I think the concentration of troops there ought to be made to the greatest attainable extent. I am not inclined to give the weight to the dangers of conspiracy which are hinted at.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I ENTIRELY subscribe to these sentiments.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

35. UPON every principle of military defence, as well as of sound policy, it is of the first importance to have a large, commanding, and disposable force, competently equipped for immediate field service, in a suitable position, to be equally available for prompt and active service in any direction, where either an external or internal enemy can appear, and to be able to detach instantly any commanding force necessary to quell insurrection, rebellion, mutiny, or conspiracy. A country is never so strong, or its inhabitants and contributories so cautious, as when it is a matter of notoriety that the State is prepared to act with vigour and decision at any moment that opposition is manifested, and it is known that but a few weeks or days must overpower their plans of resistance; indeed, they will see and know this to be futile when the fact is before them, that a light field detachment of formidable strength can reach them by forced marches in a few days, or weeks at most; and that almost with corresponding energy and little more time, a battering train and siege equipment can join it. If, then, such a *corps d'armée* is desirable and advantageous, and promises to secure tranquillity within the frontiers of the Madras Presidency, and to repel attack from the north, north-west, or invasion by sea, by either coast of Malabar and Concan, or the Carnatic, where could it be so advantageously posted as at Bangalore? The position is nearly equi-distant from the capital, Madras, from Cannanore and Mangalore on the western coast, from Trichinopoly and Dindigul, in the southern division, the northern frontier of Quilon, Kurnool, Darwar, and Belgaum, North Cuddapore, and Nellore East; and each of these stations is within 200 and 250 miles, and may be reached by a light force in 12 or 15 days, as circumstances may require. Water and forage are abundant at Bangalore for such a force. The Mysore country provides all necessary supplies, and is surrounded by districts from which they may to any extent be drawn. If, then, I have shown that such a force is desirable, and that Bangalore is the fittest position, I shall next proceed to detail the force I would recommend to be concentrated at that healthy and eligible station, both for European and Native troops.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 2. My view of the propriety of increasing the force at Bangalore, and maintaining it at as high numbers as possible, is not at all influenced by the argument here set forth. I have no apprehension of the kind alluded to. I must confess there appears to me throughout a tone of doubt, not to say of apprehension, for which I have discovered no sufficient cause, nor do I believe there exists any foundation for alarm.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree in this opinion.

It is also an influential argument in favour of increasing the European force at Bangalore, that it will at once stop the progress of those conspiracies which have been instigated by the disaffected inhabitants in Mysore; a point of much importance to the stability of that attachment we have so much right to appreciate in our Native troops, but which allegiance may become matter of anxiety to the State if the designs of the discontented to tamper with them are suffered to be so often repeated. The troops of the Mysore Rajah will, I calculate, soon become equal to secure the tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Mysore, and to effect the collection of the revenue, and then the necessity for a corps at the French Rocks, and a detachment of it at Mysore will become unnecessary; as the Commissioner progresses in the settlement of the country, then the whole force may be concentrated, and the corps at Shirkapore, Hurryhur, and French Rocks become unnecessary; and until these desirable objects are completed, those posts may be occupied by part of the Bangalore force a space of time which will be requisite to prepare quarters and accommodation for the augmented force; there is ample accommodation

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 3. I doubt the present barracks being worth it. They are faulty in plan, and by no means fit for European troops. The additional barracks required ought to be on a better construction.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

New barracks ought to be constructed. It will form a separate proposition in conclusion.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

dation for all the artillery in the horse and foot artillery lines. The barrack for the European regiment, originally built for 1,000 men, may, at no very heavy expense, be increased to hold two regiments. The cavalry place of arms and lines may in like manner be increased, and all that will be required in addition as quarters are places of arms for six Native regiments and the detachment of sappers and miners."

36. Under these impressions, I beg to suggest that a concentrated disposable force be assembled at Bangalore, consisting, at least, of 10,000 rank and file, and be composed as follows:—

| Present Force. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Dragoons (96 men dismounted) | 640 |
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| 1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns) | 90 |
| 1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns) | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 3 Regiments Native Infantry (4 is the complement) | 2,040 |
| | 4,047 |

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Dragoons | 500 |
| Light Cavalry (2 regiments) | 888 |
| Horse Artillery { 1 European troop | 102 |
| Horse Artillery { 1 Native troop (6 guns each.) | 90 |
| Foot Artillery, 2 companies (16 guns) | 194 |
| Sappers and Miners | 166 |
| European Infantry (2 regiments) | 1,472 |
| 10 Regiments Native Infantry of the Line | 6,800 |
| Total Rank and File | 10,212 |

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

No. 4. The head quarters of the sappers and miners, and their school of practical instruction, should be at Bangalore.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I agree in this opinion.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

70, 71. I cordially concur in all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore. Its position, favoured as it is by a climate so salubrious, is a most happy coincidence, and ought to be turned to all the profit which such a fortunate combination admits of.

The camp of Bangalore ought to be the practical school of the Madras army.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree.

Of this force the whole will be disposable for any temporary contingency, as the sick and convalescent and details of corps might garrison the fort and cantonment, but in case of any distant or protracted service, one wing of an European regiment and four battalions will be required for the duties of Mysore." Again—

70. The ceded districts, Mysore, and that part of Kanara bordering on the Southern Mahratta country, being the districts from whence discontent is likely to manifest itself, shows the necessity of having a larger body of troops assembled at some convenient situation; and for the military reasons assigned of masses of troops being collected, points out the necessity of some centrical situation being fixed on, from whence troops could be moved to the disturbed parts in the shortest possible time and by the shortest possible routes. Bangalore is a cantonment peculiarly well adapted for such an assemblage of men, for, besides water, forage and provisions being abundant, it is healthy and well adapted for Europeans, and for the exercise of large numbers of troops; and it will be found that at the distance of only 30 miles from this cantonment that, with this as a centre, and with a radius of 155 miles, if a circle be described, the country comprised within the circumference will equal in extent one-half the area of the Madras Presidency, will include Mysore, Ceded Districts, nearly the entire Carnatic, one-half of Malabar and Kanara, part of the country beyond our territory, and, consequently, all the discontented populations within the Madras Presidency (except the Northern Division), may be reached and overpowered by detachments from this force in from 7 to 20 days, according to the extent of the disturbances to be put down requiring larger or smaller bodies to be put in motion. The distance of this force from the subsidised troops with the Nizam will be found within 200 miles. The Northern Division has been hitherto looked to to reinforce the advanced troops, but from the peculiar formation of the country, and duties required from the

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

troops, effectual reinforcements cannot be furnished by the Northern Division to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

71. The large force at Bangalore would in every way be well adapted for a reserve for the troops at Secunderabad; the distance is not too great, for re-inforcements could be united at Hyderabad in the course of 30 days, or light detachments even in a shorter period of time, but for a large force to be required to be put in motion, Mysore is, beyond measure, better adapted than the Northern Division for equipping with cattle and followers such a force."

## Ceded Districts.

The next division I shall notice is the Ceded Districts, forming, before the cession, a part of Mysore, and intimately connected with it in every respect.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

37. The force of these Districts at present consists of—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 3 Regiments Native Infantry | 2,040 |
| Total Rank and File | 3,317 |

These are distributed—

| | |
|---|---|
| At Bellary— | |
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 European Regiment Infantry | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native Infantry | 1,360 |
| | 2,637 |

At Cuddapah—
1 Regiment Native Infantry, 680 rank and file; and these two stations furnish detachments, priodically relieved as follows:

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| From Bellary to Gooty | 170 |
| From Cuddapah to Cumbum | 84 |

Assuming that the Bangalore force will be augmented as I have recommended, I shall only propose—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 1 Regiment Native Infantry | 680 |
| Total | 1,957 |

for the garrison of Bellary.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

I would withdraw the European regiment from Bellary (as well as the regiment Native infantry proposed) to add to the force at Bangalore; and this arrangement is more available as Hyderabad is to have a second European regiment attached to the subsidiary force.

The Ceded Districts ought no longer to be a division. The force at Bellary ought to be a detachment of the Mysore division, and the general officer now at Bellary would be more usefully employed in command of Hyderabad, with the Nagpore force under

38. The regiment light cavalry, the European company of artillery, and 300 rank and file of European infantry, may be considered a disposable force.

## Cuddapah.

One regiment of Native infantry at Cuddapah, giving one company to occupy Gooty, and one for the duties at Cumbum, leaving six companies at head quarters at Cuddapah. This is as great a reduction of force in this district as can with safety be recommended, and is only offered or is justifiable by the supposed presence of the disposable

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

under his inspection; or, if Belgaum be substituted, then with that station as part of his inspection.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely concur in this opinion; a separate resolution will be proposed upon it.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

disposable field force recommended to be maintained at Bangalore."

## Malabar and Canara.

These provinces are placed at the foot of the Mysore position, and, in a military point of view, are completely dependent upon it.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company of Golundauze - - - - | 100 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry - - - | 736 |
| 3 Regiments Native Infantry - - - - | 2,040 |
| | 2,876 |

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

I presume this alludes to the event at Sireie, which was a mere momentary ebullition, and of no consequence, connected, too, with the Nuggur revolt.

The brigade which I propose to be stationed at Quilon will furnish the details for these places.

28. I am not persuaded of the military necessity of an European battalion at Cannanore, though, from its being a very healthy station, it may be advisable to have it there. Hereafter, should good barracks be erected at Bangalore for an additional European corps, the force in Cannanore ought to be removed thither; and as soon as the road through Coorg is rendered practicable down the Western ghauts, a small European

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

22. The present strength of these provinces (exclusive of His Majesty's 48th Regiment, under orders for Europe) is as per margin, and distributed as follows:

| At Head Quarters, Cannanore,— | |
|---|---|
| ¾ Company Golundauze - - | 75 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native Infantry - | 1,360 |
| Total - - | 2,171 |

Mangalore, one regiment of Native Infantry, 680.

24. These provinces comprehend a line of sea-coast of 282 miles in extent, from Sedasheghur, north, to Trichore, south, where they connect with Travancore, and are bounded to the east by the western range of ghauts.

25. The northern part of the provinces of Malabar has of late been considerably agitated by internal commotion; but the collector has, I believe, reported the restoration of tranquillity, and the consequent inutility of further military aid. During every part of the year that ships can come on the coast, the ghauts are open and practicable for the march of troops, and Bangalore is the point from whence any required reinforcements would be furnished; and as the march to Cannanore and Mangalore is nearly equidistant, the ghauts could be occupied by a light force from Bangalore in 14 days, and it could be on the coast in 21 days or thereabouts; sooner, if necessary. I do not, therefore, propose to increase the force in these provinces more than one battalion; and this is rendered necessary to give effect to the measure I propose of placing a battalion at Paulghaut to relieve the Travancore regiment of the Cochin and Trichore detachments, and to furnish those of South Malabar, as well as with a view to keep one battalion as complete as practicable in Canara in case of any sudden emergency.

28. Cannanore is the head quarters of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and I propose to station there, as at present,—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company of Golundauze - | 100 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry - | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native Infantry - | 1,360 |

and

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

European detachment is all that can be required at Cannanore, if even that is necessary.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely agree.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

Mangalore ought to be the head quarters of a regiment of Native infantry, furnishing the two detachments, but on the smallest scale.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I quite agree.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

and that it shall furnish the following detachments: Tellicherry, one company, and, anticipating the probable reduction of the present Wynaad Rangers, 200 rank and file, I shall include in the detachments from Cannanore two companies at Manantoddy. This will leave 13 companies, or 1,105 rank and file of Native infantry, for the garrison and regimental duties of Cannanore, the head quarters of the provinces, and for all extra demands, occasional detachments, escorts, and contingencies.

29. Mangalore, one battalion of Native infantry, giving a detachment of two companies for the post of Honawar, from which a jemadar's party will be sufficient to occupy the post of Sedasheghur. This will relieve the regiment of the Mysore Division, now at Shirkapore, from furnishing 212 rank and file, or 2½ companies, to occupy the posts of Honawar and Sedasheghur.

The Centre Division, including Fort St. George, and comprising the whole of the Carnatic, holds the same relation to the commanding military position of Mysore as Malabar and Canara. As long as a powerful force is kept at Bangalore no domestic insurrection can prevail for any time; but not even an European enemy sea-borne, however strong, could maintain itself upon either coast; they could bring neither cavalry nor field artillery with them; and a commander of the least skill, without hazarding a battle, would, in a very short space of time, force the invader to return to his ships, even if he had the command of the seas.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

39. Centre Division, including Fort St. George.

The present strength of this division, including Fort St. George, consists of 10,359 rank and file, and is distributed as follows:—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Fort St. George: | |
| Body Guard - - - - - - - - (On the strength of regiments.) | 102 |
| 1 Company European foot artillery - - - | 79 |
| 1 Regiment European infantry - - - | 736 |
| 1 Regiment Native veterans - - - - | 1,080 |
| 2 Regiments Native infantry - - - - | 1,360 |
| Total - - - | 3,357 |
| Poonamalee: | |
| ½ Regiment European infantry disposable. | |
| St. Thomas's Mount: | |
| 2 Troops European horse artillery - - - | 204 |
| 2⅓ Companies European foot artillery - - | 242 |
| 2¼ Companies Golundauze - - - - | 225 |
| 2 Dismounted troops of supernumerary Native horse artillery - - - - - - | |
| Palaveram: | |
| 3 Regiments Native infantry - - - - | 2,040 |
| Wallajahbad: | |
| 1 Regiment Native veterans - - - - | 1,080 |
| Vellore: | |
| 3 Regiments Native infantry - - - - | 2,040 |

44. *Fort St. George.*—No reduction of this force can be made. It is perhaps equal to the performance of the duties of the garrison,

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

44. Perhaps four battalions is not more than sufficient, as this must be looked upon as the source from whence any troops going seaward are to be drawn.

The detachments of the veteran battalion may be reduced, and the orderlies attached to the staff reduced in number, and in some instances, perhaps, done away.

The details furnished from Palaveram have in some degree been reduced, and may be still more so.

45. I am inclined to a different opinion, and believe considerable reductions may take place, and that two instead of three regiments will suffice.

46. Certainly.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

rison, but not without considerable detriment to the discipline of the two Native corps so employed, and I am of opinion they should be annually relieved, or their strength augmented.

44. *Palaveram.*—The original intention of this cantonment was, corresponding with that at Barrackpore, to furnish by monthly reliefs the Native troops for the garrison of Fort St. George. It was intended to have four battalions at all times stationed there, and it may be considered the Presidency cantonment. In former times a force was generally maintained at Wallajahbad for the duties of the Centre Division, and to cover the capital in case of any sudden exigency arising.

At present there is only the head quarters of a veteran battalion with a few men at Wallajahbad, the whole corps being dispersed in detachments and small details through the Centre Division; and Palaveram has since its establishment in 1822 been considered the disposable force of the Centre Division, and the depôt for preparing troops for embarkation to the eastward, and for refitting the relieved regiments on their return. It is now reduced to three battalions, or 2,040 rank and file, although besides 271 rank and file for detached posts in the Centre Division, it gives 130 rank and file for monthly and weekly duties at Madras in excess of the garrison and town duties of that garrison.

45. *Vellore.*—This garrison has now three regiments of Native infantry. Its general duties require 314 rank and file for daily duty; and the regimental duties for three corps will take at least 120 rank and file. These numbers added to occasional detachments, sick, furlough, and wanting to complete, exclusive of 536 rank and file on detached periodical duties, will give a total of 500 rank and file on duty, &c.; and when it is considered that in this fortress the family of the late Tippoo Sultan and the Coorg Rajah are State prisoners, it will be manifest that the duties are as limited as safety and precaution will sanction; and that three regiments, or 2,040 rank and file, are not more than a competent garrison for a fortress containing such a charge.

46. Considering the great population of Madras, and the character of the inhabitants of Triplicane, Vellore, and Arcot, I cannot consider 6,000 rank and file of effective Native infantry too great a force of that arm to be maintained in this division; and I accordingly recommend that another regiment of Native infantry be added to the Palaveram brigade, and that all the periodical detachments of the Centre Division be furnished by annual relief from that cantonment, thus leaving Fort St. George and Vellore only liable to occasional calls for treasure and other escorts, and marching detachments.

47. *Arcot.*—Adverting to my proposal to increase the light cavalry at Bangalore to two regiments, I should recommend one only to be stationed at Arcot, where there is now two regiments allotted (the 2nd and 5th, the latter not yet relieved from Jaulnah).

48. Eight

48. By

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

48. Eight regiments of Native infantry will suffice. I am more than doubtful of the value of the veteran battalion; and other arrangements of the artillery would be expedient.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I believe the veteran battalions to be utterly useless; they ought to be exclusively employed as guards to collectors, treasuries, and gaols, if they must be kept embodied.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

48. By this distribution, allowing for the increase proposed, the Centre Division would consist of—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Body guard (on the strength of regiments) | 100 |
| 1 Regiment light cavalry | 444 |
| 1 Troop European horse artillery (six guns) | 102 |
| 1½ Companies European foot artillery (12 guns) | 145 |
| 2¼ Companies Golundauze | 225 |
| 1 Regiment European infantry (the wing of the 41st at Poonamalee not included) | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native veterans | 2,160 |
| 9 Regiments Native infantry | 6,120 |
| TOTAL | 10,032 |

50. Of the force in this division—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment light cavalry | 444 |
| 1 Troop European horse artillery | 102 |
| 1 Company European foot artillery | 97 |
| 2 Companies Golundauze | 200 |
| A wing European infantry | 300 |
| 3 Regiments Native infantry | 2,040 |
| TOTAL | 3,183 |

may be considered a disposable force.

SOUTHERN DIVISION AND TRAVANCORE.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

11. The present strength of this division consists of—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment light cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| Artillery | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European infantry | 736 |
| 6 Regiments Native infantry | 4,080 |
| 4 Companies of sappers and miners | 332 |
| TOTAL | 5,689 |

and it is distributed by corps, as follows:—

| At Head Quarters. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Trichinopoly: | |
| 1 Regiment light cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| ¾ Company artillery (six guns) | 72 |
| 1 Regiment European infantry | 736 |
| 4 Regiments Native infantry | 2,720 |
| Dindigul: | |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry | 680 |
| Palamcottah: | |
| ¼ Company European foot artillery (two guns) | 24 |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry | 680 |

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

12. All these detachments to be done away with, and the only military guards to be over Hazoor treasuries and gaols.

I would add one regiment of native infantry to the disposable force, in addition to which one battalion, and in case of need, two, may be withdrawn from Quilon.

13. The detachment required for Dindigul to be furnished from head quarters (Trichinopoly), and the same as to that at Paulghautcherry, as also at Salem, which may be reduced to 100 men.

14. I propose the withdrawal of this force; that at Quilon, within 132 miles, is equally applicable for any purposes of internal tranquillity.

The detachment at Ramnad I consider unnecessary; that at Madura can be reduced to 50 men, and the one at Oodegherry will, if absolutely required, be furnished from Quilon.

With regard to the Southern Polygars, the most recent reports show that they are perfectly tranquil, and no symptoms of a contrary tendency exist.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

A particular report from the Collectors of these districts was called for when I was at Ootacamund, and nothing could be more satisfactory than their report, both as to their present state and any apprehension of future disturbance.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

The artillery to be removed to Quilon.

15. The severity of duty now existing can and ought to be diminished. In the first place, all the small detachments for civil purposes ought at once to be done away with, and it ought to be established as a general rule, that without a special sanction of Government, no detachment ought to be furnished for civil, ordinary, and permanent duties, except the guards strictly necessary for treasuries (Hazoor) and gaols; and the amount of them ought to be fixed in communication with, and under the control of, the general officer commanding the division, who will of course determine on their amount, after hearing the report of a competent staff officer sent to the spot, who, in conjunction with the civil officer, will fix the

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

12. Extracts:—There are some detachments furnished from the corps at division head quarters, amounting to 96 rank and file. These, added to general and regimental duties and occasional detachments, require 590 rank and file, and reduce the effective strength of the garrison to 2,120 rank and file.

13. Dindigul, 18th Regiment, Native Infantry.—This battalion furnishes 315 rank and file:

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Salem - - - - | 231 |
| Paulghautcherry - - | 84 |
| | 315 |

which leaves 265 rank and file for station and regimental duties, occasional escorts, for sick men on furlough, wanting to complete it, which is so considerably more than half its established strength on command, that it cannot relieve its outposts without distress and fatiguing duty at head-quarters.

14. Palamcottah, 1st Regiment Native Infantry.

This battalion has its head quarters at Palamcottah, and furnishes detachments amounting to 313 rank and file:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Ramnad - - - | 83 |
| Madura - - - | 154 |
| Oodegherry, Travancore | 76 |
| Total - - - | 313 |

Leaving 367 rank and file at regimental head quarters. Its detachments are so equally divided with its established strength, that it can just relieve the outposts periodically, provided there is no treasure escort or other call upon it at the time. But when the great population and wealth of Palamcottah is considered, and the characters of the Southern Polygars, subdued as they are, I cannot but offer my opinion that our southern possessions are thinly garrisoned, and with a very limited and inadequate disposable force, considering that the reduced strength of all the outposts and garrisons leaves nothing available for any sudden emergency.

¼ Company artillery, with two guns, is also stationed at Palamcottah.

15. The severity of duty to which the native army of this Presidency has been exposed for a series of years past has been constantly represented by all its officers, and is not only detrimental to its discipline, but must more or less affect the good feeling and attachment of the troops. I am, therefore, anxious on this occasion to apply a fair remedy to an evil of so much consequence; and while I fully feel the necessity of economy, I trust that in the arrangements I shall recommend, it will not be found that I lose sight of that principle, while I provide against an evil that has run its course too long, and the consequences of which may give a pretext to the disaffected to make our native troops discontented; and it

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

the precise number of sentinels required for the public objects; and that no more be ever given can easily be controlled by the weekly report to be called for from the officer commanding the detachment. It is essential that all civil duties should be performed without the intervention of troops, and the officers in the civil departments must, from their peons, by a proper distribution of them, come to this. I hold this to be a principle not more essential to the good order of the troops than to the proper administration of the civil (revenue more especially) departments.

All the small detachments now furnished, and under non-commissioned officers, must be done away with, and the strength of the detachments at the following places may be greatly reduced: Salem, Coimbatore, Negapatam, Combaconum, Tanjore.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

it must be kept in mind that sound policy and justice require that so important a duty should never be out of mind in fixing the military force necessary for external and internal defence.

17. The present force is distributed at three stations—Trichinopoly, Dindigul, and Palamcottah; and independently of small details on detachments from them, there are no less than 12 companies on outpost duties; I therefore recommend that another battalion be added to the effective force at Trichinopoly.

18, 19, 20. Contain an alteration in the detailed distribution, but, as being mere details, do not require notice.

21. Paulghautcherry is no doubt a very important point, for the reasons stated; but it does not appear necessary to occupy it by anything more than a detachment furnished by the Southern Division, or the Malabar one, under present circumstances.

The detachments at Cochin, &c. ought to be furnished from the Quilon force.

21. I have not included the station of Paulghautcherry in the Southern Division, as it appears more conveniently to belong to Malabar and Canara, both as regards the disposability of the force, supplies, and communication.

TRAVANCORE.

The subsidiary force was withdrawn in 1830.

I propose the force at Quilon to be composed of a brigade of three battalions, and two or four guns of field artillery. This I propose as a military disposition of the troops, instead of having any either at Palamcottah or Dindigul.

10. "I would recommend that the battalion stationed at Quilon should be at all times kept complete, and that the necessary posts dependent upon it, Cochin and Trichore, be furnished by periodical reliefs annually from Canara."

THE NORTHERN DIVISION.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

I entirely concur in the expediency of this measure.

The troops will be quite as useful for the protection of the more southern parts of the Southern Division as if they were placed within the division itself; while the money expended within Travancore by the troops will greatly facilitate the realisation of the revenue required for the payment of the subsidy.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

Force:

| | *Rank and File.* |
|---|---|
| *1 Company European foot artillery* | *97* |
| *2 Company Golundauze* | *75* |
| *1 Company sappers and miners* | *83* |
| *1 Regiment European infantry* | *736* |
| 1 Battalion European veterans, 1 wing artillery. No fixed establishment | 216 |
| 10 Regiments Native infantry | 6,800 |
| Total | 8,007 |

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

The European regiment withdrawn, and none now in this division.

53. I conceive, after the approaching north-eastern monsoon, if affairs remain on their present footing, as I think there is reason to expect they will, two regiments of native infantry may be withdrawn, besides the European regiment (His Majesty's 62nd), which has already left Masulipatam.

Another distribution of the troops will be required, so as to concentrate larger numbers, and, above all, an additional force of sappers and miners, in order to complete the roads into Kienedy and the other districts, which have hitherto been considered impenetrable to troops. The improved communication into these districts will, of course, allow of a diminution of detachments, and by such an arrangement of the force as will render it applicable to several points, the aggregate may be diminished.

73 to 75. I do not consider, under existing circumstances, that any augmentation of force, as suggested, is required. The actual force distributed in the most advantageous manner is equal to all present objects; for I repeat that a war involving chances of attack from sea, combined (as it probably would be) with assault on one or more of our land frontiers, is not the case under consideration.

*Sir Robert O'Callaghan.*

Disposition, Masulipatam:

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Masulipatam: | |
| 1 Company European foot artillery - - | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European infantry - - - | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native infantry - - - - | 1,360 |
| Ellore: | |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |
| Samulcottah: | |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |
| Vizianagram: | |
| 2 Regiments Native infantry - - - - | 1,360 |
| Vizagapatam: | |
| 1 Regiment European veterans - - - | 216 |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |
| Chicacole: | |
| ¾ Company Golundauze - - - - | 75 |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |
| Kienedey: | |
| 1 Company sappers and miners - - - | 83 |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |
| Berhampore: | |
| 1 Regiment Native infantry - - - - | 680 |

Extract.

53. I consider that there is little probability of even prospective reduction, as long as the regiments of native infantry are maintained upon their present reduced establishment. Ten regiments, native infantry, will appear a large force; but it must be kept in mind that it only gives, when all are present and complete, 6,800 rank and file; and I should say, from the general history of the northern division, the character of the chiefs and hill tributaries, as well as of the surrounding district, that 7,000 rank and file of native infantry is the lowest establishment that will be found to give security to the country, divided, as the force is, and subdivided into many permanent detached posts and parties, requiring two regiments to give those details, exclusively of occasional escorts, which are numerous and frequent. I cannot, therefore, recommend any reduction of force in the northern division; but, on the contrary, were I not restrained by a knowledge of the economy now indispensably necessary, I would not hesitate to recommend 8,000 rank and file of native infantry for the duties of this division.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

73 to 75. Sir Robert O'Callaghan's Minute concludes with a "sketch of the disposition of the inhabitants," which presents a very unfavourable feature of the feelings of the Mussulman population in Mysore, the ceded districts, and the Carnatic. Sir Frederick Adam's observations upon this subject have my entire concurrence. Upon these data Sir Robert, in the course of his statement, has recommended that the troops now stationed within the Madras Presidency, amounting to 30,256 rank and file, should be increased to 37,932 rank and file; and he shows that the number thus recommended is in the proportion of one soldier to 350 inhabitants

*Lord William Bentinck.*

350 inhabitants in the most disaffected districts, and of one to 500 in Malabar and Canara, that is, among the Hindoo population. It is not said from whence this estimate of military force to the population is taken; but no calculation of this kind, formed upon numbers of the inhabitants, without reference to their courage, their means of resistance in mountain fastnesses and unhealthy jungles, or upon foreign aid, can be deserving of much consideration. Sir Frederick Adam's general observations contain his opinion of the most proper distribution of the force within the Presidency; and he takes the opportunity of considering the advantage of an exchange of stations between the Governments of Madras and Bombay, of Nagpore and Belgaum. It will be more convenient for the reader that my opinions on Sir Frederick's propositions should be given in the order he has placed them, and on the same sheet. This discussion leads us out of the Madras Presidency, and to that central tract of the peninsula which lies between the Madras limits on the Kistna and those of Bengal on the Nerbudda. It is filled by the territories of the Nizam and the Rajah of Nagpore, the two capitals of whose states are the principal stations, and form the connecting links of the great line of defence of our Indian Empire. It includes also the principal part of the Bombay Presidency.

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

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General Observation.

1. The increase of the force at Hydrabad makes it a fit command for a general officer, and I think it would be highly advantageous to place one there, giving him a supervising authority over the contingent at Nagpore; I mean to the extent of making inspections and reports on the discipline, &c., but no direct military command.

2. The general officer at Hydrabad would be found in the reduction of the ceded districts as a military division, adding the ceded districts to the Mysore Division, and making Bellary a brigadier's command, under Bangalore. I am satisfied that this is an arrangement fraught with advantage. The Hydrabad force is one which requires a general officer, and the supervision of a general officer is essential to the well-being of the other great detached force.

3. In considering the distribution of the army of Fort St. George, it is impossible not to be struck with the advantage, as to mere distribution, whether military or economical, which the occupation of Belgaum instead of Nagpore would offer; and I should propose that arrangement. I am aware, however, that a great feeling exists in the Madras army with regard to the occupation of Nagpore. It is considered as a sort of point of honour, and its abandonment to occupy Belgaum, though the latter is a very favourite station too, would be looked upon by the officers of the Madras army, as I am led to understand, as a sort of degradation. It would be tantamount, in their minds, to a declaration that the Madras army was no longer a field army.

4. Besides these considerations, there are others which cannot be without weight. Nagpore is a full-batta station. Belgaum is not, and, I believe, has never been. No doubt this is an element that enters largely into the estimate of those concerned.

5. It may be worth while under this view to consider whether the time is yet come for proposing such a measure, for of its

1 and 2. There can be no doubt of the necessity of placing the forces at Hydrabad and Nagpore under the superintendence of a general officer, which, by the abolition of the Bellary Division, can be provided without any additional charge. The same opinion was strongly expressed by Major General Sleigh, in his Inspection Report upon the cavalry in Madras and Bombay, at these and the dependent stations.

3. Hydrabad is to the northern circars and to the southern Mahratta country, that is, to Belgaum, what Bangalore is to Malabar, and Canara, and the Carnatic. A disposable force, from 5,000 to 10,000, could at any moment march from Hydrabad to one or the other, if occasion required. The value of great bodies of reserves centrically placed, so as to support every part of its own circle, and to move up, in order to strengthen any part of the main line that may be attacked, or where danger threatens, seems never to be considered in the general distribution. Each division, like each Presidency, is to have its separate corps or army, of sufficient force to make it independent of all its neighbours; but the useless waste of men and money that is thus caused is sufficiently obvious.

4. Sir Frederick may be assured that he has hit the right nail upon the head, and that the full batta, together with a fear of reduction of regiments, and the consequent progress of absorption, is the whole and sole element of this estimate.

5. The system of self-delusion, if it were instead of the more reasonable apprehension adverted to in the last paragraph, would be as

*Sir Frederick Adam.*

its advantages I apprehend there can be no doubt; and as little doubt can there be that, unless there shall be hostile attempts from sea, the Madras army cannot be considered as in the first line; it is ludicrous to go on in a system of self-delusion upon this subject in opposition to the nature of things, and the force of circumstances beyond our control. Madras has no frontier, and its army, therefore, cannot under ordinary circumstances be an advanced force. It does not follow from thence that it is to dwindle into a mere militia; on the contrary it is and ought to be considered as the great reserve of the army of India. Its geographical situation precludes it from being a field army under any probable combination, but its strength, its efficiency, and its organization render it more valuable as a reserve.

It may be worthy of consideration whether these considerations of mere personal advantage and feeling are or are not of sufficient weight to overbalance the benefits to be derived from a more compact and economical distribution of the army.

The following distribution is that which I would propose:—

| | Dragoons. | Native Cavalry. | European Infantry. | Native Infantry. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Travancore | – | – | – | 3 |
| Trichinopoly | – | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Malabar and Cannanore | – | – | *1 | 3 |
| Coorg | – | – | – | 1 |
| Mysore | 1 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| Bellary | – | 1 | – | 1 |
| Cuddapah | – | – | – | 1 |
| Centre Division | – | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Northern Division | – | – | – | 8 |
| Hydrabad | – | 2 | 2 | 7 |
| Nagpore | – | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Malacca and Penang | – | – | – | 2 |
| Moulmeyn | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 1 | 8 | 8 | 52 |

* The European regiment to be transferred to Bangalore eventually.

*Lord William Bentinck.*

as Sir Frederick observes, truly judicious, and ought not to have any consideration when opposed, as it is, to the advantage of the public service, and to the inconvenience of all the individuals concerned. The distance of Nagpore from the head-quarters of the Madras army, and its detached position, put it quite out of sight of the general controlling authority; whereas from Bombay it is little more than half the distance, and from Poona about 355 miles; and with regard to individuals, both European and native, if the same advantage of batta were presented at half the distance, the choice would not be for a moment matter of hesitation. It is the fear of losing it altogether that alarms. The desirable object is to place all the armies upon an equal footing in every particular. This effected, there will no longer be any obstacle to the most economical and compact distribution. On one point only am I disposed not entirely to concur with Sir Frederick, and that is in designating the Madras troops as the *grand reserve* of the army of India. The Madras troops, supposing that danger can only approach from the north, can only come in the third line. The second line must be occupied by the Bombay army, for which they are very much more fitted by the superiority of the materials of which they are composed. The Madras troops, from their inferiority of strength and stature, are utterly incapable of coping with an European enemy. But in the event of such attack, their duty will be sufficiently arduous and honourable in maintaining order and tranquillity, and filling up the void that would be occasioned by the advance of the Bombay army.

I will proceed with the distribution of the Bombay and Bengal armies.

## BOMBAY ARMY.

I HAVE little to remark upon the distribution of the troops in this Presidency, which will be found in the Adjutant General's memorandum marked No. 6,* and forming an enclosure in the letter of the Secretary to Government, under date the 11th September 1832. The same system of dispersion seems to prevail, but not having the same knowledge of the territories of Bombay as of Bengal and Madras, I am unable to speak with any certainty upon the existing arrangement, which, though decidedly defective in principle, may still be rendered necessary by local circumstances. My doubts are perhaps strengthened by the fact, so often appearing upon our records, of the urgent call of civil and political authorities for an increase of military force—calls that have been almost uniformly rejected, and proved by subsequent experience to have been unfounded.

I beg at the same time to call the attention of Council to the opinion contained in the last paragraph of the Adjutant General's letter, which the Commander in Chief, Sir Colin Halkett, considers "in every respect worthy of consideration."

"I trust I may be permitted to say a few words upon the subject comprised in the 2nd paragraph of the minute before referred to, particularly as the concluding

cluding part of it relates to the efficiency and better discipline of the army—matters which directly concern the details of the department under my control.

On entering upon this subject, I beg to be understood to do so with great diffidence, aware as I am that the question, as a compound one, involves considerations of no less importance to the statesman and politician than it does to the soldier, anxious to promote the efficiency of the professional body to which he belongs; but that the advantages of better discipline, and greater efficiency, would be most effectually attained by the concentration of the troops in a central or other commanding position within such division, it is presumed, will not be disputed; the high state of efficiency and correct military feeling and habits which are only to be acquired by officers of subordinate rank in large cantonments, where opportunities are afforded them of mixing, not unfrequently, with the higher description of military characters, can never exist in an army broken up into small brigades, and still smaller stations, commands, and detachments. If therefore the important object of security was not to be endangered by an abandonment of the existing system which causes so great a distribution of the army, the proposition embraced in this paragraph appears to me to be well worthy of the most serious attention, as one affecting important military interests."

It would be desirable that the Governor in Council at Bombay should be requested to obtain from the Commander in Chief a statement of that distribution, keeping always in view the indispensable demand of the Civil Department, which would best promote the objects of military discipline and efficiency, and it would be satisfactory to request at the same time the sentiments of the Governor in Council, upon a measure which in that stage of it may be considered to have reference more to military than political considerations. I would also propose that a copy of this minute should be sent to all the Presidencies, that, as far as practicable, the principles approved by the Council of India may have general application.

I advocate in the strongest manner the occupation of Nagpore by the Bombay troops. The table in the margin will show how much more conveniently reliefs could be afforded and control exercised by the latter. With respect to Belgaum there is some small difference of distance in favour of the retention of that station by Bombay, but Hydrabad, having been lately reinforced by the Jaulnah force, has in its immediate neighbourhood a larger collection of British troops than any other station in India, amounting to near two-thirds of the whole Bombay army, and I therefore consider Hydrabad as the parent military station of the Southern Mahratta country. It will be easy to adjust an equal distribution of full batta advantages without the necessity for sacrificing a plan of the greatest public convenience for personal considerations.

| | *Miles.* |
|---|---|
| Nagpore to Madras | 722 |
| Nagpore to Bombay | 535 |
| Nagpore to Bangalore | 670 |
| Nagpore to Poona | 440 |

I consider Bangalore and Poona as the proper head quarters of their respective armies.

| | *Miles.* |
|---|---|
| Belgaum to Poona | 230 |
| Belgaum to Hydrabad | 350 |

| | *Rank and File.* |
|---|---|
| Subsidiary Force | 6,629 |
| Nizam's Contingent | 8,880 |
| | 15,109 |

To which another European corps is about to be added.

Nagpore is an important point as connecting Southern India with Hindoostan, but its character is more that of a fortress than of a *corps d'armée*, because it has no frontier to defend. The population of the Nagpore state being almost entirely Hindoo, and the most orderly in India, requires no guard for its own tranquillity, and all our provinces to the east, the northern part of the Circars, Cuttack and Ramghur territories intervening between Bundlecund and Bancoorah and Midnapore, are so separated by hills and unhealthy jungles, as to cut off all communication and assistance in case of necessity from the Nagpore force.

Nagpore, however, is a very useful *point d'appui* to three different lines of military occupation in the Bengal Presidency.

1st. From Midnapore, through the Saugor and Jubbulpore division to the Nerbudda.

2nd. From Agra by Gwalior and Bhopal to the Nerbudda.

3rd. The more advanced lines of Nusseerabad, Neemuch and Mhow.

The distances are in the margin.

In war, there ought not to be less than 10,000 men at Nagpore. In peace, it is not necessary to add to it, because no demand for aid is likely to be made upon it, and, if it were, the Poona reserve could march up to supply its place if necessary.

I have now to cross the Nerbudda, and to enter the provinces subject to the Bengal Presidency. But before entering upon the Bengal distribution, I must notice the Bombay station of Deesa, which I would strongly recommend to be transferred to Bengal. It is beyond the frontier, inaccessible from Bombay for several

several months of the year, from the inundated state of the intervening districts in the direct line, as well as from the unhealthy jungles by the most circuitous route. The natural support to Deesa is the force in Rajpootana and Malwa. Deesa is a very important point, and ought in the next cold season to be augmented by two battalions of native infantry, making a total of one European regiment, and three regiments of native infantry. The presence of an imposing force at this point will awe the Ameers of Scinde, and will tend more than anything else to secure the tranquil navigation of the Indus. I do not comprehend upon what principle an European regiment could be detached at this distance with only one native infantry corps in its company, the greater part of which, in the case of marching and service, must be left behind, either for the care of the cantonment, or detached for the protection on the march of stores, baggage, sick, &c. Besides, European regiments should only be employed as the support of Native troops, and there should be never less than three or four of the latter to one of the former. Another strong reason for having Bengal troops at Deesa is the much greater expense of all the establishments of the Bombay army, which, in the late preparations against Joudpore, precluded the employment of the Deesa force, though so conveniently posted for the purpose.

### Distribution of the Bengal Army.

The accompanying statement of the Quartermaster General shows the strength and disposition of the Bengal army in January 1834 and February 1835. It will be observed that some detached stations have been abolished, which has admitted the concentration of all the troops in Oude, and the collecting an efficient force at Agra, the most prominent military station on our frontier. An abstract of the present distribution is inserted in the margin.

To this document is annexed a memorandum from the same officer, and approved by the Adjutant General, proposing the extension of the same principle of concentration to other divisions of the army.

The most important of these, and one which I have long had in contemplation, is the collection of the troops at the three stations of Mhow, Neemuch and Nusseerabad in one centrical position; that the force so assembled should consist of a regiment of European infantry, one of European cavalry, and so many men of other arms as to give a total force of 10,000 rank and file. The disadvantages of these detached stations is obvious. When the troops are ordered on service, each cantonment, so far removed as they are from all support, and situated in a country so liable to be overrun by plunderers of all descriptions, would require for its protection nearly as large a force as the whole united. Discipline would be better enforced, the effect more imposing, and the charge of so many multiplied establishments saved. It struck me that Neemuch would give that more central position, that the agencies of Rajpootana and Malwa might be vested in one officer, and that his residence might be fixed at Neemuch. But upon talking with the heads of the staff, and with others acquainted with these parts, it would appear that both forage and water would be wanting for a force of this magnitude, and that a desirable site could only be found on the banks of the Bunass river. I shall have an estimate made out of the expense and saving of this plan, which I would recommend should be transmitted for the sanction of the Court of Directors, and in the meantime it would be right that the country should be surveyed, and a committee of officers, consisting of an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department, an engineer officer of experience and some other officer, should be deputed to examine the different sites, and to report upon their different degrees of eligibility.

The memorandum of the Quartermaster General recommends other arrangements, which will be found in the margin numbered by the paragraphs in his own letter, with my opinion upon them on the opposite side.

Abstract Distribution of the Bengal Army in February 1835.

| Disposition. | Rank and File. | Number of Guns. |
|---|---|---|
| Presidency Division | 17,308 | 36 |
| Dinapore ,, | 4,439 | 10 |
| Benares ,, | 4,676 | 8 |
| Allahabad Fortress | 1,472 | – |
| Cawnpore Division | 11,798 | 28 |
| Meerut ,, | 16,551 | 52 |
| Sirhind ,, | 6,838 | 18 |
| Saugor ,, | 5,455 | 12 |
| Rajpootana Force | 3,940 | 6 |
| Meywar ,, | 3,973 | 12 |
| Malwa ,, | 3,426 | 12 |
| | 79,876 | 194 |

*N.B.*—One regiment of European infantry, of 736 rank and file, has been added to the establishment within the past year from Madras.

| | |
|---|---|
| Paragraph 9. Recommends the withdrawal of the regiment of native infantry at Mirzapore to Benares. | 9. Entirely approved. |
| 10 and 11. Proposals for concentrating the force in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories. | 10 and 11. Approved. |
| 12. Recommends | 12. I concur |

12. Recommends the abandonment of Hansi, which has proved extremely unhealthy.

12. I concur in this proposition, as well as in the opinion that Skinner's Horse is the best description of guard for these outposts. The regiment of Native infantry should be removed to Delhi.

13. States the advantages of Loodiana as a position for a larger force, from the abundance and cheapness of provisions and forage.

13. It was, I think, an error placing so small a force in so advanced a position. It may be a question whether the great body stationed at Kurnaul would not have been better in a more advanced position in the Sikh-protected states, equidistant from the Sutlej and the Jumna, having outposts of cavalry at Loodiana and Ferozepoor. But the expense of buildings being now incurred, there is not sufficient reason to make any change in the present arrangements.

14. Recommends the continuance of the corps at Alygurh.

14. I dissent from this opinion. There is not the least necessity for the presence of a regiment.

15. Thinks the regiment at Gorruckpore should be continued.

15. Considering the contiguity of the often disturbed districts of Oude rather than of those of Nepaul, from which we have never any annoyance, I think this regiment should remain.

The regiment at Berhampore has been ordered to Chinsurah.

It is proposed also to relieve the Madras troops at Moulmein by a Bengal corps.

The question of substituting Bengal for Madras corps to the eastward will be separately considered.

Having confined myself, in other papers relating to the army already recorded, to the improvement of things as they are, and in this paper to the distribution of the actual force under the existing condition of general tranquillity, and not of an army differently constituted, or upon an hypothesis of any specific internal danger or foreign attack, I shall here close my remarks.

In another Minute upon the composition of the army I shall assume a greater license, and shall describe my opinion of the dangers to be apprehended, the inadequacy of our present means to meet them, and that alteration of our establishments which will best secure the stability of our empire under all circumstances of domestic insurrection and of foreign invasion.

(signed) *W. C. Bentinck.*

Calcutta, 28 February 1835.

## Appendix.

## ABSTRACT, BOMBAY DISTRIBUTION.

### Presidency Garrison.

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Head Quarters Battery: | |
| Foot artillery (European, 189; Native, 137) | 326 |
| 1 Regiment, European infantry | 693 |
| 2 Regiments, Native infantry | 1,362 |
| 1 Marine battalion | 648 |
| Total | 3,029 |

Detachments 3, and marines for the Navy, amounting to 377 rank and file, furnished by Marine battalion.

### Southern Division.

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 99; Native, 23) | 252 |
| 1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native 55) | 56 |
| Detachment, engineer corps | 50 |
| 1 Regiment, Native cavalry | 464 |
| 1 Regiment, European infantry | 728 |
| 6 Regiments, Native infantry | 4,139 |
| 1 Company, European veterans | 23 |
| 1 Batalion, Native veterans | 709 |
| Total | 6,365 |

**Disposition.**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Belgaum Division, Head Quarters: | | |
| 1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native, 55) | 130 | |
| Detachment, engineer corps | 50 | |
| 1 Regiment, European infantry | 728 | |
| 2 Regiments, Native infantry | 1,310 | |
| | 2,218 | |
| Dharwar: | | |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 720 | |
| Kulludghee: | | |
| 1 Troop, Native cavalry | 58 | |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 731 | |
| | 789 | |
| Sholapore: | | |
| 1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 99; native, 23) | 122 | |
| 1 Regiment, Native cavalry | *406 | * Less the troop at Kulludghee. |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 661 | |
| | 1,189 | |
| Dapoolie: | | |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 736 | |
| 1 Battalion, Native veterans | 709 | |
| | 1,445 | |
| Severndroog: | | |
| 1 Company, European veterans | — | |

Detachments in this Division:—1 cavalry, 15 Native infantry: amounting to 798 rank and file, Native infantry; 20 Native Veteran Battalions.

## Poona Division.

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 2 Troops, horse artillery (Europeans, 195; Native, 46) | 241 |
| 1 Battalion, foot artillery (European, 531; Native, 252) | 783 |
| Head quarters battalion, Golundauze | 504 |
| Head quarters, engineer corps | 453 |
| 1 Regiment, dragoons | 630 |
| 2 Regiments, European infantry | 1,302 |
| 6 Regiments, Native infantry | 4,036 |
| Total | 7,949 |

### Disposition.

| | |
|---|---|
| Poona, Division Head Quarters: | |
| 2 Troops, horse artillery (European, 195; Native, 46) | 241 |
| Detachment, engineer corps | 64 |
| 2 Regiments, European infantry | 1,302 |
| 2 Regiments, Native infantry | 1,350 |
| | 2,957 |
| Kirkee: | |
| 1 Regiment, dragoons | 630 |
| 15. Third engineer corps | 290 |
| Headquarters should be co Poona horse | 155 |
| | 445 |
| Ahmednuggur: | |
| 1 Battalion, foot artillery (European, 531; Native, 252) | 783 |
| Head quarters, ditto, Golundauze | 443 |
| Detachment, engineer corps | 51 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 683 |
| | 1,960 |
| Malligaum: | |
| 2 Regiments, Native infantry | 1,354 |
| Bhewndy: | |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 649 |

Detachments in this division:—Engineer corps, 4; Golundauze, 1; Native infantry, 15: amounting to 634 rank and file, Native infantry.

## Northern Division.

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 97; Native, 14) | 121 |
| 1 Company, foot artillery (European, 75; Native, 81) | 154 |
| Detachments Golandauze | 346 |
| Detachments engineer corps | 13 |
| 2 Regiments, Native cavalry | 900 |
| 1 Regiment, European infantry | 728 |
| 10 Regiments, Native infantry | 7,041 |
| Guzerat Provincial Battalion | 480 |
| Total | 9,783 |

### Disposition:

| | |
|---|---|
| Ahmedabad, Division Head Quarters: | |
| Detachment, engineer corps | 13 |
| 2 Regiments, Native infantry | 1,394 |
| | 1,407 |

Northern Division—*continued.*

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Hursole: | |
| 1 Wing, Native cavalry | 212 |
| Detachment Golundauze | 95 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 704 |
| | 1,011 |
| Kaira: | |
| Guzerat Provincial Battalion | 480 |
| Surat: | |
| Detachment Golundauze | 63 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 770 |
| | 833 |
| Baroda: | |
| Detachment Golundauze | 122 |
| 3 Regiments, Native infantry | 2,052 |
| | 2,174 |
| Rajkote: | |
| 1 Wing, Native cavalry | 252 |
| Detachment Golundauze | 56 |
| Regiment, Native infantry | 856 |
| | 1,169 |
| Bhooj: | |
| 1 Company, foot artillery (European, 73; Native, 81) | 154 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 680 |
| | 834 |
| Deesa: | |
| 1 Troop, horse artillery (European, 97; Native, 24) | 121 |
| 1 Regiment, Native cavalry | 464 |
| 1 Regiment, European infantry | 728 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 619 |
| | 1,932 |

Detachments in this division:—Engineer corps, 1; Golundauze, 3; Native cavalry, 1; Native infantry, 15: amounting to 977 rank and file of the line. Guzerat battalion, 9.

## Sattara Subsidiary.

| FORCE. | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Detachment Golundauze | 42 |
| 1 Regiment, Native infantry | 661 |
| Total | 703 |

Detachments from this force, 2; amounting to 141 rank and file.

## Asseerghur Fortress.

1 Regiment, Native infantry, 680.

Detachment from this corps, 1, of 20 rank and file.

*N.B.*—The strength of the several corps is taken as they stood on 1st February 1834, when some were under, but most of the Native infantry regiments above, their establishment.

## MINUTE of the Commander in Chief.

REMARKS by the Right Honourable Sir *Frederick Adam*, on the present Minute of the Commander in Chief.

I now, in obedience to the desire of Government expressed in Mr. Secretary Clerke's letter of the 10th August 1832, proceed to offer my sentiments on the Right Honourable the Governor General's Minute of the 29th June 1831.

2. The present amount of the several branches of the Madras Army, and their numerical strength in rank and file, is detailed in Appendix No. 1, and the distribution of that force as per last Return made up to 30th June 1834, is exhibited in Nos. 2 and 3, showing the distribution of the horse and foot artillery by troops and companies, with cattle attached.

3. No 4, the amount in rank and file of cavalry, European and Native infantry and artillery, employed beyond the limits of this Presidency, but in which I have not included either the troops in Mysore or Travancore, regarding them as being by treaty in all material points disposable.

4. The subsidiary forces of Hyderabad and Nagpore do not come under the review which the Governor General has called for, but it is very material that an allotment of battering guns and heavy field artillery, and small arms, as well as guns in position for Seetabuldee, should be fixed for those forces, in order to determine the supplies and allotments of stores, and to effect a well regulated economy in the Ordnance Department without infringing an efficiency. The question is one so exclusively dependent on the Subsidiary Treaties, and the policy of the Supreme Government of India, that by its authority alone, I imagine, such points can be determined.

5. The amount of the forces furnished from this Presidency to the Tenasserim Coast, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, is also beyond the limit to which my attention is drawn, but I trust I shall not fall into error by stating that the duties required of them are beyond the usual routine, and, consequently, affect their discipline, and infringe on the usual repose and comfort of soldiers in time of peace. They are as follows:

On TENASSERIM COAST.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| One Regiment of European Infantry | 736 |
| One Company of European Artillery | 97 |
| One Regiment of Native Infantry | 680 |

ne wing returned to the oast.

urnishing detachments to ie Mergui Tavvy and Amerst Town.

Treat Moulmein as no longer ours.

In

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

In the STRAITS.

| | |
|---|---|
| One half Company of European Artillery | 50 |
| One Company of Golundauze - - | 100 |
| Two Regiments of Native Infantry - | 1,360 |

Divided at Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and giving detachments in the interior the Malacca territory, and f province Wellesley.

6. By a Resolution of Council, dated 27th September 1833, this Government, with the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, authorised 80 additional privates to be supplied annually for each of the regiments serving at Penang, Malacca, and Singapore; these for the first year have been completed, and I should recommend the same additional strength to the corps at Moulmein. Even these supernumeraries will not keep the corps serving to the eastward more than complete in effective men, equal to their establishment of 680 rank and file.

Addition, 80 recruits per reg ment, annually.

7. I shall now proceed to state my opinion of the amount of force necessary for the duties, defence, and disposable force of this army within frontier, and shall commence with the southern portion of the territory dependent on Fort St. George.

TRAVANCORE.

8. Reduce Trichoor and the detachments at Trivandrum.

8. Travancore is occupied by one battalion of Native infantry of 680 rank and file, disposed of as per margin.

| | Rank a File. |
|---|---|
| Cochin - - - | 128 |
| Trichore - - | 85 |
| Resident's escort - | 46 |
| Protecting public buildings at Trivandrum and Angengo - | |

9. Our political relations with the Ranee are generally believed to be on an amic[illegible]e footing, and certainly no sympto[illegible] of turbulence or discontent affecting [illegible]he amount of force nece[illegible] to mainta[illegible]n our interests in t[illegible] has bee[illegible] manifested [illegible]since th[illegible] ary for[illegible]e was red[illegible]ced in 1830 battalio[illegible]n, but st[illegible]ll it is not improbable that it may, a[illegible]nd in the event of even the mo[illegible]st p[illegible]artial agitation, whether in the cha[illegible]acter of political conspiracy, party intrigue, or the momentary discontent of a mob, the single battalion reduced, as it must be under present circumstances, by detachments, has no disposable force at its head quarters; 398 rank and file for general and regimental guards, and all occasional demands at regimental head quarters, to render any effectual assistance to the Resident's authority, or to maintain itself in security in its position at Quilon.

10. I propose the force at Quilon to be composed of a brigade of three battalions and two or four guns of field artillery. This I propose as a military disposition of the troops, instead of having any either at Palamcottah or Dindigul.

10. I would therefore recommend that the battalion stationed at Quilon should be at all times kept complete, and that the necessary posts dependent upon it, Cochin and Trichore, be furnished

nished by periodical reliefs annually from Canara.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

## SOUTHERN DIVISION.

11. The present strength of this division consists as per margin, and it is distributed by corps as follows:—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| rtillery | 97 |
| European Infantry | 736 |
| Regiments N. I. | 4,080 |
| Companies of Sappers | 332 |
| TOTAL | 5,689 |

### At HEAD QUARTERS.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Trichinopoly: | |
| 1st Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted.) | 444 |
| ¾ Company Artillery (6 guns.) | 72 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 4 Regiments Native Infantry | 2,720 |
| Dindigul: | |
| 1 Regiment Native Infantry | 680 |
| Palamcottah: | |
| ¼ Company European Foot Artillery (2 guns.) | 24 |
| 1 Regiment Native Infantry | 680 |

12. The detachment of Native Infantry detailed in the margin are furnished by periodical reliefs from the corps at division head quarters, Trichinopoly, and amount by last Returns (June 1834) to 96 rank and file; added to this, the general duties of the station, and regimental guards, amount, the former to not less than 200 rank and file, and the latter 200; making a total of men on command and on general duty (exclusive of sick, absent on furlough, and wanting to complete with occasional detachments) of 490; but these occasional calls may be estimated at an averag[illegible] of 100 rank and file, which deduct[illegible]rom the [illegible]ctive strength 590 rank a[illegible]d file on [illegible]t average, and re[illegible]uces the [illegible]strength of the gar[illegible]ison in [illegible]nfantry to 2,120 rank [illegible]and file as [illegible]sposable force, availabl[illegible]e for all contingencies south of the Pen[illegible]ar, and westward to the Ghauts. Th[illegible]s force cannot in my opinion, wit[illegible] safety, bear any considerable reducti[illegible]on to its Native infantry, although it m[illegible]ay as at present constituted, spare [illegible]one battalion of 680 rank and file oc[illegible]casionally for any emergent service. The disposable force of this division [illegible] may thus be est[illegible]imated as per margin, * for service beyond [illegible] its limits.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| uvaloor Taluk Cutcherry | 10 |
| evaloor Cutcherry | 10 |
| unagoody do. | 13 |
| uttecottah do. | 13 |
| eroovady do. | 10 |
| unelam do. | 10 |
| llungaum do. | 10 |
| ordasarall Salt Cutcherry | 7 |
| ngapatty Cutcherry | 13 |
| TOTAL | 96 |

There is also detached from a garrison 14 rank and file Light Cavalry, as an escort the Resident at Travancore; it could be dispensed with, is desirable, as the wear and [illegible]r of horses and appoint- such duties is con-

12. All those detachments to be done away, and the only military guards to be over Hozoor Treasuries and gaols.

I would add one regiment of Native infantry to the disposable; making a total of 2,588 for any emergency, while in addition to which, one battalion, and in case of need two, may be withdrawn from Quilon.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| t Light | 444 |
| Artillery | 48 |
| | 736 |
| Regt. | |
| t N. I. | 680 |
| TAL | 1,908 |

### DINDIGUL 18th Regiment N. I.

13. This battalion furnishes, as per margin,† 315 rank and file, which leaves 265 rank and file for station and regimental duties, occasional escorts, for sick, men on furlough, wanting to complete, &c., which is so considerably more than half its established strength on

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| | 231 |
| atcherry | 84 |
| TOTAL | 315 |

13. The detachment required for Dindigul to be furnished from head quarters (Trichinopoly), and the same as to that at Paulgautcherry as also at Salem, which may be reduced to 100 men.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

14. I propose the withdrawal of this force; that at Quilon within 132 miles is equally applicable for any purposes of internal tranquillity.

The detachment at Ramnad I consider unnecessary; that at Madura can be reduced to 50 men, and the one at Oodegherry will, if absolutely required, be furnished from Quilon.

With regard to the Southern Polygars, the most recent reports show that they are perfectly tranquil, and no symptoms of a contrary tendency exist.

The Artillery to be removed to Quilon.

15. The severity of duty now existing can and ought to be diminished. In the first place all the small detachments for civil purposes ought to be at once done away with, and it ought to be established as a general rule, that without a special sanction of Government no detachment ought to be furnished for civil ordinary and permanent duties, except the Guards, strictly necessary for the treasuries (hozoor) and gaols, and the amount of them ought to be fixed in communication and under the control of the General officer commanding the division, who will of course determine on their amount after having the report of a competent staff officer sent to the spot, who, in conjunction with the civil officer, will fix the precise number of sentinels required for the public objects, and that no more be ever given; can easily be controlled, by the weekly report to be called for from the officer in command of the detachment. It is essential that all civil duties should be performed without the intervention of troops, and the officers in the Civil Departments must, from their peons, by a proper distribution of them, come to this. I hold this to be a principle not more essential to the good order of the troops, than to the proper administration of the Civil (Revenue more especially) Departments.

on command, that it cannot relieve its out-posts without distress, and fatiguing duty at head quarters.

PALAMCOTTAH 1st Regiment, N. I.

14. This battalion has its head quarters at Palamcottah, and furnishes the detachments noted in the margin, amounting to 313 rank and file, leaving 367 rank and file at regimental head quarters; its detachments are so equally divided with its established strength, that it can just relieve the out-posts periodically, provided there is no treasure escort or other call upon it at the time, but when the great population and wealth of Palamcottah is considered, and the character of the southern Polygars, subdued as they are, I cannot but offer my opinion that our southern possessions are thinly garrisoned, and with a very limited and inadequate disposable force, considering that the very reduced strength of all the out-posts and garrisons leaves nothing available for any sudden emergency.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Ramnad - - | 83 |
| Madura - - - | 154 |
| Oodegherry in Travancore - - | 76 |
| TOTAL - - | 313 |

¼ Company Artillery, 24 (2 guns).

One-fourth company of Artillery with two guns, is also stationed at Palamcottah.

15. The severity of duty to which the Native army of this Presidency has been exposed for a series of years past, has been constantly represented by all its officers, and is not only detrimental to its discipline, but must more or less affect the good feeling and attachment of the troops. I am, therefore, anxious on this occasion, to apply a fair remedy to an evil of so much consequence; and while I fully feel the necessity of economy, I trust that in the arrangements I shall recommend, it will not be found that I lose sight of that principle, while I provide against an evil that has run its course too long, and the consequences of which may give a pretext to the disaffected to make our Native troops discontented; and it must be kept in mind, that sound policy and justice require, that so important a duty should never be out of mind in fixing the military force necessary for external and internal defence.

16. I have shewn in the above statements the present strength and distribution of the southern division of the army, and I now proceed to express my opinion of the amount of force required for its security, and the distribution I would recommend.

17. The present force is distributed at three stations, Trichinopoly, Dindigul, and Palamcottah, and independently of small details on detachment from them, there are no less than 12 complete companies on out-post duties; I therefore would recommend that another battalion be added to the effective force at Trichinopoly, in order to reduce the detachments from Palamcottah and Dindigul, and to furnish by annual reliefs the out posts, which consist of one or more companies. This will affect some economy in the expense of reliefs, which are now made every six months, and the smaller detachments, consisting of less than a company and without an European officer, may be conducted as at present, every six months. By this arrangement, the force in the southern division would consist of

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted.) | 444 |
| 1 Company Artillery - - - | 97 |
| 1 European Regiment - - - | 736 |
| 7 Regiments Native Infantry - - | 4,760 |
| TOTAL - - - | 6,037 |

and the following would be the distribution of them, exclusive of small details less than a company, as per margin.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Truvaloor Talook Cutcherry - - | 10 |
| Kevaloor Cutcherry | 10 |
| Munagoody do. - | 13 |
| Putticottah do. - | 13 |
| Seerovady do. - | 10 |
| Nunelam do. - | 10 |
| Vellungaum do. - | 10 |
| Nordasarall Salt Cutcherry - - | 7 |
| Singaputty Cutcherry | 13 |
| TOTAL - - | 96 |

17*a*. At Trichinopoly

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted). | 444 |
| ¾ Company Artillery (6 guns) - | 73 |
| 1 Europeau Regiment - - - | 736 |
| 5 Native Regiments - - - | 3,400 |

giving eight complete companies of Native infantry for the annual relief of out-posts, viz.,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| To Salim - - - | Three Companies | N. I. |
| To Coimbatore - | One - | ditto. |
| To Negapatam - - | Two - | ditto. |
| To Combaconum - | One - | ditto. |
| To Tanjore - - | One - | ditto. |

18. At Dindigul one regiment Native infantry, giving for the annual relief of out-posts

To Madura, two companies Native infantry.

19. At Palamcottah, ¼ Company European foot artillery, 24 rank and file (two guns), one regiment Native infantry, giving for the annual relief of out-posts.

To Ramnad, one company Native infantry.

To

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

All the small detachments now furnished and under Native commissioned officers must be done away with, and the strength of the detachments at the following places may be greatly reduced: Salem, Coimbatore, Negapatam, Combaconum, Tanjore.

Already disposed of; I hold it not only as a general military principle that a smaller concentrated force is of more real strength than a larger one disseminated, but I also consider that, as regards the preservation of internal tranquillity, the same principle holds; and this principle is peculiarly applicable to our position in all the provinces of this country where our rule has been long established, and where no actual disturbance exists. In newly acquired territories, where public tranquillity has been recently disturbed, and where our rule is unknown, it may frequently be necessary to occupy many different points with detachments sufficient

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sufficient to keep each point in subjection; for one disturbance not instantly checked may lead to others; but not so where the population are sufficiently aware of our power, and they know how rapidly the element of that power, our military force, can be brought to any point where it is required.

It is on this principle that I suggest the distribution of our force in the Southern Division into two principal masses, with the means of moving a portion of each on the shortest notice; for a very few additional days will give the means of moving the whole, which is not required to remain as permanent garrison.

The natives are sufficiently aware of this, and it is the effect of this knowledge on the evil intentioned, which, in my opinion, renders such a distribution as effective to maintain tranquillity, as it is much more efficient to suppress disturbance should it unfortunately arise.

I do not, in the above arrangement, take into consideration the existence of a war to be carried on from seaward, because that is an hypothesis which involves a completely distinct arrangement and combination of means from the question at present under review; and it must be determined on a variety of considerations, as involving the state of relations with powers which might attack our empire from its assailable land frontiers; my present consideration is such a distribution of the force as shall maintain tranquillity, leave the largest number of disposable men for application to any emergency, and shall, at the same time, be most conducive to the discipline, good order, and comfort of the troops; all these last most important considerations are combined in a system of concentration.

Paulghautcherry is no doubt a very important point for the reasons stated, but it does not appear necessary to occupy it by anything more than a detachment furnished by the Southern Division, or the Malabar one, under the present circumstances. The detachments at Cochin ought to be furnished from the Quilon force.

To Oodagherry in Travancore, one company Native infantry.

20. This will leave the battalions at Dindigul and Palamcottah with about 500 rank and file each at regimental head quarters, without reducing the effective force at Trichinopoly, but on the contrary leaving it more complete and disposable for general or divisional service.

21. I have not included the station of Paulgautcherry, in the Southern Division, as it appears more conveniently to belong to Malabar and Canara, both as regards the disposability of its force, supplies, and communications. In the event of war with an European maritime power, the force maintained at Trichinopoly is the only disposable force to guard the coast from Cuddalore to Cape Comorin, a distance of 261 miles. I shall hereafter speak of the established strength of corps, but to guard against any misconception of my calculations, it must be kept in mind that our regiments of light cavalry are now reduced to six troops each, of 444 rank and file, and that 72 men of that number are dismounted

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that our troops of European horse artillery are only 102 rank and file, and the Native troops 90 rank and file; the companies of foot artillery are only 97 rank and file, and the Golundauze 100 rank and file; his Majesty's regiments of infantry 736 rank and file, and a regiment of Native infantry 680 rank and file. Thus the force I have recommended for the protection of the Southern Division, to take all its detachments, and afford a small disposable force, is—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) - | 444 |
| Artillery - - - - - | 97 |
| European Infantry - - - | 736 |
| Native Infantry - - - - | 4,760 |
| TOTAL - - - | 6,037 |

## MALABAR AND CANARA.

22. The present strength of these provinces (exclusive of his Majesty's 48th Regiment, under orders for Europe) is as per margin, and distributed as follows:

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Company of Golundauze - - | 100 |
| Regt. European Infantry - - | 736 |
| Regiments N. I. - | 2,040 |
| TOTAL - - | 2,876 |

At Head Quarters.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| ¾ Company, Golundauze - - - | 75 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry - | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native Infantry - - | 1,360 |
| TOTAL - - - | 2,171 |

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Calicut - - - | 212 |
| Tellicherry - - | 62 |

Cannanore.

Mangalore, 1 Regiment of Native Infantry 680.

23. The detachments of Native infantry, as per margin, are at present furnished by periodical reliefs from Cannanore. The regiment of Native infantry at Mangalore is complete, and the 2nd Regiment, Native Infantry, at Shikarpore, in Mysore, gives the detachments of 130 rank and file to Honawar, and 85 rank and file to Sedasheghur.

There is also one-fourth of the company of Golundauze now detached to Coorg.

24. These provinces comprehend a line of sea coast of 282 miles in extent from Sedashegur, north, to Trichore, south, where they connect with Travancore, and are bounded to the east by the western range of ghauts.

25. The northern part of the provinces of Malabar has of late been considerably agitated by internal commotion, but the Collector has, I believe, reported the restoration of tranquillity, and the consequent inutility of further military aid. During every part of the year that ships can come on the coast, the ghauts are open and practicable for

I presume this alludes to the event at Sircee, which was a mere momentary ebullition, and of no consequence, connected too, with the Nuggur revolt.

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for the march of troops, and Bangalore is the point from whence any required reinforcements would be furnished, and as the march to Cannanore and Mangalore are nearly equidistant, the ghauts could be occupied by a light force from Bangalore in 14 days, and it could be on the coast in 21, or thereabouts; sooner, if necessary. I do not therefore propose to increase the force in these provinces more than one battalion; and this is rendered necessary to give effect to the measure. I propose placing a battalion at Paulghaut, to relieve the Travancore regiment of the Cochin and Trichore detachments, and to furnish those of South Malabar, as well as with a view to keep one battalion as complete as practicable in Canara, in case of any sudden emergency.

The Brigade which I propose to be stationed at Quilon will furnish the details for these places.

26. This will be effected by having six companies at Mangalore and two at Honawar, but even with this alteration in the distribution, and an increase of the Paulghaut corps, and decrease of 212 rank and file now furnished from Shikapore, these provinces cannot be considered a point from which more than half a company of Golundauze, and half a regiment of European infantry can at any time be considered disposable.

27. Three companies are more than sufficient for Calicut; there is no occasion for a jemadar's party on the Neilgherries.

27. Under this view of the defences and distribution of Malabar and Canara, I propose that one regiment Native infantry be stationed at Paulghautcherry, furnishing—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Company, | Native infantry - | To Cochin. |
| 1 Company | - ditto - - | To Trichore. |
| 3 Companies | - ditto - - | To Calicut. |

A Native officer's guard for the eilgherries, leaving about three comanies at Paulghautcherry, which is an dvantageous post to occupy, with eference to Travancore, and the reef of out-posts in Malabar and Cochin, nd in case of any emergency, requirng the corps to move into Travancore t could at least call in half of its letachments within a very short otice.

I am not persuaded of the military necessity of a European battalion at Cannanore, though, from its being a very healthy station, it may be advisable to have it there. Hereafter, should good barracks be erected at Bangalore for an additional European corps, the force in Cannanore ought to be removed hither, and as soon as the road through Coorg is rendered practicable down the Western ghauts, a small European detachment is all that can be required at Cannanore if even that is necessary.

28. Cannanore is the head quarters of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, and I propose to station there, as at present,—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company, Golundauze - | 100 |
| 1 Regiment, European Infantry - | 736 |
| 2 Regiments, Native Infantry - | 1,360 |

and that it shall furnish the following detachments:

tachments: Tellichery, 1 company; and, anticipating the probable reduction of the present Wynaad Rangers 200 rank and file, I shall include in the detachments from Cannanore two companies at Manantoddy. This will leave 13 companies, or 1,105 rank and file of Native infantry for the garrison and regimental duties of Cannanore, the head quarters of the provinces, and for all extra demands, occasional detachments, escorts, and contingencies.

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29. One battalion of Native infantry, giving a detachment of two companies for the post of Honawar, from which a Jemadar's party will be sufficient to occupy the post of Sedashegur. This will relieve the regiment of the Mysore Division, now at Shirkapore, from furnishing 212 rank and file, or 2½ companies, to occupy the posts of Honawar and Sedashegur.

MANGALORE.

Mangalore ought to be the head-quarters of a regiment of Native infantry, furnishing the two detachments, but on the smallest scale.

30. Coorg has not yet been allotted to any division; it is occupied by a fourth of a company of Golundauze, 25 rank and file belonging to Cannanore, and one regiment of Native infantry. I am not prepared to offer any opinion as to the amount of force necessary for its defence and tranquillity; but assuming the present allotment fixed by superior authority as sufficient, I shall estimate it at one regiment of Native infantry, but recommend that the artillery be relieved from the mount, as a complete company ought always to be present at Cannanore.

## MYSORE DIVISION.

31. The present strength of the Mysore division of the army is—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Dragoons (96 men dismounted) | 640 |
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| 1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns) | 90 |
| 1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns) | 97 |
| 1 Company Sappers and Miners | 83 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 6 Regiments Native Infantry | 4,080 |
| TOTAL | 6,170 |

The force is distributed as follows:—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Bangalore: 1 Regiment Light Dragoons (96 men dismounted) | 640 |
| ,, 1 Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted) | 444 |
| ,, 1 Troop Native Horse Artillery (4 guns) | 90 |
| ,, 1 Company European Foot Artillery (8 guns) | 97 |
| ,, 1 Regiment of European Infantry | 736 |
| ,, 3 Regiments Native Infantry (4 is the complement) | 2,040 |
| TOTAL | 4,047 |

French Rocks, near Mysore: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - 680
Shirkapore: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - 680
Hurryhur: 1 Regiment Native Infantry - 680

32. From this force the following detachments are furnished by periodical reliefs:—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| From Bangalore to Resident's Escort | 22 of Light Cavalry. |
| From French Rocks to Mysore | 2 Companies Native Infantry |
| To Resident's Escort | 1 Company Native Infantry, or 100 rank and file at the resident's option. |
| From Shirkapore to Sircee | 100 rank and file. |
| To Terrikerry | 160 rank and file. |

This

This corps also now furnishes the detachments to Honawar and Sedasheghur in Malabar, but I have included them in the Malabar and Canara distribution.

33. The company of sappers and miners is at Ossoor and Salem. There are just now two regiments of light cavalry at Bangalore, but the 7th is destined for Saulnah, to relieve the 5th to go to Arcot, and so they are accounted for in the distribution. It would be very desirable if the Resident's escort of light cavalry can be dispensed with, and Sillidar Horse substituted.

34. The force in Mysore is subsidiary, but available by treaty for general purposes, and may be considered as an integral part of the defensive and disposable force of the Madras Presidency. Compared with other divisions of the army, it is in general less liable to be called upon for detached duties within the Mysore territory than any other division, and partakes therefore more of the character of a disposable force.

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35. In all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore, it is impossible not most fully to concur, and I think the concentration of troops there ought to be made to the greatest attainable extent.

I am not inclined to give the weight to the danger of conspiracy which is hinted at.

35. Upon every principle of military defence, as well as of sound policy, it is of the first importance to have a large commanding and disposable force completely equipped for immediate field service, in a suitable position to be equally available for prompt and active service in any direction, where either an external or internal enemy can appear, and be able to detach instantly any commanding force necessary to quell insurrection, rebellion, mutiny, or conspiracy. A country is never so strong, or its inhabitants and tributaries so cautious, as when it is a matter of notoriety that the State is prepared to act with vigour and decision at any moment that opposition is manifested, and it is known that but a few weeks or days must overpower their plans of resistance; indeed they will see and know this to be futile when the fact is before them that a light field detachment of formidable strength can reach them by forced marches in a few days, or weeks at most, and that almost with corresponding energy and little more time a battering train and siege equipment can join it. If then such a *corps d'armée* is desirable and advantageous, and promises to secure tranquillity within the frontiers of the Madras Presidency, and to repel attack from the north, north-west, or invasion by sea by either coast of Malabar and Canara, or the Carnatic, where could it be so advantageously posted as at Bangalore? The position is nearly equidistant from the capital, Madras, from Cannanore and Mangalore on the western coast, from Trichinopoly and Dindigul in the southern division. The northern frontier of Quilon, Kurnool, Durwar, and Belgaum, North Cuddapah and Nellore East, and each

of these stations is within 200 and 250 miles, and may be reached by a light force in 12 or 15 days, as circumstances may require. Water and forage are abundant at Bangalore for such a force; the Mysore country provides all necessary supplies, and is surrounded by districts from which they may, to any extent, be drawn. If, then, I have shown that such a force is desirable, and that Bangalore is the fittest position for it, I shall next proceed to detail the force I would recommend to be concentrated at that healthy and eligible station, both for European and Native troops. It is also an influential argument in favour of increasing the European force at Bangalore, that it will at once stop the progress of those conspiracies which have been instigated by the disaffected inhabitants in Mysore—a point of the first importance to the stability of that attachment we have so much right to appreciate in our Native troops, but whose allegiance may become matter of anxiety to the State if the designs of the discontented to tamper with them are suffered to be too often repeated. The troops of the Mysore rajah will, I calculate, soon become equal to secure the internal tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Mysore, and to effect the collection of the revenue, and then the necessity for a corps at the French Rocks, and a detachment of it at Mysore, will become unnecessary; as the Commissioner progresses in the settlement of the country, then the whole force may be concentrated, and the corps at Shirkapore, Hurryhur, and French Rocks become unnecessary, and until these desirable objects are completed, those posts may be occupied by part of the Bangalore force, a space of time which will be requisite to prepare quarters and accommodation for the augmented force, there is ample accommodation for all the artillery in the horse and foot artillery lines. The barrack of the European regiment, originally built for 1,000 men, may, at no very heavy expense, be increased to hold two regiments. The cavalry place of arms and lines may, in like manner, be increased, and all that will be required in addition as quarters, are places of arms for six Native regiments and the detachments of sappers and miners.

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My view of the propriety of increasing the force at Bangalore, and maintaining it at as high numbers as possible, is not at all influenced by the argument here set forth; I have no apprehension of the kind alluded to. I must confess there appears to me throughout a tone of doubt, not to say of apprehension, for which I have discovered no sufficient cause, nor do I believe there exists any foundation for alarm.

I doubt the present barracks being worth it; they are faulty in plan, and by no means fit for European troops. The additional barracks required ought to be on a better construction.

36. Under these impressions, I beg to suggest that a concentrated disposable force be assembled at Bangalore, consisting at least of 10,000 rank

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rank and file, and be composed as follows :—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Dragoons | 500 |
| Light Cavalry (2 regiments) | 888 |
| Horse Artillery : | |
| 1 European troop (6 guns) | 102 |
| 1 Native troop (6 guns) | 90 |
| Foot Artillery, 2 companies (16 guns) | 194 |
| Sappers and Miners | 166 |
| European Infantry (2 regiments) | 1,472 |
| Ten Regiments Native Infantry of the Line. | 6,800 |
| TOTAL | 10,212 |

The head quarters of the Sappers and Miners and their School of Practical Instructions should be at Bangalore.

Of this force the whole will be disposable for any temporary contingency, as the sick and convalescent and details of corps might garrison the fort and cantonment, but in case of any distant or protracted service, one wing of an European regiment and four battalions will be required for the duties of Mysore.

CEDED DISTRICTS.

I would withdraw the European regiment from Bellary (as well as the regiment of Native infantry proposed) to add to the force at Bangalore; and this arrangement is more available, as Hyderabad is to have a second European regiment attached to the subsidiary force. The ceded districts ought no longer to be a division. The force at Bellary ought to be a detachment of the Mysore Division, and the general officer now at Bellary would be more usefully employed in command of Hyderabad with the Nagpore Force under his inspection, or if Belgaum be substituted, then with that station as a part of his inspection.

37. The force of these districts at present consists of—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted). | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 3 Regiments Native Infantry | 2,040 |
| TOTAL | 3,317 |

These are distributed—

| At Bellary : | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry (72 men dismounted). | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 European Regiment of Infantry | 736 |
| 2 Native Regiments of Infantry | 1,360 |
| TOTAL | 2,637 |

At Cuddapah, one regiment Native infantry, 680 rank and file, and these two stations furnish detachments periodically relieved as follows :—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| From Bellary to Gooty | 170 |
| From Cuddapah to Cumbum | 84 |

Assuming that the Bangalore force will be augmented as I have recommended, I shall only propose—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry | 444 |
| 1 Company European Artillery | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 1 Regiment of Native Infantry | 680 |
| TOTAL | 1,957 |

for the garrison of Bellary.

38. The regiment of light cavalry, the European company of artillery, and 300 rank and file of European infantry, may be considered a disposable force.

Cuddapah.—One regiment Native infantry at Cuddapah, giving one company to occupy Gooty and one for the duties at Cumbum, leaving six companies at head quarters at Cuddapah. This is as great a reduction of force in this district as can with safety be recommended, and is only offered or is justifiable by the supposed pre sence of the disposable field force recommended to be maintained at Bangalore.

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## CENTRE DIVISION, INCLUDING FORT ST. GEORGE.

39. The present strength of this division, including Fort St. George, consists, as per margin, and is distributed by corps as follows:—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Fort St. George: | |
| Body Guard (on the strength of regiments). | 102 |
| 1 Company European Foot Artillery. | 79 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry | 736 |
| 1 Regiment Native Veterans - | 1,080 |
| 2 Regiments Native Infantry - | 1,360 |
| TOTAL - - - | 3,357 |

Poonamallee, half Regiment European Infantry (disposable.)

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| St. Thomas's Mount: | |
| 2 Troops European Horse Artillery. | 204 |
| 2⅔ Companies European Foot Artillery. | 242 |
| 2¼ Companies Golundauze - | 225 |
| 2 Dismounted Troops of Supernumerary Native Horse Artillery. | — |
| Palavaram, 3 Regiments Native Infantry. | |
| Wallajabad, 1 Regiment Native Veterans. | 1,080 |
| Nellore, 3 Regiments Native Infantry | 2,040 |

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Regiments Light Cavalry (144 men dismounted) | 888 |
| ody Guard (on the strength of Regiments) - - | 102 |
| Troops European Horse Artillery - | 204 |
| Companies European Ft. Artillery | 340 |
| Companies Golundauze - - | 225 |
| Dismounted Troops of Supernumerary Native Horse Artillery - - | - |
| Regiments European Infantry about - - - | 1,000 |
| Regiments Native Veterans - - | 2,160 |
| Regiments Native Infantry - - | 5,440 |
| TOTAL - - | 10,359 |

40. The detachments of Native Infantry, detailed in the margin, are furnished by periodical reliefs from the corps at Nellore and Pallaveram, and amount, as per last returns (June 1834) to 807 rank and file, exclusive of Native veterans furnished from Wallajahbad.

These detachments admit of considerable reductions; nearly one half may be diminished.

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| llore - - - | 119 |
| onamallee - - | 152 |
| ddalore - - | 252 |
| ittoor - - | 169 |
| ingleput - - | 83 |
| njeveram - - | 32 |
| TOTAL - - | 807 |

41. The regimental duties of this division may be estimated at about 50 rank and file per regiment, and the general daily duties at Nellore amount to about 320 rank and file, and at Palaveram 80 rank and file; this is exclusive

The duties of Nellore, I apprehend, may be considerably reduced, and the garrison reduced from three to two regiments Native infantry.

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clusive of occasional treasure escorts and detachments, men sick, on furlough, and wanting to complete.

42. In this division I have included the garrison of Fort St. George, in order that that portion of the army may be exhibited in the amount of force and disposition for defence, although the garrison of Fort St. George forms no part of the army under my command, yet it must be provided from that army, and of course is a component part of it, and inseparable from the general question of what force is necessary to be maintained for the defences and disposable force of the Madras territory within frontier.

FORT ST. GEORGE.

43. Is now garrisoned by—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company of European Foot Artillery. | 97 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry - | 736 |
| 1 Battalion Native veterans - | 1,080 |
| 2 Regiments of Native Infantry - | 1,360 |

The veterans are merely a nominal part of the garrison; they are of no efficiency.

No reduction of this force can be made; it is perhaps equal to the performance of the duties of the garrison, but not without considerable detriment to the discipline of the two Native corps so employed, and I am of opinion they should be annually relieved or their strength augmented.

PALAVERAM.

Perhaps four battalions is not more than sufficient, as this must be looked upon as the source from whence any troops going seaward are to be drawn.

The detachments of the veteran battalion may be reduced, and the orderlies attached to the staff reduced in number, and in some instances perhaps done away.

The details furnished from Palaveram have in some degree been reduced, and may be still more so.

44. The original intention of this cantonment was, corresponding with that at Barrackpore, to furnish by monthly reliefs the Native troops for the garrison duties of Fort St. George. It was intended to have four battalions at all times stationed there, and it may be considered the Presidency cantonment. In former times, a force was generally maintained at Wallajahbad for the duties of the Centre Division, and to cover the capital in case of any sudden exigency arising; at present there is only the head quarters of a veteran battalion, with a few men at Wallajahbad, the whole corps being dispersed in detachments and small details, as per margin, through the Centre Division; and Palaveram has, since its establishment in 1822, been considered the disposable force of the Centre

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Nellore - - - | 248 |
| Ongole - - - | 82 |
| Guntoor - - | 240 |
| Chingleput - - | 44 |
| Amee - - - | 29 |
| Triposore - - | 21 |
| Adjutant General of the Army - - | 14 |
| Quartermaster General of the Army - - | 7 |
| Inspector General, H. M's Hospitals | 2 |
| Judge Advocate General - - - | 6 |
| TOTAL - - | 693 |

Centre Division and the depôt for preparing troops for embarkation to the eastward, and for refitting the relieved regiments on their return. It is now reduced to three battalions, or 2,040 rank and file, although besides furnishing 271 rank and file for detached posts in the Centre Division, it gives 130 rank and file for monthly and weekly duties at Madras in excess of the garrison guards and town duties of that garrison.

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VELLORE.

45. This garrison has now three regiments of Native infantry. Its general duties require 314 rank and file for daily duty, and the regimental duties for three corps will take at least 120 rank and file. These numbers added to occasional detachments, sick, furlough, and wanting to complete, exclusive of 536 rank and file on detached periodical duties, will give a total of 500 rank and file on duty, &c.; and when it is considered that in this fortress the family of the late Tippoo Sultan and the Coorg Rajah are State prisoners, it will be manifest that the duties are as limited as safety and precaution will sanction, and that three regiments, or 2,040 rank and file, is not more than a competent garrison for a fortress containing such a charge.

I am inclined to a different opinion, and believe considerable reductions of duties may take place, and that two instead of three regiments will suffice.

46. Considering the great population of Madras and the character of the inhabitants of Triplicane, Vellore, and Arcot, I cannot consider 6,000 rank and file of effective Native infantry, too great a force of that arm to be maintained in this division, and I accordingly recommend that another regiment of Native infantry be added to the Palaveram Brigade, and that all the periodical detachments of the Centre Division be furnished by annual relief from that cantonment, thus leaving Fort St. George and Vellore only liable to occasional calls for treasure and other escorts, and marching detachments.

Certainly.

ARCOT.

47. Adverting to my proposal to increase the Light Cavalry at Bangalore to two regiments, I should recommend one only to be stationed at Arcot, where there are now two regiments allotted (the 2nd and 5th, the latter not yet relieved from Jaulnah).

48. By

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48. Eight regiments of Native Infantry will suffice. I am more than doubtful of the value of the veteran battalions; and another arrangement of the Artillery would be expedient.

48. By this distribution, allowing for the increase proposed, the Centre Division would consist of—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| Body Guards (on the strength of regiments) | 100 |
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry - - - | 444 |
| 1 Troop European Horse Artillery (6 guns) | 102 |
| 1½ Companies of European Foot Artillery (12 guns). | 145 |
| 2¼ Companies Golundauze - - - | 225 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry, the wing of 41st Foot at Poonamallee not included | 736 |
| 2 Regiments Native veterans - - - | 2,160 |
| 9 Regiments Native infantry - - - | 6,120 |
| | 10,032 |

49. Exclusive of the wing of his Majesty's 41st, or Welsh Regiment of Infantry, and two troops dismounted supernumerary Native Horse Artillery.

50. Of the force in this Division,—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Regiment Light Cavalry - - - | 444 |
| 1 Troop European Horse Artillery - - | 102 |
| 1 Company European Foot Artillery - | 97 |
| 2 Companies Golundauze - - - | 200 |
| A wing European Infantry - - - | 300 |
| 3 Regiments Native Infantry - - - | 2,040 |
| TOTAL - - - | 3,183 |

may be considered a disposable force.

NORTHERN DIVISION.

51. This division is occupied at present by the following force:

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company European Foot Artillery - | 97 |
| Company of Golundauze - - - | 75 |
| Company Sappers and Miners - - | 83 |
| 1 Regiment European Infantry - - | 736 |
| 1 Battalion European veterans, one wing Artillery no fixed establishment. | 216 |
| 10 Regiments of Native Infantry - - | 6,800 |
| TOTAL - - - | 8,007 |

which is disposed of as follows:

| | | Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|
| Masulipatam - | 1 Company European Foot Artillery. | 97 |
| | 1 Regiment European Infantry. | 736 |
| | 2 Regiments Native Infantry. | 1,360 |
| Ellore - - | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |
| Samulcottah - | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |
| Vizianagrum - | 2 Regiments Native Infantry. | 1,360 |
| Vizagapatam - | 1 Regiment European Veterans. | 216 |
| | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |
| Chicacole - | ¾ Company Golundauze - | 75 |
| | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |
| Kemmedy - | 1 Company Sappers and Miners. | 83 |
| | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |
| Berhampore - | 1 Regiment Native Infantry. | 680 |

The European regiment withdrawn, and none now in this division.

52. The permanent detachments of this division furnished by corps of Native

Native infantry by periodical reliefs are as follows, exclusive of station and regimental guards, occasional escorts, sick men on furlough, wanting to complete, &c. &c.

I do not believe that any reduction can with safety be made:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 49th Regiment N. I., Aska | 85 | | |
| Collector's Cutchery | 13 | | From Berhampore. |
| Ganjam | 11 | | |
| | | 109 | |
| 21st Regiment N. I., Bangarettypoor | 76 | | |
| Waranassy | 77 | | Kemedy. |
| Battaly | 22 | | |
| Oopaland | 64 | | |
| | | 239 | |
| 41st Regiment N. I., escort duty with Commissioners | | 23 | Chicacole. |
| 3rd Regiment L. I., Field Post, Ueerogathum | 125 | | Vizianagram. |
| Ditto - ditto Gopaupilly | 62 | | |
| | | 187 | |
| 8th Regiment N. I., Palcondah | | 260 | - - ditto. |
| 10th Regiment N. I., Cassucottah | | 150 | Vizagapatam. |
| 47th Regiment N. I., Rajahmendry | 154 | | |
| Cocandra Collector's Cutcherry | 20 | | Samulcottah. |
| | | 174 | |
| 43rd Regiment N. I., Field Force, Ragapore | 68 | | |
| Candafully | 171 | | Ellore. |
| | | 179 | |
| | | 1,321 | |

53. The rebellion which has of late agitated this division and kept the troops always on the alert, and a great portion of them in constant motion in jungles most prejudicial to their health and vigour of constitution, does not authorise me to recommend any reduction of the force; on the contrary, the principal portion of it, the Native infantry, has most harassing duties, and the success which has hitherto attended their exertions cannot warrant any relaxation of the most efficient state of preparation for field service, more particularly as I consider there is little probability of even prospective reduction as long as the regiments of Native infantry are maintained upon their present reduced establishment. Ten regiments Native infantry will appear a large force, but it must be kept in mind that it only gives, when all are present and complete, 6,800 rank and file; and I should say, from the general history of the Northern Division, the character of the chiefs and hill tributaries, as well as of the surrounding districts, that 7,000 rank and file of Native infantry is the lowest establishment that will be found to give security to the country, divided as the force is, and subdivided into many permanent detached posts and parties, requiring two regiments to give those details, exclusively of occasional escorts, which are numerous and frequent. I cannot, therefore, recommend any reduction of force on the Northern Division, but, on the contrary, were I not restrained by a knowledge of the economy now indispensably necessary, I would not hesitate to recommend 8,000 rank and file of Native infantry for the duties of this division.

54. His Majesty's 62nd Regiment at Masulipatam I have estimated

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

I conceive, after the approaching north-east monsoon, if affairs remain on their present footing, as I think there is reason to expect they will, two regiments of Native infantry may be withdrawn, besides the European regiment (Her Majesty's 62nd) which has already left Masulipatam. Another distribution of the troops will be required so as to concentrate larger numbers, and, above all, an additional force of sappers and miners, in order to complete the roads into Kimmedy and the other districts, which have been hitherto considered impenetrable to troops. The improved communications into those districts will of course allow of a diminution of detachments, and by such an arrangement of the force as will render it applicable to several points, the aggregate may be diminished.

estimated, as in all other cases, at the fixed establishment of the corps, though it at present is not half that strength; but when a complete regiment is in the Fort of Masulipatam, the disposable force may be estimated at—

| | Rank and File. |
|---|---|
| 1 Company of European Foot Artillery - | 97 |
| A wing of the European Regiment - - | 300 |

55. In the event of taking away the company of European foot artillery from the Northern Division, which nothing but necessity should sanction, the Invalid Artillery attached to the Carnatic European Veteran Battalion may supply its place as a temporary measure.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

The Wynaad Rangers are ordered to be reduced. One company of regulars will suffice to replace them at Manantoddy, for the duty of detecting smugglers is not one on which the troops ought to be employed.

The peons of the Collector are the proper instruments; neither the one or the other will be effectual to the object. The cure for smuggling is to be found in measures of a different character.

IRREGULARS.

56. There is no force of this description in the pay of the Madras Government except two companies of the Wynaad Rangers, 200 rank and file, and these may, without inconvenience or detriment to the service, be reduced, as regular troops are much more efficient and very little more expensive. The only argument in favour of the Wynaad Rangers is the expertness they are said to have attained in detecting and checking smugglers, but it is a question whether their cost does not exceed even this advantage; and I see no reason why regular troops should not be equally applicable for such a duty, since the detection of smuggling and discovering the haunts and retreats of the smuggler is a duty which more fittingly belongs to the peon of the civil authorities, by whom the aid of the military should be called in to act upon their information and support their authority and objects. There are no classes of men on this side of India between the sepoy and the peon, and, therefore, irregular troops, organised, paid, armed, and equipped as our rangers are, may be calculated to cost 9-10ths of the average expenses of regular troops.

This question is before the Supreme Government, and need not be discussed here.

MYSORE TROOPS.

57. The Mysore Sillidar Horse are about 3,500, and may be considered as an auxiliary force, but their fitness for any active field service is much to be questioned in their present condition, and cannot be calculated on as a disposable force on which much dependence can be placed, either for offensive or defensive operations; they are very inferior to the Hydrabad and Poona Auxiliary Cavalry, and their comparative efficiency may be best estimated by contrasting the pay of the one with the other.

The Mysore Sillidar has for himself and horse about half a rupee a day net pay, which is about one-third of the pay the Hydrabad and Poona irregular horseman receives, hence the comparison must be conclusive of the inferiority of the Mysore Sillidar; but perhaps a corps equal to about one-third of the present strength might be formed and maintained upon ar efficient footing, at an expense to the State not exceeding the present disbursement; but I fancy the whole system must be revised,

revised, and great changes effected in the composition of the corps, before its attachment to the British Government can be more than questionable.

58. The Mysore infantry is not in any way to be calculated upon in our disposition for defence or disposable troops; and the Travancore artillery and infantry are equally unavailable and inapplicable.

59. Readiness of the Troops to move on Field Service.—The whole of the horse and artillery, dragoons and light cavalry, the European foot artillery and infantry, and half the Native infantry of each division of the Madras Army, within frontier, are prepared to move at the shortest notice. Camp equipage, sick carriage cattle, and followers are maintained for the above proportion of force at the head quarters of each division of the army, and the troops can move within a week or 10 days, as circumstances may require, that is, as soon as the cattle can be brought in from the grazing farms.

The troops beyond frontier are all equipped and in readiness for active field service at the shortest notice, but those beyond sea are in position and can have no equipments for field service.

## Sketch of the Disposition of the Inhabitants.

60. The Madras Army within the frontier is scattered over a tract of country extending 790 miles from Cape Comorin to Ganjam on the coast of Coromandel, 673 miles from Ganjam to Sedashegur on the Malabar coast, and 430 from Sedashegur to Cape Comorin, forming a triangle whose area contains 144,700 square miles, but allowing for the part of the ocean comprised within the sides of the triangle, the estimated area is 133,756 square miles, with a population of 16,917,316 inhabitants, and an army of 33,116 rank and file, cavalry and infantry, European and Native, being one soldier to every 510·8 inhabitants, and a sea coast of 1,322 miles in length.

61. At the extreme points of the triangle, rebellion and commotions have prevailed; the one requiring large bodies of troops to suppress, the other disturbing a large tract of country and keeping small but numerous detachments in constant motion. In the very centre of the triangle sedition and conspiracies have been hatched, and some slight advantages have alone been wanting to lead to formidable and extensive insurrections.

Remarks by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

Defective information seems to me to have caused erroneous impressions of the dangers imagined to exist. That the Government should vigilantly watch the appearances and variations of the Native feeling is no more than prudence exacts, but that there is any cause for alarm I am far from being persuaded, nor do I believe that, unless moved by external impulse, there is any ground for apprehension from the Native population.

62. The cause producing these feelings may be easily ascertained, and are in the Circars attributable mainly to the numerous ancient families dispossessed of their lands, whose followers, owning and regarding their chiefs with that devotion and attachment peculiar to hill people, have united to recover for their leaders the lands possessed by their families for ages; their hills, unhealthy jungles, and numerous fastnesses, opposing difficulties to troops penetrating and establishing authority, gave confidence and consistency to their power, which the simultaneous and extensive operations of troops in that district have only, after two years, been able to subdue; but the history of the Northern Circars since the establishment of the English power in India only proves the existence of continued discontents, and such may be expected to endure until the hills and

jungles

jungles are opened by fine military roads, and the people by daily contact learn to dread our authority, and place reliance on our justice.

63. Along the side of the triangle, from the Ganjam district to Shedashegur, the frontier borders on the Nizam's dominions and Mahratta States, affording harbour to the discontented of all classes of our own subjects as well as among those of our allies, who are ever on the watch to aid and augment the slightest appearance of insurrection.

In Kanara, bordering on the Mahratta country, large bodies of men were reported by the Collector of that district to have assembled within our territory during the late operations in Coorg, and kept the country in a state of restlessness, until the planting of the British flag on Muddukary deprived them of all hope of successfully carrying on their plans. Within the frontier of Mysore, the chiefs have for several years past employed two considerable detachments and kept three regiments in a state of constant activity.

64. The internal discontents prevailing in Mysore may be expected now to subside, since the assumption of the government by the British; for the ryots or cultivators, who were the disaffected people, will, from the justice of the British, obtain that protection sufficient alone to induce them to yield ready subjection to our power. But, again, all those in authority under the late Native government, knowing that power must now be withdrawn, and galled at the prospect of sinking to that state of obscurity so usual for chiefs within our provinces, whose ancestors held extensive sway under their ancient princes, will ever be ready by their intrigues to excite conspiracies for the overthrow of our authority; and however hopeless such effects may prove, or however little the chance of success may appear, still the invariable results of our assumption of rule in this country confirm the probability of such attempts being made in the Mysore country.

65. The Travancore State in the southern part of the peninsula may eventually fall under our sway, either from the infatuation of the Government, and consequent opposition to our power, or from the misgovernment, natural to all Native governments, supported though not ruled by us; but insignificant as such a State must be to overcome, many powerful families and the independent and proud heirs must be expected to oppose all their efforts to the eventual establishment of the British sway.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

I cannot but feel that this is a highly-coloured picture. I shall not enter upon the commonplace of the causes which render our rule peculiarly unpopular to the Mussulmans. I conceive that there are many and easily-perceived reasons why those of that religion in the south of India (Mysore particularly) should entertain hostile feelings in a more vivid form. Their fall is recent. They have not yet lost the relish for power, the sweets of which many amongst them yet living have tasted; but I do not believe they are capable, without internal excitement, of any combined plan, and from partial attempts our power, as a state, has nothing to fear, but to prevent such partial efforts is the interest as it is the duty of the Government. Everything in our most extraordinary position in this country points to that duty, which consists

66. The numerous petty Polygars inhabiting strong and difficult places in the southern part of the peninsula, and retaining all their warlike feelings and peculiar habits, and hating or fearing that Government so fatal to their race, must ever be expected to seize with avidity any opportunity to attack our authority.

The hereditary feelings and prejudices peculiar to this class of people must be expected to sway all their actions, and notwithstanding the many defeats experienced by these chiefs in all their encounters with the British authorities, complete destruction of their power and removal of the ring-leaders from their own lands has alone

succeeded in quieting their followers and subjecting them to our authority.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

67. The remainder of the Carnatic having been so long subject to our authority, comprises a greater degree of obedience amongst the cultivators than any other part of the Madras Presidency; this may chiefly have arisen from the removal of all the military classes and powerful families, and to the knowledge the people possess of the English power, moderation, and justice.

in vigilance, and being prepared, but it is a vigilance which must not be apparent lest it betray suspicion, and it is a preparation which must not be obtrusive or it will be construed into alarm.

To follow out these suggestions would be a useless waste of time.

68. The religious feelings displayed of late years by the Mussulman in Mysore, Ceded Districts, and Centre Division,* and the known hostility of this race to our sway, their unfitness for other employment than that of the sword, the great decrease of the military under the British and neighbouring chiefs, all render probable the planning of measures by this class dangerous to our government; and religious pretexts which have lately hatched dangerous conspiracies should induce us to guard and watch those places where such plans may be expected to be contrived. Cuddapah, Kurnaul, Mysore, Vellore, Arcot, and Triplicane, the hotbeds of such sedition and conspiracies, the resorts of the Mussulmen, and the discontented classes of all kinds, require troops to be prepared and ready to put down their first attempts.

69. The moderation and justice of our laws must be expected eventually to act beneficially on all our subjects, but more especially on the ryots and poorer classes, who, whilst enjoying protection from oppression and moderate taxation, are peaceable and obedient under any government granting such freedom; but, unacquainted with their habits and feelings, and ignorant of the action of our laws, from our intercourse with them being so limited and so formal, their sentiments and designs are alike unknown to us, and require us in consequence to be more or less on our guard against those sudden disturbances which are created and require to be suppressed in a manner peculiar to India. Experience shows how often commotions in India have arisen from causes the most trivial, the remarkable manner such insurrections have increased by the overpowering of even a small detachment of military, and how great such success has extended the disaffected feelings over a great extent of country, and we ought, therefore, to distrust appearances of tranquillity, and be prepared to act with promptitude to crush the conspiracies at once with overwhelming power, ere the contagion can spread.

70. The Ceded Districts, Mysore, and that part of Kanara bordering on the Southern Mahratta country, being the districts from whence discontent is likely to manifest itself, shows the necessity of having a larger body of troops assembled at some convenient situation, and for the military reasons assigned of masses of troops being collected, point out the necessity of some centrical situation

I cordially concur in all that is said of the advantages of Bangalore. Its position, favoured as it is by a climate so salubrious, is a most happy coincidence, and ought to be turned to all the profit which such a fortunate combination admits of. The camp of Bangalore ought to be the practical school of the Madras army.

* In the Centre Division and Ceded Districts, and on the line from Kurnaul to Hydrabad, there is a very disaffected population, and being chiefly without employment, or means of comfortable and certain subsistence, are, of course, very discontented, and ready to engage in every plot and conspiracy formed against the Government. Religion is their favourite subject, and no other could be so formidable, or likely to work their objects of making our troops and subjects both discontented and distrustful of Government; and it is remarkable that for many years scarcely one has passed without some plausible and industriously circulated plot to favour a conspiracy, on the pretext of innovation on the religion, customs, and privileges of caste of our Native soldiers and subjects.

situation being fixed on, whence troops could be moved to the disturbed parts in the shortest possible time. and by the shortest possible routes. Bangalore is a cantonment peculiarly well adapted for such an assemblage of men, for, besides water, forage, and provisions being abundant, it is healthy and well adapted for Europeans and for the exercise of large numbers of troops; and it will be found that at the distance of only 30 miles from this cantonment, that, with this as a centre, and with a radius of 155 miles, if a circle be described, the country comprised within the circumference will equal in extent one-half the area of the Madras Presidency, will include Mysore, Ceded Districts, nearly the entire Carnatic, one-half of Malabar and Kanara, part of the country beyond our territory; and consequently all the discontented populations within the Madras Presidency (except the Northern Division) may be reached and overpowered by detachments from this force in from seven to 20 days, according to the extent of the disturbances to be put down requiring larger or smaller bodies to be put in motion. The distance of this force from the subsidised troops with the Nizam will be found within 200 miles. The Northern Division has been hitherto looked to to reinforce the advanced troops, but from the peculiar formation of the country, and duties required from the troops, effectual reinforcements cannot be furnished by the Northern Division to the Hydrabad Subsidiary Force.

71. The large force at Bangalore would, in every way, be well adapted for a reserve for the troops at Secunderabad. The distance is not too great, for reinforcements could be united at Hydrabad in the course of 30 days, or light detachments even in a shorter period of time; but for a large force to be required to be put in motion, Mysore is beyond measure better adapted than the Northern Division for equipping with cattle and followers such a force.

72. In deciding on the number of soldiers requisite for the occupation of any portion of this Presidency, the turbulence of the inhabitants, the revenues of the district, the area, and the population, are the principal points necessary to be known, to determine the allotment of rank and file of soldiers.

73. In classing the divisions of this Presidency, they will be found to be as follows:—

| I. In Area. | II. In Population. | III. In Revenue. | IV. In Turbulence. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Southern Division | 1. Southern Division | 1. Southern Division | 1. Northern Division. |
| 2. Ceded Districts - | 2. Mysore Division - | 2. Centre Division - | 2. Mysore Division. |
| 3. Centre Division - | 3. Northern Division | 3. Mysore Division - | 3. Ceded Districts. |
| 4. Mysore Division - | 4. Centre Division - | 4. Northern Division | 4. Malabar and Kanara. |
| 5. Northern Division | 5. Ceded Districts - | 5. Ceded Districts - | 5. Travancore. |
| 6. Malabar and Kanara | 6. Malabar and Kanara | 6. Malabar and Kanara | 6. Southern Division. |
| 7. Travancore - - | 7. Travancore - - | 7. Travancore - - | 7. Centre Division. |

and each division will be

| | I. | II. | III. | IV. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Division - - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| Travancore - - - - - | 7 | 7 | 7 | 5 |
| Malabar and Kanara - - - | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| Mysore Division - - - - | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Ceded Districts - - - - | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| Centre Division - - - - | 3 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
| Northern Division - - - - | 5 | 3 | 4 | 1 |

bearing in mind the nature of the duties more particularly demanded from the troops in the Southern Division, being those connected with the collection of the revenue, and a reserve sufficient to overawe the restless Nairs of the Travancore state, and the Polygars occupying the southern part of the division. That in the Centre Division the garrisons of Fort St. George and Vellore, require large garrisons, the duties of the troops being numerous in the Civil Department, and a reserve for the Presidency.

74. The importance of the divisions may be arranged as follows, in a military point of view :—

Mysore and Ceded districts.
Northern Division.
Centre Division.
Southern Division and Travancore.
Malabar and Kanara.

75. I have already shown that 37,932, rank and file* are requisite for the internal tranquillity of this Presidency. Now if for the Southern Division, Travancore, and Centre Division, one soldier for every five miles be given, with an increase of 3,000 men for the garrisons in the Centre Division ; and, if for Mysore and Ceded Districts and Northern Division, one soldier for 350 inhabitants be allowed, and 500 inhabitants to each soldier in Malabar and Kanara, then the distribution will be as follows :—

| —— | Area. | Population. | Rank and File. | Number of Square Miles to each Soldier. | Number of Inhabitants to each Soldier. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Division - Travancore and Cochin. | 29,502 | 6,131,895 | 5,900 | 5 | 500 |
| Malabar and Kanara | 14,653 | 1,669,118 | 3,338 | – | 500 |
| Mysore - - - | 29,500 | 2,573,500 | 12,864 | – | 350 |
| Ceded Districts - | 24,000 | 1,928,814 | | | |
| Centre Division - | 18,900 | 2,095,790 | 6,780 | 5 | – |
| Northern Division - | 14,200 | 2,518,199 | 7,194 | – | 350 |
| Total - - - | 130,755 | 16,917,316 G | 37,932 or 36,681 | 3·5 | 45,243 |

And from the data above laid down, the number of troops for each division will be seen to correspond with the numbers decided by the wants of the service to be actually requisite for the performance

Remarks by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

I do not consider, under exisiting circumstances, that any augmentation of force as suggested is required. The actual force distributed in the most advantageous manner is equal to all present objects ; for I repeat that a war involving chances of attack from sea, combined (as it probably would be), with assault on one or more of our land frontiers, is not the case under consideration.

*General Observations.*

The increase of the force at Hydrabad makes it a fit command for a general officer, and I think it would be highly advantageous to place one there, giving him a supervising authority over the Contingent at Nagpore—I mean to the extent of making inspections and reports on the discipline, &c., but no direct military command The general officer for Hydrabad would be found in the reduction of the Ceded Districts as a military division, adding the Ceded Districts to the Mysore division, and making Bellary a Brigadier's Command under Bangalore. I am satisfied that this is an arrangement fraught with advantage: the Hydrabad force is one which requires a general officer, and the supervision of a general officer is essential to the well-being of the other great detached force.

In considering the distribution of the army of Fort St. George, it is impossible not to be struck with the advantage as to mere distribution, whether military or economical, which the occupation of Belgaum instead of Nagpore would offer, and I should propose that arrangement. I am aware, however, that a great feeling exists in the Madras army with regard to the occupation of Nagpore.

It is considered as a sort of point of honour, and its abandonment to occupy Belgaum, though the latter is a very favourite station too, would be looked upon by the officers of the Madras army, as I am led to understand, as a kind of degradation. It would be tantamount, in their minds, to a declaration that the Madras army was no longer a field army.

Besides these considerations, there are others which cannot be without weight. Nagpore is a full Batta Station ; Belgaum is not, and I believe has never been: no doubt this is an element that enters largely into the estimate of those concerned.

It may be worth while, under this view, to consider whether the time is yet come for proposing such a measure ; for of its advantages I apprehend there can be no doubt, and as little doubt can there be that, unless there shall be hostile attempts from the sea, the Madras army cannot be considered as in the first line : it is ludicrous to go on in a system of self-delusion upon this subject in opposition to the nature of things, and the force of circumstances beyond our control. Madras has no frontier, and its army therefore cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be an advanced force. It does not follow from

* This includes European and Native Cavalry and Infantry.

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from thence that it is to dwindle down into mere a Militia: on the contrary, it is and ought to be considered as the great reserve of the army of India. Its geographical situation precludes it from being a field army under any probable combination; but its strength, its efficiency, and its organization, render it most valuable as a reserve. It may be worthy of consideration, however, whether these considerations of mere personal advantage and feeling are or are not of weight sufficient to overbalance the benefits to be derived by a more compact and economical distribution of the army.

The following distribution is that which I would propose:—

| | Dragoons. | Native Calavry. | European Infantry. | Native Infantry. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Travancore - - - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Trichinopoly - - - | - | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Malabar and Kanara* - | - | - | 1 | 3 |
| Coorg - - - - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Mysore - - - - | 1 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| Bellary - - - - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Cuddapah - - - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Centre Division - - | - | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Northern Division - - | - | - | - | 8 |
| Hydrabad - - - | - | 2 | 2 | 7 |
| Nagpore - - - | - | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Malacca and Penang - | - | - | - | 2 |
| Moulmiyn - - - | - | - | - | - |
| Total - - - | 1 | 8 | 8 | 52 |

*The European regiment to be transferred to Bangalore eventually.

TRAVANCORE.

The two corps from Palamcotta, and Dindigul, with the one now in Travancore, will furnish the proposed allotment.

TRICHINOPOLY.

The corps from Moulmein with the four now at Trichinopoly will make up the proposed allotment.

MYSORE.

A regiment of Native Cavalry withdrawn from Arcot, one of European and one of Native Infantry from Bellary, and two of the Native Infantry, from the Northern Division, will complete the additional force proposed to be stationed in Mysore.

PALAVERAM.

One of the three Native corps now at Nellore to be withdrawn, for the allotment proposed for Palaveram.

I differ in the proportions of artillery to be allotted to troops. Four pieces for a thousand men is a proportion, I believe, far beyond what has ever been brought into as the complement.

I agree with the suggestion that the European Horse Artillery should be complete

performance of the duties at present entailed on the troops within frontier.

ARTILLERY.

76. The Artillery of Madras is organised entirely as field artillery, but available for garrisons and sieges, as well as for the field. Thirty horse and 144 foot artillery guns are the complement of field pieces established for the army.

2. The Horse Artillery have invariably been equipped and organised

in a manner befitting the expense attendant on this branch of the arm, and no changes can I recommend in this force, other than to equalise all the troops in men, guns, cattle, and natures of ordnance.

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plete in all its equipments, horses, guns, &c.; and for the present the Native Horse Artillery which is now mounted and equipped to be kept so for the present.

Under the projected organisation of the artillery of the Indian Army, when on the Madras establishment, none but European Horse Artillery are to be maintained; the whole of the guns of that arm should be kept complete.

3. The establishment for the Foot Artillery is calculated to give 144 field pieces—that is 18 companies, estimated at eight guns and ammunition waggons each; but neither in men or cattle are these companies capable of manning, working, or moving their guns; and therefore the number of field pieces capable of being brought efficiently into the field can only be estimated at 54.

Sixty pieces of ordnance—or, if the batteries be considered the basis of organisation, eight batteries (64 pieces)—is ample to be kept in a state of equipment; thus giving 94 pieces of ordnance fit for service, which is two per 1,000 men; and I fancy it will be found practically that few armies have had larger proportions in the field.

For of the 10 artillery kharkhanahs, consisting of 1,200 bullocks and 600 drivers, seven only have the full complement of 132 bullocks and 66 drivers each; while the other three have only 92 bullocks and 46 drivers each; consequently, there are only kharkhanah bullocks for 8½ companies of artillery, with their waggons complete, without in any way providing for spare cattle for forage and artificers' carts, and draughts of spare carriages, therefore the kharkhanah bullock establishments of the artillery of the Madras army can only just move, on the field of exercise, 68 field pieces instead of 144 field guns, with their full equipments, and could not do more than bring 54 field pieces fully organised and equipped into the field of battle; and this calculation supposes all those field pieces to be of the smallest calibre.

I think the suggestions regarding the distribution of the field officers of Artillery good, and ought to be attended to, except that a field officer at Bellary will no longer be necessary, nor is one at Masulipatam required; the number of field officers generally present with the artillery would hardly allow of the larger number.

With regard to the various suggestions respecting the nature of ordnance which ought to be adopted, I consider it unnecessary to enter on that wide field of discussion. It is perfectly absurd that the armies of the three Presidencies should continue, as at present, without any.

4. Under this calculation the artillery of the Madras Army can only, with its present establishments, bring 84 field pieces capable of efficient movement into the field; that is, 30 field pieces of horse artillery and 54 of foot; total 84.

And I conceive an end must at once be put to so ludicrous an anomaly. I see but one way of coming to a right understanding, and that is by forming a Board of Artillery officers selected from each Presidency, and directing them to discuss fully the whole points at issue, and then the superior authorities to come to a determination which shall regulate the whole matter.

I avoid all observations on the nature of artillery as a useless discussion in the present state of the question.

This amount of artillery can only be viewed as a very limited and insufficient establishment, bearing no proportion to the cavalry and infantry of the army, which, estimated in round numbers at 45,000 men, ought to be provided with at least 180 pieces of artillery, and of which number 96 pieces are deficient.

5. Under the present financial difficulties I could not press an opinion that so expensive an increase is indispensably necessary, but

but certainly this valuable arm is now in a very disorganised, incomplete, and inefficient state, from the want of defined natures of ordnance, and the means of transports; and I cannot consider less than a full equipment for 120 of the most efficient field pieces a suitable provision for this branch of the Madras Army, with reference to the possible events which may call it into action either for offensive or defensive operations.

6. The organisation of our artillery is at present on the most expensive scale, without adding in any way to its efficiency; small corps of four companies each, fritter away the services of field officers, accumulate staff, both commissioned and non-commissioned, remove officers from company duty, add unnecessarily to establishments, artificers, and all attachés of a corps, without producing any one corresponding advantage. Artillery must be viewed as a corps composed of horse and foot, and divided into batteries, and their composition must be viewed differently to other arms; they are more detached and act in separate bodies, and therefore do not require the compact organisation of infantry; their returns and reports, their registers and pay accounts, and all the internal economy, as a corps, may be preserved with fewer staff and establishments than at present, while their field officers are more urgently required with its component parts in a detached state, and might be more profitably employed in commanding the artillery of divisions than skeleton battalions at its head quarters.

At present we see at St. Thomas's Mount—
2 Troops of Horse Artillery,
2½ Companies of Foot Artillery,
2¼ Companies of Golundauze,
Employing—
4 Field Officers,
8 Regimental Commanding Staff,
16 Regimental Non-Commanding Staff,
4 Medical Officers, with—
4 Bazar Establishments, and—
4 Sets of Artificers;

and there is no probability of their commands being increased, for detachments are more likely to be augmented than diminished. Efficiency certainly does not recommend such an organisation. The economy of the time by no means warrants it, and the great want of officers with companies, and in detached commands, imperatively urge a distribution more consonant with the discipline of the troops, and the pursuit of scientific and professional objects at out stations.

7. With these views, I would recommend that the whole of the European Foot Artillery be formed into one regiment, to be denominated the regiment of European Foot Artillery.

That all the troops, Native and European, be as at present "a Brigade of Horse Artillery," and the Golundauze Companies, one Battalion of Golundauze; and that the whole of the Gun Lascars and dismounted Horse Artillery be incorporated into the Golundauze Battalion. This will at once reduce one-half of the regimental commands, commissioned and non-commissioned staff, military and medical, bazar establishments, artificers, and all the attachés of three corps, whilst every object connected with internal economy accounts, &c. will be equally attained.

8. The field officers of the corps of artillery, although proportionate to the allotment for other branches of the service, are fewer than in the Royal Artillery, and it would be as detrimental to the science and efficiency of this valuable arm, as unjust, to

make any reduction, but they may be more appropriately and beneficially distributed and employed, and this is the object I have in view. The artillery of each subsidiary or field force, and of every division of the army commanded by a general officer, and having a depôt of ordnance and magazine of stores, should be commanded by a field officer of artillery, with an adjutant and serjeant major, and this staff will not only maintain the discipline and science of the detachments of artillery in their respective divisions, but must be made answerable for the efficiency of the ordnance and stores in use, for the cattle attached, and for all the component parts of the ordnance field equipments in use with corps or detachments. The field officer commanding may also be made eminently useful in superintending and controlling, under the divisional commanding officer, the ordnance depôt, the ordnance on works, and in store, and all the ammunitions, small stores, arms and accoutrements, and in examining, checking, and reporting to the divisional officer the state of the books and accounts, the due employment of the ordnance officers and establishments; and as he must be senior to the commissary of ordnance, whose commission is in abeyance while so employed, there can be no objection to this controlling power over the stores under the authority of the divisional commanding officer and the military Board; by this plan the following number of field officers, adjutants, and serjeant majors, would be required—

| | Field Officers. | Adjutant. | Serjeant Major. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nagpore - - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Hydrabad - - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Northern Division - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Southern „ - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mysore „ - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ceded Districts - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Fort St. George - - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Head Quarters (3 corps) - - | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| TOTAL - - - | 10 | 10 | 10 |

We have now 12 field officers, five adjutants, five quartermasters, besides those belonging to troops. Three quartermasters will be required for the three corps, but the difference of pay between the two that will be replaced by adjutants and the present division adjutants will about square it; this arrangement will be much more efficient and respectable than the present.

9. The nature of ordnance to be alloted for the field artillery is alone determinable by the Supreme Government; but I would urge on the attention of the Governor General, that the most efficient pieces are the best and least expensive to the State, and that as doubts have justly been attached to the efficiency of the pieces denominated 9-pounder guns, and 24-pounder howitzers of reduced weight, introduced lately into Bengal, it appears to me far preferable that the English natures of these calibres should be adopted in preference to all others of doubtful efficiency, and therefore I recommend that the 5-pounder gun and 12-pounder howitzer be allotted to the horse artillery batteries, and that the standard pieces for the foot artillery batteries should be the 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers, either of the English pattern or of some pieces of approved modified weight.

10. The number of pieces of ordnance to compose a battery rests also with the Supreme Government; but in reference to economy,

economy, simplicity, and real efficiency, and for the advantages of sub-division, eight pieces are the preferable number, for of whatever number of pieces a battery may consist, the number of pieces for the whole army, if formed on just proportions, will not be affected by the number of batteries; and whilst such determined number of pieces would require a certain number of men and cattle to work and move them, the unnecessary expenses and incumbrances, created by forming batteries of six instead of eight pieces, would be the difference of officers, reserve men, reserve cattle, extra establishments of artificers, carts, forges, &c., exceeding the number necessary for batteries of eight pieces by the subdivision into batteries of six pieces; and I believe all the best authorities of the present age, from Napoleon to the last proceedings of the Royal Artillery Sub-Committee, which obtained the approval of Wellington, sanction my recommendation, for the reasons I have assigned, for economy, efficiency, and concentrated fire.

11. The number of men and cattle in each troop and company, European or Native, for the sake of uniformity and discipline, ought to be equal, and that each battery should be made as imposing and efficient in itself as possible.

12. The latest fixed establishment of ordnance for the garrisons and for the heavy field artillery is specified in Appendix; but the variety of natures of ordnance therein established, consisting of—

Guns—

42-pounders, 32-pounders, 24-pounders, 20-pounders, 18-pounders, 12-pounders, 9-pounders, 6-pounders, 4-pounders, 3-pounders, 1-pounder.

Mortars—

13, 10, 8, $5\frac{1}{2}$, and $4\frac{2}{5}$ inches.

Howitzers—I strongly urge on the attention of the Governor General the immediate revision of this branch of the ordnance; for the multiplicity of every description of stores consequent on the numerous natures of ordnance, the expense, the loss, waste and confusion created by such masses and variety of stores, prove the necessity of immediate simplification of the natures of ordnance, and a reduction in the number of natures will give efficiency and economy, increased in proportion to the simplification.

The natures of the ordnance I will not now enumerate, being dependent on the general military system of India, and consequently to be decided on by the Supreme Government; but I would mention the advantages resulting from combining the natures of garrison, heavy and light field ordnance as much as possible, and thereby reducing the artillery to four or, to the utmost, five natures of ordnance.

REMARKS by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

I cannot agree; 80,000 stand quite ample; the expenditure has been most wasteful, but even then it has never exceeded 9,000 stand a year, so that if 150,000 were to be in store, we should have nearly 15 years' supply.

ALLOTMENT OF SMALL ARMS.

The number of small arms to be kept up in the magazines of the advanced forces beyond frontier, must be determined on considerations not affecting this army; but I would recommend that arms for not more than one-fourth the complement of the effective subsidiary forces be retained.

The grand depôt of Fort St. George is capable and well adapted for containing nearly 120,000 stand of arms; and, considering the establishment of the Madras army reduced, if not below, to the lowest possible numbers, and therefore the probability of new levies being made, and the liability of sudden and great demands to organise and supply with arms the people of other States and countries, besides new levies at home, induced me to recommend the complement of 100,000 arms being always kept up in the arsenal of Fort St. George, and 50,000 in the magazines within the frontier, and with a corresponding number of pistols, swords, and fusils. This may appear a large allotment of small arms for an army under 50,000 infantry, but it must be kept in mind that an extended territory must not depend on any one source of supply, that by fire or other accident even the general depôts may be destroyed, as was the case at Fort William and Allahabad; and that demands to arm new levies, the population, and our own immediate tributaries, may be multiplied by demands upon the Indian Government from Persia, Cabool, and other allies in north of Asia, or for the Eastern Archipelago.

### Conclusion.

In conclusion, I feel it impossible to close this Minute without adverting to the present strength and organisation of the cavalry and infantry of the Indian Army, which is defective as it regards both efficiency and economy, by the low establishment fixed for corps, by which all the additional expenses of staff and establishments are maintained for most reduced numbers of rank and file.

Remarks by Sir *Frederick Adam*.

It is unnecessary to discuss the weak establishments of the several corps of infantry and cavalry; my opinions are already recorded, but I think we ought at once to keep up the horses to the full complement.

### Dragoons.

There is but one regiment on the establishment, but its organisation is correct and applicable if kept complete in men and horses; but the Governor General is aware that His Majesty's 13th Dragoons has never, since its arrival in India, been quite complete in rank and file, and that by local regulations it is kept deficient 96 horses less than its effective strength of men for duty in India. The European light dragoon must be considered as the heavy cavalry or reserve of that arm in India, and should be kept complete in men and horses, not only to be prepared for field service, but in the event of any combinations or conspiracies calling forth the energies of the European part of our force.

### Light Cavalry.

There are eight regiments of six troops each, amounting to 444 rank and file each, but cavalry may be calculated by swords, more expressive for its real strength than rank and file.

These regiments, therefore, may be estimated at 500 swords each, but of which effective force there are in each corps 72 men dismounted, and the body-guard to be deducted, which leaves little more than 408 mounted swords in each regiment, or a total of 3,264 effective cavalry.

If economy is an object, combined with efficiency, I should recommend strong regiments of eight troops each, and that the whole be kept complete in horses, with the exception of 40 horses of the dragoons and 20 of each regiment of light cavalry to be kept deficient, as there are always invalids, sick and absent men to that amount, and therefore it seems only necessary to horse them up to the full complement when field operations are in contemplation.

### European Infantry.

This arm was never at so reduced an establishment as at present; in

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1802 | we had | 14,400 | rank and file. |
| 1812 | „ | 12,000 | ditto. |
| 1822 | „ | 7,234 | ditto. |
| 1832 | „ | 6,592 | ditto. |

This, however, is the establishment, but it is by no means complete, and includes the Honourable East India Company's European Regiment. I do not think that our European infantry force should be less than 10,000 men, and that no regiment should consist of less than 10 companies of 95 rank and file. It is obvious that our present European force is not more than equal to the maintenance of our interests in profound peace and tranquillity, and that their want would be severely felt if internal commotions or external demands should suddenly arise, and, in those events, where are we to look for reinforcements?

### Native Infantry.

The regiments of this line of the service are now complete skeletons, and the commonest demands for detachments and ordinary duties leave but the name of a regiment or a colour reserve. Economy, as well as efficiency, prescribe strong and complete corps; we have now 35,560 rank and file of Native infantry, divided into 52 regiments of 680 rank and file each; how great a saving might be effected, if the amount of Native infantry required for this army, which I estimate at 40,000 men, were collected into 40 regiments of 1,000 strong each, and I do not think that any Native infantry regiment of less than 1,000 men can be considered an effective body, and fit to take its place in line of battle, or to maintain its discipline perfect even in garrison, after providing for those detachments, guards, escorts, and absentees, which must fall to be furnished, more or less, by every corps of Native infantry.

Remarks by Sir *Frederick Adam.*

I do not concur in this opinion. I have not seen that these corps are of the efficiency stated, and if not they cannot be economical.

### Veteran Battalions.

It is much to be regretted that this useful, efficient, and economical branch of the infantry was ever reduced. We have now only two battalions of Native veterans, but there should be one in each division to take the minor details of duty, and in proportion as this force is maintained, so will be the efficiency of the regiments of the line, both in material and discipline, and they are the cheapest corps we can embody.

(signed) *R. W. O'Callaghan,*
Lieutenant General and
Commander in Chief.

Ootacamund,
25 August 1834.

No. 1.

RETURN of the ESTABLISHED STRENGTH of the MADRAS ARMY, without reference to the Number Wanting to Complete, made up to 30th June 1834.

| | Total Rank and File. | Total of each Arm. | Total Strength of the Army. |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAVALRY: | | | |
| His Majesty's 13th Light Dragoons | 640 | | |
| Eight Regiments, Light Cavalry | 3,552 | 4,192 | |
| ARTILLERY: | | | |
| Four Troops European Horse Artillery | 408 | | |
| Two Troops Native Horse Artillery | 180 | | |
| Twelve Companies of European Foot Artillery | 1,164 | | |
| Six Companies of Native Foot Artillery | 600 | 2,352 | |
| EUROPEAN INFANTRY: | | | |
| *Eight King's Regiments of Foot | 5,888 | | |
| One Company's European Regiment | 680 | 6,568 | |
| Sappers and Miners | 664 | 664 | |
| NATIVE INFANTRY: | | | |
| Fifty-two Regiments Native Infantry | | 35,360 | |
| IRREGULAR CORPS: | | | |
| Wynaad Rangers | 200 | 200 | |
| Residents' Escorts | — | | |
| VETERANS: | | | |
| Carnatic European Veteran Battalion | 217 | — | |
| Two Native Veteran Battalions | 2,160 | 2,377 | 51,713 |
| Gun Lascars | | | 480 |
| Drivers | | | 600 |
| GRAND TOTAL | | | 52,793 |

* There are at present nine King's corps on this establishment, but eight only are included, one being under orders of draft.

## No. 2.

DISTRIBUTION of the Amount of the several Branches of the MADRAS ARMY, and their Numerical Strength in Rank and File, made up to 30th June 1834.

| | Regiments. | | | | | Artillery. | | | Companies of Sappers. | Veteran Battalions. | | Ordnance. | | | Dragoons. | | Light Cavalry. | | Total of Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | TOTAL of European and Native Infantry. | Veterans. | | Sappers. | | Grand Total of Cavalry and Infantry. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | His Majesty's Dragoons. | Light Cavalry. | His Majesty's Infantry. | Madras European Infantry. | Native Infantry. | Troops. | Companies. | TOTAL. | | European. | Native. | Horse. | Foot. | TOTAL. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | Horses. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | *No.* | *No.* | *No.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Travancore | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Southern Division | – | 1 | 1 | – | 6 | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | – | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | – | – | – | 332 | – | – |
| Malabar and Canara | – | – | 1 | – | 3 | – | ¾ | ¾ | – | – | – | – | 6 | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coorg | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | ¼ | ¼ | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mysore | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | – | 4 | 8 | 12 | 640 | 701 | 444 | 506 | 1,084 | 1,207 | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | – | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| Ceded Districts | – | 1 | 1 | – | 3 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Centre Division | – | 2 | 1 | – | 8 | 2 | 5¾ | 7¾ | – | – | 2 | 8 | – | 8 | – | – | 888 | 1,012 | 888 | 1,012 | 736 | 5,440 | 6,176 | – | 2,160 | – | – | – | – |
| Northern Division | – | – | 1 | – | 10 | – | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1 | 1 | – | – | 14 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 6,800 | 7,536 | 217 | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| Beyond frontier | – | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | – | – | 18 | 32 | 50 | – | – | 1,332 | 1,518 | 1,332 | 1,518 | 1,416 | 7,480 | 8,896 | – | – | – | 150 | – | – |
| Beyond seas | – | – | 1 | – | 3 | – | 2½ | 2½ | – | – | – | – | 20 | 20 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | 16 | – | – |
| TOTALS | 1 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 52 | 6 | 18 | 24 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 98 | 128 | 640 | 701 | 3,552 | 4,048 | 4,192 | 4,749 | 6,568 | 35,360 | 41,928 | 217 | 2,160 | – | 664 | – | – |

*N.B.*—Nine King's Regiments on the rolls of the Army; one under orders for England; body guard included in cavalry regiments. For the Foot Artillery guns there are organised kharkanas of bullocks for seven batteries of eight guns each, and three small kharkanas for the draft of eight guns each, but not for the draft of ammunition.

No. 3.

DISTRIBUTION of the MADRAS ARTILLERY.

| STATION. | Nature of Troops. | Troops and Companies. Horse. | Troops and Companies. Foot. | Rank and File. | 6-Pounders Attached. Horse. | 6-Pounders Attached. Foot. | Horses Attached. | Bullocks. | Rank and File of Gun Lascars. | Rank and File of Drivers. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| St. Thomas Mount | Head Quarters of Horse Brigade | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 100 Native Artillery, 2 |
| | Head Quarters of 2nd Battalion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | European, 20 Gun Las |
| | Head Quarters of 3rd Battalion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | cars, furnished monthly |
| | Head Quarters of 4th Battalion | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | to the Garrison of For |
| | Horse Artillery, European | 2 | – | 204 | 8 | – | 238 | – | – | – | St. George, and 25 Na |
| | Foot Artillery, European | – | 3½ | 335 | – | not fixed | – | 92 | 120 | 46 | tives to Nellore, al |
| | Foot Artillery, Native | – | 2¼ | 225 | – | not fixed | – | 92 | 65 | 46 | included in this. |
| | Dismounted Details of Horse Artillery. | none | | 185 | none | | – | – | – | – | Two dismounted troop of Horse Artillery. |
| Trichinopoly | Foot Artillery, European | – | ¾ | 71 | – | 6 | – | 98 | 20 | 49 | |
| Palamcotta | Foot Artillery, European | – | ¼ | 26 | – | 2 | – | 34 | 10 | 17 | |
| Bangalore | Horse Artillery, Native | 1 | – | 90 | 4 | – | 126 | – | – | – | |
| | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 97 | – | 8 | – | 132 | 30 | 66 | |
| Cannanore | Foot Artillery, Native | – | ¾ | 75 | – | 6 | – | – | 10 | – | |
| Coorg Field Force | Foot Artillery, Native | – | ¼ | 25 | not known | | – | – | 10 | – | |
| Bellary | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 97 | – | 8 | – | 132 | 30 | 66 | |
| Masulipatam | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 97 | – | 8 | – | 66 | 30 | 33 | |
| Chicacole | Foot Artillery, Native | – | ¾ | 75 | none | | – | 66 | 20 | 33 | |
| Secunderabad | Head Quarters, 1st Battalion, European. | – | 1 | 97 | – | 8 | – | 132 | 30 | 66 | |
| | Horse Artillery, Native | 1 | – | 90 | 6 | – | 150 | – | – | – | |
| Jaulnah | Horse Artillery, European | 1 | – | 102 | 6 | – | 163 | – | – | – | |
| | Foot Artillery, Native | – | 1 | 100 | – | 8 | – | – | 20 | – | |
| Nagpore | Foot Artillery, European | – | 2 | 194 | – | 16 | – | 264 | 60 | 132 | |
| | Horse Artillery, European | 1 | – | 102 | 6 | – | 163 | – | – | – | |
| Coast of Tenasserim: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mergin, Tunoy, Moulmein | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 97 | not fixed | | – | – | 30 | – | |
| Penang | Foot Artillery, European | – | ½ | 53 | not fixed | | – | – | – | – | |
| | Foot Artillery, Native | – | 1 | 30 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| Singapore | Foot Artillery, Native | – | – | 37 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| Malacca | Foot Artillery, Native | – | – | 33 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| | TOTAL Fixed Establishment | 6 | 18 | 2,537 | 30 | 70 | 840 | 1,200 | 480 | 600 | |

MEMORANDUM of ARTILLERY beyond the Frontier and beyond Seas.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hydrabad Subsidiary Force. | Head Quarters of 1st Battalion Foot Artillery, European. | – | 1 | 97 | – | 8 | – | 132 | 30 | 66 |
| | Horse Artillery, Native | 1 | – | 90 | 6 | – | 150 | – | – | – |
| | Foot Artillery, Native | – | 1 | 100 | – | 8 | – | – | 20 | – |
| | Horse Artillery, European | 1 | – | 102 | 6 | – | 163 | – | – | – |
| Nagpore Subsidiary Force. | Horse Artillery, European | 1 | – | 102 | 6 | – | 163 | – | – | – |
| | Foot Artillery, European | – | 2 | 194 | – | 16 | – | 264 | – | 132 |
| Coast of Tenasserim | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 97 | not fixed | | – | – | 30 | – |
| Penang | Foot Artillery, European | – | ½ | 53 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Singapore | | | | | | | | | | |
| Malacca | Foot Artillery, European | – | 1 | 100 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | TOTAL | 3 | 6½ | 935 | 18 | 32 | 476 | 396 | 80 | 198 |

*N.B.*—Out of the 18 Companies of Foot Artillery, each with 8 guns, 7 have bullocks attached to move guns, waggons, and store carts, and 3 for the guns alone.

Foot Artillery batteries equipped, 56; and 3 batteries of 8 guns, without ammunition, or 3 of 4-gun batteries, 12 :—Total, 68.

No. 4.

RETURN of TROOPS of the MADRAS ARMY Employed beyond the Frontier and beyond Seas, the Subsidiary Forces of *Mysore* and *Travancore* not included.

| | Regiments. Light Cavalry. | Regiments. His Majesty's Infantry. | Regiments. Madras European Infantry. | Regiments. Native Infantry. | Artillery. Troops. | Artillery. Companies. | Artillery. TOTAL. | Companies of Sappers. | Ordnance. Horse. | Ordnance. Foot. | Ordnance. TOTAL. | Light Cavalry. Rank and File. | Light Cavalry. Horses. | Total of Cavalry. Rank and File. | Total of Cavalry. Horses. | Infantry. European Rank and File. | Infantry. Native Rank and File. | Total of European and Native Infantry. Rank and File. | Sappers. European Rank and File. | Sappers. Native Rank and File. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subsidiary Forces: | | | | | | | | | *No.* | *No.* | *No.* | | | | | | | | | |
| Nizam — Secunderabad | 1 | 1 | – | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 14 | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 2,720 | 3,456 | – | 166 |
| Nizam — Jaulnah | 1 | – | – | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | 6 | 8 | 14 | 444 | 6 | 444 | 506 | – | 2,040 | 2,040 | – | – |
| Nizam — Nagpore | 1 | – | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | – | 6 | 16 | 22 | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 680 | 2,720 | 3,400 | – | – |
| Tenasserim Coast | – | 1 | – | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | – | – | 736 | 680 | 1,416 | – | – |
| Straits of Malacca | – | – | – | 2 | – | 1½ | 1½ | – | – | 12 | 12 | – | – | – | – | – | 1,360 | 1,360 | – | – |
| TOTAL | 3 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 6½ | 9½ | 2 | 18 | 52 | 70 | 1,332 | 1,518 | 1,332 | 1,518 | 2,152 | 9,520 | 11,672 | – | 166 |

*N.B.*—The number of Foot Artillery guns as established are inserted, but the Foot Artillery battery at Jaulnah is supplied with hired cattle for the draft of the guns.

## Nos. 5 and 6.

### Present and Proposed Distribution of Forces within Frontier.

| | Regiments. | | | | | Artillery. | | | Companies of Sappers. | Veteran Battalions. | | Ordnance. | | | Dragoons. | | Light Cavalry. | | Total of Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | Total European and Native Infantry. | Veterans. | | Sappers. | | Grand Total of Cavalry and Infantry. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Her Majesty's Dragoons. | Light Cavalry. | Her Majesty's Infantry. | Madras European Infantry. | Native Infantry. | Troops. | Companies. | Total. | | European. | Native. | Horse. | Foot. | Total. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | Horses. |
| *No. 5.* *Present Distribution:* | | | | | | | | | | | | *No.* | *No.* | *No.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Travancore - - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 680 | 680 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Southern Division - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 6 | - | 1 | 1 | 4 | - | - | - | 8 | 8 | - | - | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | - | - | - | 332 | - | - |
| Malabar and Canara - | - | - | 1 | - | 3 | - | ¾ | ¾ | - | - | - | - | 6 | 6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coorg - - - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | ¼ | ¼ | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 680 | 680 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mysore - - - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | - | - | 4 | 8 | 12 | 640 | 701 | 444 | 506 | 1,084 | 1,207 | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | - | - | - | 83 | - | - |
| Ceded Districts - - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 3 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 8 | 8 | - | - | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 2,040 | 2,766 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Centre Division - | - | 2 | 1 | - | 8 | 2 | 5¾ | 7¾ | - | - | 2 | 8 | - | 8 | - | - | 888 | 1,012 | 888 | 1,012 | 736 | 5,440 | 6,176 | - | 2,160 | - | - | - | - |
| Northern Division - | - | - | 1 | - | 10 | - | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1 | 1 | - | - | 14 | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 736 | 6,800 | 7,536 | 216 | - | - | 83 | - | - |
| Total - - - | 1 | 5 | 6 | - | 38 | 3 | 11½ | 14½ | 6 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 46 | 58 | 640 | 701 | 2,220 | 2,530 | 2,860 | 3,231 | 4,416 | 25,840 | 30,256 | 216 | 2,160 | - | 498 | - | - |
| *No. 6.* *Proposed Distribution:* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Travancore - - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 680 | 680 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Southern Division - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 7 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 8 | 8 | - | - | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 4,760 | 5,496 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Malabar and Canara - | - | - | 1 | - | 4 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 8 | 8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 736 | 2,720 | 3,456 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coorg - - - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 680 | 680 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mysore - - - | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 10 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | - | - | 12 | 16 | 28 | 640 | 701 | 888 | 1,012 | 1,528 | 1,713 | 1,472 | 6,800 | 8,272 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ceded Districts - - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | 8 | 8 | - | - | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 1,360 | 2,096 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Centre Division - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 9 | 1 | 4¾ | 5¾ | - | - | 2 | 6 | 28 | 34 | - | - | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 6,120 | 6,856 | - | 2,160 | - | - | - | - |
| Northern Division - | - | - | 1 | - | 10 | - | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1 | 1 | - | - | 14 | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 736 | 6,800 | 7,536 | 216 | - | - | 83 | - | - |
| Total - - - | 1 | 5 | 7 | - | 44 | 3 | 11½ | 14½ | 3 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 82 | 100 | 640 | 701 | 2,220 | 2,530 | 2,660 | 3,231 | 5,152 | 29,920 | 35,072 | 216 | 2,160 | - | 83 | - | - |

— No. 7. —

COMPARATIVE RETURN of the PRESENT and PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY.

| | | Regiments. | | | | | Artillery. | | | Companies of Sappers. | Veteran Battalions. | | Ordnance. | | | Dragoons. | | Light Cavalry. | | Total of Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | Total European and Native Infantry. | Veterans. | | Sappers. | | Grand Total Cavalry and Infantry. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | His Majesty's Dragoons. | Light Cavalry. | His Majesty's Infantry. | Madras European Infantry. | Native Infantry. | Troops. | Companies. | Total. | | European. | Native. | Horse. | Foot. | Total. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | Horses. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | *No.* | *No.* | *No.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Travancore | Present | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Southern Division | Present | – | 1 | 1 | – | 6 | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | – | – | – | 8 | – | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 4,089 | 4,825 | – | – | – | 332 | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | 1 | 1 | – | 7 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 4,760 | 5,496 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Malabar and Canara | Present | – | – | 1 | – | 3 | – | ¾ | ¾ | – | – | – | – | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | – | 1 | – | 4 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 8 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 2,770 | 3,456 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coorg | Present | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | ¼ | ¼ | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mysore | Present | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | – | 4 | 8 | 12 | 640 | 701 | 444 | 506 | 1,084 | 1,207 | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | – | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | 1 | 2 | 2 | – | 10 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | – | – | 12 | 16 | 28 | 640 | 701 | 888 | 1,012 | 1,528 | 1,713 | 1,472 | 6,800 | 8,272 | – | – | – | 166 | – | – |
| Ceded Districts | Present | – | 1 | 1 | – | 3 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | – | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | 8 | 8 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 1,360 | 2,096 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Centre Division | Present | – | 2 | 1 | – | 8 | 2 | 5⅝ | 7¾ | – | – | 2 | 8 | – | – | – | – | 888 | 1,012 | 888 | 1,012 | 736 | 5,440 | 6,176 | – | 2,160 | – | – | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | 1 | 1 | – | 9 | 1 | 4¾ | 5¾ | – | – | 2 | 6 | 28 | 34 | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 6,120 | 6,856 | – | 2,160 | – | – | – | – |
| Northern Division | Present | – | – | 1 | – | 10 | – | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1 | 1 | – | – | 14 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 6,800 | 7,536 | 217 | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | – | 1 | – | 10 | – | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1 | 1 | – | – | 14 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 6,800 | 7,536 | 216 | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| Beyond Frontier | Present | – | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | – | – | 18 | 32 | 50 | – | – | 1,332 | 1,518 | 1,332 | 1,518 | 1,416 | 7,480 | 8,896 | – | – | – | 150 | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Beyond Seas | Present | – | – | 1 | – | 3 | – | 2½ | 2½ | – | – | – | – | 20 | 20 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 2,040 | 2,776 | – | – | – | 16 | – | – |
| | *Proposed* | – | – | 1 | – | 3 | – | 2½ | 2½ | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

No. 7.

DIFFERENCE between the PRESENT and PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of the ARMY.

| | | Regiments. | | | | | Artillery. | | | Companies of Sappers. | Veteran Battalions. | | Ordnance. | | | Dragoons. | | Light Cavalry. | | Total of Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | Total of European and Native Infantry. | Veterans. | | Sappers. | | Grand Total, Cavalry and Infantry. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | His Majesty's Dragoons. | Light Cavalry. | His Majesty's Infantry. | Madras European Infantry. | Native Infantry. | Troops. | Companies. | TOTAL. | | European. | Native. | Horse. | Foot. | TOTAL. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Rank and File. | Horses. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | European Rank and File. | Native Rank and File. | Rank and File. | Horses. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | *No.* | *No.* | *No.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Southern Division | Decrease | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 332 | – | – |
| | Increase | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Malabar and Canara | Increase | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | ¼ | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coorg | Decrease | – | – | – | – | – | – | ¼ | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Msyore | Increase | – | 1 | 1 | – | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | – | 8 | 8 | 16 | – | | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | 736 | 2,720 | 3,456 | – | – | – | 83 | – | – |
| Ceded Districts | Decrease | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Centre Division | Decrease | – | 1 | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 444 | 506 | 444 | 506 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | Increase | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 680 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Within Frontier | At Present | 1 | 5 | 6 | – | 38 | 3 | 11½ | 14½ | 6 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 46 | 58 | 640 | 701 | 2,220 | 2,530 | 2,860 | 3,231 | 4,416 | 25,840 | 30,256 | 216 | 2,160 | – | 498 | – | – |
| | Proposed | 1 | 5 | 7 | – | 44 | 3 | 11½ | 14½ | – | 1 | 2 | 18 | 82 | 100 | 640 | 701 | 2,220 | 2,530 | 2,860 | 3,231 | 5,152 | 29,920 | 35,072 | 216 | 2,160 | – | – | – | – |
| | Increase | – | – | 1 | – | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 36 | 42 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 736 | 4,080 | 4,816 | – | – | – | – | – | – |

No. 8.

RETURN of the Number of GARRISON ORDNANCE, with the GARRISONS AND FORCES of the *Madras* Army.

| | 42-Pounders. | 32-Pounders. | 24-Pounders. | 20-Pounders. | 18-Pounders. | 12-Pounders. | 9-Pounders. | 6-Pounders. | 4-Pounders. | 3-Pounders. | 1-Pounder. | Mortars, 13-inch. | Mortars, 10-inch. | Mortars, 8-inch. | Mortars, 5⅓-inch. | Mortars, 4⅖-inch. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arsenal of Bellary | – | – | | – | 8 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | – |
| „ Bangalore | – | – | 1 | – | 10 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 2 | – |
| „ Velore | – | – | 3 | – | 18 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – |
| „ Cannanore | – | – | 4 | – | 42 | 18 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 2 | – | – | 1 | – | 2 | – |
| „ Masulipatam | – | – | 22 | 15 | 17 | 16 | 21 | 3 | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | – |
| „ Fort St. George | 21 | 135 | 154 | – | 169 | 211 | 104 | 38 | 1 | – | – | 8 | 4 | 15 | 23 | – |
| Mount Artillery Depôt | – | – | 7 | – | 8 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 1 |
| Palamcottah | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Trichinopoly | – | – | 12 | – | 18 | 15 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 5 | 7 | – |
| Vizigapatam | – | – | 5 | – | – | 10 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jaulnah | – | – | – | – | 7 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | – |
| Moulmein | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – |
| Nagpore | – | – | 2 | – | 7 | 10 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 6 | 2 | – |
| Secunderabad | – | – | – | – | 8 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | 6 | – |
| TOTAL | 21 | 135 | 210 | 15 | 313 | 308 | 139 | 48 | 14 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 19 | 44 | 62 | 1 |

No. 9.

LIST showing the Number of GARRISON ORDNANCE mentioned by Order of Government in their Letter of 1st March 1813.

| | 32-Pounders. | 24-Pounders. | 20-Pounders. | 18-Pounders. | 12-Pounders. | 9-Pounders. | 6-Pounders. | Mortars, 13-inch. | Mortars, 10-inch. | Mortars, 8-inch. | Mortars, 5⅓-inch. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arsenal of Bellary | – | – | – | 15 | 15 | – | 20 | – | 2 | – | 6 |
| „ Gooty | – | – | – | 10 | 10 | – | 16 | – | 2 | – | 2 |
| „ Dindigul | – | – | – | – | 6 | – | 6 | – | – | – | – |
| „ Bangalore | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 20 | – | – | – | 2 |
| „ Ryacottah | – | 2 | – | – | 10 | – | 12 | – | – | – | 4 |
| „ Paulghautcherry | – | – | – | 10 | – | – | 10 | – | – | – | 2 |
| „ Vellore | – | – | – | 24 | 6 | – | 20 | – | – | 6 | 4 |
| „ Chittledroog | – | – | – | 6 | 10 | – | 20 | – | – | – | 8 |
| „ Seringapatam | – | 30 | – | 120 | 100 | – | 150 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 24 |
| „ Cannanore | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| „ Masulipatam | – | 20 | 10 | 10 | – | 30 | – | – | 2 | 6 | 2 |
| TOTAL | – | 52 | 10 | 197 | 161 | 30 | 274 | 6 | 16 | 22 | 54 |

## No. 10.

### Abstract of the Divisions.

| | Area in Square Miles. | Population. | Revenues. | Number of Rank and File of Soldiers. | Proportion Of Soldiers to Square Miles. | Proportion Of Soldiers to Population. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Present Distribution:** | | | | | | |
| I. Southern Division | 23,936 | 5,238,895 | 15,576,916 | 5,260 | 1 to 456 | 1 to 996 |
| II. Travancore and Cochin | 9,400 | 893,000 | 3,946,720 | 680 | 1 to 13·82 | 1 to 5685·6 |
| III. Malabar and Kanara | 13,780 | 1,669,118 | 5,502,894 | 2,776 | 1 to 4·9 | 1 to 601·3 |
| IV. Mysore | 27,300 | 2,573,500 | 8,000,000 | 5,900 | 1 to 4·63 | 1 to 436·2 |
| V. Coorg | 2,200 | - - | - - | 680 | 1 to 3·2 | — |
| VI. Ceded Districts | 24,000 | 1,928,814 | 5,513,169 | 3,222 | 1 to 7·45 | 1 to 698·6 |
| VII. Centre Division | 18,900 | 2,095,790 | 10,550,240 | 7,064 | * 1 to 2·67 | 1 to 296·6 |
| VIII. Northern Division | 14,200 | 2,518,199 | 6,388,937 | 7,536 | 1 to 1·88 | 1 to 334·1 |
| Total | 133,756 | 16,917,316 | 55,478,876 | 33,118 | 1 to 403 | 1 to 510·8 |
| **Proposed Distribution:** | | | | | | |
| I. Southern Division | 20,102 | 4,393,292 | 12,975,841 | 5,940 | 1 to 3·38 | 1 to 751·4 |
| II. Travancore and Cochin | 9,400 | 893,000 | 3,946,720 | 680 | 1 to 13·82 | 1 to 5685·6 |
| III. Malabar and Kanara | 17,654 | 2,514,721 | 8,103,969 | 3,456 | 1 to 5·10 | 1 to 727·6 |
| IV. Mysore | 27,300 | 2,573,500 | 8,000,000 | 9,800 | 1 to 2·78 | 1 to 262·6 |
| V. Coorg | 2,200 | - - | - - | 680 | 1 to 3·2 | — |
| VI. Ceded Districts | 24,000 | 1,928,814 | 5,513,169 | 2,540 | 1 to 9·45 | 1 to 759·3 |
| VII. Centre Division | 18,900 | 2,095,790 | 10,550,240 | 7,300 | 1 to 2·59 | 1 to 687 |
| VIII. Northern Division | 14,200 | 2,518,199 | 6,388,937 | 7,536 | 1 to 1·88 | 1 to 334·1 |
| Total | 133,756 | 16,917,316 | 55,478,876 | 37,932 | 1 to 35 | 1 to 44·6 |

* Allowing 3,000 rank and file for garrisons of Vellore and Fort Saint George, the proportion of soldiers to the area will then be 1 to 4·65 miles.

### Disposition Sketch of the Madras Army.

On No. 1.

Present Distribution.

| | Area in Square Miles. | Population. | Number of Rank and File of Cavalry and Infantry. | Ordnance Horsed. Horse. | Ordnance Horsed. Foot. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Triangle | 144,700 | 13,746,500 | 33,116 | 12 | 44 |
| Circle | 75,970 | 7,217,150 | 20,580 | 12 | 34 |
| Centre Division | 18,900 | 2,095,790 | 7,064 | 8 | 12 |
| Southern Division | 23,976 | 5,238,895 | 5,260 | – | 8 |
| Travancore | 9,400 | 893,000 | 680 | – | – |
| Malabar and Kanara | 13,780 | 1,669,118 | 2,776 | – | – |
| Coorg | 2,200 | 209,000 | 680 | – | – |
| Mysore Division | 27,300 | 2,573,500 | 5,900 | 4 | 8 |
| Ceded Districts | 24,000 | 1,928,814 | 3,222 | – | 8 |
| Northern Division | 14,200 | 2,518,199 | 7,536 | – | 8 |
| Nizam's Dominions | 108,800 | - - | 6,384 | 12 | 8 |
| Nagpore | 64,270 | 3,000,000 | 3,844 | 6 | 16 |
| Tenasserim | 15,000 | - - | 1,416 | – | – |
| Straits | 1,230 | 45,070 | 1,360 | – | – |

On No. 2.

Proposed Distribution.

| | Area in Square Miles. | Population. | Number of Rank and File of Cavalry and Infantry. | Ordnance Horsed. Horse. | Ordnance Horsed. Foot. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Triangle | 144,700 | 13,746,500 | 37,932 | 18 | 92 |
| Circle | 75,970 | 7,217,150 | 24,749 | 18 | 60 |
| Centre Division | 18,900 | 2,095,790 | 7,300 | 6 | 30 |
| Southern Division | 20,102 | 4,393,290 | 5,940 | – | 8 |
| Travancore | 9,400 | 893,000 | 680 | – | – |
| Malabar and Kanara | 17,654 | 2,514,721 | 3,456 | – | – |
| Coorg | 2,200 | 209,000 | 680 | – | – |
| Mysore Division | 27,300 | 2,573,500 | 9,800 | 12 | 16 |
| Ceded Districts | 24,000 | 1,928,814 | 2,540 | – | 8 |
| Northern Division | 14,200 | 2,518,199 | – | – | – |
| Nizam's Dominions | 108,800 | — | – | – | – |
| Nagpore | 64,270 | 3,000,000 | – | – | – |
| Tenasserim | 15,000 | — | – | – | – |
| Straits | 1,230 | 45,079 | – | – | – |

*Note.*—These statements accompany a map of early date (1835), which it is presumed will not be required.

(No. 60, of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Consultation, 25th May 1835, Nos. 17 and 18.

In continuation of the separate letter to your Honourable Court, dated Ootacamund, the 9th August 1834, and with reference to our separate letter, No. 24, dated the 26th February last, we have the honour to forward herewith, for the consideration of your Honourable Court, Minutes by the Governor General and Mr. Prinsep, dated 19th April and 29th May 1835, offering observations on the late Governor General's Minutes, proposing a re-organization of the Indian Army.

We have, &c.
(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*
*A. Ross.*
*W. Morison.*
*H. T. Prinsep.*

Fort William, 1 June 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

Military Department, 19 April 1835.

ON taking my seat as Governor General in the Council of India, I found several Minutes, recently recorded by the Right Honourable the late Governor General, relating to the army, and, consequently, to our most vital interests; for on the army, I need hardly say, depends our existence in this country.

These documents have been transmitted, I believe, to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and I am not sure that they are properly before this Government for consideration. Nevertheless, the importance of the subject induces me to offer such opinions as occur to me on the plans which they develope. Such of them as I propose to discuss I shall take seriatim, beginning with that dated Ootacamund, 23rd July 1834, which yields to none in importance.

In that Minute the reduction is proposed of 29 regiments of infantry, seven regiments of cavalry, and a large proportion of artillery, in the armies of the several Presidencies.

It is proposed to effect this reduction without diminution of the total numerical strength of the army, and a saving is thereby contemplated immediately of *Rs.* 13,81,370. 13., and respectively of *Rs.* 46,98,741. 15. 6.: Total *Rs.* 60,80,112. 12. 6.

This is a fascinating plan with reference to the saving proposed, and if the result were certain, and our situation in India fixed, I know not how it could be resisted. But, considering the moveable character of our power in India, considering that in the nature of things it can hardly remain stationary, that we must either advance or retreat, and that a retreat would be the commencement of ruin, there are, in my mind, the strongest objections to any scheme which has the appearance of a retrogade movement, objections far outweighing the uncertain prospect of a saving which may not, and, I venture to prophesy, will not be realized; for, before it can come into effect, events will probably have occurred which will overthrow and nullify all the calculations of the scheme; not specific events which I pretend to foresee, but events setting foresight at defiance, to which, in our precarious state in India, we are always liable.

The whole plan seems to me to be founded on a supposition which I conceive to be erroneous, that our military force is too large, and will admit of reduction. My opinion is totally opposed to this: I apprehend that our force is too small, and that we must keep in view the certainty of increase rather than the possibility of reduction.

Increase is the inevitable tendency of our condition in India. It always has been so, and until we know the fixed unalterable limits of our empire it always must be so. Experience has shown that every attempt at permanent reductions has been futile, or of fleeting effect. Every attempt at reduction has been followed

followed in a few years, if not sooner, by an increase. Reductions at the end of a war, either immediate or gradual, are necessary to shake off a crushing expenditure incurred by increase during the war; but such reductions ought always to be made in a manner which will produce the best possible disorganization of the existing army, and facilitate its increase whenever this may become necessary.

On this principle our present peace establishment was formed. Reduction was made in the numerical strength of regiments as far as it could be carried, with regard to efficiency, thus leaving the organization of the army unaffected, and affording the means of increase in the most expeditious manner, whenever increase might become necessary.

This plan of a peace establishment is approved by the late Governor General, as applied to England, where the practice itself, and the reasoning on which it is founded, are admitted by his Lordship to be just, but is considered by him to be most erroneously applied to India, on the ground that, although war may break out suddenly in Europe, and the greatest state of preparation is there required, no such preparation is necessary in India, there being no power capable of any offensive aggression which one-fourth of our army would not easily repel, and the only enemies by which our dominions can be endangered being far distant, of whose approach we must have timely intelligence, so as to render a state of preparation to meet attack utterly needless.

In this reasoning I cannot concur; we have repeatedly been in a state of similar confidence, which has been suddenly disturbed by an unexpected war. In 1802 a large reduction of the army took place, under the expectation of continued peace. This was followed by a war in 1803, which lasted to 1806, requiring all our energies, and exhausting our resources. Before the Goorkha war we despised our enemies, and thought them utterly powerless. Nevertheless, they proved to be the best soldiers that we had ever had to deal with. Three divisions of our army out of four were defeated, and baffled for a whole campaign; and two-thirds of the infantry of the Bengal army were employed for a long time unsuccessfully against a foe, whom we previously thought incapable of resistance, which same foe we shall some day have to meet again, perhaps, when we may be fully occupied elsewhere. The Marquis of Hastings, whom that war unexpectedly greeted on his arrival in India, left this country in a state of peace, little supposing that he had bequeathed to his successor another war, the most expensive that we have ever had, which required the employment, on an unusual and immense proportion, of our European force, alarmed the minds of our native troops, and filled all India with the hope of our downfall, notwithstanding the then recent triumphs and successes of Lord Hastings' administration. Those very triumphs and successes were gained over powers who were supposed to have been subdued in a former war, who were, in fact, our allies; whose co-operation was due: whose neutrality, at least, was confidently relied on, and who came upon us as enemies unexpectedly, when we were marching to attack and destroy a predatory power that ravaged their territories as well as our own, and whom they ought to have blessed us for eradicating, if the predominating feeling of hatred to our rule had not induced them to run the risk which ended in their own destruction.

There cannot, I conceive, be a greater mistake than to imagine that our situation in India is without danger, or that our only danger is from distant enemies. I do not even think that our greatest danger is at a distance. Our danger is round about us, in the very heart of our own empire, and in every State of India. If there were not this danger in the interior of our dominions, and in every allied and neighbouring State, dependent or independent, we might then indeed calculate what would be requisite to encounter successfully our supposed distant enemies, and reduce our army accordingly, if even then it would admit of reduction; but if we recollect that when we want to send troops to meet external enemies we need troops most at home, and that in time of war, when our force is carried out of our territories, it is most required within them, the argument which would lead us to disregard the necessity of being in a state to make rapid preparation to meet any sudden emergency appears to me to be most fallacious. The fact is, that under no organization of our army can the preparation of regular troops be rapid enough; and it will always be a difficulty when we enter into war, how to supply with sufficient celerity, within our dominions, any description of troops, to be substituted for the preservation of order and tranquillity, in lieu of those that must, on the exigency, be sent away.

I regard the army, in its present state, as consisting of so many regiments on a peace establishment, which may be completed to any strength deemed requisite for a war establishment, whenever the occasion rendering that completion necessary may arise.

I do not profess to consider a regiment of 640 strong in privates as equal to a regiment 800 strong; quite the contrary. But I regard so many regiments more on the former establishment, during peace, as better than so many less on the latter, because they are more easily and more speedily convertible into a sufficient force on the approach of war. I would prefer the 800 to the 640, even as a peace establishment, if we could afford to pay them, because I am satisfied that our force is too small, not too large. But I regard the present reduced scale of regiments as an evil which the state of our finances makes necessary, and which is to be repaired as soon as we have the means.

It appears in the Minute of Lord William Bentinck to be inferred that there would be no diminution of strength in the reduction of a number of regiments, provided that the number of privates remained the same. I cannot think so. The loss of European officers would be an immense loss of strength. What would our native army be without our European officers. The Goorkhas, the best soldiers ever opposed to us in India, told us to take away our European officers, and then see what they would do with our native troops. They were confident of their own superiority over the latter, without the former. They were right; but whether right or wrong, the sentiment evinced the value of our European officers in the eyes of our enemies, and the strength which we derive from them, That loss alone, therefore, would be a great reduction of force.

Apart from that, a reduction of regiments would, in another point of view, be a decrease of strength, greater or less, according to the number reduced. A regiment is a regiment, and for most purposes in peace has the same moral effect, whether it consist of 640 privates or of 800.

If a regiment be stationed to maintain the tranquillity of a district, it produces the effect desired, although consisting of the smaller number.

If a force of several regiments be formed, its moral strength will be greater in the estimation of those it may be sent to overawe if it consist of a greater number of regiments of the lower complement, than if of a smaller number of the higher.

The regiments will be counted and reported by the enemy's spies, not the exact number of the men. And as our regiments on their present strength are more than equal in number to those in the native armies generally, the effect of the number of regiments is not diminished by the low scale of their numerical strength. In a great majority of instances during peace regiments of the present strength would have the same moral effect as if they were on a higher scale in the number of privates, and a reduction of regiments would be, in the important respect of European officers, as well as the Native officers, a real and, in all other respects, an apparent and, therefore, a real reduction of strength.

The disheartening effect of the proposed measure on the whole army, from the oldest European officer down to the youngest sepoy, must be regarded as a very strong objection. Infinite mischief is done by any measure that excites dissatisfaction throughout the army. Nothing can tend more to shake the stability of our empire. Any expense within bounds which would promote cheerfulness in the army would be true economy; and whatever saving would produce discontent and dissatisfaction would be worse than waste.

The whole argument of the Right Honourable the late Governor General in favour of the plan which his Lordship has proposed merely goes to show that the number of men in each regiment is too small. It does not in the slightest degree prove that the number of regiments is too large, which is the thing to be demonstrated before a reduction of regiments can be a just conclusion. The only appropriate remedy for the evil actually shown is an increase in the number of privates in each regiment, a measure of which the advantage is indisputable, and which I should earnestly recommend if I thought that we could afford the expense, which, however, I fear we cannot. In this view of the case the evil which exists, and for which, in my opinion, temporary remedies might be supplied on occasions of emergency, is, I conceive, infinitely less than that which would be produced by the reduction proposed. The real question is, can we with safety and advantage effect a permanent reduction in the strength of our army by a reduction of regiments. In other words, have we too many regiments? I should decidedly say no.

no. And if not, then it will be wiser to bear the comparatively trifling inconvenience of our present organisation, which can be rectified whenever we can afford the expense or whenever necessity require it, than to seek to remove the existing inconvenience by a revolution fraught with incalculable mischief. I have said a revolution, and a reduction of regiments would be a revolution in the constitution of our army. It is a thing unknown, or, if it ever took place, it is beyond the memory of the generality, if not all, of the present generation of public servants in India. I remember, I think, that orders were received from home in 1801 or 1802 for a reduction of regiments. It was determined to reduce men instead. The war of 1803 made us repent of this reduction, and the effect would have been worse had there been a reduction of regiments. Such a measure would have, as before remarked, a most disheartening effect on the whole army, and that alone ought to prevent its adoption without an irresistible necessity for it, and without a certainty that the object contemplated would be of sure and permanent attainment. Neither this absolute necessity nor this certainty exists; but, on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the measure can hardly, with due regard to the actual wants of the State, be carried into effect so as to produce the minor saving promised; and it is almost certain, as certain as anything prospective can be, that long before the reduction contemplated can be completely effected, a necessity for increase will be recognised and acted on.

Our career in India has been one of continued advance, attended by a progressive increase of our army.

To attempt its reduction would be a resolution indicating retreat, which even if it were practicable, on just grounds, would have the worst moral effect. I am not one of those who imagine that a Russian invasion of India is the only danger that we have to apprehend.

Neither do I regard it as the greatest or the most difficult to encounter. But while it is deemed necessary to guard against the approach of Russian power and influence on our north-west frontier, and for that purpose to take a more active interest and extend our relations in that quarter, I am much surprised that a proposition for a great reduction of our army should come from one whose eye is avowedly directed towards that quarter, as the only one from which any danger can arise.

Many regard a Russian invasion, or perhaps the more probable event of an invasion, headed and instigated by Russia, as an imminent, not a remote crisis. If they are right, how can a reduction of our army be recommended in any point of view? My own opinion is that, when such an event is to be contemplated as approaching, a vast increase of our army will become necessary, and that the internal state of India alone is a sufficient reason why no reduction can at present be attempted. The general objections which apply to the reduction of one arm apply equally to the reduction of any. The infantry has hitherto been in view in these observations as the main body of our force, and the arm on which we chiefly rely. With respect to the cavalry, the inexpediency of reduction is increased by the greater delay which would attend the re-organization of cavalry, when the force reduced has to be restored, which is a strong argument in favour of keeping the regiments embodied as they now are, and waiting for the time, which will assuredly come, when it may be necessary to raise their complement. Whether our regular cavalry should be composed of Europeans or Natives, whether regular or irregular cavalry is most useful, are questions into which it is not on this occasion necessary to enter. The proposition to which I am objecting is simply for a reduction in the number of our cavalry regiments, to which I object for all the reasons already urged against reductions generally, and in addition, because our cavalry bears, I believe, a less than usual proportion to our infantry, and because it will require a longer time to restore cavalry regiments after disbanding them.

The objections to the reduction of any part of our force apply with equal strength to any reduction of our artillery, and especially of our horse artillery. Moreover, it would, I conceive, be extremely inexpedient to reduce the most scientific branch of our military force, one which is formed with so much pains, and which we ought to maintain in the greatest state of perfection, as giving an immense advantage to small bodies of regular troops over numbers on the part of their enemies, a state of things in which we continually have to contend in India, whether against internal insurrection or foreign warfare.

It is argued in favour of a reduction of the artillery, that the present number

of guns is greater than the usual proportion of four guns to 1,000 men adopted in European armies, by 10 guns in the aggregate, taking all India into the account, but it ought to be remembered that the calculation is made on a peace establishment of infantry and cavalry, which is at the very lowest point, and must infallibly be increased on the first expectation of the approach of war, when the artillery must be increased also, but with greater difficulty and delay than any other arm of our force. The calculation ought therefore to be made on the proper war establishment of our existing regiments of infantry and cavalry, when it would be found that we have much less than our proper proportion of artillery.

Besides which, if the question were examined, it would be found that we require in India more than the proportion of artillery assigned to European armies, because we have oftener to act in small bodies which most need the aid of artillery.

It is a remarkable fact that in our pitched battles with native armies they have generally been superior to us in the force of artillery, which clearly shows that we have not hitherto had a more than due proportion of that arm in our service.

I deprecate exceedingly any reduction of this important part of our force.

Since the remarks contained in the preceding part of this Minute were written, I have read Colonel Morison's Minutes of the 7th August 1834 and 16th February 1835, to which I beg leave to refer as containing many valuable observations and arguments in which I concur. It will be found that his opinions and mine are very much in unison, and whatever weight may be attached to those of either, opposed to such high authority as that of the late Governor General, it may be useful to state that mine had been offered without the knowledge of what Colonel Morison had previously written. It will be seen that two members of the present Government, of long experience in India, in different branches of the public service, looking at the question with ideas necessarily influenced by the turn of mind produced in each by the peculiar course of his own career, unite in deprecating the immense change proposed by the Right Honourable the late Governor General.

The success of the plan, viewed solely as a financial measure, rests mainly on the reduction of the number of our European officers, which is to effect the great saving prospectively contemplated. That reduction I venture to pronounce to be impracticable. Long before it can be carried into effect the necessity for an increase of our army, and especially of our European officers, in whom its efficiency so much depends, must occur. For all the reasons inadequately urged in this Minute I object to the proposed measures. Our army is not too large, but too small. Increase is forbidden by the state of our finances, and may be avoided in time of peace. We are on the lowest peace establishment, and that so formed as to admit of the most speedy increase on the approach of war. Permanent reduction is impracticable and out of the question. An attempt at a temporary reduction would not be attended by any important financial benefits, but would be fraught with immense mischief in its effects, even if it were in its very first stages possible, which is doubtful. Nothing in my opinion could justify it but absolute necessity; that overruling necessity which might compel us to reduce our army from sheer inability to maintain it at the strength required by our wants, and prepare us to submit to the natural consequence of having a force insufficient for the preservation of our dominion. That necessity does not I trust exist. Whatever reduction of expenditure may be necessary, we must look to other quarters for its realization. It cannot with safety be drawn from a reduction of our military force, or a diminution of its efficiency. We ought to exhaust every other possible source of retrenchment before we attempt, under the greatest necessity, to make serious reductions in our army of the kind proposed, which would be like gnawing our vitals. Unless permanent reduction be practicable, the changes proposed must produce more evil than good. And any expectations of the possibility of permanent reduction can only be founded on a complete delusion.

I shall offer no apology for having expressed these sentiments; that was my duty when I found measures in agitation which appeared to me to threaten extreme injury to the State; but it is with exceeding regret that I find myself opposed on such a vital subject to the late Governor General, for whom I entertain the most sincere and cordial respect, and whose whole heart was incessantly engaged in an anxious desire to promote the welfare of the empire entrusted to his charge.

19 April 1835. (signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*

MINUTE by Mr. *Prinsep.*

THE discussions upon the late Governor General's projects of military reform having been continued open to the date of his Lordship's departure from India, and nothing final being then recorded, it seems to me that the members of the present Government are called upon to record their opinions on the very important question agitated therein, and that we are by no means exempted from the obligations of taking them into consideration by the circumstance that a reference was made to England from Ootacamund, on the subject of these plans when they were originally brought forward there. The authorities in England will probably decline to come to a decision on such important changes until they shall learn the opinion of them entertained by the full Council; they would not, therefore, hold us excused, if we were merely to forward the subsequent minutes and papers in continuation of the preceding reference; and, though many motives might lead us, and myself in particular, to wish to avoid taking part in discussions partly gone by wherein our sentiments are likely to be at variance with those of the late head of the Government, there is yet no resisting the strong feeling that silence would on the present occasion be an unpardonable neglect of duty, for the measures contemplated in this instance are of first-rate importance, as they affect the interests, the *morale*, and the efficiency of our Indian armies, all which might be jeopardised by a hasty adoption of the scheme. It would be a failure of obvious duty, therefore, for any member of the Executive Council to allow these papers to be recorded and submitted to the Court of Directors without a written declaration of his own opinion on them. The particular Minutes I have now before me are those commencing with one by the late Governor General, dated 23rd July 1834, proposing a re-organization of the armies of India in all their three branches, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and holding out a prospective reduction of expense to the extent of 60,80,112 rupees from the entire execution of the plan, without present and immediate saving of 13,81,370 rupees per annum.

I have perused all the Minutes written on this subject, and have examined the statements laid before the Council at Ootacamund, along with his Lordship's first Minute, and the result is a decided conviction that the plan should not be recommended as proper to be carried into execution in any of its parts.

Under the name of a re-organization of the armies of India, the project is simply one for reducing and breaking up and disbanding 29 regiments of infantry, seven of cavalry, and a yet larger proportion to the whole force of the most important arm of all, the artillery. The rest of the scheme consists of propositions for disposing of the men, officers, horses, and equipments of the regiments and corps to be broken up. It has, of course, been an object with the late Governor General to mitigate to the persons affected the evils and injurious tendency of the reduction. The men are not to be discharged, but transferred to other regiments, which are to be increased in the number of rank and file, so as to receive them. The European officers are to be retained in skeleton corps till induced to retire by the proffer of a gratuity, or until absolved. The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers were at first proposed to be transferred as supernumeraries to other regiments; but, in consequence of the strong representation made by Colonel Morison of the injurious effect of this upon the promotion and prospects of every individual of the native army, his Lordship subsequently modified his scheme so far as to consent that these, too, should remain embodied in skeleton corps till absorbed or provided for, to the no small prejudice of the financial results of the measure.

I refer to this part of the plan once for all, in order that I may thus early state my conviction that, if it were proper and possible to make the proposed or any less considerable reductions in the number of regiments and corps of the three Indian armies, the suggested method of providing for the Native and European officers of the corps reduced is as little injurious and as free from objection as any that could be devised. But the real evil of the thing is not to be remedied or lessened by any ingenuity of this description, by which officers are retained in their position and prospects, without interfering with the promotion of others in due roster. The evil lies in the diminution of the number of corps, and it is to this part of the question that the observations I have to make will be principally addressed.

The late Governor General prefaces the introduction of his plan by pointing out that a native army composed of regiments of infantry 640 strong, and of cavalry 420, cannot in consequence of the demand for regimental and other guards, provide a disposable force of anything like the same strength as the same number of men would do regimented into corps of 800 and 600 respectively. In proposing therefore to recast the men of the present three armies into corps of larger numerical strength, his Lordship argues that he provides a more efficient force than the present, and the re-organisation is thus recommended by the double consideration of economy and of an augmentation rather than a reduction of military means. The fallacy of this view of the question is exposed in the Minute of Sir C. T. Metcalfe, and I fully concur in the observations of the present Governor General on the subject. The military means of the State must be estimated by the number of corps at its disposal, and not by the number of individual soldiers. The rank and file number is constantly fluctuating; so were the number of companies, troops, or other subdivisions of corps; there may be 10 companies to each infantry regiment at one time of 100 men each, and at another only eight of 80 as at present, still the corps is a regiment complete in its organisation, presenting the same appearance to the world, and an object of the same respect and dread. True, the corps when reduced is not so efficient, and why is it not so? only because the Government does not at the moment desire the highest comparative efficiency of which such a corps is susceptible. It leaves regiments weak when they are not likely to be called into service in the full confidence that it can by a stroke of the pen replace anyone of these reduced corps, or any number of them within a very short period on a footing of as high numerical efficiency as may be desired. Under the conviction of this in time of peace their strength is always kept down to the lowest possible scale that the actual demands of the service will admit. Since the Burmese war, the Supreme Government have felt more strongly than at any previous period the necessity of this kind of retrenchment on account as well of the augmentations by new corps made during that war, which it was felt impossible to reduce on its conclusion, as of the general burthen imposed by it on the finances of India, for it was the very first war in which the British have been engaged in India which did not end in leaving territory in our hands sufficient to provide from its revenues for the increased charges of the new position in which it placed us. Like every preceding war, this entailed the necessity of establishing new army positions; from the Valley of Assam to the Tenasserim Coast the frontier required to be armed, whereas heretofore a couple of battalions at Dacca and Chittagong were all the force detained within the wide extent of country east of Calcutta. The question was well considered at the close of the Burmese war with reference to all these circumstances, whether any regiment of the Bengal or Madras Presidencies could be considered as superfluous and be dispensed with. The stations to be occupied were necessarily the great consideration; it was not asked how many men, but how many corps it was indispensable to maintain at each. The efficiency of the corps was quite a separate question; *that* it was well known, might be and must be temporarily sacrificed for the sake of no less indispensable financial retrenchment. Now, however, that this sacrifice has been made to an extent verging on the maximum limit to which it could be carried, the plan of the late Governor General comes upon us, building on this very temporary inefficiency as an argument for further weakening and disarming ourselves by reducing the number of corps. True, the men of the reduced corps will by transfer to the weakened regiments make these efficient, and his Lordship's plan goes to keep these always at the increased strength, but where will be the security that upon the next appearance of a threatened deficit of the Treasury the companies will not again be reduced to 80 men?

The late Governor General says, under the proposed new organisation 10,000 muskets will be so disposed that, if wanted for emergent service, a larger number of them will be promptly available. This may be very true, and the Government may yet find itself much crippled of means by the change. In the first place, the 10,000 rank and file, under the new organisation, will furnish corps for $12\frac{1}{2}$ stations only; whereas, under the present, the same number offers to the world the imposing protection of a regimental cantonment at very nearly sixteen stations. No attempt whatsoever is made to show that the presence of a regiment is not wanted at any of these existing stations. If the question had been argued on that ground, the conclusion that the number of existing regiments will bear

reduction

reduction might be rightly come to. But on this branch of the subject the decision has been already passed that the corps are barely sufficiently numerous to maintain existing indispensable stations, and surely it is a curious specimen of encyclic reasoning to leave this position untouched and unimpugned, and because the efficiency of corps has been trenched upon by the reductions made in the number of each for the sake of economy, to bring forward these very reductions as a ground for doubling up and diminishing the numbers of corps, previously determined to be the lowest possible number that the service of the State could be carried on with.

But the late Governor General says more bayonets could be thrown forward upon an emergency. Even admit this in full. Still it does not necessarily result that the force thrown forward will be equally effective, equally imposing, or capable of covering so wide a field. Say the force thrown forward be 4000 bayonets, that is but five regiments under the new organisation, while, under the present, seven could be sent, more weakened, indeed, by the guards they will leave behind, but still regiments in the eyes of the world and of the enemy, and capable of each acting separately as such. If the circumstances of the time are so altered at present, that the Government cannot hazard regiments in the field in their weakened state, then is it time to make local or general augmentations of strength in preparation for such an altered state of things, but surely the same cannot be the time for disarming by breaking up regiments.

Upon the project, therefore, for the reorganisation of the armies, as presented to the Government by the late Governor General, without any reference to stations to be maintained, or to the circumstances, political and military, of the territory to be overawed, and the frontiers to be defended, but resting merely on the bare fact that the present organisation does not leave an equal number of bayonets effective, I have no hesitation in recording an opinion, that it ought on no account to be entertained. In the present financial condition of the country, I am far from saying that it is not, or may not be, a question whether to maintain so many corps as we have. Let it be shown where, how, and when any existing regiments are superfluous and can be dispensed with, and I shall be ready enough to join in recommending the reduction of them for the sake of the saving that will be the result; but upon a mere showing of supposed benefit, without impairing means, I will not be led to join in measures of reorganisation pregnant with all the evils of reductions far beyond what the supposed occasion calls for, and calculated to cripple the means of the Government, in case of future exigency, to an extent more than commensurate with the reductions. The saving indicated, now that it is agreed to throw the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers into skeleton corps, is almost entirely prospective. What we need is something immediate, for long before the hopes held out are realized, we might be embroiled in wars and distant operations calling for fresh augmentations of force.

I have referred entirely in what I have said to the infantry, because I have taken up the question as a general one, and argued against the general bearing and character of the scheme; all that I have said, however, applies equally to the cavalry and artillery reorganization, which proceeds upon the same principle; others have discussed the effect of these measures in detail on the promotion and prospects of the officers and men of the three armies. Although I have yet said nothing on this part of the question, I beg to be understood as concurring in every argument adduced in behalf of the claims of the military services to have their interests respected, and to be saved from the disheartening influence of disbandments and breakings up of corps, except under the unavoidable exigency of an impossibility to pay them longer.

As for the State of India being such as to warrant or suggest a reduction of military means, I entirely agree in all that is said in the minutes of Sir C. T. Metcalfe on this subject, and look upon it even as absurd to think of reducing the army of India or the number of corps in the army, which is the same thing, at the very time that we are pushing ourselves by negotiation along the Indus, and preparing for an extension of our relations in the north-west. At the very moment of the decease of the King of Persia, when all is unsettled in that kingdom, and nobody can say for certain that something may not every day occur to call for an expedition and extensive operations in that quarter—at the very time, too, when the conduct of the Chinese threatens the embroilment of affairs with the British nation in the extreme east, for who can pretend to a sufficient insight into futurity

to say that we may not be called upon within a few years, or even months, to support measures for the vindication of the national honour, or for the assertion of a right of intercourse in that ultima Thule of European diplomacy.

If the army were to be reorganised in the manner recommended by the late Governor General upon the avowed principle of considering the present reduced peace scale as a maximum, and studying to combine its numbers so as to give to them the greatest efficiency possible without any means of prompt extension, where should we find 20,000 men to send into Persia if so required? Where, another force of the same strength to be shipped for China? All which are contingencies not to be lost sight of in the estimate of our means compared with necessary wants, and with the probable or possible drains upon them.

I wish that the many questions now before Government, some of them nearly of equal importance with this, had left me more time to have given to the preparation of this minute, that I might have stated more forcibly and in better shape than I have done the very strong impression I feel of the injudiciousness of the plan of reorganisation proposed in this instance. The present Governor General has, however, discussed the question so very ably, and with so much judgment and propriety of view, that I feel myself saved the necessity of doing more than expressing my entire and unqualified assent and concurrence in all his arguments and conclusions.

(signed) *H. T. Prinsep.*

Calcutta, 19th May 1835.

(No. 72 of 1835.—Separate.—Military Department.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

Cons. 24 June, 1835. Nos. 1 to 3.

WITH reference to the minutes recorded by the late Governor General on the Distribution and Composition of the Armies of India, transmitted with our separate letter, No. 36, of the 16th March 1835, we have now the honour to offer for the consideration of your Honourable Court the sentiments of the Governor General and Mr. Prinsep on those important subjects, as shown in the accompanying minutes, under date the 8th and 16th May, and 9th June 1835.

We have, &c.
(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe,*
*A. Ross,*
*W. Morison,*
*H. T. Prinsep.*

Fort William, 3 July 1835.

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MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

Military Department, 8 May 1835.

A MINUTE recorded by the Right Honourable the late Governor General on the consultation of the 13th March, and dated the 28th February, contains his Lordship's sentiments on the distribution of the army of India.

In those sentiments, as far as they regard the proper principle of distribution, I have the honour entirely to concur.

There is no doubt that the dispersion of the army into small bodies is a bad mode of distribution, and that its union and concentration in large bodies is highly desirable.

When the army is dispersed in small bodies throughout the country, it is difficult to collect a large force for any purpose.

It is positively difficult, because every cantonment requires a force for its protection, by which the force to be assembled for field service must be diminished; and further, because delay must be caused by the troops having to assemble

assemble from distant points, instead of being ready to move in one body, in consequence of having been previously united.

It is morally difficult; because, wherever troops are stationed, a general belief becomes established that troops are necessary there; and, consequently, a feeling of insecurity arises whenever the troops are withdrawn. If troops be really wanted in that position, they will be most wanted when it is requisite to withdraw them; for the collection of an army for any important service is the signal for men's minds to think of change, and troops will at that time be required where they were not required before. It would be better that troops should not be stationed anywhere in time of peace for local protection, whence it would be necessary to remove them in time of trouble. It is better that the people should be accustomed to the absence of troops, than that the troops should be withdrawn when their presence is most requisite for either protection or coercion. If they can be dispensed with when everything tends most to raise up danger, either from external foes or internal disaffection, or professed plunderers, they can certainly be most easily dispensed with when all is tranquillity and men's minds are not dreaming of revolution.

If we suppose a field force to be assembled from different stations instead of one, ten times the force would be kept back in the former case to what would be required in the latter for the charge of the cantonments and protection of the posts before occupied. If, for instance, the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow were required to form a field army, a regiment probably at the least would be wanted to keep charge of each cantonment during the absence of the main body, that is three-elevenths of the whole body of infantry; but if the three stations were united, one regiment, or an eleventh part of the whole, would be sufficient for the same purpose, and the field force would be increased by a fourth or fifth, or as ten is to eight. At the same time three parts of the country would be excited by the absence of the troops, to which they had been accustomed instead of one.

Concentration of force, however, must in practice have its limits. It would not be expedient, for instance, to concentrate the whole army of any Presidency at one point. It is obvious that the greater part of the country would, in that case, remain entirely unprotected, and exposed to any disaster. Thus the distribution of the army is a wide question. There must be concentration for one purpose, and dispersion for another, and after admitting that concentration is the right principle, it may be found that dispersion is the inevitable practice, for a reason which will force itself on the mind the more the subject be examined, because the army is not sufficient for both purposes, that of forming armies for the field, for which concentration is desirable, and that of local protection, for which dispersion is unavoidable. All that can be done is to keep concentration in view, and avoid dispersion as much as possible.

Were I undertaking to distribute the army anew, without reference to its existing position, I should proceed on these principles. On every frontier where there could be a foe, I would have a concentrated force, a division of the army, complete in all arms, and at the least sufficient for defensive purposes on any occasion which might unexpectedly arise. I would have similar forces in the interior, both as reserves and supports to the frontier forces, and to secure internal tranquillity. Whenever it might be necessary to move any of these interior divisions in support of the frontier armies a sufficient force should be left or substituted for the protection of internal tranquillity, because it is then that internal tranquillity most needs protection. A calculation ought to be made of the force requisite for that purpose in each circle of territory, and that amount of force ought to be retained there in peace and in war, but especially in war when it would be most wanted. All divisions or brigades of the army, intended either for field service against enemies or for the preservation of general tranquillity in the interior, ought to be posted in the most convenient stations for the purposes contemplated, and for the health and supply of the troops, without reference to other merely local objects, in order that they may be available to move in any direction without the sacrifice of any such objects. The army ought to be dispersed as little as possible for merely local purposes, but whenever it may be necessary to post troops with reference to local considerations, the force so posted ought not to exceed the strength requisite for the purpose in view, and ought never to be withdrawn in time of trouble. For instance, let us

suppose the troops at Meerut and Kurnaul to be as they are, disposable forces for field service, and the troops at Delhi to be stationed as a garrison for that important city, and as a force for the preservation of tranquillity in its immediate neighbourhood. Is the force at Delhi sufficient, and not more than sufficient for those purposes at all times? If it be so, let it remain permanently stationed at Dihlee and never diminished at those times when the forces of Kurnaul and Meerut may be removed for field service. If it be more than sufficient for local purposes, let the surplus be removed during peace and added to the force at Kurnaul, or that at Meerut, which are supposed to be maintained for field service. The available force will thus be increased, and there will be no necessity to draw any part of the field force from Delhi at a time when a force, avowedly posted for local protection, ought not to be diminished. Take Benares as another city of importance, for which it may be deemed necessary to have a stationary force. The amount ought to be such as may be sufficient, and as might be retained there during war. If it were more, the surplus ought to be disposed of at the station of an available force, which would not be tied down by local wants, but free to move or detach whenever troops might be required. There are many situations in which local wants may be most conveniently met by local corps; such is the case in Ramgurh, Assam, &c. "where that description of force is maintained, and its use might be extended as formerly, if we could afford the expense wherever a single regiment ought to be stationed unless it were for an important military purpose for which the most efficient description of force were deemed necessary, a local corps would answer as well as one of the line, and would enable us to release the line more from local duties, and have a greater available force than at present.

But it is almost idle to speculate in this manner. We have not the pecuniary means for a sufficient increase of our army; and if the distribution of what we have were attempted according to the principles stated, we should find that we have not near enough. We are obliged to post our troops according to local exigencies, and when we have a war we collect them as best we can, leaving local exigencies to shift for themselves. It would be well, however, always to keep in mind the expediency of distributing our army so as to have the greatest possible amount of force available for field service in any direction, and not locked up for local purposes. We may not be able with our present force to do much in this way, but attention to the principle may enable us to do something.

How little can be done is shown by the measures proposed in the late Governor General's Minute which regard the Bengal army. Beyond our own territories the concentration of the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow, with some addition and some reduction, is the only measure proposed; and within our frontier, including Oude, all that is contemplated is the abolition of some small stations, and a consequent addition to some others. Nowhere within our frontier—after the adoption of these measures—could there be such a force concentrated as would in itself form a sufficient army for any great purpose, and important points of our frontier would be left as before, without the means of collecting an adequate force, on any exigency of foreign war. The principle of the proposed alterations is excellent, but the result is a failure, owing to the inadequacy of our army. Neither are the frontiers provided with sufficient forces for defence against foreign enemies, nor are the concentrated masses in the interior that would answer as armies of reserve for the support of those in front, and for the preservation of internal tranquillity. We cannot carry the operation of concentration far enough without laying bare too large a portion of country, and leaving too many places of importance unprotected.

The proposed concentration of the Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow forces is good in itself, because it would give us an additional force for field service of two regiments, as there would be only one station to protect on the troops taking the field instead of three, and because there would be an army of considerable strength ready to move in any direction without the delay of assembling from distant points. But to render the measure effectual, all the three present stations must be entirely abandoned. It would not do to keep a regiment at Mhow, as proposed by the Quartermaster General, for the purpose of furnishing an escort for the Resident at Indore; such a departure from the principles of the plan would tend very much to defeat it. It must be observed, however with reference to this plan, that it would create the necessity of making Ajmere, which is

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now protected by the neighbourhood of Nusseerabad, a separate station capable of self defence, without reference to the position of any protecting force. It must also be remarked that if the forces of Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow are beneficial in their respective vicinities, the local benefit will be affected by removing them, and great spaces of country left without any force; insecurity might be felt and insurrection encouraged, for it often happens that a small and inadequate force stationed anywhere produces all the effect in tranquillising the country that could be obtained by the presence of a larger army. The abolition therefore of these stations would be an experiment, the result of which is uncertain. The removal of a force from a foreign territory, whether it were wise to place it there or not, will always create a sensation, and may be misconstrued as a retrograde movement. It is also to be considered that by that measure much public property would be sacrificed, and much private loss and distress incurred, and that in forming the new station there would be great expense to the State and to individuals. All this having happened, and the new station being completed and occupied, it might prove to be unhealthy, or the neighbourhood incapable of supplying forage for so large a force; or some alteration of circumstances or of opinions might occur to suggest the abandonment of the new cantonment, and a different distribution of the force. That we are liable to such changes is shown by the fate of Muttra. When we extended our dominions beyond the Jumna, Agra and Muttra presented themselves as stations for our troops. Muttra was preferred, and became the principal station in our new frontier; Agra was made merely a garrison. Muttra continued to be our principal station on that frontier from 1806 to 1809, when a new commander in chief fancied another station as better suited to take the lead: and in consequence of the rising power of Runjeet Singh, and the rumoured menaces of French invasion, Meerut superceded Muttra, and became the head-quarters of the division. Muttra, however, remained a considerable station, and underwent increase and decrease as the wind blew. Agra was subsequently increased, and if I be not mistaken Muttra became subordinate to Agra. Next Agra became subordinate to Muttra; and now Muttra is, or is to be, abolished and added to Agra; and it will not be very surprising if, on account of forage, we be obliged to recur to Muttra. Considering the vicinity of Agra and Muttra, within 30 miles of each other, it cannot be supposed that there were very important reasons for these repeated changes; they must have been the consequences of mere differences of opinion prevailing at different times. But the history of Muttra as a military, not yet perhaps brought as a final, conclusion, teaches us that in forming a station we may only be laying the foundation of its abolition, and is a warning against trusting too much to any scheme for a change of stations however enticing. Were it now a question whether we should post the forces distributed at Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow, as they now are, or form them into one efficient body constituting one large station, I should, without hesitation, prefer the latter plan; but I see reason to be distrustful of change, and would prefer the continuance of the present distribution to the inconvenience, distress, and expense which would attend the abolition of the existing stations, until some greater urgency than is yet apparent imposes on us the necessity of the alteration.

What is applicable in this instance is applicable generally where cantonments have been once formed. It may be better to retain them than to incur the bad consequences of abandoning them even in pursuit of an object which, regarded singly, would be an improvement.

I will now take a brief review of the actual distribution of the army belonging to the Presidencies of Bengal and Agra. With reference to the Minutes of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Frederick Adam, and Sir Robert O'Callaghan regarding that of the Madras Army, I concur generally in all that has been said in favour of Bangalore and Hyderabad as suitable stations for large bodies of troops. I do not object to Hyderabad as a station because it is beyond our territories. For that very reason it is preferable, the troops there being available for any movement, without causing any sensation in our own country from apparent diminution of protective force. The only objection to Hyderabad as a station of a great moveable force is, that it has hitherto been considered necessary to maintain a stationary force there for local purposes; as long as this may be deemed necessary it is not, according to the ideas which I have above expressed,

the fittest station for a moveable force, because when the main body of the troops march, although a portion be reserved, there will be an impression of comparative weakness, at a time when local strength ought at least to be undiminished. If therefore a station were now to be selected, I should prefer a place for the cantonment of the field force where no special local purposes had to be attended to; but as Sikunderabad, the station in question, has long been established on a large scale, a change would be objectionable. Bangalore, which was formerly out of our territory, has, I believe, by recent arrangements, been brought within it.

The army of Bengal and Agra is distributed in seven divisions, three field forces, and the fortress of Allababad.

The Presidency division contains a force of 17,308 rank and file, and 36 guns, including local corps, as well as troops of the line. The troops are dispersed in eighteen (18) principal stations, including the Tenasserim coast beyond sea. Besides the 18 stations there are many detached posts. The extent of frontier to be guarded is from the boundary of the Madras territory to Bootan on one side, including the Burman frontier from Negrais to Sudeea, and from the Madras frontier to Singbhoom on the other side. The force is distributed for local purposes, which would be more urgent if it were necessary to bring them together. This division ought to be able to furnish a field force of 10,000 men at least for the defence of the frontier towards the Burmans, but could not provide near that number. The only large station is that of the Presidency, where a large force ought to be at all times stationed. Nevertheless, I do not perceive that the force of this division could be much less dispersed than it is. It is a remarkable fact that in practical opposition to the theory of concentration, Bancoora has recently been made a station for a single regiment of the line, which was never, I believe, a station for such a force before. This arrangement was in consequence of the insurrection of the Coles and Chooars. I am not sure it was necessary, as I think that a different one might have been made, but if it was necessary, and certainly some force of some kind was desirable in that position, it clearly shows that, however anxious we may be to concentrate, we are constrained, by the exigencies of our situation, to disperse. The force of this division appears to me to be barely adequate for the duties which it has to perform in peace, and for the requisite protection and respectability of the seat of the Supreme Government of India. It is utterly insufficient for any state of affairs, in which it might be necessary to adopt active or precautionary measures against the Burmans, putting enemies by sea out of the question.

The Dinapoor division consists of 4,439 men and 10 guns. Of this force 1,440 men and 4 guns are local corps locked up and required for local purposes, 1,416 are Europeans available for general service, and 1,416 are Native infantry stationed at Dinapoor, where there certainly ought never to be less. There is not, therefore a single sepoy of the line available in this division for field service. To form any field force out of this division every station must be totally abandoned at the precise period when every station ought to be reinforced. The two European regiments and four guns are all that this division could properly contribute towards the formation of a field army. One would suppose from the paucity of force in this division that there was no frontier to protect. But the bravest enemy that we ever had to contend with in India, and the most military nation perhaps in the whole world is on the frontier which this division has to guard. The Dinapoor and Benares divisions together ought to furnish a field force of the most efficient description of at least 10,000 men for the defence of that frontier. Much more would be required if active operations should be necessary; but it will be seen that the two divisions altogether do not contain even that number. They would contribute well in European troops three regiments, which, composed with their whole strength, would be a large proportion of that description of force. But in Native infantry these divisions could scarcely furnish anything, except by the total abandonment of stations which even in time of peace it is deemed necessary to occupy. This is a striking but not a singular proof of the insufficiency of our army, and especially of that part of it in which a reduction has been recently contemplated. Were a war with the Goorkas to take place, all our available force would necessarily be sent into the Dinapoor and Benares divisions; but without that event, were anything to happen elsewhere, which might render precautionary measures necessary

necessary on the Nepaul frontier, these divisions must be powerfully reinforced. To what, then, is it owing that there is so small an available force stationed in them, but to the fact that our troops are unavoidably distributed elsewhere according to more immediate local exigencies.

The Benares division contains 4,676 men and 8 guns. This force consists of artillery, 445 Native cavalry, 736 European infantry, and 3,400 Native infantry. The Native infantry are distributed at seven different stations. If I were disposed, which in the present state of our finances I certainly am not, to recommend any increase of expense, I should say on this and all similar occasions, let the infantry of the line be brought together in large available bodies, and let every station which requires a single regiment, or a smaller detachment for local protection, be supplied with local troops. This would greatly tend to render the army of the line more efficient in every respect, and more available for field service. It must be done hereafter, or the number of regiments be greatly increased: but at present the additional expense is out of the question. What I have remarked in speaking of the Dinapoor division, is generally applicable to that of Benares. It would be better, perhaps, if both these divisions were under one general officer's command. The head quarters, say at Ghazeepoor, or some other station intermediate between Benares and Dinapoor, to the northward of the Ganges, where the main body should be assembled available for field operations. The troops at Benares and Dinapoor to be put on the footing of stationary forces, not at any time to be reduced and regulated as to number by local wants; brigadiers to be established at Benares and Dinapoor, and the general officer of one of those divisions to be transferred to Agra, or to the general command of the field forces of Rajpootana, Meywar, and Malwa. I am not proposing these measures for adoption. They would require more consideration, and the expense attending such changes is at once an objection. I am no advocate for changes which are not imperative, or of obviously great advantage. I am merely stating what occurs to me as a better arrangement than the present one, if it could be conveniently and unobjectionably adopted.

The garrison of the fortress of Allahabad consists of a company of Native artillery, 112, and two regiments of Native infantry, 1,360—total, 1,472 rank and file. Allahabad is at present the seat of the Government of the Agra Presidency, and the force above mentioned is the force of the station, as well as the garrison of the fortress. It is not adequate as a garrison, if a garrison were really required for defence. Neither is it sufficiently respectable as a force at the seat of Government. But it is as much as can be spared for these purposes, and has been increased from one regiment and a half to its present force, two regiments, in consequence of the station becoming the capital of a Presidency.

The Cawnpore division contains 11,798 rank and file, and 28 guns. Cawnpore is the principal station where, with the exception of one company of Native artillery, which is at Lucknow, all the artillery, sappers and miners, European dragoons, Native cavalry, and European infantry, are properly assembled together with three regiments of Native infantry, which is a disproportionately small force of that arm. The Cawnpore force put in motion would be in other respects complete, but deficient in that particular. It could only take two regiments of Native infantry into the field. On the principle of concentrating for the purpose of forming moveable armies, at least four regiments of Native infantry ought to be added to the station of Cawnpore. The Native infantry is the main body of our Indian army. Until that arm can be brought together in large bodies, the object of concentration cannot be accomplished. But although other descriptions of troops are brought together at principal stations, the Native infantry is almost universally dispersed, and is scarcely ever cantoned together in sufficient numbers to form a sufficient field force. It must be supposed that this dispersion arises from some necessity, for it would otherwise be obviously a very defective and injudicious distribution. For instance, in the Cawnpore division there are 12 regiments of Native infantry, containing 8,160 rank and file. These are dispersed at 10 stations. Until lately there were 13 regiments at 12 stations. Two stations have recently been abolished, Secrora and Pertalgurh; two more might, I conceive, be abolished, Seetapoor and Sooltanpoor in Oude. But in speaking of the abolition of stations I cannot refrain from

remarking that the measure entails great loss on officers, who thereby lose their houses, purchased at considerable expense, and have to incur a similar expense in the purchase or erection of others, and that although this consequence of the occasional abandonment of a station has been usual, it becomes an extensive calamity when the measure is had recourse to generally for a systematic purpose, and becomes worthy of attention with a view to compensation. It is not merely that loss is sustained such as men can bear; the loss in many cases causes or increases debt, which ends in utter ruin. If the stations of Seetapoor and Sooltanpoor were abolished, as has been proposed, the force, two regiments, or 1,360 rank and file, with four guns, ought to be added to the principal station of Cawnpoor. If Futegurh and Mynpooree could be abolished as military stations, which I doubt, two more regiments might be added to Cawnpore. If Etawah could be abolished, the force there, half a regiment, might be added to that at Banda, one and a-half regiment, the force in Bundlekund being very weak for its duties The Cawnpoor division includes the kingdom of Oude and Bundelcund within its limits, and has the frontier of Nipal on one side, and of the Boondela States and Sendheea on the other. The principal stations are Cawnpore and Lucknow. The force at the former may be considered, with the exception of what must be left for the protection of the station, a moveable force for field service. The force at Lucknow must be regarded as stationary for local purposes. It would be right, therefore, to increase the force at Cawnpore to any amount practicable, and wrong to augment that at Lucknow beyond what may be requisite for local purposes and could be kept stationary there at all times.

The Meerut division contains a force of 16,551 rank and file, and 52 guns distributed at 12 stations. The principal stations are Meerut, Agra, Delhi, and Bareilly. The force at Meerut may be considered moveable. It could send into the field horse artillery, foot artillery, European dragoons, Native cavalry, and European infantry, in sufficient proportions to form a respectable field force, but could only supply two regiments of Native infantry, a very inadequate proportionate of that arm; there being only three at the station, and one being requisite for its protection. The troops at Delhi and Bareilly are stationary forces, and will be required there at all times. If Agra should become the capital of the fourth Presidency, the force there will become for the most part stationary from the necessity of maintaining in that quarter a respectable force at the seat of Government. Agra could at present supply horse artillery, foot artillery, Native cavalry, and European infantry, in sufficient proportions for a separate field force, but only two regiments of Native infantry. Everywhere the deficiency is in this branch of the service, showing clearly either that our regiments are too few in number, or that they are badly disposed of. That the former conclusion is the just one is evinced by the fact that the late Governor General and Commander in Chief, with the assistance of the chiefs of the staff, although bent on concentration, could not contrive to bring together at any station in the Bengal and Agra Presidencies, with the exception of the seat of Government at Fort William, more than four regiments of Native infantry, although for the purposes of his plan there ought not to have been less than seven at each great station. Although three or four stations are still left which might possibly be abolished, the general observation on examining the distribution of the army would be that many parts of the country are without troops where they are obviously required. In order to make the Native infantry equal to our wants there must either be a great increase in the number of regiments, or, which would be the cheaper plan, a substitution of local force at those stations where single regiments or small detachments are now employed. Then the regiments of the line might be brought together in large cantonments for the purposes which are contemplated by concentration. The expense of such an augmentation in either way puts it out of the question for the present, and we must be content to submit to dispersion to a great extent as unavoidable. The Meerut division is bounded by the Cawnpore division on one side, by Sendheeas country, Rajpootana, and the Jumna on another, and by the Himalaya Mountains from the Jumna to the Kingdom of Oude. It includes Rohilkund within its limits.

The Sirhind division contains 6,838 rank and file, and 18 guns. The principal station, Kurnaul has horse artillery, foot artillery, Native cavalry, and European

European infantry, in respectable proportions available for a field, but only two regiments of native infantry, of which only one would be available. The whole division contains five regiments of that description of force dispersed at three stations: two at Kurnaul, two at Loodiana, and one at Hansi. It is evident that no army of native infantry can be formed of this force, for if the detached regiments could safely be withdrawn in war, they ought not to be where they are in peace. The truth is, they are wanted where they are in peace and still more in war, but must be withdrawn in war at all risks, because we cannot do without them. Two regiments occupy the frontier post of Loodiana on the Sutlej, and there would be more advocates for increasing than for diminishing the force at that post. It is to be remembered that this division, with its five regiments scattered at three stations, occupied the frontier beyond which many politicians fancy our only danger to lie. If anywhere, then, an imposing force would be proper here, if it were possible to furnish it, which it is not.

The Saugor division contains a company of foot artillery, a regiment of horse, improperly termed local, and seven regiments of native infantry. Total rank and file, 5,455, with 12 guns. The artillery, cavalry, and four regiments of native infantry are cantoned at Saugor; the other three regiments are dispersed at six stations. This dispersion is no doubt recommended by local considerations, but otherwise it seems inexpedient and quite opposed to the principle of concentration. The force at Saugor could send into the field a company of artillery, a regiment of horse, and three regiments of native infantry, a force perhaps sufficient for local purposes. This division is distinguished from the others by having neither regular cavalry nor European infantry.

The Rajpootana force has 3,940 rank and file, and six guns. A company of foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, and four regiments of native infantry are cantoned at Nusseerabad. From that force a detachment is furnished for the duties of Ajmeer. A regiment of local infantry is stationed at Beawr, which is dispersed in numerous small detachments. The Rajpootana field force is obviously insufficient for any service on a great scale, but, like the Saugor force, might suffice for ordinary local purposes.

The Meywar force contains 3,973 rank and file, with 12 guns. It consists of a troop of native horse artillery, a company of native foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, a regiment of irregular horse, and four regiments of native infantry. The whole force is cantoned at Neemuch, furnishing a detachment of one company for the escort of the agent at Kotah. The same remark applies to the Meywar as to the Rajpootana force.

The Malwa force contains 3,426 rank and file, with 12 guns. A troop of European horse artillery, a company of European foot artillery, a regiment of native cavalry, and three regiments of native infantry, occupy the station of Mhow, which furnishes two companies for Indore and one company for Mundlesur. A regiment of horse is stationed at Bhopawar. The same remark is applicable to the Malwa as to the Meywar and Rajpootana forces. They are severally unequal to any great purpose, such as requires the assembling of a large field force.

On the subject of the concentration of these forces I have already offered my opinion. It will be seen that there is neither European infantry nor European cavalry with any of these forces.

It is observable in this cursory review of the distribution of the Bengal army, that nowhere is there any station of sufficient strength in all arms to furnish a field force of adequate amount for any great purpose, and that the deficiency is generally owing to the insufficiency of native infantry. Reckoning a regiment of European infantry, as we have been accustomed to regard it, as a due proportion to five or six regiments of native infantry, many stations and every division, Saugor, and the forces of Rajpootana, Meywar, and Malwa excepted, could furnish its quota of European infantry and of other arms for field service, but no stations, and scarcely one division, perhaps not one, could properly provide its proportion of native infantry. The cause of this is, that the native infantry is distributed and dispersed according to local exigencies, and when wanted for field service must be brought together from different points at the sacrifice of local objects, and at the risk of dangerous consequences. It does not appear that stations occupied for local purposes can to any great extent be

abandoned, in order to render the native infantry more readily available for field service. We must therefore either greatly increase our native infantry by additional regiments, or by the substitution of local corps; or either of those being impossible on account of the expense, we must be content to go on as heretofore, incurring the risks attendant on local abandonment whenever more pressing exigencies elsewhere force us to that measure.

At the same time we ought to bear in mind that the absence of troops is of less consequence in peace than in war, and that to accustom people to their presence in peace, when they must be withdrawn in war, is bad policy, consequently that we ought to disperse as little and concentrate as much as possible consistently with safety.

I do not think it necessary to go through the details of the distribution of the Madras and Bombay armies, but it will be found in both that the object of concentration cannot be pursued to a sufficient extent without sacrificing local protection, which it is deemed expedient to maintain.

Viewing the three armies as a whole, we must make the best that we can of the present distribution; and I am not aware that we shall gain any great advantage by such changes as may be practicable. We can nowhere form stations adequate singly to send forth field forces, such as we must bring together whenever called on to make any good exertion. The army of India is not large enough for that purpose, and the expense of putting it on such a footing would at present be intolerable. When, therefore, we require forces in the field, we must draw them as we have been accustomed to do from several or many stations. Whenever we foresee a war we must add greatly to our strength. In the meantime the present distribution, which is probably well suited for local purposes, will suffice in peace; changes, even though they may be in some degree for the better, would hardly be worth the inconveniences which they would cause, when their effect must, as at present, be incomplete; and the advantages to be derived from them inconsiderable. Keeping concentration in mind as a principle to be acted on, whenever this can be done without local injury or with decided advantage, we may, I think, rest with the army distributed as it is, and avoid great changes, which would have little beneficial effect until those times come, when such changes will naturally accompany others, which would then take place. At present I do not see anything in the plans proposed that would compensate for the inconveniences that would probably attend their immediate execution. The effect would be inadequate to the design. The principle is good, but its operation is necessarily limited by the insufficiency of our force for all the purposes which our army has to fulfil.

(signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*

(Military Department.)

MINUTE by the Governor General of India.

THE Right Honourable the late Governor General, in a Minute dated the 13th March, has recorded his sentiments regarding the composition of the army of India, and the method to render it more efficient.

In the commencement of that Minute, his Lordship has entered on the question of the danger of our position in India, and although he has, I think, underrated it in some respects, the sum of his remarks tends to show that we are in such danger as is incalculable.

His Lordship is of opinion, that there is no danger from native powers, because there is no chief with any semblance of military force; but this cannot be said of Runjeet Sing, nor of Sindhia, nor of the Goorkhas, a nation of disciplined soldiers, nor of Holkar, nor of the Burmans, nor of many other powers who, in a greater or less degree as to each other, have all the materials of military force according to their means, of which we might be made aware very speedily, if there were any favourable occasion for its display against us. We must not imagine, because we are now at peace, and apparently invincible, that there is

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no military power that could be arrayed against us in the event of troubles and disasters. The difficulties that we had to contend with, and the exertions that we were compelled to make when we had the Goorkhas and the Burmans singly to combat, ought to satisfy us, that we may again be involved in embarrassments which would add greatly to the moral strength of every power in India disposed to enter the field as an enemy. Except the mental effect, which may or may not have been produced by our ultimate success in our former wars with these powers, they are as strong as they ever were, the Goorkhas, I believe stronger, owing to their incessant attention to the perfection of their military efficiency, and to their admirable system by which every man in the nation is made a disciplined soldier. It may be said that they cannot cope with us in the plains and single-handed; if we could bring all our resources against them, they most probably could not; this would not, however, be from any want of energy, or of discipline on their part, but from our superiority in cavalry, artillery, and every other arm, in some respects in skill and efficiency, in others in number; but neither have we any right to expect that the war would be single-handed, nor can we calculate on its being carried on in the plains. We must be prepared for an offensive war, in which the Goorkhas would have all the advantages of their mountains, and our difficulties be accordingly increased. A merely defensive war would be to us nearly the same as defeat; it would be a change, and an evidence of weakness, which our power could hardly survive. It is not therefore enough to say that no power single-handed is a match for us; we should not be here if any were. The question is, can we conquer them all at once? for the power to do this is necessary to our safety; our danger does not lie in the military force alone of native states, but in the spirit by which they are actuated towards us; and still more in the spirit of our subjects from one end of India to the other. We have no hold on their affections; more than that, disaffection is universal, so that what to a power supported by the affections of its subjects would be a slight disaster, might to us be an irreparable calamity. The little reverse which we met with at Ramoo, in the Burman war, sounded throughout India, like our repulse at the first siege of Bhurtpore, magnified and exaggerated as if it had been our death-knell. The Commander in Chief was said to have been killed, and the Governor General to have put an end to himself in despair by swallowing pounded diamonds. Ramoo became so celebrated, that although the place is an insignificant one, in the district of Chittagong, in our own territory never before generally heard of, the word is now used by the natives as the name of the Burman Empire, or of any place to the eastward beyond sea, and an idea of something formidable and dreadful is attached to it.

Some say that our empire in India rests on opinion, others on main force. It in fact depends on both. We could not keep the country by opinion if we had not a considerable force; and no force that we could pay would be sufficient, if it were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility. Our force does not operate so much by its actual strength as by the impression which it produces, and that impression is the opinion by which we hold India.

Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of the greatest of our dangers, or rather becomes so when the means of quelling it are at a distance. It is easy to deride it, because insurgents may not have the horse, foot, and artillery of a regular army; but it becomes serious if we have not those materials at hand. Nothing can be a stronger proof of our weakness in the absence of a military force—even when it is not far removed—than the history of such insurrections as have occurred.

The civil power, and all semblance of the existence of our Government, are instantly swept away by the torrent.

We need not go far back to show that in the neighbourhood of the metropolis of British India, within a forced march from one of the largest of our military stations, our Government was subverted throughout a considerable extent of territory; our magistrates, with all the power that they could collect, driven like chaff before the wind, and an insurrectionary authority established by a handful of men, proclaiming the overthrow of our dominion, and the establishment of a new dynasty in the person of the leader of a band of fanatics. This state of things continued for several days, until the insurrection was suppressed by the application of military force, without which it is impossible to say to what extent it might have proceeded, so completely were the insurgents masters of the

neighbouring country. As the spirit of insurrection is catching, this affair was soon followed by an insurrection of the Dangur Coles, a race previously orderly and submissive, and remarkable for industrious and laborious habits out of their own country. No sooner had insurrection broken out, than it spread like wild-fire. Not a Cole in the country was free from the infection. All the inhabitants of other description, the rajah and a few chiefs excepted, who had strong-holds or military means for their protection, were massacred or expelled. The officers of our administration, and every sign of our Government, quickly disappeared. For a long time all the force that could be found on our part was not only inadequate to suppress the insurrection, but, although in able hands, could hardly resist it, and could not prevent its spreading, or do more than check it at one point. It required several months and a large force to put down this insurrection; but that of the Chooars, another wild race, soon followed, which baffled the first force and the second force employed, and kept us engaged for many months also, before it was extinguished. Had all those insurrections happened at once, or any of them, at a time when we could not have brought troops against them, they might have been exceedingly embarrassing, and the extent to which they might have proceeded, or the danger with which they might have been attended, cannot now be calculated.

These things happened in countries which had been long under our dominion, and although able reports have been written as to the causes, they have never, to my mind, been satisfactorily explained according to any motives or expectations by which men would rationally have been guided under the circumstances then existing. In each case, in my opinion, the original cause was habitual disaffection operated upon by the spirit of insurrection, excited by false notions that the time was favourable for success. The alleged causes, elicited by investigation, if they were causes at all, were merely sparks applied to combustibles previously existing.

I have noticed these circumstances at the risk of repeating what I have probably said more than once on former occasions, because the prevalent disaffection of our subjects, the uncertainty under which we hold any part of our Indian possessions without the presence or immediate vicinity of a military force, the utter inability of our civil establishments to stem the torrent of insurrection, their consternation and helplessness when it begins to roar, constitute in reality the greatest of our dangers in India, without which a Russian invasion, or any other invasion, might, I doubt not, be successfully met and repulsed. The authority of the late Governor General, in deriding internal disaffection and insurrection as if they were quite contemptible, must have great weight, the more because it will be gratifying to our rulers to see such opinions supported by such authority. Differing totally from those opinions, I think it necessary to appeal to facts of recent occurrence. What happened in the Baraset, Ramghur, and Jungle Mahal districts, may happen in any other part of our country, without any other cause than the disaffection already existing everywhere.

Persons unacquainted with our position in India might throw in our teeth, that this disaffection is the consequence of bad government, and many amongst us, connecting the two ideas together, are reluctant to credit the existence of general disaffection. But this feeling is quite natural, without any misgovernment. Instead of being excited by our misrule, it is, I believe, in a great degree mollified by our good government. It exists because the domination of strangers, in every respect strangers, in country, in colour, in dress, in manners, in habits, in religion, must be odious. It is less active than it might be, because it is evident to all that we endeavour to govern well, and that whatever harm our Government does proceeds from ignorance or mistake, and not from any wilful injustice or oppression.

Although Lord William Bentinck appears to despise the dangers of either foreign foes or internal insurrection in India, his Lordship admits some things which are quite sufficient to show that danger exists. He admits that we have no hold on the affections of our subjects; that our native army is taken from a disaffected population; that our European soldiery are too few to be of much avail against any extensive plan of insurrection. This is quite enough, and more than I have hitherto alluded to, for it is impossible to contemplate the possibility of disaffection in our army without seeing at once the full force of our danger. As long as our native army is faithful, and we can pay enough for it,

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we can keep India in order by its instrumentality, but if the instrument should turn against us, where would be the British power? Echo answers, "Where?" It is impossible to support a sufficient army of Europeans to take the place of our native army.

The late Governor General appears also to adopt in some measure the just remark of Sir John Malcolm, that "in an empire like that of India we are always in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture the form in which it may approach." This sentiment expresses the reality of the case in perhaps the truest manner, and I will not longer dwell on this part of the subject.

His Lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism of our subjects, that I rest on the spread of knowledge some hope of greater strength and security. Men will be better able to appreciate the good and evil of our rule, and if the good predominate, they will know that they may lose by a change. Without reckoning on the affection of any, it seems probable that those of the natives who would most deprecate and least promote our overthrow would be the best informed and most enlightened among them, unless they had themselves individually ambitious dreams of power. If, however, the extension of knowledge is to be a new source of danger—and I will not pretend confidently to predict the contrary—it is one altogether unavoidable. It is our duty to extend knowledge, whatever may be the result; and spread it would, even if we impeded it. The time is past when the operations of the press could be effectually restrained, even if that course would be any source of safety, which must be very doubtful. Nothing so precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore, increase of danger be really to be apprehended from increase of knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We must not try to avert it, and if we did we should fail.

His Lordship considers our greatest danger to be in an invasion from the north-west, led by the Russians. He supposes a force of 20,000 Russian infantry and 100,000 Asiatic cavalry to have arrived on our north-western frontier. Supposing such a case, with the time which we should have for preparation, we ought to be able to give a good account of the Russian infantry easily, I should say, if there was no danger of internal insurrection at such a crisis. The 100,000 cavalry it would be more difficult to manage, from the impossibility of collecting an equal force of that arm. But is there no impossibility of collecting such a force against us? I doubt the practicability of assembling such an immense body. Are all to be on one side? Is there to be no hostility to the Russians in their progress? Is every chance to turn up in their favour? If it were possible to collect such a force, how is it to be fed and supported? At whose cost? Not at that of Russia, or any other power; that being utterly impracticable from want of means. Solely, then, at the cost of the countries through which it had to pass. If this were possible, it would at least destroy these countries, and the Russian infantry would be starved to death by the operations of its allied cavalry. All speculations, however, regarding our military defence against a Russian invasion may be safely postponed until we know more on the subject. It cannot come on us so suddenly as to prevent preparation to the utmost extent that our resources will allow; and preparation for such an event must be on a much larger scale than any that our means could afford, without the immediate approach of the event, or for any length of time. Reserving suitable measures until we have reason to apprehend that we shall have to meet this danger, we have in the mean time, without reference to such a course, ample reasons for putting our army on the most efficient footing, and for increasing it to any extent that our finances will bear. The measures proposed, in the late Governor General's Minute, appear to me to fall far short of what would be requisite at the crisis which he contemplates.

Considering the possible disaffection of our Native army as our only internal danger, and the want of physical strength and moral energy as rendering them unable to contend with an European enemy, his lordship proposes that the European portion of our army should be one quarter, and eventually one third, in proportion to the strength of our Native army. He considers this as requiring a force of 30,000 Europeans in India. In the expediency of having at least this force of Europeans, even in ordinary times, I entirely

concur; that is, if we can pay them. But the limit to this, and every other part of our force, must be regulated by our means. If we attempt to fix it according to our wants, we should soon be without the means of maintaining any army. Thirty thousand European troops would be vastly inadequate for the purpose of meeting the imagined Russian invasion; for we should more require European troops in the interior of India at that time than at any other. To have our army on a footing calculated for that event is impossible. Our army cannot well be greater than it is, owing to want of means. It cannot well be less, owing to our other wants. Such as it is in extent, it is our duty to make it as efficient as we can, with or without the prospect of a Russian invasion; and this is the only way in which we can prepare for that, or any other distant and uncertain crisis. On the approach of such an event, we must have reinforcements of European troops from England to any amount required, and we must increase our Native force according to the exigency of the time. We could not long exist in a state of adequate preparation, as we should be utterly ruined by the expense.

In order to raise our European force to the proposed number of 30,000, of which 20,000 are to be infantry and 5,000 cavalry, an addition would be required of 10,000 or 12,000 to our actual force. The increase of expense would of course be great. It is an increase to which I should not object, for it may be of vital importance if we had the means of meeting it; but we have not, and this is the difficulty which opposes us in every attempt at improvement.

In order to provide, in some degree, for this additional expense, the late Governor General recommends that a captain be struck off from every regiment of the Native army. Having, in another Minute, proposed the reduction of two subalterns in every regiment to meet some other expense, his lordship now recommends the abolition of a captain to meet this. If every additional charge is to be met in this manner, what will become of our Native army? I cannot reconcile my mind to these proposed reductions of the European officers of that force. They are the life and soul of it; and to avow the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the Native army, and, in the same breath, to advocate the expediency of reducing the European officers, appears to me to be an unaccountable inconsistency. This proposition is accompanied by another for increasing the number of rank and file, in every Native regiment, to 1,000. This latter measure is highly desirable, but, like every other good proposition, impracticable from want of means.

Lord William Bentinck maintains the opinion that there are too many European officers with the Native army, or that there is no necessity for so many. From what I have said above, it will be seen that I cannot concur in that opinion. If we were to regard our Native army as mere local corps for the support of our civil administration in internal Government, we might reduce the number of European officers, but we cannot, I conceive, do so while we expect from the Native army the efficiency of real soldiers against all enemies in the field, European or Native. We must not reduce the number of officers who are to lead them to the charge, and on whose energies their discipline and spirit depend. In any future necessary increase of our Native army, either temporary or permanent, it might be well to see whether internal tranquillity and order could not be sufficiently preserved by corps partially officered, as local corps now are, and former levies have been; but with respect to any kind of regular force intended for field service requiring the aid of perfect discipline, the absence of European officers would be a deplorable and perhaps fatal deficiency. To think of the occasion when our native troops may have to be led to the charge of Russian batteries and bayonets, and to propose at the same time to take from them their European officers, are incongruities which one cannot understand.

The late Governor General condemns our Indian army, in a sweeping sentence, as being the most expensive and least efficient in the world. If it were so, how should we be here? Is it no proof of efficiency that it has conquered all India? Is it no proof of its efficiency that India is more universally tranquil, owing to our Indian army, than it ever was under any native Government or Governments that we read of? If our Indian army be so expensive, why do we not employ European troops alone to maintain India? why but because Europeans are so much more expensive that we could not pay a sufficient number? If our Indian army be so inefficient, why do we incur the expense of making soldiers of the natives? why do we not entertain the same number of undisciplined

ciplined people, who would cost much less? Why but because then we should lose the country from the inefficiency of Native force? If, therefore, the Indian army be preferable to an European force on account of its cheapness, and to other Native troops on account of its efficiency—if we cannot substitute any other force cheaper and more efficient, how can it justly be said to be the most expensive and least efficient army in the world? If it enables us to conquer and keep India; if it performs well every duty required of it—hard work in quarters, good service in the field—how can it be subject to imputation of inefficiency? The proof of its cheapness and of its efficiency is, that we cannot substitute any other description of force at once so cheap and so efficient.

One important measure proposed by the late Governor General is the entire abolition of the Bombay army, and its union, half to the Bengal, and half to the Madras army. I am not aware of any advantage to be derived from this measure, except the saving that might be effected by the abolition of the portion of staff which would cease to be necessary when the Bombay army ceased to be a separate army; but I can hardly think that this advantage would be sufficient to make the measure desirable. It would, I imagine, be a source of great discontent to the whole of the Bombay army, and of gratification to none. If there were sufficient reasons for uniting all the armies of the several Presidencies in one, which, I apprehend, there are not, the Bombay army would share the fate of the others, and all would be amalgamated; but while there are separate armies and separate presidencies, I cannot see any sufficient motive for the abolition of the Bombay army, and the infliction of the wound which would thereby be given to the feelings of that body, and of the whole service of that presidency. For so great a change some very important benefit ought to be shown, which is not at present visible. The amount of consequent reduction of expense has not been stated, and would probably be insignificant compared with the magnitude of annoyance.

The junction of the Ceylon force with that of India appears, for unity of power, to be desirable, but while the Government of Ceylon is distinct, there will probably be impediments to a junction of the forces.

The introduction of Malay troops into the Indian army is another question agitated in his Lordship's minute. I am not competent to offer any decided opinion on this subject from a want of sufficient knowledge of the Malay character. The general impression of it is unfavourable, but I have met with gentlemen accustomed to it, who speak highly of it. If Malays would make orderly and faithful soldiers, I should be inclined for the admission on the ground that our Native infantry is composed too much of men of one class, actuated by one common feeling, and that it is expedient to have a variety, in order that one description, in case of necessity, may be used to maintain order in another. But this purpose would not be well accomplished by the introduction of less orderly or less efficient or more expensive troops, and what the Malays might prove in these respects I do not know. There cannot be a more orderly body of soldiers in the world that our Bengal Native infantry, and caution ought to be exercised before we substitute for any portion of them another class of men.

It is proposed that a portion of the Native army should be light infantry. To this I see no objection. It was formerly, and is I suppose still, the case in the Madras army: it was also at one time the case in the Bengal army. Several light infantry regiments were formed during the command of General Hewitt. That was because the French were supposed to be coming. They were afterwards reduced. There is now a light infantry company in each regiment, equal in amount in the Bengal army to nine regiments. Whether it be better to have the light infantry as a portion of each regiment or in separate regiments is a question on which I cannot pretend to offer a decided opinion.

In all that Lord William Bentinck says in favour of that description of our force which is called irregular, or, still more improperly, local cavalry, perhaps from its not being local, I have the honour entirely to concur, which I am always more happy to do than to differ from one whose mind has been so properly and anxiously devoted to the public welfare. I regard the irregular horse as a most useful and valuable description of troops. I wish that all our Native cavalry were of this description, and all our regular cavalry European. I do not mean by this remark to recommend such a change. All such changes, even if they were generally desired, require great consideration. Our regular Native cavalry has grown up as a branch of our establishment, has hitherto done its duty well,

and ought not to be inconsiderately broken up. But if I had to form a cavalry army for India, without the previous existence of the regular Native corps, I would make the regular cavalry European, and the Native cavalry of the same description as that body now termed the irregular or the local horse. I do not know that the late Governor General goes so far in his opinion on this subject, but in all that I have seen of his sentiments in approbation of that description of our cavalry I fully concur.

I also concur in the opinions which he has expressed regarding the use which might be made of steam power to increase our military efficiency, and maintain a speedy communication with Europe. But this and other expensive additions to our establishment can only be adopted when we have adequate means. Great improvements might easily be suggested, but where are the funds to come from? Many are sanguine in expectation of vast increase to our revenue from the future development of the resources of India, but for the present at least we must regulate our expenditure by the income which we have.

This consideration must render nugatory all schemes of improvement which would be attended with any considerable increase of expense; and to seek improvement in one quarter by positive deterioration in another is a most unsatisfactory mode of proceeding, and requires at least that the gain by the change, as compared with the loss, should decidedly preponderate, and be well ascertained.

The concluding sentiments of the late Governor General's minute are, that we are utterly unprepared to meet a Russian invasion, which I fully admit, and that we ought to be so prepared, with the large sum already appropriated to our military expenditure; which opinion is not so convincing, but very questionable, for if the same sum were sufficient to put us in a state to meet the supposed invasion, and that were the only danger against which we had to prepare, it would follow that a great reduction in our military expenditure would be practicable were it not for that expected event, but no one is able to show how this can be effected.

With a view to that great crisis, his Lordship proposes the increase of our European force to one-fourth, and eventually to one-third, in proportion to the whole army; the increase of the regular horse to 20,000; the increase of each regiment of native infantry to 1,000 rank and file; and of each regiment of cavalry to 800; all measures highly desirable and proper, in contemplation of the expected invasion, but still inadequate, and intermediately sure to produce an immense increase of expense which would be utterly intolerable and ruinous.

The only measure pointed out by his Lordship as calculated to meet this increase of expense, are, the abolition of the separate staff of the Bombay army and the juncture of that force with the armies of Madras and Bengal, the result of which, apparently, would give little aid to the purpose designed, and would not even recompense the injury done to the feelings of the Bombay service, in the destruction of a long-established and efficient army; and, secondly, the abolition of a captain in every Native regiment at all the Presidencies, a measure which would deteriorate the efficiency of the main body of our army—the very force which it is our object to make more efficient: and, besides, have an effect on the minds of the European officers, much more injurious than the saving produced would be advantageous. These measures, exclusive of their being objectionable, would be very inadequate in their results for the end in view, and we should find the expense, as before remarked, utterly intolerable. To increase the efficiency of the army by increasing its inefficiency, appears to me to be altogether a wrong course of proceeding. No proper resources for the increase of the army can be found in the decrease of the army. The two objects are incompatible, and the same things that make the former desirable or unnecessary must make the latter impossible, or inexpedient, unless it can be shown that we have superabundance of force of some description, which cannot be done. We must not look to reductions in the army for the means of bearing expenditure, which is rendered unavoidable by the necessity of having a larger army. We can only look to our civil establishments when reduction is absolutely necessary; and even there nothing short of the total abolition of the civil service, and its amalgamation with the army, would be effectual, which could only be gradual.

Having objected to the plan of the late Governor General, I may be asked how I would prepare against the supposed invasion from the North-West. I should say, that to prepare for it adequately is impossible; we have not the pecuniary resources to place us in a state of sufficient preparation. What, then, is to be done?

done? We must wait. The event is at present remote and uncertain. We must postpone our preparations until its approach be less doubtful. It cannot come so rapidly in the shape imagined as to deprive us of time for preparation. We may then draw from England any number of European troops required, whether it be a fourth, or a third, or half, of the amount of our Native army. We may raise the complement of our Native regiments to any proper number; we may increase our irregular cavalry to 20,000, or a larger amount, if expedient; we may, by the formation of local corps and levies and depôts, make our regular army wholly available for field service. We must then make the exertions, military and financial, which the exigencies of the crisis will suggest, and our vital interests demand. In the meantime, we must keep our expenditure within our income; else, when the prophesied event arrives, it will find us in a state of the worst kind of inefficiency, an inefficiency of resources; which would be fatal, without a single blow from the enemy.

Let us, therefore, pause. Let us maintain our army on its present peace establishment, without attempting changes and reductions hurtful to its feelings, and, consequently, injurious to our best interests. Let us make it as efficient as we can without a great increase of charge. Let us watch our finances, and if they improve, and afford the means, let us apply additional funds to increase the strength and improve the efficiency of our army in any mode most advisable. Any outlay that we can afford for this purpose will be well laid out; and it is not necessary to think of the Battle of Armageddon, or a Russian invasion, to justify it. But our military efficiency in peace and ordinary times must be limited by our financial means. It is only in war and a period of necessity, that we can venture to put out of calculation the difference between income and expenditure. Our financial difficulties, actual and probable, are those which are most pressing; and military speculations, leading to a great increase of expense, ought to be suspended until they become unavoidable, or until we see our financial prospect brightening, and light shining through its present gloom.

16 May 1835. (signed) *C. T. Metcalfe.*

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(Military Department.)

MINUTE by Mr. *Prinsep.*

THE late Governor General's Minute of the 28th February last on the distribution of the armies of India, and that of the 13th March on their composition, together with the Minutes of the present Governor General on the same subjects, dated respectively the 8th and 16th May, have just reached me in circulation, and the vast importance of the questions thus brought under discussion seems to me to call for a written expression of opinion on both points. The subjects are so intimately connected that it will not be necessary to multiply the record by separately stating what I have to say on each, more especially as I hope to confine my observations within moderate compass, and shall not think it necessary to follow out the plans of the late Governor General through all the details into which his Lordship has entered.

Although the earlier Minute of his Lordship relating to the distribution of the army touches necessarily on many of the sources of danger to our power, and on the objects to be provided against by the arrangements recommended therein, it is in the Minute regarding the composition of the troops that his Lordship has stated his opinion most at length on the means of securing our position, and has discussed with the most care the evils that surround us, internal and from without, and has pointed out the kind of military preparation by which he would recommend them to be met. As it seems to me to be the first point to come to a right understanding of the real nature of the purposes for which an army is required to be maintained in this country, I shall reverse the order in which the late Governor General has brought forward these questions, and first state my opinion on this point, reserving the mode of distributing the troops so as to make the most of them for after consideration.

We require an army to protect the country from foreign enemies; it must not only be sufficient to repel invaders, but must be exhibited in a state of preparation

to deter from attack, and ensure respect, and give political influence beyond the frontier, and to keep up the prestige as well as the reality of power. We require an army to suppress insurrections and sudden commotions, to awe the disaffected and give confidence to the well disposed, to command the respect of our subjects and allies, and preserve them in obedience, by the conviction of the hopelessness of any resistance, so that the turbulent, the refractory, and the ambitious, may cease in despair to entertain designs injurious to the public peace and subversive of the established order of things. Lastly, we require an army to support the civil power, to ensure the collection of the revenue, to excite the police and local authorities to act with vigour in the confidence of unlimited support, and to enable the administration of civil and criminal justice to proceed with sure and effectual steps until the population become habituated to both, and begin to regard with affection and respect the institutions provided to secure them in their rights and possessions.

Now, these three purposes of an army are evidently very different things in different circumstances. The frontier defence is one thing, when there is a peaceable and well disposed, or a weak and broken spirited State only to be watched and overawed, and quite another thing when there is a presumptuous, overweening enemy at our door studying the means of aggression and encroachment, or, when backed by others further behind, he assumes a threatening attitude, and a motive only is wanting for the commencement of hostilities, so that there is perpetual preparation for operations on a large scale. At the present moment we have the former condition of things to look to on every part of the frontier of India, we have thorough confidence that Runjeet Singh desires to maintain peace and conciliate the British power. The principalities of the lower Indies and of Afghanistan can scarcely maintain their own independence. Nepaul, though military and martial beyond all the other powers of India, has had experience of a struggle, and is sensible of the insufficiency of its resources for another contest. The Burmese were more thoroughly broken in the late war with them than even Nepaul; and this finishes the catalogue of frontier States. Towards all these we have only to maintain the attitude of sufficient preparation to keep up the prestige of our military strength; there is no occasion anywhere to arm for defence; we have neither invasion to fear from the standing armies and regular troops of these powers, nor the unlicensed breaking in of plunderers and loose rabbles to guard against, as used to be the case when our dominion was young, and we had the hordes of Hyder and the Mahrattas to watch, and in latter days when the Pindarees and Patan Condottieri used to threaten our defensive lines at every point. The show of force is all that needs to be maintained towards any of these neighbours in their present temper; if their disposition should change, or circumstances should bring enemies on to the same frontiers, we shall need a different state of preparation; and the only question is, whether we can reckon upon knowing in time when to make the change.

The late Governor General appears to have argued this part of the question as if he thought the Supreme Government bound to make preparation now for the remotely possible contingency of a Russian force being upon the Indus. Sir C. T. Metcalf however justly observes, that this is an altered state of things for which there will be abundant time allowed to make provision; that to commence doing so now would impose the necessity for a state of preparation quite unnatural in a time of peace, and such as it must be impossible that the finances of India or of any country could bear for a permanency. That it would be bad policy, nay, absolutely ruinous, to put ourselves into that state until the danger should be imminent, and the occasion should call for the expenditure. In the interim, it must suffice to maintain such an attitude of preparation as shall confirm Runjeet Singh, and other powers like him, in the conviction that our friendship is the most advisable thing for him and them to secure. In like manner, as our preparations for frontier defence vary according to the temper and attitude of neighbouring States, so also the repressing of the disposition to rebellion and to commotion or disturbance amongst those within. The natural frontier of India is at one time an object of comparatively easy attainment, and to be effected with much less means than at another. In the first few years after the Dooab and Rohilkund were transferred to us from Oudh, nearly half the army stationed within those territories was employed in repressing rebellion, in capturing forts, and driving out bands of plunderers who traversed the country by open day to the terror of the peaceable inhabitants, if in those days there were any such.

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The same or a worse state prevailed in Bundlekund, in Kandis, and in the Nerbudda districts, and necessarily must prevail upon the first acquisition of any territory the inhabitants of which have been unused to the blessings of civil Government. The population must first be broken down by the rough hand of military coercion before they will receive civil institutions as a blessing, and change the modes of life to which they have been long inured. In the territory administered by the officers of Government, this change is effected in a very few years, and the same number and description of troops is no longer required to maintain tranquillity; but if instead of assuming the territory, we should leave the anarchist Native Governments to conduct the local administration, the wild state continues, and military force requires to be employed perpetually, as in Oudh and Hyderabad, and in Sindheeas dominions and towards Indore, we daily see occurring. This force must either be provided from the British armies maintained for general protection, or we must allow, and indeed encourage, the native princes to maintain forces of their own; in which case double the quantity of men will be required, and unless officered by Europeans, the troops will be a source of evil rather than of good. Indeed, these very troops become objects of alarm to us, and are the cause of frequent disturbance, requiring to be watched and restrained by the continued presence of a British army; assuming, of course, that all within the external frontier of India has to be protected and maintained in tranquillity by the British armies, there is evidently much variety in the circumstances under which this purpose has to be effected; and until all shall be brought under the operation of one system, we could not apply generally any one single principle for regulating either the numerical strength or the stations of our military force, while the circumstances of the several divisions of the country so widely differ, and the duties of the troops, and the requisitions for their services, depend so entirely on those circumstances, it can only mislead to refer either to the measured area, or to the number of inhabitants to be protected and maintained in peace, or to any similar criterion as furnishing a ratio for the troops required, much less for their kind and description. There is little hope that in this respect there will ever be anything like complete uniformity. It is not attained in Europe, for England and Scotland require quite a different proportion of military force from Ireland, and so always must be the different divisions of the Indian Peninsula. There are at present three great varieties of condition, the subsidized, the protected, and the directly administered, besides a wide difference in the character of the inhabitants; and the time is far distant when even the political distinctions will vanish so as to admit of all being brought under one great and consistent scheme. But even if the whole of India were to be reduced to the same political condition, and all to be subjected to the direct administration of British officers, there would still be a wide difference in the demand for military protection. The disposition to submit to civil authority is more or less confirmed, as the habits of social intercourse have been long established, and civilization has spread. Amongst the Coles and Chooars, and in the wilds of Sumbhulpore, the population know nothing of British rule, and are prone to rise in insurrection at the bidding of any chief of influence, or upon any real or fancied grievance, whereas in the Gangetic Provinces, although we have seen a local tenantry goaded by hard landlords to turbulence and rebellion, the occasion is rare that any actual employment of military force takes place; and when the civil power has proved inadequate to repress disturbance, a company of a provincial corps used ordinarily to be sufficient, the prestige of the red coat and musket being all powerful in giving to the wearers the courage and confidence that secured good behaviour, and in inspiring fear and despondency in those opposed to them.

From the above observations it will result that, in the present condition of India, each army station must always require to be regulated by the circumstances of the surrounding country, and to be considered separately with reference to the particular objects for which it has been established; some stations have been intended as cantonments for field armies, whose presence and state of preparation are to strike awe into nations and chiefs beyond the frontier. Some are for forces of a similar description subsidized to support Native Governments. Some have been established to overawe protected principalities, and prevent their encroaching one on the other, or otherwise disturbing the public peace. Some are to restrain turbulent and disaffected populations. Some to control the mobs of large cities. Some have been temporarily established to

bring into order districts recently disturbed. Some to bring under more complete subjection territory of recent acquisition, of which the inhabitants are unruly, and unused to Civil Government. All these, and many more, have been the motives which have led to the formation, and to the strength and composition of existing stations, and the armies have been deemed sufficient, or the contrary, as they have afforded the means of supplying the demand for corps to effect these purposes in all directions. The armies of India have assumed the constitution they possess from the same causes. The European troops, the artillery, and the cavalry occupy stations where they form part of the field forces or of the reserves, and they are held in readiness to take the field whenever an army has to be formed for any operation of war; but the working duties of the country are universally assigned either to corps of Native infantry of the line, or to local or provincial corps specially substituted for them, and of nearly similar organization. The number of the European troops of the artillery and regular cavalry has been regulated by the number and strength of the armies to be maintained effective, or held in a state of preparation; the number and strength of the Native infantry, on the other hand, depends on the demand for the services of this most useful class of soldiers for any of the purposes above referred to, in addition to the share they necessarily take in the formation of armies for service, or to be held in a state of preparation.

The late Governor General makes light of the dangers to be apprehended from internal commotion, whether arising from the disaffection of allies and protected feudatories, or of our own subjects. I, too, regard as utterly futile the efforts that any of these single, or united, might make to shake off the British supremacy, or to subvert the British power; but if we are safe from injury from such attempts, it is only through the omnipresence of the Native army that we enjoy the security, and the promptitude with which a disciplined body from its ranks can be thrown in, superior to any existing body of troops, or any that could be hastily raised to be opposed to it; in other words, we owe our safety to the number, the constitution, and the distribution of the corps of Native infantry, and to the confidence we feel in their fidelity. The late Governor General, looking to the condition of the field armies to be kept up, and wishing to improve their efficiency, has declared the Native infantry of the Indian armies to be an inferior order of soldiers, not worth the expense at which they are maintained; and his Lordship has expressed the desire that an additional 10,000 Europeans should be added to the total force of that description, stating the opinion that this is necessary to secure our dominion in the possible case of disaffection amongst the Native troops, or of a struggle with an European power on the Indus, or with an army of the hardy races of Central Asia.

No one can doubt for an instant that the proportion of European soldiery maintained in India is at present very low, and that we should derive great additional strength and security from any augmentation that might be possible of this part of the force; but as remarked by Sir C. T. Metcalfe, this is purely a question of finance, and the answer in that view is clear that it cannot be afforded so long as we have to provide for the entire military defence and internal protection of India, with the revenue of only half the territory to apply to these purposes, the rest being appropriated to chiefs and families who squander it on their own pleasures, or in maintaining a state that contributes nothing to either great purpose. His Lordship himself does not maintain that the Europeans thus added to the effective strength of the Indian army are to relieve and take the duty of Native troops, and so allow of reductions of this part of the force sufficient to pay for them. The reduction of a captain in every regiment, and of the staff of the Bombay army, proposed to be dispensed with by dividing that army between the Madras and Bengal Presidences, are the only savings indicated, unless it be his Lordship's intention to make applicable to this object the gain, by reducing 29 regiments of infantry and 7 of cavalry, proposed in another Minute, which gain, however, has been shown to be only remotely prospective as men and officers are absorbed, for of neither will there, according to the plan, be any present reduction. The proposition, in short, for increasing the European force is accompanied by no demonstration of commensurate saving in any other branch, but is supported purely on the ground of the urgent expediency of raising the proportion of these troops to the whole force for the sake of increased future security and strength. The Native army is to be maintained in its present numerical strength; nay, the corps kept up are proposed to be fixed at 1,000 men each,

each, and yet this proposition for increasing the peace establishment of the regiments is accompanied by another for reducing the European officers in each, and this, too, under a declaration that the Native regiments are at present inefficient, and unequal to cope with Europeans or with other troops of more hardy nations than those of India. There is surely little consistency in these propositions; the reduction of officers will not improve the efficiency of the Native troops, especially if the corps be increased in number, nor will it tend to prevent the great anticipated evil of extensive disaffection amongst them, or to promote a better feeling amongst both officers and men towards each other, and towards the Government; but these observations are incidental, not touching on the main question.

I regard the idea of danger on the side of the Indus as chimerical, at any rate, as very remote, and sure to timely warning as it approaches to require to be prepared against; I join in deriding the idea of any real danger to our power from insurrection, internal commotion, or the disaffection of allies and feudatories, so long as our Native army remains faithful, and is available for the suppression of such troubles; and I think that the Government may at all times secure the fidelity of this army by acting towards it with justice, liberality, and a due consideration for its interests and feelings. Therefore, although I should feel great additional security from an augmentation of the European force, I do not look upon this measure as one of absolute necessity, without which our dominion in the country will be liable to be brought into jeopardy, and it is not, in my opinion, a measure for the attainment of which any sacrifice ought to be made of other interests, much less should it be pursued at the expense of the Native army, which is already overworked, and insufficient in number and defective in organisation, only because of our establishments having all from financial considerations been so pared down as to trench on their efficiency. Upon the question, therefore, whether the augmentation of 10,000 Europeans should be recommended to the Home Authorities, in order to bring the proportion of Europeans to one-fourth instead of one-sixth or one-seventh as it now stands, I would say that I do not consider the augmentation to be either indispensable as a security against the infidelity of our other troops, or necessary for the increase of the field and reserve armies maintained in a state of preparation; consequently, until there shall be more reason to dread the loss of the affections of the Native troops as a body than I yet see, or until the aspect of things on the Indus frontier should present greater and more imminent dangers than yet threaten, I think the expense of the large proposed addition to our European troops may well be saved, but I would at all times rather see the European force increased than diminished.

Other points in the constitution of the Indian armies are adverted to in the Minutes of the late and present Governor General, which it may be convenient to notice, before proceeding to consider the new principles of distribution recommended. The Native troops of the Madras and Bombay armies are stated to want physical strength and stature, and on that account to be very inferior, so much so as to destroy altogether their efficiency. The late Governor General's remarks on this part of the subject do not apply to the Bengal Native soldier, who is a larger and finer man, and in stature and strength nearly equal to the European. His Lordship has been at the pains to obtain returns of the proportion of Natives of Hindoostan entertained in the ranks of the other Presidencies; and his proposition for remodelling the Bombay army, by abolishing it as a separate service, and annexing one-half the men and officers to the Bengal establishment, is founded on the ascertained fact that about one-half of the number of the Bombay sepohees are from the Western Provinces of Hindoostan. The condemnation passed by his Lordship on the Native troops of India, seems particularly to have reference to the weak and diminutive men of the Dukhun; and I am inclined, from what I have seen and heard of the sepoys of the Dukhun, to agree with his Lordship, that it should be the study of the Government, and in particular of the military authorities there, to endeavour gradually to substitute, if possible, men of a stouter race. The men of Hindoostan will be available to a certain extent, but only so while the ranks of the Bengal army are fully supplied for if extensive recruiting for the latter were to be going on, the armies of the South could only obtain men by the offer of extra countries, and the competition would be prejudicial to both services, and contrary to all sound principle, and must soon be discontinued. But the present is a favourable opportunity for

endeavouring to effect a change; and it is to be presumed that the result of the inquiries instituted by the late Governor General has convinced the military authorities of the Dukhun Presidencies of the inferiority of those armies in this particular, so as to have prepared them to fix a higher standard of strength and stature for the men who may hereafter be enlisted, and so make them eventually equal to the Bengal sepoy; the difficulty will be in getting rid of the present small race of men, which can only be done with justice by the slow process of absorption.

Amongst other suggestions connected with this subject is the enlisting of Malays, who are a much more energetic race than the Natives of the Peninsula of India. It is said that there is a corps of Malays in Ceylon, and we know that pending our occupation of Java there were Buggese corps formed on that island which had obtained considerable discipline, and of whose fidelity and military habits I have always heard favourably. I believe, however, that the rates of pay allowed to Native troops (and the Europeans get little more) are not sufficient to induce people of these races to enlist, and we lately had experience in an attempt made to raise a local corps of Burmese and Tullians, that their expectations in this respect are higher than either our system or our finances will allow. If this objection, however, can by any means be got over, I should rejoice to see corps formed of any of the races indicated, or men of these races mixed with others in the ranks of existing corps, which would perhaps be even favourable to the raising of separate corps if it could be effected.

But though I freely admit that the Native armies of India are all greatly inferior to European troops, and that those of the Peninsula are composed of men wanting in bodily strength and in mental energy, and that these men, if possible, should be gradually changed, I am far from conceding that any one of the three armies is inefficient, much less that it is not well worth the cost at which it is maintained. Considered with reference to the purposes for which Native troops have been entertained, it might, on the contrary, be asserted with safety that these troops are the most efficient, the most hard-working, and the best bargains of all that are kept up. They enable us to keep together, and save from the wear and tear of unhealthy and laborious service, our more valuable Europeans. They were added to our armies to eke out the small number of Europeans who could be brought into the field, as an aid and second rank to them; and we were satisfied to find them superior to all of the same description that were ever attempted in any part of India to be brought against them. Sir Eyre Coote gained many of his battles even over the French Europeans without bringing under fire any of his British troops, their presence in the field being alone sufficient to give confidence to the Sepoy regiments, and ensure their good behaviour against troops they would never have dared to face but for the knowledge of this support; and yet these were the undersized troops of the Dukhun who in the Burmese War, and the late Governor General says, even in the recent operations against Coorg, misbehaved when acting alone under new circumstances. In the field the Native troops require, perhaps, skilful handling; but under a commander who understands them, and in whom they have confidence, they have never hitherto failed, and will ever be found most useful. Too much, however, must not be expected of them at once; and if the enemy is new and the circumstances uncommon and the mode of warfare strange, they must be broken in by degrees to what they are unused to, and not presented rashly to dangers for which their minds are not prepared. But although the Native troops must be spoken of with these reserves when their conduct in the field is under discussion, there needs no reserve in respect to their general utility for every other purpose of a military force. Their behaviour in cantonments, their promptitude in taking the field at all seasons, and the patience with which they undergo labours and privations when employed on services for which Europeans would be quite unfit, are most exemplary; for, as above observed, it is to them that the working duties of the country are universally confided, and their performance of them proves that they are fully equal to the trust, and therefore so long as these duties are essential and necessary, no one can deny that those who perform them are well worth their salt. I confess I do not like to see the merits of these troops under-rated, and I am quite sure that nothing would tend more to lower the high military feeling it is desired to instil into them, than that they should imagine they are despised or thought unworthy, and depreciated before the world.

Another

Another change proposed by the late Governor General in the constitution of the Native army is to keep up Europeans only as regular cavalry, and to convert the Native regiments into what we call irregulars. I have seen this project presented on several occasions before, but have always been opposed to it, for I think that our hold on the fidelity of men who provide themselves and are ready to take service for the day with anyone that will pay them is much less than the attachment that may be reckoned upon in men taken in early life and broken in by habit and discipline to associations connected in all things with their regimental duties. I should regret extremely that the Government were dependent for all its Native cavalry on men of the character and habits of those who form the irregular horse, under their present constitution. They are too much of one caste, and upon any impulse or present dissatisfaction would be liable to fall into courses troublesome at least, if not dangerous. The further proposition of the late Governor General for converting several of the Native infantry regiments into light troops is, to my mind, more worthy of attention. I should think the change likely to be extremely beneficial, for in hill and jungle warfare, which is a service on which these troops are often employed alone, it must frequently be of essential benefit to use as light troops more than the single company of men trained to do duty as such that is more than the one-eighth of the whole body, which is the proportion now allotted to each regiment.

I have not yet noticed the immense facilities in the movement of troops and stores which the extensive introduction of steam navigation will be likely to give in any future operations in which the Indian Government may be engaged. If it were said that this invention, confined as it must be for a long time wholly to ourselves, doubles the efficiency and strength of our military power, I should not deem the estimate too high. But we have by no means yet pushed the invention to the limit of its power of benefiting us, and all that has yet been done is only experimental.

The late Governor General was an enthusiast in his view of the changes to be wrought by the extensive application of the power of steam to the improvement of the means of communication, internal as well as by sea, between the several parts of India and with Europe. I do not think these views at all overcharged, so far as they refer to effects expected to result in future military operations, but it is yet too early to attempt any distinct estimate of their extent, or of the precise method in which they will operate. This, however, is a digression from the subject immediately in hand, which is the composition and distribution of the Indian army ; and upon the latter branch of the subject I have yet a few observations to offer, resulting from the principles I have endeavoured to explain in stating my opinion on the points brought forward in Minutes regarding the former.

The late Governor General advocates strongly the collection of the Indian armies into masses, instead of allowing them to be spread in detail by corps and attachments. He advocates this as a general principle, and is supported by all the military authorities, who regard it as essential for the efficiency of the troops that they should be habituated to the training and discipline that can only be given when several corps are brought together.

It must be with great deference that any one not of the military profession should state an opinion differing in any shade from such authority, but I confess that I think the principle of concentration may be carried too far. I have always understood that the great benefit to corps from being exercised together is, that they should move well in brigade, which, howsoever well drilled and trained, they never will be able to do if exercised separately only as single corps. Troops that move well in brigade will act well in masses, for, beyond the brigade movements, it is generalship only that is wanting. For brigade exercise, however, a greater concentration is not required than three or four regiments, which make a force equal nearly in strength to the Roman legion, and so far as the maintenance of the country by cantonments of troops distributed over it is concerned, this strength seems to me quite sufficient for the forces to be held in readiness and exhibited to the disaffected, and quite sufficient also for the preservation of the troops composing it, in the highest possible state of discipline.

If, therefore, the whole of India were in one condition of subjection to British dominion, and its population were alike submissive, or alike in disaffection, the natural distribution for the troops, by which it should be held in subjection and overawed, would be in brigades at such distances as that there should be no district into which, in case of disturbance, a brigade could not be marched in

a given number of days, supported by others in so many additional days, according to the distance. There would be depôts with battering trains at certain selected stations, at which the troops of other arms besides the infantry would be collected, and the appearance thus kept up would be more formidable, but the general character of the distribution would be legionary if the purpose were purely to hold in subjection by means of the military force. In fact, however, the character of the country and its population are so various, and the objects to be provided for so different, that on that account alone this uniform scheme of distribution for the army would be quite inapplicable. There are large tracts that a single battalion is sufficient to overawe, and this even may be converted into a local or provincial corps without impairing the object; on the other hand, the dense population and the seditious habits of a large city may require the presence of more than a single brigade; and there may be other objects combined, such as the defence of a frontier, or the protection of an ally requiring the appearance and reality of an army equipped in all respects, and of greater strength than a brigade. The Benares, Cawnpore, and the Meeruth divisions are kept up in their present strength on these principles, and very properly so; and it is, as observed above, on this account that each military station requires, and will always require, to be judged of separately. Even where armies have to be maintained, there are often special considerations which influence their formation. When our troops were first pushed forward to the Sutlej, the natural inference would be, that as this was the most exposed position, the choicest description of force would have been placed there; but it is not so; we have never had an European regiment at Loodeeana, because we desired to avoid outraging the feelings of the Sikh population by placing amongst them troops that ate beef. A similar motive led to the first subsidiary force attached to Nagpoor, although a fighting force equipped for the front line of operations against the Pindarees, being wholly composed of Natives, and the composition of the forces now employed in Rajpoot, and will have been influenced by the same desire to avoid offending deeply-rooted prejudices on this point. From all this, I merely draw the inference that it would be unwise, upon the mere application of any general principles, to remodel the distribution which has arisen out of circumstances in each individual case, and in respect in particular to the three forces of Rajpootana and Malwa, which, from a sense of the advantages attending concentration, the late Governor General would unite in one centrical position. I can see no motive for this, unless there should be ground to apprehend that, separately, they are liable to be overwhelmed before any support could be thrown in, which is not the motive assigned. Sir C. T. Metcalf has adverted to the sacrifice of property, public and private, and to the expense that would attend this concentration; and I confess myself to be of the same opinion with him on the proposition, and to conceive that no case has yet been made out for the change. Sir Charles Metcalf has also well pointed out, as respects generally the army stations of Bengal, that the number of corps of Native infantry are insufficient for their maintenance in the strength deemed necessary, and for providing at the same time the due proportion of Native troops to be attached to any field army that might be formed to operate on any part of our frontier. I quite concur in the inference necessarily deduced from this state of things, viz., that this useful branch of the army, instead of being too numerous so as to admit of a reduction of the number of corps, is too weak at present for the purposes for which it is designed and has been raised. I also entirely concur in the suggestions as to the best means of remedying the deficiency when it shall be judged necessary to do so, and when our finances may admit of it, viz., by supplying the place of regiments of the line at all stations, were there may be only a single corps, by a local corps formed for the purpose, or by provincials. I look upon the disbandment of the provincial corps about five years ago, and the supplying of their place by Burkundazes, as a retrogade step of most prejudicial influence, for it destroyed the appearance of prompt military support to the civil power which the red coat always carried with it, and left the local authorities with no better aid than a body of Burkundazes, that every city mob or collection of Mofussil insurgents regarded as no better than themselves.

It is far from my intention to follow Sir C. T. Metcalf in the particular review he has given of the circumstances of each military division of the Bengal Presidency. I have already written too much to think of entering on such details.

In

In like manner, the late Governor General's summary of the distribution of the Madras army, with the Minutes and propositions of Sir R. W. O'Callaghan and of Sir F. Adam submitted therewith, though deserving of minute examination, must be passed over by me with only a summary notice. The points upon which I feel called upon to state an opinion are, first, the concentration of troops at Bangalore, so that the force at that station, now only 4,047 men, may be augmented to upwards of 10,000. The station possesses the advantage of being most salubrious, and it is centrical for communication with any part of the southern extremity of the peninsula. On these grounds, it is a proper place for the principal force, and for the depôts necessary for overawing and holding in subjection the subsidized States and other territories of that extremity of India. But wherefore should a larger force be kept there than may be necessary for this purpose? It is not the point from which a force would actually be selected for embarkation on foreign service. The Presidency, where only ships can be taken up, is the place to which troops must be marched whenever this is the object, and they might as well be called from anywhere else in the interior, where they may have been cantoned in brigades, as from Bangalore, where they are proposed to be in a larger body. Moreover, if India should ever again be convulsed so as to call for extensive military operations, it is farther north than Bangalore that the call would be for the strength of the Madras army to be displayed, and wherefore not so dispose the troops beforehand, that the army may be ready promptly to meet that call. Secondly, it is proposed to diminish the force at Bellary, and make Hyderabad a division command for a general officer, which it has not been heretofore. I entirely concur in the propriety of transferring the general officer from Vellore to Hyderabad, although I am not quite satisfied of the propriety of removing the troops from Bellary to strengthen the force at Bangalore. I conclude that the effect of the late political arrangements in Mysore and Koorg will be to bring all that wide tract more completely under subjection than heretofore, so as to enable it to be kept henceforward with fewer of our own troops actually in position to overawe it. There is a strong army at Hyderabad, more especially since the Jalna force has been called back, but the country it has to hold is wide, and although the Nizam has an auxiliary army, officered from our own, that can be depended upon for co-operation, that army is in respect to our own only what the Sepahees are to the Europeans, a support of inferior quality requiring to be managed with care if called upon for unusual service. The station of Nagpoor is, from its distance, further removed from support than even Hyderabad; whereas, upon the principles to which I have referred above, this part of India must be assumed to be in a condition requiring the restraint of military cantonments more than any of the territory more immediately subject to British administration. I should have expected, therefore, that the propositions for change in the distribution of the Madras army should have tended to throw troops northward into this widely vacant space, rather than to add to the crowded array in the extreme south. If the Madras army be a second line for the defence of the only frontier by which a formidable enemy could enter India, viz., by the north-west, the north or centre of the Dukhun is surely the field where one would expect to see it collected, but the effect of breaking up the Jalna station has been to withdraw it from this position, and the proposition to concentrate the army at Bangalore as the main reserve, added to that of transferring Nagpoor to the Bombay army in exchange for Belgaum, has a like tendency, viz., to keep the Madras army to the extreme south, and withdraw it from the line of support in the direction where only a serious attack is apprehended. I incline to think, on the contrary, that Nagpoor is an useful advanced position, to be occupied by the armies of Madras, and that strong supports should be posted for prompt concentrations on that point.

Such are the general impressions made on my mind by an attentive perusal of the important papers connected with the two subjects brought by the late Governor General under discussion in the Minutes cited at the commencement of this paper, viz., the composition and distribution of the armies of India. I cannot satisfy my mind that his Lordship's views upon either are just, or that any sufficient case has been made out for the extensive changes proposed or meditated by him in both these branches. My opinions on some points may be deemed presumptuous, on others, peculiar. I offer them because I feel called upon by the state in which these questions were left by the late Governor General to state my sentiments, also for the information of those who will have finally to deter-

mine on the measures to be adopted. I do not, on all points, quite agree in the views upon these subjects stated in the Minutes of the present Governor General, but if the question were put to me, whether to give my support to the latter, or to the propositions of Lord William Bentinck, I should have no hesitation in at once subscribing my assent to all the conclusions at which Sir Charles has arrived. If there be any difference of opinion between us, it is on speculative points not bearing materially on the practical results which it is the wish of us both to enforce by the line of argument and observation we have pursued.

(signed) *H. T. Prinsep.*

9 June 1835.

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Sir *John Malcolm*'s REPORT to Lord *William Bentinck*, on the Bombay Army and Army Generally; dated 27 November 1830.

My Lord,

I HAVE been long in answering your Lordship's letter, applying for my opinion on the pay, composition, and distribution of the army in India; as I wished before I did so to collect such information as would aid me in giving my opinion on points so important to the future peace and maintenance of this empire.

2. This subject divides itself into very distinct branches, the European and the Native. Of the constitution of the European branch, I have given my sentiments generally, but very fully in the second volume of "History of India." The actual state of the army of this Presidency demanding attention soon after my arrival, your Lordship will find all the information I possess, as well as my opinion upon some of the most essential points, in a copy of my Minute under date the 25th March 1828, which I annex to this letter.

3. The subject of the pay of European officers in India has been brought forcibly to your attention by the clamorous discontent occasioned by reducing several of your stations from full to half batta; and the feelings and hardships of the European corps on this establishment by the unequal operation of the order reducing half tentage. Both these facts impart a serious lesson to Government in respect to the principles that should regulate increase in the pay of armies. Full batta was originally meant to provide for field equipment and extra expense which officers must incur when marching; but it early lost this character in Bengal, when continued to officers in cantonment. The same case occurred when the mode of supplying officers of European corps on the Bombay Presidency was changed; and instead of an amount to meet a necessary but temporary expense, a monthly allowance was given, which, from strict musters being discontinued, became part of the pay! Providence for the future is a rare feature in the military character, particularly among junior officers, whose expenses will usually exceed their means. In proportion to their allowances, houses were built and furnished, houses bought, and too often debts incurred; under such circumstances, reductions were felt as hardships, and with reason, for what had formerly been deemed luxuries and enjoyed by few, had from habit become necessaries, and were deemed essential to all. It is easier to know the causes which have produced the distress that has ensued, than to point out the remedy that is consistent with the public interests. I have already given my opinion upon this subject.*

* *Vide* Colonel Frederick's Report, dated 23 November 1830.

4. When I made a Minute on the recent reduction of the batta of sepoys, I was only restrained from proposing a reduction of the full batta of the European officers at Deesa and Bhooj, as well as the troops, by consideration of the principle to which our attention has been of late frequently directed, of assimilating our military allowances with those of Bengal as much as local circumstances would permit; and by the fact of there being only four corps of the 36 of this establishment, the European officers of which draw full batta. If I had made this proposition as I did in the reduction of full batta at Mhow, I should neither have anticipated discontent nor distress on the part of the European officers of this army: and under other circumstances than the present, I should certainly have deemed the measure expedient. I think it desirable that an officer should have an increase when marching, or actually in the field, because his expenses must be increased; and if he is always on field allowances, he will soon acquire habits

habits of living which will on extraordinary expense occurring, be certain to involve him in difficulties and embarrassments.

5. An officer, particularly of a native corps, can live very well when on half batta, if he is frugal. No State can afford to pay officers in the Indian branches of its army in a manner that will exempt them from the necessity of careful and frugal habits, and the most baneful of all consequences that has been and will hereafter be found to result from too great liberality towards them, and which alike affects their future prospects and the public interests, is that this expenditure (if beyond what is strictly necessary), takes from Government the means of rewarding merit and long service.

6. An observation of the true principle, both of economy and discipline in armies, should lead to an endeavour to habituate junior officers to privations, and to make them look forward with hope, instead of dwelling on the enjoyment of ease and comfort in their actual condition. Particular situations in an army to which the view of every officer should be directed, require therefore all the consideration they can receive from Government; and the army in this country will never be in a healthy state till the command of a corps is a more desirable object for an officer of rank and character than any staff employ except the head of a Department; but of this I shall give my sentiments hereafter.

7. There can be no doubt that recent reductions have pressed with peculiar hardship upon the European branch of the army, the great majority of which are his Majesty's corps. The discontent this has caused will cease, but its evil operations will continue. I have fully shown in my Minute of the 25th March, now transmitted to your Lordship, the embarrassing results which are occasioned by the present stagnation of rise to higher rank in the Company's army, and the effect it produces of keeping many efficient officers from accompanying the corps to India, who generally have at their head colonels and lieutenant-colonels who come out in the certainty, from their rank being above the great majority of the field officers of the local army, of attaining general command. I know of no remedy to this evil, except that which I have pointed out in my Minute on the Army of this Presidency. It may be out of ordinary rule, but rules should, under such circumstances as those that relate to India, be made to bend to the primary objects of maintaining the peace and prosperity of our possessions in that quarter. Our success in that ever has been and ever will essentially depend upon the number, condition, and temper of our army. Every point therefore that affects these has much importance.

8. The arrangement I proposed would in its operation only affect the commandants of regiments in his Majesty's service serving in India, who would be of junior standing to what they are now; but there is another point of serious consideration, as it affects the captains and commanders of companies in these corps who are, I believe, under the operation of the late changes and reductions, admitted to have less means of supporting their condition with reference to local circumstances, than in any part of the king's dominions. If this be the fact, the consequence is obvious; no officer that can obtain leave or exchange without great injury to his prospects, will remain in India. The causes which formerly led to a preference being given by many to the regiments in India are gone. The pay is diminished, the chances of promotion which gave life to the service in this country no longer exist; and we observe a corps after being here some time, lose gradually almost every officer who came from England with it, while their places are supplied by others, whose circumstances, connections in this country, or want of means to promote their advancement, or even to subsist themselves, if reduced to half pay, lead them to prefer remaining in India. Such changes in the officers of a corps must be injurious, particularly among the seniors who have served long with the regiment. This might, perhaps, in some degree be rendered less by more frequent reliefs, but that must involve too great an expense. The restoring the allowances of captains and officers in charge of companies to what it was before 1825, would, I think, be a proper and salutary measure. Captains of troops and companies before that date drew a personal allowance of 20 *l.* per annum, under the head of non-effective allowance. This allowance is not known to the Indian army, and was the only part of their allowance that king's officers serving with their regiments in India could draw in England; and as such was generally appropriated by them for the pay-

ment of dress and equipment. Calculating the disadvantageous rate of exchange at which such articles are at present paid, the value of this allowance may be fairly estimated as at least to 40 *l.* paid in India. This allowance was done away with; but an exact proportional increase of net pay was given in lieu;* upon this the directors ordered that the king's pay having been increased, the Company's allowances were to be proportionally reduced, so as to keep the pay and allowances of the two services equal. Thus to captains of king's regiments in India, the change of non-effective allowance to pay was a positive reduction. It may be argued that if the Court of Directors had not acted as they have done in this respect, it would have been injustice to the Company's service. But this conclusion is not correct. The captains in the Indian army have advantages in exclusive claims to staff employ, minor commands, and many other situations that might be adduced as far more than balancing the benefits which the captains of his Majesty's regiments derived from this increased item in their allowance; and I think that it is to be regretted the reduction was ever made, which with that of the half tentage before noticed, may be said to have deteriorated the allowances of a captain of a company in one of the king's regiments nearly 100 *l.* per annum.

9. Few subaltern officers in his Majesty's army, serving in this country, can look forward to command the corps to which they belong, but they aspire to command a troop or company; and to lessen its value is taking from them the only object (as far as improved allowances are concerned) to which they had to look, and is from this and other causes singularly calculated to destroy hope and increase discontent. A discontinuance of half the field officers, or even one in a King's regiment serving in India, would go far to meet this expense, and be little if any loss to the efficiency of a corps. There are in India few of those detachments from European corps which require captains, and their places would be well supplied by an arrangement that kept captains and old subalterns with the regiment to which they belonged. In addition to the hardship which the senior captains with the King's corps in India have to complete, it may be stated that a captain regimentally, but a brevet major, has 2 *s.* per day more than another captain at home, and in all foreign stations but India. This hardship, for such it is deemed, is felt by very few, and might be relieved at small cost. I believe there is no instance in the Company's army of a captain attaining, by seniority, the rank of a field officer; and it could not, therefore, be quoted as a case of partiality.

10. I have on many occasions, and especially in the Minute sent to your Lordship, given my opinion most fully on the actual necessity of the increase of allowances to commandants of corps in a degree that will render that station superior to any on the staff, except the heads of Departments. This has been my earnest object for more than 20 years, and the Court of Directors had authorised an increase which would have effected it; but as almost the whole of the Bengal army were on full batta, the arrangement brought no benefit to their commandants, and their not wanting it had probably its influence in the resolution of the Supreme Government to annul the acts of Sir Thomas Munro and Mr. Elphinstone, both of whom had put the most liberal construction on the order of the Court of Directors, and to the Presidencies at which they were the head it was a real and essential boon.

11. The allowance for commanding a corps should, I think, be raised to 500 rupees per mensem, and if with this should be associated the modification of minor commands, and given to officers who exercised them a superior allowance of 200 rupees, without removing him from the charge of his corps, his duties would be in no way increased beyond his power of performing them, and the ends of economy, as far as such commands were concerned, would be combined with the promotion of the efficiency of the service.

12. Two commands of the first class are allotted by the orders of the Court of Directors to this Presidency; six stations will remain at this Presidency, where there will probably always be at least two corps. These might remain with the allowance now assigned to the second class; and there are five stations which, being commands, with one corps and detachments from others, might be denominated the third, with 600 rupees per mensem, but, with the exception of all these commands, unless peculiar cases required the two of the first class, rendered necessary

by

by peculiar circumstance, should include the allowance for commanding a corps. This would in most cases be very beneficial to the service, and make a saving that would enable Government to effect the desirable object of increasing the allowance to the regimental commandants. The results of it at this establishment are shown in the annexed Table.

13. This arrangement, if connected with an obligation that officers should serve a certain number of years before they could be entitled to enjoy the benefit of off-reckonings, the consequences would be most beneficial to the discipline and efficiency of the army. This arrangement, however, to be just, should in a great degree be prospective in its operation; none who had been more than six or seven years in the service being affected by it.

14. As connected with having the most effective officers for regimental duty, I think no situation of brigade or line staff should remain to the same individual beyond a period of three years, except on field service. The young captain or subaltern who now obtains such a situation deems himself removed altogether from regimental duty till his rank compels him to join a corps, and often till that places him at its head. The general result is an establishment and a mode of life that often involves him in debt. This would not be the case if these officers knew they were only to hold their stations till a relief came. It would come as a temporary boon and be taken care of, as such men would return to regimental duty with knowledge of general duties, and the whole class of officers from whom such staff were selected would be animated to efforts to fit themselves for such stations to which having passed in the Hindoostani language should be an indispensable qualification. If this arrangement is made, actual incumbents might hold their situations three years, except their corps was ordered on service.

15. With regard to other staff I need only refer to my Minute in the Military Department, of which I transmit a copy. I am confirmed in my opinion that the Pay Department should be separated in the manner proposed; and, with reference to the police of the territories under this Presidency, I am quite satisfied that a cheap and efficient agency might be introduced in the mode proposed in page 201 to 225 of my "History of India." If there was a difficulty in obtaining officers qualified and efficient for such duties, who could be prevailed upon to resign their standing in the army, their net pay might be continued, and they might have an allowance to place them on a footing with magistrates of the grade which they obtained; but they should neither be considered eligible to the promotion or pensions which were allotted to others in this line. I have been completely convinced of the necessity in this part of India for the improvement of our police; and among our hills and our frontiers we have now specific officers detached, to one of whom only the powers of a magistrate have been granted; but I mean to propose it should be given to another, and I view it as the commencement of a system which must be extended, and which may, if well conducted, tend greatly to the future peace and prosperity of our Provinces.

16. The recent orders respecting the limitation to staff to be absent from one corps were well intended, but are singularly inapplicable to the native army in India. Obedience to them will be found difficult and embarrassing in peace and wholly impracticable in war. They may be followed in his Majesty's corps, who are full of officers, and in peace occupy healthy stations and have few detachments; but the exact contrary is the fact with regard to native corps, and the rules may often limit selection where that is essential to success. Their tendency also is to damp the hopes of aspiring men and check the acquiring of those qualifications, which it is most essential European officers of the native branch should possess. The option remains with the Court of Directors to adopt the suggestion that has been frequently made of forming a staff corps, or to apply some other remedy to this evil. But I deem it essential that, with reservation as to knowledge of language and standing in the army, that the prizes of staff employment should be open to every officer of the army. But in the meantime I think your Lordship might alleviate much of the injurious application of this order by limiting the situations which are to be considered as staff. This question has lately come under discussion at this Presidency, and I have signified my intention to refer it to your Lordship in order that it may be clearly decided. According to my view no European officer of the native army, who is

detached on special duty in the provinces where he commands troops of the branch to which he belongs, can be considered on the staff, nor can I consider as subject to this rule the officers who are nominated to act with bodies of the Guicowar Contingent appointed to preserve the peace of the countries of Kattywar and Myhee Counta, which are entirely under our rule and control, and for the peace of which we are exclusively responsible. These officers are employed in command of detachments of their own branch, co-operating with the Guicowar Horse. They are it is true denominated assistants to aid the political authorities in all duties for which they may be required, but those that are not military are contingent and were added to save considerable expense. The arrangement has fully met every subject that was contemplated. These officers should, I conceive, like others I have stated, be returned and detached on special duty, and I think that officers employed with Bheel and police corps, such as two of this establishment now are, and under whom considerable bodies of their own branch are often placed, should be returned in the same manner. They are not staff and are more usefully employed as officers of the native army than with their regiments. It is not for the parade and drill duties of a corps that officers of standing are much required in the native infantry. A good commanding officer and staff with junior officers will bring a native corps into full as high order as if the whole complement of senior officers were present, but it is in the command of these troops when on service and when detached on special duty that good and efficient officers are required, and all those I have stated are in the daily exercise of this duty. I deem it here necessary to add, that I consider the arrangement recently made, by which three officers in military command, Sattara, Bhooj, and Baroda, fulfil political duties as well as the junior officers employed with the Guicowar Contingent, to be of much importance, beyond meeting as it does the object of economy in training persons in this branch as instruments who will be found not merely useful but indispensable in case of war.

17. Your Lordship will add to the facts stated regarding the staff that even under ordinary circumstances the orders of the Court fall much heavier on a comparatively small army like that of this Presidency, than on a large one like that of Bengal or even Madras, particularly as in all the latter Presidency almost all the provinces are so settled as not to call for the specific nomination of officers, while the condition of many of our districts demands such selection; and I can only add that there are four or five officers now employed on such duties that I neither could nor would remove, if I had legally the power to permit it, from the situations in which they are now employed, stating my decided opinion that I deemed their services were essential where they were placed. This may not be a common case, but it is one that will exist in this part of India for years; and a Governor who has such heavy responsibility on him as the maintenance of the public peace should have a latitude of employing instruments that he judged competent, and be freed from restrictions that limited his choice. There is no fear of patronage being abused in such cases. The duties are of a nature that can only be performed by men that are equal to them.

18. I should think the staff regulations might be construed to relate only to officers removed from regimental duty or from the command of men of their line, and they might not be applied to brigade majors or line adjutants if the system was introduced which I before suggested, of giving these temporary appointments to officers belonging to corps at the station. They are not, as I said, wanted for drill, and they would be ready for all field service or special duty on which they could be required.

19. The personal staff of Governor General and Governors, Commanders in Chief and officers on general staff, paymasters (until a change takes place), commissariat officers under existing rules, judge advocates, town majors, fort adjutants, barrack masters and officers employed with corps in territories not under British control and management, are all I conceive that should be brought under this order. Cavalry, engineer, and artillery officers should not be eligible to hold any station in the Pay Department nor in the Commissariat, unless qualified by peculiar circumstances to be placed at the head of either of those branches of the service.

20. The few points I have to suggest regarding the pay of the staff of this Presidency will be brought to your Lordship's notice by Colonel Hough, also many

many similar subjects. With respect to the pay of the European soldier and the recent changes in many points connected with his comfort and accommodation, I can only say such points are before you in great detail. My own opinion is that we have gone to an extreme, and that in many respects an expense has been incurred beyond what was called for by either attention to the habits or health of European troops serving in India.

21. I have changed none of the opinions I have given in my history regarding the expediency of making the three armies of India *one*, with three divisions, and as far as relates to the European officers and troops with their establishment, regulating allowances according to remoteness from supply and price of labours and provisions with as much uniformity of system as practicable. I am still satisfied that regimental rise to the rank of lieutenant colonel, as I proposed in the chapter upon the army, is expedient, and that exchanges with his Majesty's corps, purchase of commissions under the restrictions and regulations stated in that work, would be advisable and salutary. My opinion is given so strong in the Minute now sent regarding the obligations for officers to serve a certain number of years regimentally allotted to colonels of these corps, that I need not here again advert to the subject. The propositions I have made regarding the brigade and line staff, I deem, on many grounds, very essential. It should be, of course, prospective and applied to none who had not been five years in the service, under which period no officer should, I think, be eligible to any staff except regimental.

22. The origin of the native armies of India and their progress to their present condition and character your Lordship will find fully given in the "Quarterly Review," vol. 18, page 385. That article is framed from papers of mine, and indeed was taken in substance from a memorandum prepared by me for Lord Buckinghamshire.* If, in addition to this document, your Lordship peruses what I have said of the native troops in my History of India, volume 2, page 225 to 245, you will find all I can say upon the more general parts of this subject. I can only add that recent observations have confirmed every sentiment expressed in the volume to which I have alluded.

* *Sic in.*

23. The pay of our native troops at the different Presidencies is, I believe, the same. There is a difference in the batta and a more considerable one in some of the pensions. This has arisen from a variety of causes referring to the class of men, the difficulty of obtaining recruits, price of provisions and labour, and the different judgments formed with reference to local considerations of means best adapted to form, in particular quarters of India, an efficient native army.

24. The Bombay Army is at present composed of:

| | |
|---|---|
| Hindoostanees - - - - - - - - - - | 12,476 |
| Konkanees - - - - - - - - - - | 10,015 |
| Deccanees - - - - - - - - - - | 1,910 |

This large number of Hindoostanee men has occurred since the breaking out of the Mahratta war, and particularly during that with Burma in 1824-25. Previous to the former period their number in the army of this Presidency did not exceed 4,000.

25. In 1824 the Hindoostanees in the Bombay army amounted to 7,465, and the following year, on an increase of its establishments, to 1,000 men per battalion, with an addition of two extra battalions, the number of this class of men was greatly augmented, caused a good deal perhaps by the station of the Bombay troops at Mhow, where an officer was specially employed to recruit for the army.

26. This increase of foreigners over the natives of the Bombay territories was by no means desired by the more experienced officers of this army, and was, moreover, contrary to the wishes of the Court of Directors, who, in 1821, directed that the armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as distinct as possible in their respective territories. In 1823 this subject was brought to the attention of the Bombay Government by a letter from the Military Secretary, Colonel Casement, and in 1824 recruiting for this army in the Bengal provinces was positively prohibited by the Supreme Government.

27. The officers of the Bombay army generally considered it beneficial to have a mixture of castes in their regiments, and among others a proportion of Hindoostanee men, not exceeding 200 per battalion, but they consider these as only indispensable when their own provinces cannot recruit their ranks.

28. They consider the Hindoostanee men, though in size, appearance, and, perhaps, in a certain degree of military pride to be superior to their own, to excel them in nothing else. The Konkanees and Deccanees they account more patient under privation and fatigue, more easily subsisted and managed, and in bravery to be fully their equals. They are the descendants of Sawajies "Mountain Rats," whom neither the stature nor military bearings of the Hindoostanee could debar from advancing to the gates of Delhi; and the early history of the Bombay army (no where better related than in "Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas") shows them to be in no way degenerated from the spirit of their ancestors.

29. For the welfare of the Presidency there is another very good reason (not of a military character) why its army should be recruited from its own provinces. Not only do the men receiving pensions retire to spend them in its villages, but the sepoys on actual service remit (as is well known to every one acquainted with the kind filial feelings of the natives of India) a portion of their pay for the subsistence of their parents and families. This not only to a certain degree enriches the village, but affords a great inducement to the young men to enlist, with the view of following so enviable an example; with the Hindoostan sepoys all this is lost, and the inhabitants of that Presidency are discouraged from entering our ranks, not only from the want of examples of their countrymen's enjoyment of comfortable retirement, but from an impression that the superior stature, and the more soldier-like appearance of the Rajpoots, often recommend them to promotion in cases when the equality-efficient Konkanee and Deccanee in all the substantial qualities of a soldier give them as good if not better pretensions.

30. My own opinion is, that if the encouragements now given are continued to the men of the Bombay provinces, there will not in future be occasion to have recourse to other countries for recruits. The natives of this Presidency will early become reconciled to service in the regular ar[illegible] Hindoostanee commissioned officers and men will bring their familie[illegible]ise.* But I am adverse to the present proportion of these men in ou[illegible], and if the evil of the present system is aggravated by those prejudices [illegible] admitted to have force, it would be much better that the Hindoostanees of the Bombay army were in distinct corps, than that their numbers, aided by their looks, should tend to lessen the self-esteem, and damp the hopes of men of lower cast and stature.

31. I have perused very attentively the records of the Bombay native army before they had any men from Hindoostan, and through the severest trials they have evinced a courage of fidelity and temper under danger, privation, and fatigue that we cannot expect to see exceeded. Till within twelve years the general sentiment among these men was the pride of corps. I regret to observe that the pride of caste is now much cherished by the men,† and considered by the officers. There are no prejudices and pretensions that will be found so injurious if not resisted as those minor ones of caste, if they receive more attention than is due to them. This is not the place to state my sentiments on this point as relating to our civil rule, farther than as that affects the temper of the native army. Almost all the principal native revenue servants are Brahmins, and

* *Vide* Appendix (F.) containing propositions for the Widows' Fund, from which it appears that the report of this fund added to the existing establishment of boys, led all the native officers to apply for means of bringing their families from Hindoostan.

† A remarkable circumstance, which shows the character of this feeling, occurred in 1818. Captain McDonald, an officer on my staff, who had belonged to a Bengal corps, at the siege of one of the forts of Bundelcund, where a low caste man had distinguished himself, and been promoted to the great disgust of the others, several of whom had taken their discharge, came to me one day in Malwa, and said he had met one of these Brahmins, a naique in the 8th Bombay Infantry, and that he asked why he left his corps on a low caste man being promoted, and was now serving with a Jeu Subedar, a Purwaree Jemadar, and other low caste men; the man said, he answered promptly, "Hindoostan Zat ke Ghyrat, Bombay, Pultun ke Ghyrat," that is, "In Hindoostan, it is the pride of caste, in Bombay, that of the corps."

and they are a valuable class of men. Every attention is due to the essential observances of their caste and religion; but when, as frequently happens, they solicit their European superiors to classify sepoys, and to place sentries in a manner that will prevent the inconvenience of their washing, or be offensive, they should be told the soldier is ennobled by his occupation, and that they might leave the public service, if the proximity to any of those employed in it was insufferable. This feeling when indulged increases and creates the worst spirit amongst the men of the corps, as well as hatred in sepoys to be employed under, or have any communication with Native servants in the civil branch. They complain, and justly, that the treatment they meet from them is often different from that they receive from their officers. "These cowardly fellows of Brahmins," said an able and old Konkanee subadar I was conversing with on this point, "who would not look at me, and would degrade a brave man of my caste (a Purwaree) by refusing to let him stand sentry over the treasure, if in a cutcherry will cringe and help the collector to his shoe if it fell off, and would consider themselves the more honoured the nearer he sat to them; and yet, I believe," said the old man, laughing, "you Faringees are, according to their belief, as unclean and impure as we Purwarees." I have communicated with some of the Brahmins who exercised high civil and military power under the Native Government of the Deccan, and they assure me no objection would have been tolerated on this score against any soldier. Purwa, the celebrated Dewan of Mysore, himself a strict Brahmin, and the ablest man I ever knew, repressed this spirit with great violence in one of the two instances where it appeared in men of his own caste, and repeatedly told me it was calculated to make impressions dangerous to any government, however constituted, in India. The error into which numbers fall in this respect proceeds from the best motive, that of conciliating useful and respectable men; but their pride of caste must not be gratified at the hazard of any part of the temper and respectability of that army to which the safety of that empire has been and must continue to be intrusted.

32. In the Madras army desertions have been long almost unknown. This has prevailed to a great extent in that of Bombay; from 1803 to 1808, a period of five years, the desertions equalled its entire numerical strength, a loss to Government, independent of the services of the men, of seven lacs of rupees. The desertions of the next three years, from 1808 to 1812, averaged 2500 men per annum, costing Government six lacs. From that period (1811) to 1822 the returns show an average of desertion of 1·253 annually, but from 1822 to the present year, such became the improved state (in this respect) of the Bombay army, that they have decreased, and its desertions do not in the last year exceed 300 men.

33. Many causes combined to render desertions frequent, some local and uncontrollable—the disgust taken at the system of our discipline by the recruit; the facility of desertion from the limited territories of this presidency, and the certainty of getting service from Mahratta princes.

34. The Hindostanee men, indeed, were after a certain period of service almost certain to desert. Their view in enlisting was generally to obtain an opportunity of saving a sum of money (which their parsimonious habits enabled them to do), and they had no local bias, for they never brought their wives and families with them from Hindostan. When their object was attained, they took the first opportunity of deserting, and the distance of their homes, which, as well as their right names, are generally unknown, secured them from subsequent detection.

35. In 1809 Government, on the suggestion of Sir John Abercrombie, adopted several measures to obviate this great evil, and these were attended with most beneficial effects.

36. An amnesty to deserters, with liberty to re-enlist, was published. Furloughs were granted, the gratuity system was abolished, and pensions* for service and wounds were established for the sepoy, and, under certain circumstances, for his wife and children. Men were also allowed to enlist for limited periods of five, eight, or ten years.

*After 20 years' service three-fourths of his pay, and after 30, full pay for life.

37. There was before my arrival at Bombay a small establishment of sepoy boys with each Native corps, to which the court of directors had at first objected.

They, however, afterwards assented, on the representation of the Bombay Government of the ultimate economy as well as efficiency of the measure, to sanction it. Sir Thomas Bradford, the late commander-in-chief, pressed the increase of the sepoy boys, which, when the reductions were made in invalids, was carried into execution on the grounds stated in an annexed extract. When the hill forts were reduced in 1828, and a considerable reduction of expense effected, their commandants were remodified, and first and second class killadars established on a footing which, at a very trifling increase of expense, instituted a system of honourable rewards for old and distinguished soldiers. The annexed extracts of minutes will show your Lordship my reasons for adopting this measure, and the effects by which it has been followed. I also annex extract of a minute by which your Lordship will see that our local Sebundy corps are now commanded by active and distinguished Native officers, by which economy and efficiency have been promoted, and great encouragement given to the Native army.

*Vide* Appendix, B.

*Vide* Appendix, C.

*Vide* Appendix, D.

38. A subsequent measure, which allows a trifling distinction in pay, and exemption from corporal punishments in passing through the ranks, to a limited number in each corps to the sons of Native commissioned officers has been carried into execution at this presidency. The grounds on which the measure was adopted, as well as the expense incurred, your Lordship will find stated in the Appendix, to which I have added the minute upon the proposed widows' fund for Native commissioned officers, which would have been attended with no increase of expense to Government, but which, I regret to say, has been objected to by the supreme Government on the same ground that objections have been stated to the other measures regarding killadars and boys, that there were no such usages in Bengal, and that such distinctions were calculated to create discontent among the Native troops of that Establishment.

*Vide* Appendix, B.

*Vide* Appendix, F.

39. Each of the three Presidencies of India has succeeded in attaining, though by different means, the object of having an effective Native army. I have served with, and commanded, Native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and I declare to your Lordship I have hardly a choice. They have different qualities, but with good officers they are all excellent troops. Their respective characters have been elsewhere described, and I confess I should dislike to see any serious change in their composition further than was dictated by a gradual change of circumstances. Independent of other reasons, which render the change far from desirable, there is no empire in which more attention may be eventually required, than in that of India, to the well-known maxim of the Romans in regard to their distant conquests, which was to preserve, or restore if disturbed, the peace of one province by troops drawn from another.

40. I have of late noticed this subject in several Minutes, in reply to suggestions and instructions from your Lordship in Council, founded on general principles of making an arrangement respecting Native troops similar at the three presidencies, and expressing apprehension lest giving encouragement to the Native army at one Presidency might create discontent at another. That this consideration has not before met with attention is to be referred to the distance at which the armies at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay acted, the different races of whom they were formed, and their habits of life. There has been no occasion to give that encouragement to the frugal Rajpoots, who are the cultivators of the provinces of Hindostan, that has been found necessary to attach Mahometans of the Carnatic, and the Hindoos of the Northern Circars, at Madras, and to induce the inhabitants of the Northern Concan and Deccan to enter the ranks at Bombay; but there can be no doubt that the pensions to Native officers of distinction, the fine establishment of boys attached to their corps, the regimental depots formed at the best recruiting stations at Madras, have accomplished their objects in fixing the attachment of the army to their colours, and their forwardness to march and embark on every service, as singularly evinced on the late occasion of the war in Burmah.

*Vide* Sir Thomas Munro's Correspondence.

41. Desertions, as I have already remarked, are almost unknown in that army, and I have shown that the same causes have produced the same effects at Bombay; recent and most minute examination into this and other subjects connected with the public service of this Presidency has quite convinced me that if the principles upon which measures are founded, and the effects produced by them, are not very carefully considered, the objects of true economy may be afterwards

wards sacrificed, and I have seldom known this fact more clearly elucidated than by the papers I have had to examine regarding the past and present condition of the army of this Presidency, the general results of which I have already noticed.

42. The late approximation of our Native armies certainly requires more attention than was formerly given to similarity of measures in regard to them, but there are so many opposite usages and feelings, as well as local circumstances, to be considered, that this object must be the work of time. Great care and caution are also necessary, for most serious injury may be inflicted by an order that apparently rests upon indisputable general grounds, but is inapplicable to the particular case. Before any measure connected with the improvement of our Native army is rejected at one Presidency because it has not been found necessary at another, it should be ascertained, in the first place, whether there are not local causes and considerations that render it wise and expedient, where it has been adopted; and, in the next, whether, judging the principles upon which it is founded and the effects it is calculated to produce, it is not worthy of imitation.

43. On the consequence that attaches to the Native army all are agreed. That a certain proportion of European troops should always be in India is fully admitted, but there is no error more common than that of considering the latter as a check upon the Native armies. They never have, and never will prove such. Long experience has rendered my opinions the same as those of Sir Thomas Munro. The necessity of check implies distrust that degrades. It is by complete confidence alone that the Native army of India can be preserved in efficiency, and attached to the Government it serves. But this most important object will require great increased consideration when a period of successive wars and field service is succeeded by a long peace, which, besides its other effects, calls for reduction in every branch of public expenditure; and, at such a time, with men who cannot be aware of all the bearings of this subject, and must be ignorant of the motives which actuate Government in the line of conduct necessity obliges them to pursue, and consequently are likely to misrepresent its intentions towards them. Government should be solicitous to substitute every other possible motive of fidelity and attachment, and omit no opportunity that may still be available of strengthening the subsisting ties between the Native soldiery and Government. I have elsewhere observed: "The rigid principles of economy, and the precise "forms of our civil rule, should both yield to the establishment of this corner-"stone of our strength, as without it the vast fabric which has been raised with "such pains must totter to its base at every tempest with which it is assailed."

44. On the pay of our Native army I can make no further remark than that I think prospectively a modification might be made that would be beneficial to Government, and not unsatisfactory to the troops, by giving less to the younger sepoy and more to the older. This is the case in the British army, and I believe with every one in Europe. I know of none in which it would be more accordant with circumstances than in the Native army of India. But it is a point that merits great attention, and the scale of it, if it is ever adopted, should be fixed with deliberate care.

45. I cannot quit this part of my subject without stating my opinion to your Lordship that it is not one to be intrusted to mere financiers or calculators, far less should the opinions of men not intimately acquainted with the feelings and character of our Native troops, and who have never served with them, be taken; nor can the opinions of those who have only served in one part of India be adopted as conclusive in regard to arrangements which affect another quarter of our dominions; the considerations which are involved in every question that does or may affect the temper of our Native army are, in my mind, of the highest importance. It cannot be too often repeated, this army is our safety and our danger. Every information should be sought and obtained to aid the judgment of those who have to decide upon points by which the temper, zeal, and fidelity of that class of troops can be affected; but not even what appears to be the least important of these measures should be adopted without the most serious deliberation. Every branch of this subject requires the mind of a statesman. We have, through the efforts of our Native army, triumphed in wars; and rebellious plots and conspiracies may be formed, but they will never succeed while we maintain the good spirit and fidelity of this branch of our force. This our

enemies, avowed and secret, well know; and all their efforts have been and will hereafter be directed to its corruption. This object has never been but very partially effected, but it is one which we must beware of aiding by any measure that impairs the confidence, that undervalues the merits, and slights the pretensions of men who are every day becoming more sensible of their own importance, and naturally seek for participation in the benefit of a power they have so largely contributed to establish, and of which they cannot be ignorant they must continue the principal support.

46. With respect to the distribution of the armies of India, I can only state a few leading principles by which that should be regulated. Though circumstances may occasion deviations that cannot be provided for, if we fix and pursue to the utmost of our ability a settled plan we shall avoid great expense, both to Government and individuals; for when that plan is fully acted upon, the distinction will be completely made between temporary and fixed stations. The plan regarding fixed stations is simple and obvious, from its principal object being the preservation of the internal peace of India and defence against foreign invasion.

47. The recurring expediency of embarking European troops should also be borne in mind; and this, with the nature of their supplies, requires that, where it is practicable, a considerable proportion of that branch should be near the sea, or where there is water carriage. These corps should be distributed in ordinary times according to the proportion of the divisions of the Native army with which they serve.

48. The principles to be observed in fixing upon permanent stations are, lines of defence and of communication. I have, in recommending such stations since I arrived, kept this steadily in view. From Bombay to Masulipatam, which cuts the Peninsula at a part very important for preserving tranquillity, the line of direct road from Bombay is Poonah, the principal station for European troops, and from that to Sholapore, our next permanent station, is 160 miles, from which it is 200 to Hydrabad and to Masulipatam. The superior road recently constructed up the Bhore Ghaut renders that not only practicable but easy for wheeled carriages, though the ascent is 2,000 feet. It completes an excellent road to Poonah, and we are gradually extending that to Sholapore by the Collectors, which, from the soil of the Deccan being so favourable, has not yet cost more than 300 rupees per mile. If the Nizam's Government can hereafter be persuaded to make the road through its territories between those of Madras and Bombay, the communication from sea to sea, on this line, will be complete, while the station of Belgaum is in another line, by which we communicate with the ceded districts of Madras and Mysore. This road from Poona will extend to the Neera Bridge, from whence the Rajah of Sattarah has promised to make it through his territories, which leaves a distance of miles to Belgaum, whence an excellent road to Dharwar will be completed by the Madras Pioneers within the next month. Little remains to finish this line, and these roads, when completed, will be found of the utmost importance, not only as they facilitate a communication between our force throughout the southern parts of India, and enable us to reduce expense by improved means of combining military resources, but as they promote intercourse and commerce. The permanent station of Belgaum has, besides the recommendation of being on this line, that of salubrity, and being well situated for a European regiment, and the additional one of being within 70 miles of the port of Vingoorla, to which an excellent road has been made that facilitates supplies from Bombay, and is favourable for this corps embarking at the shortest notice.

49. Ahmednuggur, which is on the line from Poonah to Central India, and also to Aurungabad, Jaulna, and Nagpore, must ever be deemed, in the distribution of the troops allotted to this quarter, an important permanent station. It is now the Artillery Depôt, and almost the whole of that corps are fixed at it. The communication between this place and Bombay can be shortened by 30 or 40 miles, and it may be eventually useful to open this line of road. The Engineer Corps being stationed at Seroor, which is on the line, and exactly half way between this place and Poonah, will soon complete, and at no cost, a road already commenced betwixt them; and, that being hereafter carried to Jaulna and

and Nagpore, will be of much importance in improving the efficiency derived from the station of troops on that line to the Bengal territories.

50. A most excellent and permanent road has been made from Bombay to Tannah, and from that up the Tull Ghaut to Malligaum, and through the greater part of Candeish, towards Sindwar. It will be of much importance this road should hereafter be extended to Mhow. The distance to be made is not great, and the soil in most parts favourable. The construction of a road, and clearing the jungle, would make this route as good and as safe as other lines of communication in which such tracts are to be passed.

51. To the northward our present permanent stations are singularly well calculated to maintain the public peace, to meet invasion, and to communicate (the most important of all points) with the troops of Bengal for the protection of our north-western frontier, from the Indus to the Himalaya mountains.

52. Ahmedabad, a most centrical situation, is now the head quarters of the northern division. It is from the Gulf of Cambay 30 miles; 70 from Deesa, the principal permanent station on the frontier of Guzerat; 80 miles from Rajcote, in Katywar, by which it communicates in a direct line with Kutch; and 70 from Baroda. Hursole, a new station, which is 30 miles from Ahmedabad, is on the direct line to Neemuch, from which its distance is only 130 or 140 miles; and, by the report of Lieutenant Holland, lately returned from the survey of a route from Hursole to Dungerpore, added to my knowledge of the Banswarrah and Purtubghur country, I must assume that a road sufficiently good for all military purposes might be constructed, at comparatively small cost, between these stations, and through it our military strength would be increased without any addition to its numerical numbers; but a line from Deesa, from Seroee to Ajmeer and Delhi, is of still more consequence. A glance at the map will satisfy your Lordship of this fact; I cannot tell you the importance I attach to opening these roads, which are to communicate, and in a manner join, the only frontiers of our Empire which can be exposed to invasion; but that may be termed a speculative event, and one probably so remote as not to warrant any disbursement. But there is, or I am mistaken, more proximate dangers from internal disturbances along these lines that would be almost removed by the construction of roads, or, under all circumstances, much lessened. My inquiries and observations in Katty war and Myekanta, as well as the information I was able to obtain of the adjoining districts of Rajpootana, led me to deem these countries far from free of the seeds of future trouble. The chiefs under our direct rule, as well as those subject to our controlling management throughout our north-western frontier, are neither in a settled or contented state. Independent of their attachment to ambitious habits, and their restless minds, those of this class in our own provinces are far from being yet reconciled to the system of our judicial administration, which it has been stated by my predecessor, and has been recently* repeated by me, is, in its forms and processes, very unsuited to their condition. Those who are not yet subject to the regulations, but are under protection, live in dread of the approach of our regular courts, and I really know of no other feeling that makes this class of persons view with jealousy, and a spirit of hostility, the extension of our power, which, whenever our system has been modified to the circumstances and condition of such classes, has been recognised and acknowledged as a blessing.

*Vide* Minute in Revenue Department, in Guzerat, dated 15 October 1830.

53. The Rajpoot chiefs to whom I allude are almost all connected with the highest families in Rajpootana,† with whom they correspond, intermarry, and no doubt at times intrigue. There may be no immediate proofs of existing danger, but this is a part of our territories in which a flame once raised would be likely to spread, and not be easily extinguished. The intersection of these countries by roads, and the increased intercourse consequently created, would, while it improved both their countries and ours, give us a facility of moving troops at all seasons that would tend more materially than any measure I know to preserve the general tranquillity.

54. In

† Both the Eden and Ahmednuggur chiefs are very nearly related to the Rajah of Gordpore. The son of the Ahmednuggur Rajah (a fine boy), is, I believe, thought likely to succeed eventually to that great Principality.

54. In the present state of the finance of India no large work of the nature proposed can be undertaken, but the object of the true economy of a state is to reduce every unnecessary expense, that it may possess the means of making those disbursements which it is compelled to do by public exigencies, or which it is wise and expedient to do on grounds that cannot be disputed, of preventive policy, which demands more attention in a Government like that we have established in India than in any I know in the whole world, would gain by the increased power of rapidly combining our military resources, and lead to great saving of future expenditure. I do not wish your Lordship to go farther at present than to direct the plan I have sketched, if you approve of it, to be progressively accomplished. If that is done I should deprecate any extensive surveys, or any nominations of general superintendents, or employment of scientific officers, except to construct bridges or other works in which science was required. The lines being decided upon by reference to past surveys, and information of local revenue and political authorities, the roads might be gradually commenced by the collectors, and princes and chiefs may be induced by remissions or favour to continue it through their territories. If this was done, and some aid granted, much might be effected at small comparative cost. I am by no means an advocate for these lines being made in the first instance on any great scale, though they might be constructed with a view to future improvement, when their beneficial results, and the more prosperous state of our finance warranted. Practical experience upon this subject leads me to assure your Lordship that the expense, if incurred gradually, and the work effected in the manner we are now carrying on some roads in the Deccan, will not be great. Natural obstacles will no doubt occur, which will require the application of art as well as expenditure, but these would not be numerous in any of the lines I have suggested, and, when overcome, would be attended with increase of commerce, and consequently of customs, besides the cheaper conveyance of stores and provisions, even when a duty was not established to reimburse expenditure.

55. The rendering the Bhore Ghaut, on the road between Bombay and Panwell, practicable for wheeled carriages, has long been a desirable object; but Government was deterred by the expense, it having been estimated at above two lacs of rupees. A contract was made for one lac. The annual saving upon the transport of public stores is between 6000 and 7000 rupees in times of profound peace. Had it been as practicable for carts as it now is, even as late as 1827 (during the Kolapoor expedition) the calculated saving would have been from forty to fifty thousand rupees in one year; and, besides the saving actually made on stores, twelve thousand rupees have been offered for the moderate duties imposed for next year. More will be given, and there can be no doubt the judicious expenditure of one lac of rupees on this work will be a certain source of revenue of thirty or forty thousand rupees in ordinary times, and, on the occurrence of military operations, the actual cost will be more than realized every year. The duties levied will be cheerfully paid, for it is as great pecuniary benefit to individuals as to the public. I instance this work as one in which the outlay is very profitable, besides the many great advantages to be derived from its construction.

56. The stations at Madras have been fixed at different periods, as here, to meet the changing circumstances of the territories it had to protect, and the subsidiary forces it had to furnish. The southern stations have been gradually decreased. Its great line of communication with Calcutta through the Circars is one not requiring protection. The stations in the Carnatic and Mysore, which are those of its disposable troops, connect it with Malabar in one line and with the Southern Mahratta country by another. The latter has also a communication with the stations in the ceded districts. All these lines require attention, and fortunately the excellent roads made through various parts of Mysore, and the ability and disposition of the Rajah to construct such works, will greatly aid the object in this quarter.

57. The communication from Hydrabad, by Nagpore to Saugur, is a military line of importance, and one on which the stations should be permanent, while that of Jaulna is useful as communicating with Malwa.

58. From Calcutta to the station of Loodhiana, on the Sutledge, is one direct line on which, besides the stations, the disposable part of the army of this Presidency is cantoned. This line, branching from Allahabad or Benares military lines,

lines, might lead to Malwa, Bundelchund, and Nagpore, which, with those communicating with the Bombay troops on the North Western Frontier, would make not only the distribution of our force, but the means of one part giving aid to another, very complete.

59. With respect to the extent of country to be occupied, and lines to be guarded by each Presidency, I must state my opinion that no changes can well be made, unless it is determined, as I anxiously trust it will be, that the local Indian force is to be one great army of three divisions. If that took place, the troops of this Presidency might occupy the line from Mhow to Mangalore as the South Eastern Frontier, and from Cutch to Serohee, which they now do within a few miles, as the North Western. It is, however, to be stated, that though many reasons, which I have before placed upon record, would render it more economical as well as convenient for the relief, stores, and supplies of the station of Mhow to appertain to Bombay than Bengal; yet unless the present separate, imperfect, and, I must add, fallacious system of keeping the accounts of India is changed, the expenses of this station would be an objection, so far as tending to swell the deficit of this Presidency; but that would be made up by the transfer of Canara, which is, in fact, similar in language to the whole of the Southern Mahratta country, and might be placed under the same rule, with considerable saving of expense. The military station of Mangalore would, particularly if an European regiment from this establishment was stationed there, be supplied with more facility and more economy from Bombay than Madras; but I beg to be distinctly understood by your Lordship as not recommending this extension of our lines of defence with the slightest view to increase the corps of this establishment to the decrease of either Bengal or Madras; on the contrary, I should deem such a measure unjust to the fair expectation and pretensions of those armies. But I state it as a desirable distribution, if the forces of the three Presidencies were so united as to clear us of the increasing embarrassment and injury to the public service which must continue on their present footing.

60. Your Lordship has expressed a wish, to which I can have no objection, that my opinion on the subject you have referred to my consideration should be placed on record; so I shall likewise place a copy on the records of this Presidency.

I am, &c.

Bombay, 27 November 1830. (signed) *J. Malcolm.*

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(A.)

MINUTE on the State of the Bombay Army, dated 25th March 1828, by Major General Sir *John Malcolm*, G. C. B. and K. L. S.

IN the letter in the military department, to the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 1st of December 1827, it was stated to be the intention of Government to address the Court at an early period, and in a fuller manner, upon the state of the army.

2. In pursuance of this intention, I desire to place upon record my opinion upon this large question, which, though grounded on general experience, will have more immediate reference to the present condition of the army of this Presidency.

3. The statement in the Appendix, No. 1, will show the exact number of officers now doing duty with corps, and the number of those employed on the staff, on furlough, and on sick certificate.

4. It appears from this statement, that of the three regiments of cavalry, one is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and two by majors; of the two regiments of Europeans, one is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and the other by a major.

5. Of the 26 regiments of Native infantry, three are commanded by lieutenant colonels, nine by majors, and the remaining 14 by captains, some of which latter are of very junior rank.

6. When to this is added, that the greatest part of the Native troops are scattered over an extensive country, many stations of which are unhealthy, it is difficult to conceive a state more inefficient than that of these corps, with regard to European officers. It is thought by some, from recollection of former times, that a battalion of Native infantry may be brought not only to and maintained in discipline by two or three officers, but be nearly as efficient for service. This opinion has gained strength by the excellent state of several extra corps which have only an European commandant and adjutant, but the conclusion here alluded to is drawn from erroneous premises. The introduction of a greater number of European officers into Native corps has totally altered their constitution, and they form, according to the existing system, a part whose inefficiency in number must include that of the whole corps. It would be needless to enumerate the obvious causes of this effect, as it relates to the regiments of the line. With regard to extra corps, though they have admirably answered the local purposes for which they have been raised, they would not without an addition of European officers be fit for general service.

7. It is much easier to point out the evil effects which this want of regimental officers, particularly of the higher class, must have upon the efficiency and reputation of the army than to suggest the remedies, but the case is one which will neither admit of evasion nor delay; and if it is felt, as it is at this moment, seriously to affect the discipline of the army during a period of profound peace, what would be the consequence in the event of war? for we must always bear in mind that our situation on such an event occurring has no analogy to that of any other state.

The officers who are absent on furlough are almost without exception in Europe, and cannot join till the emergency is over, while the number on sick certificate is certain to be increased without any possibility of supplying their place. This applies even to the most junior ranks, for, judging from the last 20 years, there never have been cadets more than sufficient to complete the establishment.

8. Before entering upon the means necessary to render regiments more efficient in European officers, it is essential to offer some observations upon the actual condition of this army with respect to officers required for more general command.

9. The only two major generals, Morris and Skelton, and two colonels, Lewis and Osborne, belonging to this establishment, are in England; the youngest major general is upwards of 46 years in the service, and the youngest colonel 37 years, and are, as is to be expected from their period of service, enjoying a liberal and comfortable retirement; and as their return to the active duties of their profession could not be anticipated, the Government have been compelled to place two lieutenant colonels commandant upon the general staff. This measure has and must continue to excite unpleasant feelings amongst senior * lieutenant colonels of his Majesty's service who are in regimental, garrison, or station commands, while their juniors are doing the duty and receiving the pay of general officers. Though the discontent they may feel be, for reasons that will be stated,† groundless, as far as relates to the established rights and usages of the army, with whom they are associated on service, its existence is an evil, and might, in the event of general operations, be attended with great loss of temper and much embarrassment.

10. This point, therefore, requires serious attention; no remedy (while brevets are so rare in England) suggests itself to my mind, except giving to officers of a certain standing, say 12 years as lieutenant colonels, local brevets or commissions as brigadier generals. If His Majesty deem it proper to issue such brevets to officers of his service employed in India on the staff, as well as to those of the Company, it could have no further injurious effect in His Majesty's service than that of preventing some old officers proceeding with their regiments to India; for if the expedient was adopted, no regimental officer of the standing of those eligible to be brigadier generals could be employed in that country;

* Commander in Chief's letter, 19 September 1824.

† *See* Appendix, No. 4, Mr. Elphinstone's minute in reply to Sir C. Colville's letter of 19 September 1824.

country; but, on the other hand, whilst it imposes no obligation to employ junior officers on the general staff, it might afford an opportunity that a long peace would render very desirable of bringing forward comparatively young men in duties for which they are required, and in the execution of which they might gain an experience that would prove most valuable to the country in the event of future hostilities in Europe. I speak with great diffidence when I presume to offer my observations upon the result of such an expedient as I have suggested, as far as it affects his Majesty's service; but I am quite positive in my opinion, that without this measure or some similar one is adopted, the army of this Presidency must deteriorate from that discipline and high reputation by which it has been hitherto distinguished. It cannot long support its character without the officers at its head are in rank as well as command on a par with the army with whom they are associated. If those are liable to constant supercession, and limited in their opportunities of acquiring fame, they will sink in their own estimation. The desire of obtaining the means of returning to England will be their sole object, and when they abandon for such feelings their hopes of military reputation, they will cease to enjoy the respect and consideration of their inferiors. The high tone and spirit of the army will degenerate, and without that is kept up, no army can be efficient; and most of all, one so constituted as that of the Company.

11. The late alteration in the army,* which only changed the number of battalions into as many regiments, added to the number of colonels, but not to the number of lieutenant colonels or majors, and by the privilege granted to those who became commandants of remaining in England, only five have been induced to stay in India, two† being nominated to the high station of the general staff of the army, one‡ acting in that station, one§ in a junior command, and one‖ in command of the artillery.

12. The prospect even of the station commands has not been sufficient to withhold officers of this class from retiring, nor is it to be expected that persons who have served near 30 years in India will remain in expectation of such commands when they have the power of living in complete comfort in their native country.

13. It may be urged that officers of the standing here mentioned have generally suffered in constitution, and their places in India are better filled by younger and more efficient men.

14. This would be true if such juniors attained rank, and every branch of troops employed in India was on the same footing; but it is the difference in the constitution of the King's and Company's army that creates the difficulty.

15. The oldest of the Company's lieutenant colonels present for duty on the Bombay establishment will, at a very early period, if no change takes place, be almost all junior to the majority of those in his Majesty's regiments. This is in a great degree the case at present, as will be seen by the Appendix, No. 8, which gives the number and rank of the 10 senior lieutenant colonels, King's and Company's, on the Bombay establishment. Justice to the senior officers of the Company's army, and consideration of their great local experience, has led to their being appointed to several separate and important commands; and attention to this rule must frequently compel the Government to resort to expedients with regard to the distribution of its troops,¶ which, in time of peace, are often difficult and embarrassing, and in the event of hostilities wholly impracticable. The consequence is, that his Majesty's and the Company's troops can never join in service without the senior officers of the latter (however high the separate commands they may have held) being superseded by the great proportion of the regimental officers of his Majesty's corps, who must, from their seniority

* *See* Appendix, No. 7, stating the alteration and increase that actually took place.
† Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Leighton and Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Hessman.
‡ Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Cleiland.
§ Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Delamotte. ‖ Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Whish.
¶ Sir C. Colville's letter, 19 September 1824, and Mr. Elphinstone's Minute in reply, Appendix, No. 4.

seniority, command every division, brigade, or detachment. There is no question meant to be raised as to the comparative merits and pretensions of the officers of the two armies, but the above facts are stated as the ground of my positive opinion that the present system in its effects has a direct tendency to prevent the senior officers of the Company's army, present in India, exercising high command during war, and consequently to deprive them of opportunities of distinguishing themselves in the service of their country; and it is obvious that, under such circumstances, these officers will exclusively limit their views to the preservation of their health and the completion of their period of service, in order that they may enjoy in their native country that comfort and repose which the liberality of Government has provided for them.

16. This is a fair and just object for men in the ordinary walks of life, but it is not one that will ever excite or maintain that spirit of animation among the seniors of an army which is requisite to make them stand as they ought in the estimation of those they command. Subordinate officers will cease to consider with sentiments of deference and respect persons whom they never contemplate as likely to attain any rank in command that will enable them to confer by their notice benefits and distinction; and the Native troops of India, who singularly associate their fame with that of their officers, will gradually cease to regard with that consideration they have hitherto done persons whose names they cannot trace from the loved and honoured command of their regiment to the successful leader of a division or army, whose victories have raised the reputation of the branch of the service to which he belonged.

17. These effects have always been, and must always continue to be, the consequence of the mixed service in India of his Majesty's and the Company's troops; various measures have been adopted to remedy the evils which have constantly occurred from the different constitution of these armies, and whenever this subject has been agitated, the local branch (that of the Company) has had no reason to complain of want of attention to its just claims. It may indeed be stated, that the actual increase of the evil at this moment is in some degree to be traced to a desire in the Honourable the Court of Directors to benefit the condition of the officers in India. By the regulations which divided each regiment into two, the number of retirements for commandants of corps was doubled; and though the income of the succeeding commandants was lessened, it was still however a provision so liberal, that it was not to be anticipated that many officers,* entitled to the enjoyment of such comfort in their native country, would remain in India in the distant expectation of advancement, while, on the other hand, alarm at slight indisposition even would in times of peace incline them to retire from the active duties of their profession; and on the occurrence of war, hostilities would be, in all probability, terminated before they could return.

* 28 out of 31 are in England.

18. It has been concluded that the division of the regiments, by doubling the number of commandants, would greatly add to promotion, but the fact may be questioned.

19. The casualties in the higher rank will, from the residence in England of a greater proportion of commandants, decrease in a ratio that will probably balance the difference of numbers calculated upon; and if not, the improved prospect of attaining this provision will prevent many from retiring on the pay of their rank, who, under the former system, would have done so, either from incompetence to active duties, or from despair of obtaining the off-reckonings of a regiment.

20. It might seem to a superficial observer that the evil stated would admit of an easy remedy, by only granting leave to a certain proportion of the commandants of corps to remain in England; but this, in the first place, would appear to be a violation of the principles of the existing regulations, and in the next, it would be ineffective to its object, for officers of such standing in the service, when they desired to retire home, would in most cases be too certain to have the just plea of impaired health; and it may be asserted that, under the circumstances they are placed, Government* cannot have the benefit of their services, unless

* Appendix, No. 21—H. E. Sir Thomas Bradford's letter of 12 December 1826.

unless arrangements are made that render these to a limited extent indispensable to establish their claim to the command of a corps, or that prevent them, by adding to their income, or giving them a prospect of distinction, from taking immediate advantage of their right of retirement.

21. The principle, of selection to the command and emolument of a regiment can never be introduced into an army so constituted as that of the Company in India; it seems fair to the public service, however, that every individual, before he became eligible to that station, should have served with credit for a certain period in the command of a corps, or in a station so high in the general staff as to be deemed of equal importance as that charge.

22. The established principle of seniority would not be violated by such a regulation; none would be excluded by its operation, except those who, from bad health or other causes, were incompetent to the higher duties of their profession, and to such the pay of their rank would appear a sufficient reward for past services. On others it would impose no hardship beyond obliging them to serve one or two years more in the higher stations of the army than what they might otherwise do, or to abandon their claims to a regiment. This principle has been, in fact, adopted in other branches of the service. An actual period of service is necessary to a medical officer, both as a superintending surgeon and in the medical board, before it can establish his rights to pension. The above suggestion is merely offered for consideration; if adopted, it could have no retrospective operation, and in its introduction it might be so qualified that it should not injure the just pretensions of any meritorious officers.

23. The Court of Directors have not been inattentive to the necessity of inducing officers of rank and character to remain in India after they become entitled to return to England. By their order, under date 25th of November 1823, besides the general officers on the staff, several stations * and brigades, of different classes, were authorised on allowances calculated to give every fair encouragement to the senior officers of the Company's service; and had the same liberal principle been extended to the officers actually commanding corps, the evils now complained of would, as far as the field officers † were concerned, not have existed, for a less proportion would have solicited furlough, and none would have remained filling subordinate staff situations.

24. There is no principle connected with the efficiency of an army so universally admitted, as that its discipline depends more upon the officers commanding regiments than any other class; and it is further admitted, that to command a corps well not only requires a knowledge of military duties but high rank.‡

25. It follows, that with the exception of the principal staff§, the command of a corps should be the most desirable, both from allowances and respectability, that an officer can aspire to hold.

26. There is no subordinate staff situation which a subaltern or captain of 12 or 15 years' standing cannot fill as well as a major or lieutenant colonel; but the former, however otherwise qualified, cannot exercise the command of a corps, except under great disadvantages. A full conviction of the truth of these facts, and of their great consequence to the efficiency of the Indian army, led the Court of Directors to take the subject into their consideration, and in consequence they sent out their orders of November 1823, which not only remodelled the armies of the three Presidencies, but settled the number of Government commands for each, with their respective allowances.

27. The Bengal Government, in forwarding the orders of the Court, stated in their instructions that the number fixed of seven Government commands at Bombay was to include all permanent Government commands, but that frontier stations and subsidiary forces were not subject to the same restrictions on the score

* Appendix, No. 11.—Statement of Allowances to the several Commands.
† Appendix, No. 12.—Statement of Regimental Allowances.
‡ Appendix, No 13.—Sir C. Colville, Sir Thomas Bradford, and Colonel Leighton's opinions on this head.
§ Appendix, No. 27.

score of allowances, and that the officers placed at the head of such forces were to be selections by the Governor without reference to seniority.

28. The orders of the Court of Directors regarding the changes in the constitution of the army directed the allowance of 400 rupees per mensem as increase to officers in command of corps.

29. The Governments of Madras and Bombay granted this allowance in addition to the full batta of the rank, considering such to be the Court's intention;* but the Governor General in Council did not concur in this interpretation of the Court's order, and in a letter to this Government, under date the 4th February 1825, it is stated that the corps in garrison† in Bengal drew only half batta, and that officers commanding such corps lost by the late orders from England a sum more than equivalent to the 400 rupees, and therefore the field allowances which had been continued at Bombay could not be sanctioned. Similar orders were sent to the Government of Fort St. George.

30. The existing difference between the allowances of the European officers of the Bengal establishment and those of the coast of Coromandel, is in no instance so great as in that of full batta, which, with the exception of two or three garrisons,‡ is drawn throughout the territories subject to Bengal, whereas the armies of the subordinate Presidencies have the allowance at none but a few field stations.§

This difference between the establishments in this and other allowances to officers commanding corps affected the operation of the Court's orders on this point, and renders what would be a boon to the officers of Madras and Bombay not so to those of Bengal.‖

31. The orders issued by the Supreme Government on this occasion reduced a lieutenant colonel commanding a corps at Bombay, at a half batta station, from the monthly allowances of 1,420 rupees,¶ which he had drawn under the interpretation given by the Governor in Council to the Court's order, to 1,220 rupees,** and from the diminution of this liberal augmentation of his former salary, the principal effect anticipated from the arrangement was in a great measure lost, for the command of a regiment, though increased, was not sufficiently so to induce officers of high rank to remain in India, nor to tempt others to quit staff situations from which it would have been harsh and impolitic to remove them, unless for their advantage; but there appears no ground to doubt but the objects the Honourable Court had in view will be attained (as far as the army of this Presidency is affected), if the Honourable Court determine upon granting the increase of 400 rupees without striking off the additional batta formerly enjoyed by officers in command of regiments. According to the existing rule, lieutenant colonel commandants under this Presidency are not considered at liberty to remain with their corps when their turn comes for Government commands. The operation of this rule may even at present be in some cases detrimental to the public service, and supposing that the increase recommended for the regimental commanding officers of corps is adopted, it might be an injury to a lieutenant colonel, instead of a benefit, to remove him from his regimental charge to one of the lesser Government commands,†† for while he would receive a very trifling increase of allowance, his expenses would become greater.

32. It

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* *See* Mr. Elphinstone's minute, dated 2nd March 1825.
† Colonel Casement's letter, and Colonel Imlach, the Auditor General's remark.
‡ Fort William, Barrackpore Cantonment, and Allahabad.
§ Cutch, Deesa, and Mhow, all on the frontier.
‖ Colonel Casement's letter, 12th August 1824.

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| ¶ Field Allowances | 1,020 |
| Staff Pay | 400 |
| | 1,420 |
| ** Garrison Allowances | 820 |
| Staff Pay | 400 |
| | 1,220 |

†† Appendix, No 11.—Statement of Allowances.

32. It may be here stated that though the number of brigades authorised by the Court of Directors is quite indispensable as an encouragement to the senior members of the army, while the officers in command of corps are on their present allowances, the case would be altered if the proposed increase was given to the commanders of corps; it would, on such a measure being adopted, appear practicable to reduce some of the stations that are of minor importance, while the four principal frontier stations, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, and Cutch, and the large cantonment of Poonah, might be beneficially increased. The result of such an arrangement would be to give more field officers for regimental duty, and the prospect of these higher and more desirable commands might prevent officers of rank from soliciting a furlough to England, or taking advantage of their right to retire at so early a period as they otherwise would.

33. To preserve that spirit and animation which are necessary in an army, and above all to that of India, high prizes must be presented to officers of rank. There is, when a forcible impetus is required, little if any advantage derived from those slight gradations of allowances and command, which leave individuals in doubt whether they shall benefit or lose by a change of their situations.

34. Other arrangements might be made to keep lieutenant colonels of the Bombay army with their corps. Of the present Government commands, I can only deem those I have before mentioned, Baroda, Mhow, Deesa, Cutch, and Poonah, of importance enough to require a specific officer to be nominated to them; with regard to the other stations, such as Candeish, Southern Konkan, Kaira, there appears to me no reason why the senior regimental officer at the station might not exercise the general command, as is now the case in the garrisons of Surat and Bombay.* Such officer would have a moderate additional allowance for this duty, but he would not be separated from his corps, and though his next senior might have regimental charge, his regiment would continue under his general authority and inspection.

35. The reduction made by discontinuing some of the above stations as Government commands might well be applied to increase the allowance now enjoyed by the officers in charge of the five important cantonments before noticed. This would constitute them into such objects, that officers of rank and character would remain in the country, or return to it in hopes of attaining them. They would of course continue as at present to be filled by selection; and though seniority would constitute a claim, it would be destructive of principles essential to the political administration of the country to admit it as giving any right to such command.

36. This plan would in a great degree be rendered abortive if lieutenant colonel commandants were not allowed to command their regiments, when they had no general charge, but to this there can be no objection. In his Majesty's service there are generally two lieutenant colonels present with a corps; and in the Company's, from regimental use ceasing at the rank of major, lieutenant colonels are always available for any corps in which they are required, and a case can hardly be anticipated in which two† could be present with one regiment.

37. It is unnecessary to add, that the proposition I have made to diminish the number of Government commands is meant to be contingent on the increase of allowances to officers commanding corps, and of the grant of an increase to the higher commands in the army; if such a reduction was made without the adoption of these measures, the evil complained of would be aggravated instead of being remedied.

38. The above arrangements relate chiefly to field officers, but there are, and must still be, a great want of efficiency in the army till the vacancies‡ in corps caused by the number employed in the staff are diminished.

39. The Adjutant General's return§ will show the number of officers in the Bombay army employed on staff duty. The great proportion of captains will be noticed

* Bombay is a special appointment, generally a king's officer.
† A lieutenant colonel commandant and a lieutenant colonel.
‡ Appendix, No. 11.—H. E. Sir T. Bradford's letter, December 1826.
§ Appendix, No. 19.

noticed. This arises from several causes. Under the regulations and usages of the service, officers of this rank may be said to be alone eligible to many stations on the staff.

40. We shall effect no good if we merely obtain field officers for regimental duty, without these are aided with more captains than we now have.* This rank is one of the most important in the army, and there cannot be a condition more unfavourable to military discipline than that of many corps of this Presidency, in which there is not an officer between the commander of the regiment and the subalterns. This injurious effect will in a great degree be done away by arrangements which give to those that perform regimental duty as good, if not better, prospects than upon the staff, and which render a certain portion of actual service with a corps indispensable to rise to the distinction and the emoluments accompanying its command; but further measures must be adopted to give an actual increase of officers, and particularly of captains, for regimental duty.

41. It has often been proposed to strike off the staff of the Indian army, but from the established principle of rise by seniority, and its association on service with his Majesty's troops, every plan hitherto brought forward has been found liable to what were deemed insurmountable objections; but the necessity for doing something is imperative, and we must not be withheld by ordinary difficulties and general rules from applying an unusual remedy in a case so emergent, and one which on some points has analogy to no other.

42. It has been proposed to form corps of officers without men, from which vacancies by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff or be nominated to corps proceeding on service,† but under all circumstances continue to rise in the skeleton corps to which they belonged.

43. There appears to me fewer objections to this plan than to any other I have seen. It would furnish officers for regimental duty without disturbing the regular rise of regiments, or producing those just grievances and irregularities of promotion that must result from associating in the Indian army staff employ with the attainment of permanent rank.

44. The above corps should in the first instance be raised as an augmentation. They should certainly have no ensigns in them, and perhaps the rank of lieutenant might also be dispensed with.‡ The promotion to the junior rank of these corps, whether it was a lieutenant or captain, should be from the senior ensign or lieutenant of the line; and this effect would be good, so far as it repaired bad fortune in regimental rise.

45. As the proposed skeleton regiments would have no lieutenant colonels commandant, they would consist of one lieutenant colonel,§ one major, five captains, and 10 lieutenants (if that rank was included); and two or three corps would consequently render disposable, for staff or to fill vacancies, 34 officers, all of whom would be of some standing in India.

46. Another question relating to staff employment remains to be examined, on which I shall venture some suggestions on points that I believe to be very seriously connected with the future efficiency of this army. In treating this subject, I shall divide the staff into military and civil. Under the first head is the general, the division, the brigade, the garrison, and the regimental staff. I consider also that in India the officers of the Commissariat Department must continue on the military staff of the army.

47. Independent of many other reasons which require this department to be filled by officers educated in the army, I know no line that derives so much advantage from the information brought into it by persons well acquainted with other branches of the service, nor one that imparts more useful knowledge to officers who leave it, on promotion, to assume regimental or general command.

The

* Appendix, No. 22.—Statement of the Number of Captains, and how employed.
† Appendix, No. 24.
‡ Appendix, No. 25.—Statement of the Plan.
§ Appendix, No. 26.—Comparative Statement of Expense of Three Skeleton Corps.

The greatest difficulty in operations in India is feeding an army, and familiarity with the details by which that is done is an incalculable advantage to an officer. I should on that and other grounds deem this department an essential branch of military staff; for if it takes men from regimental or general duty, it returns them more efficient, supposing always that advancement in it is not regulated by a succession by seniority, that must in a series of years make numbers forget other branches of their profession, and become fit only for office duties.

48. Officers who enter into the political line are usually selected for their talent and energy, combined with a knowledge of the languages and habits of the natives, acquired in the course of military service; and when they return to professional duties, they carry with them an experience and information that are most useful. Their occupation, indeed, in the political line often includes much military employment, and it would be as injurious to this class as it would be detrimental to the army not to consider them as a branch of military staff.

49. Officers employed in the survey branch may also be strictly accounted military, as their pursuits and studies are calculated to improve them in science, and to fit them for the highest stations in their profession; and above all, the Quartermaster General's Department.

50. I must place under the head of civil staff the Auditor * General's Department and paymasters, collectors, magistrates, or other officers continued permanently on civil duties.

51. I think there are many and obvious reasons why persons should be selected from the army to fill the various offices in the Pay Department, in which they should rise according to seniority or merit in the branch they had chosen. No officer should be eligible to this line that had not been eight or ten years in India, and who could not find ample security. The pay and prospects in this department would be such as fully to form compensation to satisfy officers well qualified for such appointments, for what they gave up in quitting the military line; and all persons appointed permanently to this branch should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belonged. Their promotion should cease, and they should retain no further claims upon the military line than that of a right, at the stated period, to the pension of the rank they held when they were nominated to the civil staff.

52. This separation of the Auditor General's Department would not apply to any person appointed to act on periods of emergency, but only to those who were nominated to the fixed establishment.

53. When emergencies or urgent calls of the service led to the appointment of military officers to be collectors, magistrates, or any other office that was strictly civil, such officer, if continued after the emergency had ceased, should be considered as upon the civil staff, and be struck off the strength of his corps, in the same manner as those belonging to the Pay Department.

54. To prevent the possibility of this arrangement giving rise to any complaints with regard to the unequal promotion it might make in regiments, it should be a rule that any vacancy caused by the transfer of an officer to the civil staff should be filled up by line, and not regimental promotion.

55. The army would gain in the number of officers with corps and in promotion† by striking off the civil staff; and it would not lose in efficiency by their separation from the line, for though there would be no want of qualified and respectable candidates for this branch, these would not be officers whose minds were

* *Vide* Appendix, No. 27.

† The period that officers served in the line would be one of probation as to character and fitness for the duties of the pay department, and promotion would be accelerated by their transfer to this branch. This last is an important consideration, for, in an army that rises as that of India must continue to do upon the principle of seniority, it is almost impossible to devise expedients that will save it from that stagnation into which it is so prone to seniority. Amongst others, benefit has been justly anticipated from permitting, under strict regulation, the sale of commissions and exchanges with His Majesty's army; but I have elsewhere* given my sentiments very fully upon both these points.

* *Vide* "Political History of India," vol. ii. pp. 211, 212, 213, 222.

were bent upon military duties, or who were ambitious of advancement in their profession.

56. If the suggestions here offered respecting the civil staff are adopted it will be but just to the meritorious officers now in this branch to give them two or three years to make up their option, whether they will remain in it, or return to the military line of the service.

57. To sum up what has been stated: the superior commands proposed to be given to the senior officers, and the increased allowance to those in charge of corps, might be expected to preserve and regain the services of the most experienced and distinguished men in the army, while the other arrangements proposed would add greatly to the number of officers for regimental duty.

58. These arrangements will no doubt be attended with considerable expense, but it has been assumed that this expenditure has already been contemplated by the Honourable the Court of Directors, who have considered that it is justified by the necessity which exists of preserving and improving the efficiency of the Indian army.

59. The facts I have adduced will, I think, prove that as far as that of this Presidency is concerned, there is a considerable danger, if some change is not made in the present system, of a deterioration from that high character it has hitherto maintained.

60. I am quite aware of the numerous and serious objections which may be offered to what I have proposed, but they are the best and most expedient that I can devise.

61. The case is surrounded with too many difficulties and embarrassments to give a hope of remedying every evil; but I must conscientiously state my conviction that nothing short of some such measures as I have proposed will give health and vigour to a branch of the service which, in its decay, must involve that of an empire.

## Appendix No. 1.

RETURN of the Officers belonging to 3 Regiments of Light Cavalry, and 2 European and 26 Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment.

Adjutant General's Office, 14 December 1867.

| | Colonels, &c. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | TOTAL. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Native cavalry, 3 regiments | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 20 | 14 | 43 |
| European infantry, 2 regiments | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 8 | 27 |
| Native infantry, 26 regiments | – | 3 | 9 | 54 | 197 | 91 | 354 |
| TOTAL | – | 5 | 12 | 64 | 230 | 113 | 424 |
| On the Staff: | | | | | | | |
| Native cavalry, 3 regiments | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | – | 11 |
| European infantry, 2 regiments | – | 1 | – | 4 | 3 | – | 8 |
| Native infantry, 26 regiments | 3 | 9 | 8 | 56 | 38 | – | 114 |
| TOTAL | 4 | 12 | 9 | 63 | 45 | – | 133 |

| | Colonels, &c. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| On Furlough, Europe: | | | | | | | |
| Native Cavalry, 3 regiments - - - | 2 | – | – | 6 | 6 | 1 | 15 |
| European infantry, 2 regiments - - | 2 | – | 1 | 2 | 4 | – | 9 |
| Native infantry, 26 regiments - - - | 23 | 14 | 9 | 20 | 25 | 3 | 94 |
| Total - - - | 27 | 14 | 10 | 28 | 35 | 4 | 118 |
| Abstract: | | | | | | | |
| Effective, doing duty with 31 regiments - | – | 5 | 12 | 64 | 230 | 113 | 424 |
| On staff employ, and other appointments - | 4 | 12 | 9 | 63 | 45 | – | 133 |
| On furlough { On sick certificate - - | 6 | 6 | 7 | 19 | 31 | 3 | 66 |
| to Europe { On private affairs - - | 21 | 8 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 46 |
| Total - - - | 31 | 31 | 31 | 155 | 310 | 117 | 669 |

(True Abstract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,* Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 2.

Paragraph 3rd. "The security of our profession in this country must chiefly depend on our military power."

Paragraph. "The improvement of our military system is our first and most important care."

Lord William Bentinck's Minute, while Governor at Madras.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 3.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Madras Army, to the late President of the Board of Control.

"We must mingle the two services by permitting exchanges, under certain limitations, and we must make them one at a particular point by rendering officers who have attained the rank of colonel or major eligible to employment in all parts of the world; and we must show that honorary marks of distinction and the office of the Commander in Chief are not exclusively reserved for one service.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 4.

Mr. Elphinstone's Minute in reply to Sir Charles Colville's letter, 19th September 1824, states that the distinctions complained of (Company's officers having the greater number of commands, while many of those officers were junior to those of his Majesty's service) were not so great as apprehended by the Commander in Chief, as the commands were as equally distributed as political circumstances rendered expedient, and had an European regiment (King's) been sent to Mhow, and the 4th Dragoons to Baroda (as was in agitation), the two best commands would be filled by King's officers.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 5.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Army.

THE senior officers who have not regiments must remain, from necessity, in India, subjected to the mortification of seeing the commands of most importance entrusted to the King's officers of equal rank, not from partiality, but from their being younger men, and fitter for the duty. The officers actually in charge of corps, by the diminution of their allowances, and by being more seldom employed than formerly in distinguished commands, have lost, in the eyes both of the junior European officers and of the Native troops, much of that respect which they once enjoyed. The younger part of the European regimental officers, seeing their commanders obliged to give way to his Majesty's officers in almost every situation where honour is to be acquired, and knowing that after the longest course of service their own case will be no better, have lost the very hope of distinctions, and with it the most powerful incentive to honourable deeds.

We must quicken promotion by augmenting the number of officers in the higher, and diminishing that of those in the lower, ranks.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 6.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the State of the Army.

WE must render the situation of officers commanding Native corps more respectable, by higher allowances and a larger share of authority than they now possess. We must remove, as far as may be practicable, all distinctions between the King's and Company's officers, and we must elevate the Company's service by making their officers virtually, as well as in form, eligible to every office in India to which those of his Majesty's can be appointed, and eligible also, after attaining a certain rank, to employment in Europe or any part of the world.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 7.

THE old establishment, consisting of 13 regiments of two battalions each (now denominated 26 single regiments), each with one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and two majors, are each divided into two single regiments with each one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major; consequently, the increase has only been of one colonel, thus leaving each regiment or battalion with its former number of lieutenant colonels and majors.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 8.

THE senior officers of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service present on the Bombay establishment:—

Colonel Fitzgerald, his Majesty's 20th Foot, 12th August 1819.

Lieutenant Colonels:

Leighton, Company's, 25th December 1812.
Sullivan, his Majesty's 6th Foot, 1st July 1813.
Willshire, his Majesty's 6th Foot, Queen's, 4th December 1815.
Hessman, Artillery, 2nd February 1816.
Thomas, his Majesty's 20th Foot, 21st January 1819.
Cleiland, Company's, 15th April 1819.
Wilson, his Majesty's 4th Dragoons, 12th August 1819.
Whish, Artillery, 11th September 1820.
Rainey, his Majesty's unattached, 15th August 1822.

## Appendix, No. 9.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter.

THE conclusion which I would wish to draw from all that has been said is, that if we would wish to raise the Company's army from its present depressed state, we must make the situation of officers commanding Native corps more fixed and respectable. We must accelerate promotion by a greater proportion of the higher ranks, and we must draw home the senior officers when past the time of actual service by securing to them a comfortable retirement.

(True copy.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 10.

Commander in Chief's Letter, 12th December 1826.

Paragraph 3. I think it imperatively my duty to call the attention of the honourable President and Board to the state of the regiments in regard to the number of officers for regimental duty.

Para. 4. His Excellency admits there is no other method of filling up the Staff than from the line, but adds that "besides the other vacancies, the casualties occasioned by the climate, and the propriety of listening to old and sick officers for furlough, the proposed increase would not more than meet the demands of the service." His Excellency proposes the vacant commissions (90) to be filled up by an additional major to each regiment.

Mr. *Elphinstone's* Minute, 15th December.

Replies generally to the above, and then proceeds to state,—

Para. 4. We shall find by the adjutant general's list that the number of officers on the Staff and other duties does not exceed that contemplated by the Court of Directors.

Para. 5. I nevertheless agree with his Excellency as to the advantage of a large proportion of European officers, and therefore readily concur to recommend the whole of his suggestions to the honourable Court.

Second Minute by Mr. *Elphinstone.*

Para. 7. If we refer to the state of appointments in 1817, 1818, and 1819, the average was then about five per regiment. The last Madras army list shows the proportion in that long-settled Presidency to be very little less.

In Bengal, also, it is considerably more than four, but the larger the army the less in proportion will be the Staff.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 11.

THE following seven commands were authorised for Bombay:

| | |
|---|---|
| Baroda, beyond frontier | *Rs.* 1,410 |
| Mhow - - ditto | 1,180 |
| Cutch - - ditto | 710 |
| Sattara - - ditto | 710 |
| Candeish - ditto | 600 |
| Southern Concan, beyond frontier | 600 |
| Northern Division, Guzerat, beyond frontier | 600 |

in addition to regimental pay and allowances.

The cantonment of Poonah falls to the command of the senior King's officer, and the garrison of Bombay is a special command, and held almost always by a King's officer also.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 12.

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Lieutenant Colonel's pay and allowances on the Bombay Presidency - - - | 820 |
| Allowance for commanding - - - - - - - - - - - - | 400 |
| *Rs.* | 1,220 |

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Lieutenant Colonel's pay and allowances in all situations in Bengal, agreeably to Colonel Imlack, the Auditor General's, statement - - - - - - | 1,020 |
| Allowance for commanding - - - - - - - - - - - - | 400 |
| *Rs.* | 1,420 |

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

*N. B. See* pay table and Colonel Imlack's red ink remark.

## Appendix, No. 13.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S letter, 12th December 1826, "and that the efficiency of the Native army can only be preserved by having an adequate number of European officers with each regiment."

Commander in Chief's Minute, 2nd January 1827, paragraph 2nd:—"Every native regiment should have at its head a field officer, as those under that rank who fall into the command labour under disadvantages, and are never looked up to with the same respect by the sepoys, who think it a great hardship to be commanded by officers who know little or nothing about their individual character; and perhaps it is not too much to say, that the junior inexperienced European officers, of whom the proportion, compared with the number who know their duty, is much too great in almost every regiment, at present do not conduct themselves towards a captain in temporary command as they would towards a field officer."

Extract from Colonel Leighton, the late Adjutant General's letter.

(True extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 14.

MR. ELPHINSTONE'S Minute, 2nd March 1825, stating that it is his opinion that the 400 rupees should be in addition to the field allowances for the command of regiments, that being the case at Bengal and at Madras.

*See* the whole of this discussion in Council under this date, with Mr. Chief Secretary Newnham's remarks.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 15.

IN Bengal, all stations below Allahabad, that is to say, Barrackpoor and the garrison of Fort William, are half-batta stations; and all above Allahabad, that is to say, every other station

station in that Presidency are on field batta. Colonel Imlack, the Auditor General, makes the following red ink remark in his official returns sent to Bombay under date 31st July 1827.

" The allowances of commissioned officers *do not* change in any situation."

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 16.

On the Bombay Presidency there are only three batta stations, Mhow, Cutch, and Deesa; but at the two frontier stations (which are also subsidiary forces), Baroda and Sattara, half batta only is drawn.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 17.

| | |
|---|---|
| Lieutenant Colonel commanding a corps draws together - - - | *Rs.* 1,220 |
| If the proposed additional batta was given of - - - - - - | 200 |
| | 1,420 |
| The Government commands, &c. - - - - - - - - - | 1,660 |
| | *Rs.* 240 |

The difference of 240 rupees, therefore, between the Government command and the command of a regiment would appear a trifle.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 18.

The Honourable the Court clearly did not, in their orders, contemplate the probability of a regiment being commanded by a lieutenant colonel commandant, for they most expressly direct the command allowance of 400 rupees not to be drawn by an officer in the receipt of off-reckonings.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

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## Appendix, No. 19.

RETURN of the Number of Staff and other Appointments, not Regimental, held by Officers of Cavalry, European and Native Infantry in the Honourable Company's Army on the Bombay Establishment during the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827. Adjutant General's Office, Bombay, 6 February 1828.

| | 1st January 1826. | | | | | | | 1st January 1827. | | | | | | | 1st January 1828. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. | Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. | Colonels, &c., Lieutenant Colonel Commandants. | Lieutenant Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. |
| General Staff and Departments of the Army | 3 | 5 | 4 | 22 | 3 | – | 37 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 23 | 4 | – | 36 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 21 | 4 | – | 30 |
| Divisional and District Staff | 4 | 1 | – | 13 | 9 | – | 27 | 2 | 4 | – | 13 | 10 | – | 29 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 13 | 9 | – | 30 |
| Garrison Staff | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | – | 8 | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | – | 8 | – | 1 | – | 1 | 2 | – | 4 |
| Personal Staff to the Honourable the Governor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Commander in Chief and General Officer of the Staff | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 2 | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | – | 1 | – | 1 | 2 | – | 4 |
| Attached to the Survey Department | – | 1 | – | 5 | 9 | 2 | 17 | – | – | – | 6 | 16 | – | 22 | – | – | – | 5 | 3 | – | 8 |
| Attached to the Battalion of the Pioneers, extra Battalions Marine | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Battalion Invalid and Sebundy Corps | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Guzerat and Provincial Battalion, Poonah Auxiliary Horse and Political Escorts | – | 1 | – | 11 | 31 | – | 43 | – | – | – | 13 | 24 | – | 37 | – | – | – | 14 | 17 | – | 31 |
| Employed in Political or Civil Duties | – | 4 | 1 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 23 | – | 4 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 1 | 24 | – | 3 | 7 | 7 | 5 | – | 22 |
| Attached to the Troops of H. H. the Nizam and Nagpore Auxiliary Horse | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | 4 | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | – | 3 |
| Total | 7 | 13 | 6 | 72 | 60 | 3 | 161 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 71 | 65 | 2 | 164 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 64 | 43 | – | 132 |

(True Copy.)
(signed) *Ed. Frederick*, Lieutenant Colonel, M.S.

(signed) *J. W. Atchison*,
Adjutant General of the Army.

## Appendix, No. 20.

RETURN of the Number of Officers belonging to each Regiment of Light Cavalry, European and Native Infantry, on the Bombay Establishment, Effective with the Regiments during the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827.

Adjutant General's Office, Bombay, 6 February 1828.

| | | 1st January 1826. | | | | | | | 1st January 1827. | | | | | | | 1st January 1828. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. | Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. | Colonels and Lieut.-Colonels Commandant. | Lieut.-Colonels. | Majors. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Cornets and Ensigns. | Total. |
| Native cavalry | 1st Regiment | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 20 | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 18 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 15 |
| | 2nd ditto | – | – | 1 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 16 | – | – | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 15 | – | – | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 15 |
| | 3rd ditto | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 17 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 9 | 3 | 14 | – | 1 | 1 | – | 9 | 4 | 15 |
| European infantry | 1st Regiment | – | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 2 | 10 | – | – | – | 2 | 5 | 3 | 10 | – | 1 | – | 2 | 4 | 4 | 11 |
| | 2nd ditto | – | – | – | 3 | 9 | 5 | 17 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 13 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 16 |
| | 1st Regiment | – | – | 1 | – | 7 | 4 | 12 | – | – | – | – | 6 | 3 | 9 | – | – | – | 1 | 10 | 3 | 14 |
| | 2nd ditto | – | – | – | 2 | 6 | 3 | 11 | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 3 | 11 | – | – | – | 3 | 6 | 4 | 13 |
| | 3rd ditto | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 3 | 12 | – | 1 | – | 3 | 8 | 3 | 15 | – | 1 | – | 2 | 5 | 4 | 12 |
| | 4th ditto | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 14 | – | – | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 14 | – | – | – | 1 | 9 | 4 | 14 |
| | 5th ditto | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 13 | – | – | – | 1 | 7 | 1 | 9 | – | – | 1 | – | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| | 6th ditto | – | 1 | – | 1 | 9 | 3 | 14 | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 4 | 15 | – | – | – | 4 | 8 | 2 | 14 |
| | 7th ditto | – | – | 1 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 12 | – | – | – | 3 | 9 | 4 | 16 | – | – | – | 4 | 8 | 3 | 15 |
| | 8th ditto | – | – | – | 3 | 7 | 4 | 14 | – | – | – | 2 | 7 | 4 | 13 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 15 |
| | 9th ditto | – | 1 | – | – | 7 | 5 | 13 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 11 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 12 |
| | 10th ditto | – | – | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 13 | – | 1 | – | 4 | 8 | 3 | 16 | – | 1 | – | 3 | 9 | 2 | 15 |
| | 11th ditto | – | – | – | 2 | 7 | 2 | 11 | – | 1 | – | 1 | 8 | 2 | 12 | – | – | – | 1 | 8 | 4 | 13 |
| | 12th ditto | – | – | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 10 | – | 1 | – | 2 | 6 | 1 | 10 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 14 |
| Native infantry | 13th ditto | – | – | – | 3 | 8 | 4 | 15 | – | – | – | 3 | 8 | 3 | 14 | – | – | – | 3 | 8 | 4 | 15 |
| | 14th ditto | – | 1 | – | 1 | 7 | 3 | 13 | – | – | – | 1 | 7 | 3 | 11 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 13 |
| | 15th ditto | – | – | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 13 | – | – | – | 2 | 6 | 1 | 9 | – | – | – | 2 | 6 | 3 | 11 |
| | 16th ditto | – | – | – | – | 5 | 3 | 8 | – | – | – | 1 | 4 | 3 | 8 | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | 4 | 10 |
| | 17th ditto | – | 1 | – | 1 | 7 | 5 | 14 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 4 | 15 | – | 1 | – | 3 | 7 | 3 | 14 |
| | 18th ditto | – | – | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 14 | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 14 | – | – | – | 1 | 10 | 4 | 15 |
| | 19th ditto | – | – | 1 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 17 | – | – | 1 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 15 | – | – | 1 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 15 |
| | 20th ditto | – | – | 1 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 18 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 15 | – | – | 1 | 2 | 10 | 5 | 18 |
| | 21st ditto | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 12 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 12 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 13 |
| | 22nd ditto | – | – | – | – | 8 | 4 | 12 | – | – | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 14 | – | – | 1 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 14 |
| | 23rd ditto | – | – | – | 1 | 7 | 5 | 14 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 13 | – | – | – | 2 | 8 | 2 | 12 |
| | 24th ditto | – | 1 | – | 1 | 7 | 3 | 12 | – | – | – | 1 | 8 | 4 | 13 | – | – | – | 1 | 8 | 4 | 13 |
| | 25th ditto | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 12 | – | – | – | 1 | 8 | 4 | 13 |
| | 26th ditto | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 5 | 3 | 10 | – | – | – | 2 | 7 | 4 | 13 |
| Total | | 2 | 10 | 15 | 53 | 206 | 104 | 390 | 1 | 10 | 13 | 62 | 222 | 89 | 397 | – | 5 | 13 | 63 | 230 | 112 | 423 |

(True copy.)

(signed) *Fd. Frederick*,
Lieut.-Colonel, M. S.

(signed) *J. W. Atchison*,
Adjutant General of the Army.

## Appendix, No. 21.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief remarks, in his letter of the 12th December 1826, that it never could have been in the contemplation of the Court of Directors, in the original constitution of the army, that the increasing exigencies of the service during a period of 30 years would have created so extensive a demand for officers for the staff. Mr. Elphinstone, in reply, agrees with the general reasoning of his Excellency, and finally proposes the reduction of some staff appointments, that these officers might join their corps. But the Commander in Chief imagines this would not answer the demand, for regimental officers who lost their appointments would apply for furlough, on the plea of impaired health.

(True Extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederich,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 22.

In three regiments of cavalry, two of European infantry, and 26 of Native infantry, there are a total number of captains - - - - - - - - - - 155

Deduct,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Captains as deputies in offices - - - - - - - - - - | 4 | |
| Ditto - assistants - ditto - - - - - - - - - | 14 | |
| Ditto - brigade majors - - - - - - - - - - | 5 | |
| Ditto - paymasters - - - - - - - - - - | 7 | |
| Ditto - surveyors, political agents in civil and other appointments - | 32 | |
| | 62 | |
| Ditto - sick, absent - - - - - - - - - - | 24 | |
| | | 86 |
| Captains for regimental duty, about 2½ per regiment - - - - - - | | 69 |

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 23.

Sir *Thomas Munro*'s Letter.

If military considerations alone regulated the formation of armies, it would not be difficult to ascertain what kind of army would be best adapted to Indian service. In this view, then, the best army would be such an one as the Indian army formerly was, the whole, both European and Native, one army under the Company, receiving temporary aid in war from the King.

What cannot be done by force may now and at all times be effected by justice, by a wise and liberal Government substituting confidence for distrust, and securing to the officers of the Native army a fair participation in all the honours and advantages of military command.

(True Extract.)

(signed) *Ed. Frederick,*
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 24.

Sir *John Malcolm*'s Central India, Vol. 2nd.

"And accelerating promotion in the local army; but there is no measure so requisite for the latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regiments occasioned by the removal of their officers to other duties. Under the present system, the deficiency of European officers is felt, particularly on service, as a great evil. This evil must continue till the regular staff of the army are separated from that list which it is essential to keep complete for regimental duties. If this measure is

is determined upon, the formation of a plan * for carrying it into effect will not be difficult; but great care must be taken that it combines a due regard for the interests of individuals with those of the public.

"We must continue dependent on the fidelity and efficiency of our Native Army for the preservation of India. The European officers are the links by which we must preserve its attachment and maintain its reputation. Their peculiar condition requires favour and support, and it is not too much to affirm that any means which have a tendency to depress this body of men, or to introduce any claims but those of Indian service and complete competence, into a competition for those objects of reward, will be fatal to our best hopes of preserving our Eastern Empire."

## Appendix, No. 25.

To fill up vacancies occasioned by staff appointments and absentee field officers.

It is not intended that the staff corps alluded to should be on the same principle as the one in England. This would involve some objections, as affecting the rise by seniority.

It is meant only to offer an experiment, by way of relief, which could be relinquished if found not applicable. That for a certain number of the fixed staff appointments, such as adjutant and quartermaster general, auditor and commissary general, with two or three of the principal commands, a promotion of majors to lieutenant colonels, and captains to majors, should take place, as an augmentation to the aggregate number of field officers in the line, to fill up the vacancies occasioned by these appointments, which, as being permanent, would occasion no fluctuation. This would keep the operation of it strictly in the line, while it placed so many more field officers at the head of corps.

If it were necessary, the operation might be extended to captains holding the deputy-ships, brigade majors, and paymasters, all being permanent but not temporary appointments; so that when a lieutenant was promoted to be a captain, a captain a major, a major a lieutenant colonel, in the place of those appointed to the permanent staff, they would run no risk of being reduced, when once promoted, by the staff person dying, retiring, or other casualty, as the vacancy must be filled up, because a certain number must be employed on the staff from the line; for an officer who had once attained the "lance rank" would never go back to his former one, while it would have the advantage of giving the seniors of every grade the pay and rank of the duties and command they were exercising in the absence of those employed on the staff. It is necessary to contemplate a case similar to the one in existence of a captain holding the appointment of adjutant general. This would not influence the rule, which ought to be allowed to take its course; and though the promotion of a major incidental to it might be considered as not strictly called for, and as surcharging the establishment, yet as no provision is made for the vacancies of field officers absent on sick leave, it would only act as beneficial, filling up the place of a field officer in Europe; otherwise, in considering it an exception to the rule, it might operate prejudicially to meritorious individuals, and consequently injurious to the public service.

It is to be doubted whether doubling the number of officers would effect the object in view. The Native Army wants more European officers, but the sepoys do not require so many in proportion as the King's regiments. One of the greatest defects is, that the communicating link between major and subaltern is so frequently broken by the absence of many and sometimes of all the captains of a regiment. Sir Thomas Munro thought the Indian Army wanted more field officers, but not more captains and subalterns.

The plan, however, for the skeleton corps mentioned in Appendix, No. 26, is no doubt the simplest and best.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M.S.

## Appendix, No. 26.

THE proposed augmentation of one major to each regiment would involve monthly expense of - - - - - - - - - - - - - *Rs.* 19,685

The expense monthly for officers at one regiment native infantry would be - 9,277

The proposed plan for three skeleton corps would be, for—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 Lieutenant Colonels - - - - - - - | *Rs.* 2,460 | |
| 3 Majors - - - - - - - - - | 1,905 | |
| 15 Captains - - - - - - - - | 5,565 | |
| | | 9,930 |

While

* The formation of the corps of officers without men from whom vacancies caused by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the staff, and who could join corps with whom their services might be required, but should rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections to this plan than any other, for it could in no degree disturb the regular rise of other corps or produce those inequalities of promotion that must result from filling by nomination to the staff from the regiments to which they belonged. These unattached corps would be found in the first instance as an augmentation.—Note, page 223, vol. ii.

While this plan furnishes 21 officers in the ranks most important, it incurs no expense for off-reckonings, staff, &c. Sir Thomas Munro was decidedly of opinion that the defect of our army laid in the want of officers in the *senior*, not *junior* ranks.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 27.

THE adjutant and quartermaster general's offices require to be filled by the first professional officers in the army, and should be equal to the general staff; while the situations of auditor and commissary general should be paid more as civil officers, proportionate to their great responsibility.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

## Appendix, No. 28.

Sir *Thomas Munro's* Letter on the state of the Madras Army, to the late President of the Board of Control.

PROMOTION might also in some degree be aided by giving to the officers appointed to the situations of quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, commissary-general, or military secretary to Government one step of advanced rank, provided they had served a certain number of years in India.

There is another mode of accelerating promotion, which was recommended by Lord Cornwallis, namely, to permit officers who had served their full time of 22 years actually in India to sell their commissions.

The introduction of this practice into a service where seniority is the fundamental principle of promotion, is a measure of doubtful expediency, as it might not at first be well received by the Company's officers; and if not limited by the strictest regulations, it might so extend as to destroy the rise by seniority, the very basis of the service; as it is, however, a most essential point that promotion should be facilitated whenever it can be done without injury to the present system, officers who have completed their 22 years service might, I think, be allowed to sell their commissions.

(signed) *Ed. Frederick*,
Lieutenant Colonel, M. S.

*Ordered*, That the subject of the preceding be noticed in the next Despatch to the Honourable Court, and that a copy of the paragraphs already prepared relative thereto, and the Minute above recorded, be sent to the Supreme Government.

## Appendix (B.)

EXTRACT of Sir *John Malcolm's* Minute, dated 4 September 1829.

I AM quite prepared to give the attention it demands to the proposition of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, regarding an increase of the number of boys to each native regiment.

The number proposed would entail a considerable expense, and it would be difficult at the present moment to incur that without authority from the Honourable the Court of Directors, except we had stronger reasons than any that can be urged for the measure as it now comes under consideration; but as I deem it of particular importance, when we are making every reduction we can, and have effected some and contemplate more in the pay of establishments and followers, to assure our native army by acts that these plans of retrenchment will not affect them, and that on the contrary we continue anxious to improve their condition, and as I consider their attachment to be very dependent on the feelings towards Government of the native commissioned officers, I must desire to combine with the proposition of the Commander in Chief an arrangement that would induce native officers to give their sons to the service, which false pride and alarm lest bad conduct in the son should bring disgrace upon the father now prevents their doing. There is another reason for our offering every encouragement for native officers bringing their sons up in the army, as it will obviate much of that distress which often falls upon their families at their death, and creates embarrassing claims on Government.

I would propose that the present number of boys be increased to 30; but that eight more boys be added, and denominated "first-class boys," with some slight distinctive mark

mark on their dress, and receiving 1½ rupees more than other boys. This class to be exclusively composed of the sons of native officers, and there might be eight men in every corps who were also sons of native officers, who received until they were promoted, from their superior merits, to the rank of commissioned officers, the sum of two rupees extra, but to have no other privilege or claim either to promotion or favour above other men of the corps, except exemption from corporal punishment. If guilty of disgraceful or improper conduct, they would, on this being reported, be discharged the service. When a vacancy occurred in this class, a best class boy, if old enough, might succeed.

The small extra pay recommended for these boys and men, and the exemption proposed, would be regarded with no envious feeling by the men of the regiment; on the contrary, it would add to the value of that rank to which they all aspired, and to which officers' sons would have no claim, except on the ground of superior merit.

This arrangement, supposing it to extend to all the native corps in the army, would be a total expense of little more than 2,000 rupees per mensem, or 24,000 rupees per annum, and less than the proposition of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, nearly 4,000 rupees per annum.

I have not entered into minute details of this plan, as these can be settled or modified if the principles on which it is grounded are approved. Of its excellent effects I can have no doubt, and I am indeed persuaded, from my knowledge of the feelings of our native troops, acquired in a course of 40 years' service with them, that no measure could be adopted more caculated to attach them to the service and to give value to the rank they have attained.

This measure is further recommended by the actual condition of the army of Bombay. The number of Hindoostan men in the native corps of this Presidency is within the last nine years 8,000 men more than it was previous to that period, and a decrease of 3,000 men has taken place of the natives of this Presidency. Notwithstanding the superior appearance and acknowledged gallantry of the Rajpoots of Hindoostan, this change in the composition of the native army of Bombay is far from desirable, for unless we can make the sepoys of Hindoostan settle in our provinces, they will be much more liable to desert; and many circumstances may occur to prevent their being so much depended upon as the natives of our provinces, who from many causes, and none more than this influx of foreigners, it is now difficult to recruit.

The measure I have proposed would be a real encouragement to men born in our provinces, and have a beneficial influence, as it tempted natives from Hindoostan to settle with their families in this part of India.

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MINUTE by Sir *John Malcolm*, dated 14th September 1829.

I HAVE given every consideration to the Minute of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, upon the introduction into our ranks of the sons of native officers with a small increase of pay, and with exemption, unless in capital cases, from corporal punishment, and as we differ on the latter point, I must desire with his Excellency's acquiescence to postpone for the present the further consideration of this subject.

I am quite positive that under the very exigent call for reduction in all parts of our military charges and establishments, and the proof exhibited in the recent dispatches of the Court of Directors of these being higher than those of either Madras or Bengal, that not only considerations of economy, but the best interests of this Presidency imperatively demand that all expenses under the head of military charges should be avoided, unless they can be proved to be attended with a benefit of a clear and positive magnitude. Such the proposition I brought forward, would, I am assured have been, but I am also quite persuaded that, unless commissioned officers' sons were in some mode (I care not about forms) exempted, except in capital cases, from disgraceful punishment, that the good effects of the measure would be so materially lessened, as not to make it justifiable under the circumstances, we are placed in regard to all increase of military establishments.

I am quite aware that this opinion is not only contrary to that of his Excellency, but to that of officers for whose experience and judgment I have great respect. I spoke to Brigadier General Leighton upon the subject, and he told me that he thought with the Commander in Chief that the course of justice to all should, in his opinion, be equal, and he did not like the exemption suggested. Notwithstanding these opinions, I cannot resign my judgment upon a point that I may honestly say has had my anxious attention for more than 40 years, during which period I have served and been in intimate and direct communication with all ranks of our native troops, and have had under me those of every Presidency in India. I am positive on the grounds of the knowledge, that unless the exemption from corporal punishment is in some mode secured, the proposed boon to the native commissioned officers will be so deteriorated as not to warrant the expenditure that has been suggested.

I have very recently given a strong opinion on the operation of those general principles, attention to which limits and depresses the natives in every branch of our service, and shall here only repeat my perfect conviction that our unbending systems, and our reluctance to grant to our native subjects public servants and soldiers any exemption or privilege, however slight and unsubstantial, that interferes with our rules or forms, will

tend more, if rigidly persevered in, than any other cause I know to prevent our empir over India being of long duration. It is the constant theme (I speak from an experienc on this point that cannot be mistaken) of all our native subjects in India, and creates brooding discontent with their condition. That increases as men are advanced in ou service, for disappointment at checked ambition will, from the construction of the human mind, be too often found a stronger feeling than gratitude for past favours. Among our native commissioned officers, of whom I now speak, I know their most corroding feeling is, that though they may found the highest claims upon the service, they can transmit none, and they die in nine cases out of ten with the melancholy thought of leaving starving widows and idle profligate sons whom pride (mistaken perhaps) has led them to withhold from a career in which they have been successful, but in which they have fears the thoughtlessness of youth or vice may lead to their disgrace in corporal punishment being inflicted on their sons.

It has been often proposed to remedy these evils by introducing the promising sons of deserving men as volunteers, and allowing them to rise to commissions without passing through the ranks. For this I have ever objected, and ever shall. It would destroy the whole constitution of our native service, but the necessity of denying to the claims of rank and of merit, such distinction made me more anxious to grant all I could to gratify the prejudices and natural feelings of this valuable class of men, but it is a point I cannot desire to press in opposition to the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the army.

## Appendix (C.)

EXTRACT from Sir *John Malcolm's* Minute, dated 2nd November 1828.

REDUCTIONS have been recently made in many branches of the Military Department, and from intended reforms in the Native Pension Invalid Establishment, very considerable savings may be anticipated in this great but essential branch of expenditure. The certainty of provision in his old age, or when disabled by wounds, forms the principal tie by which we hold the attachment of our native army, but it is to be doubted whether, considering the changed condition of India, and the want of that action which beyond all other causes keeps soldiers true to their duty, we shall not now require an accession of motives to animate men upon whom we must continue dependent, and who will be every day more exposed to temptation to swerve from allegiance.

Minute on Captain Spiller's Corps, 28 October 1828.

I have observed, in a recent minute, that "the defect in this branch of our army, which threatens gradually to undermine its attachment, is the impracticability of raising any person in it above the most subordinate military charge. To reconcile the zeal and ambition required to animate the soldier with such depression, is a problem of no easy solution," but the difficulty of effecting this in a manner that fully meets the object, should not deter us from measures which have a tendency to keep alive hope, and through it to maintain the attachment of this most valuable and most important of all the classes of our native subjects.

Subsequent to the last war, this consideration led to the appointment of some distinguished commissioned and non-commissioned native officers to the charge of the hill forts upon a small additional pay, and the recent nomination of native officers to command the Sebundy Corps in the northern and southern concans, with the appointment of a senior subadar and the gradual introduction of deserving men from the line into the provincial corps at Ahmednugger, and other places may be expected to operate gradually in a manner the most beneficial to the public service; but more is wanting to give rank and consideration to our native soldiery in the community to which they belong. However distant the prospect, and however small the number who might reach the objects of ambition we may create, a stigma would be removed from our Government, which is now justly reproached with owing its aggrandisement and existence to a body of men to whom it denies all distinction. By conferring that upon some of the most distinguished, the whole service would be elevated, and the youngest native soldier would be cheered and inspirited with the prospect of future honour and advancement.

*Vide* Appendix (A.)

According to the annexed return, all the native commissioned and non-commissioned of this army who drew any allowance, extra to their regimental pay, or that received as invalids or pensioners were, four subadar majors, five subadars, and four havildars with the rank of jemadars who were nominated to the command of Hill Forts.

The nine subadars receive each for this duty, which exposes them to expense and hazard of health, 30 rupees salary and 15 rupees half batta, and four havildars 14 rupees each and two and a half batta, making a total of *Rs.* 473. 8. per mensem, or 5,061 rupees per annum, which before the recent resolution to appoint a native commandant to the Sebundy corps (a measure of economy, as it saved the allowances of an European officer), was literally all of extra reward, to which the natives of the Bombay army, consisting of three regiments of cavalry, a battalion of Golendauze, and 26 regiments of infantry could look.

This is besides the marine and extra battalions.

At Madras (with the native service of which I am better acquainted than any other) rewards to the native officers have been frequent and liberal, consisting of palanqueen allowances, horse allowance, pensions, and often grants of lands. These have been, and particularly lately, bestowed with all those imposing ceremonies that gratify the native, and,

and, above all, those who have military habits. I do not find that any similar rewards have been granted in this army, but though I would by no means exclude them for rare and distinguished service, I prefer the mode which has been commenced (for I can deem it nothing more) at this Presidency of instituting a fixed number of commands which present a number of certain objects to which men may look forward as the reward of long and distinguished service. But I am decidedly of opinion that these rewards should be made of higher value. If there were no other reasons, the great changes which have lately taken place, and the efforts made and making to advance the respectability of the public servants in the civil branch of the Government demand that some steps should be taken to grant comparative consideration to those whose services are of equal, if not greater, importance.*

The proportions I shall submit to Government to effect this object will be as much directed to elevate the old and faithful native soldier in rank as in emolument. The latter will not be great, and it will be consistent with every principle of true economy, for it will reconcile men to reforms now in progress in our invalid and pension establishments, that will, I trust, produce a great annual saving in this most heavy but most indispensable branch of public expenditure.

I should propose that the present 13 commands of hill forts† be reduced to six, to each of which there should be a killadar and a naik.

These should be divided into grades:—

Two of the first class.
Two of the second class.
Two of the third class.

† These forts might be Ryghur, Poorundur, Singhur, Loghur, Trimbuck, and Doomp.

The killadar should not be under the rank of subadar, nor his naik under that of jemadar.

A killadar of the first class should have an extra allowance to that which he was entitled to retire upon, of 170 rupees per mensem and 30 rupees to keep a horse.

He would be nominated by Government at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, and receive on his nomination a sumida's killadar, a dress of honour, and a horse from the Government.

A killadar of the second class should have an extra allowance of 150 rupees per mensem and a sunnud and dress from the governor. Those of the third class should have 100 rupees per mensem and a dress and a sunnud in the same manner.

The naib killadars should have as follows:—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| First class | - | - | 80 rupees per mensem. |
| Second class | - | - | 60 - ditto - ditto. |
| Third class | - | - | 40 - ditto - ditto. |

The killadars of the first class should be admitted to the third-class of the privileged orders of the Deccan. The killadars might be permitted to reside at the fort to which they were nominated, or not, as was expedient; but where any causes led to their being allowed to be absent, the naib must remain in charge.

The whole expense of this arrangement would amount to 1,000 rupees per mensem, or 787 rupees above that now incurred, and there cannot be a doubt that this small increase of expenditure with the employment of the native commissioned and non-commissioned in the provincial corps combined with, perhaps, some slight changes in the constitution of the veteran battalion, will diffuse life and spirit throughout this class of our troops.

Nothing but a thorough conviction of the expediency and policy of this measure would induce me to recommend any increase of expenditure, however small, at a period like the present; but one of the motives which have recently led me to suggest reductions that might, I thought, be made without injury to the service is to possess Government of means to meet expenditure which, like the present, is essential to promote its best interests.

The commands I have proposed would be fixed and certain rewards to which the oldest and most meritorious native officers of this army might aspire in the ordinary course of service, but rare instances may occur under this Presidency, where the extraordinary fidelity or gallantry of a native officer entitles him to higher notice, and in such cases, policy requires we should be forward to confer that distinction which belongs to the possession of land, and the jaghire or enam given to the deserving father might be conditionally or unconditionally given to his heirs. In cases where very extraordinary services called for such notice in an individual of the native army he should be elevated to the jud class of privileged persons in the Deccan, and honoured in every manner that could flatter the pride of that body of men to whom he belonged.

MINUTE by Sir *John Malcolm*, dated 3rd January 1829.

REFERRING to the Government General Order of the 14th November, regarding native officers to be appointed to the command of certain hill forts.

I should

* More than comparative consideration cannot be granted, but the highest allowance to two subadars or killadars of 1st staff pay included, is not 300, while many native servants in the civil establishments may rise to as high a salary as 500 and 600 rupees per mensem.

(signed) *J. M.*

I should propose that such commands should not be bestowed upon any native officers of less than 30 years' service. Extraordinary valour or conduct will merit and receive extraordinary notice, without reference to the period of service, but that will be independent of the fixed reward now instituted, as powerful inducements to high military feelings and distinction in this branch of our army.

It being very desirable that the most effectual means should be taken for ascertaining the individuals who have established the best claims upon Government for the proposed appointments, I should suggest that his Excellency the Commander in Chief be requested to lay before Government as soon as may be convenient a register roll of at least 12 subadar majors or other senior subadars, and of 12 jemadars, exhibiting the dates of promotion of each grade, and a detailed account of their services, specifying also whether wounded or not, the number of actions, sieges, and assaults of fortified places at which they may have been employed. It appears necessary that the names and services of all the native officers now in command of hill forts by the appointment of Government, should be laid before the Board in a separate list to enable it to judge of their pretensions to be continued in such commands under the late regulations in preference to others. The dates of their appointments and by whom originally recommended, and the manner they have conducted themselves up to the present time, should also be stated.

Native officers of 30 years' service who may have been transferred from the effective strength of the army since the 1st of January 1828, if properly qualified by their services, are to be deemed eligible, but beyond that period the regulation should not have a retrospective effect to pensioned or invalid officers.

It would be satisfactory that the correctness of the statement of each officer's services were ascertained by division or other superior commanding officers, by careful inquiry and personal examination of the native officers themselves.

The register rolls to be accompanied by a recommendation of the Commander in Chief in favour of the officers who, in his Excellency's opinion, have best entitled themselves, by their services in the field, to reward and high distinction among their countrymen. The selection, however, from the best submitted to the Board, to rest with the Governor in Council in the same manner as that of European officers to Government commands.

The Governor will give the investiture of khilâts to the native officers so selected, and when he cannot do that in person, he will delegate his authority for this purpose, but on all occasions this honour will be conferred with those forms and observances that are calculated to add to the value of the distinctions conferred on the individual.

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MINUTE by Sir *John Malcolm*, dated 3rd October 1829.

HAVING fixed upon the 23rd of September, the anniversary of the battle of Assaye as an appropriate day to confer the sunnuds and khilâts upon the native officers who have been recommended by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to be promoted to the rank of killadar and naib killadars, the troops at Poona were ordered under arms, and all the jaghirdars and sirdars residing at that city were requested to attend. After these, with the killadars, had been received by me and his Excellency the Commander in Chief in a tent, we adjourned to the front where the ceremony of conferring the honours upon the parties could be witnessed by all the troops. The native officers of the sepoy corps were directed to fall out and attend to the ceremony, at which all the European officers in the cantonment not on duty were present.

A killât, with a horse, was given to the six subadars, along with a sunnud as killadar to each; while a khilât only was given to the six naib killadars, who received also a sunnud of their appointment.

The subadars of the first class, Bhicajee Jadow and Perseraw Sing, the two most distinguished of these old soldiers, were admitted into the third class of the privileged order of the Deccan.* Though this gives no immunities of which such men can be supposed desirous of availing themselves, it bestows rank and distinction in the native community, and was from this feeling received by the subadar major as the greatest honour that was conferred upon them, and appeared to give equal satisfaction to the other native officers; one of whom observed it was a distinction, which though given to only two of their class, elevated them all in the estimation of their countrymen.

I shall not attempt to describe the effect produced by the liberality of the Government on the occasion further than by stating, an expenditure, not exceeding 1,000 rupees per mensem, and only 787 more than was before incurred, associated as it has been with the distinctions being conferred with every ceremony that could render it impressive, has produced feelings of pride and gratification among the native troops at this place, which I have no doubt will spread to every military station of the Presidency.

When

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* The privileges of sirdars of the second class consist in an exemption from the ordinary procedure of the zilla courts and a right to have reports against them tried by the agent or deputy agent, who are directed to treat them with every consideration due to their rank.

In certain cases suits against persons in this class may be compromised and an arrangement entered into for an equitable division of their property among their creditors; but in all cases their persons and also much of their property as is necessary to support them in a manner consistent with their rank in society is held exempt from attachment.

When the ceremony of investiture was completed, a royal salute was fired in honour of the occasion, and the killadars and the naibs were invited to an entertainment, which was given by me in the evening, to which I had asked nearly 200 of the principal natives of Poona.

I have to propose that the following Government order be issued:

It has been determined by Government, in order to extend its means of encouraging and rewarding the oldest and most distinguished native officers of its army, to institute at permanent stations six killadars of the principal hill fortresses under Bombay, and to give to each of the officers raised to the dignity suitable allowances. His Excellency the Commander in Chief recommended the following officers to fill these situations:

| Present Rank. | Names. | —— | Designation. | To what Command. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subadar | Bhicajee Jadow | 15th Regiment N. I. | Killedar | Ryghur | 1st Class. |
| Local Jemadar | Gomogee Damajee | Invalid | Naib | | |
| Subadar Major | Pursuram Sing | 5th Regiment N. I. | Killedar | Poorundur | |
| Jemadar | Gopaljee Jadow | 1st E. B. | Naib | | |
| Subadar major | Khooshall | 5th Regiment R. I. | Killedar | Singhur | 2nd Class. |
| Jemadar | Tannae Jannae | Gl. P. B. | Naib | | |
| Subadar major | Morad Khan | 1st Gr. Regiment | Killedar | Loghur | |
| Jemadar | Baboo Ram | 10th Regiment N. I. | Naib | | |
| Subadar major | Ramjee Crojee | 17th Regiment N. I. | Killedar | Trimbuck | 3rd Class. |
| Jemadar | Kristna | 9th Regiment N. I. | Naib | | |
| Subadar | Mirza Mahomedally | 12th Regiment N. I. | Killedar | Doomp | |
| Jemadar | Shaik Mahomed | 9th Regiment N. I. | Naib | | |

The Honourable the Governor and His Excellency the Commander in Chief being at Poona, it was resolved that the ceremony of conferring this distinction should be fixed for the 23rd September, that day being the anniversary of the memorable Battle of Assaye, to the success of which the bravery of sepoys so greatly contributed; khilâts, horses, sunnuds, and other marks of honour were given by the Governor to each of the old and gallant officers that had been nominated Killadars and Naib Killadars. This ceremony was performed in front of the corps at Poona, drawn out for the occasion, and at the close a royal salute was fired to mark the degree to which the Government is disposed to honour those who distinguished themselves in its service.

In transmitting this order to His Excellency the Commander in Chief, he may be requested to direct its being communicated in the form he deems most impressive to the different native corps of the army.

## Appendix (D.)

MINUTE by the Governor, subscribed by Mr. *Warden* and Mr. *Goodwin*.

I CONCUR with Mr. Warden in deeming it inexpedient to employ European officers in command of Sebundies, but I think an encouragement which is much wanted might be given to active and intelligent native officers by nominating them with superior allowances to such commands. It would be both a reward for the past and a stimulus to future exertion, and such men, well selected, would effect more in police duties than any European officers could. Native officers so employed should be struck off the strength of the corps to which they belong, but his Excellency the Commander in Chief, if he adopts this suggestion, could best bring forward a plan by which it might be carried into effect with benefit to deserving individuals and to the service.

(signed) *John Malcolm.*

To the Adjutant General of the Army.

Sir,

I AM directed to acquaint you, for information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the Honourable the Governor in Council has resolved to appoint subadars, to be selected from the army, to the command of the Sebundies employed in the districts under this Presidency, and to grant them, in addition to the net pay of their rank, a staff salary of rupees (100) one hundred per mensem, with the established allowance of rupees (30) thirty, horse money.

2. The Governor in Council therefore requests that his Excellency will be pleased to place an active and meritorious subadar at the disposal of Government, to be appointed on the pay above referred to, to the command of the Sebundies in the Northern Conkan.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. G. Gardiner,*
Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle,
7 May 1828.

## Appendix (E.)

MINUTE by Sir *John Malcolm,* dated 27 January 1830.

I HAVE repeatedly alluded to the difficulty of recruiting the army of this Presidency from our own provinces, which will, I trust, be greatly lessened by the encouragement lately given by the nomination of native officers to be killadars, and the appointment of active and intelligent native commissioned officers to command Sebundy corps instead of European officers, and above all, by allotting eight boys and a similar number of men, the sons of subadars and jemadars, to each corps with a slight difference of pay. This last measure has already had the anticipated effect of removing the prejudices native officers have hitherto entertained of withholding their sons from the army.

The Governor General in Council, in a despatch now under consideration, dwells with justice on the expedience of having our native armies, on all points where it is practicable, similar in their frame and constitution, but local circumstances, and particularly those connected with recruiting, must create and continue to create distinctions. Some of the provinces of Bengal abound in recruits, and vacancies can be at once supplied by eligible men. There is greater difficulty at Madras and Bombay, and at both Presidencies it has, I believe, been found necessary to give much encouragement to obtain a superior class of men, and nothing certainly has more tended to infuse a spirit of attachment in these armies, and to prevent desertions, than the rewards given to distinguished native officers and the establishment of recruit boys.

It may be stated that recruits from Hindoostan will always be obtained in sufficient numbers by the Bombay army and the number of Purdesses now in that body may be adduced as a proof of this fact. But admitting it, the oldest and most experienced officers of this Presidency are not anxious to see the numbers of this caste of men increased.

They admit their eligibility from robustness of frame and military habits, but contend that they are mere mercenaries; have a dislike to those embarkations to which the troops of Bombay are so liable, and from having no ties of family (for they seldom or ever bring their wives and children) are apt to desert. These objections would in a great degree be removed if the Hindoostanees in the Bombay Army could be induced to settle; and, considering the numbers who have attained the rank of commissioned officers, there appears every prospect that this may be effected, if to the measures already adopted can be added a pension to their widows. The want of such a fund is with native officers of all castes the most serious grievance. The liberality of Government is often extended to the relief of the wives of men who die on service, but no more, and as they can save little if anything from their pay, their widows (who have lived in comparative affluence) are left almost objects of charity. Contemplating the advantages of a fund that would remedy this evil, I applied to Lieutenant Johnson, 1st assistant of the Military Auditor's office, and I give annexed the plan of a fund framed for me by that intelligent officer, which would meet the object without subjecting Government to any extra expense beyond a small donation at its first institution.

I have had the fullest communications with some of the most respectable native officers of this army, and they are unanimous in their desire to see this plan adopted. Its necessity and justice they observed, are alike obvious, and while it increases their respectability, it would, they all said, bind and attach them still more to the service.

I stated to several the difficulty that might arise from a plurality of wives, but this, they seemed to think, was more ideal than real. "We soldiers," said *Purseram Sing, one of the oldest and most distinguished native officers of the army, "have seldom more than

* Purseram Sing is a killadar of the first class.

than one wife; and if it happens otherwise, a Punchayet can decide how the pension is to be allotted." I asked this native officer whether he did not think that however obligatory the subscription should be upon men hereafter promoted, it would not be right to leave it optional to subscribe or not with the present native officers. "By no means," said the sensible veteran; "put the plan of the fund at once in the orderly book. You know the distress in which our families are left by daily memorials for relief. It is almost the only evil of our condition." This relates to men who are married here, and the officers and others from Hindoostan are not only deterred from bringing their families from Hindoostan by the fear of leaving a wife and young children on their death without support, and at a thousand miles from their home and kindred. If to the distinctions recently given to us old soldiers, and the opening made for our boys, you add the establishment of this fund, you will soon see colonies of Rajpoots in the Bombay territories, and no one can object to moderate deduction from his pay for such an object.

I found the opinions and impressions of Purseram Sing were those of other native officers of the 23rd Regiment at Baroda, who are almost all Hindoostan men. On my speaking to them upon the subject, they not only expressed the same sentiments of this plan, but actually desired (as I was informed by Colonel Kennet), in anticipation of its adoption, to write immediately to their families, which I desired they should not do till it was more matured. Some of them I found had written for their sons, on the publication of the order of the 2nd December 1829 (No. 427), being unwilling, as they said, that men of the Bombay Provinces should have the exclusive enjoyment of such benefits.

The above facts, and the concurring opinion of every experienced officer whom I have consulted as to the expediency and policy of this fund, would have led me to recommend it to the Board for immediate adoption; but after the letter from Colonel Casement, under date the 20th November 1829, I deem it proper that the fund should first receive the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, who will judge its merits with reference to the peculiar manner in which the native army of this Presidency is composed and recruited, which will, with every desire to assimilate, render some distinctions between its institutions and that of Bengal unavoidable, and particularly in cases where an encouragement is required at one settlement, to induce men to enlist and remain in the service, that is not found necessary at another. The subjoined plan of a fund for pensioning widows of native commissioned officers, has been framed upon the following data.

1st. With regard to the number of subscribers, that all Native officers, as they stood on the reduced establishment, be required to contribute, viz.—

| | Subadars. | Jemidars. |
|---|---|---|
| Cavalry | 18 | 36 |
| Artillery, Two Battalions: | | |
| Lascars | 8 | 8 |
| Golundauze | 6 | 12 |
| Ditto - lascars | 6 | 6 |
| Sappers | 2 | 2 |
| Infantry, including marine battalion and pioneers | 226 | 226 |
| | 266 | 290 |

2nd. That the contributions of subscribers be made with reference to the amount of their net pay, by deduction of five per cent. from all classes and ranks, which, assuming the medium class of subadars to be the average, would give the following as the annual payments by members, and the monthly rate of stoppage from each.

ESTIMATE Amount and Rate of Subscriptions.

| — | Annual Pay of Medium Class. | Number of Subscribers. | Pay of the Whole. | Deduction of Five per Cent. | Rate per Month. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry: | *Rs.* | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* |
| Subadar - - | 1,218 | 18 | 21,924 | 1,096 | 5 – 29 |
| Jemidar - - | 378 | 36 | 13,608 | 680 | 1 2 30 |
| Artillery, Golundauze: | | | | | |
| Subadars - - | 624 | 6 | 3,744 | 187 | 2 2 40 |
| Jemidars - - | 336 | 12 | 4,032 | 201 | 1 1 58 |
| Lascars: | | | | | |
| Subadars - - | 378 | 14 | 5,292 | 264 | 1 2 28 |
| Jemidars - - | 210 | 14 | 2,940 | 147 | – 3 50 |
| Sappers: | | | | | |
| Subadars - - | 624 | 2 | 1,248 | 62 | 2 2 40 |
| Jemidars - - | 336 | 2 | 672 | 33 | 1 1 58 |
| Infantry: | | | | | |
| Subadars - - | 624 | 226 | 141,024 | 7,051 | 2 2 40 |
| Jemidars - - | 294 | 226 | 66,444 | 3,322 | 1 – 90 |
| TOTAL Annual Subscriptions - - - | | | *Rs.* | 13,043 | |

3rd. That Government grant a donation, at the outset, of 10,000 rupees, and a sum equal to the annual average charge on account of pensions to widows of native officers during the last 10 years, towards defraying the annual expenses of the fund.

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| In 1819–20 the actual payments to this class of pensioners were - | 8,473 3 48 |
| 1820–21 - - - - - - - - - - | 8,233 2 50 |
| 1821–22 - - - - - - - - - - | 9,901 – 20 |
| 1822–23 - - - - - - - - - - | 10,152 3 – |
| 1823–24 - - - - - - - - - - | 9,519 – 60 |
| 1824–25 - - - - - - - - - - | 8,894 2 20 |
| 1825–26 - - - - - - - - - - | 7,830 1 20 |
| 1826–27 - - - - - - - - - - | 7,725 3 60 |
| 1827–28 - - - - - - - - - - | 7,551 – 60 |
| 1828–29 - - - - - - - - - - | 7,880 3 80 |
| *Rs.* | 86,163 1 18 |

Showing an average of *Rs.* 8,616. 1. 31. annually. As Government would remain charged with the stipends of the already pensioned widows, it might be thought advisable to regulate the annual payment to the fund in proportion to the probable decrease in that charge, by which arrangement any additional expense to the public would be avoided. The average diminution in the above years is 606 rupees. If, therefore, a grant of 600 rupees, increased yearly by that amount till the full sum of 8,600 rupees be completed, were sanctioned, the object of Government would be fulfilled, and no extra charge, most probably, be incurred.

4th. That

4th. That the number of deaths among the subscribers will be in proportion to the average of the last 15 years, which has proved as undermentioned:

| 1st May | Subadars. | | Jemidars. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1814-15 | there were 188, | of whom 11 died in that year; | 213, | of whom 7 died. |
| 1815-16 | „ 197 | „ 5 „ | 214 | „ 2 „ |
| 1816-17 | „ 187 | „ 3 „ | 210 | „ 7 „ |
| 1817-18 | „ 195 | „ 7 „ | 214 | „ 12 „ |
| 1818-19 | „ 210 | „ 6 „ | 248 | „ 8 „ |
| 1819-20 | „ 222 | „ 6 „ | 253 | „ 6 „ |
| 1820-21 | „ 243 | „ 19 „ | 257 | „ 13 „ |
| 1821-22 | „ 268 | „ 6 „ | 303 | „ 4 „ |
| 1822-23 | „ 290 | „ 6 „ | 313 | „ 6 „ |
| 1823-24 | „ 298 | „ 4 „ | 316 | „ – „ |
| 1824-25 | „ 297 | „ 5 „ | 317 | „ – „ |
| 1825-26 | „ 294 | „ 2 „ | 310 | „ 8 „ |
| 1826-27 | „ 319 | „ 9 „ | 347 | „ 6 „ |
| 1827-28 | „ 335 | „ 10 „ | 368 | „ 5 „ |
| 1828-29 | „ 342 | „ 8 „ | 371 | „ 6 „ |
| | 3,885 | 107 | 4,254 | 90 |

It appears, then, that the average number of native officers in the last 15 years has been 259 subadars, 303 jemidars; and that the average number of deaths in the same period has been 7·13 subadars and six jemidars, or 2·71 per cent. in the former and two per cent. in the latter rank.

### Receipts.

On the data laid down, the gross receipts in the first year would be—

| | *Rs.* |
|---|---|
| Interest on Government donation (8 per cent.) - - - | 800 |
| Subscription by Government - - - - - - | 600 |
| Deduction from the pay of native officers - - - - | 13,043 |
| | 14,443 |

increasing, in the ratio of 600 rupees, till the 14–15th year, when they would remain stationary at 21,643 rupees.

### Expenditure.

The widows to be provided for annually would be determined by the number of subscribers in each rank, multiplied by the rate per cent. of casualties in the last 15 years, expressed by—

$$\frac{266 \times 2{\cdot}71}{100} = 720 \text{ subadar widows.}$$

$$\frac{290 \times 2}{100} = 580 \text{ jemadar widows.}$$

Total - - 13

of which the proportion for the cavalry would be - $\frac{18 \times 2{\cdot}71}{100} = 48$ subadar widows.

$$\frac{36 \times 2}{100} = 72 \text{ jemidar widows.}$$

infantry „ - $\frac{248 \times 2{\cdot}71}{100} = 672$ subadars.

$$\frac{254 \times 2}{100} = 508 \text{ jemidars.}$$

Total Number of Widows annually - - - 13

In estimating the expenses, the principal points for inquiry are,—

1st. What sum could a fund constituted as above afford to pay on the death of each member.

2nd. What annuity could be safely granted to the widow of such member in consideration of that sum improving at compound interest at eight per cent.

There are no data upon which an opinion might be established as to the duration of life among Natives, or the probable average age at which wives become widows; perfect accuracy is not therefore to be looked for in a calculation involving those questions. If, however, it be made on the general assumption that the widows will, one with another, live 26 years after admission on the fund, there will be little cause to dread an under estimate of expense.

It appears above that the number of pensions annually to be provided would probably be 13, and it is found on calculation that 13 pensioners, of *Rs.* 125. 2., could be furnished for 26 years out of the annual receipts, as estimated in the preceding page, or, in other words, a gross monthly pension of 136 rupees.

On a subdivision of this sum, made with reference to the different ranks (subadar and jemidar) and branches of the service (cavalry and infantry), the stipends of the widows might be fixed as follows:—

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Widows of cavalry subadars, | *Rs.* 15 × ·48, | the number of pensions | - | 7·20 |
| Ditto - ditto jemidars, | 10 × ·71 - - | ditto - - - | | 7·10 |
| Widows of infantry subadars, | 12 × 6·73 - - | ditto - - - | | 80·76 |
| Ditto - ditto jemidars, | 8 × 5·08 - - | ditto - - - | | 40·64 |
| | | | *Rs.* | 135·70 |

Forming a charge of 1,629 rupees annually for pensions. Of course any other disposition of this sum can be adopted that may seem better suited to the case, provided the aggregate amount does not exceed that laid down.

A statement exhibiting the condition of the fund in each year up to the 26th, when it is assumed the maximum of expenditure would be attained, is annexed. It appears from it that the institution would then be in possession of a capital, the interest of which added to the annual contributions by members, would be sufficient at all times to pay the number of annuitants then supposed to be receiving pensions (viz. 338). It is indispensable that such a capital should be available when the annuitants are at their greatest number, regard being had to the stability of the fund. That the period is more distant than has been assumed is very probable, but in the absence of proper tables showing the rate of mortality in India, it is impracticable to form a prospective estimate of the affairs of an annuity fund without assuming a certain term up to which each annuitant is supposed to have an equal chance of living.

It may be proper to state that, according to the generally received theory of life in Europe, where the expectation is 26 years, the age is 34; this is, however, inapplicable to the duration of life in India.

In the case of a fund for the benefit of widows, consisting of the number of subscribers above stated (556), the supposition that the greatest number of annuitants in life together will amount to 330, affords good reason to expect that the calculations have been made on grounds rather favourable to the institution (considered as the party insuring) than of an opposite character.

PROSPECTIVE ESTIMATE of the Receipts and Expenditure of a Native Military Fund, constituted on the Principles laid down in the preceding Remarks.

| YEAR. | Number of Annuitants. | Annual Payment to Annuitants. | Receipts. | Interest at 8 per Cent. | Capital. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | *Rs.* | |
| 1 | 13 | 1,629 | 13,643 | 800 | 22,816 | Inclusive of Government donation of 10,000 rupees. |
| 2 | 26 | 3,258 | 14,243 | 1,825 | 35,626 | |
| 3 | 39 | 4,887 | 14,843 | 2,850 | 48,432 | |
| 4 | 52 | 6,516 | 15,442 | 3,874 | 61,233 | |
| 5 | 65 | 8,145 | 16,043 | 4,898 | 74,029 | |
| 6 | 78 | 9,774 | 16,643 | 5,922 | 86,830 | |
| 7 | 91 | 11,043 | 17,243 | 6,946 | 99,616 | |
| 8 | 104 | 13,032 | 17,843 | 7,969 | 1,12,396 | |
| 9 | 117 | 14,661 | 18,443 | 8,991 | 1,25,169 | |
| 10 | 130 | 16,290 | 19,043 | 10,013 | 1,37,935 | |
| 11 | 143 | 17,919 | 19,643 | 11,034 | 1,50,693 | |
| 12 | 156 | 19,548 | 20,243 | 12,055 | 1,63,443 | |
| 13 | 169 | 21,177 | 20,843 | 13,075 | 1,76,184 | |
| 14 | 182 | 22,086 | 21,443 | 14,094 | 1,88,915 | |
| 15 | 195 | 24,435 | 21,648 | 15,113 | 2,01,236 | In this year the amount of the Government subscription would be completed, after which it would remain at 8,600 rupees per annum. |
| 16 | 208 | 26,064 | 21,643 | 16,098 | 2,12,913 | |
| 17 | 221 | 27,693 | 21,643 | 17,033 | 2,23,896 | |
| 18 | 234 | 29,322 | 21,643 | 17,911 | 2,34,128 | |
| 19 | 247 | 30,951 | 21,643 | 18,730 | 2,43,550 | |
| 20 | 260 | 32,580 | 21,643 | 19,484 | 2,52,093 | |
| 21 | 273 | 34,209 | 21,643 | 20,167 | 2,59,794 | |
| 22 | 286 | 35,838 | 21,643 | 20,783 | 2,66,382 | |
| 23 | 299 | 37,467 | 21,643 | 21,310 | 2,71,868 | |
| 24 | 312 | 39,096 | 21,643 | 21,749 | 2,76,164 | |
| 25 | 325 | 40,725 | 21,643 | 22,093 | 2,79,175 | |
| 26 | 338 | 42,354 | 21,643 | 22,334 | 2,80,798 | |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of every Description,

| 1 APRIL 1837. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Presidency Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort William | – | – | 32 | 674 | 706 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Barrackpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dum Dum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 901 | 27 | 12 | 870 | 6 | 3 | 585 | 2,406 |
| Cuttack | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 59 | 59 |
| Dacca | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 61 | 61 |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 60 | 60 |
| Arracan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 31 | 31 |
| Chinsurah | – | – | 33 | 779 | 812 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bally-Gunj | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allypore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bancoorah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Midnapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Poorie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jemaulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cherra-Poonjee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bisnauth-Assam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Gowahatty-Assam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Chittagong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Dinapore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dinapore | – | – | 29 | 858 | 887 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 99 | – | – | – | 102 |
| Bhaugulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hazareebaugh | – | – | 36 | 834 | 870 | 1 | 2 | 148 | 151 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dorundah (Chota-Nagpore) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Benares Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secrole (Benares) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 101 | – | – | – | 103 |
| Ghazeepore | – | – | 35 | 735 | 770 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sultanpore (Benares) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Chunar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mirzapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Goruckpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 58 | 58 |
| Fortress of Allahabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 125 | 126 |
| **Cawnpore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cawnpore | 25 | 650 | 32 | 856 | 1,563 | – | – | – | – | 11 | 220 | 54 | 9 | 416 | 2 | 3 | 471 | 1,186 |
| Futtehghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 31 | 31 |
| Mynpoorie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Etawah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bandah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Oude:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lucknow | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 125 | 127 |
| Seetapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sultanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st April 1837.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 85 | 14 | 5,193 | 5,292 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 685 | 699 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 751 | 764 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 752 | 765 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 746 | 760 | 4 | – | 465 | 469 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | 1 | 118 | 122 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 1 | 1,122 | 1,126 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 658 | 671 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 1 | 718 | 733 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 57 | 57 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 752 | 768 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 950 | 958 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 954 | 964 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 746 | 749 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 725 | 737 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 1,325 | 1,355 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 419 | 424 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 94 | 95 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 1,114 | 1,123 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | 6 | 2,140 | 2,179 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 113 | 113 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 2 | 495 | 508 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 187 | 190 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 527 | 539 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 368 | 377 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 19 | 3 | 1,500 | 1,522 | – | – | – | – |
| 26 | 4 | 992 | 1,022 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 6 | 2,339 | 2,381 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 749 | 765 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 739 | 755 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 1 | 434 | 443 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 3 | 901 | 918 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 35 | 6 | 2,215 | 2,256 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 735 | 751 | – | – | – | – |
| | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 2 | 751 | 765 | – | – | – | – |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 APRIL 1837. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—*continued.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Meerut Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Meerut | 19 | 643 | 30 | 833 | 1,525 | – | – | – | – | 14 | 324 | 191 | 3 | 93 | 2 | – | 125 | 757 |
| Delhi | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 30 | 936 | 974 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allyghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dehrah Dhoon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Fortress and Garrison of Agra. | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 226 | – | – | – | 236 |
| Muttra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 103 | 27 | – | – | – | – | – | 132 |
| Gwalior | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rohilcund: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bareilly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Moradabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kemaoon: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Almorah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Howalbaugh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sirhind Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kernaul | – | – | 24 | 784 | 808 | – | – | – | – | 6 | 112 | 27 | 7 | 202 | – | – | – | 354 |
| Loodhianah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 137 | – | – | – | – | – | 142 |
| Hansi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subathoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Saugor Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Saugor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 102 | – | – | – | 104 |
| Hussingabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jubbulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 61 | 61 |
| Rajpootana Force: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nusseerabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 111 | – | – | – | 116 |
| Beawr | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Meywah Force: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Neemuch | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 137 | – | – | 2 | – | 125 | 268 |
| Malwah Force: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mhow | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 113 | 27 | 5 | 113 | – | – | – | 261 |
| Mundlaisir | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhopawar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 44 | 1,293 | 251 | 6,353 | 7,941 | 9 | 32 | 1,084 | 1,125 | 43 | 1,777 | 627 | 58 | 2,338 | 15 | 6 | 1,917 | 6,781 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st April 1837—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| 11 | 2 | 497 | 510 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 6 | 2,245 | 2,287 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 39 | 6 | 2,222 | 2,267 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 750 | 762 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 754 | 760 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 29 | 773 | 802 | 48 | 8 | 2,837 | 2,893 | – | – | – | – |
| 16 | 2 | 496 | 514 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 77 | 77 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 90 | 91 | – | – | – | – |
| 4 | – | 644 | 648 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 1,501 | 1,531 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 751 | 765 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 744 | 760 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 747 | 752 | – | – | – | – |
| 23 | 4 | 1,245 | 1,272 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 1,241 | 1,271 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 1,431 | 1,462 | – | – | – | – |
| 5 | – | 903 | 908 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 253 | 256 | 3 | 2 | 698 | 703 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 730 | 736 |
| 4 | – | 643 | 647 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 51 | 8 | 2,943 | 3,002 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 729 | 745 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 4 | 1,429 | 1,457 | 1 | – | 1,756 | 1,757 |
| 11 | 2 | 496 | 509 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 45 | 8 | 2,971 | 3,024 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 762 | 768 |
| 12 | 2 | 1,146 | 1,160 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 52 | 8 | 2,999 | 3,059 | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 2 | 495 | 510 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 34 | 6 | 2,227 | 2,267 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 412 | 413 |
| 3 | – | 805 | 808 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 142 | 21 | 8,975 | 9,138 | – | – | – | 29 | 773 | 802 | 895 | 148 | 55,095 | 56,138 | 47 | 15 | 10,128 | 10,190 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 April 1837. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Centre Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort St. George | – | – | 31 | 686 | 717 | 1 | 3 | 80 | 84 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| St. Thomas' Mount | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 94 | 215 | 12 | 443 | 4 | 2 | 99 | 875 |
| Palaveram | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Poonamallee | – | – | 33 | 411 | 444 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Arcot | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vellore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Wallajabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Mysore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bangalore | 32 | 632 | 34 | 723 | 1,421 | – | – | – | – | 12 | 119 | 105 | 2 | 103 | – | – | – | 341 |
| French Rocks | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hurryhur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp in Coorg | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 3 | 207 | 212 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Malabar and Canara:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cannanore | – | – | 36 | 666 | 702 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 92 | – | – | – | 93 |
| Mangalore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Masulipatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ellore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Samulcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizagapatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Watair | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizianagram | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Chicacole | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp in Goomsoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trichinopoly | – | – | 36 | 828 | 864 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 77 | – | – | – | 81 |
| Palamcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 23 | – | – | – | 24 |
| Paulgautcherry | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Quilon in Travancore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp Neilgherries | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 9 | 218 | 232 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Ceded Districts:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bellary | – | – | 34 | 896 | 930 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 97 | – | – | – | 99 |
| Cuddapah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secunderabad | – | – | 36 | 897 | 933 | – | – | – | – | 5 | 6 | 106 | 8 | 121 | – | – | – | 246 |
| Jaulnah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 102 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 107 |
| **Nagpore Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kamptee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 103 | – | 8 | 224 | – | – | – | 340 |
| **Tenasserim Provinces:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Moulmein | – | – | 33 | 668 | 701 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 113 | – | – | – | 119 |
| **Prince of Wales' Island and its Dependencies:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Penang | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 283 | – | – | – | 289 |
| Malacca | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Detachment Duty | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 8 | 319 | 329 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 32 | 632 | 273 | 5,775 | 6,712 | 10 | 23 | 824 | 857 | 33 | 424 | 426 | 50 | 1,576 | 4 | 2 | 99 | 2,614 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st April 1837—*continued*.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| 2 | 2 | 119 | 123 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 1,451 | 1,481 | – | – | – | – | 16 | 2 | 1,045 | 1,063 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 6 | 1,938 | 1,981 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 155 | 157 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 32 | 6 | 948 | 986 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 22 | 4 | 968 | 994 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 2 | 50 | 57 |
| 18 | 3 | 474 | 495 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 6 | 1,829 | 1,872 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 615 | 631 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 736 | 751 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 734 | 749 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 4 | 952 | 976 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 456 | 469 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | 4 | 982 | 1,003 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 832 | 848 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 458 | 466 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | 290 | 295 | – | – | – | – | 8 | 261 | – | 269 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 401 | 411 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 32 | 6 | 1,847 | 1,885 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 721 | 734 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 618 | 630 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 4 | 1,405 | 1,429 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 3 | 473 | 488 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 39 | 6 | 1,927 | 1,972 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 464 | 476 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 470 | 484 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 590 | 605 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 3 | 474 | 490 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 28 | 4 | 1,450 | 1,482 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 546 | 561 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 3 | 473 | 488 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 76 | 12 | 4,396 | 4,484 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 15 | 3 | 472 | 490 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 710 | 725 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 18 | 3 | 472 | 493 | – | – | – | 27 | 753 | 780 | 55 | 8 | 2,905 | 2,968 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 515 | 527 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 1,296 | 1,327 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 608 | 620 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 40 | – | 3,549 | 3,589 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 122 | 26 | 3,905 | 4,053 | – | – | – | 27 | 753 | 780 | 664 | 104 | 36,814 | 37,582 | – | – | – | – | 29 | 265 | 1,095 | 1,389 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

1 APRIL 1837.

| STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Presidency Garrison:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bombay | – | – | 36 | 786 | 822 | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | 5 | 151 | – | – | – | 156 |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgaum | – | – | 34 | 719 | 753 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dharwar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kulladghee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sholapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 103 | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 131 |
| Concan:—Dapoolie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Poonah Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poonah | – | – | 32 | 681 | 713 | 4 | 22 | 375 | 401 | 7 | 187 | 48 | – | – | – | – | – | 242 |
| Kirkee | 32 | 739 | – | – | 771 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Seroor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ahmednuggur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 405 | 5 | 2 | 461 | 879 |
| Candish:—Malligaum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ahmedabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kairah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hursole | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Baroda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rajcote | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Surat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhoog | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Deesa | – | – | 35 | 711 | 746 | – | – | – | – | 5 | 109 | 24 | – | – | – | – | – | 138 |
| **Sattarah Subsidiary:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sattarah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Asseerghur Fortress:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asseerghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Detachment Duty | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 80 | 84 | – | – | – | 7 | 196 | 8 | – | 419 | 630 |
| TOTAL | 32 | 739 | 137 | 2,897 | 3,805 | 4 | 26 | 455 | 485 | 15 | 399 | 97 | 18 | 752 | 13 | 2 | 880 | 2,177 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st April 1837—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 3 | 2,275 | 2,315 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 32 | 2 | 1,129 | 1,163 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 728 | 743 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 1 | 659 | 669 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 18 | – | 479 | 497 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 25 | 1 | 1,068 | 1,094 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | – | 429 | 437 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 22 | 692 | 714 | 27 | 4 | 1,426 | 1,457 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 1 | 78 | 79 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 730 | 743 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 1 | 1,191 | 1,213 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 1 | 1,113 | 1,129 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 1 | 400 | 404 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | – | 636 | 645 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 1 | 1,411 | 1,433 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 2 | 335 | 348 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | – | 637 | 646 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | – | 729 | 739 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 1 | 631 | 644 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 1 | 290 | 303 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 532 | 543 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 1 | 639 | 655 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | – | 680 | 689 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 10 | – | 359 | 369 | 1 | 767 | 768 | – | – | – | 23 | – | 2,925 | 2,948 | – | – | 127 | 127 | 2 | – | 643 | 645 |
| 51 | 3 | 1,463 | 1,517 | 2 | 845 | 847 | 22 | 692 | 714 | 307 | 22 | 19,139 | 19,468 | 3 | 1 | 527 | 531 | 10 | – | 1,072 | 1,082 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and Native, of every Description,

| 1 MAY 1847. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Garrison: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort William | – | – | 32 | 581 | 613 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allipore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Presidency Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Barrakpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dum-Dum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 319 | 6 | 4 | 408 | 750 |
| Midnapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Darjeeling | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 206 | 208 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Khyouk Thyoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dacca | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuttack | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Akyab | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cherra-Poonjee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jaipore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Gowahatty-Assam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Debrooghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 118 | 121 |
| Dinapore Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dinapore | – | – | 36 | 991 | 1,027 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 70 | – | – | – | 73 |
| Segowlie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhangulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nepaul | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dorundah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Benares Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Benares | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 126 | – | – | – | 133 |
| Sultanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mirzapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Goruckpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Juanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Chuna | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allahabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 106 | 106 |
| Cawnpore Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cawnpore | – | – | 30 | 1,067 | 1,097 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 123 | 5 | 5 | 224 | 362 |
| Futtehghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mynpoorie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Etawah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Oude: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lucknow | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 172 | 174 |
| Sultanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Seetapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Meerut Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Meerut | – | – | 24 | 707 | 57 | 2,258 | 3,046 | 10 | 39 | 540 | 589 | 13 | 233 | 207 | – | – | 8 | 7 | 272 | 740 |
| Delhi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 4 | 326 | 334 |
| Allyghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dehrah-Doon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st May 1847.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 1,074 | 1,079 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 52 | 7 | 3,336 | 3,395 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 1 | 703 | 712 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 987 | 1,004 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 1 | 638 | 650 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | 2 | 1,008 | 1,027 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 1,111 | 1,121 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 2 | 669 | 676 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 1 | 517 | 522 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 391 | 397 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 664 | 668 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 57 | 8 | 3,992 | 4,057 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 588 | 592 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 474 | 479 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 95 | 96 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 1 | 200 | 201 | – | – | – | 4 | 4 | 868 | 876 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | 6 | 2,508 | 2,547 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 586 | 590 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 1,042 | 1,055 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 824 | 837 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 1,440 | 1,444 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 43 | – | 44 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 2,115 | 2,145 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 14 | 3 | 497 | 514 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 2,029 | 2,060 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 1,012 | 1,027 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 1 | 400 | 405 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 1 | 607 | 615 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 45 | 6 | 3,044 | 3,095 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 942 | 948 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 936 | 941 | – | – | – | – |
| 8 | 3 | 492 | 503 | 3 | 587 | 590 | – | – | – | 24 | 3 | 2,164 | 2,191 | 6 | 5 | 2,242 | 2,253 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 44 | 6 | 3,064 | 3,114 | 1 | 2 | 1,093 | 1,096 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 1,088 | 1,105 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 6 | 2 | 385 | 393 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 1,026 | 1,032 | – | – | – | – |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 MAY 1847. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—*continued.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Meerut Division—*cont^d.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agra | – | – | 37 | 1,008 | 1,045 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 89 | – | – | – | 96 |
| Muttra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 143 | – | – | – | – | – | 148 |
| Bareilly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 177 | 179 |
| Moradabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Shahjehanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Almorah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 104 | 106 |
| Seharunpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Sirhind Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Umballah | 37 | 1,350 | 33 | 1,007 | 2,427 | – | – | – | – | 13 | 260 | 57 | 11 | 172 | – | – | – | 513 |
| Loodianah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 128 | 169 | 8 | 229 | – | – | – | 548 |
| Subathoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mukhoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ferozepore | – | – | 29 | 1,014 | 1,043 | 1 | 4 | 257 | 262 | 8 | 118 | 171 | 4 | 148 | – | – | – | 449 |
| Kussowlie | – | – | 31 | 946 | 977 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Juttoh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hansi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Punjaub Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lahore | – | – | 30 | 953 | 983 | 1 | 5 | 242 | 248 | 4 | 115 | 35 | 12 | 275 | – | – | – | 441 |
| Jullundur | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | 135 | 139 | 3 | 109 | 29 | 7 | 91 | – | – | – | 239 |
| Urmur-Tanda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 171 | 177 |
| Phillour | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 105 | 109 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hajeepore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nakoda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kurturpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Noorpore | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 106 | 110 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hoshezapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 111 | 28 | – | – | – | – | – | 143 |
| Kangra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mokerian | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Saugor Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Saugor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 111 | 112 |
| Nowgong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 173 | 174 |
| Nagode | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jhansi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jubbulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dumoh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bandah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Rajpootanah Field Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nusseerabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 79 | – | – | – | 82 |
| Bewar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Meywar Field Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Neemuch | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 166 | 169 |
| Kerwarrah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mhow | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 88 | – | – | – | 92 |
| Bhopawar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mundlaisir | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp, Sirdapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **China:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hong Kong:—Victoria | – | – | 31 | 956 | 987 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Detachment Duty | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 61 | 2,057 | 346 | 10,781 | 13,245 | 16 | 58 | 1,591 | 1,665 | 62 | 1,076 | 839 | 84 | 1,809 | 39 | 24 | 2,528 | 6,461 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st May 1847—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 2,070 | 2,101 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 3 | 472 | 487 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 615 | 619 | – | – | – | 28 | 4 | 2,278 | 2,310 | 1 | 3 | 1,105 | 1,109 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 1 | 690 | 699 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 1 | 372 | 377 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 1,073 | 1,081 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 615 | 618 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 8 | 2 | 482 | 492 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 2 | 2,042 | 2,064 | 5 | 2 | 1,147 | 1,154 | – | – | – | – |
| 8 | 3 | 485 | 496 | 2 | 588 | 590 | – | – | – | 38 | 6 | 3,247 | 3,291 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 62 | 1,597 | 1,659 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 611 | 613 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 3 | 485 | 501 | 2 | 588 | 590 | – | – | – | 66 | 10 | 4,919 | 4,986 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 1 | 1,106 | 1,111 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 582 | 586 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 623 | 628 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 588 | 591 | – | – | – | 105 | 16 | 8,617 | 8,738 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 3 | 498 | 514 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 59 | 8 | 4,195 | 4,262 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 1,078 | 1,093 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 1,147 | 1,161 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 882 | 897 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 465 | 479 | 4 | 588 | 592 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 10 | 3 | 497 | 510 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 7 | 1,168 | 1,175 | – | – | – | 29 | 4 | 2,094 | 2,127 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | 2 | 1,031 | 1,050 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 589 | 593 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 698 | 702 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 1,062 | 1,078 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 637 | 641 | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 854 | 867 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | 1,540 | 1,544 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | 1,665 | 1,669 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 938 | 952 | 2 | 3 | 1,412 | 1,417 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 25 | 4 | 1,934 | 1,963 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 760 | 766 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 632 | 636 | – | – | – | 28 | 4 | 2,151 | 2,183 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 1,027 | 1,033 | – | – | – | – |
| 16 | 3 | 462 | 481 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 1,739 | 1,770 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 604 | 608 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | 91 | 91 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 254 | 254 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 639 | 639 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | – | 1,744 | 1,764 | 8 | – | 2,715 | 2,723 | – | – | – | – |
| 119 | 31 | 5,220 | 5,370 | 63 | 11,155 | 11,218 | 62 | 1,597 | 1,659 | 1,027 | 157 | 80,425 | 81,609 | 62 | 40 | 23,819 | 23,921 | 1 | 43 | – | 44 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 MAY 1847. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Centre Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort St. George | – | – | 33 | 953 | 986 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| St. Thomas Mount | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 106 | – | 22 | 501 | – | – | – | 634 |
| Arcot | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vellore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Wallajahbad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Mysore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bangalore | 31 | 654 | 31 | 723 | 1,439 | – | – | – | – | 11 | 145 | 119 | – | – | – | – | – | 275 |
| French Rocks | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hurryhur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mercara | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 18 | 364 | 392 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Malabar and Canara:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cannanore | – | – | 38 | 1,129 | 1,167 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mangalore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Masulipatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Samulcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Russelcondah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizanagrum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizagapatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 83 | 88 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cotapolliam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuttack | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trichinopoly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 51 | – | – | – | 52 |
| Pallamcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 109 | 22 | – | – | – | 131 |
| Paulghautcherry | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Quilon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Ceded Districts:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bellary | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 75 | – | – | – | 78 |
| Kurnool | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuddapah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Kulladghee** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Nagpore Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kamptee | – | – | 34 | 1,017 | 1,051 | – | – | – | – | 5 | 108 | – | 9 | 172 | – | – | – | 294 |
| Setabuldee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Saugor and Nerbudda Territories:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nowgong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Husinghabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Saugor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 70 | – | – | – | 73 |
| Jubbulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secunderabad | – | – | 34 | 1,056 | 1,090 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 6 | 103 | 9 | 106 | – | – | – | 228 |
| Jaulna | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 97 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 102 |
| **Moulmien** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 14 | – | – | – | 5 | 79 | – | – | – | 84 |
| **Singapore** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **China** | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Aden** | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 5 | 322 | 330 | – | – | – | 3 | 99 | – | – | – | 102 |
| **On Detachment Duty** | – | – | 13 | 460 | 473 | – | 7 | 40 | 47 | – | – | – | 21 | 115 | – | – | – | 136 |
| TOTAL | 31 | 654 | 183 | 5,338 | 6,206 | 13 | 35 | 823 | 871 | 30 | 462 | 222 | 185 | 1,290 | – | – | – | 2,189 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st May 1847—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned, | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| 2 | 2 | 124 | 128 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 4 | 1,894 | 1,934 | – | – | – | – | 13 | 41 | 850 | 904 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 15 | 3 | 473 | 491 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | 4 | 1,642 | 1,679 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 79 | 82 | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 249 | 258 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 38 | 6 | 2,137 | 2,181 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 18 | 2 | 812 | 832 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 730 | 747 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 832 | 847 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 32 | 4 | 1,225 | 1,261 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 722 | 738 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | 2 | 698 | 717 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 431 | 443 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 2 | 997 | 1,019 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 25 | 4 | 2,171 | 2,200 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | 367 | 371 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 76 | – | 80 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 590 | 604 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 536 | 553 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 816 | 832 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 14 | 3 | 453 | 470 | – | – | – | 34 | 872 | 906 | 30 | 4 | 1,510 | 1,544 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 651 | 663 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 694 | 709 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 656 | 672 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 18 | 3 | 488 | 509 | – | – | – | 37 | 886 | 923 | 34 | 4 | 1,781 | 1,819 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 16 | 2 | 740 | 758 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 695 | 712 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 771 | 788 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 14 | 3 | 484 | 501 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 45 | 6 | 2,445 | 2,496 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 2 | 1,169 | 1,192 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 15 | 3 | 478 | 496 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 588 | 603 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 4 | 1,845 | 1,885 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 634 | 648 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 14 | 3 | 445 | 462 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 88 | 10 | 4,554 | 4,652 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 16 | 3 | 471 | 490 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | 4 | 1,810 | 1,847 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 31 | 4 | 1,723 | 1,758 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 524 | 536 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 23 | 2 | 1,039 | 1,064 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 4 | 1,944 | 1,985 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 87 | – | 6,433 | 6,520 | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | 975 | 980 |
| 108 | 23 | 3,416 | 3,547 | – | – | – | 71 | 1,758 | 1,829 | 902 | 104 | 48,885 | 49,891 | – | – | – | – | 29 | 119 | 2,074 | 2,222 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS, of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 MAY 1847. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Presidency Garrison:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bombay | – | – | 12 | 450 | 462 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 67 | – | – | – | 73 |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgaum | – | – | 26 | 1,111 | 1,139 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sholapoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 78 | – | – | – | 81 |
| Dharwar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kulladghee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sawunt-Warree | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kolapoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 90 | – | – | – | 91 |
| Rutnagherry | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Poonah Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poonah | – | – | 80 | 2,287 | 2,367 | – | – | – | – | 9 | 220 | 50 | – | – | – | – | – | 279 |
| Kirkee | 28 | 643 | – | – | 671 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ahmednuggur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 381 | – | – | – | 395 |
| Seroor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Candeish—Malligaum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Conean—Dapoolie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jannah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dhurrumgawn | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ahmedabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Baroda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Surat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Deesa | – | – | 25 | 1,022 | 1,047 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 111 | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 140 |
| Rajcote | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kaira | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kattywar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mylee-Caunta | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Sattara Subsidiary:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sattara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Asseerghur Fortress | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Aden Force | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | 222 | 225 | – | – | – | 7 | 104 | – | – | – | 111 |
| **Scinde Field Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hyderabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kurrachee | – | – | 30 | 929 | 959 | 2 | 25 | 305 | 332 | 5 | 148 | 22 | – | – | – | – | – | 175 |
| Sukkur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Shikarpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Fort Fitzgerald | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Khanghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhooj | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 100 | – | – | – | 103 |
| On Detachment Duty | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 2 | – | – | – | 22 |
| TOTAL | 28 | 643 | 175 | 5,799 | 6,645 | 4 | 26 | 527 | 557 | 18 | 479 | 97 | 53 | 822 | – | – | – | 1,469 |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st May 1847—*continued*.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 5 | 2,392 | 2,433 | 4 | – | 552 | 556 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | 154 | 154 | – | – | – | 26 | 1 | 1,518 | 1,545 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 7 | 2 | 469 | 478 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | – | 1,003 | 1,016 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | – | 1,030 | 1,044 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 768 | 783 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 621 | 624 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | – | 1,689 | 1,713 | 2 | – | 571 | 573 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | – | 172 | 175 | 1 | – | 496 | 497 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | – | 2,057 | 2,090 | 1 | 2 | 467 | 470 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | – | 1,007 | 1,017 | 1 | – | 731 | 732 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 238 | 241 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | – | 1,621 | 1,645 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | – | 411 | 420 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | – | 650 | 656 | – | – | 682 | 682 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1,153 | 1,153 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 690 | 694 | – | – | – | 30 | 1 | 1,846 | 1,877 | 2 | – | 598 | 600 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 28 | – | 1,746 | 1,774 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 1 | 1,007 | 1,019 | – | – | 394 | 394 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 1 | 479 | 491 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 905 | 918 | – | – | 800 | 800 | – | – | – | – |
| 19 | 1 | 428 | 448 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | – | 925 | 936 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 1 | 969 | 973 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 901 | 902 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1,000 | 1,000 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 1 | 990 | 1,006 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 676 | 689 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 28 | 724 | 752 | 16 | 2 | 956 | 974 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 81 | 84 | – | – | – | 13 | 1 | 941 | 955 | 4 | 1 | 915 | 920 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 773 | 794 | 18 | 1 | 1,030 | 1,049 | 10 | 3 | 3,188 | 3,201 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | 1,044 | 1,049 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 20 | 2 | 1,790 | 1,812 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | 497 | 502 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 574 | 577 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 16 | 1 | 996 | 1,013 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 29 | – | 3,937 | 3,966 | – | – | 2,114 | 2,114 | 2 | – | 626 | 628 |
| 37 | 4 | 1,376 | 1,417 | 13 | 1,737 | 1,750 | 49 | 1,497 | 1,546 | 436 | 22 | 31,796 | 32,254 | 37 | 7 | 16,749 | 16,793 | 11 | – | 1,937 | 1,048 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of

| 1 January 1857. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS & SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Garrison: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort William | – | – | 17 | 547 | 564 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allypore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ballygunge | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Presidency Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Barrackpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dum-Dum | – | – | 12 | 403 | 415 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 55 | 2 | 90 | 4 | 5 | 242 | 398 |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Midnapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Akyab | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Eastern Frontier: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jumaulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cherra Ponjee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Debroghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 102 | 104 |
| Gowahatty | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sonthal District: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Raneegunge | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sooree | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bonsee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rohnee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dinapore Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dinapore | – | – | 25 | 950 | 975 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Segowlie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhaugulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Darjeeling | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 3 | 134 | 138 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dorundah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 47 | 48 |
| Nepaul | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Benares | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 72 | – | – | 62 | 137 |
| Sultanpore Benares | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mirzapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Goruckpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cawnpore Division: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cawnpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 78 | 2 | 5 | 122 | 208 |
| Futteygurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Etawah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mynpoorie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Lucknow, Oude | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 167 | 169 |
| Allahabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 68 | 69 |
| Nowgong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 1,430 | 1,436 |
| Jhansi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Oude Field Force: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lucknow | – | – | 27 | 790 | 817 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 79 | – | – | – | 84 |
| Fyzabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 98 | 103 |
| Seetapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sultanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Saugor District: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Saugor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 81 | – | – | – | 84 |
| Jubbulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mhow | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 90 | – | – | – | 93 |

every Description, serving in the Presidency of *Bengal*, on the 1st January 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | – | 1,074 | 1,086 | – | – | – | – |
| 4 | 1 | 188 | 193 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 3 | 1,127 | 1,133 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 43 | 8 | 4,030 | 4,081 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 503 | 506 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 1 | 1,161 | 1,175 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | 898 | 902 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 539 | 545 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 914 | 930 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 567 | 573 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 694 | 699 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | 396 | 402 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 1 | 543 | 550 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 931 | 944 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 464 | 468 | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 637 | 649 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 435 | 438 | – | – | – | 52 | 6 | 4,157 | 4,215 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 314 | 319 |
| – | – | – | – | 1 | 117 | 118 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 2 | 742 | 749 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 1,001 | 1,013 | 1 | – | 92 | 93 |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 587 | 591 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 774 | 779 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 928 | 939 | 4 | 2 | 695 | 701 |
| 13 | 3 | 507 | 523 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 67 | 11 | 3,671 | 3,749 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 1,163 | 1,178 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 786 | 796 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 40 | 5 | 3,334 | 3,379 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 505 | 519 | 1 | 260 | 261 | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 2,174 | 2,204 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 331 | 333 | – | – | – | 8 | 1 | 606 | 615 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 1 | 504 | 510 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 491 | 505 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 212 | 215 | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 1,163 | 1,177 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1,061 | 1,077 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 316 | 318 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 4 | 2,272 | 2,300 | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 3 | 506 | 521 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 1,160 | 1,177 | – | – | – | – |
| | | | | | | | | | | 14 | 2 | 1,153 | 1,169 | – | – | – | – |

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of every Description,

| 1 JANUARY 1857. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS AND SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—*continued.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Meerut Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Meerut | 26 | 634 | 24 | 965 | 1,649 | – | – | – | – | 7 | 120 | 29 | 4 | 94 | – | – | – | 254 |
| Roorkee | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 78 | 913 | 1,006 | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 103 | 108 |
| Delhi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Alligurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Deyrah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Agra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 138 | 4 | 79 | – | – | – | 226 |
| **Rohilcund:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bareilly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 102 | 107 |
| Shahjehanpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Almorah Kemaoon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 100 | 101 |
| Sirdapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bewar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kherwarrah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Sirhind Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Umballah | 27 | 676 | – | – | 703 | – | – | – | – | 10 | 233 | 57 | – | – | – | – | – | 300 |
| Hansi | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Juttogh, Simla | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dugshaie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kussowlie | – | – | 26 | 1,008 | 1,034 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subathoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jullundur | – | – | 31 | 937 | 968 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 108 | 29 | 3 | 8 | – | – | – | 152 |
| Phillour | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hoshegarpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 135 | – | – | – | – | – | 140 |
| **Lahore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Lahore | – | – | 31 | 906 | 937 | – | – | – | – | 11 | 208 | 56 | 7 | 269 | – | – | – | 551 |
| Umritsur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 101 | 105 |
| Govindgurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 73 | – | – | – | 74 |
| Ferozepore | – | – | 33 | 1,023 | 1,056 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 143 | – | – | – | 148 |
| Goordaspore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mooltan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 136 | 1 | 79 | – | – | – | 222 |
| Sealkote | – | – | 27 | 834 | 861 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 107 | 29 | 2 | 77 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 232 |
| Noorpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 54 | 55 |
| Kangra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 53 | 53 |
| **Peshawur Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Peshawur | – | – | 52 | 1,812 | 1,864 | 2 | 6 | 208 | 216 | 7 | 215 | 58 | 4 | 420 | – | – | – | 704 |
| Murdan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Attock | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 77 | 80 | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 97 | 98 |
| Shumsabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Shubkuddur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nowshera | – | – | 31 | 1,018 | 1,049 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | 79 | 82 |
| **Sind Sagur District:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rawul Pindee | – | – | 22 | 1,001 | 1,023 | 4 | 2 | 131 | 137 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jhelum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 107 | 112 |
| Asnee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sirjbund, Hazarah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dera Ismael Khan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Abbottabad, Hazarah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Deenah | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 2 | 91 | 94 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

serving in the Presidency of BENGAL, on the 1st January 1857—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| 14 | 2 | 504 | 520 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 2,281 | 2,311 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 4 | 2,284 | 2,314 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 1 | 586 | 594 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 810 | 836 | 38 | 6 | 3,383 | 3,427 | 2 | 1 | 341 | 344 |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 588 | 590 | – | – | – | 17 | 3 | 1,780 | 1,800 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 1,158 | 1,175 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 1,104 | 1,117 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 559 | 560 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 669 | 675 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 816 | 822 |
| 12 | 3 | 459 | 474 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 2,248 | 2,279 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 295 | 299 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 737 | 743 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 865 | 891 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 606 | 612 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 22 | 785 | 807 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 35 | 6 | 3,471 | 3,512 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 278 | 281 | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 954 | 969 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 29 | 4 | 2,282 | 2,315 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 501 | 515 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 33 | 5 | 3,203 | 3,241 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 1,103 | 1,119 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 488 | 502 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 578 | 582 | – | – | – | 27 | 3 | 2,293 | 2,323 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 5 | 588 | 593 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 7 | 2 | 320 | 329 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 4 | 2,164 | 2,192 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 27 | 4 | 1,980 | 2,011 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 1 | 601 | 614 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | 508 | 512 | – | – | – | – |
| 7 | 2 | 458 | 467 | 8 | 1,166 | 1,174 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 1 | 288 | 289 | – | – | – | 56 | 10 | 5,019 | 5,085 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | 569 | 573 |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 589 | 593 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 588 | 592 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 1,137 | 1,149 | 4 | 1 | 513 | 518 |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 566 | 569 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 572 | 576 | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 836 | 847 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 1 | 1,153 | 1,166 | 4 | 1 | 660 | 665 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 912 | 918 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 3 | 672 | 678 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 2 | 912 | 917 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 1 | 892 | 896 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 January 1857. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | | Engineers and Sappers. | | | | Artillery. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—*continued.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Punjaub Irregular Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kohat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 4 | 239 | – | – | – | – | – | 246 |
| Bunno | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 138 | 142 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dera Ghazeekhan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Asnee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dera Ishmael Khan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 80 | 81 |
| Abbottabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 104 | 105 |
| **Troops in Pegu:*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Thyatmew | – | – | 23 | 749 | 772 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 167 | – | – | – | 170 |
| Meeanday | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 71 | 71 |
| Moulmein | – | – | 20 | 404 | 424 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Detachment Duty | – | – | 21 | 609 | 630 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 45 | – | – | 3 | – | 255 | 303 |
| Total | 53 | 1,310 | 422 | 13,956 | 15,741 | 26 | 95 | 1,692 | 1,813 | 56 | 1,001 | 1,006 | 51 | 1,899 | 40 | 30 | 3,650 | 7,733 |

* Troops in Pegu under

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the Forces, European and Native, of every

| 1 April 1857. STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | | Engineers and Sappers. | | | | Artillery. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Centre Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fort St. George | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| St. Thomas Mount | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 111 | – | 10 | 130 | – | – | – | 254 |
| Arcot | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vellore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Mysore Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bangalore | 23 | 279 | 16 | 476 | 794 | – | – | – | – | 11 | 97 | 107 | – | – | – | – | – | 215 |
| French Rocks | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hurryhur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mercara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Malabar and Canara:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cannanore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mangalore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

serving in the Presidency of BENGAL, on the 1st January 1857—*continued.*

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| NATIVE CAVALRY. | | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 587 | 591 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 18 | 1 | 3,478 | 3,497 |
| – | – | – | – | 3 | 554 | 557 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | – | 1,564 | 1,571 |
| – | – | – | – | 4 | 357 | 361 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 6 | 749 | 755 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 18 | 2 | 955 | 975 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 4 | 1 | 263 | 268 | 5 | 2,225 | 2,230 | – | – | – | 40 | 1 | 6,442 | 6,483 | 7 | 2 | 4,849 | 4,858 |
| 117 | 29 | 5,190 | 5,336 | 87 | 13,793 | 13,880 | 74 | 2,460 | 2,534 | 956 | 139 | 83,348 | 84,443 | 112 | 43 | 25,587 | 25,742 |

orders to return to Bengal.

Description, serving in the Presidency of MADRAS, on the 1st April 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| NATIVE CAVALRY. | | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2 | 2 | 117 | 121 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 6 | 2,349 | 2,391 | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 856 | 864 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 10 | 3 | 343 | 356 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 412 | 427 | – | – | – | – | 2 | 2 | 124 | 128 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 3 | 370 | 385 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 23 | 4 | 1,433 | 1,460 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 2 | 616 | 632 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 2 | 592 | 606 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 668 | 680 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 4 | 1,256 | 1,275 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 650 | 660 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

500.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of every Description,

1 April 1857—*continued.*

| STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS - - - - - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS AND SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non Commissioned and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | TOTAL. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | TOTAL. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS—*continued.*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Masulipatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Samulcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Russellcondah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizianagram | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizagapatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuttack | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dowlaserum | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 24 | 317 | 348 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trichinopoly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 155 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 161 |
| Palamcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Paulghaut | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Quilon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jackatalla | – | – | 17 | 414 | 431 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Ceded Districts:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bellary | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 81 | – | – | – | 82 |
| Cuddapah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kurnool | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sholapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Secunderabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 6 | 103 | 7 | 167 | – | – | – | 287 |
| Jaulnah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Nagpore Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kamptee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 101 | – | 4 | 98 | – | – | – | 205 |
| Hossingabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Pegu Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rangoon | – | – | 29 | 792 | 821 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 344 | – | – | – | 358 |
| Henzadah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Tongho | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 38 | – | – | – | 39 |
| Moulmein | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 43 | – | – | – | 43 |
| **Penang and Straits of Malacca:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Singapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Penang | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Persian Gulf | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Detachment Duty | 13 | 326 | 32 | 1,298 | 1,669 | 12 | 65 | 1,023 | 1,100 | – | – | – | 21 | 461 | – | – | – | 482 |
| TOTAL | 36 | 605 | 94 | 2,980 | 3,715 | 19 | 89 | 1,340 | 1,448 | 26 | 470 | 210 | 58 | 1,362 | – | – | – | 2,126 |

serving in the Presidency of *Madras*, on the 1st April 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | | Veterans. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Men. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. | 37. | 38. | 39. | 40. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 756 | 769 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 353 | 362 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 2 | 769 | 784 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 383 | 392 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 2 | 382 | 391 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 418 | 428 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 800 | 810 | – | – | – | – | 3 | 110 | – | 113 |
| 10 | 3 | 351 | 364 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 31 | 6 | 1,606 | 1,643 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 2 | 521 | 528 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 576 | 584 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 571 | 582 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 7 | 3 | 365 | 375 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 17 | 2 | 824 | 843 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 605 | 616 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 484 | 494 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 3 | 375 | 391 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 13 | 3 | 385 | 401 | – | – | – | 18 | 966 | 984 | 76 | 10 | 4,746 | 4,832 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 15 | 3 | 377 | 395 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 372 | 386 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 34 | 6 | 1,789 | 1,829 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 2 | 658 | 670 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 76 | 14 | 4,807 | 4,897 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 495 | 506 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 839 | 863 | 24 | 4 | 1,589 | 1,617 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 25 | 4 | 793 | 822 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 23 | 4 | 1,203 | 1,230 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 2 | 581 | 594 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 790 | 816 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 115 | – | 8,400 | 8,515 | – | – | – | – | 8 | – | 2,107 | 2,115 |
| 93 | 26 | 3,055 | 3,174 | – | – | – | 68 | 2,595 | 2,663 | 680 | 104 | 42,085 | 42,869 | – | – | – | – | 19 | 114 | 3,087 | 3,220 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the Forces, European and Native, of

| 1 April 1857. STATION. | Royal Troops. | | | | | Company's Troops. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cavalry. | | Infantry. | | | Engineers & Sappers. | | | | Artillery. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | Native Foot. | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Presidency Garrison:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bombay | – | – | 15 | 487 | 502 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 77 | 4 | 74 | 76 | 233 |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgaum | – | – | 4 | 131 | 135 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 74 | 73 | 147 |
| Sholapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 90 | 91 |
| Dharwar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kolapoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Poona Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poona | – | – | 1 | 105 | 106 | 1 | 3 | 233 | 237 | 5 | 119 | 24 | – | – | – | – | – | 148 |
| Kirkee | 15 | 366 | – | – | 381 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ahmednuggur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 239 | 73 | 4 | 176 | 3 | 3 | 267 | 767 |
| **Candeish:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Malligaum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 28 | 28 |
| Sattara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 88 | 89 |
| **Concan:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dapoolie | Nil. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Northern Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ahmedabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 3 | 171 | 176 |
| Baroda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 89 | 90 |
| Rajcote | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 28 | 29 |
| Deesa | – | – | 23 | 830 | 853 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 90 | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 119 |
| Surat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 32 | 32 |
| Bhooj | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Sinde Division:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kurrachee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hydrabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | 113 | 116 |
| Shikarpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 1 | 119 | 122 |
| Jacobabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Asseerghur Fortress | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Aden Force | – | – | 15 | 450 | 465 | 1 | – | 94 | 95 | – | – | – | 4 | 87 | 1 | – | 92 | 184 |
| **Rajpootana Field Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nusseerabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | – | 154 | 156 |
| Neemuch | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 2 | 137 | – | – | – | – | – | 145 |
| **Persian Gulf Expeditionary Force:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mohumrah | – | – | 43 | 1,246 | 1,289 | – | – | – | – | 6 | 150 | 25 | 8 | 223 | – | – | – | 412 |
| Bushire | 24 | 616 | 11 | 560 | 1,211 | 10 | 15 | 358 | 383 | 6 | 160 | 25 | 7 | 339 | 10 | 101 | 220 | 868 |
| On detachment duty | – | – | 2 | 110 | 112 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 207 | – | – | – | 218 |
| Total | 39 | 982 | 114 | 3,919 | 5,054 | 12 | 18 | 685 | 715 | 29 | 760 | 309 | 36 | 1,109 | 30 | 257 | 1,640 | 4,170 |

every Description, serving in the Presidency of *Bombay*, on the 1st April 1857.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 31 | 1 | 2,409 | 2,441 | 4 | – | 380 | 384 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 22 | 3 | 1,613 | 1,638 | – | – | – | – |
| 12 | 2 | 389 | 403 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 1 | 725 | 731 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 1 | 728 | 741 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 1 | 684 | 695 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 861 | 876 | 19 | – | 1,694 | 1,713 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 30 | 31 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | – | 692 | 702 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 1 | 548 | 557 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 433 | 435 | – | – | – | 6 | – | 940 | 946 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 2 | 1,526 | 1,549 | – | – | – | – |
| 14 | 1 | 377 | 392 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | 1,246 | 1,263 | – | – | – | – |
| 1 | – | 134 | 135 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 1 | 4,019 | 4,025 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | – | 841 | 851 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 1 | 508 | 513 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | – | 508 | 517 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 1,004 | 1,025 | 17 | – | 1,753 | 1,770 | 6 | – | 896 | 902 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | – | 859 | 870 | – | – | 13 | 13 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 1 | 714 | 726 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 9 | 1,186 | 1,195 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 446 | 448 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 1 | 830 | 841 | – | – | – | – |
| 15 | 1 | 454 | 470 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 2 | 947 | 958 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | – | 1,410 | 1,421 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 66 | 2 | 2,548 | 2,616 | – | – | – | – |
| 16 | 1 | 462 | 479 | 9 | 1,348 | 1,357 | 28 | 957 | 985 | 33 | 1 | 1,649 | 1,683 | 5 | – | 768 | 773 |
| 1 | – | 148 | 149 | 1 | 797 | 798 | – | – | – | 15 | – | 2,102 | 2,117 | 1 | – | 138 | 139 |
| 59 | 5 | 1,964 | 2,028 | 21 | 3,764 | 3,785 | 64 | 2,822 | 2,886 | 372 | 22 | 31,969 | 32,363 | 16 | – | 2,195 | 2,211 |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, of every Description,

| 1 SEPTEMBER 1867. STATIONS. | ROYAL ARTILLERY. Horse. Officers. 1. | Horse. Non-Commissioned and Men. 2. | Foot. Officers. 3. | Foot. Non-Commissioned and Men. 4. | Total. 5. | SAPPERS AND MINERS. British Officers. 6. | British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. 7. | Native Commissioned Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. 8. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL:** | | | | | | | | |
| **Presidency Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Fort William | – | – | 1 | 73 | 74 | – | – | – |
| Allipoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dum-Dum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Barrackpoor | – | – | 11 | 259 | 270 | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hazareebaugh | – | – | 5 | 130 | 135 | – | – | – |
| Dorumdah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhaugulpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Darjeeling | – | – | 3 | 67 | 70 | – | – | – |
| **Eastern Frontier District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Cherrapoonjie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jowaie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Gowhatty | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cachar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nowgong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Tezpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Galaghat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dibroghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jezpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Suddyah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Poobamookh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Buxa | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Julpigoree | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dacca | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Shillong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Allahabad Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Allahabad | – | – | 10 | 207 | 217 | – | – | – |
| Cawnpore | – | – | 4 | 124 | 128 | – | – | – |
| Benares | 5 | 128 | – | – | 133 | – | – | – |
| Segowlie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dinapoor | – | – | 5 | 132 | 137 | – | – | – |
| Chunar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Oude Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Lucknow | 4 | 139 | 9 | 214 | 366 | – | – | – |
| Goruckpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Roy Bareilly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Fyzabad | – | – | 3 | 145 | 148 | – | – | – |
| Seetapoor | – | – | 4 | 144 | 148 | – | – | – |
| **Saugor District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Saugor | – | – | 7 | 198 | 205 | – | – | – |
| Jubbulpore | – | – | 3 | 131 | 134 | – | – | – |
| Nagode | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Banda | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nowgong | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Gwalior District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Morar | 4 | 121 | 16 | 256 | 397 | – | – | – |
| Gwalior Fort | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sepree | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Lullutpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jhansie | – | – | 4 | 126 | 130 | – | – | – |
| **Rohilcund District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Bareilly | – | – | 5 | 118 | 123 | – | – | – |
| Moradabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nynee Tal | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Almorah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Petoragurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Shajehanpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp Rudowly | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |

serving in the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st September 1867.

| CAVALRY. | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British. | | | Native. | | | British. | | | Native. | | | |
| Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | |
| 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 707 | 733 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | 33 | 33 | 1 | – | – | 29 | 2,058 | 2,087 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 19 | 551 | 570 | 9 | 704 | 713 | |
| – | – | – | 8 | 431 | 439 | 3 | 81 | 84 | 11 | 707 | 718 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | 87 | 91 | 2 | 134 | 136 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 799 | 823 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 715 | 723 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 557 | 564 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 480 | 504 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 172 | 174 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 66 | 66 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 326 | 327 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 233 | 234 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 88 | 89 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 495 | 500 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 57 | 57 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 73 | 74 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 30 | 30 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 126 | 128 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 46 | 46 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 740 | 749 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 585 | 595 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 417 | 428 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 736 | 746 | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 69 | 70 | 26 | 798 | 824 | 9 | 712 | 721 | |
| 5 | 105 | 110 | 8 | 271 | 279 | 24 | 571 | 595 | 9 | 647 | 656 | |
| 21 | 215 | 236 | – | 16 | 16 | 10 | 315 | 325 | 8 | 632 | 640 | |
| – | – | – | 6 | 366 | 372 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | 13 | 13 | 30 | 805 | 835 | 9 | 701 | 710 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 64 | 64 | |
| 24 | 458 | 482 | 11 | 459 | 470 | 63 | 1,798 | 1,861 | 16 | 1,351 | 1,367 | |
| – | – | – | 2 | 66 | 68 | – | – | – | 10 | 695 | 705 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 375 | 384 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 115 | 116 | 35 | 798 | 833 | 9 | 707 | 716 | |
| – | – | – | 3 | 262 | 265 | – | – | – | 18 | 358 | 376 | |
| – | – | – | 10 | 428 | 438 | 24 | 523 | 547 | 14 | 687 | 701 | |
| – | – | – | 2 | 118 | 120 | 21 | 614 | 635 | 9 | 672 | 681 | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 107 | 108 | 5 | 211 | 216 | 11 | 680 | 691 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 356 | 365 | |
| – | – | – | 7 | 241 | 248 | 6 | 198 | 204 | 1 | 320 | 321 | |
| – | – | – | 9 | 436 | 445 | 21 | 587 | 608 | 16 | 1,360 | 1,376 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 181 | 187 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | 24 | 24 | 6 | 149 | 155 | – | 25 | 25 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 52 | 53 | |
| – | – | – | 2 | 184 | 186 | 24 | 540 | 564 | 5 | 602 | 607 | |
| – | – | – | 5 | 399 | 404 | 39 | 711 | 750 | 13 | 678 | 691 | |
| – | – | – | – | 54 | 54 | 8 | 301 | 309 | 7 | 454 | 461 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 62 | 62 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 622 | 633 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 25 | 25 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 19 | 302 | 321 | 2 | 254 | 256 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 176 | 181 | – | – | – | |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description,

| 1 SEPTEMBER 1867. STATIONS. | ROYAL ARTILLERY. Horse. Officers. 1. | Horse. Non-Commissioned and Men. 2. | Foot. Officers. 3. | Foot. Non-Commissioned and Men. 4. | Total. 5. | SAPPERS AND : British Officers. 6. | British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. 7. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **PRESIDENCY OF BENGAL—*continued.*** | | | | | | | |
| **Meerut Division:** | | | | | | | |
| Meerut | 12 | 308 | 8 | 321 | 649 | – | – |
| Delhi | – | – | 2 | 64 | 66 | – | – |
| Muttra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Agra | – | – | 5 | 188 | 193 | – | – |
| Futtehgurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Allygurh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Roorkee | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 75 |
| Dehra Doon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Sirhind Division:** | | | | | | | |
| Umballa | – | – | 10 | 281 | 291 | – | – |
| Dugshaie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Simla | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp Dhobee Ghat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subathoo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp, Solon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp, Dugshaie Road | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Camp, Bhanaloghee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Loodiana | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Philour | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Jullundur | – | – | 4 | 144 | 148 | – | – |
| **Lahore Division:** | | | | | | | |
| Meean Meer | 3 | 151 | 7 | 196 | 357 | – | – |
| Fort Lahore | – | – | 2 | 55 | 57 | – | – |
| Mooltan | – | – | 5 | 204 | 209 | – | – |
| Sealkote | 5 | 123 | – | – | 128 | – | – |
| Ferozepore | – | – | 4 | 135 | 139 | – | – |
| Umritzur | – | – | 2 | 66 | 68 | – | – |
| Kangra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dhurmsala | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bukloh | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Peshawur Division:** | | | | | | | |
| Peshawur | 7 | 246 | 7 | 207 | 467 | 1 | 8 |
| Shubkudur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nuchnee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Abozaie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mackeson | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nowshera | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Attock | – | – | 2 | 62 | 64 | – | – |
| Campbellpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sydun Bowlie | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rawul Pindee | 4 | 126 | 2 | 131 | 263 | – | – |
| Murree | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hill Roads | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cherat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Punjab Frontier Force:** | | | | | | | |
| Abbottabad | – | – | 6 | 142 | 148 | – | – |
| Hoti Murdan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kohat | – | – | 4 | 182 | 186 | – | – |
| Bunnoo | – | – | 2 | 104 | 106 | – | – |
| Dera Ismail Khan | – | – | 2 | 104 | 106 | – | – |
| Dera Gazee Khan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rajanpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 44 | 1,342 | 164 | 4,910 | 6,460 | 11 | 83 |

Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st September 1867—*continued*.

| CAVALRY. | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British. | | Native. | | | British. | | | Native. | | | |
| Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Remarks. |
| 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | |
| 423 | 446 | 13 | 328 | 341 | 38 | 692 | 730 | 13 | 606 | 619 | |
| – | – | 1 | 74 | 75 | 9 | 290 | 299 | 8 | 674 | 682 | |
| 432 | 456 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 47 | 47 | 33 | 843 | 876 | 12 | 698 | 710 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 296 | 303 | 1 | 184 | 185 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 503 | 510 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 21 | 419 | 440 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 59 | 60 | |
| 412 | 435 | 10 | 415 | 425 | 28 | 692 | 720 | 11 | 673 | 684 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 34 | 833 | 867 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 154 | 155 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 217 | 226 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 97 | 103 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 185 | 191 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 49 | 50 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 232 | 239 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 127 | 128 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 71 | 74 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | 1 | 52 | 53 | 24 | 683 | 707 | 8 | 575 | 583 | |
| – | – | 9 | 428 | 437 | 26 | 798 | 824 | 18 | 1,274 | 1,292 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 106 | 108 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | 7 | 460 | 467 | 25 | 515 | 540 | 8 | 665 | 673 | |
| 441 | 467 | 9 | 458 | 467 | 26 | 816 | 842 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 30 | 30 | 36 | 685 | 721 | 10 | 704 | 714 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 69 | 70 | 1 | 142 | 143 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 67 | 69 | – | 39 | 39 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 11 | 666 | 677 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 551 | 561 | |
| – | – | 22 | 1,086 | 1,108 | 24 | 522 | 546 | 51 | 3,043 | 3,094 | |
| – | – | – | 50 | 50 | – | – | – | – | 90 | 90 | |
| – | – | – | 47 | 47 | – | – | – | – | 71 | 71 | |
| – | – | – | 50 | 50 | – | – | – | – | 71 | 71 | |
| – | – | – | 26 | 26 | – | – | – | – | 30 | 30 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 24 | 768 | 792 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 15 | 15 | 3 | 108 | 111 | – | 173 | 173 | |
| 337 | 359 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 111 | 115 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | 11 | 441 | 452 | 46 | 1,138 | 1,184 | 17 | 1,143 | 1,160 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 96 | 97 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 13 | 652 | 665 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 36 | 36 | 30 | 797 | 827 | 1 | 232 | 233 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | 14 | 1,408 | 1,422 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | 2 | 364 | 366 | – | – | – | 10 | 712 | 722 | |
| – | – | 7 | 497 | 504 | – | – | – | 18 | 2,124 | 2,142 | |
| – | – | 7 | 497 | 504 | – | – | – | 13 | 1,403 | 1,416 | |
| – | – | 8 | 474 | 482 | 3 | 61 | 64 | 10 | 1,393 | 1,403 | |
| – | – | 7 | 496 | 503 | – | – | – | 12 | 1,408 | 1,420 | |
| – | – | 6 | 494 | 500 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 2,034 | 3,106 | 196 | 10,957 | 11,153 | 982 | 26,767 | 27,749 | 560 | 42,064 | 42,624 | |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description, serving in

| 1 SEPTEMBER 1867. STATIONS. | ROYAL ARTILLERY. | | | | | SAPPERS AND MINERS. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Horse. | | Foot. | | | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Total. | British Officers. | British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS.** | | | | | | | | |
| **Centre Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Fort St. George | – | – | 5 | 69 | 74 | – | – | – |
| Palaveram | – | – | *2 | *183 | *185 | – | – | – |
| Arcot | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| St. Thomas's Mount | – | – | 22 | 440 | 462 | – | – | – |
| Vellore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Northern District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Vizagapatam | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Wattair | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Vizianagrum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Berhampore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sumbulpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuttack | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Samulcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Southern Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Trichinopoly | – | – | 5 | 137 | 142 | – | – | – |
| Palamcottah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Wellington | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 45 |
| Quilon | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Coonoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 43 |
| Trichoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Trevandrum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Mysore Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Bangalore | 17 | 150 | 12 | 175 | 354 | – | 49 | 528 |
| French Rocks | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mysore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hurryhur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mercara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Malabar and Canara:** | | | | | | | | |
| Cannanore | – | – | 6 | 134 | 140 | – | – | – |
| Malliapooram | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Calliout | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mangalore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Wynaad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 94 |
| **Ceded District:** | | | | | | | | |
| Bellary | 6 | 123 | – | – | 129 | 2 | 4 | 115 |
| Kurnool | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Cuddepah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Hyderabad Subsidiary Force:** | | | | | | | | |
| Secunderabad | 6 | 128 | 28 | 356 | 518 | 1 | 5 | 199 |
| **Nagpore Force:** | | | | | | | | |
| Kamptee | 4 | 121 | 21 | 329 | 475 | – | – | – |
| Seetabuldee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Raepore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Hoshungabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Chaudah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Seroncha | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 108 |
| Chinduanah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Pegu Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Rangoon | – | – | 10 | 149 | 159 | – | – | – |
| Thyetmyoo | – | – | 6 | 133 | 139 | – | – | – |
| Tonghoo | – | – | 4 | 78 | 82 | – | – | – |
| Shoaygheen | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Moulmein | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Andaman Islands: | | | | | | | | |
| Port Blair | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | 121 |
| **Straits Settlements:** | | | | | | | | |
| Penang | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Malacca | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Singapore | – | – | 5 | 82 | 87 | – | – | – |
| Labuan | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| **Bengal Presidency Division:** | | | | | | | | |
| Dorundah | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 33 | 522 | 126 | 2,265 | 2,946 | 5 | 58 | 1,253 |

the Presidencies of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*, on the 1st September 1867—*continued*.

| CAVALRY. | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British. | | | Native. | | | British. | | | Native. | | | |
| Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | |
| 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 638 | 674 | 24 | 2,147 | 2,171 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | *Veterans. |
| – | – | – | 9 | 376 | 385 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 175 | 176 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 555 | 563 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | †65 | †65 | – | – | – | †Veterans. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 720 | 726 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 725 | 733 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 722 | 730 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 345 | 347 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 439 | 444 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 709 | 716 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 89 | 91 | 16 | 1,416 | 1,432 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 639 | 647 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 528 | 5 35 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 179 | 180 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 73 | 73 | |
| 31 | 518 | 549 | – | – | – | 38 | 925 | 963 | 16 | 1,434 | 1,450 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 630 | 637 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 86 | 87 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 704 | 712 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 719 | 727 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 32 | 497 | 529 | 17 | 1,415 | 1,432 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 89 | 92 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 82 | 84 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 794 | 803 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 7 | 375 | 382 | 39 | 755 | 794 | 16 | 1,393 | 1,409 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 706 | 714 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 711 | 719 | |
| 34 | 445 | 479 | 9 | 397 | 406 | 82 | 1,595 | 1,677 | 25 | 2,148 | 2,173 | |
| – | – | – | 7 | 364 | 371 | 34 | 745 | 779 | 13 | 1,423 | 1,436 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 54 | 55 | 8 | 341 | 349 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 712 | 719 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 712 | 721 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 159 | 160 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 157 | 158 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 50 | 52 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 42 | 646 | 688 | 8 | 695 | 703 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 30 | 456 | 486 | 10 | 717 | 727 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 355 | 365 | 8 | 578 | 586 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 126 | 127 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 610 | 617 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 110 | 113 | 1 | 85 | 86 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 530 | 536 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 178 | 180 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 544 | 550 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 165 | 168 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 717 | 725 | |
| 65 | 963 | 1,028 | 32 | 1,512 | 1,544 | 356 | 7,151 | 7,507 | 323 | 28,461 | 28,784 | |

ABSTRACT STATEMENTS of the Forces, European and Native, of every Description, ser

| 1 SEPTEMBER 1867. STATIONS. | ROYAL ARTILLERY. | | | | | SAPPERS AND MI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Horse. | | Foot. | | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Total. | British Officers. | British Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. |
| **PRESIDENCY OF BOMBAY:** | | | | | | | |
| Presidency District: | | | | | | | |
| Bombay | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Tanna | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Poona Division: | | | | | | | |
| Poona | – | – | – | 18 | 18 | – | 14 |
| Kirkee | 19 | 267 | 16 | 250 | 552 | – | – |
| Ahmednuggur | 7 | 134 | – | – | 141 | – | – |
| Asseerghur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sholapore | – | – | 5 | 141 | 146 | – | – |
| Sattara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Malligaum | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dhoolia | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Seroor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Patrol Duty in Kandeish | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mhow Division: | | | | | | | |
| Mhow | 4 | 131 | 35 | 71 | 241 | – | – |
| Nusseerabad | – | – | 6 | 136 | 142 | – | – |
| Neemuch | – | – | 5 | 136 | 141 | – | – |
| Indore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Ajmere | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mehidpore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Augur | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Northern Division: | | | | | | | |
| Ahmedabad | – | – | 15 | 289 | 304 | – | – |
| Deesa | – | – | 3 | 127 | 130 | – | – |
| Baroda | – | – | – | 10 | 10 | – | – |
| Mount Aboo | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Rajcote | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Bhooj | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Surat | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dwarka | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Sadra | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On Field Service in Katywar Districts | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Scinde Division: | | | | | | | |
| Kurrachee | – | – | 26 | 136 | 162 | – | – |
| Hydrabad | – | – | 6 | 152 | 158 | – | – |
| Jacobabad | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Patrolling on Scinde Frontier | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Belgaum District: | | | | | | | |
| Belgaum | – | – | 9 | 200 | 209 | – | – |
| Kulladghee | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Dharwar | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Kolapore | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Aden Force: | | | | | | | |
| Aden | – | – | 7 | 133 | 140 | – | – |
| Perim | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| TOTAL | 30 | 532 | 133 | 1,799 | 2,494 | – | 14 |

the Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st September 1867—*continued.*

| CAVALRY. | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British. | | | Native. | | | British. | | | Native. | | | |
| Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | |
| 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 28 | 465 | 493 | 17 | 1,425 | 1,442 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 341 | 343 | |
| – | 29 | 29 | 9 | 499 | 508 | 116 | 2,316 | 2,432 | 24 | 2,125 | 2,149 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 32 | 405 | 437 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | 705 | 715 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 145 | 151 | 2 | 178 | 180 | |
| – | – | – | – | 85 | 85 | – | – | – | 8 | 708 | 716 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 219 | 224 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 449 | 457 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 534 | 540 | |
| – | – | – | 8 | 278 | 286 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 150 | 151 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 29 | 456 | 485 | – | – | – | 33 | 737 | 770 | 15 | 1,205 | 1,220 | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 151 | 152 | 38 | 635 | 673 | 10 | 709 | 719 | |
| – | – | – | 9 | 344 | 353 | 5 | 156 | 161 | 6 | 710 | 716 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 78 | 80 | 1 | 205 | 206 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 59 | 60 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 6 | 344 | 350 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 355 | 357 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 18 | 1,357 | 1,375 | |
| – | – | – | 8 | 395 | 403 | 38 | 804 | 842 | 8 | 711 | 719 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 688 | 696 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 44 | 45 | – | – | – | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 70 | 71 | – | – | – | 11 | 691 | 702 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 707 | 714 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 700 | 708 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 505 | 513 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 54 | 54 | |
| – | – | – | – | 30 | 30 | – | – | – | 4 | 312 | 316 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 36 | 859 | 895 | 9 | 704 | 713 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 233 | 245 | 8 | 711 | 719 | |
| – | – | – | 19 | 1,284 | 1,303 | – | – | – | 6 | 594 | 600 | |
| – | – | – | – | 223 | 223 | – | – | – | – | 100 | 100 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 37 | 840 | 877 | 18 | 1,398 | 1,416 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 75 | 76 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 626 | 634 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 705 | 714 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 26 | 536 | 562 | 8 | 689 | 697 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 84 | 86 | |
| 61 | 890 | 951 | 56 | 3,509 | 3,565 | 384 | 8,126 | 8,510 | 258 | 21,404 | 21,662 | |

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades, se
in those Territories which, on the 1st day o

| STATIONS. | ROYAL TROOPS. | | | | | COMPANY'S TROOPS. | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CAVALRY. | | INFANTRY. | | | ENGINEERS and SAPPERS. | | | | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Horse. | | | European Foot. | | N | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | European Officers. | |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | |
| 1857: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kurnool | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| Sinde | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | |
| Jullundur | – | – | 3 | 937 | 940 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 108 | 29 | 3 | 8 | – | |
| Sattara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | |
| Punjaub | – | – | 174 | 5,593 | 5,767 | 5 | 10 | 423 | 438 | 29 | 536 | 518 | 20 | 1,061 | 10 | |
| Pegu | – | – | 43 | 1,153 | 1,196 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 167 | – | |
| Nagpoor | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 101 | – | 4 | 98 | – | |
| Oude | – | – | 27 | 790 | 817 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 79 | 5 | |
| TOTAL | – | – | 247 | 8,473 | 8,720 | 5 | 10 | 423 | 438 | 35 | 745 | 547 | 35 | 1,413 | 20 | |

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

RETURN of the Strength of FORCES, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, showing the Arms and Grades, ser
the 1st day of May 1837, were n

| STATIONS. | ROYAL ARTILLERY. | | | | | SAPPERS AN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Horse. | | Foot. | | | | |
| | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Men. | Total. | British Officers. | British Non-Commissioned and Rank and Fi |
| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. |
| 1837: | | | | | | | |
| Kurnool | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Scinde | – | – | 32 | 288 | 320 | – | – |
| Jullundur | – | – | 4 | 144 | 148 | – | – |
| Sattara | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Punjaub | 19 | 646 | 45 | 1,588 | 2,298 | – | – |
| Pegu | – | – | 20 | 360 | 380 | *See* last Co | |
| Nagpoor | 4 | 121 | 21 | 329 | 475 | *See* last Col | |
| Oude | 4 | 139 | 16 | 503 | 662 | – | – |
| TOTAL | 27 | 906 | 138 | 3,212 | 4,283 | *See* last C | |

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

Presidency of *Bengal* on the 1st day of January, and of *Madras* and *Bombay* on the 1st of April 1857, were not under the direct authority of the Government of India.

COMPANY'S TROOPS.

| Native Cavalry. | | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | European. | | | Native. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | Regular. | | | | Irregular. | | | |
| European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. | European Officers. | European Non-Commissioned. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. | Total. |
| 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. | 36. |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 2 | 484 | 494 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 9 | 1,186 | 1,195 | 21 | 1,004 | 1,025 | 39 | 1 | 3,326 | 3,366 | 6 | – | 909 | 915 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 35 | 6 | 3,471 | 3,512 | – | – | – | – |
| – | – | – | – | 2 | 433 | 435 | – | – | – | 6 | – | 940 | 946 | – | – | – | – |
| 36 | 10 | 1,767 | 1,813 | 43 | 6,040 | 6,083 | – | – | – | 203 | 31 | 18,018 | 18,252 | 21 | 1 | 5,042 | 5,064 |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 18 | 2 | 955 | 975 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 372 | 386 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 44 | 8 | 2,447 | 2,499 | – | – | – | – |
| 11 | 3 | 491 | 505 | 3 | 212 | 215 | – | – | – | 66 | 9 | 5,558 | 5,633 | – | – | – | – |
| 58 | 16 | 2,630 | 2,704 | 57 | 7,871 | 7,928 | 21 | 1,004 | 1,025 | 419 | 59 | 35,199 | 35,677 | 27 | 1 | 5,951 | 5,979 |

## BENGAL, MADRAS, AND BOMBAY.

Presidencies of *Bengal, Madras,* and *Bombay,* on the 1st day of September 1867 in those Territories, which, on direct authority of the Government of India.

| Cavalry. | | | | | | Infantry. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British. | | | Native. | | | British. | | | Native. | | | |
| Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | Officers. | Non-Commissioned and Rank and File. | Total. | British Officers. | Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File. | Total. | |
| 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 706 | 714 | |
| – | – | – | 19 | 1,507 | 1,526 | 48 | 1,092 | 1,140 | 23 | 2,109 | 2,132 | |
| – | – | – | 1 | 52 | 53 | 24 | 683 | 707 | 8 | 575 | 583 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 219 | 224 | – | – | – | |
| 52 | 889 | 941 | 95 | 6,049 | 6,144 | 262 | 7,111 | 7,373 | 205 | 17,497 | 17,702 | |
| – | – | – | – | – | – | 85 | 1,570 | 1,655 | *36 | *2,929 | *2,965 | * Includes 1 officer, 121 men, Sappers and Miners. |
| – | – | – | 7 | 364 | 371 | 37 | 856 | 893 | †40 | †3,665 | †3,705 | † Includes 1 officer, 108 men, Sappers and Miners. |
| 24 | 458 | 482 | 17 | 902 | 919 | 128 | 3,436 | 3,564 | 35 | 2,753 | 2,788 | |
| 76 | 1,347 | 1,423 | 139 | 8,87[illegible] | 9,013 | 589 | 14,967 | 15,556 | ‡355 | ‡30,234 | ‡30,589 | ‡ Includes 2 officers, 229 men, Sappers and Miners. |

STATEMENT of the AREA and POPULATION of the several TERRITORIES acquired by the BRITISH GOVERNMENT between the 1st day of May 1[illegible] and the 1st day of May 1857, and since that Date.

| | Date when acquired. | Area: Square Miles. | Population. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jaloun | 1840 | 1,873 | 240,207 |
| Kurnool | 1841 | 3,278 | 278,190 |
| Khythul | 1841 | 516 | Not known. |
| Kolaba | 1843 | 318 | 58,721 |
| Sind | 1843 | 63,500 | 1,708,787 |
| Serampore and Tranquebar | 1845 | Not known. | 18,000 |
| | | 15 | 23,426 |
| Sattara | 1848 | 10,222 | 1,005,777 |
| Punjab | 1849 | 81,625 | 13,717,821 |
| Jeitpore | 1849 | 165 | 16,000 |
| Sumbulpore | 1849 | 4,693 | 274,000 |
| Sikhim (part of) | 1850 | 1,670 | 61,766 |
| Pegu | 1852 | 32,250 | 570,180 |
| Khyrpoor (part of) | 1852 | 5,412 | Not known. |
| Oderpore, S. W. I. | 1852 | 2,305 | 133,749 |
| Territory of Tularam Senaputtee (North Cachar). | 1853 | 2,160 | 5,014 |
| Nagpore (Berar) | 1853 | 76,432 | 4,559,000 |
| Boodawul (Candeish) | 1855 | 50 | 914 |
| Oudh | 1856 | 25,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Punj Mehals | 1860 | Not known. | |
| Bhootan (Dooars) | 1865 | 19,000 | Not known. |

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